aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/tools/perf/scripts/python/export-to-postgresql.py (unfollow)
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2016-09-16x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack when dumping itAndy Lutomirski3-0/+15
Specifically, pin the stack in save_stack_trace_tsk() and show_trace_log_lvl(). This will prevent a crash if the target task dies before or while dumping its stack once we start freeing task stacks early. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf0082cde65d1941a996d026f2b2cdbfaca17bfa.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-16kthread: Pin the stack via try_get_task_stack()/put_task_stack() in to_live_kthread() functionOleg Nesterov1-2/+6
get_task_struct(tsk) no longer pins tsk->stack so all users of to_live_kthread() should do try_get_task_stack/put_task_stack to protect "struct kthread" which lives on kthread's stack. TODO: Kill to_live_kthread(), perhaps we can even kill "struct kthread" too, and rework kthread_stop(), it can use task_work_add() to sync with the exiting kernel thread. Message-Id: <20160629180357.GA7178@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb9b16bbc19d4aea4507ab0552e4644c1211d130.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-16sched/core: Add try_get_task_stack() and put_task_stack()Andy Lutomirski2-0/+19
There are a few places in the kernel that access stack memory belonging to a different task. Before we can start freeing task stacks before the task_struct is freed, we need a way for those code paths to pin the stack. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/17a434f50ad3d77000104f21666575e10a9c1fbd.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-16x86/entry/64: Fix a minor comment rebase errorAndy Lutomirski1-1/+0
When I rebased my thread_info changes onto Brian's switch_to() changes, I carefully checked that I fixed up all the code correctly, but I missed a comment :( Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 15f4eae70d36 ("x86: Move thread_info into task_struct") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/089fe1e1cbe8b258b064fccbb1a5a5fd23861031.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15iommu/amd: Don't put completion-wait semaphore on stackJoerg Roedel2-16/+37
The semaphore used by the AMD IOMMU to signal command completion lived on the stack until now, which was safe as the driver busy-waited on the semaphore with IRQs disabled, so the stack can't go away under the driver. But the recently introduced vmap-based stacks break this as the physical address of the semaphore can't be determinded easily anymore. The driver used the __pa() macro, but that only works in the direct-mapping. The result were Completion-Wait timeout errors seen by the IOMMU driver, breaking system boot. Since putting the semaphore on the stack is bad design anyway, move the semaphore into 'struct amd_iommu'. It is protected by the per-iommu lock and now in the direct mapping again. This fixes the Completion-Wait timeout errors and makes AMD IOMMU systems boot again with vmap-based stacks enabled. Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86: Move thread_info into task_structAndy Lutomirski6-57/+10
Now that most of the thread_info users have been cleaned up, this is straightforward. Most of this code was written by Linus. Originally-from: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a50eab40abeaec9cb9a9e3cbdeafd32190206654.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15sched/core: Allow putting thread_info into task_structAndy Lutomirski6-4/+74
If an arch opts in by setting CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT, then thread_info is defined as a single 'u32 flags' and is the first entry of task_struct. thread_info::task is removed (it serves no purpose if thread_info is embedded in task_struct), and thread_info::cpu gets its own slot in task_struct. This is heavily based on a patch written by Linus. Originally-from: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0898196f0476195ca02713691a5037a14f2aac5.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15um/Stop conflating task_struct::stack with thread_infoLinus Torvalds1-4/+4
thread_info may move in the future, so use the accessors. [ Andy Lutomirski wrote this changelog message and changed "task_thread_info(child)->cpu" to "task_cpu(child)". ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3439705d9838940cc82733a7335fa8c654c37db8.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/entry: Get rid of pt_regs_to_thread_info()Linus Torvalds1-14/+6
It was a nice optimization while it lasted, but thread_info is moving and this optimization will no longer work. Quoting Linus: Oh Gods, Andy. That pt_regs_to_thread_info() thing made me want to do unspeakable acts on a poor innocent wax figure that looked _exactly_ like you. [ Changelog written by Andy. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6376aa81c68798cc81631673f52bd91a3e078944.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/asm: Move the thread_info::status field to thread_structAndy Lutomirski9-42/+27
Because sched.h and thread_info.h are a tangled mess, I turned in_compat_syscall() into a macro. If we had current_thread_struct() or similar and we could use it from thread_info.h, then this would be a bit cleaner. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ccc8a1b2f41f9c264a41f771bb4a6539a642ad72.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/dumpstack: Add recursion checking for all stacksJosh Poimboeuf2-19/+38
in_exception_stack() has some recursion checking which makes sure the stack trace code never traverses a given exception stack more than once. This prevents an infinite loop if corruption somehow causes a stack's "next stack" pointer to point to itself (directly or indirectly). The recursion checking can be useful for other stacks in addition to the exception stack, so extend it to work for all stacks. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/95de5db4cfe111754845a5cef04e20630d01423f.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/dumpstack: Add support for unwinding empty IRQ stacksJosh Poimboeuf2-3/+15
