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On arm64 we always call stackleak_erase() on a task stack, and never
call it on another stack. We can avoid some redundant work by using
stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(), telling the stackleak code that it's
being called on a task stack.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-14-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The stackleak_erase() code dynamically handles being on a task stack or
another stack. In most cases, this is a fixed property of the caller,
which the caller is aware of, as an architecture might always return
using the task stack, or might always return using a trampoline stack.
This patch adds stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() and
stackleak_erase_off_task_stack() functions which callers can use to
avoid on_thread_stack() check and associated redundant work when the
calling stack is known. The existing stackleak_erase() is retained as a
safe default.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-13-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The stackleak code relies upon the current SP and lowest recorded SP
falling within expected task stack boundaries.
Check this at the start of the test.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-12-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test is instrumentable and runs with IRQs
unmasked, so it's possible for unrelated code to clobber the task stack
and/or manipulate current->lowest_stack while the test is running,
resulting in spurious failures.
The regular stackleak erasing code is non-instrumentable and runs with
IRQs masked, preventing similar issues.
Make the body of the test non-instrumentable, and run it with IRQs
masked, avoiding such spurious failures.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
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There are a few problems with the way the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING test
manipulates the stack pointer and boundary values:
* It uses the address of a local variable to determine the current stack
pointer, rather than using current_stack_pointer directly. As the
local variable could be placed anywhere within the stack frame, this
can be an over-estimate of the true stack pointer value.
* Is uses an estimate of the current stack pointer as the upper boundary
when scanning for poison, even though prior functions could have used
more stack (and may have updated current->lowest stack accordingly).
* A pr_info() call is made in the middle of the test. As the printk()
code is out-of-line and will make use of the stack, this could clobber
poison and/or adjust current->lowest_stack. It would be better to log
the metadata after the body of the test to avoid such problems.
These have been observed to result in spurious test failures on arm64.
In addition to this there are a couple of things which are sub-optimal:
* To avoid the STACK_END_MAGIC value, it conditionally modifies 'left'
if this contains more than a single element, when it could instead
calculate the bound unconditionally using stackleak_task_low_bound().
* It open-codes the poison scanning. It would be better if this used the
same helper code as used by erasing function so that the two cannot
diverge.
This patch reworks the test to avoid these issues, making use of the
recently introduced helpers to ensure this is aligned with the regular
stackleak code.
As the new code tests stack boundaries before accessing the stack, there
is no need to fail early when the tracked or untracked portions of the
stack extend all the way to the low stack boundary.
As stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is now used to find the top of the
poisoned region of the stack, the subsequent poison checking starts at
this boundary and verifies that stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is
working correctly.
The pr_info() which logged the untracked portion of stack is now moved
to the end of the function, and logs the size of all the portions of the
stack relevant to the test, including the portions at the top and bottom
of the stack which are not erased or scanned, and the current / lowest
recorded stack usage.
Tested on x86_64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 168 bytes
| current: 336 bytes
| lowest: 656 bytes
| tracked: 656 bytes
| untracked: 400 bytes
| poisoned: 15152 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 656 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 1232 bytes
| untracked: 672 bytes
| poisoned: 14136 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64 with deliberate breakage to the starting stack value and
poison scanning:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 24 bytes below poison boundary: 0x0
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 32 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083dbc00
...
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1912 bytes below poison boundary: 0x78b4b9999e8cb15
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1920 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083db400
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 688 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 576 bytes
| untracked: 288 bytes
| poisoned: 15176 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: Unexpected! This kernel (5.18.0-rc1-00013-g1f7b1f1e29e0-dirty aarch64) was built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-10-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test scans for a contiguous block of
poison values between the low stack bound and the stack pointer, and
fails if it does not find a sufficiently large block.
This can happen legitimately if the scan the low stack bound, which
could occur if functions called prior to lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() used
a large amount of stack. If this were to occur, it means that the erased
portion of the stack is smaller than the size used by the scan, but does
not cause a functional problem
In practice this is unlikely to happen, but as this is legitimate and
would not result in a functional problem, the test should not fail in
this case.
Remove the spurious failure case.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Currently we over-estimate the region of stack which must be erased.
