From 47d804bfa1857b0edcac972c86499dcd14df3cf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:39:11 +1100 Subject: CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/keys/key.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- security/keys/request_key.c | 10 +++++----- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 14948cf83ef6..a6ca39ed3b0e 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } /* allocate a new key */ - key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, + key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, perm, flags); if (IS_ERR(key)) { key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index acc9c89e40a8..3f09e5b2a784 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm) down_write(&key->sem); /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current->fsuid) { + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) { key->perm = perm; ret = 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index ba32ca6469bd..a8ebc9520cac 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, /* allocate a new session keyring */ sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial); - keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, + keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, goto error_link; /* record the UID and GID */ - sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current->fsuid); - sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current->fsgid); + sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current_fsuid()); + sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current_fsgid()); /* we say which key is under construction */ sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial); @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock); key = key_alloc(type, description, - current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, KEY_POS_ALL, + current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, KEY_POS_ALL, flags); if (IS_ERR(key)) goto alloc_failed; @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, struct key *key; int ret; - user = key_user_lookup(current->fsuid); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); if (!user) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index bd237b0a6331..729156b3485e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial); authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc, - current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, + current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b