From 2e5aa86609ec1cf37bcc204fd7ba6c24c2f49fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:38 -0400
Subject: lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementation

The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller.  This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:

 * xfrm_state_alloc
 * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire

Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h        |  26 ++++--
 security/capability.c           |  15 ++-
 security/security.c             |  13 +--
 security/selinux/hooks.c        |   3 +-
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |   4 +-
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         | 199 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4686491852a7..e5a5e8a41e55 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1039,17 +1039,25 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
  *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
  *	Authorize deletion of xp->security.
- * @xfrm_state_alloc_security:
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc:
  *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
  *	Database by the XFRM system.
  *	@sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
  *	the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
- *	@secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the context.
  *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
  *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
- *	context to correspond to either sec_ctx or polsec, with the mls portion
- *	taken from secid in the latter case.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context).
+ *	context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
+ *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ *	Database by the XFRM system.
+ *	@polsec contains the policy's security context.
+ *	@secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
+ *	context.
+ *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ *	context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
  * @xfrm_state_free_security:
  *	@x contains the xfrm_state.
  *	Deallocate x->security.
@@ -1651,9 +1659,11 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
 	void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 	int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
-	int (*xfrm_state_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_state *x,
-		struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
-		u32 secid);
+	int (*xfrm_state_alloc) (struct xfrm_state *x,
+				 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+	int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire) (struct xfrm_state *x,
+					 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+					 u32 secid);
 	void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
 	int (*xfrm_state_delete_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
 	int (*xfrm_policy_lookup) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 1728d4e375db..67afc679719a 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -767,9 +767,15 @@ static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
-					 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
-					 u32 secid)
+static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+					struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+					u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1084,7 +1090,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a3dce87d1aef..57e25c962968 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1322,22 +1322,17 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx);
 }
 
-int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, 0);
+	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc(x, sec_ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	if (!polsec)
-		return 0;
-	/*
-	 * We want the context to be taken from secid which is usually
-	 * from the sock.
-	 */
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, secid);
+	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, polsec, secid);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5c6f2cd2d095..d3555bdf66af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5708,7 +5708,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
 	.xfrm_policy_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
 	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
-	.xfrm_state_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+	.xfrm_state_alloc =		selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+	.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
 	.xfrm_state_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_free,
 	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
 	.xfrm_policy_lookup =		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 65f67cb0aefb..f2a2314aac1a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid);
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index d03081886214..07ae0c06dfc3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -73,6 +73,54 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+	int rc;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	u32 str_len;
+
+	if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+	    uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+	    uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	*ctxp = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
  * a xfrm policy rule.
@@ -190,96 +238,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
- * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
- */
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-	struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
-	char *ctx_str = NULL;
-	u32 str_len;
-
-	BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
-
-	if (!uctx)
-		goto not_from_user;
-
-	if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
-	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-			      str_len + 1,
-			      GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
-	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
-	ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
-
-	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-	       uctx+1,
-	       str_len);
-	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
-				     str_len,
-				     &ctx->ctx_sid);
-
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
-	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	return rc;
-
-not_from_user:
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-			      str_len,
-			      GFP_ATOMIC);
-
-	if (!ctx) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
-	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
-	ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
-	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
-	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-	       ctx_str,
-	       str_len);
-
-	goto out2;
-
-out:
-	*ctxp = NULL;
-	kfree(ctx);
-out2:
-	kfree(ctx_str);
-	return rc;
-}
-
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
  * xfrm_policy.
@@ -287,15 +245,7 @@ out2:
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
-	int err;
-
-	BUG_ON(!uctx);
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
-	if (err == 0)
-		atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-
-	return err;
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
 }
 
 
@@ -347,20 +297,51 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
- * xfrm_state.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
-		u32 secid)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	int err;
+	int rc;
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+	char *ctx_str = NULL;
+	int str_len;
 
-	BUG_ON(!x);
+	if (!polsec)
+		return 0;
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
-	if (err == 0)
-		atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-	return err;
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+	kfree(ctx_str);
+
+	x->security = ctx;
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ccf17cc4b81537c29f0d5950b38b5548b6cb5858 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:39 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup and consolidate the XFRM alloc/clone/delete/free
 code

The SELinux labeled IPsec code state management functions have been
long neglected and could use some cleanup and consolidation.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 07ae0c06dfc3..f8d71262b45d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -121,6 +121,33 @@ err:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
+ */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return;
+
+	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
  * a xfrm policy rule.
@@ -258,17 +285,16 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 {
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
 
-	if (old_ctx) {
-		new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
-				  GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!new_ctx)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!old_ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new_ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len);
+	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+	*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
 
-		memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
-		memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
-		atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-		*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -277,8 +303,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
  */
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-	kfree(ctx);
+	selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -286,14 +311,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return 0;
-
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
-			    NULL);
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -349,8 +367,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-	kfree(x->security);
+	selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
 }
 
  /*
@@ -358,15 +375,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
   */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return 0;
-
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
-			    NULL);
+	return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 96484348ad712aed2c6ad7229b848bc1bf6165a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:39 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and
 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match()

Do some basic simplification and comment reformatting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index f8d71262b45d..4a7ba4ac487e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,42 +155,30 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 sel_sid;
 
-	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-	if (ctx) {
-		if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-	} else
-		/*
-		 * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
-		 * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
-		 * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
-		 */
+	/* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+	 * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+	if (!ctx)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-			  NULL);
-
-	if (rc == -EACCES)
-		return -ESRCH;
+	/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
 
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
  * the given policy, flow combo.
  */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-			const struct flowi *fl)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi *fl)
 {
 	u32 state_sid;
-	int rc;
 
 	if (!xp->security)
 		if (x->security)
@@ -213,18 +201,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
 	if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-			  NULL)? 0:1;
-
-	/*
-	 * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
-	 * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
-	 * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
-	 * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
-	 */
-
-	return rc;
+	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+	return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From eef9b41622f2f09e824fb4e7356b42bddada6623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:39 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and
 selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()

Some basic simplification and comment reformatting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 17 +++++----
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         | 85 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index f2a2314aac1a..b463f210f1af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 	return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
 }
 
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct common_audit_data *ad);
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct common_audit_data *ad)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad,
+					      u8 proto)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 4a7ba4ac487e..1f6c6e619e98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -367,14 +367,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
-	int i, rc = 0;
-	struct sec_path *sp;
-	u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-
-	sp = skb->sp;
+	int i;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 	if (sp) {
 		for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
@@ -382,23 +380,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-				sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * This check even when there's no association involved is
-	 * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
-	 * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
-	 * explicitly allowed by policy.
-	 */
-
-	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-
-	return rc;
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -408,49 +400,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-					struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	dst = skb_dst(skb);
-
-	if (dst) {
-		struct dst_entry *dst_test;
-
-		for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
-		     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
-			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
-				goto out;
-		}
-	}
 
 	switch (proto) {
 	case IPPROTO_AH:
 	case IPPROTO_ESP:
 	case IPPROTO_COMP:
-		/*
-		 * We should have already seen this packet once before
-		 * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
-		 * unlabeled check.
-		 */
-		goto out;
+		/* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+		 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+		 * check. */
+		return 0;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * This check even when there's no association involved is
-	 * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
-	 * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
-	 * explicitly allowed by policy.
-	 */
+	dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *iter;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-			  ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
-out:
-	return rc;
+		for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+				return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4baabeec2a061fe771f9fcc01c61204a2ee2f608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:39 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup some comment and whitespace issues in the XFRM code

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 1f6c6e619e98..00801cef1dd9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /*
- * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
- * a xfrm policy rule.
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
@@ -213,7 +213,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
  * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
  * incoming packet.
  */
-
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 {
 	struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -248,8 +247,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
- * xfrm_policy.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
@@ -257,10 +255,9 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
 }
 
-
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
- * new for policy cloning.
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
@@ -352,9 +349,9 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
 }
 
- /*
-  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
-  */
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
 	return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e21936958000a4f2298193b3875b707fbcbc8f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:40 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_decode_session()

Some basic simplification.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 00801cef1dd9..425b9f91d755 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -215,34 +215,35 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 {
+	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
 	struct sec_path *sp;
 
-	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
 	if (skb == NULL)
-		return 0;
+		goto out;
 
 	sp = skb->sp;
 	if (sp) {
-		int i, sid_set = 0;
+		int i;
 
-		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 
-				if (!sid_set) {
-					*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-					sid_set = 1;
-
+				if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+					sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
 					if (!ckall)
-						break;
-				} else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+						goto out;
+				} else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+					*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 					return -EINVAL;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
+out:
+	*sid = sid_session;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d1b17b09f390369271ecfbc7e4a4d0d0dcff1b1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:40 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup the XFRM header

Remove the unused get_sock_isec() function and do some formatting
fixes.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 19 +++++--------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index b463f210f1af..60774bcf61b3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
@@ -23,18 +23,8 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
-			struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl);
-
-/*
- * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
- */
-static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	if (!sk->sk_socket)
-		return NULL;
-
-	return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
-}
+				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+				      const struct flowi *fl);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
@@ -74,7 +64,8 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
+					      int ckall)
 {
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From bed4d7efb31fd81b3a3c83dc8540197cd0fe81c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:40 -0400
Subject: selinux: remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid()

Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the
error code up to the caller.  Also check the return values in the
only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid().

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c        | 8 ++++++--
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d3555bdf66af..4bc068b3773d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3722,8 +3722,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_type;
 
-	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
-	selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+	err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EACCES;
 
 	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 60774bcf61b3..7605251936f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -76,10 +76,9 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
-	int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
-	BUG_ON(err);
+	return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
 }
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From fee7114298cf54bbd221cdb2ab49738be8b94f4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:41 -0400
Subject: SELinux: Reduce overhead of mls_level_isvalid() function call

While running the high_systime workload of the AIM7 benchmark on
a 2-socket 12-core Westmere x86-64 machine running 3.10-rc4 kernel
(with HT on), it was found that a pretty sizable amount of time was
spent in the SELinux code. Below was the perf trace of the "perf
record -a -s" of a test run at 1500 users:

  5.04%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_get_bit
  1.96%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] mls_level_isvalid
  1.95%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] find_next_bit

The ebitmap_get_bit() was the hottest function in the perf-report
output.  Both the ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions
were, in fact, called by mls_level_isvalid(). As a result, the
mls_level_isvalid() call consumed 8.95% of the total CPU time of
all the 24 virtual CPUs which is quite a lot. The majority of the
mls_level_isvalid() function invocations come from the socket creation
system call.

Looking at the mls_level_isvalid() function, it is checking to see
if all the bits set in one of the ebitmap structure are also set in
another one as well as the highest set bit is no bigger than the one
specified by the given policydb data structure. It is doing it in
a bit-by-bit manner. So if the ebitmap structure has many bits set,
the iteration loop will be done many times.

The current code can be rewritten to use a similar algorithm as the
ebitmap_contains() function with an additional check for the
highest set bit. The ebitmap_contains() function was extended to
cover an optional additional check for the highest set bit, and the
mls_level_isvalid() function was modified to call ebitmap_contains().

With that change, the perf trace showed that the used CPU time drop
down to just 0.08% (ebitmap_contains + mls_level_isvalid) of the
total which is about 100X less than before.

  0.07%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_contains
  0.05%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_get_bit
  0.01%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] mls_level_isvalid
  0.01%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] find_next_bit

The remaining ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions calls
are made by other kernel routines as the new mls_level_isvalid()
function will not call them anymore.

This patch also improves the high_systime AIM7 benchmark result,
though the improvement is not as impressive as is suggested by the
reduction in CPU time spent in the ebitmap functions. The table below
shows the performance change on the 2-socket x86-64 system (with HT
on) mentioned above.

+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
|   Workload   | mean % change | mean % change  | mean % change   |
|              | 10-100 users  | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| high_systime |     +0.1%     |     +0.9%      |     +2.6%       |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h   |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c       | 22 +++++++---------------
 security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 30f119b1d1ec..820313a04d49 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -213,7 +213,12 @@ netlbl_import_failure:
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
-int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
 {
 	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
 	int i;
@@ -223,14 +228,25 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
 
 	n1 = e1->node;
 	n2 = e2->node;
+
 	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
 		if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
 			n1 = n1->next;
 			continue;
 		}
-		for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
+		for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
+			i--;	/* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+		if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+			u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+					 __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+			if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+				return 0;
+		}
+
+		while (i >= 0) {
 			if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
 				return 0;
+			i--;
 		}
 
 		n1 = n1->next;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 922f8afa89dd..e7eb3a9c5ab7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 
 int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
-int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 40de8d3f208e..c85bc1ec040c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
 {
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
-	struct ebitmap_node *node;
-	int i;
 
 	if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
 		return 0;
@@ -170,19 +168,13 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
 	if (!levdatum)
 		return 0;
 
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&l->cat, node, i) {
-		if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
-			return 0;
-		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i)) {
-			/*
-			 * Category may not be associated with
-			 * sensitivity.
-			 */
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 1;
+	/*
+	 * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+	 * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+	 * p->p_cats.nprim.
+	 */
+	return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+				p->p_cats.nprim);
 }
 
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
index 03bed52a8052..e93648774137 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 {
 	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
-		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
 }
 
 #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a767f680e34bf14a36fefbbb6d85783eef99fd57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:41 -0400
Subject: SELinux: Increase ebitmap_node size for 64-bit configuration

Currently, the ebitmap_node structure has a fixed size of 32 bytes. On
a 32-bit system, the overhead is 8 bytes, leaving 24 bytes for being
used as bitmaps. The overhead ratio is 1/4.

On a 64-bit system, the overhead is 16 bytes. Therefore, only 16 bytes
are left for bitmap purpose and the overhead ratio is 1/2. With a
3.8.2 kernel, a boot-up operation will cause the ebitmap_get_bit()
function to be called about 9 million times. The average number of
ebitmap_node traversal is about 3.7.

This patch increases the size of the ebitmap_node structure to 64
bytes for 64-bit system to keep the overhead ratio at 1/4. This may
also improve performance a little bit by making node to node traversal
less frequent (< 2) as more bits are available in each node.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index e7eb3a9c5ab7..712c8a7b8e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@
 
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
-#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS	((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32))	\
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	64
+#else
+#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS	((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
 					/ sizeof(unsigned long))
 #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE	BITS_PER_LONG
 #define EBITMAP_SIZE		(EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 5c73fceb8c70466c5876ad94c356922ae75a0820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:41 -0400
Subject: SELinux: Enable setting security contexts on rootfs inodes.

rootfs (ramfs) can support setting of security contexts
by userspace due to the vfs fallback behavior of calling
the security module to set the in-core inode state
for security.* attributes when the filesystem does not
provide an xattr handler.  No xattr handler required
as the inodes are pinned in memory and have no backing
store.

This is useful in allowing early userspace to label individual
files within a rootfs while still providing a policy-defined
default via genfs.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4bc068b3773d..911b780fcf80 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -406,6 +406,13 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
 		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 
+	/*
+	 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
+	 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b138004ea0382bdc6d02599c39392651b4f63889 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:42 -0400
Subject: SELinux: fix selinuxfs policy file on big endian systems

The /sys/fs/selinux/policy file is not valid on big endian systems like
ppc64 or s390.  Let's see why:

static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
	int *cnt = ptr;
	*cnt = *cnt + 1;

	return 0;
}

static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
	size_t nel;
[...]
	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
	nel = 0;
	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
	if (rc)
		return rc;
	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);

So size_t is 64 bits.  But then we pass a pointer to it as we do to
hashtab_cnt.  hashtab_cnt thinks it is a 32 bit int and only deals with
the first 4 bytes.  On x86_64 which is little endian, those first 4
bytes and the least significant, so this works out fine.  On ppc64/s390
those first 4 bytes of memory are the high order bits.  So at the end of
the call to hashtab_map nel has a HUGE number.  But the least
significant 32 bits are all 0's.

We then pass that 64 bit number to cpu_to_le32() which happily truncates
it to a 32 bit number and does endian swapping.  But the low 32 bits are
all 0's.  So no matter how many entries are in the hashtab, big endian
systems always say there are 0 entries because I screwed up the
counting.

The fix is easy.  Use a 32 bit int, as the hashtab_cnt expects, for nel.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 9cd9b7c661ec..3fc8969b499c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -3200,9 +3200,8 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 
 static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	size_t nel;
 	__le32 buf[1];
-	int rc;
+	int rc, nel;
 	struct policy_data pd;
 
 	pd.p = p;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 40d3d0b85fa22084fc3b7eeb943aca365097cea3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:58:45 -0400
Subject: SELinux: remove crazy contortions around proc

We check if the fsname is proc and if so set the proc superblock security
struct flag.  We then check if the flag is set and use the string 'proc'
for the fsname instead of just using the fsname.  What's the point?  It's
always proc...  Get rid of the useless conditional.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 911b780fcf80..42b538ceb8b4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 
 	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-	rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d355987f47bbe24e7450b509a3f8aac0db88b65a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:58:53 -0400
Subject: SELinux: make it harder to get the number of mnt opts wrong

Instead of just hard coding a value, use the enum to out benefit.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 42b538ceb8b4..863f20590186 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
-
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -307,8 +305,11 @@ enum {
 	Opt_defcontext = 3,
 	Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 	Opt_labelsupport = 5,
+	Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
 };
 
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS	(Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
+
 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 	{Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 	{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From af8e50cc7d546c508e9091bbbdf3cf8b243bd8cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:59:00 -0400
Subject: SELinux: use define for number of bits in the mnt flags mask

We had this random hard coded value of '8' in the code (I put it there)
for the number of bits to check for mount options.  This is stupid.  Instead
use the #define we already have which tells us the number of mount
options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 863f20590186..e13d65a62104 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -466,9 +466,12 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
+
 	tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 	/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
 		if (tmp & 0x01)
 			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 		tmp >>= 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 12f348b9dcf6d9616c86a049c3c8700f9dc0af55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2012 10:56:25 -0400
Subject: SELinux: rename SE_SBLABELSUPP to SBLABEL_MNT

Just a flag rename as we prepare to make it not so special.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e13d65a62104..344f4f999681 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 	}
 
-	sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
+	sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SBLABEL_MNT);
 
 	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
@@ -401,18 +401,18 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
 	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
 	    sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
-		sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+		sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
 	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
-		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/*
 	 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
 	 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
 	 */
 	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
-		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 		tmp >>= 1;
 	}
 	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
-	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
 		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
 	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -524,9 +524,9 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
-	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
-		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
 	}
 
 	BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 		u32 sid;
 
-		if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 			prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
 			break;
-		case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+		case SBLABEL_MNT:
 			seq_putc(m, ',');
 			seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
 			continue;
@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
+	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
 					     &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
 		if (rc)
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		u32 sid;
 		size_t len;
 
-		if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
@@ -2546,7 +2546,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
 	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
 		newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
-	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
+	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
 					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
 					     qstr, &newsid);
@@ -2568,7 +2568,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		isec->initialized = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
+	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name) {
@@ -2776,7 +2776,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 6d3885165d14..7ec750609cca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 /* Non-mount related flags */
 #define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x10
 #define SE_SBPROC		0x20
-#define SE_SBLABELSUPP	0x40
+#define SBLABEL_MNT	0x40
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From eadcabc697e904e0d93d10070a324d8855740b91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:59:14 -0400
Subject: SELinux: do all flags twiddling in one place

Currently we set the initialize and seclabel flag in one place.  Do some
unrelated printk then we unset the seclabel flag.  Eww.  Instead do the flag
twiddling in one place in the code not seperated by unrelated printk.  Also
don't set and unset the seclabel flag.  Only set it if we need to.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 344f4f999681..ca0a1c671f0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -387,8 +387,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 	}
 
-	sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SBLABEL_MNT);
-
 	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
@@ -397,11 +395,11 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
-	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
-	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
-	    sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
-		sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
+	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
+		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
 	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From cfca0303da0e2c3f570cb5cfc7c373828e6c13a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2012 16:20:08 -0400
Subject: SELinux: renumber the superblock options

Just to make it clear that we have mount time options and flags,
separate them.  Since I decided to move the non-mount options above
above 0x10, we need a short instead of a char.  (x86 padding says
this takes up no additional space as we have a 3byte whole in the
structure)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index aa47bcabb5f6..fe99f64a1d54 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
 	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
 	u32 mntpoint_sid;		/* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
 	unsigned int behavior;		/* labeling behavior */
-	unsigned char flags;		/* which mount options were specified */
+	unsigned short flags;		/* which mount options were specified */
 	struct mutex lock;
 	struct list_head isec_head;
 	spinlock_t isec_lock;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 7ec750609cca..9c424d8bd2e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -45,14 +45,15 @@
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
 #define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
 /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT	0x02
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT	0x04
 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT	0x08
+#define SBLABEL_MNT	0x10
 /* Non-mount related flags */
-#define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x10
-#define SE_SBPROC		0x20
-#define SBLABEL_MNT	0x40
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x0100
+#define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From f936c6e502d3bc21b87c9830b3a24d1e07e6b6e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2012 10:38:47 -0400
Subject: SELinux: change sbsec->behavior to short

We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that
packs nicely.  This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little
bit.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index fe99f64a1d54..b1dfe1049450 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of file system superblock */
 	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
 	u32 mntpoint_sid;		/* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
-	unsigned int behavior;		/* labeling behavior */
+	unsigned short behavior;	/* labeling behavior */
 	unsigned short flags;		/* which mount options were specified */
 	struct mutex lock;
 	struct list_head isec_head;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 9c424d8bd2e0..20830be6b61f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE		5 /* no labeling support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT	6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
 
-int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
+int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, short unsigned int *behavior,
 	u32 *sid);
 
 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index b4feecc3fe01..603c638434bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ out:
  */
 int security_fs_use(
 	const char *fstype,
-	unsigned int *behavior,
+	short unsigned int *behavior,
 	u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 308ab70c465d97cf7e3168961dfd365535de21a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:59:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag

Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option
just handle it like the mount options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 3 ---
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ca0a1c671f0e..5596dc51e21b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -474,9 +474,6 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 		tmp >>= 1;
 	}
-	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
-	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
-		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
 	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 20830be6b61f..1a73fcd51d56 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
-#define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
+#define SE_MNTMASK	0x1f
 /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
 /* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a64c54cf0811b8032fdab8c9d52576f0370837fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 15:59:07 -0400
Subject: SELinux: pass a superblock to security_fs_use

Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock.  It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  3 +--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 21 +++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5596dc51e21b..ec15a5694b9e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 
 	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	rc = security_fs_use(sb);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 1a73fcd51d56..01a0382c43ca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -171,8 +171,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE		5 /* no labeling support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT	6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
 
-int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, short unsigned int *behavior,
-	u32 *sid);
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
 
 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
 	u32 *sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 603c638434bb..a90721771615 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2323,17 +2323,14 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
- * @fstype: filesystem type
- * @behavior: labeling behavior
- * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ * @sb: superblock in question
  */
-int security_fs_use(
-	const char *fstype,
-	short unsigned int *behavior,
-	u32 *sid)
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -2345,21 +2342,21 @@ int security_fs_use(
 	}
 
 	if (c) {
-		*behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
 			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
-		*sid = c->sid[0];
+		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
 	} else {
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
 		if (rc) {
-			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
 			rc = 0;
 		} else {
-			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b43e725d8d386bf2092473953b525aaae71b6c28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2012 14:27:35 -0400
Subject: SELinux: use a helper function to determine seclabel

Use a helper to determine if a superblock should have the seclabel flag
rather than doing it in the function.  I'm going to use this in the
security server as well.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ec15a5694b9e..b222e966babe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -354,6 +354,29 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
+	 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
@@ -396,20 +419,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
 	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
-	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
-	    sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
-		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
-
-	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
-	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
-		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
-
-	/*
-	 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
-	 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
-	 */
-	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
+	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b04eea886409de7460b5727b5931fb0bd417275f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 17:38:38 -0400
Subject: selinux: fix problems in netnode when BUG() is compiled out

When the BUG() macro is disabled at compile time it can cause some
problems in the SELinux netnode code: invalid return codes and
uninitialized variables.  This patch fixes this by making sure we take
some corrective action after the BUG() macro.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/netnode.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index c5454c0477c3..03a72c32afd7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return;
 	}
 
 	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2be4d74f2fd45460d70d4fe65cc1972ef45bf849 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Date: Fri, 3 May 2013 09:05:39 -0400
Subject: Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer
 classes.

Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables.  Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.

Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.

Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.

The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.

Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  3 +++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |  4 +++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  3 +++
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b222e966babe..4fbf2c5f26ce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -136,12 +136,28 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
- * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
  *
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -4197,7 +4213,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
-	peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -4579,7 +4595,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
 	netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
-	peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
@@ -4731,7 +4747,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 #endif
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
-	peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 01a0382c43ca..004a2479880f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -69,12 +69,15 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
 enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
 	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
 
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 /*
  * type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ff427733c290..5122affe06a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
 /* Policy capability filenames */
 static char *policycap_names[] = {
 	"network_peer_controls",
-	"open_perms"
+	"open_perms",
+	"redhat1",
+	"always_check_network"
 };
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a90721771615..d106733ad987 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -1812,6 +1813,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
 	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
 }
 
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2013 18:56:19 -0400
Subject: selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies

Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.

By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:

fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);

This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.

Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4fbf2c5f26ce..0d4408debb45 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -94,6 +94,10 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
+#define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s"
+#define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0])
+#define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : ""
+
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -407,8 +411,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		   the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 		   assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 		if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
-			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no "
+			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
 			rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -416,22 +420,22 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 			if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
-				       "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
-				       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+				       SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n",
+				       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
 			else
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
-				       "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
-				       sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+				       SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+				       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc);
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
-		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n",
+		       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
 	else
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
-		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n",
+		       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb),
 		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
 	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
@@ -589,7 +593,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int rc = 0, i;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 	struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
@@ -642,8 +645,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
-			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
-			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
 			goto out;
 		}
 		switch (flags[i]) {
@@ -779,7 +782,8 @@ out:
 out_double_mount:
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
-	       "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
+	       "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
+	       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
 	goto out;
 }
 
@@ -2439,8 +2443,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
-			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
-			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
 			goto out_free_opts;
 		}
 		rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2478,8 +2482,8 @@ out_free_secdata:
 	return rc;
 out_bad_option:
 	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
-	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
-	       sb->s_type->name);
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
+	       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
 	goto out_free_opts;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d106733ad987..ee470a0b5c27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2334,16 +2334,50 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+	const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL;
+	struct ocontext *base = NULL;
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
-	while (c) {
-		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+	for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) {
+		char *sub;
+		int baselen;
+
+		baselen = strlen(fstype);
+
+		/* if base does not match, this is not the one */
+		if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen))
+			continue;
+
+		/* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */
+		if (!subtype)
+			break;
+
+		/* skip past the base in this entry */
+		sub = c->u.name + baselen;
+
+		/* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */
+		if (sub[0] == '\0') {
+			base = c;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */
+		if (sub[0] != '.')
+			continue;
+
+		/* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */
+		sub++; /* move past '.' */
+
+		/* exact match of fstype AND subtype */
+		if (!strcmp(subtype, sub))
 			break;
-		c = c->next;
 	}
 
+	/* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */
+	if (!c)
+		c = base;
+
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 0b4bdb3573a86a88c829b9e4ad702859eb923e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 13:32:42 -0400
Subject: Revert "SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag"

This reverts commit 308ab70c465d97cf7e3168961dfd365535de21a6.

It breaks my FC6 test box.  /dev/pts is not mounted.  dmesg says

SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)

Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 3 +++
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0d4408debb45..c156f5eb1aea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -504,6 +504,9 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 			opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 		tmp >>= 1;
 	}
+	/* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+	if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
+		opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
 	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 004a2479880f..7aad3a1389d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
-#define SE_MNTMASK	0x1f
+#define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
 /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
 /* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT	0x01
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7a362838f9ed1d6806a2b28f68699826423a7e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 13:57:55 -0400
Subject: selinux: add Paul Moore as a SELinux maintainer

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index b140c8123098..3df53f174725 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -7310,9 +7310,10 @@ SELINUX SECURITY MODULE
 M:	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
 M:	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
 M:	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
+M:	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
 L:	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion)
 W:	http://selinuxproject.org
-T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux.git
+T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/selinux*
 F:	security/selinux/
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a3c9e45d18ace44d02574518144742a00c7a94ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 09:51:50 -0400
Subject: security: remove erroneous comment about capabilities.o link ordering

Back when we had half ass LSM stacking we had to link capabilities.o
after bigger LSMs so that on initialization the bigger LSM would
register first and the capabilities module would be the one stacked as
the 'seconday'.  Somewhere around 6f0f0fd496333777d53 (back in 2008) we
finally removed the last of the kinda module stacking code but this
comment in the makefile still lives today.

Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/Makefile | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index c26c81e92571..a5918e01a4f7 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
 # Object file lists
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
-# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 5a5f2acfd04269e2e0958067216b68ff461c285c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 13:14:04 -0400
Subject: selinux: add Paul Moore as a SELinux maintainer

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index e61c2e83fc2b..4fde7066de70 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -7390,9 +7390,10 @@ SELINUX SECURITY MODULE
 M:	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
 M:	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
 M:	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
+M:	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
 L:	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion)
 W:	http://selinuxproject.org
-T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux.git
+T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/selinux*
 F:	security/selinux/
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 61ea0c0ba904a55f55317d850c1072ff7835ac92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:13 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession

Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
for possession.  Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.

This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
initial permissions granted to a key.

The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/internal.h         | 1 +
 security/keys/process_keys.c     | 8 +++++---
 security/keys/request_key.c      | 6 ++++--
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index d4f1468b9b50..df971feceaf2 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 					 const void *description,
 					 key_match_func_t match,
+					 bool no_state_check,
 					 const struct cred *cred);
 
 extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 42defae1e161..a3410d605849 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ found:
 key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 				  const void *description,
 				  key_match_func_t match,
+				  bool no_state_check,
 				  const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	might_sleep();
 
 	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
-					     false, cred);
+					     no_state_check, cred);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		goto found;
 	err = key_ref;
@@ -468,7 +469,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
 
 			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
-							  match, rka->cred);
+							  match, no_state_check,
+							  rka->cred);
 
 			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ try_again:
 		/* check to see if we possess the key */
 		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
 						   lookup_user_key_possessed,
-						   cred);
+						   true, cred);
 
 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
 			key_put(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index c411f9bb156b..172115b38054 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 	 * waited for locks */
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
-	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
+					  false, cred);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		goto key_already_present;
 
@@ -539,7 +540,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 	       dest_keyring, flags);
 
 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
-	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
+					  false, cred);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 85730d5a5a59..92077de555df 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 		&key_type_request_key_auth,
 		(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
 		key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
-		cred);
+		false, cred);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
 		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a5b4bd2874d9032b42db8cc4880058576c561b06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:14 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Use bool in make_key_ref() and is_key_possessed()

Make make_key_ref() take a bool possession parameter and make
is_key_possessed() return a bool.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/security/keys.txt | 7 +++----
 include/linux/key.h             | 4 ++--
 security/keys/keyring.c         | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 7b4145d00452..9ede67084f0b 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -865,15 +865,14 @@ encountered:
      calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its
      keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these:
 
-	key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key,
-			       unsigned long possession);
+	key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, bool possession);
 
 	struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref);
 
-	unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
+	bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
 
      The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and
-     possession information (which must be 0 or 1 and not any other value).
+     possession information (which must be true or false).
 
      The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the
      third retrieves the possession flag.
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 4dfde1161c5e..51bce2950de4 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct keyring_name;
 typedef struct __key_reference_with_attributes *key_ref_t;
 
 static inline key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key,
-				     unsigned long possession)
+				     bool possession)
 {
 	return (key_ref_t) ((unsigned long) key | possession);
 }
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static inline struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref)
 	return (struct key *) ((unsigned long) key_ref & ~1UL);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
+static inline bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
 {
 	return (unsigned long) key_ref & 1UL;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 6ece7f2e5707..f78406372ebe 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -329,9 +329,10 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	struct keyring_list *keylist;
 	struct timespec now;
-	unsigned long possessed, kflags;
+	unsigned long kflags;
 	struct key *keyring, *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	bool possessed;
 	long err;
 	int sp, nkeys, kix;
 
@@ -542,8 +543,8 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			       key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	unsigned long possessed;
 	struct key *keyring, *key;
+	bool possessed;
 	int nkeys, loop;
 
 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7e55ca6dcd07b45619035df343c9614a3ab35034 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:14 +0100
Subject: KEYS: key_is_dead() should take a const key pointer argument

key_is_dead() should take a const key pointer argument as it doesn't modify
what it points to.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/internal.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index df971feceaf2..490aef5ba34b 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
 /*
  * Determine whether a key is dead.
  */
-static inline bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit)
 {
 	return
 		key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) |
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 16feef4340172b7dbb9cba60850e78fa6388adf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:15 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access

Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for accessing keys.  The index key
is the search term needed to find a key directly - basically the key type and
the key description.  We can add to that the description length.

This will be useful when turning a keyring into an associative array rather
than just a pointer block.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/key.h         | 21 +++++++++----
 security/keys/internal.h    |  8 ++---
 security/keys/key.c         | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 security/keys/keyring.c     | 37 +++++++++++------------
 security/keys/request_key.c | 12 +++++---
 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 51bce2950de4..d573e820a23d 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ struct key_owner;
 struct keyring_list;
 struct keyring_name;
 
+struct keyring_index_key {
+	struct key_type		*type;
+	const char		*description;
+	size_t			desc_len;
+};
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * key reference with possession attribute handling
@@ -129,7 +135,6 @@ struct key {
 		struct list_head graveyard_link;
 		struct rb_node	serial_node;
 	};
-	struct key_type		*type;		/* type of key */
 	struct rw_semaphore	sem;		/* change vs change sem */
 	struct key_user		*user;		/* owner of this key */
 	void			*security;	/* security data for this key */
@@ -163,12 +168,18 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
 #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
 
-	/* the description string
-	 * - this is used to match a key against search criteria
-	 * - this should be a printable string
+	/* the key type and key description string
+	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
+	 * - it should be a printable string
 	 * - eg: for krb5 AFS, this might be "afs@REDHAT.COM"
 	 */
-	char			*description;
+	union {
+		struct keyring_index_key index_key;
+		struct {
+			struct key_type	*type;		/* type of key */
+			char		*description;
+		};
+	};
 
 	/* type specific data
 	 * - this is used by the keyring type to index the name
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 490aef5ba34b..77441dd1f9d4 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -89,19 +89,17 @@ extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
 extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
 
 extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
-			    const struct key_type *type,
-			    const char *description,
+			    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
 			    unsigned long *_prealloc);
 extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
 extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 		       unsigned long *_prealloc);
 extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
-			   struct key_type *type,
+			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
 			   unsigned long prealloc);
 
 extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-				      const struct key_type *type,
-				      const char *description,
+				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
 				      key_perm_t perm);
 
 extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 8fb7c7bd4657..7e6bc396bb23 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -242,8 +242,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
-	quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
+	desclen = strlen(desc);
+	quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
 
 	/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
 	user = key_user_lookup(uid);
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	if (desc) {
-		key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
+		key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!key->description)
 			goto no_memory_3;
 	}
@@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
 	init_rwsem(&key->sem);
 	lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
-	key->type = type;
+	key->index_key.type = type;
 	key->user = user;
 	key->quotalen = quotalen;
 	key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
@@ -489,8 +490,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	}
 
 	if (keyring) {
-		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
-				       &prealloc);
+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_preparse;
 	}
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 					 &prealloc);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
 
 error_free_preparse:
 	if (key->type->preparse)
@@ -548,8 +548,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	ret = -EBUSY;
 
 	if (keyring)
-		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type,
-					    key->description, &prealloc);
+		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
 
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
@@ -581,7 +580,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
 
 	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
 	if (awaken)
@@ -780,25 +779,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			       key_perm_t perm,
 			       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prealloc;
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
+		.description	= description,
+	};
 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct key_type *ktype;
+	unsigned long prealloc;
 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
 	 * types */
-	ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
-	if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
+	index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
+	if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate ||
-	    (!description && !ktype->preparse))
+	if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
+	    (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
 		goto error_put_type;
 
 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
@@ -812,21 +813,22 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
 	prep.data = payload;
 	prep.datalen = plen;
-	prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
-	if (ktype->preparse) {
-		ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
+	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
+	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
+		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 			goto error_put_type;
 		}
-		if (!description)
-			description = prep.description;
+		if (!index_key.description)
+			index_key.description = prep.description;
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-		if (!description)
+		if (!index_key.description)
 			goto error_free_prep;
 	}
+	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
 
-	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 		goto error_free_prep;
@@ -844,9 +846,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	 * key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
 	 * update that instead if possible
 	 */
-	if (ktype->update) {
-		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
-					       0);
+	if (index_key.type->update) {
+		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key, 0);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found_matching_key;
 	}
@@ -856,16 +857,17 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
 		perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
 
-		if (ktype->read)
+		if (index_key.type->read)
 			perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
 
-		if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update)
+		if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
+		    index_key.type->update)
 			perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
 	}
 
 	/* allocate a new key */
-	key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
-			perm, flags);
+	key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
+			cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
 		key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
 		goto error_link_end;
@@ -882,12 +884,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
 error_link_end:
-	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
 error_free_prep:
-	if (ktype->preparse)
-		ktype->free_preparse(&prep);
+	if (index_key.type->preparse)
+		index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
 error_put_type:
-	key_type_put(ktype);
+	key_type_put(index_key.type);
 error:
 	return key_ref;
 
@@ -895,7 +897,7 @@ error:
 	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
 	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
 	 */
-	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 	goto error_free_prep;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index f78406372ebe..c7f59f9dd7b6 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -538,8 +538,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
  * to the returned key reference.
  */
 key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-			       const struct key_type *ktype,
-			       const char *description,
+			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
 			       key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist;
@@ -558,9 +557,9 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		smp_rmb();
 		for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) {
 			key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
-			if (key->type == ktype &&
+			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
 			    (!key->type->match ||
-			     key->type->match(key, description)) &&
+			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
 			    key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
 					   perm) == 0 &&
 			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
@@ -747,8 +746,8 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 /*
  * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring.
  */
-int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
-		     const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc)
+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+		     unsigned long *_prealloc)
 	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
 	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
@@ -759,7 +758,8 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
 	size_t size;
 	int loop, lru, ret;
 
-	kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description);
+	kenter("%d,%s,%s,",
+	       key_serial(keyring), index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
 
 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
 		return -ENOTDIR;
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
 
 	/* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
 	 * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */
-	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
 	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
@@ -784,8 +784,8 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
 		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
 			struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
 								keyring);
-			if (key->type == type &&
-			    strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) {
+			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
+			    strcmp(key->description, index_key->description) == 0) {
 				/* Found a match - we'll replace the link with
 				 * one to the new key.  We record the slot
 				 * position.
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ error_quota:
 	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
 			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
 error_sem:
-	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 error_krsem:
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
@@ -957,16 +957,17 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
  *
  * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called.
  */
-void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
+void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
+		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
 		    unsigned long prealloc)
 	__releases(&keyring->sem)
 	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
-	BUG_ON(type == NULL);
-	BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
-	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, type->name, prealloc);
+	BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL);
+	BUG_ON(index_key->type->name == NULL);
+	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, prealloc);
 
-	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
 	if (prealloc) {
@@ -1007,12 +1008,12 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 	key_check(keyring);
 	key_check(key);
 
-	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
-		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 172115b38054..586cb79ee82d 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -352,6 +352,11 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 			       struct key_user *user,
 			       struct key **_key)
 {
+	const struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
+		.type		= type,
+		.description	= description,
+		.desc_len	= strlen(description),
+	};
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	unsigned long prealloc;
 	struct key *key;
@@ -379,8 +384,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
 
 	if (dest_keyring) {
-		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, type, description,
-				       &prealloc);
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
 	}
@@ -400,7 +404,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
 	*_key = key;
 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
@@ -416,7 +420,7 @@ key_already_present:
 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_check_failed;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4bdf0bc300314141e5475e145acb8b5ad846f00d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:15 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Introduce a search context structure

Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.

Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
keys looking for a non-description match.

This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
through to the iterator callback function.

Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
clear which is being supplied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/key-type.h         |   5 ++
 security/keys/internal.h         |  40 +++++++------
 security/keys/keyring.c          |  70 +++++++++++------------
 security/keys/proc.c             |  17 ++++--
 security/keys/process_keys.c     | 117 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 security/keys/request_key.c      |  56 +++++++++----------
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c |  14 +++--
 security/keys/user_defined.c     |  18 +++---
 8 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 518a53afb9ea..f58737bcb050 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ struct key_type {
 	 */
 	size_t def_datalen;
 
+	/* Default key search algorithm. */
+	unsigned def_lookup_type;
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT	0x0000	/* Direct lookup by description. */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE	0x0001	/* Iterative search. */
+
 	/* vet a description */
 	int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 77441dd1f9d4..f4bf938b68b4 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -107,23 +107,31 @@ extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
 
 typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
 
+struct keyring_search_context {
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
+	const struct cred	*cred;
+	key_match_func_t	match;
+	const void		*match_data;
+	unsigned		flags;
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE	0x0001	/* [as type->def_lookup_type] */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK	0x0002	/* Skip state checks */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK	0x0004	/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME	0x0008	/* Don't update times */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0010	/* Don't check permissions */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0020	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
+
+	/* Internal stuff */
+	int			skipped_ret;
+	bool			possessed;
+	key_ref_t		result;
+	struct timespec		now;
+};
+
 extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-				    const struct cred *cred,
-				    struct key_type *type,
-				    const void *description,
-				    key_match_func_t match,
-				    bool no_state_check);
-
-extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
-					    const void *description,
-					    key_match_func_t match,
-					    bool no_state_check,
-					    const struct cred *cred);
-extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
-					 const void *description,
-					 key_match_func_t match,
-					 bool no_state_check,
-					 const struct cred *cred);
+				    struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
+
+extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
+extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
 
 extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index c7f59f9dd7b6..b42f2d4f7f83 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -280,11 +280,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
 /**
  * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
  * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
- * @cred: The credentials to use for permissions checks.
- * @type: The type of key to search for.
- * @description: Parameter for @match.
- * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
- * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
+ * @ctx: The keyring search context.
  *
  * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
  * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
@@ -314,11 +310,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
  * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
  */
 key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-			     const struct cred *cred,
-			     struct key_type *type,
-			     const void *description,
-			     key_match_func_t match,
-			     bool no_state_check)
+			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct {
 		/* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
@@ -328,20 +320,18 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
 
 	struct keyring_list *keylist;
-	struct timespec now;
 	unsigned long kflags;
 	struct key *keyring, *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
-	bool possessed;
 	long err;
 	int sp, nkeys, kix;
 
 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-	possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
+	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
 	key_check(keyring);
 
 	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
-	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
 		goto error;
@@ -353,7 +343,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	now = current_kernel_time();
+	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
 	err = -EAGAIN;
 	sp = 0;
 
@@ -361,16 +351,17 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	 * are looking for */
 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
 	kflags = keyring->flags;
-	if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
+	if (keyring->type == ctx->index_key.type &&
+	    ctx->match(keyring, ctx->match_data)) {
 		key = keyring;
-		if (no_state_check)
+		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
 			goto found;
 
 		/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
 		 * revoked */
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
 			goto error_2;
-		if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
 			goto error_2;
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
@@ -384,7 +375,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
 		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
 		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
-	    (keyring->expiry && now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
+	    (keyring->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
 		goto error_2;
 
 	/* start processing a new keyring */
@@ -406,29 +397,29 @@ descend:
 		kflags = key->flags;
 
 		/* ignore keys not of this type */
-		if (key->type != type)
+		if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type)
 			continue;
 
 		/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
-		if (!no_state_check) {
+		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)) {
 			if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
 				      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
 				continue;
 
-			if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+			if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
 				continue;
 		}
 
 		/* keys that don't match */
-		if (!match(key, description))
+		if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data))
 			continue;
 
 		/* key must have search permissions */
-		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
-					cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
-		if (no_state_check)
+		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
 			goto found;
 
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
@@ -456,8 +447,8 @@ ascend:
 		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
 			continue;
 
-		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
-					cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
 		/* stack the current position */
@@ -489,12 +480,12 @@ not_this_keyring:
 	/* we found a viable match */
 found:
 	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-	key->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
-	keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
+	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
 	while (sp > 0)
-		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
+		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
 	key_check(key);
-	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed);
+	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
 error_2:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 error:
@@ -514,11 +505,20 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 			 struct key_type *type,
 			 const char *description)
 {
-	if (!type->match)
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= type,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match			= type->match,
+		.match_data		= description,
+		.flags			= (type->def_lookup_type |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK),
+	};
+
+	if (!ctx.match)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
-	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
-				  type, description, type->match, false);
+	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 217b6855e815..88e9a466940f 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
 
 static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct rb_node *_p = v;
 	struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
 	struct timespec now;
@@ -191,15 +190,23 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	char xbuf[12];
 	int rc;
 
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= key->type,
+		.index_key.description	= key->description,
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match			= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.match_data		= key,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
+	};
+
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
 
 	/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
 	 * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
 	 */
 	if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
-		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
-						      lookup_user_key_possessed,
-						      true, cred);
+		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
 			key_ref_put(skey_ref);
 			key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	 * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
 	 *   access to __current_cred() safe
 	 */
-	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW);
+	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index a3410d605849..e68a3e0e7aa0 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -319,11 +319,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
  * returned key reference.
  */
-key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
-				     const void *description,
-				     key_match_func_t match,
-				     bool no_state_check,
-				     const struct cred *cred)
+key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
 
@@ -339,10 +335,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
 
 	/* search the thread keyring first */
-	if (cred->thread_keyring) {
+	if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-			make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -358,10 +353,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	}
 
 	/* search the process keyring second */
-	if (cred->process_keyring) {
+	if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-			make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -379,11 +373,11 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	}
 
 	/* search the session keyring */
-	if (cred->session_keyring) {
+	if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-			make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1),
-			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
+			make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),
+			ctx);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -402,10 +396,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 		}
 	}
 	/* or search the user-session keyring */
-	else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
+	else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
-			make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
+			ctx);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -437,19 +431,14 @@ found:
  *
  * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().
  */
-key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
-				  const void *description,
-				  key_match_func_t match,
-				  bool no_state_check,
-				  const struct cred *cred)
+key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
 
 	might_sleep();
 
-	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
-					     no_state_check, cred);
+	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		goto found;
 	err = key_ref;
@@ -458,19 +447,21 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	 * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
 	 * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
 	 */
-	if (cred->request_key_auth &&
-	    cred == current_cred() &&
-	    type != &key_type_request_key_auth
+	if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&
+	    ctx->cred == current_cred() &&
+	    ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth
 	    ) {
+		const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
+
 		/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
 		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
-		if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
-			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+		if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
+			rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
 
-			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
-							  match, no_state_check,
-							  rka->cred);
+			ctx->cred = rka->cred;
+			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
+			ctx->cred = cred;
 
 			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
@@ -524,19 +515,23 @@ int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
 key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			  key_perm_t perm)
 {
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.match	= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.flags	= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+			   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
+	};
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
-	const struct cred *cred;
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
 	int ret;
 
 try_again:
-	cred = get_current_cred();
+	ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
 	switch (id) {
 	case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
+		if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
 			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
@@ -548,13 +543,13 @@ try_again:
 			goto reget_creds;
 		}
 
-		key = cred->thread_keyring;
+		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->process_keyring) {
+		if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
 			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
@@ -566,13 +561,13 @@ try_again:
 			goto reget_creds;
 		}
 
-		key = cred->process_keyring;
+		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->session_keyring) {
+		if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
 			/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
 			 * doesn't exist yet */
 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
@@ -582,13 +577,13 @@ try_again:
 				ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
 			else
 				ret = install_session_keyring(
-					cred->user->session_keyring);
+					ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
 
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto error;
 			goto reget_creds;
-		} else if (cred->session_keyring ==
-			   cred->user->session_keyring &&
+		} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
+			   ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
 			   lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
 			ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
 			if (ret < 0)
@@ -597,32 +592,32 @@ try_again:
 		}
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
+		key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
+		if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto error;
 		}
 
-		key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
+		key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
+		if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto error;
 		}
 
-		key = cred->user->session_keyring;
+		key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
@@ -633,7 +628,7 @@ try_again:
 		goto error;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
-		key = cred->request_key_auth;
+		key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
 		if (!key)
 			goto error;
 
@@ -642,20 +637,20 @@ try_again:
 		break;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
-		if (!cred->request_key_auth)
+		if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
 			goto error;
 
-		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+		down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
-			     &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
+			     &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
 			key = NULL;
 		} else {
-			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
 			key = rka->dest_keyring;
 			atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 		}
-		up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 		if (!key)
 			goto error;
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -675,9 +670,13 @@ try_again:
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
 
 		/* check to see if we possess the key */
-		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
-						   lookup_user_key_possessed,
-						   true, cred);
+		ctx.index_key.type		= key->type;
+		ctx.index_key.description	= key->description;
+		ctx.index_key.desc_len		= strlen(key->description);
+		ctx.match_data			= key;
+		kdebug("check possessed");
+		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
+		kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
 
 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
 			key_put(key);
@@ -717,14 +716,14 @@ try_again:
 		goto invalid_key;
 
 	/* check the permissions */
-	ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+	ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto invalid_key;
 
 	key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
 
 error:
-	put_cred(cred);
+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
 	return key_ref;
 
 invalid_key:
@@ -735,7 +734,7 @@ invalid_key:
 	/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
 	 * creds to be installed */
 reget_creds:
-	put_cred(cred);
+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
 	goto try_again;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 586cb79ee82d..ab75df4745af 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -345,38 +345,34 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
  * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a
  * race between two thread calling request_key().
  */
-static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
-			       const char *description,
+static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
 			       struct key *dest_keyring,
 			       unsigned long flags,
 			       struct key_user *user,
 			       struct key **_key)
 {
-	const struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
-		.type		= type,
-		.description	= description,
-		.desc_len	= strlen(description),
-	};
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	unsigned long prealloc;
 	struct key *key;
 	key_perm_t perm;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	int ret;
 
-	kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description);
+	kenter("%s,%s,,,",
+	       ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);
 
 	*_key = NULL;
 	mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
 
 	perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
 	perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
-	if (type->read)
+	if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
 		perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
-	if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update)
+	if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
+	    ctx->index_key.type->update)
 		perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
 
-	key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
+	key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
+			ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
 			perm, flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(key))
 		goto alloc_failed;
@@ -384,7 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
 
 	if (dest_keyring) {
-		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &prealloc);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
 	}
@@ -394,8 +390,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 	 * waited for locks */
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
-	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
-					  false, cred);
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		goto key_already_present;
 
@@ -404,7 +399,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
 	*_key = key;
 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
@@ -420,7 +415,7 @@ key_already_present:
 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_check_failed;
 	}
@@ -449,8 +444,7 @@ alloc_failed:
 /*
  * Commence key construction.
  */
-static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
-					  const char *description,
+static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
 					  const char *callout_info,
 					  size_t callout_len,
 					  void *aux,
@@ -469,8 +463,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 
 	construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
 
-	ret = construct_alloc_key(type, description, dest_keyring, flags, user,
-				  &key);
+	ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
 	key_user_put(user);
 
 	if (ret == 0) {
@@ -534,18 +527,24 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 				 struct key *dest_keyring,
 				 unsigned long flags)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= type,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match			= type->match,
+		.match_data		= description,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	};
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	int ret;
 
 	kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
-	       type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
-	       dest_keyring, flags);
+	       ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
+	       callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
 
 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
-	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
-					  false, cred);
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
@@ -568,9 +567,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 		if (!callout_info)
 			goto error;
 
-		key = construct_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,
-					     callout_len, aux, dest_keyring,
-					     flags);
+		key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
+					     aux, dest_keyring, flags);
 	}
 
 error:
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 92077de555df..8d09852854ca 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -239,15 +239,17 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
  */
 struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
+		.cred			= current_cred(),
+		.match			= key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
+		.match_data		= (void *)(unsigned long)target_id,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	};
 	struct key *authkey;
 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
 
-	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(
-		&key_type_request_key_auth,
-		(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
-		key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
-		false, cred);
+	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
 		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 55dc88939185..faa2caeb593f 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -25,14 +25,15 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
  * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
  */
 struct key_type key_type_user = {
-	.name		= "user",
-	.instantiate	= user_instantiate,
-	.update		= user_update,
-	.match		= user_match,
-	.revoke		= user_revoke,
-	.destroy	= user_destroy,
-	.describe	= user_describe,
-	.read		= user_read,
+	.name			= "user",
+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
+	.update			= user_update,
+	.match			= user_match,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.read			= user_read,
 };
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
  */
 struct key_type key_type_logon = {
 	.name			= "logon",
+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
 	.update			= user_update,
 	.match			= user_match,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d0a059cac6523b23ad7d743dec8783705aab1668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:16 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID

Search for auth-key by name rather than by target key ID as, in a future
patch, we'll by searching directly by index key in preference to iteration
over all keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 21 +++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 8d09852854ca..7495a93b4b90 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
 
 static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
 					struct key_preparsed_payload *);
@@ -221,34 +222,26 @@ error_alloc:
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
-/*
- * See if an authorisation key is associated with a particular key.
- */
-static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
-					       const void *_id)
-{
-	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
-	key_serial_t id = (key_serial_t)(unsigned long) _id;
-
-	return rka->target_key->serial == id;
-}
-
 /*
  * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for
  * instantiation of a key.
  */
 struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 {
+	char description[16];
 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
 		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
+		.index_key.description	= description,
 		.cred			= current_cred(),
-		.match			= key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
-		.match_data		= (void *)(unsigned long)target_id,
+		.match			= user_match,
+		.match_data		= description,
 		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	};
 	struct key *authkey;
 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
 
+	sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
+
 	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ccc3e6d9c9aea07a0b60b2b0bfc5b05a704b66d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:16 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc()

Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/security/keys.txt | 13 ++++++++-----
 include/linux/key.h             | 10 +++++++---
 security/keys/key.c             |  2 +-
 security/keys/keyring.c         |  6 +++---
 security/keys/process_keys.c    | 16 ++++++++--------
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 9ede67084f0b..a4c33f1a7c6d 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -960,14 +960,17 @@ payload contents" for more information.
     the argument will not be parsed.
 