To determine the region to be erased, we scan downwards for a contiguous
block of poison values (or the low bound of the stack). There are a few
minor problems with this today:
* When we find a block of poison values, we include this block within
the region to erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite 'STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH' (128) bytes with
poison.
* As the loop condition checks 'poison_count <= depth', it will run an
additional iteration after finding the contiguous block of poison,
decrementing 'erase_low' once more than necessary.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
* As we always decrement 'erase_low' after checking an element on the
stack, we always include the element below this within the region to
erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
Note that this is not a functional problem. As the loop condition
checks 'erase_low > task_stack_low', we'll never clobber the
STACK_END_MAGIC. As we always decrement 'erase_low' after this, we'll
never fail to erase the element immediately above the STACK_END_MAGIC.
In total, this can cause us to erase `128 + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)`
bytes more than necessary, which is unfortunate.
This patch reworks the logic to find the address immediately above the
poisoned region, by finding the lowest non-poisoned address. This is
factored into a stackleak_find_top_of_poison() helper both for clarity
and so that this can be shared with the LKDTM test in subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Prior to returning to userspace, we reset current->lowest_stack to a
reasonable high bound. Currently we do this by subtracting the arbitrary
value `THREAD_SIZE/64` from the top of the stack, for reasons lost to
history.
Looking at configurations today:
* On i386 where THREAD_SIZE is 8K, the bound will be 128 bytes. The
pt_regs at the top of the stack is 68 bytes (with 0 to 16 bytes of
padding above), and so this covers an additional portion of 44 to 60
bytes.
* On x86_64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 32K with KASAN) the
bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 512 with KASAN). The pt_regs
at the top of the stack is 168 bytes, and so this cover an additional
88 bytes of stack (up to 344 with KASAN).
* On arm64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 64K with 64K pages
and VMAP_STACK), the bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 1024 with
KASAN). The pt_regs at the top of the stack is 336 bytes, so this can
fall within the pt_regs, or can cover an additional 688 bytes of
stack.
Clearly the `THREAD_SIZE/64` value doesn't make much sense -- in the
worst case, this will cause more than 600 bytes of stack to be erased
for every syscall, even if actual stack usage were substantially
smaller.
This patches makes this slightly less nonsensical by consistently
resetting current->lowest_stack to the base of the task pt_regs. For
clarity and for consistency with the handling of the low bound, the
generation of the high bound is split into a helper with commentary
explaining why.
Since the pt_regs at the top of the stack will be clobbered upon the
next exception entry, we don't need to poison these at exception exit.
By using task_pt_regs() as the high stack boundary instead of
current_top_of_stack() we avoid some redundant poisoning, and the
compiler can share the address generation between the poisoning and
resetting of `current->lowest_stack`, making the generated code more
optimal.
It's not clear to me whether the existing `THREAD_SIZE/64` offset was a
dodgy heuristic to skip the pt_regs, or whether it was attempting to
minimize the number of times stackleak_check_stack() would have to
update `current->lowest_stack` when stack usage was shallow at the cost
of unconditionally poisoning a small portion of the stack for every exit
to userspace.
For now I've simply removed the offset, and if we need/want to minimize
updates for shallow stack usage it should be easy to add a better
heuristic atop, with appropriate commentary so we know what's going on.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The logic within __stackleak_erase() can be a little hard to follow, as
`boundary` switches from being the low bound to the high bound mid way
through the function, and `kstack_ptr` is used to represent the start of
the region to erase while `boundary` represents the end of the region to
erase.
Make this a little clearer by consistently using clearer variable names.
The `boundary` variable is removed, the bounds of the region to erase
are described by `erase_low` and `erase_high`, and bounds of the task
stack are described by `task_stack_low` and `task_stack_high`.
As the same time, remove the comment above the variables, since it is
unclear whether it's intended as rationale, a complaint, or a TODO, and
is more confusing than helpful.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and
__stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the
bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and
only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented.
In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally
add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In
stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in
stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase()
we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end
boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic.
This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in
all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the
lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses
end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this
is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the
STACK_END_MAGIC value.
In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled
into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that
`current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the
poison scan will stop immediately above this.
For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no
change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated
assembly is slightly simpler and shorter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In __stackleak_erase() we check that the `erase_low` value derived from
`current->lowest_stack` is above the lowest legitimate stack pointer
value, but this is already enforced by stackleak_track_stack() when
recording the lowest stack value.
