| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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The macro btrfs_std_error got renamed to btrfs_handle_fs_error in an
independent branch for the same merge target (4.7). To make the code
compilable for bisectability reasons, add a temporary stub.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Current btrfs qgroup design implies a requirement that after calling
btrfs_qgroup_account_extents() there must be a commit root switch.
Normally this is OK, as btrfs_qgroup_accounting_extents() is only called
inside btrfs_commit_transaction() just be commit_cowonly_roots().
However there is a exception at create_pending_snapshot(), which will
call btrfs_qgroup_account_extents() but no any commit root switch.
In case of creating a snapshot whose parent root is itself (create a
snapshot of fs tree), it will corrupt qgroup by the following trace:
(skipped unrelated data)
======
btrfs_qgroup_account_extent: bytenr = 29786112, num_bytes = 16384, nr_old_roots = 0, nr_new_roots = 1
qgroup_update_counters: qgid = 5, cur_old_count = 0, cur_new_count = 1, rfer = 0, excl = 0
qgroup_update_counters: qgid = 5, cur_old_count = 0, cur_new_count = 1, rfer = 16384, excl = 16384
btrfs_qgroup_account_extent: bytenr = 29786112, num_bytes = 16384, nr_old_roots = 0, nr_new_roots = 0
======
The problem here is in first qgroup_account_extent(), the
nr_new_roots of the extent is 1, which means its reference got
increased, and qgroup increased its rfer and excl.
But at second qgroup_account_extent(), its reference got decreased, but
between these two qgroup_account_extent(), there is no switch roots.
This leads to the same nr_old_roots, and this extent just got ignored by
qgroup, which means this extent is wrongly accounted.
Fix it by call commit_cowonly_roots() after qgroup_account_extent() in
create_pending_snapshot(), with needed preparation.
Mark: I added a check at the top of qgroup_account_snapshot() to skip this
code if qgroups are turned off. xfstest btrfs/122 exposes this problem.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Make sure to deallocate fspath with vfree() in case of error in
init_ipath().
fspath is allocated with vmalloc() in init_data_container() since
commit 425d17a290c0 ("Btrfs: use larger limit for translation of logical to
inode").
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Be verbose if there are no workspaces at all, ie. the module init time
preallocation failed.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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With just one preallocated workspace we can guarantee forward progress
even if there's no memory available for new workspaces. The cost is more
waiting but we also get rid of several error paths.
On average, there will be several idle workspaces, so the waiting
penalty won't be so bad.
In the worst case, all cpus will compete for one workspace until there's
some memory. Attempts to allocate a new one are done each time the
waiters are woken up.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Preallocate one workspace for each compression type so we can guarantee
forward progress in the worst case. A failure cannot be a hard error as
we might not use compression at all on the filesystem. If we can't
allocate the workspaces later when need them, it might actually
deadlock, but in such situation the system has effectively not enough
memory to operate properly.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The names are confusing, pick more fitting names and add comments.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4623:21
signed integer overflow:
10808 * 262144 cannot be represented in type 'int [8]'
If 8192<=items<16384, we request a writeback of an insane number of pages
which is benign (everything will be written). But if items>=16384, the
space reservation won't be enough.
Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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During a mount, we start the cleaner kthread first because the transaction
kthread wants to wake up the cleaner kthread. We start the transaction
kthread next because everything in btrfs wants transactions. We do reloc
recovery in the thread that was doing the original mount call once the
transaction kthread is running. This means that the cleaner kthread
could already be running when reloc recovery happens (e.g. if a snapshot
delete was started before a crash).
Relocation does not play well with the cleaner kthread, so a mutex was
added in commit 5f3164813b90f7dbcb5c3ab9006906222ce471b7 "Btrfs: fix
race between balance recovery and root deletion" to prevent both from
being active at the same time.
If the cleaner kthread is already holding the mutex by the time we get
to btrfs_recover_relocation, the mount will be blocked until at least
one deleted subvolume is cleaned (possibly more if the mount process
doesn't get the lock right away). During this time (which could be an
arbitrarily long time on a large/slow filesystem), the mount process is
stuck and the filesystem is unnecessarily inaccessible.