 
-(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling the following function:
+(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following
+    functions:
 
+	struct key *__key_get(struct key *key);
 	struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
 
-    These need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when they've been
-    finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. If the pointer
-    is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set then the key will not be dereferenced and
-    no increment will take place.
+    Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when
+    they've been finished with.  The key pointer passed in will be returned.
+
+    In the case of key_get(), if the pointer is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set
+    then the key will not be dereferenced and no increment will take place.
 
 
 (*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index d573e820a23d..ef596c7af585 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -219,13 +219,17 @@ extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
 extern void key_put(struct key *key);
 
-static inline struct key *key_get(struct key *key)
+static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key)
 {
-	if (key)
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 	return key;
 }
 
+static inline struct key *key_get(struct key *key)
+{
+	return key ? __key_get(key) : key;
+}
+
 static inline void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref)
 {
 	key_put(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 7e6bc396bb23..1e23cc288106 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ found:
 	/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
 	 * doesn't actually change the key
 	 */
-	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+	__key_get(key);
 
 error:
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index b42f2d4f7f83..87eff32b53f4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ not_this_keyring:
 
 	/* we found a viable match */
 found:
-	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+	__key_get(key);
 	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
 	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
 	while (sp > 0)
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
 found:
-	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+	__key_get(key);
 	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
 		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 
 	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
 
-	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+	__key_get(key);
 	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
 		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index e68a3e0e7aa0..68548ea6fe01 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
 		if (IS_ERR(keyring))
 			return PTR_ERR(keyring);
 	} else {
-		atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
+		__key_get(keyring);
 	}
 
 	/* install the keyring */
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ try_again:
 		}
 
 		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ try_again:
 		}
 
 		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ try_again:
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ try_again:
 		}
 
 		key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ try_again:
 		}
 
 		key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ try_again:
 		if (!key)
 			goto error;
 
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+		__key_get(key);
 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
 		break;
 
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ try_again:
 		} else {
 			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
 			key = rka->dest_keyring;
-			atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+			__key_get(key);
 		}
 		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 		if (!key)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e57e8669f2ab8350d30f771dd2fdd5377f183db2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:17 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Drop the permissions argument from __keyring_search_one()

Drop the permissions argument from __keyring_search_one() as the only caller
passes 0 here - which causes all checks to be skipped.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/internal.h | 3 +--
 security/keys/key.c      | 2 +-
 security/keys/keyring.c  | 9 +++------
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index f4bf938b68b4..73950bf8f875 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -99,8 +99,7 @@ extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 			   unsigned long prealloc);
 
 extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-				      key_perm_t perm);
+				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
 
 extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
 					  key_serial_t target_id);
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 1e23cc288106..7d716b82a61e 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	 * update that instead if possible
 	 */
 	if (index_key.type->update) {
-		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key, 0);
+		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found_matching_key;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 87eff32b53f4..eeef1a073db4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -531,15 +531,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
  * RCU is used to make it unnecessary to lock the keyring key list here.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if
- * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked keys and keys not
- * providing the requested permission are skipped over.
+ * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys
+ * are skipped over.
  *
  * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref
  * to the returned key reference.
  */
 key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-			       key_perm_t perm)
+			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist;
 	struct key *keyring, *key;
@@ -560,8 +559,6 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
 			    (!key->type->match ||
 			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
-			    key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
-					   perm) == 0 &&
 			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
 					    (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
 			    )
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 3cb989501c2688cacbb7dc4b0d353faf838f53a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:17 +0100
Subject: Add a generic associative array implementation.

Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the
container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available
whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys.

This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies.

Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt

Some of the properties of the implementation are:

 (1) Objects are opaque pointers.  The implementation does not care where they
     point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything).

     [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant
     	       bits.

 (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array.  This
     permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously.
     Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects.

 (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value).
     This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the
     array itself or its algorithms.

 (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array.

 (5) Index keys must be unique.  Inserting an object with the same key as one
     already in the array will replace the old object.

 (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths.

 (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to
     length is seen.

 (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array.

 (9) The array can iterated over.  The objects will not necessarily come out in
     key order.

(10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU
     readlock is being held by the iterator.  Note, however, under these
     circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once.  If this is a
     problem, the iterator should lock against modification.  Objects will not
     be missed, however, unless deleted.

(11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key.

(12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the
     RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up.

The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed
on each level by nibbles from the index key.  To improve memory efficiency,
shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of
single-occupancy nodes.  Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare
space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an
object needs to be added to a full node.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/assoc_array.txt    |  574 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/assoc_array.h      |   92 ++
 include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h |  182 ++++
 lib/Kconfig                      |   14 +
 lib/Makefile                     |    1 +
 lib/assoc_array.c                | 1745 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 2608 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/assoc_array.txt
 create mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
 create mode 100644 lib/assoc_array.c

diff --git a/Documentation/assoc_array.txt b/Documentation/assoc_array.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4faec0f66e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/assoc_array.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+		   ========================================
+		   GENERIC ASSOCIATIVE ARRAY IMPLEMENTATION
+		   ========================================
+
+Contents:
+
+ - Overview.
+
+ - The public API.
+   - Edit script.
+   - Operations table.
+   - Manipulation functions.
+   - Access functions.
+   - Index key form.
+
+ - Internal workings.
+   - Basic internal tree layout.
+   - Shortcuts.
+   - Splitting and collapsing nodes.
+   - Non-recursive iteration.
+   - Simultaneous alteration and iteration.
+
+
+========
+OVERVIEW
+========
+
+This associative array implementation is an object container with the following
+properties:
+
+ (1) Objects are opaque pointers.  The implementation does not care where they
+     point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything).
+
+     [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the least significant bit.
+
+ (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array.  This
+     permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously.
+     Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects.
+
+ (3) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array.
+
+ (4) Index keys must be unique.  Inserting an object with the same key as one
+     already in the array will replace the old object.
+
+ (5) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths.
+
+ (6) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to
+     length is seen.
+
+ (7) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array.
+
+ (8) The array can iterated over.  The objects will not necessarily come out in
+     key order.
+
+ (9) The array can be iterated over whilst it is being modified, provided the
+     RCU readlock is being held by the iterator.  Note, however, under these
+     circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once.  If this is a
+     problem, the iterator should lock against modification.  Objects will not
+     be missed, however, unless deleted.
+
+(10) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key.
+
+(11) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the
+     RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up.
+
+The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed
+on each level by nibbles from the index key in the same manner as in a radix
+tree.  To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over
+what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes.  Further, nodes
+pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an
+extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node.
+
+
+==============
+THE PUBLIC API
+==============
+
+The public API can be found in <linux/assoc_array.h>.  The associative array is
+rooted on the following structure:
+
+	struct assoc_array {
+		...
+	};
+
+The code is selected by enabling CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY.
+
+
+EDIT SCRIPT
+-----------
+
+The insertion and deletion functions produce an 'edit script' that can later be
+applied to effect the changes without risking ENOMEM.  This retains the
+preallocated metadata blocks that will be installed in the internal tree and
+keeps track of the metadata blocks that will be removed from the tree when the
+script is applied.
+
+This is also used to keep track of dead blocks and dead objects after the
+script has been applied so that they can be freed later.  The freeing is done
+after an RCU grace period has passed - thus allowing access functions to
+proceed under the RCU read lock.
+
+The script appears as outside of the API as a pointer of the type:
+
+	struct assoc_array_edit;
+
+There are two functions for dealing with the script:
+
+ (1) Apply an edit script.
+
+	void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
+
+     This will perform the edit functions, interpolating various write barriers
+     to permit accesses under the RCU read lock to continue.  The edit script
+     will then be passed to call_rcu() to free it and any dead stuff it points
+     to.
+
+ (2) Cancel an edit script.
+
+	void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
+
+     This frees the edit script and all preallocated memory immediately.  If
+     this was for insertion, the new object is _not_ released by this function,
+     but must rather be released by the caller.
+
+These functions are guaranteed not to fail.
+
+
+OPERATIONS TABLE
+----------------
+
+Various functions take a table of operations:
+
+	struct assoc_array_ops {
+		...
+	};
+
+This points to a number of methods, all of which need to be provided:
+
+ (1) Get a chunk of index key from caller data:
+
+	unsigned long (*get_key_chunk)(const void *index_key, int level);
+
+     This should return a chunk of caller-supplied index key starting at the
+     *bit* position given by the level argument.  The level argument will be a
+     multiple of ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE and the function should return
+     ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE bits.  No error is possible.
+
+
+ (2) Get a chunk of an object's index key.
+
+	unsigned long (*get_object_key_chunk)(const void *object, int level);
+
+     As the previous function, but gets its data from an object in the array
+     rather than from a caller-supplied index key.
+
+
+ (3) See if this is the object we're looking for.
+
+	bool (*compare_object)(const void *object, const void *index_key);
+
+     Compare the object against an index key and return true if it matches and
+     false if it doesn't.
+
+
+ (4) Diff the index keys of two objects.
+
+	int (*diff_objects)(const void *a, const void *b);
+
+     Return the bit position at which the index keys of two objects differ or
+     -1 if they are the same.
+
+
+ (5) Free an object.
+
+	void (*free_object)(void *object);
+
+     Free the specified object.  Note that this may be called an RCU grace
+     period after assoc_array_apply_edit() was called, so synchronize_rcu() may
+     be necessary on module unloading.
+
+
+MANIPULATION FUNCTIONS
+----------------------
+
+There are a number of functions for manipulating an associative array:
+
+ (1) Initialise an associative array.
+
+	void assoc_array_init(struct assoc_array *array);
+
+     This initialises the base structure for an associative array.  It can't
+     fail.
+
+
+ (2) Insert/replace an object in an associative array.
+
+	struct assoc_array_edit *
+	assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			   const void *index_key,
+			   void *object);
+
+     This inserts the given object into the array.  Note that the least
+     significant bit of the pointer must be zero as it's used to type-mark
+     pointers internally.
+
+     If an object already exists for that key then it will be replaced with the
+     new object and the old one will be freed automatically.
+
+     The index_key argument should hold index key information and is
+     passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called.
+
+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
+     an out-of-memory error.
+
+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
+
+
+ (3) Delete an object from an associative array.
+
+	struct assoc_array_edit *
+	assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			   const void *index_key);
+
+     This deletes an object that matches the specified data from the array.
+
+     The index_key argument should hold index key information and is
+     passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called.
+
+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
+     an out-of-memory error.  NULL will be returned if the specified object is
+     not found within the array.
+
+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
+
+
+ (4) Delete all objects from an associative array.
+
+	struct assoc_array_edit *
+	assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
+			  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
+
+     This deletes all the objects from an associative array and leaves it
+     completely empty.
+
+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
+     an out-of-memory error.
+
+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
+
+
+ (5) Destroy an associative array, deleting all objects.
+
+	void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
+				 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
+
+     This destroys the contents of the associative array and leaves it
+     completely empty.  It is not permitted for another thread to be traversing
+     the array under the RCU read lock at the same time as this function is
+     destroying it as no RCU deferral is performed on memory release -
+     something that would require memory to be allocated.
+
+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers and accessors
+     of the array.
+
+
+ (6) Garbage collect an associative array.
+
+	int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			   bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
+			   void *iterator_data);
+
+     This iterates over the objects in an associative array and passes each one
+     to iterator().  If iterator() returns true, the object is kept.  If it
+     returns false, the object will be freed.  If the iterator() function
+     returns true, it must perform any appropriate refcount incrementing on the
+     object before returning.
+
+     The internal tree will be packed down if possible as part of the iteration
+     to reduce the number of nodes in it.
+
+     The iterator_data is passed directly to iterator() and is otherwise
+     ignored by the function.
+
+     The function will return 0 if successful and -ENOMEM if there wasn't
+     enough memory.
+
+     It is possible for other threads to iterate over or search the array under
+     the RCU read lock whilst this function is in progress.  The caller should
+     lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
+
+
+ACCESS FUNCTIONS
+----------------
+
+There are two functions for accessing an associative array:
+
+ (1) Iterate over all the objects in an associative array.
+
+	int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
+				int (*iterator)(const void *object,
+						void *iterator_data),
+				void *iterator_data);
+
+     This passes each object in the array to the iterator callback function.
+     iterator_data is private data for that function.
+
+     This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being
+     modified, provided the RCU read lock is held.  Under such circumstances,
+     it is possible for the iteration function to see some objects twice.  If
+     this is a problem, then modification should be locked against.  The
+     iteration algorithm should not, however, miss any objects.
+
+     The function will return 0 if no objects were in the array or else it will
+     return the result of the last iterator function called.  Iteration stops
+     immediately if any call to the iteration function results in a non-zero
+     return.
+
+
+ (2) Find an object in an associative array.
+
+	void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
+			       const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			       const void *index_key);
+
+     This walks through the array's internal tree directly to the object
+     specified by the index key..
+
+     This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being
+     modified, provided the RCU read lock is held.
+
+     The function will return the object if found (and set *_type to the object
+     type) or will return NULL if the object was not found.
+
+
+INDEX KEY FORM
+--------------
+
+The index key can be of any form, but since the algorithms aren't told how long
+the key is, it is strongly recommended that the index key includes its length
+very early on before any variation due to the length would have an effect on
+comparisons.
+
+This will cause leaves with different length keys to scatter away from each
+other - and those with the same length keys to cluster together.
+
+It is also recommended that the index key begin with a hash of the rest of the
+key to maximise scattering throughout keyspace.
+
+The better the scattering, the wider and lower the internal tree will be.
+
+Poor scattering isn't too much of a problem as there are shortcuts and nodes
+can contain mixtures of leaves and metadata pointers.
+
+The index key is read in chunks of machine word.  Each chunk is subdivided into
+one nibble (4 bits) per level, so on a 32-bit CPU this is good for 8 levels and
+on a 64-bit CPU, 16 levels.  Unless the scattering is really poor, it is
+unlikely that more than one word of any particular index key will have to be
+used.
+
+
+=================
+INTERNAL WORKINGS
+=================
+
+The associative array data structure has an internal tree.  This tree is
+constructed of two types of metadata blocks: nodes and shortcuts.
+
+A node is an array of slots.  Each slot can contain one of four things:
+
+ (*) A NULL pointer, indicating that the slot is empty.
+
+ (*) A pointer to an object (a leaf).
+
+ (*) A pointer to a node at the next level.
+
+ (*) A pointer to a shortcut.
+
+
+BASIC INTERNAL TREE LAYOUT
+--------------------------
+
+Ignoring shortcuts for the moment, the nodes form a multilevel tree.  The index
+key space is strictly subdivided by the nodes in the tree and nodes occur on
+fixed levels.  For example:
+
+ Level:	0		1		2		3
+	===============	===============	===============	===============
+							NODE D
+			NODE B		NODE C	+------>+---+
+		+------>+---+	+------>+---+	|	| 0 |
+	NODE A	|	| 0 |	|	| 0 |	|	+---+
+	+---+	|	+---+	|	+---+	|	:   :
+	| 0 |	|	:   :	|	:   :	|	+---+
+	+---+	|	+---+	|	+---+	|	| f |
+	| 1 |---+	| 3 |---+	| 7 |---+	+---+
+	+---+		+---+		+---+
+	:   :		:   :		| 8 |---+
+	+---+		+---+		+---+	|	NODE E
+	| e |---+	| f |		:   :   +------>+---+
+	+---+	|	+---+		+---+		| 0 |
+	| f |	|			| f |		+---+
+	+---+	|			+---+		:   :
+		|	NODE F				+---+
+		+------>+---+				| f |
+			| 0 |		NODE G		+---+
+			+---+	+------>+---+
+			:   :	|	| 0 |
+			+---+	|	+---+
+			| 6 |---+	:   :
+			+---+		+---+
+			:   :		| f |
+			+---+		+---+
+			| f |
+			+---+
+
+In the above example, there are 7 nodes (A-G), each with 16 slots (0-f).
+Assuming no other meta data nodes in the tree, the key space is divided thusly:
+
+	KEY PREFIX	NODE
+	==========	====
+	137*		D
+	138*		E
+	13[0-69-f]*	C
+	1[0-24-f]*	B
+	e6*		G
+	e[0-57-f]*	F
+	[02-df]*	A
+
+So, for instance, keys with the following example index keys will be found in
+the appropriate nodes:
+
+	INDEX KEY	PREFIX	NODE
+	===============	=======	====
+	13694892892489	13	C
+	13795289025897	137	D
+	13889dde88793	138	E
+	138bbb89003093	138	E
+	1394879524789	12	C
+	1458952489	1	B
+	9431809de993ba	-	A
+	b4542910809cd	-	A
+	e5284310def98	e	F
+	e68428974237	e6	G
+	e7fffcbd443	e	F
+	f3842239082	-	A
+
+To save memory, if a node can hold all the leaves in its portion of keyspace,
+then the node will have all those leaves in it and will not have any metadata
+pointers - even if some of those leaves would like to be in the same slot.
+
+A node can contain a heterogeneous mix of leaves and metadata pointers.
+Metadata pointers must be in the slots that match their subdivisions of key
+space.  The leaves can be in any slot not occupied by a metadata pointer.  It
+is guaranteed that none of the leaves in a node will match a slot occupied by a
+metadata pointer.  If the metadata pointer is there, any leaf whose key matches
+the metadata key prefix must be in the subtree that the metadata pointer points
+to.
+
+In the above example list of index keys, node A will contain:
+
+	SLOT	CONTENT		INDEX KEY (PREFIX)
+	====	===============	==================
+	1	PTR TO NODE B	1*
+	any	LEAF		9431809de993ba
+	any	LEAF		b4542910809cd
+	e	PTR TO NODE F	e*
+	any	LEAF		f3842239082
+
+and node B:
+
+	3	PTR TO NODE C	13*
+	any	LEAF		1458952489
+
+
+SHORTCUTS
+---------
+
+Shortcuts are metadata records that jump over a piece of keyspace.  A shortcut
+is a replacement for a series of single-occupancy nodes ascending through the
+levels.  Shortcuts exist to save memory and to speed up traversal.
+
+It is possible for the root of the tree to be a shortcut - say, for example,
+the tree contains at least 17 nodes all with key prefix '1111'.  The insertion
+algorithm will insert a shortcut to skip over the '1111' keyspace in a single
+bound and get to the fourth level where these actually become different.
+
+
+SPLITTING AND COLLAPSING NODES
+------------------------------
+
+Each node has a maximum capacity of 16 leaves and metadata pointers.  If the
+insertion algorithm finds that it is trying to insert a 17th object into a
+node, that node will be split such that at least two leaves that have a common
+key segment at that level end up in a separate node rooted on that slot for
+that common key segment.
+
+If the leaves in a full node and the leaf that is being inserted are
+sufficiently similar, then a shortcut will be inserted into the tree.
+
+When the number of objects in the subtree rooted at a node falls to 16 or
+fewer, then the subtree will be collapsed down to a single node - and this will
+ripple towards the root if possible.
+
+
+NON-RECURSIVE ITERATION
+-----------------------
+
+Each node and shortcut contains a back pointer to its parent and the number of
+slot in that parent that points to it.  None-recursive iteration uses these to
+proceed rootwards through the tree, going to the parent node, slot N + 1 to
+make sure progress is made without the need for a stack.
+
+The backpointers, however, make simultaneous alteration and iteration tricky.
+
+
+SIMULTANEOUS ALTERATION AND ITERATION
+-------------------------------------
+
+There are a number of cases to consider:
+
+ (1) Simple insert/replace.  This involves simply replacing a NULL or old
+     matching leaf pointer with the pointer to the new leaf after a barrier.
+     The metadata blocks don't change otherwise.  An old leaf won't be freed
+     until after the RCU grace period.
+
+ (2) Simple delete.  This involves just clearing an old matching leaf.  The
+     metadata blocks don't change otherwise.  The old leaf won't be freed until
+     after the RCU grace period.
+
+ (3) Insertion replacing part of a subtree that we haven't yet entered.  This
+     may involve replacement of part of that subtree - but that won't affect
+     the iteration as we won't have reached the pointer to it yet and the
+     ancestry blocks are not replaced (the layout of those does not change).
+
+ (4) Insertion replacing nodes that we're actively processing.  This isn't a
+     problem as we've passed the anchoring pointer and won't switch onto the
+     new layout until we follow the back pointers - at which point we've
+     already examined the leaves in the replaced node (we iterate over all the
+     leaves in a node before following any of its metadata pointers).
+
+     We might, however, re-see some leaves that have been split out into a new
+     branch that's in a slot further along than we were at.
+
+ (5) Insertion replacing nodes that we're processing a dependent branch of.
+     This won't affect us until we follow the back pointers.  Similar to (4).
+
+ (6) Deletion collapsing a branch under us.  This doesn't affect us because the
+     back pointers will get us back to the parent of the new node before we
+     could see the new node.  The entire collapsed subtree is thrown away
+     unchanged - and will still be rooted on the same slot, so we shouldn't
+     process it a second time as we'll go back to slot + 1.
+
+Note:
+
+ (*) Under some circumstances, we need to simultaneously change the parent
+     pointer and the parent slot pointer on a node (say, for example, we
+     inserted another node before it and moved it up a level).  We cannot do
+     this without locking against a read - so we have to replace that node too.
+
+     However, when we're changing a shortcut into a node this isn't a problem
+     as shortcuts only have one slot and so the parent slot number isn't used
+     when traversing backwards over one.  This means that it's okay to change
+     the slot number first - provided suitable barriers are used to make sure
+     the parent slot number is read after the back pointer.
+
+Obsolete blocks and leaves are freed up after an RCU grace period has passed,
+so as long as anyone doing walking or iteration holds the RCU read lock, the
+old superstructure should not go away on them.
diff --git a/include/linux/assoc_array.h b/include/linux/assoc_array.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a193b84238a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/assoc_array.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* Generic associative array implementation.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H
+#define _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG /* Key data retrieved in chunks of this size */
+
+/*
+ * Generic associative array.
+ */
+struct assoc_array {
+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*root;		/* The node at the root of the tree */
+	unsigned long		nr_leaves_on_tree;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Operations on objects and index keys for use by array manipulation routines.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_ops {
+	/* Method to get a chunk of an index key from caller-supplied data */
+	unsigned long (*get_key_chunk)(const void *index_key, int level);
+
+	/* Method to get a piece of an object's index key */
+	unsigned long (*get_object_key_chunk)(const void *object, int level);
+
+	/* Is this the object we're looking for? */
+	bool (*compare_object)(const void *object, const void *index_key);
+
+	/* How different are two objects, to a bit position in their keys? (or
+	 * -1 if they're the same)
+	 */
+	int (*diff_objects)(const void *a, const void *b);
+
+	/* Method to free an object. */
+	void (*free_object)(void *object);
+};
+
+/*
+ * Access and manipulation functions.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_edit;
+
+static inline void assoc_array_init(struct assoc_array *array)
+{
+	array->root = NULL;
+	array->nr_leaves_on_tree = 0;
+}
+
+extern int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
+			       int (*iterator)(const void *object,
+					       void *iterator_data),
+			       void *iterator_data);
+extern void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
+			      const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			      const void *index_key);
+extern void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
+				const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
+						   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+						   const void *index_key,
+						   void *object);
+extern void assoc_array_insert_set_object(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
+					  void *object);
+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
+						   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+						   const void *index_key);
+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
+						  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
+extern void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
+extern void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
+extern int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
+			  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+			  bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
+			  void *iterator_data);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY */
+#endif /* _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h b/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..711275e6681c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/* Private definitions for the generic associative array implementation.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H
+#define _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
+
+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
+
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT		16	/* Number of slots per node */
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK		(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT - 1)
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP		(ilog2(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT))
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK	(ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP - 1)
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK	(ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 1)
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT	(ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG))
+
+/*
+ * Undefined type representing a pointer with type information in the bottom
+ * two bits.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_ptr;
+
+/*
+ * An N-way node in the tree.
+ *
+ * Each slot contains one of four things:
+ *
+ *	(1) Nothing (NULL).
+ *
+ *	(2) A leaf object (pointer types 0).
+ *
+ *	(3) A next-level node (pointer type 1, subtype 0).
+ *
+ *	(4) A shortcut (pointer type 1, subtype 1).
+ *
+ * The tree is optimised for search-by-ID, but permits reasonable iteration
+ * also.
+ *
+ * The tree is navigated by constructing an index key consisting of an array of
+ * segments, where each segment is ilog2(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) bits in size.
+ *
+ * The segments correspond to levels of the tree (the first segment is used at
+ * level 0, the second at level 1, etc.).
+ */
+struct assoc_array_node {
+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*back_pointer;
+	u8			parent_slot;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*slots[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT];
+	unsigned long		nr_leaves_on_branch;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A shortcut through the index space out to where a collection of nodes/leaves
+ * with the same IDs live.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_shortcut {
+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*back_pointer;
+	int			parent_slot;
+	int			skip_to_level;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*next_node;
+	unsigned long		index_key[];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Preallocation cache.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_edit {
+	struct rcu_head			rcu;
+	struct assoc_array		*array;
+	const struct assoc_array_ops	*ops;
+	const struct assoc_array_ops	*ops_for_excised_subtree;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*leaf;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		**leaf_p;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*dead_leaf;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*new_meta[3];
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*excised_meta[1];
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*excised_subtree;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		**set_backpointers[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT];
+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*set_backpointers_to;
+	struct assoc_array_node		*adjust_count_on;
+	long				adjust_count_by;
+	struct {
+		struct assoc_array_ptr	**ptr;
+		struct assoc_array_ptr	*to;
+	} set[2];
+	struct {
+		u8			*p;
+		u8			to;
+	} set_parent_slot[1];
+	u8				segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Internal tree member pointers are marked in the bottom one or two bits to
+ * indicate what type they are so that we don't have to look behind every
+ * pointer to see what it points to.
+ *
+ * We provide functions to test type annotations and to create and translate
+ * the annotated pointers.
+ */
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_LEAF_TYPE 0x0UL	/* Points to leaf (or nowhere) */
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE 0x1UL	/* Points to node or shortcut */
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK	0x2UL
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_NODE_SUBTYPE	0x0UL
+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SHORTCUT_SUBTYPE 0x2UL
+
+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (unsigned long)x & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK;
+}
+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return !assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(x);
+}
+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (unsigned long)x & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+}
+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_node(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return !assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(x);
+}
+
+static inline void *assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (void *)((unsigned long)x & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline
+unsigned long __assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (unsigned long)x &
+		~(ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK);
+}
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_node *assoc_array_ptr_to_node(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (struct assoc_array_node *)__assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(x);
+}
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_shortcut *assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (struct assoc_array_shortcut *)__assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(x);
+}
+
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_ptr *__assoc_array_x_to_ptr(const void *p, unsigned long t)
+{
+	return (struct assoc_array_ptr *)((unsigned long)p | t);
+}
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(const void *p)
+{
+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_LEAF_TYPE);
+}
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_node_to_ptr(const struct assoc_array_node *p)
+{
+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(
+		p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_NODE_SUBTYPE);
+}
+static inline
+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(const struct assoc_array_shortcut *p)
+{
+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(
+		p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SHORTCUT_SUBTYPE);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY */
+#endif /* _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H */
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index b3c8be0da17f..3cb879b1f282 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -322,6 +322,20 @@ config TEXTSEARCH_FSM
 config BTREE
 	boolean
 