Remove the redundant check.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In stackleak_erase() we check skip_erasing() after accessing some fields
from current. As generating the address of current uses asm which
hazards with the static branch asm, this work is always performed, even
when the static branch is patched to jump to the return at the end of the
function.
This patch avoids this redundant work by moving the skip_erasing() check
earlier.
To avoid complicating initialization within stackleak_erase(), the body
of the function is split out into a __stackleak_erase() helper, with the
check left in a wrapper function. The __stackleak_erase() helper is
marked __always_inline to ensure that this is inlined into
stackleak_erase() and not instrumented.
Before this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
66 90 xchg %ax,%ax <------------ static branch
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
After this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <--- static branch
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
Before this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
After this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
While this may not be a huge win on its own, moving the static branch
will permit further optimization of the body of the function in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
implementation.
The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
specifically for stackleak in commit:
0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
wildly:
* On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
* On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
The implementation checks the SP against a number of
potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
erase with:
| if (on_thread_stack())
| boundary = current_stack_pointer;
| else
| boundary = current_top_of_stack();
On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
stack.
Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
functional problem if that code were reachable).
As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
out-of-line instrumentable code.
While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
Fixes: 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Clang 15 will support randstruct via the -frandomize-layout-seed-file=...
option. Update the Kconfig and Makefile to recognize this feature.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-7-keescook@chromium.org
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To enable Clang randstruct support, move the structure layout
randomization seed generation out of scripts/gcc-plugins/ into
scripts/basic/ so it happens early enough that it can be used by either
compiler implementation. The gcc-plugin still builds its own header file,
but now does so from the common "randstruct.seed" file.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-6-keescook@chromium.org
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To enable the new Clang randstruct implementation[1], move
randstruct into its own Makefile and split the CFLAGS from
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS into RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS.
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D121556
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-5-keescook@chromium.org
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In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs,
move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named
CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full
randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line
sized mode.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
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When the sancov_plugin is enabled, it gets added to gcc-plugin-y which
is used to populate both GCC_PLUGIN (for building the plugin) and
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS (for enabling and options). Instead of adding sancov
to both and then removing it from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS, create a separate
list, gcc-plugin-external-y, which is only added to GCC_PLUGIN.
This will also be used by the coming randstruct build changes.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-3-keescook@chromium.org
|
|
Clang's structure layout randomization feature gets upset when it sees
struct inode (which is randomized) cast to struct netfs_i_context. This
is due to seeing the inode pointer as being treated as an array of inodes,
rather than "something else, following struct inode".
Since netfs can't use container_of() (since it doesn't know what the
true containing struct is), it uses this direct offset instead. Adjust
the code to better reflect what is happening: an arbitrary pointer is
being adjusted and cast to something else: use a "void *" for the math.
The resulting binary output is the same, but Clang no longer sees an
unexpected cross-structure cast:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/inode.c:50:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/fscache.h:15:
In file included from ../include/linux/fscache.h:18:
../include/linux/netfs.h:298:9: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct inode *' to 'struct netfs_i_context *'
return (struct netfs_i_context *)(inode + 1);
^
1 error generated.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-2-keescook@chromium.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7562f8eccd7cc0e447becfe9912179088784e3b9.camel@kernel.org
|
|
Clang 14 added support for the __builtin_function_start function,
which allows us to implement the function_nocfi macro without
architecture-specific inline assembly and in a way that also works
with static initializers.
Change CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to depend on Clang >= 14, define
function_nocfi using __builtin_function_start, and remove the arm64
inline assembly implementation.
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/ec2e26eaf63558934f5b73a6e530edc453cf9508
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1353
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> # arm64
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405221618.633743-1-samitolvanen@google.com
|
|
The initialization of "security_hook_heads" is done by casting it to
another structure pointer type, and treating it as an array of "struct
hlist_head" objects. This requires an exception be made in "randstruct",
because otherwise it will emit an error, reducing the effectiveness of
the hardening technique.
Instead of using a cast, initialize the individual struct hlist_head
elements in security_hook_heads explicitly. This removes the need for
the cast and randstruct exception.
Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407175930.471870-1-morbo@google.com
|
|
There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more;
the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this
set of checks now.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-5-willy@infradead.org
|
|
Move the compound page overrun detection out of
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN and convert it to use folios so it's
enabled for more people.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-4-willy@infradead.org
|
|
If you have a vmalloc() allocation, or an address from calling vmap(),
you cannot overrun the vm_area which describes it, regardless of the
size of the underlying allocation. This probably doesn't do much for
security because vmalloc comes with guard pages these days, but it
prevents usercopy aborts when copying to a vmap() of smaller pages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-3-willy@infradead.org
|
|
If you are copying to an address in the kmap region, you may not copy
across a page boundary, no matter what the size of the underlying
allocation. You can't kmap() a slab page because slab pages always
come from low memory.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-2-willy@infradead.org
|
|
struct stat (defined in arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/stat.h) has 32-bit
st_dev and st_rdev; struct compat_stat (defined in
arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h) has 16-bit st_dev and st_rdev followed by
a 16-bit padding.
This patch fixes struct compat_stat to match struct stat.
[ Historical note: the old x86 'struct stat' did have that 16-bit field
that the compat layer had kept around, but it was changes back in 2003
by "struct stat - support larger dev_t":
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/?id=e95b2065677fe32512a597a79db94b77b90c968d
and back in those days, the x86_64 port was still new, and separate
from the i386 code, and had already picked up the old version with a
16-bit st_dev field ]
Note that we can't change compat_dev_t because it is used by
compat_loop_info.
Also, if the st_dev and st_rdev values are 32-bit, we don't have to use
old_valid_dev to test if the value fits into them. This fixes
-EOVERFLOW on filesystems that are on NVMe because NVMe uses the major
number 259.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from
get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is
applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from
get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit
seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount
of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of
/dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of
-frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent
entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that
case, we detect whether gcc's set_random_seed() has been called by
making a call to get_random_seed(noinit=true) in the plugin init
function, which is called after set_random_seed() is called but before
anything that calls get_random_seed(noinit=false), and seeing if it's
zero or not. If it's not zero, we're in deterministic mode, and so we
just generate numbers with a basic xorshift prng.
Note that we don't detect if -frandom-seed is being used using the
documented local_tick variable, because it's assigned via:
local_tick = (unsigned) tv.tv_sec * 1000 + tv.tv_usec / 1000;
which may well overflow and become -1 on its own, and so isn't
reliable: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=105171
[kees: The 256 byte rnd_buf size was chosen based on average (250),
median (64), and std deviation (575) bytes of used entropy for a
defconfig x86_64 build]
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405222815.21155-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
|
|
The following WARN is triggered from kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock():
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 579353 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3161 mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
CPU: 10 PID: 579353 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G W O 5.16.0.stable #20
Hardware name: LENOVO 20UF001CUS/20UF001CUS, BIOS R1CET65W(1.34 ) 06/17/2021
RIP: 0010:mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? kvm_write_guest+0x114/0x120 [kvm]
kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x9e/0xf0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa26/0xc50 [kvm]
? schedule+0x4e/0xc0
? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
? futex_wait+0x166/0x250
? __send_signal+0x1f1/0x3d0
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x747/0xda0 [kvm]
...
The WARN was introduced by commit 03c0304a86bc ("KVM: Warn if
mark_page_dirty() is called without an active vCPU") but the change seems
to be correct (unlike Hyper-V TSC page update mechanism). In fact, there's
no real need to actually write to guest memory to invalidate TSC page, this
can be done by the first vCPU which goes through kvm_guest_time_update().
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407201013.963226-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
|
|
Since current AVIC implementation cannot support encrypted memory,
inhibit AVIC for SEV-enabled guest.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220408133710.54275-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
+new file mode 100644
+WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
+#27: FILE: Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst:1:
Opportunistically update all other non-added KVM documents and
remove a new extra blank line at EOF for x86/errata.rst.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220406063715.55625-5-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The tsc_scaling_sync's binary should be present in the .gitignore
file for the git to ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220406063715.55625-3-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
If objdump writes to stderr it can block waiting for it to be read. As
perf doesn't read stderr then progress stops with perf waiting for
stdout output.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Truong <alexandre.truong@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Cc: Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Lexi Shao <shaolexi@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Remi Bernon <rbernon@codeweavers.com>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220407230503.1265036-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The `perf --list-cmds` output prints only internal commands, although
there is no reason for that from users' perspective.
