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2019-02-02x86/resctrl: Avoid confusion over the new X86_RESCTRL configJohannes Weiner6-10/+10
"Resource Control" is a very broad term for this CPU feature, and a term that is also associated with containers, cgroups etc. This can easily cause confusion. Make the user prompt more specific. Match the config symbol name. [ bp: In the future, the corresponding ARM arch-specific code will be under ARM_CPU_RESCTRL and the arch-agnostic bits will be carved out under the CPU_RESCTRL umbrella symbol. ] Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190130195621.GA30653@cmpxchg.org
2019-02-01x86/kexec: Don't setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabledKairui Song1-0/+3
Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] Call Trace: efi_runtime_map_copy+0x28/0x30 bzImage64_load+0x688/0x872 arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x6d/0x70 kimage_file_alloc_init+0x13e/0x220 __x64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x144/0x290 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Just skip the EFI info setup if EFI runtime services are not enabled. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: erik.schmauss@intel.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: lenb@kernel.org Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190118111310.29589-2-kasong@redhat.com
2019-01-31x86/microcode/amd: Don't falsely trick the late loading mechanismThomas Lendacky1-1/+1
The load_microcode_amd() function searches for microcode patches and attempts to apply a microcode patch if it is of different level than the currently installed level. While the processor won't actually load a level that is less than what is already installed, the logic wrongly returns UCODE_NEW thus signaling to its caller reload_store() that a late loading should be attempted. If the file-system contains an older microcode revision than what is currently running, such a late microcode reload can result in these misleading messages: x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect. x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update. These messages were issued on a system where SME/SEV are not enabled by the BIOS (MSR C001_0010[23] = 0b) because during boot, early_detect_mem_encrypt() is called and cleared the SME and SEV features in this case. However, after the wrong late load attempt, get_cpu_cap() is called and reloads the SME and SEV feature bits, resulting in the messages. Update the microcode level check to not attempt microcode loading if the current level is greater than(!) and not only equal to the current patch level. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Fixes: 2613f36ed965 ("x86/microcode: Attempt late loading only when new microcode is present") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/154894518427.9406.8246222496874202773.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2019-01-30MAINTAINERS: Add Andy and Darren as arch/x86/platform/ reviewersBorislav Petkov1-0/+9
... so that they can get CCed on platform patches. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190128113619.19025-1-bp@alien8.de
2019-01-29x86/fault: Fix sign-extend unintended sign extensionColin Ian King1-1/+1
show_ldttss() shifts desc.base2 by 24 bit, but base2 is 8 bits of a bitfield in a u16. Due to the really great idea of integer promotion in C99 base2 is promoted to an int, because that's the standard defined behaviour when all values which can be represented by base2 fit into an int. Now if bit 7 is set in desc.base2 the result of the shift left by 24 makes the resulting integer negative and the following conversion to unsigned long legitmately sign extends first causing the upper bits 32 bits to be set in the result. Fix this by casting desc.base2 to unsigned long before the shift. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1475635 ("Unintended sign extension") [ tglx: Reworded the changelog a bit as I actually had to lookup the standard (again) to decode the original one. ] Fixes: a1a371c468f7 ("x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181222191116.21831-1-colin.king@canonical.com
2019-01-29x86/boot/compressed/64: Set EFER.LME=1 in 32-bit trampoline before returning to long modeWei Huang2-1/+9
In some old AMD KVM implementation, guest's EFER.LME bit is cleared by KVM when the hypervsior detects that the guest sets CR0.PG to 0. This causes the guest OS to reboot when it tries to return from 32-bit trampoline code because the CPU is in incorrect state: CR4.PAE=1, CR0.PG=1, CS.L=1, but EFER.LME=0. As a precaution, set EFER.LME=1 as part of long mode activation procedure. This extra step won't cause any harm when Linux is booted on a bare-metal machine. Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190104054411.12489-1-wei@redhat.com
2019-01-29x86/cpu: Add Atom Tremont (Jacobsville)Kan Liang1-1/+2
Add the Atom Tremont model number to the Intel family list. [ Tony: Also update comment at head of file to say "_X" suffix is also used for microserver parts. ] Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190125195902.17109-4-tony.luck@intel.com
2019-01-22x86/Kconfig: Select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI is enabledSinan Kaya1-1/+1