Fix this by locking cleaner_mutex before we start cleaner_kthread, and
unlocking the mutex after mount no longer requires it. This ensures
that the mounting process will not be blocked by the cleaner kthread.
The cleaner kthread is already prepared for mutex contention and will
just go to sleep until the mutex is available.
Signed-off-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Move the op exclusivity check before the other code (same as in
ADD_DEV).
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Perform the want_write check if we get far enough to do any writes.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Move scratch super outside of the chunk lock to avoid below
lockdep warning. The better place to scratch super is in
the function btrfs_rm_dev_replace_free_srcdev() just before
free_device, which is outside of the chunk lock as well.
To reproduce:
(fresh boot)
mkfs.btrfs -f -draid5 -mraid5 /dev/sdc /dev/sdd /dev/sde
mount /dev/sdc /btrfs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/btrfs/tf1 bs=4096 count=100
(get devmgt from https://github.com/asj/devmgt.git)
devmgt detach /dev/sde
dd if=/dev/zero of=/btrfs/tf1 bs=4096 count=100
sync
btrfs replace start -Brf 3 /dev/sdf /btrfs <--
devmgt attach host7
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
4.6.0-rc2asj+ #1 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------------
btrfs/2174 is trying to acquire lock:
(sb_writers){.+.+.+}, at:
[<ffffffff812449b4>] __sb_start_write+0xb4/0xf0
but task is already holding lock:
(&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.+.}, at:
[<ffffffffa05c5f55>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x145/0x980 [btrfs]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Chain exists of:
sb_writers --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex --> &fs_info->chunk_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
lock(sb_writers);
*** DEADLOCK ***
-> #0 (sb_writers){.+.+.+}:
[<ffffffff810e6415>] __lock_acquire+0x1bc5/0x1ee0
[<ffffffff810e707e>] lock_acquire+0xbe/0x210
[<ffffffff810df49a>] percpu_down_read+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff812449b4>] __sb_start_write+0xb4/0xf0
[<ffffffff81265534>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x50
[<ffffffff812508a2>] path_openat+0x952/0x1190
[<ffffffff81252451>] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100
[<ffffffff8123f5cc>] file_open_name+0xfc/0x140
[<ffffffff8123f643>] filp_open+0x33/0x60
[<ffffffffa0572bb6>] update_dev_time+0x16/0x40 [btrfs]
[<ffffffffa057f60d>] btrfs_scratch_superblocks+0x5d/0xb0 [btrfs]
[<ffffffffa057f70e>] btrfs_rm_dev_replace_remove_srcdev+0xae/0xd0 [btrfs]
[<ffffffffa05c62c5>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x4b5/0x980 [btrfs]
[<ffffffffa05c6ae8>] btrfs_dev_replace_start+0x358/0x530 [btrfs]
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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pagev array in scrub_block{} is of size SCRUB_MAX_PAGES_PER_BLOCK.
page_index should be checked with the same to trigger BUG_ON().
Signed-off-by: Ashish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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btrfs_map_block can go horribly wrong in the face of fs corruption, lets agree
to not be assholes and panic at any possible chance things are all fucked up.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
[ removed type casts ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The struct 'map_lookup' uses type int for @stripe_len, while
btrfs_chunk_stripe_len() can return a u64 value, and it may end up with
@stripe_len being undefined value and it can lead to 'divide error' in
__btrfs_map_block().
This changes 'map_lookup' to use type u64 for stripe_len, also right now
we only use BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN for stripe_len, so this adds a valid checker for
BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ folded division fix to scrub_raid56_parity ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If the label setting ioctl races with sysfs label handler, we could get
mixed result in the output, part old part new. We should either get the
old or new label. The chances to hit this race are low.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Add a sanity check for the fs_info as we will dereference it, similar to
what the 'store features' handler does.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We don't want to trigger the change on a read-only filesystem, similar
to what the label handler does.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
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The key variable occupies 17 bytes, the key_start is used once, we can
simply reuse existing 'key' for that purpose. As the key is not a simple
type, compiler doest not do it on itself.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The size of root item is more than 400 bytes, which is quite a lot of
stack space. As we do IO from inside the subvolume ioctls, we should
keep the stack usage low in case the filesystem is on top of other
layers (NFS, device mapper, iscsi, etc).