Adding the external commands to commands array with NULL function
pointer allows printing all perf commands while not changing the logic
of command handler selection.
Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404221541.30312-2-mpetlan@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404221541.30312-1-mpetlan@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
If a perf event doesn't fit into remaining buffer space return NULL to
remap buf and fetch the event again.
Keep the logic to error out on inadequate input from fuzzing.
This fixes perf failing on ChromeOS (with 32b userspace):
$ perf report -v -i perf.data
...
prefetch_event: head=0x1fffff8 event->header_size=0x30, mmap_size=0x2000000: fuzzed or compressed perf.data?
Error:
failed to process sample
Fixes: 57fc032ad643ffd0 ("perf session: Avoid infinite loop when seeing invalid header.size")
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330031130.2152327-1-denik@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Fix firmware file names assignment in si2157 tuner, allow for running
devices without firmware files needed.
modprobe gives error: unknown chip version Si2147-A30 ROM 0x50
Device initialization is interrupted.
Caused by:
1. table si2157_tuners has swapped fields rom_id and required vs struct
si2157_tuner_info.
2. both firmware file names can be null for devices with
required == false - device uses build-in firmware in this case
Tested on this device:
m07ca:1871 AVerMedia Technologies, Inc. TD310 DVB-T/T2/C dongle
[mchehab: fix mangled patch]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215726
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5f660108-8812-383c-83e4-29ee0558d623@leemhuis.info/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/c4bcaff8-fbad-969e-ad47-e2c487ac02a1@gmail.com
Fixes: 1c35ba3bf972 ("media: si2157: use a different namespace for firmware")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17.x
Signed-off-by: Piotr Chmura <chmooreck@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Robert Schlabbach <robert_s@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
|
|
The 'perf bench epoll' testcase fails on systems with more than 1K CPUs.
Testcase: perf bench epoll all
Result snippet:
<<>>
Run summary [PID 106497]: 1399 threads monitoring on 64 file-descriptors for 8 secs.
perf: pthread_create: No such file or directory
<<>>
In epoll benchmarks (ctl, wait) pthread_create is invoked in do_threads
from respective bench_epoll_* function. Though the logs shows direct
failure from pthread_create, the actual failure is from
"sched_setaffinity" returning EINVAL (invalid argument).
This happens because the default mask size in glibc is 1024. To overcome
this 1024 CPUs mask size limitation of cpu_set_t, change the mask size
using the CPU_*_S macros.
Patch addresses this by fixing all the epoll benchmarks to use CPU_ALLOC
to allocate cpumask, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE for size, and CPU_SET_S to set the
mask.
Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Jajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406175113.87881-3-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The 'perf bench futex' testcase fails on systems with more than 1K CPUs.
Testcase: perf bench futex all
Failure snippet:
<<>>Running futex/hash benchmark...
perf: pthread_create: No such file or directory
<<>>
All the futex benchmarks (ie hash, lock-api, requeue, wake,
wake-parallel), pthread_create is invoked in respective bench_futex_*
function. Though the logs shows direct failure from pthread_create,
strace logs showed that actual failure is from "sched_setaffinity"
returning EINVAL (invalid argument).
This happens because the default mask size in glibc is 1024. To overcome
this 1024 CPUs mask size limitation of cpu_set_t, change the mask size
using the CPU_*_S macros.
Patch addresses this by fixing all the futex benchmarks to use CPU_ALLOC
to allocate cpumask, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE for size, and CPU_SET_S to set the
mask.
Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Jajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406175113.87881-2-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
eprintf() does not expect va_list as the type of the 4th parameter.
Use veprintf() because it does.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Fixes: 428dab813a56ce94 ("libperf: Merge libperf_set_print() into libperf_init()")
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408132625.2451452-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Since commit bb30acae4c4dacfa ("perf report: Bail out --mem-mode if mem
info is not available") "perf mem report" and "perf report --mem-mode"
don't allow opening the file unless one of the events has
PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC set.
SPE doesn't have this set even though synthetic memory data is generated
after it is decoded. Fix this issue by setting DATA_SRC on SPE events.
This has no effect on the data collected because the SPE driver doesn't
do anything with that flag and doesn't generate samples.