After commit 5d32a66541c4 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") dependencies on CONFIG_PCI that previously were satisfied implicitly through dependencies on CONFIG_ACPI have to be specified directly. PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG depends on PCI but this dependency has not been mentioned in the Kconfig so add an explicit dependency here and fix WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG Depends on [n]: PCI [=n] Selected by [y]: - X86 [=y] Fixes: 5d32a66541c46 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190121231958.28255-2-okaya@kernel.org
2019-01-18x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PVJan Beulich1-2/+4
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case, and special care is needed. Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack. There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests. [ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ] Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5C3E1128020000780020DFAD@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com
2019-01-15x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failureDave Young2-0/+3
Commit b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") changed the behavior of kexec_locate_mem_hole(): it will try to allocate free memory only when kbuf.mem is initialized to zero. However, x86's kexec_file_load() implementation reuses a struct kexec_buf allocated on the stack and its kbuf.mem member gets set by each kexec_add_buffer() invocation. The second kexec_add_buffer() will reuse the same kbuf but not reinitialize kbuf.mem. Therefore, explictily reset kbuf.mem each time in order for kexec_locate_mem_hole() to locate a free memory region each time. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Fixes: b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me> Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181228011247.GA9999@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
2019-01-15x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof()Peng Hao1-2/+2
Using sizeof(pointer) for determining the size of a memset() only works when the size of the pointer and the size of type to which it points are the same. For pte_t this is only true for 64bit and 32bit-NONPAE. On 32bit PAE systems this is wrong as the pointer size is 4 byte but the PTE entry is 8 bytes. It's actually not a real world issue as this code depends on 64bit, but it's wrong nevertheless. Use sizeof(*p) for correctness sake. Fixes: aad983913d77 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()") Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1546065252-97996-1-git-send-email-peng.hao2@zte.com.cn
2019-01-15x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preservedDave Hansen1-10/+31
There was a bug where the per-mm pkey state was not being preserved across fork() in the child. fork() is performed in the pkey selftests, but all of the pkey activity is performed in the parent. The child does not perform any actions sensitive to pkey state. To make the test more sensitive to these kinds of bugs, add a fork() where the parent exits, and execution continues in the child. To achieve this let the key exhaustion test not terminate at the first allocation failure and fork after 2*NR_PKEYS loops and continue in the child. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215657.585704B7@viggo.jf.intel.com
2019-01-15x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()Dave Hansen1-0/+18
Memory protection key behavior should be the same in a child as it was in the parent before a fork. But, there is a bug that resets the state in the child at fork instead of preserving it. The creation of new mm's is a bit convoluted. At fork(), the code does: 1. memcpy() the parent mm to initialize child 2. mm_init() to initalize some select stuff stuff 3. dup_mmap() to create true copies that memcpy() did not do right For pkeys two bits of state need to be preserved across a fork: 'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map'. Those are preserved by the memcpy(), but mm_init() invokes init_new_context() which overwrites 'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map' with "new" values. The author of the code erroneously believed that init_new_context is *only* called at execve()-time. But, alas, init_new_context() is used at execve() and fork(). The result is that, after a fork(), the child's pkey state ends up looking like it does after an execve(), which is totally wrong. pkeys that are already allocated can be allocated again, for instance. To fix this, add code called by dup_mmap() to copy the pkey state from parent to child explicitly. Also add a comment above init_new_context() to make it more clear to the next poor sod what this code is used for. Fixes: e8c24d3a23a ("x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215655.7A69518C@viggo.jf.intel.com
2019-01-11x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parametersDaniel Drake1-2/+2
The outb() function takes parameters value and port, in that order. Fix the parameters used in the kalsr i8254 fallback code. Fixes: 5bfce5ef55cb ("x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions") Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux@endlessm.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107034024.15005-1-drake@endlessm.com
2019-01-11x86/intel/lpss: Make PCI dependency explicitSinan Kaya1-1/+1