Reviewed-by: Tsutomu Itoh <t-itoh@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We're going to use the argument multiple times later.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When the replace target fails, the target device will be taken
out of fs device list, scratch + update_dev_time and freed. However
we could do the scratch + update_dev_time and free part after the
device has been taken out of device list, so that we don't have to
hold the device_list_mutex and uuid_mutex locks.
Reported issue:
[ 5375.718845] ======================================================
[ 5375.718846] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[ 5375.718849] 4.4.5-scst31x-debug-11+ #40 Not tainted
[ 5375.718849] -------------------------------------------------------
[ 5375.718851] btrfs-health/4662 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 5375.718861] (sb_writers){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0
[ 5375.718862]
[ 5375.718862] but task is already holding lock:
[ 5375.718907] (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa028263c>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x3c/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 5375.718907]
[ 5375.718907] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 5375.718907]
[ 5375.718908]
[ 5375.718908] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 5375.718911]
[ 5375.718911] -> #3 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[ 5375.718917] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0
[ 5375.718921] [<ffffffff81633949>] mutex_lock_nested+0x69/0x3c0
[ 5375.718940] [<ffffffffa0219bf6>] btrfs_show_devname+0x36/0x210 [btrfs]
[ 5375.718945] [<ffffffff81267079>] show_vfsmnt+0x49/0x150
[ 5375.718948] [<ffffffff81240b07>] m_show+0x17/0x20
[ 5375.718951] [<ffffffff81246868>] seq_read+0x2d8/0x3b0
[ 5375.718955] [<ffffffff8121df28>] __vfs_read+0x28/0xd0
[ 5375.718959] [<ffffffff8121e806>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
[ 5375.718962] [<ffffffff8121f4c9>] SyS_read+0x49/0xa0
[ 5375.718966] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[ 5375.718968]
[ 5375.718968] -> #2 (namespace_sem){+++++.}:
[ 5375.718971] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0
[ 5375.718974] [<ffffffff81635199>] down_write+0x49/0x80
[ 5375.718977] [<ffffffff81243593>] lock_mount+0x43/0x1c0
[ 5375.718979] [<ffffffff81243c13>] do_add_mount+0x23/0xd0
[ 5375.718982] [<ffffffff81244afb>] do_mount+0x27b/0xe30
[ 5375.718985] [<ffffffff812459dc>] SyS_mount+0x8c/0xd0
[ 5375.718988] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[ 5375.718991]
[ 5375.718991] -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#5){+.+.+.}:
[ 5375.718994] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0
[ 5375.718996] [<ffffffff81633949>] mutex_lock_nested+0x69/0x3c0
[ 5375.719001] [<ffffffff8122d608>] path_openat+0x468/0x1360
[ 5375.719004] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[ 5375.719007] [<ffffffff8121da7b>] do_sys_open+0x12b/0x210
[ 5375.719010] [<ffffffff8121db7e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[ 5375.719013] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
[ 5375.719015]
[ 5375.719015] -> #0 (sb_writers){.+.+.+}:
[ 5375.719018] [<ffffffff810d97ca>] __lock_acquire+0x17ba/0x1ae0
[ 5375.719021] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0
[ 5375.719026] [<ffffffff810d3bef>] percpu_down_read+0x4f/0xa0
[ 5375.719028] [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0
[ 5375.719031] [<ffffffff81242eb4>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x50
[ 5375.719035] [<ffffffff8122ded2>] path_openat+0xd32/0x1360
[ 5375.719037] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[ 5375.719040] [<ffffffff8121d8a4>] file_open_name+0xe4/0x130
[ 5375.719043] [<ffffffff8121d923>] filp_open+0x33/0x60
[ 5375.719073] [<ffffffffa02776a6>] update_dev_time+0x16/0x40 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719099] [<ffffffffa02825be>] btrfs_scratch_superblocks+0x4e/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719123] [<ffffffffa0282665>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x65/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719150] [<ffffffffa02c6c80>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6b0/0x990 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719175] [<ffffffffa02c729e>] btrfs_dev_replace_start+0x33e/0x540 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719199] [<ffffffffa02c7f58>] btrfs_auto_replace_start+0xf8/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719222] [<ffffffffa02464e6>] health_kthread+0x246/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719225] [<ffffffff810a70df>] kthread+0xef/0x110
[ 5375.719229] [<ffffffff81637d2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5375.719230]
[ 5375.719230] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 5375.719230]
[ 5375.719233] Chain exists of:
[ 5375.719233] sb_writers --> namespace_sem --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex
[ 5375.719233]
[ 5375.719234] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 5375.719234]
[ 5375.719234] CPU0 CPU1
[ 5375.719235] ---- ----
[ 5375.719236] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
[ 5375.719238] lock(namespace_sem);
[ 5375.719239] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