+config ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
+	bool
+	help
+	  Generic associative array.  Can be searched and iterated over whilst
+	  it is being modified.  It is also reasonably quick to search and
+	  modify.  The algorithms are non-recursive, and the trees are highly
+	  capacious.
+
+	  See:
+
+		Documentation/assoc_array.txt
+
+	  for more information.
+
 config HAS_IOMEM
 	boolean
 	depends on !NO_IOMEM
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index f3bb2cb98adf..1e806477e472 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ CFLAGS_hweight.o = $(subst $(quote),,$(CONFIG_ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS))
 obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a0952818f938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1745 @@
+/* Generic associative array implementation.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+//#define DEBUG
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
+
+/*
+ * Iterate over an associative array.  The caller must hold the RCU read lock
+ * or better.
+ */
+static int assoc_array_subtree_iterate(const struct assoc_array_ptr *root,
+				       const struct assoc_array_ptr *stop,
+				       int (*iterator)(const void *leaf,
+						       void *iterator_data),
+				       void *iterator_data)
+{
+	const struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	const struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	const struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr, *parent;
+	unsigned long has_meta;
+	int slot, ret;
+
+	cursor = root;
+
+begin_node:
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
+		/* Descend through a shortcut */
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
+		cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+	}
+
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+	slot = 0;
+
+	/* We perform two passes of each node.
+	 *
+	 * The first pass does all the leaves in this node.  This means we
+	 * don't miss any leaves if the node is split up by insertion whilst
+	 * we're iterating over the branches rooted here (we may, however, see
+	 * some leaves twice).
+	 */
+	has_meta = 0;
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+		has_meta |= (unsigned long)ptr;
+		if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
+			/* We need a barrier between the read of the pointer
+			 * and dereferencing the pointer - but only if we are
+			 * actually going to dereference it.
+			 */
+			smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
+			/* Invoke the callback */
+			ret = iterator(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
+				       iterator_data);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* The second pass attends to all the metadata pointers.  If we follow
+	 * one of these we may find that we don't come back here, but rather go
+	 * back to a replacement node with the leaves in a different layout.
+	 *
+	 * We are guaranteed to make progress, however, as the slot number for
+	 * a particular portion of the key space cannot change - and we
+	 * continue at the back pointer + 1.
+	 */
+	if (!(has_meta & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE))
+		goto finished_node;
+	slot = 0;
+
+continue_node:
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+			cursor = ptr;
+			goto begin_node;
+		}
+	}
+
+finished_node:
+	/* Move up to the parent (may need to skip back over a shortcut) */
+	parent = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
+	slot = node->parent_slot;
+	if (parent == stop)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(parent)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(parent);
+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
+		cursor = parent;
+		parent = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+		if (parent == stop)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Ascend to next slot in parent node */
+	cursor = parent;
+	slot++;
+	goto continue_node;
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_iterate - Pass all objects in the array to a callback
+ * @array: The array to iterate over.
+ * @iterator: The callback function.
+ * @iterator_data: Private data for the callback function.
+ *
+ * Iterate over all the objects in an associative array.  Each one will be
+ * presented to the iterator function.
+ *
+ * If the array is being modified concurrently with the iteration then it is
+ * possible that some objects in the array will be passed to the iterator
+ * callback more than once - though every object should be passed at least
+ * once.  If this is undesirable then the caller must lock against modification
+ * for the duration of this function.
+ *
+ * The function will return 0 if no objects were in the array or else it will
+ * return the result of the last iterator function called.  Iteration stops
+ * immediately if any call to the iteration function results in a non-zero
+ * return.
+ *
+ * The caller should hold the RCU read lock or better if concurrent
+ * modification is possible.
+ */
+int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
+			int (*iterator)(const void *object,
+					void *iterator_data),
+			void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *root = ACCESS_ONCE(array->root);
+
+	if (!root)
+		return 0;
+	return assoc_array_subtree_iterate(root, NULL, iterator, iterator_data);
+}
+
+enum assoc_array_walk_status {
+	assoc_array_walk_tree_empty,
+	assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node,
+	assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut,
+} status;
+
+struct assoc_array_walk_result {
+	struct {
+		struct assoc_array_node	*node;	/* Node in which leaf might be found */
+		int		level;
+		int		slot;
+	} terminal_node;
+	struct {
+		struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+		int		level;
+		int		sc_level;
+		unsigned long	sc_segments;
+		unsigned long	dissimilarity;
+	} wrong_shortcut;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Navigate through the internal tree looking for the closest node to the key.
+ */
+static enum assoc_array_walk_status
+assoc_array_walk(const struct assoc_array *array,
+		 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+		 const void *index_key,
+		 struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
+	unsigned long sc_segments, dissimilarity;
+	unsigned long segments;
+	int level, sc_level, next_sc_level;
+	int slot;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(array->root);
+	if (!cursor)
+		return assoc_array_walk_tree_empty;
+
+	level = 0;
+
+	/* Use segments from the key for the new leaf to navigate through the
+	 * internal tree, skipping through nodes and shortcuts that are on
+	 * route to the destination.  Eventually we'll come to a slot that is
+	 * either empty or contains a leaf at which point we've found a node in
+	 * which the leaf we're looking for might be found or into which it
+	 * should be inserted.
+	 */
+jumped:
+	segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
+	pr_devel("segments[%d]: %lx\n", level, segments);
+
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor))
+		goto follow_shortcut;
+
+consider_node:
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
+	slot = segments >> (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
+	slot &= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+
+	pr_devel("consider slot %x [ix=%d type=%lu]\n",
+		 slot, level, (unsigned long)ptr & 3);
+
+	if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+		/* The node doesn't have a node/shortcut pointer in the slot
+		 * corresponding to the index key that we have to follow.
+		 */
+		result->terminal_node.node = node;
+		result->terminal_node.level = level;
+		result->terminal_node.slot = slot;
+		pr_devel("<--%s() = terminal_node\n", __func__);
+		return assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node;
+	}
+
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
+		/* There is a pointer to a node in the slot corresponding to
+		 * this index key segment, so we need to follow it.
+		 */
+		cursor = ptr;
+		level += ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+		if ((level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0)
+			goto consider_node;
+		goto jumped;
+	}
+
+	/* There is a shortcut in the slot corresponding to the index key
+	 * segment.  We follow the shortcut if its partial index key matches
+	 * this leaf's.  Otherwise we need to split the shortcut.
+	 */
+	cursor = ptr;
+follow_shortcut:
+	shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+	pr_devel("shortcut to %d\n", shortcut->skip_to_level);
+	sc_level = level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+	BUG_ON(sc_level > shortcut->skip_to_level);
+
+	do {
+		/* Check the leaf against the shortcut's index key a word at a
+		 * time, trimming the final word (the shortcut stores the index
+		 * key completely from the root to the shortcut's target).
+		 */
+		if ((sc_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) == 0)
+			segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, sc_level);
+
+		sc_segments = shortcut->index_key[sc_level >> ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT];
+		dissimilarity = segments ^ sc_segments;
+
+		if (round_up(sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) > shortcut->skip_to_level) {
+			/* Trim segments that are beyond the shortcut */
+			int shift = shortcut->skip_to_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
+			dissimilarity &= ~(ULONG_MAX << shift);
+			next_sc_level = shortcut->skip_to_level;
+		} else {
+			next_sc_level = sc_level + ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
+			next_sc_level = round_down(next_sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+		}
+
+		if (dissimilarity != 0) {
+			/* This shortcut points elsewhere */
+			result->wrong_shortcut.shortcut = shortcut;
+			result->wrong_shortcut.level = level;
+			result->wrong_shortcut.sc_level = sc_level;
+			result->wrong_shortcut.sc_segments = sc_segments;
+			result->wrong_shortcut.dissimilarity = dissimilarity;
+			return assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut;
+		}
+
+		sc_level = next_sc_level;
+	} while (sc_level < shortcut->skip_to_level);
+
+	/* The shortcut matches the leaf's index to this point. */
+	cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+	if (((level ^ sc_level) & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0) {
+		level = sc_level;
+		goto jumped;
+	} else {
+		level = sc_level;
+		goto consider_node;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_find - Find an object by index key
+ * @array: The associative array to search.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ * @index_key: The key to the object.
+ *
+ * Find an object in an associative array by walking through the internal tree
+ * to the node that should contain the object and then searching the leaves
+ * there.  NULL is returned if the requested object was not found in the array.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold the RCU read lock or better.
+ */
+void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
+		       const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+		       const void *index_key)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
+	const struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	const struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	const void *leaf;
+	int slot;
+
+	if (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result) !=
+	    assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	node = result.terminal_node.node;
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
+	/* If the target key is available to us, it's has to be pointed to by
+	 * the terminal node.
+	 */
+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+		if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
+			/* We need a barrier between the read of the pointer
+			 * and dereferencing the pointer - but only if we are
+			 * actually going to dereference it.
+			 */
+			leaf = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr);
+			smp_read_barrier_depends();
+			if (ops->compare_object(leaf, index_key))
+				return (void *)leaf;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destructively iterate over an associative array.  The caller must prevent
+ * other simultaneous accesses.
+ */
+static void assoc_array_destroy_subtree(struct assoc_array_ptr *root,
+					const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *parent = NULL;
+	int slot = -1;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	cursor = root;
+	if (!cursor) {
+		pr_devel("empty\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+move_to_meta:
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
+		/* Descend through a shortcut */
+		pr_devel("[%d] shortcut\n", slot);
+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor));
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
+		BUG_ON(shortcut->back_pointer != parent);
+		BUG_ON(slot != -1 && shortcut->parent_slot != slot);
+		parent = cursor;
+		cursor = shortcut->next_node;
+		slot = -1;
+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(cursor));
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("[%d] node\n", slot);
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	BUG_ON(node->back_pointer != parent);
+	BUG_ON(slot != -1 && node->parent_slot != slot);
+	slot = 0;
+
+continue_node:
+	pr_devel("Node %p [back=%p]\n", node, node->back_pointer);
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr = node->slots[slot];
+		if (!ptr)
+			continue;
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+			parent = cursor;
+			cursor = ptr;
+			goto move_to_meta;
+		}
+
+		if (ops) {
+			pr_devel("[%d] free leaf\n", slot);
+			ops->free_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr));
+		}
+	}
+
+	parent = node->back_pointer;
+	slot = node->parent_slot;
+	pr_devel("free node\n");
+	kfree(node);
+	if (!parent)
+		return; /* Done */
+
+	/* Move back up to the parent (may need to free a shortcut on
+	 * the way up) */
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(parent)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(parent);
+		BUG_ON(shortcut->next_node != cursor);
+		cursor = parent;
+		parent = shortcut->back_pointer;
+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+		pr_devel("free shortcut\n");
+		kfree(shortcut);
+		if (!parent)
+			return;
+
+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(parent));
+	}
+
+	/* Ascend to next slot in parent node */
+	pr_devel("ascend to %p[%d]\n", parent, slot);
+	cursor = parent;
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	slot++;
+	goto continue_node;
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_destroy - Destroy an associative array
+ * @array: The array to destroy.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ *
+ * Discard all metadata and free all objects in an associative array.  The
+ * array will be empty and ready to use again upon completion.  This function
+ * cannot fail.
+ *
+ * The caller must prevent all other accesses whilst this takes place as no
+ * attempt is made to adjust pointers gracefully to permit RCU readlock-holding
+ * accesses to continue.  On the other hand, no memory allocation is required.
+ */
+void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
+			 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
+{
+	assoc_array_destroy_subtree(array->root, ops);
+	array->root = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle insertion into an empty tree.
+ */
+static bool assoc_array_insert_in_empty_tree(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_node *new_n0;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_n0)
+		return false;
+
+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[0];
+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
+	edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+
+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [no root]\n", __func__);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle insertion into a terminal node.
+ */
+static bool assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
+						  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+						  const void *index_key,
+						  struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *new_n1, *side;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	unsigned long dissimilarity, base_seg, blank;
+	size_t keylen;
+	bool have_meta;
+	int level, diff;
+	int slot, next_slot, free_slot, i, j;
+
+	node	= result->terminal_node.node;
+	level	= result->terminal_node.level;
+	edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = result->terminal_node.slot;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	/* We arrived at a node which doesn't have an onward node or shortcut
+	 * pointer that we have to follow.  This means that (a) the leaf we
+	 * want must go here (either by insertion or replacement) or (b) we
+	 * need to split this node and insert in one of the fragments.
+	 */
+	free_slot = -1;
+
+	/* Firstly, we have to check the leaves in this node to see if there's
+	 * a matching one we should replace in place.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		ptr = node->slots[i];
+		if (!ptr) {
+			free_slot = i;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), index_key)) {
+			pr_devel("replace in slot %d\n", i);
+			edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[i];
+			edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[i];
+			pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [replace]\n", __func__);
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If there is a free slot in this node then we can just insert the
+	 * leaf here.
+	 */
+	if (free_slot >= 0) {
+		pr_devel("insert in free slot %d\n", free_slot);
+		edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[free_slot];
+		edit->adjust_count_on = node;
+		pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert]\n", __func__);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* The node has no spare slots - so we're either going to have to split
+	 * it or insert another node before it.
+	 *
+	 * Whatever, we're going to need at least two new nodes - so allocate
+	 * those now.  We may also need a new shortcut, but we deal with that
+	 * when we need it.
+	 */
+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_n0)
+		return false;
+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_n1)
+		return false;
+	edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
+
+	/* We need to find out how similar the leaves are. */
+	pr_devel("no spare slots\n");
+	have_meta = false;
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		ptr = node->slots[i];
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+			edit->segment_cache[i] = 0xff;
+			have_meta = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+		base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(
+			assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), level);
+		base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
+		edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (have_meta) {
+		pr_devel("have meta\n");
+		goto split_node;
+	}
+
+	/* The node contains only leaves */
+	dissimilarity = 0;
+	base_seg = edit->segment_cache[0];
+	for (i = 1; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
+		dissimilarity |= edit->segment_cache[i] ^ base_seg;
+
+	pr_devel("only leaves; dissimilarity=%lx\n", dissimilarity);
+
+	if ((dissimilarity & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) == 0) {
+		/* The old leaves all cluster in the same slot.  We will need
+		 * to insert a shortcut if the new node wants to cluster with them.
+		 */
+		if ((edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] ^ base_seg) == 0)
+			goto all_leaves_cluster_together;
+
+		/* Otherwise we can just insert a new node ahead of the old
+		 * one.
+		 */
+		goto present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf;
+	}
+
+split_node:
+	pr_devel("split node\n");
+
+	/* We need to split the current node; we know that the node doesn't
+	 * simply contain a full set of leaves that cluster together (it
+	 * contains meta pointers and/or non-clustering leaves).
+	 *
+	 * We need to expel at least two leaves out of a set consisting of the
+	 * leaves in the node and the new leaf.
+	 *
+	 * We need a new node (n0) to replace the current one and a new node to
+	 * take the expelled nodes (n1).
+	 */
+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
+	new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
+
+do_split_node:
+	pr_devel("do_split_node\n");
+
+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+	new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
+
+	/* Begin by finding two matching leaves.  There have to be at least two
+	 * that match - even if there are meta pointers - because any leaf that
+	 * would match a slot with a meta pointer in it must be somewhere
+	 * behind that meta pointer and cannot be here.  Further, given N
+	 * remaining leaf slots, we now have N+1 leaves to go in them.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		slot = edit->segment_cache[i];
+		if (slot != 0xff)
+			for (j = i + 1; j < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1; j++)
+				if (edit->segment_cache[j] == slot)
+					goto found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy;
+	}
+found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy:
+	pr_devel("same slot: %x %x [%02x]\n", i, j, slot);
+	BUG_ON(i >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
+	BUG_ON(j >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1);
+	BUG_ON(slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
+
+	new_n1->parent_slot = slot;
+
+	/* Metadata pointers cannot change slot */
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
+			new_n0->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
+		else
+			new_n0->slots[i] = NULL;
+	BUG_ON(new_n0->slots[slot] != NULL);
+	new_n0->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
+
+	/* Filter the leaf pointers between the new nodes */
+	free_slot = -1;
+	next_slot = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
+			continue;
+		if (edit->segment_cache[i] == slot) {
+			new_n1->slots[next_slot++] = node->slots[i];
+			new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
+		} else {
+			do {
+				free_slot++;
+			} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
+			new_n0->slots[free_slot] = node->slots[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("filtered: f=%x n=%x\n", free_slot, next_slot);
+
+	if (edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] != slot) {
+		do {
+			free_slot++;
+		} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[free_slot];
+		edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
+	} else {
+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n1->slots[next_slot++];
+		edit->adjust_count_on = new_n1;
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(next_slot <= 1);
+
+	edit->set_backpointers_to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		if (edit->segment_cache[i] == 0xff) {
+			ptr = node->slots[i];
+			BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr));
+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
+				side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+				edit->set_backpointers[i] = &side->back_pointer;
+			} else {
+				shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+				edit->set_backpointers[i] = &shortcut->back_pointer;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	ptr = node->back_pointer;
+	if (!ptr)
+		edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
+	else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
+		edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr)->slots[node->parent_slot];
+	else
+		edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr)->next_node;
+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split node]\n", __func__);
+	return true;
+
+present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf:
+	/* All the old leaves cluster in the same slot, but the new leaf wants
+	 * to go into a different slot, so we create a new node to hold the new
+	 * leaf and a pointer to a new node holding all the old leaves.
+	 */
+	pr_devel("present leaves cluster but not new leaf\n");
+
+	new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
+	new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n1->parent_slot = edit->segment_cache[0];
+	new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
+		new_n1->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
+
+	new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[0]] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT]];
+
+	edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer)->slots[node->parent_slot];
+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert node before]\n", __func__);
+	return true;
+
+all_leaves_cluster_together:
+	/* All the leaves, new and old, want to cluster together in this node
+	 * in the same slot, so we have to replace this node with a shortcut to
+	 * skip over the identical parts of the key and then place a pair of
+	 * nodes, one inside the other, at the end of the shortcut and
+	 * distribute the keys between them.
+	 *
+	 * Firstly we need to work out where the leaves start diverging as a
+	 * bit position into their keys so that we know how big the shortcut
+	 * needs to be.
+	 *
+	 * We only need to make a single pass of N of the N+1 leaves because if
+	 * any keys differ between themselves at bit X then at least one of
+	 * them must also differ with the base key at bit X or before.
+	 */
+	pr_devel("all leaves cluster together\n");
+	diff = INT_MAX;
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		int x = ops->diff_objects(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->leaf),
+					  assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(node->slots[i]));
+		if (x < diff) {
+			BUG_ON(x < 0);
+			diff = x;
+		}
+	}
+	BUG_ON(diff == INT_MAX);
+	BUG_ON(diff < level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP);
+
+	keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+	keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
+
+	new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
+			 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_s0)
+		return false;
+	edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+
+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+	new_s0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
+	new_s0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
+	new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+	new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
+
+	new_s0->skip_to_level = level = diff & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
+	pr_devel("skip_to_level = %d [diff %d]\n", level, diff);
+	BUG_ON(level <= 0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
+		new_s0->index_key[i] =
+			ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, i * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+
+	blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
+	pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
+	new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
+
+	/* This now reduces to a node splitting exercise for which we'll need
+	 * to regenerate the disparity table.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+		ptr = node->slots[i];
+		base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
+						     level);
+		base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
+		edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+	}
+
+	base_seg = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
+	base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
+	edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+	goto do_split_node;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle insertion into the middle of a shortcut.
+ */
+static bool assoc_array_insert_mid_shortcut(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+					    struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0, *new_s1;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *side;
+	unsigned long sc_segments, dissimilarity, blank;
+	size_t keylen;
+	int level, sc_level, diff;
+	int sc_slot;
+
+	shortcut	= result->wrong_shortcut.shortcut;
+	level		= result->wrong_shortcut.level;
+	sc_level	= result->wrong_shortcut.sc_level;
+	sc_segments	= result->wrong_shortcut.sc_segments;
+	dissimilarity	= result->wrong_shortcut.dissimilarity;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s(ix=%d dis=%lx scix=%d)\n",
+		 __func__, level, dissimilarity, sc_level);
+
+	/* We need to split a shortcut and insert a node between the two
+	 * pieces.  Zero-length pieces will be dispensed with entirely.
+	 *
+	 * First of all, we need to find out in which level the first
+	 * difference was.
+	 */
+	diff = __ffs(dissimilarity);
+	diff &= ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
+	diff += sc_level & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
+	pr_devel("diff=%d\n", diff);
+
+	if (!shortcut->back_pointer) {
+		edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
+	} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(shortcut->back_pointer)) {
+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(shortcut->back_pointer);
+		edit->set[0].ptr = &node->slots[shortcut->parent_slot];
+	} else {
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(shortcut);
+
+	/* Create a new node now since we're going to need it anyway */
+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_n0)
+		return false;
+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
+
+	/* Insert a new shortcut before the new node if this segment isn't of
+	 * zero length - otherwise we just connect the new node directly to the
+	 * parent.
+	 */
+	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+	if (diff > level) {
+		pr_devel("pre-shortcut %d...%d\n", level, diff);
+		keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
+
+		new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
+				 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new_s0)
+			return false;
+		edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+		edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+		new_s0->back_pointer = shortcut->back_pointer;
+		new_s0->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+		new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+		new_s0->skip_to_level = diff;
+
+		new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
+		new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
+
+		memcpy(new_s0->index_key, shortcut->index_key,
+		       keylen * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+		blank = ULONG_MAX << (diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
+		pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, diff, blank);
+		new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
+	} else {
+		pr_devel("no pre-shortcut\n");
+		edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+		new_n0->back_pointer = shortcut->back_pointer;
+		new_n0->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+	}
+
+	side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(shortcut->next_node);
+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = side->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+
+	/* We need to know which slot in the new node is going to take a
+	 * metadata pointer.
+	 */
+	sc_slot = sc_segments >> (diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
+	sc_slot &= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
+
+	pr_devel("new slot %lx >> %d -> %d\n",
+		 sc_segments, diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK, sc_slot);
+
+	/* Determine whether we need to follow the new node with a replacement
+	 * for the current shortcut.  We could in theory reuse the current
+	 * shortcut if its parent slot number doesn't change - but that's a
+	 * 1-in-16 chance so not worth expending the code upon.
+	 */
+	level = diff + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+	if (level < shortcut->skip_to_level) {
+		pr_devel("post-shortcut %d...%d\n", level, shortcut->skip_to_level);
+		keylen = round_up(shortcut->skip_to_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
+
+		new_s1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
+				 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new_s1)
+			return false;
+		edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
+
+		new_s1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+		new_s1->parent_slot = sc_slot;
+		new_s1->next_node = shortcut->next_node;
+		new_s1->skip_to_level = shortcut->skip_to_level;
+
+		new_n0->slots[sc_slot] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
+
+		memcpy(new_s1->index_key, shortcut->index_key,
+		       keylen * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+		edit->set[1].ptr = &side->back_pointer;
+		edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
+	} else {
+		pr_devel("no post-shortcut\n");
+
+		/* We don't have to replace the pointed-to node as long as we
+		 * use memory barriers to make sure the parent slot number is
+		 * changed before the back pointer (the parent slot number is
+		 * irrelevant to the old parent shortcut).
+		 */
+		new_n0->slots[sc_slot] = shortcut->next_node;
+		edit->set_parent_slot[0].p = &side->parent_slot;
+		edit->set_parent_slot[0].to = sc_slot;
+		edit->set[1].ptr = &side->back_pointer;
+		edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+	}
+
+	/* Install the new leaf in a spare slot in the new node. */
+	if (sc_slot == 0)
+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[1];
+	else
+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[0];
+
+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split shortcut]\n", __func__);
+	return edit;
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_insert - Script insertion of an object into an associative array
+ * @array: The array to insert into.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ * @index_key: The key to insert at.
+ * @object: The object to insert.
+ *
+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the insertion or replacement of an
+ * object in an associative array.  This results in an edit script that can
+ * either be applied or cancelled.
+ *
+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script or -ENOMEM.
+ *
+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
+ *
+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+					    const void *index_key,
+					    void *object)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	/* The leaf pointer we're given must not have the bottom bit set as we
+	 * use those for type-marking the pointer.  NULL pointers are also not
+	 * allowed as they indicate an empty slot but we have to allow them
+	 * here as they can be updated later.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(object));
+
+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!edit)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	edit->array = array;
+	edit->ops = ops;
+	edit->leaf = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(object);
+	edit->adjust_count_by = 1;
+
+	switch (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result)) {
+	case assoc_array_walk_tree_empty:
+		/* Allocate a root node if there isn't one yet */
+		if (!assoc_array_insert_in_empty_tree(edit))
+			goto enomem;
+		return edit;
+
+	case assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node:
+		/* We found a node that doesn't have a node/shortcut pointer in
+		 * the slot corresponding to the index key that we have to
+		 * follow.
+		 */
+		if (!assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(edit, ops, index_key,
+							   &result))
+			goto enomem;
+		return edit;
+
+	case assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut:
+		/* We found a shortcut that didn't match our key in a slot we
+		 * needed to follow.
+		 */
+		if (!assoc_array_insert_mid_shortcut(edit, ops, &result))
+			goto enomem;
+		return edit;
+	}
+
+enomem:
+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_insert_set_object - Set the new object pointer in an edit script
+ * @edit: The edit script to modify.
+ * @object: The object pointer to set.
+ *
+ * Change the object to be inserted in an edit script.  The object pointed to
+ * by the old object is not freed.  This must be done prior to applying the
+ * script.
+ */
+void assoc_array_insert_set_object(struct assoc_array_edit *edit, void *object)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!object);
+	edit->leaf = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(object);
+}
+
+struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context {
+	struct assoc_array_node	*node;
+	const void		*skip_leaf;
+	int			slot;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Subtree collapse to node iterator.
+ */
+static int assoc_array_delete_collapse_iterator(const void *leaf,
+						void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context *collapse = iterator_data;
+
+	if (leaf == collapse->skip_leaf)
+		return 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(collapse->slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
+
+	collapse->node->slots[collapse->slot++] = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(leaf);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_delete - Script deletion of an object from an associative array
+ * @array: The array to search.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ * @index_key: The key to the object.
+ *
+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the deletion of an object from an
+ * associative array.  This results in an edit script that can either be
+ * applied or cancelled.
+ *
+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script if the object was found,
+ * NULL if the object was not found or -ENOMEM.
+ *
+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
+ *
+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+					    const void *index_key)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context collapse;
+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	bool has_meta;
+	int slot, i;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!edit)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	edit->array = array;
+	edit->ops = ops;
+	edit->adjust_count_by = -1;
+
+	switch (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result)) {
+	case assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node:
+		/* We found a node that should contain the leaf we've been
+		 * asked to remove - *if* it's in the tree.
+		 */
+		pr_devel("terminal_node\n");
+		node = result.terminal_node.node;
+
+		for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+			ptr = node->slots[slot];
+			if (ptr &&
+			    assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr) &&
+			    ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
+						index_key))
+				goto found_leaf;
+		}
+	case assoc_array_walk_tree_empty:
+	case assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut:
+	default:
+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+		pr_devel("not found\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+found_leaf:
+	BUG_ON(array->nr_leaves_on_tree <= 0);
+
+	/* In the simplest form of deletion we just clear the slot and release
+	 * the leaf after a suitable interval.
+	 */
+	edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[slot];
+	edit->set[0].ptr = &node->slots[slot];
+	edit->set[0].to = NULL;
+	edit->adjust_count_on = node;
+
+	/* If that concludes erasure of the last leaf, then delete the entire
+	 * internal array.
+	 */
+	if (array->nr_leaves_on_tree == 1) {
+		edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
+		edit->set[1].to = NULL;
+		edit->adjust_count_on = NULL;
+		edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
+		pr_devel("all gone\n");
+		return edit;
+	}
+
+	/* However, we'd also like to clear up some metadata blocks if we
+	 * possibly can.
+	 *
+	 * We go for a simple algorithm of: if this node has FAN_OUT or fewer
+	 * leaves in it, then attempt to collapse it - and attempt to
+	 * recursively collapse up the tree.
+	 *
+	 * We could also try and collapse in partially filled subtrees to take
+	 * up space in this node.
+	 */
+	if (node->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
+		struct assoc_array_node *parent, *grandparent;
+		struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+
+		/* First of all, we need to know if this node has metadata so
+		 * that we don't try collapsing if all the leaves are already
+		 * here.
+		 */
+		has_meta = false;
+		for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+			ptr = node->slots[i];
+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+				has_meta = true;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		pr_devel("leaves: %ld [m=%d]\n",
+			 node->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1, has_meta);
+
+		/* Look further up the tree to see if we can collapse this node
+		 * into a more proximal node too.
+		 */
+		parent = node;
+	collapse_up:
+		pr_devel("collapse subtree: %ld\n", parent->nr_leaves_on_branch);
+
+		ptr = parent->back_pointer;
+		if (!ptr)
+			goto do_collapse;
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+			struct assoc_array_shortcut *s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+			ptr = s->back_pointer;
+			if (!ptr)
+				goto do_collapse;
+		}
+
+		grandparent = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+		if (grandparent->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
+			parent = grandparent;
+			goto collapse_up;
+		}
+
+	do_collapse:
+		/* There's no point collapsing if the original node has no meta
+		 * pointers to discard and if we didn't merge into one of that
+		 * node's ancestry.
+		 */
+		if (has_meta || parent != node) {
+			node = parent;
+
+			/* Create a new node to collapse into */
+			new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!new_n0)
+				goto enomem;
+			edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+
+			new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
+			new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
+			new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+			edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
+
+			collapse.node = new_n0;
+			collapse.skip_leaf = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->dead_leaf);
+			collapse.slot = 0;
+			assoc_array_subtree_iterate(assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node),
+						    node->back_pointer,
+						    assoc_array_delete_collapse_iterator,
+						    &collapse);
+			pr_devel("collapsed %d,%lu\n", collapse.slot, new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch);
+			BUG_ON(collapse.slot != new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1);
+
+			if (!node->back_pointer) {
+				edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(node->back_pointer)) {
+				BUG();
+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(node->back_pointer)) {
+				struct assoc_array_node *p =
+					assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer);
+				edit->set[1].ptr = &p->slots[node->parent_slot];
+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(node->back_pointer)) {
+				struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
+					assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(node->back_pointer);
+				edit->set[1].ptr = &s->next_node;
+			}
+			edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
+			edit->excised_subtree = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return edit;
+
+enomem:
+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_clear - Script deletion of all objects from an associative array
+ * @array: The array to clear.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ *
+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the deletion of all the objects
+ * from an associative array.  This results in an edit script that can either
+ * be applied or cancelled.
+ *
+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script if there are objects to be
+ * deleted, NULL if there are no objects in the array or -ENOMEM.
+ *
+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
+ *
+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
+ */
+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
+					   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!array->root)
+		return NULL;
+
+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!edit)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	edit->array = array;
+	edit->ops = ops;
+	edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
+	edit->set[1].to = NULL;
+	edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
+	edit->ops_for_excised_subtree = ops;
+	pr_devel("all gone\n");
+	return edit;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the deferred destruction after an applied edit.
+ */
+static void assoc_array_rcu_cleanup(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit =
+		container_of(head, struct assoc_array_edit, rcu);
+	int i;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (edit->dead_leaf)
+		edit->ops->free_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->dead_leaf));
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->excised_meta); i++)
+		if (edit->excised_meta[i])
+			kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_node(edit->excised_meta[i]));
+
+	if (edit->excised_subtree) {
+		BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(edit->excised_subtree));
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(edit->excised_subtree)) {
+			struct assoc_array_node *n =
+				assoc_array_ptr_to_node(edit->excised_subtree);
+			n->back_pointer = NULL;
+		} else {
+			struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
+				assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(edit->excised_subtree);
+			s->back_pointer = NULL;
+		}
+		assoc_array_destroy_subtree(edit->excised_subtree,
+					    edit->ops_for_excised_subtree);
+	}
+
+	kfree(edit);
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_apply_edit - Apply an edit script to an associative array
+ * @edit: The script to apply.
+ *
+ * Apply an edit script to an associative array to effect an insertion,
+ * deletion or clearance.  As the edit script includes preallocated memory,
+ * this is guaranteed not to fail.
+ *
+ * The edit script, dead objects and dead metadata will be scheduled for
+ * destruction after an RCU grace period to permit those doing read-only
+ * accesses on the array to continue to do so under the RCU read lock whilst
+ * the edit is taking place.
+ */
+void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	int i;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	smp_wmb();
+	if (edit->leaf_p)
+		*edit->leaf_p = edit->leaf;
+
+	smp_wmb();
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set_parent_slot); i++)
+		if (edit->set_parent_slot[i].p)
+			*edit->set_parent_slot[i].p = edit->set_parent_slot[i].to;
+
+	smp_wmb();
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set_backpointers); i++)
+		if (edit->set_backpointers[i])
+			*edit->set_backpointers[i] = edit->set_backpointers_to;
+
+	smp_wmb();
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set); i++)
+		if (edit->set[i].ptr)
+			*edit->set[i].ptr = edit->set[i].to;
+
+	if (edit->array->root == NULL) {
+		edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree = 0;
+	} else if (edit->adjust_count_on) {
+		node = edit->adjust_count_on;
+		for (;;) {
+			node->nr_leaves_on_branch += edit->adjust_count_by;
+
+			ptr = node->back_pointer;
+			if (!ptr)
+				break;
+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+				shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+				ptr = shortcut->back_pointer;
+				if (!ptr)
+					break;
+			}
+			BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
+			node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+		}
+
+		edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree += edit->adjust_count_by;
+	}
+
+	call_rcu(&edit->rcu, assoc_array_rcu_cleanup);
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_cancel_edit - Discard an edit script.
+ * @edit: The script to discard.
+ *
+ * Free an edit script and all the preallocated data it holds without making
+ * any changes to the associative array it was intended for.
+ *
+ * NOTE!  In the case of an insertion script, this does _not_ release the leaf
+ * that was to be inserted.  That is left to the caller.
+ */
+void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	int i;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->new_meta); i++) {
+		ptr = edit->new_meta[i];
+		if (ptr) {
+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
+				kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr));
+			else
+				kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr));
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(edit);
+}
+
+/**
+ * assoc_array_gc - Garbage collect an associative array.
+ * @array: The array to clean.
+ * @ops: The operations to use.
+ * @iterator: A callback function to pass judgement on each object.
+ * @iterator_data: Private data for the callback function.
+ *
+ * Collect garbage from an associative array and pack down the internal tree to
+ * save memory.
+ *
+ * The iterator function is asked to pass judgement upon each object in the
+ * array.  If it returns false, the object is discard and if it returns true,
+ * the object is kept.  If it returns true, it must increment the object's
+ * usage count (or whatever it needs to do to retain it) before returning.
+ *
+ * This function returns 0 if successful or -ENOMEM if out of memory.  In the
+ * latter case, the array is not changed.
+ *
+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
+ *
+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
+ */
+int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
+		   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
+		   bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
+		   void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp;
+	unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree;
+	int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;
+
+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!array->root)
+		return 0;
+
+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!edit)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	edit->array = array;
+	edit->ops = ops;
+	edit->ops_for_excised_subtree = ops;
+	edit->set[0].ptr = &array->root;
+	edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
+
+	new_root = new_parent = NULL;
+	new_ptr_pp = &new_root;
+	cursor = array->root;
+
+descend:
+	/* If this point is a shortcut, then we need to duplicate it and
+	 * advance the target cursor.
+	 */
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
+		keylen = round_up(shortcut->skip_to_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
+		new_s = kmalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
+				keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new_s)
+			goto enomem;
+		pr_devel("dup shortcut %p -> %p\n", shortcut, new_s);
+		memcpy(new_s, shortcut, (sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
+					 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+		new_s->back_pointer = new_parent;
+		new_s->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+		*new_ptr_pp = new_parent = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s);
+		new_ptr_pp = &new_s->next_node;
+		cursor = shortcut->next_node;
+	}
+
+	/* Duplicate the node at this position */
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	new_n = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_n)
+		goto enomem;
+	pr_devel("dup node %p -> %p\n", node, new_n);
+	new_n->back_pointer = new_parent;
+	new_n->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
+	*new_ptr_pp = new_parent = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
+	new_ptr_pp = NULL;
+	slot = 0;
+
+continue_node:
+	/* Filter across any leaves and gc any subtrees */
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = node->slots[slot];
+		if (!ptr)
+			continue;
+
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
+			if (iterator(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
+				     iterator_data))
+				/* The iterator will have done any reference
+				 * counting on the object for us.
+				 */
+				new_n->slots[slot] = ptr;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		new_ptr_pp = &new_n->slots[slot];
+		cursor = ptr;
+		goto descend;
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);
+
+	/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the
+	 * subtree leaf count.
+	 */
+	new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
+	nr_free = 0;
+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = new_n->slots[slot];
+		if (!ptr)
+			nr_free++;
+		else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr))
+			new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
+	}
+	pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
+
+	/* See what we can fold in */
+	next_slot = 0;
+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		struct assoc_array_shortcut *s;
+		struct assoc_array_node *child;
+
+		ptr = new_n->slots[slot];
+		if (!ptr || assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr))
+			continue;
+
+		s = NULL;
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+			s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+			ptr = s->next_node;
+		}
+
+		child = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+		new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch += child->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+
+		if (child->nr_leaves_on_branch <= nr_free + 1) {
+			/* Fold the child node into this one */
+			pr_devel("[%d] fold node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
+				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
+				 next_slot);
+
+			/* We would already have reaped an intervening shortcut
+			 * on the way back up the tree.
+			 */
+			BUG_ON(s);
+
+			new_n->slots[slot] = NULL;
+			nr_free++;
+			if (slot < next_slot)
+				next_slot = slot;
+			for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
+				struct assoc_array_ptr *p = child->slots[i];
+				if (!p)
+					continue;
+				BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));
+				while (new_n->slots[next_slot])
+					next_slot++;
+				BUG_ON(next_slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
+				new_n->slots[next_slot++] = p;
+				nr_free--;
+			}
+			kfree(child);
+		} else {
+			pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
+				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
+				 next_slot);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
+
+	nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;
+
+	/* Excise this node if it is singly occupied by a shortcut */
+	if (nr_free == ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT - 1) {
+		for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++)
+			if ((ptr = new_n->slots[slot]))
+				break;
+
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) &&
+		    assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+			pr_devel("excise node %p with 1 shortcut\n", new_n);
+			new_s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+			new_parent = new_n->back_pointer;
+			slot = new_n->parent_slot;
+			kfree(new_n);
+			if (!new_parent) {
+				new_s->back_pointer = NULL;
+				new_s->parent_slot = 0;
+				new_root = ptr;
+				goto gc_complete;
+			}
+
+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(new_parent)) {
+				/* We can discard any preceding shortcut also */
+				struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
+					assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(new_parent);
+
+				pr_devel("excise preceding shortcut\n");
+
+				new_parent = new_s->back_pointer = s->back_pointer;
+				slot = new_s->parent_slot = s->parent_slot;
+				kfree(s);
+				if (!new_parent) {
+					new_s->back_pointer = NULL;
+					new_s->parent_slot = 0;
+					new_root = ptr;
+					goto gc_complete;
+				}
+			}
+
+			new_s->back_pointer = new_parent;
+			new_s->parent_slot = slot;
+			new_n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
+			new_n->slots[slot] = ptr;
+			goto ascend_old_tree;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Excise any shortcuts we might encounter that point to nodes that
+	 * only contain leaves.
+	 */
+	ptr = new_n->back_pointer;
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto gc_complete;
+
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		new_s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		new_parent = new_s->back_pointer;
+		slot = new_s->parent_slot;
+
+		if (new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) {
+			struct assoc_array_node *n;
+
+			pr_devel("excise shortcut\n");
+			new_n->back_pointer = new_parent;
+			new_n->parent_slot = slot;
+			kfree(new_s);
+			if (!new_parent) {
+				new_root = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
+				goto gc_complete;
+			}
+
+			n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
+			n->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
+		}
+	} else {
+		new_parent = ptr;
+	}
+	new_n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
+
+ascend_old_tree:
+	ptr = node->back_pointer;
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+		cursor = shortcut->back_pointer;
+	} else {
+		slot = node->parent_slot;
+		cursor = ptr;
+	}
+	BUG_ON(!ptr);
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
+	slot++;
+	goto continue_node;
+
+gc_complete:
+	edit->set[0].to = new_root;
+	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+	edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree = nr_leaves_on_tree;
+	return 0;
+
+enomem:
+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
+	assoc_array_destroy_subtree(new_root, edit->ops);
+	kfree(edit);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:18 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring

Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using
the previously added associative array implementation.  Currently the maximum
capacity is:

	(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *)

which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500.  However, since this is being
used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that.  The new implementation
gives us effectively unlimited capacity.

With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion
after this patch is applied.  The alterations are because (a) keyrings that
are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have
changed a bit.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 include/keys/keyring-type.h |   17 +-
 include/linux/key.h         |   13 +-
 lib/assoc_array.c           |    1 +
 security/keys/Kconfig       |    1 +
 security/keys/gc.c          |   33 +-
 security/keys/internal.h    |   17 +-
 security/keys/key.c         |   35 +-
 security/keys/keyring.c     | 1436 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 security/keys/request_key.c |   12 +-
 9 files changed, 803 insertions(+), 762 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/keys/keyring-type.h b/include/keys/keyring-type.h
index cf49159b0e3a..fca5c62340a4 100644
--- a/include/keys/keyring-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/keyring-type.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* Keyring key type
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -13,19 +13,6 @@
 #define _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
-
-/*
- * the keyring payload contains a list of the keys to which the keyring is
- * subscribed
- */
-struct keyring_list {
-	struct rcu_head	rcu;		/* RCU deletion hook */
-	unsigned short	maxkeys;	/* max keys this list can hold */
-	unsigned short	nkeys;		/* number of keys currently held */
-	unsigned short	delkey;		/* key to be unlinked by RCU */
-	struct key __rcu *keys[0];
-};
-
+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
 
 #endif /* _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index ef596c7af585..2417f789d29b 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -196,11 +197,13 @@ struct key {
 	 *   whatever
 	 */
 	union {
-		unsigned long		value;
-		void __rcu		*rcudata;
-		void			*data;
-		struct keyring_list __rcu *subscriptions;
-	} payload;
+		union {
+			unsigned long		value;
+			void __rcu		*rcudata;
+			void			*data;
+		} payload;
+		struct assoc_array keys;
+	};
 };
 
 extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
index a0952818f938..17edeaf19180 100644
--- a/lib/assoc_array.c
+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  */
 //#define DEBUG
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index a90d6d300dbd..15e0dfe8c80f 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 config KEYS
 	bool "Enable access key retention support"
+	select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
 	help
 	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
 	  access keys in the kernel.
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index d67c97bb1025..cce621c33dce 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
 	kleave("");
 }
 
+static int key_gc_keyring_func(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	const struct key *key = object;
+	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
+	return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
+}
+
 /*
  * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.
  *
@@ -138,10 +145,9 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
  */
 static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	int loop;
+	int result;
 
-	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
 
 	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
 			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
@@ -149,27 +155,17 @@ static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 
 	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (!klist)
-		goto unlock_dont_gc;
-
-	loop = klist->nkeys;
-	smp_rmb();
-	for (loop--; loop >= 0; loop--) {
-		struct key *key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
-		if (key_is_dead(key, limit))
-			goto do_gc;
-	}
-
-unlock_dont_gc:
+	result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
+				     key_gc_keyring_func, &limit);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (result == true)
+		goto do_gc;
+
 dont_gc:
 	kleave(" [no gc]");
 	return;
 
 do_gc:
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
 	keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
 	kleave(" [gc]");
 }
@@ -392,7 +388,6 @@ found_unreferenced_key:
 	 */
 found_keyring:
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
-	kdebug("scan keyring %d", key->serial);
 	key_gc_keyring(key, limit);
 	goto maybe_resched;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 73950bf8f875..581c6f688352 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -90,20 +90,23 @@ extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
 
 extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
 			    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-			    unsigned long *_prealloc);
+			    struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
 extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
-extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
-		       unsigned long *_prealloc);
+extern void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
 extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-			   unsigned long prealloc);
+			   struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
 
-extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
+extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+				    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
 
 extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
 					  key_serial_t target_id);
 
+extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring,
+				int (*func)(const struct key *key, void *data),
+				void *data);
+
 typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
 
 struct keyring_search_context {
@@ -119,6 +122,8 @@ struct keyring_search_context {
 #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0010	/* Don't check permissions */
 #define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0020	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
 
+	int (*iterator)(const void *object, void *iterator_data);
+
 	/* Internal stuff */
 	int			skipped_ret;
 	bool			possessed;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 7d716b82a61e..a819b5c7d4ec 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				      struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
 				      struct key *keyring,
 				      struct key *authkey,
-				      unsigned long *_prealloc)
+				      struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
 {
 	int ret, awaken;
 
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 
 			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
 			if (keyring)
-				__key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc);
+				__key_link(key, _edit);
 
 			/* disable the authorisation key */
 			if (authkey)
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 			     struct key *authkey)
 {
 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
-	unsigned long prealloc;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
@@ -490,16 +490,15 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	}
 
 	if (keyring) {
-		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_preparse;
 	}
 
-	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey,
-					 &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
 
 error_free_preparse:
 	if (key->type->preparse)
@@ -537,7 +536,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 			struct key *keyring,
 			struct key *authkey)
 {
-	unsigned long prealloc;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	struct timespec now;
 	int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
 
@@ -548,7 +547,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	ret = -EBUSY;
 
 	if (keyring)
-		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
+		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 
 		/* and link it into the destination keyring */
 		if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
-			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
+			__key_link(key, &edit);
 
 		/* disable the authorisation key */
 		if (authkey)
@@ -580,7 +579,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
 
 	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
 	if (awaken)
@@ -783,8 +782,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		.description	= description,
 	};
 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	unsigned long prealloc;
 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	int ret;
@@ -828,7 +827,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
 
-	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 		goto error_free_prep;
@@ -847,8 +846,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	 * update that instead if possible
 	 */
 	if (index_key.type->update) {
-		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key);
-		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
+		if (key_ref)
 			goto found_matching_key;
 	}
 
@@ -874,7 +873,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 
 	/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
-	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_put(key);
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -884,7 +883,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
 error_link_end:
-	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
 error_free_prep:
 	if (index_key.type->preparse)
 		index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
@@ -897,7 +896,7 @@ error:
 	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
 	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
 	 */
-	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 	goto error_free_prep;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index eeef1a073db4..f7cdea22214f 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* Keyring handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -17,25 +17,11 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
-#define rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring)				\
-	(rcu_dereference_protected(					\
-		(keyring)->payload.subscriptions,			\
-		rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
-
-#define rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, index, keyring)			\
-	(rcu_dereference_protected(					\
-		(klist)->keys[index],					\
-		rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
-
-#define MAX_KEYRING_LINKS						\
-	min_t(size_t, USHRT_MAX - 1,					\
-	      ((PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct keyring_list)) / sizeof(struct key *)))
-
-#define KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA 1UL
-
 /*
  * When plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit
  * set on how deep we're willing to go.
@@ -47,6 +33,28 @@
  */
 #define KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE	(1 << 5)
 
+/*
+ * We mark pointers we pass to the associative array with bit 1 set if
+ * they're keyrings and clear otherwise.
+ */
+#define KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE	0x2UL
+
+static inline bool keyring_ptr_is_keyring(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	return (unsigned long)x & KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE;
+}
+static inline struct key *keyring_ptr_to_key(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
+{
+	void *object = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(x);
+	return (struct key *)((unsigned long)object & ~KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
+}
+static inline void *keyring_key_to_ptr(struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		return (void *)((unsigned long)key | KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
+	return key;
+}
+
 static struct list_head	keyring_name_hash[KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE];
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock);
 
@@ -67,7 +75,6 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
  */
 static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
 			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
-static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion);
 static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
 static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
 static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m);
@@ -76,9 +83,9 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
 
 struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
 	.name		= "keyring",
-	.def_datalen	= sizeof(struct keyring_list),
+	.def_datalen	= 0,
 	.instantiate	= keyring_instantiate,
-	.match		= keyring_match,
+	.match		= user_match,
 	.revoke		= keyring_revoke,
 	.destroy	= keyring_destroy,
 	.describe	= keyring_describe,
@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
 	if (prep->datalen == 0) {
+		assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
 		/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
 		keyring_publish_name(keyring);
 		ret = 0;
@@ -136,14 +144,225 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
 }
 
