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Commit a699449bb13b ("printk: refactor and rework printing logic")
removed the need for @nr_ext_console_drivers. Remove the unneeded
variable.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220924000454.3319186-4-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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kernel/printk/printk.c:365:1: warning: symbol 'log_wait' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220924000454.3319186-3-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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No user outside the printk code and no reason to export this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220924000454.3319186-2-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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The console_stop() and console_start() functions call pr_flush().
When suspending, these functions are called by the serial subsystem
while the serial port is suspended. In this scenario, if there are
any pending messages, a call to pr_flush() will always result in a
timeout because the serial port cannot make forward progress. This
causes longer suspend and resume times.
Add a check in pr_flush() so that it will immediately timeout if
the consoles are suspended.
Fixes: 3b604ca81202 ("printk: add pr_flush()")
Reported-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715061042.373640-2-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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This reverts commit 2bb2b7b57f81255c13f4395ea911d6bdc70c9fe2.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-7-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit 09c5ba0aa2fcfdadb17d045c3ee6f86d69270df7.
This reverts commit b87f02307d3cfbda768520f0687c51ca77e14fc3.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-6-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit 8e274732115f63c1d09136284431b3555bd5cc56.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-5-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit ab406816fca009349b89cbde885daf68a8c77e33.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-4-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit c3230283e2819a69dad2cf7a63143fde8bab8b5c.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-3-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit b87f02307d3cfbda768520f0687c51ca77e14fc3.
The testing of 5.19 release candidates revealed missing synchronization
between early and regular console functionality.
It would be possible to start the console kthreads later as a workaround.
But it is clear that console lock serialized console drivers between
each other. It opens a big area of possible problems that were not
considered by people involved in the development and review.
printk() is crucial for debugging kernel issues and console output is
very important part of it. The number of consoles is huge and a proper
review would take some time. As a result it need to be reverted for 5.19.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YrBdjVwBOVgLfHyb@alley
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623145157.21938-2-pmladek@suse.com
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There are reports that the console kthreads block the global console
lock when the system is going down, for example, reboot, panic.
First part of the solution was to block kthreads in these problematic
system states so they stopped handling newly added messages.
Second part of the solution is to wait when for the kthreads when
they are actively printing. It solves the problem when a message
was printed before the system entered the problematic state and
the kthreads managed to step in.
A busy waiting has to be used because panic() can be called in any
context and in an unknown state of the scheduler.
There must be a timeout because the kthread might get stuck or sleeping
and never release the lock. The timeout 10s is an arbitrary value
inspired by the softlockup timeout.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610205038.GA3050413@paulmck-ThinkPad-P17-Gen-1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAMdYzYpF4FNTBPZsEFeWRuEwSies36QM_As8osPWZSr2q-viEA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220615162805.27962-3-pmladek@suse.com
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There are known situations when the console kthreads are not
reliable or does not work in principle, for example, early boot,
panic, shutdown.
For these situations there is the direct (legacy) mode when printk() tries
to get console_lock() and flush the messages directly. It works very well
during the early boot when the console kthreads are not available at all.
It gets more complicated in the other situations when console kthreads
might be actively printing and block console_trylock() in printk().
The same problem is in the legacy code as well. Any console_lock()
owner could block console_trylock() in printk(). It is solved by
a trick that the current console_lock() owner is responsible for
printing all pending messages. It is actually the reason why there
is the risk of softlockups and why the console kthreads were
introduced.
The console kthreads use the same approach. They are responsible
for printing the messages by definition. So that they handle
the messages anytime when they are awake and see new ones.
The global console_lock is available when there is nothing
to do.
It should work well when the problematic context is correctly
detected and printk() switches to the direct mode. But it seems
that it is not enough in practice. There are reports that
the messages are not printed during panic() or shutdown()
even though printk() tries to use the direct mode here.
The problem seems to be that console kthreads become active in these
situation as well. They steel the job before other CPUs are stopped.
Then they are stopped in the middle of the job and block the global
console_lock.
First part of the solution is to block console kthreads when
the system is in a problematic state and requires the direct
printk() mode.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610205038.GA3050413@paulmck-ThinkPad-P17-Gen-1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAMdYzYpF4FNTBPZsEFeWRuEwSies36QM_As8osPWZSr2q-viEA@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220615162805.27962-2-pmladek@suse.com
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This reverts commit 938ba4084abcf6fdd21d9078513c52f8fb9b00d0.
