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Smatch Warning:
drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c:388 mcp_smbus_write() error: __memcpy()
'&mcp->txbuf[5]' too small (59 vs 255)
drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c:388 mcp_smbus_write() error: __memcpy() 'buf'
too small (34 vs 255)
The 'len' variable can take a value between 0-255 as it can come from
data->block[0] and it is user data. So add an bound check to prevent a
buffer overflow in memcpy().
Fixes: 67a95c21463d ("HID: mcp2221: add usb to i2c-smbus host bridge")
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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The trackpad of the given device sends continuous report of pointers
status as per wxn8 spec. However, the spec did not clarify when the
fingers are lifted so fast that between the interval of two report
frames fingers on pad reduced from >=2 to 0. The second last report
contains >=2 fingers with tip state 1 and the last report contains only
1 finger with tip state 0. Although this can happen unfrequently, a
quick fix will be improve the consistency to 100%. A quick fix is to
disable MT_QUIRK_ALWAYS_VALID and enable MT_QUIRK_NOT_SEEN_MEANS_UP.
Test for hid-tools is added in [1]
In addition to this, I2C device 04CA:00B1 may also need similar class
but with MT_QUIRK_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT disabled (but it does not harm to
enable it on non-multi-input device either). The respective owner has
been notified and a patch may coming soon after test.
[1]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libevdev/hid-tools/-/merge_requests/130
Signed-off-by: Tao Jin <tao-j@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Smatch warnings:
drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c:793 cp2112_xfer() error: __memcpy()
'data->block[1]' too small (33 vs 255)
drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c:793 cp2112_xfer() error: __memcpy() 'buf' too
small (64 vs 255)
The 'read_length' variable is provided by 'data->block[0]' which comes
from user and it(read_length) can take a value between 0-255. Add an
upper bound to 'read_length' variable to prevent a buffer overflow in
memcpy().
Fixes: 542134c0375b ("HID: cp2112: Fix I2C_BLOCK_DATA transactions")
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Similar to the Surface Go (1), the (Elantech) touchscreen/digitizer in
the Surface Go 2 mistakenly reports the battery of the stylus. Instead
of over the touchscreen device, battery information is provided via
bluetooth and the touchscreen device reports an empty battery.
Apply the HID_BATTERY_QUIRK_IGNORE quirk to ignore this battery and
prevent the erroneous low battery warnings.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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time_before deals with timer wrapping correctly.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiong <liqiong@nfschina.com>
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Delete the redundant word 'in'.
Signed-off-by: Xiang wangx <wangxiang@cdjrlc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Running kernel-doc script on drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c, it found
6 warnings for hid_dbg() wrapper functions below:
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:48: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst
* Dump tablet interface pen parameters with hid_dbg(), indented with one tab.
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:48: warning: missing initial short description on line:
* Dump tablet interface pen parameters with hid_dbg(), indented with one tab.
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:48: info: Scanning doc for function Dump
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:80: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst
* Dump tablet interface frame parameters with hid_dbg(), indented with two
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:80: warning: missing initial short description on line:
* Dump tablet interface frame parameters with hid_dbg(), indented with two
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:80: info: Scanning doc for function Dump
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:105: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst
* Dump tablet interface parameters with hid_dbg().
drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-params.c:105: warning: missing initial short description on line:
* Dump tablet interface parameters with hid_dbg().
One of them is reported by kernel test robot.
Fix these warnings by properly format kernel-doc comment for these
functions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202205272033.XFYlYj8k-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: a228809fa6f39c ("HID: uclogic: Move param printing to a function")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: José Expósito <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Nikolai Kondrashov <spbnick@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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JC_RUMBLE_ZERO_AMP_PKT_CNT is only used when force feedback support in
the driver is enabled. Place the declaration in the CONFIG_NINTENDO_FF
ifdef to avoid a warning when compiling without rumble support.
Signed-off-by: Daniel J. Ogorchock <djogorchock@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen <s.jegen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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When sensor discovery fails, this means that the system doesn't have
any sensors connected and a user should only be notified at most one time.
A message is already displayed at WARN level of "failed to discover,
sensors not enabled". It's pointless to show that the client init failed
at ERR level for the same condition.
Check the return code and don't display this message in those conditions.
Fixes: b5d7f43e97da ("HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery")
Reported-by: David Chang <David.Chang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Acked-by: Basavaraj Natikar <Basavaraj.Natikar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Touch switch state is received through WACOM_PAD_FIELD. However, it
is reported by touch_input. Don't register pad_input if no other pad
events require the interface.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ping Cheng <ping.cheng@wacom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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The generic routine, wacom_wac_pen_event, turns rotation value 90
degree anti-clockwise before posting the events. This non-zero
event trggers a non-zero ABS_Z event for non art pen tools. However,
HID_DG_TWIST is only supported by art pen.