After commit 5d32a66541c4 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") dependencies on CONFIG_PCI that previously were satisfied implicitly through dependencies on CONFIG_ACPI have to be specified directly. LPSS code relies on PCI infrastructure but this dependency has not been explicitly called out so do that. Fixes: 5d32a66541c46 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102181038.4418-11-okaya@kernel.org
2019-01-09x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINEWANG Chao4-4/+4
Commit 4cd24de3a098 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support") replaced the RETPOLINE define with CONFIG_RETPOLINE checks. Remove the remaining pieces. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 4cd24de3a098 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support") Signed-off-by: WANG Chao <chao.wang@ucloud.cn> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210163725.95977-1-chao.wang@ucloud.cn
2019-01-09x86/cache: Rename config option to CONFIG_X86_RESCTRLBorislav Petkov6-8/+8
CONFIG_RESCTRL is too generic. The final goal is to have a generic option called like this which is selected by the arch-specific ones CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL and CONFIG_ARM64_RESCTRL. The generic one will cover the resctrl filesystem and other generic and shared bits of functionality. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190108171401.GC12235@zn.tnic
2019-01-08samples/seccomp: Fix 32-bit buildTycho Andersen1-0/+1
Both the .o and the actual executable need to be built with -m32 in order to link correctly. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: fec7b6690541 ("samples: add an example of seccomp user trap") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107231631.1849-1-tycho@tycho.ws Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-01-06arch: restore generic-y += shmparam.h for some architecturesMasahiro Yamada7-0/+7
For some reasons, I accidentally got rid of "generic-y += shmparam.h" from some architectures. Restore them to fix building c6x, h8300, hexagon, m68k, microblaze, openrisc, and unicore32. Fixes: d6e4b3e326d8 ("arch: remove redundant UAPI generic-y defines") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-06Linux 5.0-rc1Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
2019-01-06Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pagesLinus Torvalds1-81/+13
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping". The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users shouldn't really even care about. So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be" part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use). In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code had a comment saying Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely. and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really comfortable. NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping that doesn't actually have any pages in it. I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the info leak is real. We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the information leak sanely. Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-06Fix 'acccess_ok()' on alpha and SHLinus Torvalds2-5/+10
Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'") broke both alpha and SH booting in qemu, as noticed by Guenter Roeck. It turns out that the bug wasn't actually in that commit itself (which would have been surprising: it was mostly a no-op), but in how the addition of access_ok() to the strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user() functions now triggered the case where those functions would test the access of the very last byte of the user address space. The string functions actually did that user range test before too, but they did it manually by just comparing against user_addr_max(). But with user_access_begin() doing the check (using "access_ok()"), it now exposed problems in the architecture implementations of that function. For example, on alpha, the access_ok() helper macro looked like this: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ ((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0) and what it basically tests is of any of the high bits get set (the USER_DS masking value is 0xfffffc0000000000). And that's completely wrong for the "addr+size" check. Because it's off-by-one for the case where we check to the very end of the user address space, which is exactly what the strn*_user() functions do. Why? Because "addr+size" will be exactly the size of the address space, so trying to access the last byte of the user address space will fail the __access_ok() check, even though it shouldn't. As a result, the user string accessor functions failed consistently - because they literally don't know how long the string is going to be, and the max access is going to be that last byte of the user address space. Side note: that alpha macro is buggy for another reason too - it re-uses the arguments twice. And SH has another version of almost the exact same bug: #define __addr_ok(addr) \ ((unsigned long __force)(addr) < current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg) so far so good: yes, a user address must be below the limit. But then: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ (__addr_ok((addr) + (size))) is wrong with the exact same off-by-one