| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Enable generic ioctls to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-22-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Enable the init helpers to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-21-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Enable the setfl() helper to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-20-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Enable the vfs_utimes() helper to handle idmapped mounts by passing down
the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed
nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as
before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-19-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When binding a non-abstract AF_UNIX socket it will gain a representation
in the filesystem. Enable the socket infrastructure to handle idmapped
mounts by passing down the user namespace of the mount the socket will
be created from. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes
so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-18-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
For core file operations such as changing directories or chrooting,
determining file access, changing mode or ownership the vfs will verify
that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend the various helpers
to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions
checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. When changing file
ownership we need to map the uid and gid from the mount's user
namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-17-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged
over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is
accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's
user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The various vfs_*() helpers are called by filesystems or by the vfs
itself to perform core operations such as create, link, mkdir, mknod, rename,
rmdir, tmpfile and unlink. Enable them to handle idmapped mounts. If the
inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace and pass it down. Afterwards the checks and
operations are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-15-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
In order to handle idmapped mounts we will extend the vfs rename helper
to take two new arguments in follow up patches. Since this operations
already takes a bunch of arguments add a simple struct renamedata and
make the current helper use it before we extend it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-14-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The may_follow_link(), may_linkat(), may_lookup(), may_open(),
may_o_create(), may_create_in_sticky(), may_delete(), and may_create()
helpers determine whether the caller is privileged enough to perform the
associated operations. Let them handle idmapped mounts by mapping the
inode or fsids according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the
checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. The patch takes care to
retrieve the mount's user namespace right before performing permission
checks and passing it down into the fileystem so the user namespace
can't change in between by someone idmapping a mount that is currently
not idmapped. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-13-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The generic_fillattr() helper fills in the basic attributes associated
with an inode. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is
accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user
namespace before we store the uid and gid. If the initial user namespace
is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-12-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Add simple helpers to make it easy to map kuids into and from idmapped
mounts. We provide simple wrappers that filesystems can use to e.g.
initialize inodes similar to i_{uid,gid}_read() and i_{uid,gid}_write().
Accessing an inode through an idmapped mount maps the i_uid and i_gid of
the inode to the mount's user namespace. If the fsids are used to
initialize inodes they are unmapped according to the mount's user
namespace. Passing the initial user namespace to these helpers makes
them a nop and so any non-idmapped paths will not be impacted.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user
namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the
ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default
all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial
user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All
operations behave as before.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to
setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
Later patches enforce that once a mount has been idmapped it can't be
remapped. This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management
simple. Users wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new
detached mount with a different idmapping.
Add a new mnt_userns member to vfsmount and two simple helpers to
retrieve the mnt_userns from vfsmounts and files.
The idea to attach user namespaces to vfsmounts has been floated around
in various forms at Linux Plumbers in ~2018 with the original idea
tracing back to a discussion in 2017 at a conference in St. Petersburg
between Christoph, Tycho, and myself.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
|
|
So technically there is nothing wrong with adding a pinned page to the
swap cache, but the pinning obviously means that the page can't actually
be free'd right now anyway, so it's a bit pointless.
However, the real problem is not with it being a bit pointless: the real
issue is that after we've added it to the swap cache, we'll try to unmap
the page. That will succeed, because the code in mm/rmap.c doesn't know
or care about pinned pages.
Even the unmapping isn't fatal per se, since the page will stay around
in memory due to the pinning, and we do hold the connection to it using
the swap cache. But when we then touch it next and take a page fault,
the logic in do_swap_page() will map it back into the process as a
possibly read-only page, and we'll then break the page association on
the next COW fault.
Honestly, this issue could have been fixed in any of those other places:
(a) we could refuse to unmap a pinned page (which makes conceptual
sense), or (b) we could make sure to re-map a pinned page writably in
do_swap_page(), or (c) we could just make do_wp_page() not COW the
pinned page (which was what we historically did before that "mm:
do_wp_page() simplification" commit).
But while all of them are equally valid models for breaking this chain,
not putting pinned pages into the swap cache in the first place is the
simplest one by far.
It's also the safest one: the reason why do_wp_page() was changed in the
first place was that getting the "can I re-use this page" wrong is so
fraught with errors. If you do it wrong, you end up with an incorrectly
shared page.
As a result, using "page_maybe_dma_pinned()" in either do_wp_page() or
do_swap_page() would be a serious bug since it is only a (very good)
heuristic. Re-using the page requires a hard black-and-white rule with
no room for ambiguity.
In contrast, saying "this page is very likely dma pinned, so let's not
add it to the swap cache and try to unmap it" is an obviously safe thing
to do, and if the heuristic might very rarely be a false positive, no
harm is done.