[jkosina@suse.cz: fix build: add missing brace]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ping Cheng <ping.cheng@wacom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
--
Hi Jiri,
This is kind of a version 2 of the last one I posted two days ago.
I updated the logic so it has less changed lines: 29 vs 158! Hopefully,
the logic is easier to follow now. Please ignore the last one.
Thank you!
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being
read either because they are overwritten or the function ends.
Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Create a maintainer entry for CAAM trusted keys in the Linux keyring.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
encryption/decryption of user data.
This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM)
can be used to protect user-defined data across system reboot:
- When the system is fused and boots into secure state, the master
key is a unique never-disclosed device-specific key
- random key is encrypted by key derived from master key
- data is encrypted using the random key
- encrypted data and its encrypted random key are stored alongside
- This blob can now be safely stored in non-volatile memory
On next power-on:
- blob is loaded into CAAM
- CAAM writes decrypted data either into memory or key register
Add functions to realize encrypting and decrypting into memory alongside
the CAAM driver.
They will be used in a later commit as a source for the trusted key
seal/unseal mechanism.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Depending on SoC variant, a CAAM may be available, but with some futures
fused out. The LS1028A (non-E) SoC is one such SoC and while it
indicates BLOB support, BLOB operations will ultimately fail, because
there is no AES support. Add a new blob_present member to reflect
whether both BLOB support and the AES support it depends on is
available.
These will be used in a follow-up commit to allow blob driver
initialization to error out on SoCs without the necessary hardware
support instead of failing at runtime with a cryptic
caam_jr 8020000.jr: 20000b0f: CCB: desc idx 11: : Invalid CHA selected.
Co-developed-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:
- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience
Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.
Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it
depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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TPM2_GetCapability with a capability that has the property type value
of TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS returns a zero length list, when an Infineon
TPM2 is in field upgrade mode.
Since an Infineon TPM2.0 in field upgrade mode returns RC_SUCCESS on
TPM2_Startup, the field upgrade mode has to be detected by
TPM2_GetCapability.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Under certain conditions uninitialized memory will be accessed.
As described by TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Specification,
rev. 1.59 (Part 3: Commands), if a TPM2_GetCapability is received,
requesting a capability, the TPM in field upgrade mode may return a
zero length list.
Check the property count in tpm2_get_tpm_pt().
Fixes: 2ab3241161b3 ("tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in an error
message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make a
difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
As tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() emits an error message already and the
additional error message by the i2c core doesn't add any useful
information, change the return value to zero to suppress this error
message.
Note that if i2c_clientdata is NULL, there is something really fishy.
Assuming no memory corruption happened (then all bets are lost anyhow),
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() is only called after tpm_cr50_i2c_probe() returned
successfully. So there was a tpm chip registered before and after
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() its privdata is freed but the associated character
device isn't removed. If after that happened userspace accesses the
character device it's likely that the freed memory is accessed. For that
reason the warning message is made a bit more frightening.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Accept one additional numerical value of DID:VID for next generation
Google TPM with new firmware, to be used in future Chromebooks.
The TPM with the new firmware has the code name TI50, and is going to
use the same interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Jes B. Klinke <jbk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Only tpm_tis and tpm_tis_synquacer have a dedicated way to access
multiple bytes at once, every other driver will just fall back to
read_bytes/write_bytes. Therefore, remove the read16/read32/write32
calls and move their logic to read_bytes/write_bytes.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Holland <johannes.holland@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return
an error code instead.
Fixes: d8d74ea3c002 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Return boolean values ("true" or "false") instead of 1 or 0 from bool
functions.
Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
errors. This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322111323.542184-2-mic@digikod.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjeW2r6Wv55Du0bJ@iki.fi
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-3-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist
key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Let's help users by documenting how to enable and check for Landlock in
the kernel and the running system. The userspace-api section may not be
the best place for this but it still makes sense to put all the user
documentation at the same place.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513112743.156414-1-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Summarize the rationale of filesystem access rights according to the
file type.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-13-mic@digikod.net
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Explain how to set access rights per hierarchy in an efficient and safe
way, especially with the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER side effect (i.e.
partial ordering and constraints for access rights per hierarchy).
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-12-mic@digikod.net
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Add LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER in the example and properly check to only
use it if the current kernel support it thanks to the Landlock ABI
version.
Move the file renaming and linking limitation to a new "Previous
limitations" section.
Improve documentation about the backward and forward compatibility,
including the rational for ruleset's handled_access_fs.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-11-mic@digikod.net
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Add LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER to the "roughly write" access rights and
leverage the Landlock ABI version to only try to enforce it if it is
supported by the running kernel.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-10-mic@digikod.net
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These test suites try to check all edge cases for directory and file
renaming or linking involving a new parent directory, with and without
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and other access rights.
layout1:
* reparent_refer: Tests simple FS_REFER usage.