[ 5375.719241] lock(sb_writers);
[ 5375.719241]
[ 5375.719241] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 5375.719241]
[ 5375.719243] 4 locks held by btrfs-health/4662:
[ 5375.719266] #0: (&fs_info->health_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0246303>] health_kthread+0x63/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719293] #1: (&fs_info->dev_replace.lock_finishing_cancel_unmount){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02c6611>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x41/0x990 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719319] #2: (uuid_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0282620>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x20/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719343] #3: (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa028263c>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x3c/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719343]
[ 5375.719343] stack backtrace:
[ 5375.719347] CPU: 2 PID: 4662 Comm: btrfs-health Not tainted 4.4.5-scst31x-debug-11+ #40
[ 5375.719348] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6018R-WTRT/X10DRW-iT, BIOS 1.0c 01/07/2015
[ 5375.719352] 0000000000000000 ffff880856f73880 ffffffff813529e3 ffffffff826182a0
[ 5375.719354] ffffffff8260c090 ffff880856f738c0 ffffffff810d667c ffff880856f73930
[ 5375.719357] ffff880861f32b40 ffff880861f32b68 0000000000000003 0000000000000004
[ 5375.719357] Call Trace:
[ 5375.719363] [<ffffffff813529e3>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc2
[ 5375.719366] [<ffffffff810d667c>] print_circular_bug+0x1ec/0x260
[ 5375.719369] [<ffffffff810d97ca>] __lock_acquire+0x17ba/0x1ae0
[ 5375.719373] [<ffffffff810f606d>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20
[ 5375.719376] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0
[ 5375.719378] [<ffffffff812214f7>] ? __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0
[ 5375.719383] [<ffffffff810d3bef>] percpu_down_read+0x4f/0xa0
[ 5375.719385] [<ffffffff812214f7>] ? __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0
[ 5375.719387] [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0
[ 5375.719389] [<ffffffff81242eb4>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x50
[ 5375.719393] [<ffffffff8122ded2>] path_openat+0xd32/0x1360
[ 5375.719415] [<ffffffffa02462a0>] ? btrfs_congested_fn+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719418] [<ffffffff810f606d>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20
[ 5375.719420] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0
[ 5375.719423] [<ffffffff810f615d>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6d/0x80
[ 5375.719426] [<ffffffff81201a9b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x26b/0x5d0
[ 5375.719430] [<ffffffff8122e7d4>] ? getname_kernel+0x34/0x120
[ 5375.719433] [<ffffffff8121d8a4>] file_open_name+0xe4/0x130
[ 5375.719436] [<ffffffff8121d923>] filp_open+0x33/0x60
[ 5375.719462] [<ffffffffa02776a6>] update_dev_time+0x16/0x40 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719485] [<ffffffffa02825be>] btrfs_scratch_superblocks+0x4e/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719506] [<ffffffffa0282665>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x65/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719530] [<ffffffffa02c6c80>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6b0/0x990 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719554] [<ffffffffa02c6b23>] ? btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x553/0x990 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719576] [<ffffffffa02c729e>] btrfs_dev_replace_start+0x33e/0x540 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719598] [<ffffffffa02c7f58>] btrfs_auto_replace_start+0xf8/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719621] [<ffffffffa02464e6>] health_kthread+0x246/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719641] [<ffffffffa02463d8>] ? health_kthread+0x138/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719661] [<ffffffffa02462a0>] ? btrfs_congested_fn+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 5375.719663] [<ffffffff810a70df>] kthread+0xef/0x110
[ 5375.719666] [<ffffffff810a6ff0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200
[ 5375.719669] [<ffffffff81637d2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5375.719672] [<ffffffff810a6ff0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200
[ 5375.719697] ------------[ cut here ]------------
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Yauhen Kharuzhy <yauhen.kharuzhy@zavadatar.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The "sizeof(*arg->clone_sources) * arg->clone_sources_count" expression
can overflow. It causes several static checker warnings. It's all
under CAP_SYS_ADMIN so it's not that serious but lets silence the
warnings.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Since mixed block groups accounting isn't byte-accurate and f_bree is an
unsigned integer, it could overflow. Avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Suggested-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Metadata for mixed block is already accounted in total data and should not
be counted as part of the free metadata space.
Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114281
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Currently, we don't allow the user to try and rebalance to a dup profile
on a multi-device filesystem. In most cases, this is a perfectly sensible
restriction as raid1 uses the same amount of space and provides better
protection.
However, when reshaping a multi-device filesystem down to a single device
filesystem, this requires the user to convert metadata and system chunks
to single profile before deleting devices, and then convert again to dup,
which leaves a period of time where metadata integrity is reduced.
This patch removes the single-device-only restriction from converting to
dup profile to remove this potential data integrity reduction.
Signed-off-by: Austin S. Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Now we force to create empty block group to keep data profile alive,
however, in the below example, we eventually get an empty block group
while we're trying to get more space for other types (metadata/system),
- Before,
block group "A": size=2G, used=1.2G
block group "B": size=2G, used=512M
- After "btrfs balance start -dusage=50 mount_point",
block group "A": size=2G, used=(1.2+0.5)G
block group "C": size=2G, used=0
Since there is no data in block group C, it won't be deleted
automatically and we have to get the unused 2G until the next mount.
Balance itself just moves data and doesn't remove data, so it's safe
to not create such a empty block group if we already have data
allocated in other block groups.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The delalloc reserved space is calculated in terms of number of bytes
used by an integral number of blocks. This is done by rounding down the
value of 'pos' to the nearest multiple of sectorsize.
The file offset value held by 'pos' variable may not be aligned to
sectorsize and hence when passing it as an argument to
btrfs_delalloc_release_space(), we may end up releasing larger delalloc
space than we originally had reserved.
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Now that we bail out immediately if ->writepage() returns an error,
we don't need an extra error to retain the error code.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If sequential writer is writing in the middle of the page and it just redirties
the last written page by continuing from it.
In the above case this can end up with seeking back to that firstly redirtied
page after writing all the pages at the end of file because btrfs updates
mapping->writeback_index to 1 past the current one.
For non-cow filesystems, the cost is only about extra seek, while for cow
filesystems such as btrfs, it means unnecessary fragments.
To avoid it, we just need to continue writeback from the last written page.
This also updates btrfs to behave like what write_cache_pages() does, ie, bail
out immediately if there is an error in writepage().
<Ref: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg52628.html>
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger.hoffstaette@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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32-bit ioctl uses these rather than the regular FS_IOC_* versions. They can
be handled in btrfs using the same code. Without this, 32-bit {ch,ls}attr
fail.
Signed-off-by: Luke Dashjr <luke-jr+git@utopios.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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These new syscalls are implemented as generic code, so enable them for
architectures like arm64 which use the generic syscall table.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Haswell and Broadwell can be configured to hash the channel
interleave function using bits [27:12] of the physical address.
On those processor models we must check to see if hashing is
enabled (bit21 of the HASWELL_HASYSDEFEATURE2 register) and
act accordingly.
Based on a patch by patrickg <patrickg@supermicro.com>
Tested-by: Patrick Geary <patrickg@supermicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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In commit:
eb1af3b71f9d ("Fix computation of channel address")
I switched the "sck_way" variable from holding the log2 value read
from the h/w to instead be the actual number. Unfortunately it
is needed in log2 form when used to shift the address.
