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Reported by syzkaller:
pte_list_remove: ffff9714eb1f8078 0->BUG
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:1157!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
RIP: 0010:pte_list_remove+0x11b/0x120 [kvm]
Call Trace:
drop_spte+0x83/0xb0 [kvm]
mmu_page_zap_pte+0xcc/0xe0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x81/0x4a0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages+0x159/0x220 [kvm]
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all+0xe/0x10 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x6c/0xa0 [kvm]
? kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x5/0xa0 [kvm]
__mmu_notifier_release+0x79/0x110
? __mmu_notifier_release+0x5/0x110
exit_mmap+0x15a/0x170
? do_exit+0x281/0xcb0
mmput+0x66/0x160
do_exit+0x2c9/0xcb0
? __context_tracking_exit.part.5+0x4a/0x150
do_group_exit+0x50/0xd0
SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
The reason is that when creates new memslot, there is no guarantee for new
memslot not overlap with private memslots. This can be triggered by the
following program:
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
long r[16];
int main()
{
void *p = valloc(0x4000);
r[2] = open("/dev/kvm", 0);
r[3] = ioctl(r[2], KVM_CREATE_VM, 0x0ul);
uint64_t addr = 0xf000;
ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR, &addr);
r[6] = ioctl(r[3], KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0x0ul);
ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR, 0x0ul);
ioctl(r[6], KVM_RUN, 0);
ioctl(r[6], KVM_RUN, 0);
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region mr = {
.slot = 0,
.flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES,
.guest_phys_addr = 0xf000,
.memory_size = 0x4000,
.userspace_addr = (uintptr_t) p
};
ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &mr);
return 0;
}
This patch fixes the bug by not adding a new memslot even if it
overlaps with private memslots.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
---
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
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When introducing support for irqchip in userspace we needed a way to
mask the timer signal to prevent the guest continuously exiting due to a
screaming timer.
We did this by disabling the corresponding percpu interrupt on the
host interrupt controller, because we cannot rely on the host system
having a GIC, and therefore cannot make any assumptions about having an
active state to hide the timer signal.
Unfortunately, when introducing this feature, it became entirely
possible that a VCPU which belongs to a VM that has a userspace irqchip
can disable the vtimer irq on the host on some physical CPU, and then go
away without ever enabling the vtimer irq on that physical CPU again.
This means that using irqchips in userspace on a system that also
supports running VMs with an in-kernel GIC can prevent forward progress
from in-kernel GIC VMs.
Later on, when we started taking virtual timer interrupts in the arch
timer code, we would also leave this timer state active for userspace
irqchip VMs, because we leave it up to a VGIC-enabled guest to
deactivate the hardware IRQ using the HW bit in the LR.
Both issues are solved by only using the enable/disable trick on systems
that do not have a host GIC which supports the active state, because all
VMs on such systems must use irqchips in userspace. Systems that have a
working GIC with support for an active state use the active state to
mask the timer signal for both userspace and in-kernel irqchips.
Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Fixes: d9e139778376 ("KVM: arm/arm64: Support arch timers with a userspace gic")
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"ARM:
- icache invalidation optimizations, improving VM startup time
- support for forwarded level-triggered interrupts, improving
performance for timers and passthrough platform devices
- a small fix for power-management notifiers, and some cosmetic
changes
PPC:
- add MMIO emulation for vector loads and stores
- allow HPT guests to run on a radix host on POWER9 v2.2 CPUs without
requiring the complex thread synchronization of older CPU versions
- improve the handling of escalation interrupts with the XIVE
interrupt controller
- support decrement register migration
- various cleanups and bugfixes.