* reparent_link: Tests a mix of FS_MAKE_REG and FS_REFER with links.
* reparent_rename: Tests a mix of FS_MAKE_REG and FS_REFER with renames
and RENAME_EXCHANGE.
* reparent_exdev_layers_rename1/2: Tests renames with two layers.
* reparent_exdev_layers_exchange1/2/3: Tests exchanges with two layers.
* reparent_remove: Tests file and directory removal with rename.
* reparent_dom_superset: Tests access partial ordering.
layout1_bind:
* reparent_cross_mount: Tests FS_REFER propagation across mount points.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 95.4% of 604 lines according to
gcc/gcov-11.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-9-mic@digikod.net
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Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers
to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a
specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed
with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename,
and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This
lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an
inode.
Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed,
whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not
considered a threat to user data.
However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent
directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly.
Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by
being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure
that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory
itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is
not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible
for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking
it.
Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the
destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users.
Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to
require such destination access right to be also granted to the source
(to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to
the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination.
See the provided documentation for additional details.
New tests are provided with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-8-mic@digikod.net
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In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and
RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the
rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the
switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs
using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock,
reduce the number of path walks).
AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This
should not change the current behavior (same check order), except
(different level of) speed boosts.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net
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Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone
is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following
commit.
Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new
code provided by a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-6-mic@digikod.net
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The original behavior was to check if the full set of requested accesses
was allowed by at least a rule of every relevant layer. This didn't
take into account requests for multiple accesses and same-layer rules
allowing the union of these accesses in a complementary way. As a
result, multiple accesses requested on a file hierarchy matching rules
that, together, allowed these accesses, but without a unique rule
allowing all of them, was illegitimately denied. This case should be
rare in practice and it can only be triggered by the path_rename or
file_open hook implementations.
For instance, if, for the same layer, a rule allows execution
beneath /a/b and another rule allows read beneath /a, requesting access
to read and execute at the same time for /a/b should be allowed for this
layer.
This was an inconsistency because the union of same-layer rule accesses
was already allowed if requested once at a time anyway.
This fix changes the way allowed accesses are gathered over a path walk.
To take into account all these rule accesses, we store in a matrix all
layer granting the set of requested accesses, according to the handled
accesses. To avoid heap allocation, we use an array on the stack which
is 2*13 bytes. A following commit bringing the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
access right will increase this size to reach 112 bytes (2*14*4) in case
of link or rename actions.
Add a new layout1.layer_rule_unions test to check that accesses from
different rules pertaining to the same layer are ORed in a file
hierarchy. Also test that it is not the case for rules from different
layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-5-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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This refactoring will be useful in a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-4-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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The maximum number of nested Landlock domains is currently 64. Because
of the following fix and to help reduce the stack size, let's reduce it
to 16. This seems large enough for a lot of use cases (e.g. sandboxed
init service, spawning a sandboxed SSH service, in nested sandboxed
containers). Reducing the number of nested domains may also help to
discover misuse of Landlock (e.g. creating a domain per rule).
Add and use a dedicated layer_mask_t typedef to fit with the number of
layers. This might be useful when changing it and to keep it consistent
with the maximum number of layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-3-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Create and use the access_mask_t typedef to enforce a consistent access
mask size and uniformly use a 16-bits type. This will helps transition
to a 32-bits value one day.
Add a build check to make sure all (filesystem) access rights fit in.
This will be extended with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-2-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Add inval_create_ruleset_arguments, extension of
inval_create_ruleset_flags, to also check error ordering for
landlock_create_ruleset(2).
This is similar to the previous commit checking landlock_add_rule(2).
Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.4% of 504 lines accorging to
gcc/gcov-11.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-11-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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According to the Landlock goal to be a security feature available to
unprivileges processes, it makes more sense to first check for
no_new_privs before checking anything else (i.e. syscall arguments).
Merge inval_fd_enforce and unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs tests
into the new restrict_self_checks_ordering. This is similar to the
previous commit checking other syscalls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-10-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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This makes more sense to first check the ruleset FD and then the rule
attribute. It will be useful to factor out code for other rule types.
Add inval_add_rule_arguments tests, extension of empty_path_beneath_attr
tests, to also check error ordering for landlock_add_rule(2).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-9-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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The O_PATH flag is currently not handled by Landlock. Let's make sure
this behavior will remain consistent with the same ruleset over time.
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-8-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Harshit Mogalapalli
Tao Jin
Maximilian Luz
Li Qiong
Xiang wangx
Bagas Sanjaya
Daniel J. Ogorchock
Mario Limonciello
Ping Cheng
Daniel Thompson
Michal Orzel
Ahmad Fatoum
Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann
Uwe Kleine-König
Jes B. Klinke
Johannes Holland
Xiu Jianfeng
Haowen Bai
Mickaël Salaün
Mickaël Salaün