Fixes: 09854ba94c6a ("mm: do_wp_page() simplification")
Reported-and-tested-by: Martin Raiber <martin@urbackup.org>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Turning a pinned page read-only breaks the pinning after COW. Don't do it.
The whole "track page soft dirty" state doesn't work with pinned pages
anyway, since the page might be dirtied by the pinning entity without
ever being noticed in the page tables.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Turning page table entries read-only requires the mmap_sem held for
writing.
So stop doing the odd games with turning things from read locks to write
locks and back. Just get the write lock.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Linux kernel can only map 1GB of address space for RV32 as the page offset
is set to 0xC0000000. The current description in the Kconfig is confusing
as it indicates that RV32 can support 2GB of physical memory. That is
simply not true for current kernel. In future, a 2GB split support can be
added to allow 2GB physical address space.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
|
|
Currently, linux kernel can not use last 4k bytes of addressable space
because IS_ERR_VALUE macro treats those as an error. This will be an issue
for RV32 as any memblock allocator potentially allocate chunk of memory
from the end of DRAM (2GB) leading bad address error even though the
address was technically valid.
Fix this issue by limiting the memblock if available memory spans the
entire address space.
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
|
|
Currently, resource tree allocates memory blocks while iterating on the
list. It leads to following kernel warning because memblock allocation
also invokes memory block reservation API.
[ 0.000000] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/resource.c:795
__insert_resource+0x8e/0xd0
[ 0.000000] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted
5.10.0-00022-ge20097fb37e2-dirty #549
[ 0.000000] epc: c00125c2 ra : c001262c sp : c1c01f50
[ 0.000000] gp : c1d456e0 tp : c1c0a980 t0 : ffffcf20
[ 0.000000] t1 : 00000000 t2 : 00000000 s0 : c1c01f60
[ 0.000000] s1 : ffffcf00 a0 : ffffff00 a1 : c1c0c0c4
[ 0.000000] a2 : 80c12b15 a3 : 80402000 a4 : 80402000
[ 0.000000] a5 : c1c0c0c4 a6 : 80c12b15 a7 : f5faf600
[ 0.000000] s2 : c1c0c0c4 s3 : c1c0e000 s4 : c1009a80
[ 0.000000] s5 : c1c0c000 s6 : c1d48000 s7 : c1613b4c
[ 0.000000] s8 : 00000fff s9 : 80000200 s10: c1613b40
[ 0.000000] s11: 00000000 t3 : c1d4a000 t4 : ffffffff
This is also unnecessary as we can pre-compute the total memblocks required
for each memory region and allocate it before the loop. It save precious
boot time not going through memblock allocation code every time.
Fixes: 00ab027a3b82 ("RISC-V: Add kernel image sections to the resource tree")
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
|
|
sizeof needs to be called on the compat pointer, not the native one.
Fixes: 89cd35c58bc2 ("iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
If we enter with requests pending and performm cancelations, we'll have
a different inflight count before and after calling prepare_to_wait().
This causes the loop to restart. If we actually ended up canceling
everything, or everything completed in-between, then we'll break out
of the loop without calling finish_wait() on the waitqueue. This can
trigger a warning on exit_signals(), as we leave the task state in
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE.
Put a finish_wait() after the loop to catch that case.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
When 'perf inject' reads a perf.data file from an older version of perf,
it writes event attributes into the output with the original size field,
but lays them out as if they had the size currently used. Readers see a
corrupt file. Update the size field to match the layout.
Signed-off-by: Al Grant <al.grant@foss.arm.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124195818.30603-1-al.grant@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
In some cases, the number of cpus (nr_cpus_online) is confused with the
maximum cpu number (nr_cpus_avail), which results in the error in the
example below:
Example on system with 8 cpus:
Before:
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu2/online
# ./perf record --kcore -e intel_pt// taskset --cpu-list 7 uname
Linux
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.147 MB perf.data ]
# ./perf script --itrace=e
Requested CPU 7 too large. Consider raising MAX_NR_CPUS
0x25908 [0x8]: failed to process type: 68 [Invalid argument]
After:
# ./perf script --itrace=e
#
Fixes: 8c7274691f0d ("perf machine: Replace MAX_NR_CPUS with perf_env::nr_cpus_online")
Fixes: 7df4e36a4785 ("perf session: Replace MAX_NR_CPUS with perf_env::nr_cpus_online")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210107174159.24897-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
As of now it doesn't consider cgroups when collecting shadow stats and
metrics so counter values from different cgroups will be saved in a same
slot. This resulted in incorrect numbers when those cgroups have
different workloads.