s390:
- Cornelia Huck passed maintainership to Janosch Frank
- exitless interrupts for emulated devices
- cleanup of cpuflag handling
- kvm_stat counter improvements
- VSIE improvements
- mm cleanup
x86:
- hypervisor part of SEV
- UMIP, RDPID, and MSR_SMI_COUNT emulation
- paravirtualized TLB shootdown using the new KVM_VCPU_PREEMPTED bit
- allow guests to see TOPOEXT, GFNI, VAES, VPCLMULQDQ, and more
AVX512 features
- show vcpu id in its anonymous inode name
- many fixes and cleanups
- per-VCPU MSR bitmaps (already merged through x86/pti branch)
- stable KVM clock when nesting on Hyper-V (merged through
x86/hyperv)"
* tag 'kvm-4.16-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (197 commits)
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add MMIO emulation for VMX instructions
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make HPT resizing work on POWER9
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix handling of secondary HPTEG in HPT resizing code
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix broken select due to misspelling
KVM: x86: don't forget vcpu_put() in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs()
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix svcpu copying with preemption enabled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop locks before reading guest memory
kvm: x86: remove efer_reload entry in kvm_vcpu_stat
KVM: x86: AMD Processor Topology Information
x86/kvm/vmx: do not use vm-exit instruction length for fast MMIO when running nested
kvm: embed vcpu id to dentry of vcpu anon inode
kvm: Map PFN-type memory regions as writable (if possible)
x86/kvm: Make it compile on 32bit and with HYPYERVISOR_GUEST=n
KVM: arm/arm64: Fixup userspace irqchip static key optimization
KVM: arm/arm64: Fix userspace_irqchip_in_use counting
KVM: arm/arm64: Fix incorrect timer_is_pending logic
MAINTAINERS: update KVM/s390 maintainers
MAINTAINERS: add Halil as additional vfio-ccw maintainer
MAINTAINERS: add David as a reviewer for KVM/s390
...
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Pull more arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
"As I mentioned in the last pull request, there's a second batch of
security updates for arm64 with mitigations for Spectre/v1 and an
improved one for Spectre/v2 (via a newly defined firmware interface
API).
Spectre v1 mitigation:
- back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec()
- masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the
syscall table
- masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines
Spectre v2 mitigation update:
- using the new firmware SMC calling convention specification update
- removing the current PSCI GET_VERSION firmware call mitigation as
vendors are deploying new SMCCC-capable firmware
- additional branch predictor hardening for synchronous exceptions
and interrupts while in user mode
Meltdown v3 mitigation update:
- Cavium Thunder X is unaffected but a hardware erratum gets in the
way. The kernel now starts with the page tables mapped as global
and switches to non-global if kpti needs to be enabled.
Other:
- Theoretical trylock bug fixed"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (38 commits)
arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround
arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support
arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive
arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity
firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops
firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit
arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support
arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline
arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1
arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support
arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code
arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper
arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files
arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap
arm: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls
arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls
arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions
arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference
...
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A new feature of SMCCC 1.1 is that it offers firmware-based CPU
workarounds. In particular, SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 provides
BP hardening for CVE-2017-5715.
If the host has some mitigation for this issue, report that
we deal with it using SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, as we apply the
host workaround on every guest exit.
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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We're about to need kvm_psci_version in HYP too. So let's turn it
into a static inline, and pass the kvm structure as a second
parameter (so that HYP can do a kern_hyp_va on it).
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead
when calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery
mechanism.
Make it visible to KVM guests.
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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PSCI 1.0 can be trivially implemented by providing the FEATURES
call on top of PSCI 0.2 and returning 1.0 as the PSCI version.
We happily ignore everything else, as they are either optional or
are clarifications that do not require any additional change.
PSCI 1.0 is now the default until we decide to add a userspace
selection API.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Instead of open coding the accesses to the various registers,
let's add explicit SMCCC accessors.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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As we're about to trigger a PSCI version explosion, it doesn't
hurt to introduce a PSCI_VERSION helper that is going to be
used everywhere.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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As we're about to update the PSCI support, and because I'm lazy,
let's move the PSCI include file to include/kvm so that both
ARM architectures can find it.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
...
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Topic branch for stable KVM clockource under Hyper-V.
Thanks to Christoffer Dall for resolving the ARM conflict.
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Commit 4d4bbd8526a8 ("mm, oom_reaper: skip mm structs with mmu
notifiers") prevented the oom reaper from unmapping private anonymous
memory with the oom reaper when the oom victim mm had mmu notifiers
registered.
The rationale is that doing mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_{start,end}()
around the unmap_page_range(), which is needed, can block and the oom
killer will stall forever waiting for the victim to exit, which may not
be possible without reaping.