When an interrupt happens in entry code while running on a software IRQ stack, and the IRQ stack was empty, regs->sp will contain the stack end address (e.g., irq_stack_ptr). If the regs are passed to dump_trace(), get_stack_info() will report STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, causing dump_trace() to return prematurely without trying to go to the next stack. Update the bounds checking for software interrupt stacks so that the ending address is now considered part of the stack. This means that it's now possible for the 'walk_stack' callbacks -- print_context_stack() and print_context_stack_bp() -- to be called with an empty stack. But that's fine; they're already prepared to deal with that due to their on_stack() checks. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5a5e5de92dcf11e8dc6b6e8e50ad7639d067830b.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() interfaceJosh Poimboeuf7-128/+234
valid_stack_ptr() is buggy: it assumes that all stacks are of size THREAD_SIZE, which is not true for exception stacks. So the walk_stack() callbacks will need to know the location of the beginning of the stack as well as the end. Another issue is that in general the various features of a stack (type, size, next stack pointer, description string) are scattered around in various places throughout the stack dump code. Encapsulate all that information in a single place with a new stack_info struct and a get_stack_info() interface. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8164dd0db96b7e6a279fa17ae5e6dc375eecb4a9.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-15x86/dumpstack: Simplify in_exception_stack()Josh Poimboeuf1-63/+26
in_exception_stack() does some bad, bad things just so the unwinder can print different values for different areas of the debug exception stack. There's no need to clarify where exactly on the stack it is. Just print "#DB" and be done with it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e91cb410169dd576678dd427c35efb716fd0cee1.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-14x86/dumpstack: Allow preemption in show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace()Josh Poimboeuf2-25/+15
show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() are already preemption safe: - If they're running in irq or exception context, preemption is already disabled and the percpu stack pointers can be trusted. - If they're running with preemption enabled, they must be running on the task stack anyway, so it doesn't matter if they're comparing the stack pointer against a percpu stack pointer from this CPU or another one: either way it won't match. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0ca0b1044eca97d4f0ec7c1619cf80b3b65560d.1473371307.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-14arm/xen: fix SMP guests bootVitaly Kuznetsov1-4/+3
Commit 88e957d6e47f ("xen: introduce xen_vcpu_id mapping") broke SMP ARM guests on Xen. When FIFO-based event channels are in use (this is the default), evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block() is called on CPU_UP_PREPARE event and this happens before we set up xen_vcpu_id mapping in xen_starting_cpu. Temporary fix the issue by setting direct Linux CPU id <-> Xen vCPU id mapping for all possible CPUs at boot. We don't currently support kexec/kdump on Xen/ARM so these ids always match. In future, we have several ways to solve the issue, e.g.: - Eliminate all hypercalls from CPU_UP_PREPARE, do them from the starting CPU. This can probably be done for both x86 and ARM and, if done, will allow us to get Xen's idea of vCPU id from CPUID/MPIDR on the starting CPU directly, no messing with ACPI/device tree required. - Save vCPU id information from ACPI/device tree on ARM and use it to initialize xen_vcpu_id mapping. This is the same trick we currently do on x86. Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Tested-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2016-09-13avr32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro3-4/+13
really ugly, but apparently avr32 compilers turns access_ok() into something so bad that they want it in assembler. Left that way, zeroing added in inline wrapper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13microblaze: fix __get_user()Al Viro1-1/+1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13microblaze: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-3/+6
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13m32r: fix __get_user()Al Viro1-1/+1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13blackfin: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-4/+5
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13sparc32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-1/+3
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13sh: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-1/+4
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13sh64: failing __get_user() should zeroAl Viro1-0/+1
It could be done in exception-handling bits in __get_user_b() et.al., but the surgery involved would take more knowledge of sh64 details than I have or _want_ to have. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13score: fix copy_from_user() and friendsAl Viro1-21/+20
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13score: fix __get_user/get_userAl Viro1-1/+4
* should zero on any failure * __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user() Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13s390: get_user() should zero on failureAl Viro1-4/+4
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13ppc32: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-23/+2
should clear on access_ok() failures. Also remove the useless range truncation logics. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13parisc: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-2/+4