Fixes: bb30acae4c4dacfa ("perf report: Bail out --mem-mode if mem info is not available")
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408144056.1955535-1-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Commit Fixes: b9f6fbb3b2c29736 ("perf arm64: Inject missing frames when
using 'perf record --call-graph=fp'") intended to add a 'best effort'
DWARF unwind that improved the frame pointer stack in most scenarios.
It's expected that the unwind will fail sometimes, but this shouldn't be
reported as an error. It only works when the return address can be
determined from the contents of the link register alone.
Fix the error shown when the unwinder requires extra registers by adding
a new flag that suppresses error messages. This flag is not set in the
normal --call-graph=dwarf unwind mode so that behavior is not changed.
Fixes: b9f6fbb3b2c29736 ("perf arm64: Inject missing frames when using 'perf record --call-graph=fp'")
Reported-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Tested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Truong <alexandre.truong@arm.com>
Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220406145651.1392529-1-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To get the changes in:
83bea32ac7ed37bb ("arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A78AE")
That addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h'
diff -u tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h
Cc: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
Cc: Andrew Kilroy <andrew.kilroy@arm.com>
Cc: Chanho Park <chanho61.park@samsung.com>
Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
By default `perf test tsc` does not return the error message when the
child process detected kernel does not support it. Instead, the child
process prints an error message to stderr, unfortunately stderr is
redirected to /dev/null when verbose <= 0.
This patch does:
- return TEST_SKIP to the parent process instead of TEST_OK when
perf_read_tsc_conversion() is not supported.
- Add a new subtest of testing if TSC is supported on current
architecture by moving exist code to a separate function.
It avoids two places in test__perf_time_to_tsc() that return
TEST_SKIP by doing this.
- Extend the test suite definition to contain above two subtests.
Current test_suite and test_case structs do not support printing skip
reason when the number of subtest less than 1. To print skip reason, it
is necessary to extend current test suite definition.
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengdong Li <chengdongli@tencent.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: likexu@tencent.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408084748.43707-1-chengdongli@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Using -ffat-lto-objects in the python feature test when building with
clang-13 results in:
clang-13: error: optimization flag '-ffat-lto-objects' is not supported [-Werror,-Wignored-optimization-argument]
error: command '/usr/sbin/clang' failed with exit code 1
cp: cannot stat '/tmp/build/perf/python_ext_build/lib/perf*.so': No such file or directory
make[2]: *** [Makefile.perf:639: /tmp/build/perf/python/perf.so] Error 1
Noticed when building on a docker.io/library/archlinux:base container.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The clang compiler complains about some options even without a source
file being available, while others require one, so use the simple
tools/build/feature/test-hello.c file.
Then check for the "is not supported" string in its output, in addition
to the "unknown argument" already being looked for.
This was noticed when building with clang-13 where -ffat-lto-objects
isn't supported and since we were looking just for "unknown argument"
and not providing a source code to clang, was mistakenly assumed as
being available and not being filtered to set of command line options
provided to clang, leading to a build failure.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
These make the feature check fail when using clang, so remove them just
like is done in tools/perf/Makefile.config to build perf itself.
Adding -Wno-compound-token-split-by-macro to tools/perf/Makefile.config
when building with clang is also necessary to avoid these warnings
turned into errors (-Werror):
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-perl.o
In file included from util/scripting-engines/trace-event-perl.c:35:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:4085:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/hv.h:659:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/hv_func.h:34:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/sbox32_hash.h:4:
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: error: '(' and '{' tokens introducing statement expression appear in different macro expansion contexts [-Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro]
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:80:38: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
#define ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(v,prime) STMT_START { \
^~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:737:29: note: expanded from macro 'STMT_START'
# define STMT_START (void)( /* gcc supports "({ STATEMENTS; })" */
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: note: '{' token is here
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:80:49: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
#define ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(v,prime) STMT_START { \
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: error: '}' and ')' tokens terminating statement expression appear in different macro expansion contexts [-Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro]
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:87:41: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
v ^= (v>>23); \
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: note: ')' token is here
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:88:3: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
} STMT_END
^~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:738:21: note: expanded from macro 'STMT_END'
# define STMT_END )
^
Please refer to the discussion on the Link: tag below, where Nathan
clarifies the situation:
<quote>
acme> And then get to the problems at the end of this message, which seem
acme> similar to the problem described here:
acme>
acme> From Nathan Chancellor <>
acme> Subject [PATCH] mwifiex: Remove unnecessary braces from HostCmd_SET_SEQ_NO_BSS_INFO
acme>
acme> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/1/135
acme>
acme> So perhaps in this case its better to disable that
acme> -Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro when building with clang?