That concern is real, but only true for mmu notifiers that have
blockable invalidate_range_{start,end}() callbacks. This patch adds a
"flags" field to mmu notifier ops that can set a bit to indicate that
these callbacks do not block.
The implementation is steered toward an expensive slowpath, such as
after the oom reaper has grabbed mm->mmap_sem of a still alive oom
victim.
[rientjes@google.com: mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end() can also call the invalidate_range() must not block, fix comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1801091339570.240101@chino.kir.corp.google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mm_has_blockable_invalidate_notifiers() return bool, use rwsem_is_locked()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1712141329500.74052@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull get_user_pages_fast updates from Al Viro:
"A bit more get_user_pages work"
* 'work.get_user_pages_fast' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kvm: switch get_user_page_nowait() to get_user_pages_unlocked()
__get_user_pages_locked(): get rid of notify_drop argument
get_user_pages_unlocked(): pass true to __get_user_pages_locked() notify_drop
cris: switch to get_user_pages_fast()
fold __get_user_pages_unlocked() into its sole remaining caller
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All d-entries for vcpu have the same, "anon_inode:kvm-vcpu". That means
it is impossible to know the mapping between fds for vcpu and vcpu
from userland.
# LC_ALL=C ls -l /proc/617/fd | grep vcpu
lrwx------. 1 qemu qemu 64 Jan 7 16:50 18 -> anon_inode:kvm-vcpu
lrwx------. 1 qemu qemu 64 Jan 7 16:50 19 -> anon_inode:kvm-vcpu
It is also impossible to know the mapping between vma for kvm_run
structure and vcpu from userland.
# LC_ALL=C grep vcpu /proc/617/maps
7f9d842d0000-7f9d842d3000 rw-s 00000000 00:0d 20393 anon_inode:kvm-vcpu
7f9d842d3000-7f9d842d6000 rw-s 00000000 00:0d 20393 anon_inode:kvm-vcpu
This change adds vcpu id to d-entries for vcpu. With this change
you can get the following output:
# LC_ALL=C ls -l /proc/617/fd | grep vcpu
lrwx------. 1 qemu qemu 64 Jan 7 16:50 18 -> anon_inode:kvm-vcpu:0
lrwx------. 1 qemu qemu 64 Jan 7 16:50 19 -> anon_inode:kvm-vcpu:1
# LC_ALL=C grep vcpu /proc/617/maps
7f9d842d0000-7f9d842d3000 rw-s 00000000 00:0d 20393 anon_inode:kvm-vcpu:0
7f9d842d3000-7f9d842d6000 rw-s 00000000 00:0d 20393 anon_inode:kvm-vcpu:1
With the mappings known from the output, a tool like strace can report more details
of qemu-kvm process activities. Here is the strace output of my local prototype:
# ./strace -KK -f -p 617 2>&1 | grep 'KVM_RUN\| K'
...
[pid 664] ioctl(18, KVM_RUN, 0) = 0 (KVM_EXIT_MMIO)
K ready_for_interrupt_injection=1, if_flag=0, flags=0, cr8=0000000000000000, apic_base=0x000000fee00d00
K phys_addr=0, len=1634035803, [33, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], is_write=112
[pid 664] ioctl(18, KVM_RUN, 0) = 0 (KVM_EXIT_MMIO)
K ready_for_interrupt_injection=1, if_flag=1, flags=0, cr8=0000000000000000, apic_base=0x000000fee00d00
K phys_addr=0, len=1634035803, [33, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], is_write=112
...
Signed-off-by: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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For EPT-violations that are triggered by a read, the pages are also mapped with
write permissions (if their memory region is also writable). That would avoid
getting yet another fault on the same page when a write occurs.
This optimization only happens when you have a "struct page" backing the memory
region. So also enable it for memory regions that do not have a "struct page".
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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KVM/ARM Changes for v4.16
The changes for this version include icache invalidation optimizations
(improving VM startup time), support for forwarded level-triggered
interrupts (improved performance for timers and passthrough platform
devices), a small fix for power-management notifiers, and some cosmetic
changes.