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13openrisc: fix copy_from_user()Al Viro1-24/+11
... that should zero on faults. Also remove the <censored> helpful logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32. Where it had ever been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared. A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13nios2: fix __get_user()Al Viro1-2/+2
a) should not leave crap on fault b) should _not_ require access_ok() in any cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13nios2: copy_from_user() should zero the tail of destinationAl Viro1-3/+6
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13mn10300: copy_from_user() should zero on access_ok() failure...Al Viro1-1/+3
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13mn10300: failing __get_user() and get_user() should zeroAl Viro1-0/+1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13mips: copy_from_user() must zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro1-0/+3
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13ARC: uaccess: get_user to zero out dest in cause of faultVineet Gupta1-2/+9
Al reported potential issue with ARC get_user() as it wasn't clearing out destination pointer in case of fault due to bad address etc. Verified using following | { | u32 bogus1 = 0xdeadbeef; | u64 bogus2 = 0xdead; | int rc1, rc2; | | pr_info("Orig values %x %llx\n", bogus1, bogus2); | rc1 = get_user(bogus1, (u32 __user *)0x40000000); | rc2 = get_user(bogus2, (u64 __user *)0x50000000); | pr_info("access %d %d, new values %x %llx\n", | rc1, rc2, bogus1, bogus2); | } | [ARCLinux]# insmod /mnt/kernel-module/qtn.ko | Orig values deadbeef dead | access -14 -14, new values 0 0 Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13metag: copy_from_user() should zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro1-1/+2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13ia64: copy_from_user() should zero the destination on access_ok() failureAl Viro1-14/+11
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13hexagon: fix strncpy_from_user() error returnAl Viro1-1/+2
It's -EFAULT, not -1 (and contrary to the comment in there, __strnlen_user() can return 0 - on faults). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13frv: fix clear_user()Al Viro1-3/+9
It should check access_ok(). Otherwise a bunch of places turn into trivially exploitable rootholes. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13cris: buggered copy_from_user/copy_to_user/clear_userAl Viro1-39/+32
* copy_from_user() on access_ok() failure ought to zero the destination * none of those primitives should skip the access_ok() check in case of small constant size. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13asm-generic: make get_user() clear the destination on errorsAl Viro1-3/+7
both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-13PCI: Fix bridge_d3 update on device removalLukas Wunner1-2/+1
Starting with v4.8, we allow a PCIe port to runtime suspend to D3hot if the port itself and its children satisfy a number of conditions. Once a child is removed, we recheck those conditions in case the removed device was blocking the port from suspending. The rechecking needs to happen *after* the device has been removed from the bus it resides on. Otherwise when walking the port's subordinate bus in pci_bridge_d3_update(), the device being removed would erroneously still be taken into account. However the device is removed from the bus_list in pci_destroy_dev() and we currently recheck *before* that. Fix it. Fixes: 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend") Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
2016-09-13x86/entry/64: Clean up and document espfix64 stack setupAndy Lutomirski1-11/+53
The espfix64 setup code was a bit inscrutible and contained an unnecessary push of RAX. Remove that push, update all the stack offsets to match, and document the whole mess. Reported-By: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e5459eb10cf1175c8b36b840bc425f210d045f35.1473717910.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-13selftests/x86/sigreturn: Use CX, not AX, as the scratch registerAndy Lutomirski1-8/+8
RAX is handled specially in ESPFIX64. Use CX as our scratch register so that, if something goes wrong with RAX handling, we'll notice. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9ceeb24ea56925586c330dc46306f757ddea9fb5.1473717910.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-09-11Linux 4.8-rc6Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
2016-09-11net/mlx4_en: Fix panic on xmit while port is downMoshe Shemesh1-5/+7
When port is down, tx drop counter update is not needed. Updating the counter in this case can cause a kernel panic as when the port is down, ring can be NULL. Fixes: 63a664b7e92b ("net/mlx4_en: fix tx_dropped bug") Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-11net/mlx4_en: Fixes for DCBXTariq Toukan4-43/+28
This patch adds a capability check before enabling DCBX. In addition, it re-organizes the relevant data structures, and fixes a typo in a define. Fixes: af7d51852631 ("net/mlx4_en: Add DCB PFC support through CEE netlink commands") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-11net/mlx4_en: Fix the return value of mlx4_en_dcbnl_set_state()Kamal Heib1-1/+4
mlx4_en_dcbnl_set_state() returns u8, the return value from mlx4_en_setup_tc() could be negative in case of failure, so fix that. Fixes: af7d51852631 ("net/mlx4_en: Add DCB PFC support through CEE netlink commands") Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalh@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-11net/mlx4_en: Fix the return value of mlx4_en_dcbnl_set_all()Kamal Heib1-10/+11
mlx4_en_dcbnl_set_all() returns u8, so return value can't be negative in case of failure. Fixes: af7d51852631 ("net/mlx4_en: Add DCB PFC support through CEE netlink commands") Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalh@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Rana Shahout <ranas@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.