Yes, I think that is probably the best solution. As far as I can tell,
at least in this file and context, the warning appears harmless, as the
"create a GNU C statement expression from two different macros" is very
much intentional, based on the presence of PERL_USE_GCC_BRACE_GROUPS.
The warning is fixed in upstream Perl by just avoiding creating GNU C
statement expressions using STMT_START and STMT_END:
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/issues/18780
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/pull/18984
If I am reading the source code correctly, an alternative to disabling
the warning would be specifying -DPERL_GCC_BRACE_GROUPS_FORBIDDEN but it
seems like that might end up impacting more than just this site,
according to the issue discussion above.
</quote>
Based-on-a-patch-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # Debian/Selfmade LLVM-14 (x86-64)
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkxWcYzph5pC1EK8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Just like its done for ldopts and for both in tools/perf/Makefile.config.
Using `` to initialize PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS somehow precludes using:
$(filter-out SOMETHING_TO_FILTER,$(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS))
And we need to do it to allow for building with versions of clang where
some gcc options selected by distros are not available.
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # Debian/Selfmade LLVM-14 (x86-64)
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YktYX2OnLtyobRYD@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To get the changes in:
b04d910af330b55e ("vdpa: support exposing the count of vqs to userspace")
a61280ddddaa45f9 ("vdpa: support exposing the config size to userspace")
Silencing this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/vhost.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
$ diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
--- tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h 2021-07-15 16:17:01.840818309 -0300
+++ include/uapi/linux/vhost.h 2022-04-02 18:55:05.702522387 -0300
@@ -150,4 +150,11 @@
/* Get the valid iova range */
#define VHOST_VDPA_GET_IOVA_RANGE _IOR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x78, \
struct vhost_vdpa_iova_range)
+
+/* Get the config size */
+#define VHOST_VDPA_GET_CONFIG_SIZE _IOR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x79, __u32)
+
+/* Get the count of all virtqueues */
+#define VHOST_VDPA_GET_VQS_COUNT _IOR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x80, __u32)
+
#endif
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > before
$ cp include/uapi/linux/vhost.h tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
--- before 2022-04-04 14:52:25.036375145 -0300
+++ after 2022-04-04 14:52:31.906549976 -0300
@@ -38,4 +38,6 @@
[0x73] = "VDPA_GET_CONFIG",
[0x76] = "VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM",
[0x78] = "VDPA_GET_IOVA_RANGE",
+ [0x79] = "VDPA_GET_CONFIG_SIZE",
+ [0x80] = "VDPA_GET_VQS_COUNT",
};
$
Cc: Longpeng <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YksxoFcOARk%2Fldev@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
vcpu_fp uses the riscv_isa_extension mechanism which gets
defined in hwcap.h but doesn't include that head file.
While it seems to work in most cases, in certain conditions
this can lead to build failures like
../arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_fp.c: In function ‘kvm_riscv_vcpu_fp_reset’:
../arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_fp.c:22:13: error: implicit declaration of function ‘riscv_isa_extension_available’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
22 | if (riscv_isa_extension_available(&isa, f) ||
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_fp.c:22:49: error: ‘f’ undeclared (first use in this function)
22 | if (riscv_isa_extension_available(&isa, f) ||
Fix this by simply including the necessary header.
Fixes: 0a86512dc113 ("RISC-V: KVM: Factor-out FP virtualization into separate
sources")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
|
Mark Rutland
Kees Cook
Sami Tolvanen
Bill Wendling
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Mikulas Patocka
Jason A. Donenfeld
Vitaly Kuznetsov
Suravee Suthikulpanit
Like Xu
Linus Torvalds
Ian Rogers
Michael Petlan
Denis Nikitin
Piotr Chmura
Athira Rajeev
Adrian Hunter
James Clark
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Chengdong Li
Heiko Stuebner