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When I introduced a static key to avoid work in the critical path for
userspace irqchips which is very rarely used, I accidentally messed up
my logic and used && where I should have used ||, because the point was
to short-circuit the evaluation in case userspace irqchips weren't even
in use.
This fixes an issue when running in-kernel irqchip VMs alongside
userspace irqchip VMs.
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Fixes: c44c232ee2d3 ("KVM: arm/arm64: Avoid work when userspace iqchips are not used")
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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We were not decrementing the static key count in the right location.
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() is only called to clean up after a failed
VCPU create attempt, whereas kvm_arch_vcpu_free() is called on teardown
of the VM as well. Move the static key decrement call to
kvm_arch_vcpu_free().
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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After the recently introduced support for level-triggered mapped
interrupt, I accidentally left the VCPU thread busily going back and
forward between the guest and the hypervisor whenever the guest was
blocking, because I would always incorrectly report that a timer
interrupt was pending.
This is because the timer->irq.level field is not valid for mapped
interrupts, where we offload the level state to the hardware, and as a
result this field is always true.
Luckily the problem can be relatively easily solved by not checking the
cached signal state of either timer in kvm_timer_should_fire() but
instead compute the timer state on the fly, which we do already if the
cached signal state wasn't high. In fact, the only reason for checking
the cached signal state was a tiny optimization which would only be
potentially faster when the polling loop detects a pending timer
interrupt, which is quite unlikely.
Instead of duplicating the logic from kvm_arch_timer_handler(), we
enlighten kvm_timer_should_fire() to report something valid when the
timer state is loaded onto the hardware. We can then call this from
kvm_arch_timer_handler() as well and avoid the call to
__timer_snapshot_state() in kvm_arch_timer_get_input_level().
Reported-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tn@semihalf.com>
Tested-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tn@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Pull poll annotations from Al Viro:
"This introduces a __bitwise type for POLL### bitmap, and propagates
the annotations through the tree. Most of that stuff is as simple as
'make ->poll() instances return __poll_t and do the same to local
variables used to hold the future return value'.
Some of the obvious brainos found in process are fixed (e.g. POLLIN
misspelled as POLL_IN). At that point the amount of sparse warnings is
low and most of them are for genuine bugs - e.g. ->poll() instance
deciding to return -EINVAL instead of a bitmap. I hadn't touched those
in this series - it's large enough as it is.
Another problem it has caught was eventpoll() ABI mess; select.c and
eventpoll.c assumed that corresponding POLL### and EPOLL### were
equal. That's true for some, but not all of them - EPOLL### are
arch-independent, but POLL### are not.
The last commit in this series separates userland POLL### values from
the (now arch-independent) kernel-side ones, converting between them
in the few places where they are copied to/from userland. AFAICS, this
is the least disruptive fix preserving poll(2) ABI and making epoll()
work on all architectures.
As it is, it's simply broken on sparc - try to give it EPOLLWRNORM and
it will trigger only on what would've triggered EPOLLWRBAND on other
architectures. EPOLLWRBAND and EPOLLRDHUP, OTOH, are never triggered
at all on sparc. With this patch they should work consistently on all
architectures"
* 'misc.poll' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (37 commits)
make kernel-side POLL... arch-independent
eventpoll: no need to mask the result of epi_item_poll() again
eventpoll: constify struct epoll_event pointers
debugging printk in sg_poll() uses %x to print POLL... bitmap
annotate poll(2) guts
9p: untangle ->poll() mess
->si_band gets POLL... bitmap stored into a user-visible long field
ring_buffer_poll_wait() return value used as return value of ->poll()
the rest of drivers/*: annotate ->poll() instances
media: annotate ->poll() instances
fs: annotate ->poll() instances
ipc, kernel, mm: annotate ->poll() instances
net: annotate ->poll() instances
apparmor: annotate ->poll() instances
tomoyo: annotate ->poll() instances
sound: annotate ->poll() instances
acpi: annotate ->poll() instances
crypto: annotate ->poll() instances
block: annotate ->poll() instances
x86: annotate ->poll() instances
...