For example, let's look at the scenario below: cgroups A and C runs same
workload which burns a cpu while cgroup B runs a light workload.
$ perf stat -a -e cycles,instructions --for-each-cgroup A,B,C sleep 1
Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
3,958,116,522 cycles A
6,722,650,929 instructions A # 2.53 insn per cycle
1,132,741 cycles B
571,743 instructions B # 0.00 insn per cycle
4,007,799,935 cycles C
6,793,181,523 instructions C # 2.56 insn per cycle
1.001050869 seconds time elapsed
When I run 'perf stat' with single workload, it usually shows IPC around
1.7. We can verify it (6,722,650,929.0 / 3,958,116,522 = 1.698) for cgroup A.
But in this case, since cgroups are ignored, cycles are averaged so it
used the lower value for IPC calculation and resulted in around 2.5.
avg cycle: (3958116522 + 1132741 + 4007799935) / 3 = 2655683066
IPC (A) : 6722650929 / 2655683066 = 2.531
IPC (B) : 571743 / 2655683066 = 0.0002
IPC (C) : 6793181523 / 2655683066 = 2.557
We can simply compare cgroup pointers in the evsel and it'll be NULL
when cgroups are not specified. With this patch, I can see correct
numbers like below:
$ perf stat -a -e cycles,instructions --for-each-cgroup A,B,C sleep 1
Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
4,171,051,687 cycles A
7,219,793,922 instructions A # 1.73 insn per cycle
1,051,189 cycles B
583,102 instructions B # 0.55 insn per cycle
4,171,124,710 cycles C
7,192,944,580 instructions C # 1.72 insn per cycle
1.007909814 seconds time elapsed
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210115071139.257042-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pass more info to the saved_value in the runtime_stat, add a new
struct runtime_stat_data. Currently it only has 'ctx' field but later
patch will add more.
Note that we intentionally pass 0 as ctx to clock-related events for
compatibility. It was already there in a few places. So move the code
into the saved_value_lookup() explicitly and add a comment.
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210115071139.257042-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Permissions are necessary to get a tracepoint id. Fail the test when the
read fails.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210114180250.3853825-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
If a test fails return -1 rather than 0. This is consistent with the
return value in test-cpumap.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210114180250.3853825-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The variable 'bf' is read (for a write call) without being initialized
triggering a memory sanitizer warning. Use 'bf' in the read and switch
the write to reading from a string.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210114212304.4018119-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
In the fast commit, it adds REQ_FUA and REQ_PREFLUSH on each fast
commit block when barrier is enabled. However, in recovery phase,
ext4 compares CRC value in the tail. So it is sufficient to add
REQ_FUA and REQ_PREFLUSH on the block that has tail.
Signed-off-by: Daejun Park <daejun7.park@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106013242epcms2p5b6b4ed8ca86f29456fdf56aa580e74b4@epcms2p5
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
We got a "deleted inode referenced" warning cross our fsstress test. The
bug can be reproduced easily with following steps:
cd /dev/shm
mkdir test/
fallocate -l 128M img
mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 img
mount img test/
dd if=/dev/zero of=test/foo bs=1M count=128
mkdir test/dir/ && cd test/dir/
for ((i=0;i<1000;i++)); do touch file$i; done # consume all block
cd ~ && renameat2(AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/file1, AT_FDCWD,
/dev/shm/test/dir/dst_file, RENAME_WHITEOUT) # ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename will return ENOSPC!!
cd /dev/shm/ && umount test/ && mount img test/ && ls -li test/dir/file1
We will get the output:
"ls: cannot access 'test/dir/file1': Structure needs cleaning"
and the dmesg show:
"EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_lookup:1626: inode #2049: comm ls:
deleted inode referenced: 139"
ext4_rename will create a special inode for whiteout and use this 'ino'
to replace the source file's dir entry 'ino'. Once error happens
latter(the error above was the ENOSPC return from ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename since all space has been consumed), the cleanup do drop the
nlink for whiteout, but forget to restore 'ino' with source file. This
will trigger the bug describle as above.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd808deced43 ("ext4: support RENAME_WHITEOUT")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105062857.3566-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
After full/fast commit, entries in staging queue are promoted to main
queue. In ext4_fs_cleanup function, it splice to staging queue to
staging queue.
Fixes: aa75f4d3daaeb ("ext4: main fast-commit commit path")
Signed-off-by: Daejun Park <daejun7.park@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201230094851epcms2p6eeead8cc984379b37b2efd21af90fd1a@epcms2p6
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
1: ext4_iget/ext4_find_extent never returns NULL, use IS_ERR
instead of IS_ERR_OR_NULL to fix this.