The wait queue @log_wait never has exclusive waiters, so there
is no need to use wake_up_interruptible_all(). Using
wake_up_interruptible() was the correct function to wake all
waiters.
Since there are no exclusive waiters, erroneously changing
wake_up_interruptible() to wake_up_interruptible_all() did not
result in any behavior change. However, using
wake_up_interruptible_all() on a wait queue without exclusive
waiters is fundamentally wrong.
Go back to using wake_up_interruptible() to wake all waiters.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526203056.81123-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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Commit c724c866bb70 ("linux/types.h: remove unnecessary __bitwise__")
was right that there are no users of __bitwise__ in the kernel, but it
turns out there are user space users of it that do expect it.
It is, after all, in the uapi directory, so user space usage is to be
expected.
Instead of reverting the commit completely, let's just clarify the
situation so that it doesn't happen again, and have some in-code
explanations for why that "__bitwise__" still exists.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b5c0a68d-8387-4909-beea-f70ab9e6e3d5@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit b2a90f4fcb14 ("media: lirc: remove unused lirc features") removed
feature flags which were never implemented, but they are still used by
the lirc daemon went built from source.
Reinstate these symbols in order not to break the lirc build.
Fixes: b2a90f4fcb14 ("media: lirc: remove unused lirc features")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a0470450-ecfd-2918-e04a-7b57c1fd7694@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Make the test_dummy_encryption mount option require that the encrypt
feature flag be already enabled on the filesystem, rather than
automatically enabling it. Practically, this means that "-O encrypt"
will need to be included in MKFS_OPTIONS when running xfstests with the
test_dummy_encryption mount option. (ext4/053 also needs an update.)
Moreover, as long as the preconditions for test_dummy_encryption are
being tightened anyway, take the opportunity to start rejecting it when
!CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION rather than ignoring it.
The motivation for requiring the encrypt feature flag is that:
- Having the filesystem auto-enable feature flags is problematic, as it
bypasses the usual sanity checks. The specific issue which came up
recently is that in kernel versions where ext4 supports casefold but
not encrypt+casefold (v5.1 through v5.10), the kernel will happily add
the encrypt flag to a filesystem that has the casefold flag, making it
unmountable -- but only for subsequent mounts, not the initial one.
This confused the casefold support detection in xfstests, causing
generic/556 to fail rather than be skipped.
- The xfstests-bld test runners (kvm-xfstests et al.) already use the
required mkfs flag, so they will not be affected by this change. Only
users of test_dummy_encryption alone will be affected. But, this
option has always been for testing only, so it should be fine to
require that the few users of this option update their test scripts.
- f2fs already requires it (for its equivalent feature flag).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519204437.61645-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__es_tree_search+0x1e0/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:217
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_es_cache_extent+0x109/0x340 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:766
ext4_cache_extents+0x239/0x2e0 fs/ext4/extents.c:561
ext4_find_extent+0x6b7/0xa20 fs/ext4/extents.c:964
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x16b/0x4b70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4384
ext4_map_blocks+0xe26/0x19f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:567
ext4_getblk+0x320/0x4c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:980
ext4_bread+0x2d/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:1031
ext4_quota_read+0x248/0x320 fs/ext4/super.c:6257
v2_read_header+0x78/0x110 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:63
v2_check_quota_file+0x76/0x230 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:82
vfs_load_quota_inode+0x5d1/0x1530 fs/quota/dquot.c:2368
dquot_enable+0x28a/0x330 fs/quota/dquot.c:2490
ext4_quota_enable fs/ext4/super.c:6137 [inline]
ext4_enable_quotas+0x5d7/0x960 fs/ext4/super.c:6163
ext4_fill_super+0xa7c9/0xdc00 fs/ext4/super.c:4754
mount_bdev+0x2e9/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1158
mount_fs+0x4b/0x1e4 fs/super.c:1261
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_enable_quotas
ext4_quota_enable
ext4_iget
__ext4_iget
ext4_ext_check_inode
ext4_ext_check
__ext4_ext_check
ext4_valid_extent_entries
Check for overlapping extents does't take effect
dquot_enable
vfs_load_quota_inode
v2_check_quota_file
v2_read_header
ext4_quota_read
ext4_bread
ext4_getblk
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_find_extent
ext4_cache_extents
ext4_es_cache_extent
ext4_es_cache_extent
__es_tree_search
ext4_es_end
BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk)
The error ext4 extents is as follows:
0af3 0300 0400 0000 00000000 extent_header
00000000 0100 0000 12000000 extent1
00000000 0100 0000 18000000 extent2
02000000 0400 0000 14000000 extent3
In the ext4_valid_extent_entries function,
if prev is 0, no error is returned even if lblock<=prev.