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Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
"The main theme of this pull request is security covering variants 2
and 3 for arm64. I expect to send additional patches next week
covering an improved firmware interface (requires firmware changes)
for variant 2 and way for KPTI to be disabled on unaffected CPUs
(Cavium's ThunderX doesn't work properly with KPTI enabled because of
a hardware erratum).
Summary:
- Security mitigations:
- variant 2: invalidate the branch predictor with a call to
secure firmware
- variant 3: implement KPTI for arm64
- 52-bit physical address support for arm64 (ARMv8.2)
- arm64 support for RAS (firmware first only) and SDEI (software
delegated exception interface; allows firmware to inject a RAS
error into the OS)
- perf support for the ARM DynamIQ Shared Unit PMU
- CPUID and HWCAP bits updated for new floating point multiplication
instructions in ARMv8.4
- remove some virtual memory layout printks during boot
- fix initial page table creation to cope with larger than 32M kernel
images when 16K pages are enabled"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (104 commits)
arm64: Fix TTBR + PAN + 52-bit PA logic in cpu_do_switch_mm
arm64: Turn on KPTI only on CPUs that need it
arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2
arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs
arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context
arm64: mm: ignore memory above supported physical address size
arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN
KVM: arm64: Emulate RAS error registers and set HCR_EL2's TERR & TEA
KVM: arm64: Handle RAS SErrors from EL2 on guest exit
KVM: arm64: Handle RAS SErrors from EL1 on guest exit
KVM: arm64: Save ESR_EL2 on guest SError
KVM: arm64: Save/Restore guest DISR_EL1
KVM: arm64: Set an impdef ESR for Virtual-SError using VSESR_EL2.
KVM: arm/arm64: mask/unmask daif around VHE guests
arm64: kernel: Prepare for a DISR user
arm64: Unconditionally enable IESB on exception entry/return for firmware-first
arm64: kernel: Survive corrected RAS errors notified by SError
arm64: cpufeature: Detect CPU RAS Extentions
arm64: sysreg: Move to use definitions for all the SCTLR bits
arm64: cpufeature: __this_cpu_has_cap() shouldn't stop early
...
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cpu_pm_enter() calls the pm notifier chain with CPU_PM_ENTER, then if
there is a failure: CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED.
When KVM receives CPU_PM_ENTER it calls cpu_hyp_reset() which will
return us to the hyp-stub. If we subsequently get a CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED,
KVM does nothing, leaving the CPU running with the hyp-stub, at odds
with kvm_arm_hardware_enabled.
Add CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED as a fallthrough for CPU_PM_EXIT, this reloads
KVM based on kvm_arm_hardware_enabled. This is safe even if CPU_PM_ENTER
never gets as far as KVM, as cpu_hyp_reinit() calls cpu_hyp_reset()
to make sure the hyp-stub is loaded before reloading KVM.
Fixes: 67f691976662 ("arm64: kvm: allows kvm cpu hotplug")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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KVM/ARM Fixes for v4.15, Round 3 (v2)
Three more fixes for v4.15 fixing incorrect huge page mappings on systems using
the contigious hint for hugetlbfs; supporting an alternative GICv4 init
sequence; and correctly implementing the ARM SMCC for HVC and SMC handling.
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We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors
notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add
some minimal handling to KVM.
There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a
RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO,
or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit.
For SError that interrupt a guest and are routed to EL2 the existing
behaviour is to inject an impdef SError into the guest.
Add code to handle RAS SError based on the ESR. For uncontained and
uncategorized errors arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror() will panic(), these
errors compromise the host too. All other error types are contained:
For the fatal errors the vCPU can't make progress, so we inject a virtual
SError. We ignore contained errors where we can make progress as if
we're lucky, we may not hit them again.
If only some of the CPUs support RAS the guest will see the cpufeature
sanitised version of the id registers, but we may still take RAS SError
on this CPU. Move the SError handling out of handle_exit() into a new
handler that runs before we can be preempted. This allows us to use
this_cpu_has_cap(), via arm64_is_ras_serror().
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Non-VHE systems take an exception to EL2 in order to world-switch into the
guest. When returning from the guest KVM implicitly restores the DAIF
flags when it returns to the kernel at EL1.