 /*
- * Match keyrings on their name
+ * Multiply 64-bits by 32-bits to 96-bits and fold back to 64-bit.  Ideally we'd
+ * fold the carry back too, but that requires inline asm.
+ */
+static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
+{
+	u64 hi = (u64)(u32)(x >> 32) * y;
+	u64 lo = (u64)(u32)(x) * y;
+	return lo + ((u64)(u32)hi << 32) + (u32)(hi >> 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash a key type and description.
+ */
+static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
+	const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
+	const char *description = index_key->description;
+	unsigned long hash, type;
+	u32 piece;
+	u64 acc;
+	int n, desc_len = index_key->desc_len;
+
+	type = (unsigned long)index_key->type;
+
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13);
+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+	for (;;) {
+		n = desc_len;
+		if (n <= 0)
+			break;
+		if (n > 4)
+			n = 4;
+		piece = 0;
+		memcpy(&piece, description, n);
+		description += n;
+		desc_len -= n;
+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+	}
+
+	/* Fold the hash down to 32 bits if need be. */
+	hash = acc;
+	if (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE == 32)
+		hash ^= acc >> 32;
+
+	/* Squidge all the keyrings into a separate part of the tree to
+	 * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is
+	 * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0)
+		return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1;
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0)
+		return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask;
+	return hash;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build the next index key chunk.
+ *
+ * On 32-bit systems the index key is laid out as:
+ *
+ *	0	4	5	9...
+ *	hash	desclen	typeptr	desc[]
+ *
+ * On 64-bit systems:
+ *
+ *	0	8	9	17...
+ *	hash	desclen	typeptr	desc[]
+ *
+ * We return it one word-sized chunk at a time.
  */
-static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
+static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
+{
+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
+	unsigned long chunk = 0;
+	long offset = 0;
+	int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk);
+
+	level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
+	switch (level) {
+	case 0:
+		return hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key);
+	case 1:
+		return ((unsigned long)index_key->type << 8) | desc_len;
+	case 2:
+		if (desc_len == 0)
+			return (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >>
+				    (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8));
+		n--;
+		offset = 1;
+	default:
+		offset += sizeof(chunk) - 1;
+		offset += (level - 3) * sizeof(chunk);
+		if (offset >= desc_len)
+			return 0;
+		desc_len -= offset;
+		if (desc_len > n)
+			desc_len = n;
+		offset += desc_len;
+		do {
+			chunk <<= 8;
+			chunk |= ((u8*)index_key->description)[--offset];
+		} while (--desc_len > 0);
+
+		if (level == 2) {
+			chunk <<= 8;
+			chunk |= (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >>
+				      (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8));
+		}
+		return chunk;
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level)
+{
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	return keyring_get_key_chunk(&key->index_key, level);
+}
+
+static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
 {
-	return keyring->description &&
-		strcmp(keyring->description, description) == 0;
+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+
+	return key->index_key.type == index_key->type &&
+		key->index_key.desc_len == index_key->desc_len &&
+		memcmp(key->index_key.description, index_key->description,
+		       index_key->desc_len) == 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position
+ * at which they differ - if they differ.
+ */
+static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+{
+	const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a);
+	const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b);
+	const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key;
+	const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key;
+	unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
+	int level, i;
+
+	level = 0;
+	seg_a = hash_key_type_and_desc(a);
+	seg_b = hash_key_type_and_desc(b);
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+
+	/* The number of bits contributed by the hash is controlled by a
+	 * constant in the assoc_array headers.  Everything else thereafter we
+	 * can deal with as being machine word-size dependent.
+	 */
+	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8;
+	seg_a = a->desc_len;
+	seg_b = b->desc_len;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+
+	/* The next bit may not work on big endian */
+	level++;
+	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->type;
+	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->type;
+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+		goto differ;
+
+	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+	if (a->desc_len == 0)
+		goto same;
+
+	i = 0;
+	if (((unsigned long)a->description | (unsigned long)b->description) &
+	    (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)) {
+		do {
+			seg_a = *(unsigned long *)(a->description + i);
+			seg_b = *(unsigned long *)(b->description + i);
+			if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+				goto differ_plus_i;
+			i += sizeof(unsigned long);
+		} while (i < (a->desc_len & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)));
+	}
+
+	for (; i < a->desc_len; i++) {
+		seg_a = *(unsigned char *)(a->description + i);
+		seg_b = *(unsigned char *)(b->description + i);
+		if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+			goto differ_plus_i;
+	}
+
+same:
+	return -1;
+
+differ_plus_i:
+	level += i;
+differ:
+	i = level * 8 + __ffs(seg_a ^ seg_b);
+	return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free an object after stripping the keyring flag off of the pointer.
+ */
+static void keyring_free_object(void *object)
+{
+	key_put(keyring_ptr_to_key(object));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Operations for keyring management by the index-tree routines.
+ */
+static const struct assoc_array_ops keyring_assoc_array_ops = {
+	.get_key_chunk		= keyring_get_key_chunk,
+	.get_object_key_chunk	= keyring_get_object_key_chunk,
+	.compare_object		= keyring_compare_object,
+	.diff_objects		= keyring_diff_objects,
+	.free_object		= keyring_free_object,
+};
+
 /*
  * Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed.  Unpublish its name if it had one
  * and dispose of its data.
@@ -155,9 +374,6 @@ static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
  */
 static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	int loop;
-
 	if (keyring->description) {
 		write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
 
@@ -168,12 +384,7 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
 		write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
 	}
 
-	klist = rcu_access_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (klist) {
-		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
-			key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
-		kfree(klist);
-	}
+	assoc_array_destroy(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -181,76 +392,88 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
  */
 static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
-
 	if (keyring->description)
 		seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
 	else
 		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
 
 	if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-		if (klist)
-			seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+		if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
+			seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
 		else
 			seq_puts(m, ": empty");
-		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
 }
 
+struct keyring_read_iterator_context {
+	size_t			qty;
+	size_t			count;
+	key_serial_t __user	*buffer;
+};
+
+static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
+{
+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}",
+	       key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty);
+
+	if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty)
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ctx->buffer++;
+	ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents in binary form
  *
- * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller.
+ * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller.  This prevents someone
+ * from modifying it under us - which could cause us to read key IDs multiple
+ * times.
  */
 static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
 			 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	struct key *key;
-	size_t qty, tmp;
-	int loop, ret;
+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx;
+	unsigned long nr_keys;
+	int ret;
 
-	ret = 0;
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-	if (klist) {
-		/* calculate how much data we could return */
-		qty = klist->nkeys * sizeof(key_serial_t);
-
-		if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
-			if (buflen > qty)
-				buflen = qty;
-
-			/* copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the
-			 * buffer */
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-
-			for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
-				key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
-							    keyring);
-
-				tmp = sizeof(key_serial_t);
-				if (tmp > buflen)
-					tmp = buflen;
-
-				if (copy_to_user(buffer,
-						 &key->serial,
-						 tmp) != 0)
-					goto error;
-
-				buflen -= tmp;
-				if (buflen == 0)
-					break;
-				buffer += tmp;
-			}
-		}
+	kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen);
+
+	if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree;
+	if (nr_keys == 0)
+		return 0;
 
-		ret = qty;
+	/* Calculate how much data we could return */
+	ctx.qty = nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t);
+
+	if (!buffer || !buflen)
+		return ctx.qty;
+
+	if (buflen > ctx.qty)
+		ctx.qty = buflen;
+
+	/* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */
+	ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer;
+	ctx.count = 0;
+	ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
-error:
-	return ret;
+	kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count);
+	return ctx.count;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -277,219 +500,360 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
 
-/**
- * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
- * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
- * @ctx: The keyring search context.
- *
- * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
- * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
- * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search
- * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use
- * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree.  In
- * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches.
- *
- * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed
- * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH).
- *
- * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
- * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit.  The
- * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to
- * determine the match.  Normally the match function from the key type would be
- * used.
- *
- * RCU is used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without the
- * need to take lots of locks.
- *
- * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if
- * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked
- * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the
- * specified keyring wasn't a keyring.
- *
- * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from
- * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
+/*
+ * Iteration function to consider each key found.
  */
-key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 {
-	struct {
-		/* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
-		struct key *keyring;
-		struct keyring_list *keylist;
-		int kix;
-	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
-
-	struct keyring_list *keylist;
-	unsigned long kflags;
-	struct key *keyring, *key;
-	key_ref_t key_ref;
-	long err;
-	int sp, nkeys, kix;
+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	unsigned long kflags = key->flags;
 
-	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
-	key_check(keyring);
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
-	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
-	if (err < 0) {
-		key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
-		goto error;
+	/* ignore keys not of this type */
+	if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type) {
+		kleave(" = 0 [!type]");
+		return 0;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
-	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
-		goto error;
+	/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
+		if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+			kleave(" = %d [invrev]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED);
+			kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
+	}
 
-	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
-	err = -EAGAIN;
-	sp = 0;
-
-	/* firstly we should check to see if this top-level keyring is what we
-	 * are looking for */
-	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
-	kflags = keyring->flags;
-	if (keyring->type == ctx->index_key.type &&
-	    ctx->match(keyring, ctx->match_data)) {
-		key = keyring;
-		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
-			goto found;
+	/* keys that don't match */
+	if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data)) {
+		kleave(" = 0 [!match]");
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-		/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
-		 * revoked */
-		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
-			goto error_2;
-		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
-			goto error_2;
-		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
-		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
-			goto error_2;
-		goto found;
+	/* key must have search permissions */
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
+	    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+				ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+		ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+		goto skipped;
 	}
 
-	/* otherwise, the top keyring must not be revoked, expired, or
-	 * negatively instantiated if we are to search it */
-	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
-	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
-		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
-	    (keyring->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
-		goto error_2;
-
-	/* start processing a new keyring */
-descend:
-	kflags = keyring->flags;
-	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-		goto not_this_keyring;
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
+		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
+		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
+			kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
+			goto skipped;
+		}
+	}
 
-	keylist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (!keylist)
-		goto not_this_keyring;
+	/* Found */
+	ctx->result = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
+	kleave(" = 1 [found]");
+	return 1;
 
-	/* iterate through the keys in this keyring first */
-	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
-	smp_rmb();
-	for (kix = 0; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
-		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
-		kflags = key->flags;
+skipped:
+	return ctx->skipped_ret;
+}
 
-		/* ignore keys not of this type */
-		if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type)
-			continue;
+/*
+ * Search inside a keyring for a key.  We can search by walking to it
+ * directly based on its index-key or we can iterate over the entire
+ * tree looking for it, based on the match function.
+ */
+static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	if ((ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE) ==
+	    KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
+		const void *object;
+
+		object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys,
+					  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+					  &ctx->index_key);
+		return object ? ctx->iterator(object, ctx) : 0;
+	}
+	return assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, ctx->iterator, ctx);
+}
 
-		/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
-		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)) {
-			if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-				      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-				continue;
+/*
+ * Search a tree of keyrings that point to other keyrings up to the maximum
+ * depth.
+ */
+static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
+				   struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct key *keyring;
+		struct assoc_array_node *node;
+		int slot;
+	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
 
-			if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
-				continue;
-		}
+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
+	struct key *key;
+	int sp = 0, slot;
 
-		/* keys that don't match */
-		if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data))
-			continue;
+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
+	       keyring->serial,
+	       ctx->index_key.type->name,
+	       ctx->index_key.description);
 
-		/* key must have search permissions */
-		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
-			continue;
+	if (ctx->index_key.description)
+		ctx->index_key.desc_len = strlen(ctx->index_key.description);
 
-		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
+	/* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for
+	 * and whether it is valid or not.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ||
+	    keyring_compare_object(keyring, &ctx->index_key)) {
+		ctx->skipped_ret = 2;
+		ctx->flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK;
+		switch (ctx->iterator(keyring_key_to_ptr(keyring), ctx)) {
+		case 1:
 			goto found;
-
-		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
-		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
-			err = key->type_data.reject_error;
-			continue;
+		case 2:
+			return false;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
+	}
 
+	ctx->skipped_ret = 0;
+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
+		ctx->flags &= ~KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK;
+
+	/* Start processing a new keyring */
+descend_to_keyring:
+	kdebug("descend to %d", keyring->serial);
+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+
+	/* Search through the keys in this keyring before its searching its
+	 * subtrees.
+	 */
+	if (search_keyring(keyring, ctx))
 		goto found;
-	}
 
-	/* search through the keyrings nested in this one */
-	kix = 0;
-ascend:
-	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
-	smp_rmb();
-	for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
-		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
-		if (key->type != &key_type_keyring)
-			continue;
+	/* Then manually iterate through the keyrings nested in this one.
+	 *
+	 * Start from the root node of the index tree.  Because of the way the
+	 * hash function has been set up, keyrings cluster on the leftmost
+	 * branch of the root node (root slot 0) or in the root node itself.
+	 * Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root
+	 * slots 1-15).
+	 */
+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto not_this_keyring;
 
-		/* recursively search nested keyrings
-		 * - only search keyrings for which we have search permission
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		/* If the root is a shortcut, either the keyring only contains
+		 * keyring pointers (everything clusters behind root slot 0) or
+		 * doesn't contain any keyring pointers.
 		 */
-		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
+		if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
+			goto not_this_keyring;
+
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+		goto begin_node;
+	}
+
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
+	ptr = node->slots[0];
+	if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr))
+		goto begin_node;
+
+descend_to_node:
+	/* Descend to a more distal node in this keyring's content tree and go
+	 * through that.
+	 */
+	kdebug("descend");
+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+	}
+
+begin_node:
+	kdebug("begin_node");
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+	slot = 0;
+ascend_to_node:
+	/* Go through the slots in a node */
+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
+
+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
+			goto descend_to_node;
+
+		if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr))
 			continue;
 
-		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+		key = keyring_ptr_to_key(ptr);
+
+		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) {
+			if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP) {
+				ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+				return false;
+			}
+			goto not_this_keyring;
+		}
+
+		/* Search a nested keyring */
+		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
+		    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
 					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
 		/* stack the current position */
 		stack[sp].keyring = keyring;
-		stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
-		stack[sp].kix = kix;
+		stack[sp].node = node;
+		stack[sp].slot = slot;
 		sp++;
 
 		/* begin again with the new keyring */
 		keyring = key;
-		goto descend;
+		goto descend_to_keyring;
+	}
+
+	/* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need
+	 * to ascend to the parent and continue processing there.
+	 */
+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
+	slot = node->parent_slot;
+
+	if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
+	}
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto not_this_keyring;
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
+	slot++;
+
+	/* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just
+	 * finished processing the leftmost branch rather than the root slots -
+	 * so there can't be any more keyrings for us to find.
+	 */
+	if (node->back_pointer) {
+		kdebug("ascend %d", slot);
+		goto ascend_to_node;
 	}
 
-	/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
-	 * matching key */
+	/* The keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
+	 * matching key.
+	 */
 not_this_keyring:
-	if (sp > 0) {
-		/* resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
-		sp--;
-		keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
-		keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
-		kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
-		goto ascend;
+	kdebug("not_this_keyring %d", sp);
+	if (sp <= 0) {
+		kleave(" = false");
+		return false;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
-	goto error_2;
+	/* Resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
+	sp--;
+	keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
+	node = stack[sp].node;
+	slot = stack[sp].slot + 1;
+	kdebug("ascend to %d [%d]", keyring->serial, slot);
+	goto ascend_to_node;
 
-	/* we found a viable match */
+	/* We found a viable match */
 found:
-	__key_get(key);
-	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-	while (sp > 0)
-		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result);
 	key_check(key);
-	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
-error_2:
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) {
+		key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+		keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+		while (sp > 0)
+			stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+	}
+	kleave(" = true");
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
+ * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
+ * @ctx: The keyring search context.
+ *
+ * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
+ * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
+ * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search
+ * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use
+ * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree.  In
+ * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches.
+ *
+ * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed
+ * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH).
+ *
+ * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
+ * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit.  The
+ * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to
+ * determine the match.  Normally the match function from the key type would be
+ * used.
+ *
+ * RCU can be used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without
+ * the need to take lots of locks.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if
+ * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked
+ * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the
+ * specified keyring wasn't a keyring.
+ *
+ * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from
+ * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
+ */
+key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	long err;
+
+	ctx->iterator = keyring_search_iterator;
+	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
+
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key_check(keyring);
+
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+
+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
+		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
+	if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx))
+		__key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-error:
-	return key_ref;
+	return ctx->result;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -499,7 +863,7 @@ error:
  * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find.
  *
  * As keyring_search_aux() above, but using the current task's credentials and
- * type's default matching function.
+ * type's default matching function and preferred search method.
  */
 key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 			 struct key_type *type,
@@ -523,58 +887,49 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 
 /*
- * Search the given keyring only (no recursion).
+ * Search the given keyring for a key that might be updated.
  *
  * The caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring and that the
- * permission is granted to search the keyring as no check is made here.
- *
- * RCU is used to make it unnecessary to lock the keyring key list here.
+ * permission is granted to modify the keyring as no check is made here.  The
+ * caller must also hold a lock on the keyring semaphore.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if
- * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys
- * are skipped over.
+ * successful and returns NULL if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys are
+ * skipped over.
  *
  * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref
  * to the returned key reference.
  */
-key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
+			     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
 	struct key *keyring, *key;
-	bool possessed;
-	int nkeys, loop;
+	const void *object;
 
 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-	possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
 
-	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (klist) {
-		nkeys = klist->nkeys;
-		smp_rmb();
-		for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) {
-			key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
-			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
-			    (!key->type->match ||
-			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
-			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-					    (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-			    )
-				goto found;
-		}
-	}
+	object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  index_key);
 
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	if (object)
+		goto found;
+
+	kleave(" = NULL");
+	return NULL;
 
 found:
+	key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	if (key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			  (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
+		kleave(" = NULL [x]");
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	__key_get(key);
-	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
-		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
+	kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial);
+	return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -637,6 +992,19 @@ out:
 	return keyring;
 }
 
+static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
+					 void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+
+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+
+	BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data);
+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * See if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
  * tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A).
@@ -646,117 +1014,39 @@ out:
  */
 static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 {
-	struct {
-		struct keyring_list *keylist;
-		int kix;
-	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
-
-	struct keyring_list *keylist;
-	struct key *subtree, *key;
-	int sp, nkeys, kix, ret;
+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+		.index_key	= A->index_key,
+		.match_data	= A,
+		.iterator	= keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
+		.flags		= (KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT |
+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP),
+	};
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-
-	ret = -EDEADLK;
-	if (A == B)
-		goto cycle_detected;
-
-	subtree = B;
-	sp = 0;
-
-	/* start processing a new keyring */
-descend:
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags))
-		goto not_this_keyring;
-
-	keylist = rcu_dereference(subtree->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (!keylist)
-		goto not_this_keyring;
-	kix = 0;
-
-ascend:
-	/* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */
-	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
-	smp_rmb();
-	for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
-		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
-
-		if (key == A)
-			goto cycle_detected;
-
-		/* recursively check nested keyrings */
-		if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
-			if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
-				goto too_deep;
-
-			/* stack the current position */
-			stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
-			stack[sp].kix = kix;
-			sp++;
-
-			/* begin again with the new keyring */
-			subtree = key;
-			goto descend;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
-	 * matching key */
-not_this_keyring:
-	if (sp > 0) {
-		/* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */
-		sp--;
-		keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
-		kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
-		goto ascend;
-	}
-
-	ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */
-
-error:
+	search_nested_keyrings(B, &ctx);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ret;
-
-too_deep:
-	ret = -ELOOP;
-	goto error;
-
-cycle_detected:
-	ret = -EDEADLK;
-	goto error;
-}
-
-/*
- * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked
- * key
- */
-static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
-	struct keyring_list *klist =
-		container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
-
-	if (klist->delkey != USHRT_MAX)
-		key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey]));
-	kfree(klist);
+	return PTR_ERR(ctx.result) == -EAGAIN ? 0 : PTR_ERR(ctx.result);
 }
 
 /*
  * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring.
  */
-int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-		     unsigned long *_prealloc)
+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
+		     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
+		     struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
 	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
 	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
-	unsigned long prealloc;
-	unsigned max;
-	time_t lowest_lru;
-	size_t size;
-	int loop, lru, ret;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	int ret;
 
 	kenter("%d,%s,%s,",
-	       key_serial(keyring), index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
+
+	BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);
 
 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
 		return -ENOTDIR;
@@ -772,88 +1062,25 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-
-	/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
-	lru = -1;
-	if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
-		lowest_lru = TIME_T_MAX;
-		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
-			struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
-								keyring);
-			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
-			    strcmp(key->description, index_key->description) == 0) {
-				/* Found a match - we'll replace the link with
-				 * one to the new key.  We record the slot
-				 * position.
-				 */
-				klist->delkey = loop;
-				prealloc = 0;
-				goto done;
-			}
-			if (key->last_used_at < lowest_lru) {
-				lowest_lru = key->last_used_at;
-				lru = loop;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* If the keyring is full then do an LRU discard */
-	if (klist &&
-	    klist->nkeys == klist->maxkeys &&
-	    klist->maxkeys >= MAX_KEYRING_LINKS) {
-		kdebug("LRU discard %d\n", lru);
-		klist->delkey = lru;
-		prealloc = 0;
-		goto done;
-	}
-
 	/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
 	ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
 				  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_sem;
 
-	if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
-		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
-		klist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
-		prealloc = KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
-	} else {
-		/* grow the key list */
-		max = 4;
-		if (klist) {
-			max += klist->maxkeys;
-			if (max > MAX_KEYRING_LINKS)
-				max = MAX_KEYRING_LINKS;
-			BUG_ON(max <= klist->maxkeys);
-		}
-
-		size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
-
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!nklist)
-			goto error_quota;
-
-		nklist->maxkeys = max;
-		if (klist) {
-			memcpy(nklist->keys, klist->keys,
-			       sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys);
-			nklist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
-			nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys + 1;
-			klist->delkey = USHRT_MAX;
-		} else {
-			nklist->nkeys = 1;
-			nklist->delkey = 0;
-		}
-
-		/* add the key into the new space */
-		RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], NULL);
-		prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist | KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
+	/* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the
+	 * keyring tree.
+	 */
+	edit = assoc_array_insert(&keyring->keys,
+				  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  index_key,
+				  NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
+		goto error_quota;
 	}
 
-done:
-	*_prealloc = prealloc;
+	*_edit = edit;
 	kleave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
 
@@ -893,60 +1120,12 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
  * holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description
  * combination.
  */
-void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
-		unsigned long *_prealloc)
+void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
-	struct key *discard;
-
-	nklist = (struct keyring_list *)(*_prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA);
-	*_prealloc = 0;
-
-	kenter("%d,%d,%p", keyring->serial, key->serial, nklist);
-
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-
 	__key_get(key);
-	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
-		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
-
-	/* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly
-	 * allocated list we can fill */
-	if (nklist) {
-		kdebug("reissue %hu/%hu/%hu",
-		       nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys);
-
-		RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], key);
-
-		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
-
-		/* dispose of the old keyring list and, if there was one, the
-		 * displaced key */
-		if (klist) {
-			kdebug("dispose %hu/%hu/%hu",
-			       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
-			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
-		}
-	} else if (klist->delkey < klist->nkeys) {
-		kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
-		       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
-
-		discard = rcu_dereference_protected(
-			klist->keys[klist->delkey],
-			rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem));
-		rcu_assign_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
-		/* The garbage collector will take care of RCU
-		 * synchronisation */
-		key_put(discard);
-	} else {
-		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
-		kdebug("append %hu/%hu/%hu",
-		       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
-
-		RCU_INIT_POINTER(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
-		smp_wmb();
-		klist->nkeys++;
-	}
+	assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key));
+	assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
+	*_edit = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -956,23 +1135,20 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
  */
 void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-		    unsigned long prealloc)
+		    struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
 	__releases(&keyring->sem)
 	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
 {
 	BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL);
-	BUG_ON(index_key->type->name == NULL);
-	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, prealloc);
+	kenter("%d,%s,", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name);
 
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	if (prealloc) {
-		if (prealloc & KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA)
-			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-					    keyring->datalen -
-					    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-		kfree((struct keyring_list *)(prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA));
+	if (edit) {
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
 	}
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
 }
@@ -999,20 +1175,24 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
  */
 int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 {
-	unsigned long prealloc;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	int ret;
 
+	kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
+
 	key_check(keyring);
 	key_check(key);
 
-	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 	if (ret == 0) {
+		kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
 		if (ret == 0)
-			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
-		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
+			__key_link(key, &edit);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
 	}
 
+	kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
@@ -1036,90 +1216,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
  */
 int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
-	int loop, ret;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+	int ret;
 
 	key_check(keyring);
 	key_check(key);
 
-	ret = -ENOTDIR;
 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
-		goto error;
+		return -ENOTDIR;
 
 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-	if (klist) {
-		/* search the keyring for the key */
-		for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++)
-			if (rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]) == key)
-				goto key_is_present;
+	edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+				  &key->index_key);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
+		goto error;
 	}
-
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
 	ret = -ENOENT;
-	goto error;
-
-key_is_present:
-	/* we need to copy the key list for RCU purposes */
-	nklist = kmalloc(sizeof(*klist) +
-			 sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys,
-			 GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!nklist)
-		goto nomem;
-	nklist->maxkeys = klist->maxkeys;
-	nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys - 1;
-
-	if (loop > 0)
-		memcpy(&nklist->keys[0],
-		       &klist->keys[0],
-		       loop * sizeof(struct key *));
-
-	if (loop < nklist->nkeys)
-		memcpy(&nklist->keys[loop],
-		       &klist->keys[loop + 1],
-		       (nklist->nkeys - loop) * sizeof(struct key *));
-
-	/* adjust the user's quota */
-	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-
-	rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
-
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-
-	/* schedule for later cleanup */
-	klist->delkey = loop;
-	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
+	if (edit == NULL)
+		goto error;
 