This was intended to skip the check on the first extent, but
in the error image above, prev=0+1-1=0 when checking the second extent,
so even though lblock<=prev, the function does not return an error.
As a result, bug_ON occurs in __es_tree_search and the system panics.
To solve this problem, we only need to check that:
1. The lblock of the first extent is not less than 0.
2. The lblock of the next extent is not less than
the next block of the previous extent.
The same applies to extent_idx.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 5946d089379a ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518120816.1541863-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree
stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting
tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node
split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by
verifying traversed block numbers are unique.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Before splitting a directory block verify its directory entries are sane
so that the splitting code does not access memory it should not.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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The EXT4_FC_REPLAY bit in sbi->s_mount_state is used to indicate that
we are in the middle of replay the fast commit journal. This was
actually a mistake, since the sbi->s_mount_info is initialized from
es->s_state. Arguably s_mount_state is misleadingly named, but the
name is historical --- s_mount_state and s_state dates back to ext2.
What should have been used is the ext4_{set,clear,test}_mount_flag()
inline functions, which sets EXT4_MF_* bits in sbi->s_mount_flags.
The problem with using EXT4_FC_REPLAY is that a maliciously corrupted
superblock could result in EXT4_FC_REPLAY getting set in
s_mount_state. This bypasses some sanity checks, and this can trigger
a BUG() in ext4_es_cache_extent(). As a easy-to-backport-fix, filter
out the EXT4_FC_REPLAY bit for now. We should eventually transition
away from EXT4_FC_REPLAY to something like EXT4_MF_REPLAY.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420192312.1655305-1-phind.uet@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517174028.942119-1-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+c7358a3cd05ee786eb31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
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Before this patch, function bh_get used block_map to figure out the
block it needed to read in from the quota_change file. This patch
changes it to use iomap directly to make it more efficient.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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Before this patch, functions gfs2_qa_get and _put used the i_rw_mutex to
prevent simultaneous access to its i_qadata. But i_rw_mutex is now used
for many other things, including iomap_begin and end, which causes a
conflict according to lockdep. We cannot just remove the lock since
simultaneous opens (gfs2_open -> gfs2_open_common -> gfs2_qa_get) can
then stomp on each others values for i_qadata.
This patch solves the conflict by using the i_lock spin_lock in the inode
to prevent simultaneous access.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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The bug that 27ca8273f ("gfs2: Make sure FITRIM minlen is rounded up to
fs block size") fixes was a little confusing as the user saw
"Input/output error" which masked the -EINVAL that sb_issue_discard()
returned.
sb_issue_discard() can fail for various reasons, so we should return its
return value from gfs2_rgrp_send_discards() to avoid all errors being
reported as IO errors.
This improves error reporting for FITRIM and makes no difference to the
-o discard code path because the return value from
gfs2_rgrp_send_discards() gets thrown away in that case (and the option
switches off). Presumably that's why it was ok to just return -EIO in
the past, before FITRIM was implemented.
Tested with xfstests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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Clang's structure layout randomization feature gets upset when it sees
struct address_space (which is randomized) cast to struct gfs2_glock.
This is due to seeing the mapping pointer as being treated as an array
of gfs2_glock, rather than "something else, before struct address_space":
In file included from fs/gfs2/acl.c:23:
fs/gfs2/meta_io.h:44:12: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct address_space *' to 'struct gfs2_glock *'
return (((struct gfs2_glock *)mapping) - 1)->gl_name.ln_sbd;
^
Replace the instances of open-coded pointer math with container_of()
usage, and update the allocator to match.
Some cleanups and conversion of gfs2_glock_get() and
gfs2_glock_dealloc() by Andreas.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202205041550.naKxwCBj-lkp@intel.com
Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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Add some comments explaining the oddities of partial direct I/O reads
and writes.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 87c9ce3ffec9 ("zonefs: Add active seq file accounting") wrongly
changed zonefs_init_file_inode() to always return 0 even if the call to
zonefs_zone_mgmt() fails. Fix this by propagating zonefs_zone_mgmt()
return value as the return value for zonefs_init_file_inode().