With VHE none of this exception-level jumping happens, so KVMs
world-switch code is exposed to the host kernel's DAIF values, and KVM
spills the guest-exit DAIF values back into the host kernel.
On entry to a guest we have Debug and SError exceptions unmasked, KVM
has switched VBAR but isn't prepared to handle these. On guest exit
Debug exceptions are left disabled once we return to the host and will
stay this way until we enter user space.
Add a helper to mask/unmask DAIF around VHE guests. The unmask can only
happen after the hosts VBAR value has been synchronised by the isb in
__vhe_hyp_call (via kvm_call_hyp()). Masking could be as late as
setting KVMs VBAR value, but is kept here for symmetry.
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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On x86, ARM and s390, struct kvm_vcpu_arch has a usercopy region
that is read and written by the KVM_GET/SET_CPUID2 ioctls (x86)
or KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG (ARM/s390). Without whitelisting the area,
KVM is completely broken on those architectures with usercopy hardening
enabled.
For now, allow writing to the entire struct on all architectures.
The KVM tree will not refine this to an architecture-specific
subset of struct kvm_vcpu_arch.
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Commit fa2a8445b1d3 incorrectly masks the index of the HYP ID map pgd
entry, causing a non-VHE kernel to hang during boot. This happens when
VA_BITS=48 and the ID map text is in 52-bit physical memory. In this
case we don't need an extra table level but need more entries in the
top-level table, so we need to map into hyp_pgd and need to use
__kvm_idmap_ptrs_per_pgd to mask in the extra bits. However,
__create_hyp_mappings currently masks by PTRS_PER_PGD instead.
Fix it so that we always use __kvm_idmap_ptrs_per_pgd for the HYP ID
map. This ensures that we use the larger mask for the top-level ID map
table when it has more entries. In all other cases, PTRS_PER_PGD is used
as normal.
Fixes: fa2a8445b1d3 ("arm64: allow ID map to be extended to 52 bits")
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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kvm_host_cpu_state is a per-cpu allocation made from kvm_arch_init()
used to store the host EL1 registers when KVM switches to a guest.
Make it easier for ASM to generate pointers into this per-cpu memory
by making it a static allocation.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Commit 3d1ad640f8c94 ("KVM: arm/arm64: Fix GICv4 ITS initialization
issues") moved the vgic_supports_direct_msis() check in vgic_v4_init().
However when vgic_v4_init is called from vgic_its_create(), the has_its
field is not yet set. Hence vgic_supports_direct_msis returns false and
vgic_v4_init does nothing.
The gic/its init sequence is a bit messy, so let's be specific about the
prerequisite checks in the various call paths instead of relying on a
common wrapper.
Fixes: 3d1ad640f8c94 ("KVM: arm/arm64: Fix GICv4 ITS initialization issues")
Reported-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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KVM only supports PMD hugepages at stage 2 but doesn't actually check
that the provided hugepage memory pagesize is PMD_SIZE before populating
stage 2 entries.
In cases where the backing hugepage size is smaller than PMD_SIZE (such
as when using contiguous hugepages), KVM can end up creating stage 2
mappings that extend beyond the supplied memory.
Fix this by checking for the pagesize of userspace vma before creating
PMD hugepage at stage 2.
Fixes: 66b3923a1a0f77a ("arm64: hugetlb: add support for PTE contiguous bit")
Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Now that we have per-CPU vectors, let's plug then in the KVM/arm64 code.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The vcpu parameter isn't used for anything, and gets in the way of
further cleanups. Let's get rid of it.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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So far, we loose the Exec property whenever we take permission
faults, as we always reconstruct the PTE/PMD from scratch. This
can be counter productive as we can end-up with the following
fault sequence:
X -> RO -> ROX -> RW -> RWX
Instead, we can lookup the existing PTE/PMD and clear the XN bit in the
new entry if it was already cleared in the old one, leadig to a much
nicer fault sequence:
X -> ROX -> RWX
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The only case where we actually need to perform a dcache maintenance
is when we map the page for the first time, and subsequent permission
faults do not require cache maintenance. Let's make it conditional
on not being a permission fault (and thus a translation fault).
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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We've so far eagerly invalidated the icache, no matter how
the page was faulted in (data or prefetch abort).