2: ext4_fc_replay_inode should set the inode to NULL when IS_ERR.
and go to call iput properly.
Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yili@winhong.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201230033827.3996064-1-yili@winhong.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
It was using some bash-specific features and failed to parse when
running with a different shell like below:
root@kbl-ppc:~/kbl-ws/perf-dev/lck-9077/acme.tmp/tools/perf# ./perf test 83 -vv
83: perf stat metrics (shadow stat) test :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 3922
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 19: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 24: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 30: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
(standard_in) 2: syntax error
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 36: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 19: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 24: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 30: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
(standard_in) 2: syntax error
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 36: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: [[: not found
./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: 45: ./tests/shell/stat+shadow_stat.sh: declare: not found
test child finished with -1
---- end ----
perf stat metrics (shadow stat) test: FAILED!
Reported-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210114050609.1258820-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick up the changes in:
3a176b94609a18f5 ("Revert "kbuild: avoid static_assert for genksyms"")
And silence this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/linux/build_bug.h' differs from latest version at 'include/linux/build_bug.h'
diff -u tools/include/linux/build_bug.h include/linux/build_bug.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes in:
647daca25d24fb6e ("KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs in an SEV-ES guest")
That don't cause any tooling change, just silences this perf build
warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/kvm.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
It was looking at bpf/bpf.h, which caused this problem:
# perf trace -e tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c
/home/acme/git/perf/tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c:42:10: fatal error: 'bpf/bpf.h' file not found
#include <bpf/bpf.h>
^~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.
ERROR: unable to compile tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c
Hint: Check error message shown above.
Hint: You can also pre-compile it into .o using:
clang -target bpf -O2 -c tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c
with proper -I and -D options.
event syntax error: 'tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c'
\___ Failed to load tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c from source: Error when compiling BPF scriptlet
#
Change that to plain bpf.h, to make it work again:
# perf trace -e tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c sleep 5s
0.000 perf_bpf_probe:hrtimer_nanosleep(__probe_ip: -1776891872, rqtp: 5000000000)
# perf trace -e tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c/max-stack=16/ sleep 5s
0.000 perf_bpf_probe:hrtimer_nanosleep(__probe_ip: -1776891872, rqtp: 5000000000)
hrtimer_nanosleep ([kernel.kallsyms])
common_nsleep ([kernel.kallsyms])
__x64_sys_clock_nanosleep ([kernel.kallsyms])
do_syscall_64 ([kernel.kallsyms])
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe ([kernel.kallsyms])
__clock_nanosleep_2 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.32.so)
# perf trace -e tools/perf/examples/bpf/5sec.c sleep 4s
#
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Right now io_flush_timeouts() checks if the current number of events
is equal to ->timeout.target_seq, but this will miss some timeouts if
there have been more than 1 event added since the last time they were
flushed (possible in io_submit_flush_completions(), for example). Fix
it by recording the last sequence at which timeouts were flushed so
that the number of events seen can be compared to the number of events
needed without overflow.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Diop-Gonzalez <marcelo827@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
The SVE and FPSIMD stress tests have a spelling mistake in the output, fix
it.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108183144.673-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
The kbuild test robot reports that when building with W=1, GCC will warn
for a couple of missing prototypes in syscall.c:
| arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:157:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 157 | void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~
| arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:164:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc_compat' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 164 | void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While this isn't a functional problem, as a general policy we should
include the prototype for functions wherever possible to catch any
accidental divergence between the prototype and implementation. Here we
can easily include <asm/exception.h>, so let's do so.
While there are a number of warnings elsewhere and some warnings enabled
under W=1 are of questionable benefit, this change helps to make the
code more robust as it evolved and reduces the noise somewhat, so it
seems worthwhile.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202101141046.n8iPO3mw-lkp@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114124812.17754-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
GCC versions >= 4.9 and < 5.1 have been shown to emit memory references
beyond the stack pointer, resulting in memory corruption if an interrupt
is taken after the stack pointer has been adjusted but before the
reference has been executed. This leads to subtle, infrequent data
corruption such as the EXT4 problems reported by Russell King at the
link below.
Life is too short for buggy compilers, so raise the minimum GCC version
required by arm64 to 5.1.
Reported-by: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105154726.GD1551@shell.armlinux.org.uk
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112224832.10980-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
Christian Brauner
Tycho Andersen
Linus Torvalds
Al Viro
Atish Patra
Christoph Hellwig
Jens Axboe
Al Grant
Adrian Hunter
Namhyung Kim
Ian Rogers
Daejun Park
yangerkun
Yi Li
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Marcelo Diop-Gonzalez
Mark Brown
Mark Rutland
Will Deacon