case: the case when "addr+size" is exactly _equal_ to the limit is actually perfectly fine (think "one byte access at the last address of the user address space") The SH version is actually seriously buggy in another way: it doesn't actually check for overflow, even though it did copy the _comment_ that talks about overflow. So it turns out that both SH and alpha actually have completely buggy implementations of access_ok(), but they happened to work in practice (although the SH overflow one is a serious serious security bug, not that anybody likely cares about SH security). This fixes the problems by using a similar macro on both alpha and SH. It isn't trying to be clever, the end address is based on this logic: unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; which basically says "add start and length, and then subtract one unless the length was zero". We can't subtract one for a zero length, or we'd just hit an underflow instead. For a lot of access_ok() users the length is a constant, so this isn't actually as expensive as it initially looks. Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-06fscrypt: add Adiantum supportEric Biggers7-188/+468
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06kconfig: rename generated .*conf-cfg to *conf-cfgMasahiro Yamada2-18/+19
Remove the dot-prefixing since it is just a matter of the .gitignore file. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: remove unnecessary stubs for archheader and archscriptsMasahiro Yamada1-5/+1
Make simply skips a missing rule when it is marked as .PHONY. Remove the dummy targets. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: use assignment instead of define ... endef for filechk_* rulesMasahiro Yamada6-26/+12
You do not have to use define ... endef for filechk_* rules. For simple cases, the use of assignment looks cleaner, IMHO. I updated the usage for scripts/Kbuild.include in case somebody misunderstands the 'define ... endif' is the requirement. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06arch: remove redundant UAPI generic-y definesMasahiro Yamada24-408/+0
Now that Kbuild automatically creates asm-generic wrappers for missing mandatory headers, it is redundant to list the same headers in generic-y and mandatory-y. Suggested-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2019-01-06kbuild: generate asm-generic wrappers if mandatory headers are missingMasahiro Yamada3-10/+10
Some time ago, Sam pointed out a certain degree of overwrap between generic-y and mandatory-y. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/7/10/121) I tweaked the meaning of mandatory-y a little bit; now it defines the minimum set of ASM headers that all architectures must have. If arch does not have specific implementation of a mandatory header, Kbuild will let it fallback to the asm-generic one by automatically generating a wrapper. This will allow to drop lots of redundant generic-y defines. Previously, "mandatory" was used in the context of UAPI, but I guess this can be extended to kernel space ASM headers. Suggested-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2019-01-06arch: remove stale comments "UAPI Header export list"Masahiro Yamada24-25/+0
These comments are leftovers of commit fcc8487d477a ("uapi: export all headers under uapi directories"). Prior to that commit, exported headers must be explicitly added to header-y. Now, all headers under the uapi/ directories are exported. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06riscv: remove redundant kernel-space generic-yMasahiro Yamada1-25/+0
This commit removes redundant generic-y defines in arch/riscv/include/asm/Kbuild. [1] It is redundant to define the same generic-y in both arch/$(ARCH)/include/asm/Kbuild and arch/$(ARCH)/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild. Remove the following generic-y: errno.h fcntl.h ioctl.h ioctls.h ipcbuf.h mman.h msgbuf.h param.h poll.h posix_types.h resource.h sembuf.h setup.h shmbuf.h signal.h socket.h sockios.h stat.h statfs.h swab.h termbits.h termios.h types.h [2] It is redundant to define generic-y when arch-specific implementation exists in arch/$(ARCH)/include/asm/*.h Remove the following generic-y: cacheflush.h module.h Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: change filechk to surround the given command with { }Masahiro Yamada7-12/+14
filechk_* rules often consist of multiple 'echo' lines. They must be surrounded with { } or ( ) to work correctly. Otherwise, only the string from the last 'echo' would be written into the target. Let's take care of that in the 'filechk' in scripts/Kbuild.include to clean up filechk_* rules. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: remove redundant target cleaning on failureMasahiro Yamada9-25/+16
Since commit 9c2af1c7377a ("kbuild: add .DELETE_ON_ERROR special target"), the target file is automatically deleted on failure. The boilerplate code ... || { rm -f $@; false; } is unneeded. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: clean up rule_dtc_dt_yamlMasahiro Yamada1-2/+2
Commit 3a2429e1faf4 ("kbuild: change if_changed_rule for multi-line recipe") and commit 4f0e3a57d6eb ("kbuild: Add support for DT binding schema checks") came in via different sub-systems. This is a follow-up cleanup. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kbuild: remove UIMAGE_IN and UIMAGE_OUTMasahiro Yamada1-4/+2