+	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
 	ret = 0;
 
 error:
-	return ret;
-nomem:
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	goto error;
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink);
 
-/*
- * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, releasing the keys it
- * links to.
- */
-static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	int loop;
-
-	klist = container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
-
-	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
-		key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
-
-	kfree(klist);
-}
-
 /**
  * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring
  * @keyring: The keyring to clear.
@@ -1130,33 +1256,25 @@ static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
  */
 int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = -ENOTDIR;
-	if (keyring->type == &key_type_keyring) {
-		/* detach the pointer block with the locks held */
-		down_write(&keyring->sem);
-
-		klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-		if (klist) {
-			/* adjust the quota */
-			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-					    sizeof(struct keyring_list));
-
-			rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
-					   NULL);
-		}
-
-		up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -ENOTDIR;
 
-		/* free the keys after the locks have been dropped */
-		if (klist)
-			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 
+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
+	} else {
+		if (edit)
+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
 		ret = 0;
 	}
 
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
@@ -1168,17 +1286,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
  */
 static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
+	if (!IS_ERR(edit)) {
+		if (edit)
+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
+	}
+}
 
-	/* adjust the quota */
-	key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
+static bool gc_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
 
-	if (klist) {
-		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
-		call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
-	}
+	if (key_is_dead(key, *limit))
+		return false;
+	key_get(key);
+	return true;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1191,88 +1317,12 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
  */
 void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 {
-	struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
-	struct key *key;
-	int loop, keep, max;
-
 	kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description);
 
 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
-
-	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-	if (!klist)
-		goto no_klist;
-
-	/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
-	keep = 0;
-	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
-		if (!key_is_dead(rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring),
-				 limit))
-			keep++;
-
-	if (keep == klist->nkeys)
-		goto just_return;
-
-	/* allocate a new keyring payload */
-	max = roundup(keep, 4);
-	new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!new)
-		goto nomem;
-	new->maxkeys = max;
-	new->nkeys = 0;
-	new->delkey = 0;
-
-	/* install the live keys
-	 * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
-	 */
-	keep = 0;
-	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
-		key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring);
-		if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
-			if (keep >= max)
-				goto discard_new;
-			RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->keys[keep++], key_get(key));
-		}
-	}
-	new->nkeys = keep;
-
-	/* adjust the quota */
-	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-			    sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
-			    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
-
-	if (keep == 0) {
-		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
-		kfree(new);
-	} else {
-		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
-	}
-
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-
-	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
-	kleave(" [yes]");
-	return;
-
-discard_new:
-	new->nkeys = keep;
-	keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+	assoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+		       gc_iterator, &limit);
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	kleave(" [discard]");
-	return;
 
-just_return:
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	kleave(" [no dead]");
-	return;
-
-no_klist:
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	kleave(" [no_klist]");
-	return;
-
-nomem:
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	kleave(" [oom]");
+	kleave("");
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index ab75df4745af..df94827103d0 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
 			       struct key_user *user,
 			       struct key **_key)
 {
-	unsigned long prealloc;
+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
 	struct key *key;
 	key_perm_t perm;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
 
 	if (dest_keyring) {
-		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &prealloc);
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
 	}
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
 		goto key_already_present;
 
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
+		__key_link(key, &edit);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
 	*_key = key;
 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ key_already_present:
 	if (dest_keyring) {
 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
 		if (ret == 0)
-			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
-		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
+			__key_link(key, &edit);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto link_check_failed;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ab3c3587f8cda9083209a61dbe3a4407d3cada10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:18 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs

Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus
swapspace when memory is tight.  This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
---
 include/keys/big_key-type.h |  25 ++++++
 include/linux/key.h         |   1 +
 security/keys/Kconfig       |  11 +++
 security/keys/Makefile      |   1 +
 security/keys/big_key.c     | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 242 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/keys/big_key-type.h
 create mode 100644 security/keys/big_key.c

diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d69bc8af3292
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* Big capacity key type.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_big_key;
+
+extern int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key);
+extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key);
+extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m);
+extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 2417f789d29b..010dbb618aca 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ struct key {
 			unsigned long		value;
 			void __rcu		*rcudata;
 			void			*data;
+			void			*data2[2];
 		} payload;
 		struct assoc_array keys;
 	};
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 15e0dfe8c80f..b56362275ec8 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KEYS
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
 
+config BIG_KEYS
+	tristate "Large payload keys"
+	depends on KEYS
+	depends on TMPFS
+	help
+	  This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
+	  (for example Kerberos ticket caches).  The data may be stored out to
+	  swapspace by tmpfs.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
 config TRUSTED_KEYS
 	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
 	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 504aaa008388..c487c77a00be 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -22,5 +22,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
 #
 # Key types
 #
+obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5f9defc4a807
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* Large capacity key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+/*
+ * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
+ * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
+ * least as large as the data.
+ */
+#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
+
+/*
+ * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
+	.name			= "big_key",
+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	.instantiate		= big_key_instantiate,
+	.match			= user_match,
+	.revoke			= big_key_revoke,
+	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
+	.describe		= big_key_describe,
+	.read			= big_key_read,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a big key
+ */
+int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+	struct file *file;
+	ssize_t written;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* Set an arbitrary quota */
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	key->type_data.x[1] = datalen;
+
+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
+		 * to be swapped out if needed.
+		 *
+		 * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
+		 */
+		file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(file))
+			goto err_quota;
+
+		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
+		if (written != datalen) {
+			if (written >= 0)
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_fput;
+		}
+
+		/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
+		 * later
+		 */
+		*path = file->f_path;
+		path_get(path);
+		fput(file);
+	} else {
+		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
+		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!data) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_quota;
+		}
+
+		key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+err_fput:
+	fput(file);
+err_quota:
+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
+ * - called with the key sem write-locked
+ */
+void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+
+	/* clear the quota */
+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
+	if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+		vfs_truncate(path, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+		path_put(path);
+		path->mnt = NULL;
+		path->dentry = NULL;
+	} else {
+		kfree(key->payload.data);
+		key->payload.data = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * describe the big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
+
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+
+	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+		seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]",
+			   datalen,
+			   datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
+}
+
+/*
+ * read the key data
+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
+ */
+long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
+	long ret;
+
+	if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
+		return datalen;
+
+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+		struct file *file;
+		loff_t pos;
+
+		file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+		if (IS_ERR(file))
+			return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+		pos = 0;
+		ret = vfs_read(file, buffer, datalen, &pos);
+		fput(file);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret != datalen)
+			ret = -EIO;
+	} else {
+		ret = datalen;
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init big_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
+}
+
+static void __exit big_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
+}
+
+module_init(big_key_init);
+module_exit(big_key_cleanup);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From f36f8c75ae2e7d4da34f4c908cebdb4aa42c977e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 10:35:19 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID
 kerberos caches

Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos
caches held within the kernel.

This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's
processes so that the user's cron jobs can work.

The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like:

	struct user_namespace
	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
			\___ tkt785 big_key	- A ccache blob
			\___ tkt12345 big_key	- Another ccache blob

Or possibly:

	struct user_namespace
	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
			\___ tkt785 keyring	- A ccache
				\___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key
				\___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
				\___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
				\___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
				\___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
				\___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key

What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace.  Kernel
support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want.

The user asks for their Kerberos cache by:

	krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring);

The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID).  This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
mess with the cache.

The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read,
search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to.  Active LSMs get a
chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link.

Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a
timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring
goes away after a while.  The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to
three days.

Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the
register.  The cache keyrings are added to it.  This means that standard key
search and garbage collection facilities are available.

The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left
in it is then automatically gc'd.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |   6 ++
 include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h    |   1 +
 kernel/user.c                  |   4 +
 kernel/user_namespace.c        |   6 ++
 security/keys/Kconfig          |  17 +++++
 security/keys/Makefile         |   1 +
 security/keys/compat.c         |   3 +
 security/keys/internal.h       |   9 +++
 security/keys/keyctl.c         |   3 +
 security/keys/persistent.c     | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/sysctl.c         |  11 +++
 11 files changed, 230 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/keys/persistent.c

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 4db29859464f..4836ba3c1cd8 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ struct user_namespace {
 	kuid_t			owner;
 	kgid_t			group;
 	unsigned int		proc_inum;
+
+	/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	struct key		*persistent_keyring_register;
+	struct rw_semaphore	persistent_keyring_register_sem;
+#endif
 };
 
 extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
index c9b7f4faf97a..840cb990abe2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -56,5 +56,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_REJECT			19	/* reject a partially constructed key */
 #define KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV		20	/* instantiate a partially constructed key */
 #define KEYCTL_INVALIDATE		21	/* invalidate a key */
+#define KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT		22	/* get a user's persistent keyring */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 5bbb91988e69..a3a0dbfda329 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
 	.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
 	.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_KERBEROS_CACHE
+	.krb_cache_register_sem =
+	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.krb_cache_register_sem),
+#endif
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
 
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 13fb1134ba58..240fb62cf394 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
 
 	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -130,6 +133,9 @@ void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
 
 	do {
 		parent = ns->parent;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
+#endif
 		proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum);
 		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
 		ns = parent;
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index b56362275ec8..53d8748c9564 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -20,6 +20,23 @@ config KEYS
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
 
+config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
+	depends on KEYS
+	help
+	  This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings,
+	  primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage.  The keyrings are persistent
+	  in the sense that they stay around after all processes of that UID
+	  have exited, not that they survive the machine being rebooted.
+
+	  A particular keyring may be accessed by either the user whose keyring
+	  it is or by a process with administrative privileges.  The active
+	  LSMs gets to rule on which admin-level processes get to access the
+	  cache.
+
+	  Keyrings are created and added into the register upon demand and get
+	  removed if they expire (a default timeout is set upon creation).
+
 config BIG_KEYS
 	tristate "Large payload keys"
 	depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index c487c77a00be..dfb3a7bededf 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ obj-y := \
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
 
 #
 # Key types
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index d65fa7fa29ba..bbd32c729dbb 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
 		return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
 
+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+		return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 581c6f688352..80b2aac4f50c 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -255,6 +255,15 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
 					  const struct iovec *,
 					  unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t, key_serial_t);
+extern unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry;
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 33cfd27b4de2..cee72ce64222 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1667,6 +1667,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
 		return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
 
+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
+		return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82f4957a7acf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/* General persistent per-UID keyrings register
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */
+
+/*
+ * Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
+ *
+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
+ */
+static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
+					KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+					current_cred(),
+					((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+					 KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+					KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(reg))
+		return PTR_ERR(reg);
+
+	ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create the persistent keyring for the specified user.
+ *
+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
+ */
+static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
+				       struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
+{
+	struct key *persistent;
+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
+
+	if (!ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
+		long err = key_create_persistent_register(ns);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+	} else {
+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, index_key);
+		if (persistent_ref)
+			return persistent_ref;
+	}
+
+	persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description,
+				   uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+				   ns->persistent_keyring_register);
+	if (IS_ERR(persistent))
+		return ERR_CAST(persistent);
+
+	return make_key_ref(persistent, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
+ * keyring.
+ */
+static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
+			       key_ref_t dest_ref)
+{
+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
+	struct key *persistent;
+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
+	char buf[32];
+	long ret;
+
+	/* Look in the register if it exists */
+	index_key.type = &key_type_keyring;
+	index_key.description = buf;
+	index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid));
+
+	if (ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
+		down_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, &index_key);
+		up_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
+
+		if (persistent_ref)
+			goto found;
+	}
+
+	/* It wasn't in the register, so we'll need to create it.  We might
+	 * also need to create the register.
+	 */
+	down_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
+	persistent_ref = key_create_persistent(ns, uid, &index_key);
+	up_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
+	if (!IS_ERR(persistent_ref))
+		goto found;
+
+	return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
+
+found:
+	ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
+		ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry);
+			ret = persistent->serial;		
+		}
+	}
+
+	key_ref_put(persistent_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
+ * keyring.
+ */
+long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+	key_ref_t dest_ref;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* -1 indicates the current user */
+	if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
+		uid = current_uid();
+	} else {
+		uid = make_kuid(ns, _uid);
+		if (!uid_valid(uid))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not
+		 * sufficiently privileged.
+		 */
+		if (uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
+		    uid_eq(uid, current_suid()) &&
+		    uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
+		    uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()) &&
+		    !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	/* There must be a destination keyring */
+	dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
+		return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
+	if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
+		ret = -ENOTDIR;
+		goto out_put_dest;
+	}
+
+	ret = key_get_persistent(ns, uid, dest_ref);
+
+out_put_dest:
+	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index ee32d181764a..8c0af08760c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -61,5 +61,16 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
 		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
+	{
+		.procname = "persistent_keyring_expiry",
+		.data = &persistent_keyring_expiry,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
+	},
+#endif
 	{ }
 };
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9abc4e66eb839c28516916543768be08c814a3c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:10 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays

Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash
algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name".

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 14 +++++++-------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  8 ++++----
 include/crypto/public_key.h              |  6 +++---
 kernel/module_signing.c                  |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index cb2e29180a87..b313df1bd253 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 
-const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_ALGO_DSA]		= "DSA",
 	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= "RSA",
 };
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
 
-const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_HASH_MD4]		= "md4",
 	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= "md5",
 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA1]	= "sha1",
@@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA512]	= "sha512",
 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA224]	= "sha224",
 };
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo_name);
 
-const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_ID_PGP]		= "PGP",
 	[PKEY_ID_X509]		= "X509",
 };
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
 
 /*
  * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
 
 	if (key)
 		seq_printf(m, "%s.%s",
-			   pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
+			   pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 06007f0e880c..afbbc362f85a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
-	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]);
+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
 		 cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
 	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
-		 pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
-		 pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
+		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
+		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
 
 	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
 		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index f5b0224c9967..619d5706d837 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
 	PKEY_ALGO__LAST
 };
 
-extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
 
 enum pkey_hash_algo {
 	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ enum pkey_hash_algo {
 	PKEY_HASH__LAST
 };
 
-extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
 
 enum pkey_id_type {
 	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum pkey_id_type {
 	PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
 };
 
-extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
 
 /*
  * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index f2970bddc5ea..ee476404167b 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
 
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
 	if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
-	    !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash])
+	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
 	key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 206ce59a109f3b4bb352845bcd04f3cf504ae592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:18 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to public_key.c

Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to
public_key.c as it isn't X.509 specific.

Note that to make this configure correctly, the public key part must be
dependent on the RSA module rather than the other way round.  This needs a
further patch to make use of the crypto module loading stuff rather than using
a fixed table.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig           |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      |  8 ++++++++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +----------
 include/crypto/public_key.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 6d2c2ea12559..862b01fe6172 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
 config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 	tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype"
 	select MPILIB
+	select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
 	help
 	  This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling.
 	  If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
@@ -20,7 +21,6 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 
 config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
 	tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
-	depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 	select MPILIB_EXTRA
 	help
 	  This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index b313df1bd253..796ce0802aa0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
 
+const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
+	defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
+	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
+#endif
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
+
 const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_HASH_MD4]		= "md4",
 	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= "md5",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index afbbc362f85a..fe38628adae9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
-static const
-struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
-	[PKEY_ALGO_DSA]		= NULL,
-#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
-	defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
-	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
-#endif
-};
-
 /*
  * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
  */
@@ -174,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
 
-	cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo];
+	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
 
 	/* Check the signature on the key */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 619d5706d837..46bde250bfae 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
 };
 
 extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
+extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
 
 enum pkey_hash_algo {
 	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 67f7d60b3a08a3e3ec51c29c25767a9d9d0bd2b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:24 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct

Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes.  This
allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a
default in public_key_verify_signature().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 5 +++--
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 1 -
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  | 4 ++--
 include/crypto/public_key.h               | 1 +
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index facbf26bc6bb..8cc253d2dc92 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
-	/* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */
-	ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+	ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+
+	/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
 	ctx->key = value + 1;
 	ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index f86dc5fcc4ad..e583ad09e5a1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
 	struct tm	valid_from;
 	struct tm	valid_to;
-	enum pkey_algo	pkey_algo : 8;		/* Public key algorithm */
 	enum pkey_algo	sig_pkey_algo : 8;	/* Signature public key algorithm */
 	enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index fe38628adae9..fac574c457b3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
-	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
 		 cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
 
-	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
+	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
 
 	/* Check the signature on the key */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 46bde250bfae..05778df0e3b4 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct public_key {
 #define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT	0x02
 #define PKEY_CAN_SIGN		0x04
 #define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY		0x08
+	enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
 	enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8;
 	union {
 		MPI	mpi[5];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 3d167d68e3805ee45ed2e8412fc03ed919c54c24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:30 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make available

Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct
rather than a key struct and supply a wrapper that takes a key struct.  The
wrapper is then used by the asymmetric key subtype and the modified function is
used by X.509 self-signature checking and can be used by other things also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h      |  6 +++++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 796ce0802aa0..49ac8d848ed1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -86,21 +86,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
 /*
  * Verify a signature using a public key.
  */
-static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
-				       const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
+				const struct public_key_signature *sig)
 {
-	const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
+	const struct public_key_algorithm *algo;
+
+	BUG_ON(!pk);
+	BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[0]);
+	BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[1]);
+	BUG_ON(!sig);
+	BUG_ON(!sig->digest);
+	BUG_ON(!sig->mpi[0]);
+
+	algo = pk->algo;
+	if (!algo) {
+		if (pk->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST)
+			return -ENOPKG;
+		algo = pkey_algo[pk->pkey_algo];
+		if (!algo)
+			return -ENOPKG;
+	}
 
-	if (!pk->algo->verify_signature)
+	if (!algo->verify_signature)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
-	if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) {
+	if (sig->nr_mpi != algo->n_sig_mpi) {
 		pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n",
-			 sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi);
+			 sig->nr_mpi, algo->n_sig_mpi);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
+	return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
+
+static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
+					 const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
+	return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -111,6 +135,6 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
 	.name			= "public_key",
 	.describe		= public_key_describe,
 	.destroy		= public_key_destroy,
-	.verify_signature	= public_key_verify_signature,
+	.verify_signature	= public_key_verify_signature_2,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
index 5e5e35626899..5c37a22a0637 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
 };
 
 extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
+
+/*
+ * public_key.c
+ */
+extern int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
+				       const struct public_key_signature *sig);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index fac574c457b3..8cb2f7075479 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_mpi;
 
-	ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig);
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
 
 	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 1573801fa89d022b9f5bd1b189d23221335f9f56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:37 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature struct

Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference
purposes.  This allows a public_key_signature struct to be embedded in
struct x509_certificate and other places more easily.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 05778df0e3b4..b34fda4dcabf 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
 	u8 *digest;
 	u8 digest_size;			/* Number of bytes in digest */
 	u8 nr_mpi;			/* Occupancy of mpi[] */
+	enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
 	enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
 	union {
 		MPI mpi[2];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 57be4a784bf58eb41784aa3431165b455cf7e9c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:16:34 +0100
Subject: X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring

struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h
prior to its definition.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index e583ad09e5a1..2d0118214770 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
+#include <linux/time.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 
 struct x509_certificate {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b426beb6eeb0c81aeaa419f7444064abc9cb04ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:02 +0100
Subject: X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create filler function

Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating
now unnecessary fields, and split x509_check_signature() to create a filler
function for it that attaches a digest of the signed data and an MPI that
represents the signature data.  x509_free_certificate() is then modified to
deal with these.

Whilst we're at it, export both x509_check_signature() and the new
x509_get_sig_params().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 30 +++++------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 16 ++++--
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  | 83 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 8cc253d2dc92..144201ccba0c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		kfree(cert->subject);
 		kfree(cert->fingerprint);
 		kfree(cert->authority);
+		kfree(cert->sig.digest);
+		mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
 		kfree(cert);
 	}
 }
@@ -152,33 +154,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
 
 	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
-		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -203,8 +205,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	ctx->cert->sig = value;
-	ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen;
+	ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 2d0118214770..87d9cc26f630 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -21,12 +21,11 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
 	struct tm	valid_from;
 	struct tm	valid_to;
-	enum pkey_algo	sig_pkey_algo : 8;	/* Signature public key algorithm */
-	enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
-	size_t		tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
-	const void	*sig;			/* Signature data */
-	size_t		sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
+	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
+	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
+	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
+	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -34,3 +33,10 @@ struct x509_certificate {
  */
 extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
 extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+/*
+ * x509_public_key.c
+ */
+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
+				struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 8cb2f7075479..b7c81d8df08b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -24,72 +24,83 @@
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
 /*
- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
+ * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
  */
-static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
-				const struct x509_certificate *cert)
+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 {
-	struct public_key_signature *sig;
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-	
+
+	if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
+		return 0;
+
+	cert->sig.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size);
+	if (!cert->sig.rsa.s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	cert->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
 	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
-	/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
-	 * context data.
+	/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
+	 * digest storage space.
 	 */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sig)
-		goto error_no_sig;
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest)
+		goto error;
 
-	sig->pkey_hash_algo	= cert->sig_hash_algo;
-	sig->digest		= (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size;
-	sig->digest_size	= digest_size;
+	cert->sig.digest = digest;
+	cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
 
-	desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig);
-	desc->tfm	= tfm;
-	desc->flags	= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	desc = digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
 
 	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
+	might_sleep();
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
+error:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params);
 
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size);
-	if (!sig->rsa.s)
-		goto error;
+/*
+ * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ */
+int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
+			 struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+	int ret;
 
-	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error_mpi;
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
-	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
+	ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
 
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
 	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
-
-error_mpi:
-	mpi_free(sig->rsa.s);
-error:
-	kfree(sig);
-error_no_sig:
-	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-
-	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 
 /*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
@@ -118,8 +129,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
 	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
-		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
-		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
+		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
+		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
 
 	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
 		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2ecdb23b8c545fbee95caad0f2e45082787563ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:15 +0100
Subject: X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an X.509
 certificate

Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup
corresponds to algorithms that are available to us.

Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index b7c81d8df08b..eb368d4c632c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
+
+	if (cert->pub->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
+	    cert->sig.pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
+	    cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+	    !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] ||
+	    !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] ||
+	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
+		ret = -ENOPKG;
+		goto error_free_cert;
+	}
+
 	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 17334cabc814f8847975cddc0e29291af6093464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:31 +0100
Subject: X.509: Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field

Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming
they're self-signed and checking their signatures against themselves.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index eb368d4c632c..0f55e3b027a0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
 		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
 
-	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
-		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
+	if (!cert->fingerprint) {
+		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
 			cert->subject);
 		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
 		goto error_free_cert;
@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
 
-	/* Check the signature on the key */
-	if (strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
+	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
+	if (!cert->authority ||
+	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
 		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_cert;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 124df926090b32a998483f6e43ebeccdbe5b5302 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2013 17:40:44 +0100
Subject: X.509: Remove certificate date checks

Remove the certificate date checks that are performed when a certificate is
parsed.  There are two checks: a valid from and a valid to.  The first check is
causing a lot of problems with system clocks that don't keep good time and the
second places an implicit expiry date upon the kernel when used for module
signing, so do we really need them?

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
cc: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 38 --------------------------------
 1 file changed, 38 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 0f55e3b027a0..c1540e8f454a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct x509_certificate *cert;
-	struct tm now;
 	size_t srlen, sulen;
 	char *desc = NULL;
 	int ret;
@@ -150,43 +149,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
 
-	time_to_tm(CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec, 0, &now);
-	pr_devel("Now: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
-		 now.tm_year + 1900, now.tm_mon + 1, now.tm_mday,
-		 now.tm_hour, now.tm_min,  now.tm_sec);
-	if (now.tm_year < cert->valid_from.tm_year ||
-	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_from.tm_year &&
-	     (now.tm_mon < cert->valid_from.tm_mon ||
-	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_from.tm_mon &&
-	       (now.tm_mday < cert->valid_from.tm_mday ||
-		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_from.tm_mday &&
-		 (now.tm_hour < cert->valid_from.tm_hour ||
-		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_from.tm_hour &&
-		   (now.tm_min < cert->valid_from.tm_min ||
-		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_from.tm_min &&
-		     (now.tm_sec < cert->valid_from.tm_sec
-		      ))))))))))) {
-		pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint);
-		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
-		goto error_free_cert;
-	}
-	if (now.tm_year > cert->valid_to.tm_year ||
-	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_to.tm_year &&
-	     (now.tm_mon > cert->valid_to.tm_mon ||
-	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_to.tm_mon &&
-	       (now.tm_mday > cert->valid_to.tm_mday ||
-		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_to.tm_mday &&
-		 (now.tm_hour > cert->valid_to.tm_hour ||
-		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_to.tm_hour &&
-		   (now.tm_min > cert->valid_to.tm_min ||
-		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_to.tm_min &&
-		     (now.tm_sec > cert->valid_to.tm_sec
-		      ))))))))))) {
-		pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint);
-		ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
-		goto error_free_cert;
-	}
-
 	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From f0e6d220a7cd93afa0260ac5e7849f00b05e035a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:13 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring

Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel
base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring.