Fixes: 87c9ce3ffec9 ("zonefs: Add active seq file accounting")
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
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Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being
read either because they are overwritten or the function ends.
Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Create a maintainer entry for CAAM trusted keys in the Linux keyring.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
encryption/decryption of user data.
This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM)
can be used to protect user-defined data across system reboot:
- When the system is fused and boots into secure state, the master
key is a unique never-disclosed device-specific key
- random key is encrypted by key derived from master key
- data is encrypted using the random key
- encrypted data and its encrypted random key are stored alongside
- This blob can now be safely stored in non-volatile memory
On next power-on:
- blob is loaded into CAAM
- CAAM writes decrypted data either into memory or key register
Add functions to realize encrypting and decrypting into memory alongside
the CAAM driver.
They will be used in a later commit as a source for the trusted key
seal/unseal mechanism.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Depending on SoC variant, a CAAM may be available, but with some futures
fused out. The LS1028A (non-E) SoC is one such SoC and while it
indicates BLOB support, BLOB operations will ultimately fail, because
there is no AES support. Add a new blob_present member to reflect
whether both BLOB support and the AES support it depends on is
available.
These will be used in a follow-up commit to allow blob driver
initialization to error out on SoCs without the necessary hardware
support instead of failing at runtime with a cryptic
caam_jr 8020000.jr: 20000b0f: CCB: desc idx 11: : Invalid CHA selected.
Co-developed-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:
- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience
Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.
Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it
depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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TPM2_GetCapability with a capability that has the property type value
of TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS returns a zero length list, when an Infineon
TPM2 is in field upgrade mode.
Since an Infineon TPM2.0 in field upgrade mode returns RC_SUCCESS on
TPM2_Startup, the field upgrade mode has to be detected by
TPM2_GetCapability.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Under certain conditions uninitialized memory will be accessed.
As described by TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Specification,
rev. 1.59 (Part 3: Commands), if a TPM2_GetCapability is received,
requesting a capability, the TPM in field upgrade mode may return a
zero length list.
Check the property count in tpm2_get_tpm_pt().
Fixes: 2ab3241161b3 ("tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in an error
message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make a
difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
As tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() emits an error message already and the
additional error message by the i2c core doesn't add any useful
information, change the return value to zero to suppress this error
message.
Note that if i2c_clientdata is NULL, there is something really fishy.
Assuming no memory corruption happened (then all bets are lost anyhow),
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() is only called after tpm_cr50_i2c_probe() returned
successfully. So there was a tpm chip registered before and after
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() its privdata is freed but the associated character
device isn't removed. If after that happened userspace accesses the
character device it's likely that the freed memory is accessed. For that
reason the warning message is made a bit more frightening.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Accept one additional numerical value of DID:VID for next generation
Google TPM with new firmware, to be used in future Chromebooks.
The TPM with the new firmware has the code name TI50, and is going to
use the same interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Jes B. Klinke <jbk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Only tpm_tis and tpm_tis_synquacer have a dedicated way to access
multiple bytes at once, every other driver will just fall back to
read_bytes/write_bytes. Therefore, remove the read16/read32/write32
calls and move their logic to read_bytes/write_bytes.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Holland <johannes.holland@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return
an error code instead.
Fixes: d8d74ea3c002 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Return boolean values ("true" or "false") instead of 1 or 0 from bool
functions.
Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
errors. This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322111323.542184-2-mic@digikod.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjeW2r6Wv55Du0bJ@iki.fi
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-3-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist
key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Let's help users by documenting how to enable and check for Landlock in
the kernel and the running system. The userspace-api section may not be
the best place for this but it still makes sense to put all the user
documentation at the same place.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513112743.156414-1-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Summarize the rationale of filesystem access rights according to the
file type.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-13-mic@digikod.net
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Thomas Gleixner
John Ogness
Petr Mladek
Linus Torvalds
Sean Young
Eric Biggers
Baokun Li
Jan Kara
Theodore Ts'o
Bob Peterson
Andrew Price
Kees Cook
Andreas Gruenbacher
Daniel Thompson
Damien Le Moal
Michal Orzel
Ahmad Fatoum
Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann
Uwe Kleine-König
Jes B. Klinke
Johannes Holland
Xiu Jianfeng
Haowen Bai
Mickaël Salaün
Mickaël Salaün