The only/last user of UIMAGE_IN/OUT was removed by commit 4722a3e6b716 ("microblaze: fix multiple bugs in arch/microblaze/boot/Makefile"). The input and output should always be $< and $@. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06jump_label: move 'asm goto' support test to KconfigMasahiro Yamada42-119/+65
Currently, CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL just means "I _want_ to use jump label". The jump label is controlled by HAVE_JUMP_LABEL, which is defined like this: #if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) && defined(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) # define HAVE_JUMP_LABEL #endif We can improve this by testing 'asm goto' support in Kconfig, then make JUMP_LABEL depend on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO. Ugly #ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL will go away, and CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL will match to the real kernel capability. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
2019-01-06kallsyms: lower alignment on ARMMathias Krause1-2/+2
As mentioned in the info pages of gas, the '.align' pseudo op's interpretation of the alignment value is architecture specific. It might either be a byte value or taken to the power of two. On ARM it's actually the latter which leads to unnecessary large alignments of 16 bytes for 32 bit builds or 256 bytes for 64 bit builds. Fix this by switching to '.balign' instead which is consistent across all architectures. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06scripts: coccinelle: boolinit: drop warnings on named constantsJulia Lawall1-0/+5
Coccinelle doesn't always have access to the values of named (#define) constants, and they may likely often be bound to true and false values anyway, resulting in false positives. So stop warning about them. Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06scripts: coccinelle: check for redeclarationJulia Lawall1-0/+3
Avoid reporting on the use of an iterator index variable when the variable is redeclared. Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06kconfig: remove unused "file" field of yylval unionMasahiro Yamada1-1/+0
This has never been used. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06nds32: remove redundant kernel-space generic-yMasahiro Yamada1-10/+0
This commit removes redundant generic-y defines in arch/nds32/include/asm/Kbuild. [1] It is redundant to define the same generic-y in both arch/$(ARCH)/include/asm/Kbuild and arch/$(ARCH)/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild. Remove the following generic-y: bitsperlong.h bpf_perf_event.h errno.h fcntl.h ioctl.h ioctls.h mman.h shmbuf.h stat.h [2] It is redundant to define generic-y when arch-specific implementation exists in arch/$(ARCH)/include/asm/*.h Remove the following generic-y: ftrace.h Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06nios2: remove unneeded HAS_DMA defineMasahiro Yamada1-3/+0
kernel/dma/Kconfig globally defines HAS_DMA as follows: config HAS_DMA bool depends on !NO_DMA default y Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-01-05lib/genalloc.c: include vmalloc.hOlof Johansson1-0/+1
Fixes build break on most ARM/ARM64 defconfigs: lib/genalloc.c: In function 'gen_pool_add_virt': lib/genalloc.c:190:10: error: implicit declaration of function 'vzalloc_node'; did you mean 'kzalloc_node'? lib/genalloc.c:190:8: warning: assignment to 'struct gen_pool_chunk *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion] lib/genalloc.c: In function 'gen_pool_destroy': lib/genalloc.c:254:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree'; did you mean 'kfree'? Fixes: 6862d2fc8185 ('lib/genalloc.c: use vzalloc_node() to allocate the bitmap') Cc: Huang Shijie <sjhuang@iluvatar.ai> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexey Skidanov <alexey.skidanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-05dma-direct: fix DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING for remapped allocationsChristoph Hellwig1-6/+7
We need to return a dma_addr_t even if we don't have a kernel mapping. Do so by consolidating the phys_to_dma call in a single place and jump to it from all the branches that return successfully. Fixes: bfd56cd60521 ("dma-mapping: support highmem in the generic remap allocator") Reported-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu@dudau.co.uk Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Tested-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu@dudau.co.uk>
2019-01-05x86/amd_gart: fix unmapping of non-GART mappingsChristoph Hellwig1-1/+9
In many cases we don't have to create a GART mapping at all, which also means there is nothing to unmap. Fix the range check that was incorrectly modified when removing the mapping_error method. Fixes: 9e8aa6b546 ("x86/amd_gart: remove the mapping_error dma_map_ops method") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Tested-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
2019-01-04ia64: fix compile without swiotlbChristoph Hellwig2-1/+3
Some non-generic ia64 configs don't build swiotlb, and thus should not pull in the generic non-coherent DMA infrastructure. Fixes: 68c608345c ("swiotlb: remove dma_mark_clean") Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04x86: re-introduce non-generic memcpy_{to,from}ioLinus Torvalds4-18/+51