But we can easily track execution by setting the XN bits
in the S2 page tables, get the prefetch abort at HYP and
perform the icache invalidation at that time only.
As for most VMs, the instruction working set is pretty
small compared to the data set, this is likely to save
some traffic (specially as the invalidation is broadcast).
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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As we're about to introduce opportunistic invalidation of the icache,
let's split dcache and icache flushing.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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kvm_hyp.h has an odd dependency on kvm_mmu.h, which makes the
opposite inclusion impossible. Let's start with breaking that
useless dependency.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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We currently check if the VM has a userspace irqchip in several places
along the critical path, and if so, we do some work which is only
required for having an irqchip in userspace. This is unfortunate, as we
could avoid doing any work entirely, if we didn't have to support
irqchip in userspace.
Realizing the userspace irqchip on ARM is mostly a developer or hobby
feature, and is unlikely to be used in servers or other scenarios where
performance is a priority, we can use a refcounted static key to only
check the irqchip configuration when we have at least one VM that uses
an irqchip in userspace.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The VGIC can now support the life-cycle of mapped level-triggered
interrupts, and we no longer have to read back the timer state on every
exit from the VM if we had an asserted timer interrupt signal, because
the VGIC already knows if we hit the unlikely case where the guest
disables the timer without ACKing the virtual timer interrupt.
This means we rework a bit of the code to factor out the functionality
to snapshot the timer state from vtimer_save_state(), and we can reuse
this functionality in the sync path when we have an irqchip in
userspace, and also to support our implementation of the
get_input_level() function for the timer.
This change also means that we can no longer rely on the timer's view of
the interrupt line to set the active state, because we no longer
maintain this state for mapped interrupts when exiting from the guest.
Instead, we only set the active state if the virtual interrupt is
active, and otherwise we simply let the timer fire again and raise the
virtual interrupt from the ISR.
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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For mapped IRQs (with the HW bit set in the LR) we have to follow some
rules of the architecture. One of these rules is that VM must not be
allowed to deactivate a virtual interrupt with the HW bit set unless the
physical interrupt is also active.
This works fine when injecting mapped interrupts, because we leave it up
to the injector to either set EOImode==1 or manually set the active
state of the physical interrupt.
However, the guest can set virtual interrupt to be pending or active by
writing to the virtual distributor, which could lead to deactivating a
virtual interrupt with the HW bit set without the physical interrupt
being active.
We could set the physical interrupt to active whenever we are about to
enter the VM with a HW interrupt either pending or active, but that
would be really slow, especially on GICv2. So we take the long way
around and do the hard work when needed, which is expected to be
extremely rare.
When the VM sets the pending state for a HW interrupt on the virtual
distributor we set the active state on the physical distributor, because
the virtual interrupt can become active and then the guest can
deactivate it.
When the VM clears the pending state we also clear it on the physical
side, because the injector might otherwise raise the interrupt. We also
clear the physical active state when the virtual interrupt is not
active, since otherwise a SPEND/CPEND sequence from the guest would
prevent signaling of future interrupts.
Changing the state of mapped interrupts from userspace is not supported,
and it's expected that userspace unmaps devices from VFIO before
attempting to set the interrupt state, because the interrupt state is
driven by hardware.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The GIC sometimes need to sample the physical line of a mapped
interrupt. As we know this to be notoriously slow, provide a callback
function for devices (such as the timer) which can do this much faster
than talking to the distributor, for example by comparing a few
in-memory values. Fall back to the good old method of poking the
physical GIC if no callback is provided.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Level-triggered mapped IRQs are special because we only observe rising
edges as input to the VGIC, and we don't set the EOI flag and therefore
are not told when the level goes down, so that we can re-queue a new
interrupt when the level goes up.
One way to solve this problem is to side-step the logic of the VGIC and
special case the validation in the injection path, but it has the
unfortunate drawback of having to peak into the physical GIC state
whenever we want to know if the interrupt is pending on the virtual
distributor.
Instead, we can maintain the current semantics of a level triggered
interrupt by sort of treating it as an edge-triggered interrupt,
following from the fact that we only observe an asserting edge. This
requires us to be a bit careful when populating the LRs and when folding
the state back in though:
* We lower the line level when populating the LR, so that when
subsequently observing an asserting edge, the VGIC will do the right
thing.