Tested-by: Patrick Geary <patrickg@supermicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eb1af3b71f9d ("Fix computation of channel address")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Huge pages are not normally available to PV guests. Not suppressing
hugetlbfs use results in an endless loop of page faults when user mode
code tries to access a hugetlbfs mapped area (since the hypervisor
denies such PTEs to be created, but error indications can't be
propagated out of xen_set_pte_at(), just like for various of its
siblings), and - once killed in an oops like this:
kernel BUG at .../fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:428!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
RIP: e030:[<ffffffff811c333b>] [<ffffffff811c333b>] remove_inode_hugepages+0x25b/0x320
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811c3415>] hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x15/0x40
[<ffffffff81167b3d>] evict+0xbd/0x1b0
[<ffffffff8116514a>] __dentry_kill+0x19a/0x1f0
[<ffffffff81165b0e>] dput+0x1fe/0x220
[<ffffffff81150535>] __fput+0x155/0x200
[<ffffffff81079fc0>] task_work_run+0x60/0xa0
[<ffffffff81063510>] do_exit+0x160/0x400
[<ffffffff810637eb>] do_group_exit+0x3b/0xa0
[<ffffffff8106e8bd>] get_signal+0x1ed/0x470
[<ffffffff8100f854>] do_signal+0x14/0x110
[<ffffffff810030e9>] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xe9/0xf0
[<ffffffff814178a5>] retint_user+0x8/0x13
This is CVE-2016-3961 / XSA-174.
Reported-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <JGross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/57188ED802000078000E431C@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Correct the size of the module mapping space and the maximum available
physical memory size of current processors.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461310504-15977-1-git-send-email-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The recent introduction of the hotplug thread which invokes the callbacks on
the plugged cpu, cased the following regression:
If takedown_cpu() fails, then we run into several issues:
1) The rollback of the target cpu states is not invoked. That leaves the smp
threads and the hotplug thread in disabled state.
2) notify_online() is executed due to a missing skip_onerr flag. That causes
that both CPU_DOWN_FAILED and CPU_ONLINE notifications are invoked which
confuses quite some notifiers.
3) The CPU_DOWN_FAILED notification is not invoked on the target CPU. That's
not an issue per se, but it is inconsistent and in consequence blocks the
patches which rely on these states being invoked on the target CPU and not
on the controlling cpu. It also does not preserve the strict call order on
rollback which is problematic for the ongoing state machine conversion as
well.
To fix this we add a rollback flag to the remote callback machinery and invoke
the rollback including the CPU_DOWN_FAILED notification on the remote
cpu. Further mark the notify online state with 'skip_onerr' so we don't get a
double invokation.
This workaround will go away once we moved the unplug invocation to the target
cpu itself.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog and moved the CPU_DOWN_FAILED notifiaction to the
target cpu ]
Fixes: 4cb28ced23c4 ("cpu/hotplug: Create hotplug threads")
Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rt@linutronix.de
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160408124015.GA21960@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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|
Commit 0881841f7e78 introduced a regression by inverting a test check
after calling clocksource_mmio_init(). That results on the system to
hang at boot time.
Fix it by inverting the test again.
Fixes: 0881841f7e78 ("Replace code by clocksource_mmio_init")
Reported-by: Marc Gonzalez <marc_gonzalez@sigmadesigns.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
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When doing a make allmodconfig, I hit the following compile error:
In file included from builtin-check.c:32:0:
elf.h:22:18: fatal error: gelf.h: No such file or directory
compilation terminated.
...
Digging into it, it appears that the $(shell ..) command in the Makefile does
not give the proper result when it fails to find -lelf, and continues to
compile objtool.
Instead, use the "try-run" makefile macro to perform the test. This gives a
proper result for both cases.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 442f04c34a1a4 ("objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160420153234.GA24032@home.goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
|
Was previously always hardcoded to 0.
Signed-off-by: Sonny Jiang <sonny.jiang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
|
Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma
(so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious
corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite
the page->mapping field when mapping buffer).
This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does
try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the
ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm
vm fault handler.
So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma
(so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious
corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite
the page->mapping field when mapping buffer).
This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does
try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the
ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm
vm fault handler.
So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
David Sterba
Qu Wenruo
Vincent Stehlé
Adam Borowski
Zygo Blaxell
David Sterba
Anand Jain
Ashish Samant
Josef Bacik
Liu Bo
Dan Carpenter
Luis de Bethencourt
Austin S. Hemmelgarn
Chandan Rajendra
Luke Dashjr
Linus Torvalds
Andre Przywara
Tony Luck
Jan Beulich
Juergen Gross
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Daniel Lezcano
Steven Rostedt
Huacai Chen
Ben Skeggs
Sonny Jiang
Jérôme Glisse