This has been broken forever, and nobody ever really noticed because it's purely a performance issue. Long long ago, in commit 6175ddf06b61 ("x86: Clean up mem*io functions") Brian Gerst simplified the memory copies to and from iomem, since on x86, the instructions to access iomem are exactly the same as the regular instructions. That is technically true, and things worked, and nobody said anything. Besides, back then the regular memcpy was pretty simple and worked fine. Nobody noticed except for David Laight, that is. David has a testing a TLP monitor he was writing for an FPGA, and has been occasionally complaining about how memcpy_toio() writes things one byte at a time. Which is completely unacceptable from a performance standpoint, even if it happens to technically work. The reason it's writing one byte at a time is because while it's technically true that accesses to iomem are the same as accesses to regular memory on x86, the _granularity_ (and ordering) of accesses matter to iomem in ways that they don't matter to regular cached memory. In particular, when ERMS is set, we default to using "rep movsb" for larger memory copies. That is indeed perfectly fine for real memory, since the whole point is that the CPU is going to do cacheline optimizations and executes the memory copy efficiently for cached memory. With iomem? Not so much. With iomem, "rep movsb" will indeed work, but it will copy things one byte at a time. Slowly and ponderously. Now, originally, back in 2010 when commit 6175ddf06b61 was done, we didn't use ERMS, and this was much less noticeable. Our normal memcpy() was simpler in other ways too. Because in fact, it's not just about using the string instructions. Our memcpy() these days does things like "read and write overlapping values" to handle the last bytes of the copy. Again, for normal memory, overlapping accesses isn't an issue. For iomem? It can be. So this re-introduces the specialized memcpy_toio(), memcpy_fromio() and memset_io() functions. It doesn't particularly optimize them, but it tries to at least not be horrid, or do overlapping accesses. In fact, this uses the existing __inline_memcpy() function that we still had lying around that uses our very traditional "rep movsl" loop followed by movsw/movsb for the final bytes. Somebody may decide to try to improve on it, but if we've gone almost a decade with only one person really ever noticing and complaining, maybe it's not worth worrying about further, once it's not _completely_ broken? Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()Linus Torvalds1-31/+22
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in unsafe_put_user(). For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault); in the waitid() system call: movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2] It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that instruction faults. Before, we would generate this: xorl %edx, %edx movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3] testl %edx, %edx jne .L309 with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the 'testl' instruction. So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence, we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live across it all. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04x86 uaccess: Introduce __put_user_gotoLinus Torvalds1-11/+17
This is finally the actual reason for the odd error handling in the "unsafe_get/put_user()" functions, introduced over three years ago. Using a "jump to error label" interface is somewhat odd, but very convenient as a programming interface, and more importantly, it fits very well with simply making the target be the exception handler address directly from the inline asm. The reason it took over three years to actually do this? We need "asm goto" support for it, which only became the default on x86 last year. It's now been a year that we've forced asm goto support (see commit e501ce957a78 "x86: Force asm-goto"), and so let's just do it here too. [ Side note: this commit was originally done back in 2016. The above commentary about timing is obviously about it only now getting merged into my real upstream tree - Linus ] Sadly, gcc still only supports "asm goto" with asms that do not have any outputs, so we are limited to only the put_user case for this. Maybe in several more years we can do the get_user case too. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-05parisc: Remap hugepage-aligned pages in set_kernel_text_rw()Helge Deller1-2/+2
The alternative coding patch for parisc in kernel 4.20 broke booting machines with PA8500-PA8700 CPUs. The problem is, that for such machines the parisc kernel automatically utilizes huge pages to access kernel text code, but the set_kernel_text_rw() function, which is used shortly before applying any alternative patches, didn't used the correctly hugepage-aligned addresses to remap the kernel text read-writeable. Fixes: 3847dab77421 ("parisc: Add alternative coding infrastructure") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.20] Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
2019-01-04ARM: multi_v7_defconfig: enable CONFIG_UNIPHIER_MDMACMasahiro Yamada1-0/+1
Enable the UniPhier MIO DMAC driver. This is used as the DMA engine for accelerating the SD/eMMC controller drivers. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>