* If the guest never acked the interrupt while running (for example if
it had masked interrupts at the CPU level while running), we have
to preserve the pending state of the LR and move it back to the
line_level field of the struct irq when folding LR state.
If the guest never acked the interrupt while running, but changed the
device state and lowered the line (again with interrupts masked) then
we need to observe this change in the line_level.
Both of the above situations are solved by sampling the physical line
and set the line level when folding the LR back.
* Finally, if the guest never acked the interrupt while running and
sampling the line reveals that the device state has changed and the
line has been lowered, we must clear the physical active state, since
we will otherwise never be told when the interrupt becomes asserted
again.
This has the added benefit of making the timer optimization patches
(https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/pipermail/kvmarm/2017-July/026343.html) a
bit simpler, because the timer code doesn't have to clear the active
state on the sync anymore. It also potentially improves the performance
of the timer implementation because the GIC knows the state or the LR
and only needs to clear the
active state when the pending bit in the LR is still set, where the
timer has to always clear it when returning from running the guest with
an injected timer interrupt.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The timer logic was designed after a strict idea of modeling an
interrupt line level in software, meaning that only transitions in the
level need to be reported to the VGIC. This works well for the timer,
because the arch timer code is in complete control of the device and can
track the transitions of the line.
However, as we are about to support using the HW bit in the VGIC not
just for the timer, but also for VFIO which cannot track transitions of
the interrupt line, we have to decide on an interface between the GIC
and other subsystems for level triggered mapped interrupts, which both
the timer and VFIO can use.
VFIO only sees an asserting transition of the physical interrupt line,
and tells the VGIC when that happens. That means that part of the
interrupt flow is offloaded to the hardware.
To use the same interface for VFIO devices and the timer, we therefore
have to change the timer (we cannot change VFIO because it doesn't know
the details of the device it is assigning to a VM).
Luckily, changing the timer is simple, we just need to stop 'caching'
the line level, but instead let the VGIC know the state of the timer
every time there is a potential change in the line level, and when the
line level should be asserted from the timer ISR. The VGIC can ignore
extra notifications using its validate mechanism.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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We are about to distinguish between userspace accesses and mmio traps
for a number of the mmio handlers. When the requester vcpu is NULL, it
means we are handling a userspace access.
Factor out the functionality to get the request vcpu into its own
function, mostly so we have a common place to document the semantics of
the return value.
Also take the chance to move the functionality outside of holding a
spinlock and instead explicitly disable and enable preemption. This
supports PREEMPT_RT kernels as well.
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The __this_cpu_read() and __this_cpu_write() functions already implement
checks for the required preemption levels when using
CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT which gives you nice error messages and such.
Therefore there is no need to explicitly check this using a BUG_ON() in
the code (which we don't do for other uses of per cpu variables either).
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings:
virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c:971:1-3: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used
Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO rather than if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/ptr_ret.cocci
Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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Currently, when using VA_BITS < 48, if the ID map text happens to be
placed in physical memory above VA_BITS, we increase the VA size (up to
48) and create a new table level, in order to map in the ID map text.
This is okay because the system always supports 48 bits of VA.
This patch extends the code such that if the system supports 52 bits of
VA, and the ID map text is placed that high up, then we increase the VA
size accordingly, up to 52.
One difference from the current implementation is that so far the
condition of VA_BITS < 48 has meant that the top level table is always
"full", with the maximum number of entries, and an extra table level is
always needed. Now, when VA_BITS = 48 (and using 64k pages), the top
level table is not full, and we simply need to increase the number of
entries in it, instead of creating a new table level.
Tested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Tested-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: reduce arguments to __create_hyp_mappings()]
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: reworked/renamed __cpu_uses_extended_idmap_level()]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Wanpeng Li
Christoffer Dall
Linus Torvalds
Marc Zyngier
Radim Krčmář
David Rientjes
Masatake YAMATO
KarimAllah Ahmed
James Morse
Paolo Bonzini
Kristina Martsenko
Punit Agrawal
Vasyl Gomonovych