The "extra_certificates" file is then redundant.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/Makefile              | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 kernel/modsign_certificate.S |  3 +--
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 1ce47553fb02..c34e5f993a21 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -142,17 +142,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,bc)
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+###############################################################################
 #
-# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel
+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
+# them into the kernel.
 #
+###############################################################################
+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
+X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
+
+ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
+$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
+ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
+$(info X.509 certificate list changed)
+$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
+endif
+endif
+
+kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
 
-quiet_cmd_touch = TOUCH   $@
-      cmd_touch = touch   $@
+quiet_cmd_x509certs  = CERTS   $@
+      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
+targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
+	$(call if_changed,x509certs)
 
-extra_certificates:
-	$(call cmd,touch)
+targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
+$(obj)/.x509.list:
+	@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
 
-kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
 
 ###############################################################################
 #
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
index 4a9a86d12c8b..6fe03c7ffe72 100644
--- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
+++ b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
@@ -7,6 +7,5 @@
 	.section ".init.data","aw"
 
 GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
-	.incbin "signing_key.x509"
-	.incbin "extra_certificates"
+	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
 GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 0fbd39cf7ffe3b6a787b66b672d21b84e4675352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 17:13:15 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to
 deduplicate

Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certificates before we sort them
as this allows $(sort) to better remove duplicates.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/Makefile | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index c34e5f993a21..2c24195249d5 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -144,13 +144,19 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 ###############################################################################
 #
-# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
-# them into the kernel.
+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
+# the kernel.
+#
+# We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
+# in ".x509".  Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
+# have make canonicalise the pathnames and then sort them to discard the
+# duplicates.
 #
 ###############################################################################
 X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
 X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
-X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
+				$(or $(realpath $(CERT)),$(CERT))))
 
 ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
 $(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b56e5a17b6b9acd16997960504b9940d0d7984e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:30 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module
 signing

Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 include/keys/system_keyring.h |  23 ++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                  |  13 ++++++
 kernel/Makefile               |  15 ++++--
 kernel/modsign_certificate.S  |  11 -----
 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c       | 104 ------------------------------------------
 kernel/module-internal.h      |   2 -
 kernel/module_signing.c       |   3 +-
 kernel/system_certificates.S  |  12 +++++
 kernel/system_keyring.c       | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/keys/system_keyring.h
 delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_certificate.S
 delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
 create mode 100644 kernel/system_certificates.S
 create mode 100644 kernel/system_keyring.c

diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8dabc399bd1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* System keyring containing trusted public keys.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
+#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
+extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 3ecd8a1178f1..0ff5407a8378 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1668,6 +1668,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
+	depends on KEYS
+	help
+	  Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added.  Keys in
+	  the keyring are considered to be trusted.  Keys may be added at will
+	  by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
+	  userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
+	  keys already in the keyring.
+
+	  Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1741,6 +1753,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
+	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	select KEYS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 2c24195249d5..63136989c132 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -141,11 +142,11 @@ targets += timeconst.h
 $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,bc)
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 ###############################################################################
 #
 # Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
-# the kernel.
+# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
+# boot.
 #
 # We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
 # in ".x509".  Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 # duplicates.
 #
 ###############################################################################
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
 X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
 X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
 X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
@@ -169,10 +171,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
 endif
 endif
 
-kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
 
 quiet_cmd_x509certs  = CERTS   $@
-      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
+      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; echo "  - Including cert $(X509)")
+
 targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
 $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
 	$(call if_changed,x509certs)
@@ -182,7 +185,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list:
 	@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
 
 clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
+endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 ###############################################################################
 #
 # If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
deleted file mode 100644
index 6fe03c7ffe72..000000000000
--- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/export.h>
-
-#define GLOBAL(name)	\
-	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name);	\
-	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name):
-
-	.section ".init.data","aw"
-
-GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
-	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
-GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cbd4507a7e6..000000000000
--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-/* Public keys for module signature verification
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/cred.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include "module-internal.h"
-
-struct key *modsign_keyring;
-
-extern __initconst const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
-extern __initconst const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
-
-/*
- * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice
- * if modsign.pub changes.
- */
-static __initconst const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo";
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
- */
-static __init int module_verify_init(void)
-{
-	pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n");
-
-	modsign_keyring = keyring_alloc(".module_sign",
-					KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
-					current_cred(),
-					((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-					 KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-					KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
-	if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
-		panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
- */
-device_initcall(module_verify_init);
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
- */
-static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void)
-{
-	key_ref_t key;
-	const u8 *p, *end;
-	size_t plen;
-
-	pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n");
-
-	end = modsign_certificate_list_end;
-	p = modsign_certificate_list;
-	while (p < end) {
-		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
-		 * than 256 bytes in size.
-		 */
-		if (end - p < 4)
-			goto dodgy_cert;
-		if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
-		    p[1] != 0x82)
-			goto dodgy_cert;
-		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
-		plen += 4;
-		if (plen > end - p)
-			goto dodgy_cert;
-
-		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
-					   "asymmetric",
-					   NULL,
-					   p,
-					   plen,
-					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
-					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
-		if (IS_ERR(key))
-			pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
-			       PTR_ERR(key));
-		else
-			pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n",
-				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
-		p += plen;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-
-dodgy_cert:
-	pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
-	return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys);
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 24f9247b7d02..915e123a430f 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -9,6 +9,4 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
-extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
-
 extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index ee476404167b..0b6b870dc5e4 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 /*
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
 
 	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
 
-	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
 			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
 	if (IS_ERR(key))
 		pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..552d47b2d463
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#define GLOBAL(name)	\
+	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name);	\
+	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name):
+
+	__INITRODATA
+
+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list)
+	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list_end)
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51c35141a13a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "module-internal.h"
+
+struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+
+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list_end[];
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in keys
+ */
+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
+{
+	pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
+
+	system_trusted_keyring =
+		keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
+			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
+		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
+ */
+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	const u8 *p, *end;
+	size_t plen;
+
+	pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
+
+	end = system_certificate_list_end;
+	p = system_certificate_list;
+	while (p < end) {
+		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+		 * than 256 bytes in size.
+		 */
+		if (end - p < 4)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+		if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
+		    p[1] != 0x82)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+		plen += 4;
+		if (plen > end - p)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+
+		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+					   "asymmetric",
+					   NULL,
+					   p,
+					   plen,
+					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
+					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+			       PTR_ERR(key));
+		} else {
+			pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+			key_ref_put(key);
+		}
+		p += plen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+dodgy_cert:
+	pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 008643b86c5f33c115c84ccdda1725cac3ad50ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:37 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag

Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.

Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 include/linux/key-type.h | 1 +
 include/linux/key.h      | 3 +++
 kernel/system_keyring.c  | 4 +++-
 security/keys/key.c      | 8 ++++++++
 security/keys/keyring.c  | 4 ++++
 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index f58737bcb050..a74c3a84dfdd 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
 	const void	*data;		/* Raw data */
 	size_t		datalen;	/* Raw datalen */
 	size_t		quotalen;	/* Quota length for proposed payload */
+	bool		trusted;	/* True if key is trusted */
 };
 
 typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 010dbb618aca..80d677483e31 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE	5	/* set if key is negative */
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
 #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED	8	/* set if key is trusted */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY	9	/* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
 
 	/* the key type and key description string
 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -218,6 +220,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA	0x0000	/* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN	0x0001	/* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA	0x0002	/* not in quota */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED	0x0004	/* Key should be flagged as trusted */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 51c35141a13a..5296721eca5b 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
 
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
 					   plen,
 					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
-					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+					   KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
 		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
 			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
 			       PTR_ERR(key));
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index a819b5c7d4ec..d331ea9ef380 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 
 	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
 
 	memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
 
@@ -813,6 +815,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	prep.data = payload;
 	prep.datalen = plen;
 	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
+	prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
 	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
 		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
 		if (ret < 0) {
@@ -827,6 +830,11 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
 
+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+	if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
+		goto error_free_prep;
+	flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
+
 	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index f7cdea22214f..9b6f6e09b50c 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1183,6 +1183,10 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 	key_check(keyring);
 	key_check(key);
 
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) &&
+	    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From cd0421dcd0230d3e402ae9c6d012610132c3f078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 19:28:03 +0100
Subject: KEYS: Set the asymmetric-key type default search method

The keyring expansion patches introduces a new search method by which
key_search() attempts to walk directly to the key that has exactly the same
description as the requested one.

However, this causes inexact matching of asymmetric keys to fail.  The
solution to this is to select iterative rather than direct search as the
default search type for asymmetric keys.

As an example, the kernel might have a key like this:

	Magrathea: Glacier signing key: 6a2a0f82bad7e396665f465e4e3e1f9bd24b1226

and:

	keyctl search <keyring-ID> asymmetric id:d24b1226

should find the key, despite that not being its exact description.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index cf807654d221..b77eb5304788 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
 	.match		= asymmetric_key_match,
 	.destroy	= asymmetric_key_destroy,
 	.describe	= asymmetric_key_describe,
+	.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From af34cb0c3d16b46d88b661692b885d1d998a8ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:36:26 -0400
Subject: KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace

Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read
permission on the trusted keys added during boot.  The latter is actually more
theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently
provide a read operation.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/system_keyring.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 5296721eca5b..564dd93430a2 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
 		keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
 			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
 			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
 					   NULL,
 					   p,
 					   plen,
-					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
+					   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+					   KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
 					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
 					   KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
 		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 09fbc47373826d67531380662b516de2da120545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:36:27 -0400
Subject: KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key

Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring.  This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.

This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index c1540e8f454a..87612642f1b1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -18,11 +18,59 @@
 #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
+/*
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
+ */
+static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(
+	struct key *keyring,
+	const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
+	const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	char *id;
+
+	/* Construct an identifier. */
+	id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+	id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
+	id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
+	memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
+	id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+			 id, PTR_ERR(key));
+	kfree(id);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(key);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -102,6 +150,33 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 
+/*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pk;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
+					  cert->authority,
+					  strlen(cert->authority));
+	if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
+		pk = key->payload.data;
+		ret = x509_check_signature(pk, cert);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
  */
@@ -155,9 +230,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
 	if (!cert->authority ||
 	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
-		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
+		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_cert;
+	} else {
+		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, system_trusted_keyring);
+		if (!ret)
+			prep->trusted = 1;
 	}
 
 	/* Propose a description */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c124bde28bce41f9e46e32d03d134a81e116d38c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 13:26:22 +0100
Subject: KEYS: initialize root uid and session keyrings early

In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's
uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/process_keys.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 68548ea6fe01..0cf8a130a267 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -857,3 +857,13 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.
+ */
+static int __init init_root_keyring(void)
+{
+	return install_user_keyrings();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_root_keyring);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4ff158229770d245ce0a961a594adfc0e86d1cc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 15:14:52 +0400
Subject: MPILIB: add module description and license

This patch fixes lack of license, otherwise mpi.ko taints kernel.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 lib/mpi/mpiutil.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
index 657979f71bef..bf076d281d40 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
@@ -121,3 +121,6 @@ void mpi_free(MPI a)
 	kfree(a);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_free);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Multiprecision maths library");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e19aaa7d43bed3bf6740a2931878beef5da9d7d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 15:14:55 +0400
Subject: X.509: add module description and license

This patch fixes lack of license, otherwise x509_key_parser.ko taints kernel.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 87612642f1b1..6abc27f2e8a5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -292,3 +292,6 @@ static void __exit x509_key_exit(void)
 
 module_init(x509_key_init);
 module_exit(x509_key_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From eb8948a03704f3dbbfc7e83090e20e93c6c476d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Antonio Alecrim Jr <antonio.alecrim@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2013 11:04:54 -0300
Subject: X.509: remove possible code fragility: enumeration values not handled

Signed-off-by: Antonio Alecrim Jr <antonio.alecrim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
index db0e5cd34c70..91c4117637ae 100644
--- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
+++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
@@ -1353,6 +1353,8 @@ static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out)
 			render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF%s,\n", act);
 			render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),\n", entry);
 			break;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
 		if (e->action)
 			render_opcode(out, "_action(ACT_%s),\n",
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7d1db4b242134bb4c7170f4c15491980ac064ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 15:52:13 -0400
Subject: selinux: Use kmemdup instead of kmalloc + memcpy

Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 425b9f91d755..a91d205ec0c6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -268,10 +268,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 	if (!old_ctx)
 		return 0;
 
-	new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+			  GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!new_ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len);
 	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
 	*new_ctxp = new_ctx;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 42d64e1add3a1ce8a787116036163b8724362145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 17:00:46 -0400
Subject: selinux: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_connect)

The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems
with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below.  This patch
corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a
more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call.

 ===============================
 [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted
 -------------------------------
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
 2 locks held by ping/731:
  #0:  (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect
  #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19
 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500
  ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000
  000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74
  [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120
  [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0
  [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190
  [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190
  [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0
  [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170
  [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0
  [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20
  [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130
  [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
  [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
  [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
  [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
  [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/netlabel.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index da4b8b233280..6235d052338b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -442,8 +442,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
 	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
 		return 0;
 
-	local_bh_disable();
-	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+	lock_sock(sk);
 
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
 	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
@@ -464,7 +463,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
 
 socket_connect_return:
-	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
-	local_bh_enable();
+	release_sock(sk);
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c0ab6e56dcb7ca9903d460247cb464e769ae6e77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2013 18:06:39 -0700
Subject: Smack: Implement lock security mode

Linux file locking does not follow the same rules
as other mechanisms. Even though it is a write operation
a process can set a read lock on files which it has open
only for read access. Two programs with read access to
a file can use read locks to communicate.

This is not acceptable in a Mandatory Access Control
environment. Smack treats setting a read lock as the
write operation that it is. Unfortunately, many programs
assume that setting a read lock is a read operation.
These programs are unhappy in the Smack environment.

This patch introduces a new access mode (lock) to address
this problem. A process with lock access to a file can
set a read lock. A process with write access to a file can
set a read lock or a write lock. This prevents a situation
where processes are granted write access just so they can
set read locks.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack.h        | 12 ++++++++----
 security/smack/smack_access.c | 10 ++++++++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    |  9 +++++++--
 security/smack/smackfs.c      | 10 ++++++++--
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 076b8e8a51ab..364cc64fce71 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -177,9 +177,13 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           184     /* 23 * 8 */
 
 /*
- * Flag for transmute access
+ * Flags for untraditional access modes.
+ * It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
+ * in fs.h, but do so anyway.
  */
-#define MAY_TRANSMUTE	64
+#define MAY_TRANSMUTE	0x00001000	/* Controls directory labeling */
+#define MAY_LOCK	0x00002000	/* Locks should be writes, but ... */
+
 /*
  * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
  */
@@ -188,9 +192,9 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 #define MAY_NOT		0
 
 /*
- * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxat)
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatl)
  */
-#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 6
 
 /* SMACK data */
 struct smack_audit_data {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index b3b59b1e93d6..14293cd9b1e5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
  *
  * Do the object check first because that is more
  * likely to differ.
+ *
+ * Allowing write access implies allowing locking.
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 			struct list_head *rule_list)
@@ -99,6 +101,11 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * MAY_WRITE implies MAY_LOCK.
+	 */
+	if ((may & MAY_WRITE) == MAY_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_LOCK;
 	return may;
 }
 
@@ -245,6 +252,7 @@ out_audit:
 static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 {
 	int i = 0;
+
 	if (access & MAY_READ)
 		string[i++] = 'r';
 	if (access & MAY_WRITE)
@@ -255,6 +263,8 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 		string[i++] = 'a';
 	if (access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
 		string[i++] = 't';
+	if (access & MAY_LOCK)
+		string[i++] = 'l';
 	string[i] = '\0';
 }
 /**
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8825375cc031..88d366e55793 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  * @file: the object
  * @cmd: unused
  *
- * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
+ * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
  */
 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
-	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1178,8 +1178,13 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case F_GETLK:
+		break;
 	case F_SETLK:
 	case F_SETLKW:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+		break;
 	case F_SETOWN:
 	case F_SETSIG:
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 80f4b4a45725..160aa08e3cd5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
  * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
  */
 #define SMK_OACCESS	"rwxa"
-#define SMK_ACCESS	"rwxat"
+#define SMK_ACCESS	"rwxatl"
 #define SMK_OACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
 #define SMK_ACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
 #define SMK_OLOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
@@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
 		case 'T':
 			perm |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
 			break;
+		case 'l':
+		case 'L':
+			perm |= MAY_LOCK;
+			break;
 		default:
 			return perm;
 		}
@@ -452,7 +456,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		/*
 		 * Minor hack for backward compatibility
 		 */
-		if (count != SMK_OLOADLEN && count != SMK_LOADLEN)
+		if (count < SMK_OLOADLEN || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
 		if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
@@ -592,6 +596,8 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 		seq_putc(s, 'a');
 	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
 		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_LOCK)
+		seq_putc(s, 'l');
 
 	seq_putc(s, '\n');
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 901486b89b8ee1c87148d6681c4a1c49d921effe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 19:28:30 +0200
Subject: tpm: MAINTAINERS: Add myself as tpm maintainer

Since I'm actively maintaining the tpm subsystem for a few months now,
it's time to step up and be an official maintainer for the tpm subsystem,
atleast until I hear something different from my company.

The maintaining is done solely in my private time, out of private interest.
Speaking only on behalf of myself, trying to be as vendor neutral as possible.

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 4fde7066de70..936adb4e6b39 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8475,6 +8475,7 @@ F:	drivers/media/usb/tm6000/
 TPM DEVICE DRIVER
 M:	Leonidas Da Silva Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
 M:	Ashley Lai <ashley@ashleylai.com>
+M:	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
 M:	Rajiv Andrade <mail@srajiv.net>
 W:	http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net
 M:	Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 37ab03414829e5cf261d7f82f0a39b505635143e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2013 16:57:58 -0600
Subject: tpm: ibmvtpm: Use %zd formatting for size_t format arguments

This suppresses compile warnings on 32 bit builds.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 56b07c35a13e..838f04314814 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 
 	if (count < len) {
 		dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
-			"Invalid size in recv: count=%ld, crq_size=%d\n",
+			"Invalid size in recv: count=%zd, crq_size=%d\n",
 			count, len);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 
 	if (count > ibmvtpm->rtce_size) {
 		dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev,
-			"Invalid size in send: count=%ld, rtce_size=%d\n",
+			"Invalid size in send: count=%zd, rtce_size=%d\n",
 			count, ibmvtpm->rtce_size);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 1e6e0974b5d401ab8505eca821f00fcb74d50a55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2013 17:36:29 -0600
Subject: tpm atmel: Call request_region with the correct base

Commit e0dd03caf20d040a0a86 ("tpm: return chip from
tpm_register_hardware") changed the code path here so that
ateml_get_base_addr no longer directly altered the tpm_vendor_specific
structure, and instead placed the base address on the stack.

The commit missed updating the request_region call, which would have
resulted in request_region being called with 0 as the base address.

I don't know if request_region(0, ..) will fail, if so the
driver has been broken since 2006 and we should remove it
from the tree as it has no users.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c
index 99d6820c611d..c9a528d25d22 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int __init init_atmel(void)
 
 	have_region =
 	    (atmel_request_region
-	     (tpm_atmel.base, region_size, "tpm_atmel0") == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+	     (base, region_size, "tpm_atmel0") == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_atmel", -1, NULL, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(pdev)) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 6aff1fdc5d59acd7181bdd2f41b34d7bea1b6dcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 14:19:18 -0600
Subject: tpm: Store devname in the tpm_chip

Just put the memory directly in the chip structure, rather than
in a 2nd dedicated kmalloc.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 17 ++++++-----------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index e3c974a6c522..71eb8c762880 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1463,7 +1463,6 @@ void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		chip->vendor.release(chip->dev);
 
 	clear_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
-	kfree(chip->vendor.miscdev.name);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
 
@@ -1496,17 +1495,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_release);
 struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
 					const struct tpm_vendor_specific *entry)
 {
-#define DEVNAME_SIZE 7
-
-	char *devname;
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 
 	/* Driver specific per-device data */
 	chip = kzalloc(sizeof(*chip), GFP_KERNEL);
-	devname = kmalloc(DEVNAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 
-	if (chip == NULL || devname == NULL)
-		goto out_free;
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 
 	mutex_init(&chip->buffer_mutex);
 	mutex_init(&chip->tpm_mutex);
@@ -1531,8 +1526,9 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
 
 	set_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
 
-	scnprintf(devname, DEVNAME_SIZE, "%s%d", "tpm", chip->dev_num);
-	chip->vendor.miscdev.name = devname;
+	scnprintf(chip->devname, sizeof(chip->devname), "%s%d", "tpm",
+		  chip->dev_num);
+	chip->vendor.miscdev.name = chip->devname;
 
 	chip->vendor.miscdev.parent = dev;
 	chip->dev = get_device(dev);
@@ -1558,7 +1554,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
 		goto put_device;
 	}
 
-	chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(devname);
+	chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip->devname);
 
 	/* Make chip available */
 	spin_lock(&driver_lock);
@@ -1571,7 +1567,6 @@ put_device:
 	put_device(chip->dev);
 out_free:
 	kfree(chip);
-	kfree(devname);
 	return NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_register_hardware);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index a7bfc176ed43..0df18b56b2c5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {
 	struct device *dev;	/* Device stuff */
 
 	int dev_num;		/* /dev/tpm# */
+	char devname[7];
 	unsigned long is_open;	/* only one allowed */
 	int time_expired;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 58c09e21332c4ab56ac694a71f6715db2768f53f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 2013 11:38:02 -0600
Subject: tpm: Use container_of to locate the tpm_chip in tpm_open

misc_open sets the file->private_date to the misc_dev when calling
open. We can use container_of to go from the misc_dev back to the
tpm_chip.

Future clean ups will move tpm_open into a new file and this change
means we do not have to export the tpm_chip list.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 21 ++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 71eb8c762880..c3ab508222af 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1170,38 +1170,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
  */
 int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	int minor = iminor(inode);
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = NULL, *pos;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) {
-		if (pos->vendor.miscdev.minor == minor) {
-			chip = pos;
-			get_device(chip->dev);
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	if (!chip)
-		return -ENODEV;
+	struct miscdevice *misc = file->private_data;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(misc, struct tpm_chip,
+					     vendor.miscdev);
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &chip->is_open)) {
 		dev_dbg(chip->dev, "Another process owns this TPM\n");
-		put_device(chip->dev);
 		return -EBUSY;
 	}
 
 	chip->data_buffer = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (chip->data_buffer == NULL) {
 		clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
-		put_device(chip->dev);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
 	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
 
 	file->private_data = chip;
+	get_device(chip->dev);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_open);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d0a40174efb0b9d232ccd1cf127cb90a2120f55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 2013 11:40:19 -0600
Subject: tpm: Remove redundant dev_set_drvdata

TPM drivers should not call dev_set_drvdata (or aliases), only the core
code is allowed to call dev_set_drvdata, and it does it during
tpm_register_hardware.

These extra sets are harmless, but are an anti-pattern that many drivers
have copied.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c | 2 --
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c | 2 --
 drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c     | 2 --
 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
index b8735de8ce95..e33d8e551eff 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
@@ -685,7 +685,6 @@ out_vendor:
 	chip->dev->release = NULL;
 	chip->release = NULL;
 	tpm_dev.client = NULL;
-	dev_set_drvdata(chip->dev, chip);
 out_err:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -766,7 +765,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
 	chip->dev->release = NULL;
 	chip->release = NULL;
 	tpm_dev.client = NULL;
-	dev_set_drvdata(chip->dev, chip);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
index 5bb8e2ddd3b3..1c68d9317aba 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
@@ -746,8 +746,6 @@ tpm_st33_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id)
 
 	tpm_get_timeouts(chip);
 
-	i2c_set_clientdata(client, chip);
-
 	dev_info(chip->dev, "TPM I2C Initialized\n");
 	return 0;
 _irq_set:
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
index 7a7929ba2658..9b483705694e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
@@ -386,8 +386,6 @@ static int tpmfront_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 
 	tpm_get_timeouts(priv->chip);
 
-	dev_set_drvdata(&dev->dev, priv->chip);
-
 	return rv;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From cb996158dfe8a31377700f46b7f3d69ddc5ae1e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 16:03:28 -0600
Subject: tpm: st33: Remove chip->data_buffer access from this driver

For some reason this driver thinks that chip->data_buffer needs
to be set before it can call tpm_pm_*. This is not true. data_buffer
is used only by /dev/tpmX, which is why it is managed exclusively
by the fops functions.

Cc: Mathias Leblanc <mathias.leblanc@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
index 1c68d9317aba..b2390b6173e7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
@@ -805,24 +805,18 @@ static int tpm_st33_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
 /*
  * tpm_st33_i2c_pm_suspend suspend the TPM device
- * Added: Work around when suspend and no tpm application is running, suspend
- * may fail because chip->data_buffer is not set (only set in tpm_open in Linux
- * TPM core)
  * @param: client, the i2c_client drescription (TPM I2C description).
  * @param: mesg, the power management message.
  * @return: 0 in case of success.
  */
 static int tpm_st33_i2c_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct st33zp24_platform_data *pin_infos = dev->platform_data;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (power_mgt) {
 		gpio_set_value(pin_infos->io_lpcpd, 0);
 	} else {
-		if (chip->data_buffer == NULL)
-			chip->data_buffer = pin_infos->tpm_i2c_buffer[0];
 		ret = tpm_pm_suspend(dev);
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -847,8 +841,6 @@ static int tpm_st33_i2c_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
 					  TPM_STS_VALID) == TPM_STS_VALID,
 					  chip->vendor.timeout_b);
 	} else {
-		if (chip->data_buffer == NULL)
-			chip->data_buffer = pin_infos->tpm_i2c_buffer[0];
 		ret = tpm_pm_resume(dev);
 		if (!ret)
 			tpm_do_selftest(chip);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e907481bed439cd04fb24084baab41015b89da6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 18:19:44 -0600
Subject: tpm: Remove tpm_show_caps_1_2

The version of the TPM should not depend on the bus it is connected
through. 1.1, 1.2 and soon 2.0 TPMS will be all be able to use the
same bus interfaces.

Make tpm_show_caps try the 1.2 capability first. If that fails then
fall back to the 1.1 capability. This effectively auto-detects what
interface the TPM supports at run-time.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c              | 56 +++++++++++++++----------------------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h              |  2 --
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c |  2 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c |  2 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c      |  2 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c          |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index c3ab508222af..72f0c68d466e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1020,43 +1020,33 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
 		       be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
 
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
-		        "attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-	str += sprintf(str,
-		       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
-		       cap.tpm_version.Major, cap.tpm_version.Minor,
-		       cap.tpm_version.revMajor, cap.tpm_version.revMinor);
-	return str - buf;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_caps_1_2(struct device * dev,
-			  struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-	char *str = buf;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the manufacturer");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-	str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
-		       be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
+	/* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */
 	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
 			 "attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-	str += sprintf(str,
-		       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
-		       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major, cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor,
-		       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor,
-		       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
+	if (!rc) {
+		str += sprintf(str,
+			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
+	} else {
+		/* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */
+		rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
+				"attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
+		if (rc)
+			return 0;
+		str += sprintf(str,
+			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
+			       cap.tpm_version.Major,
+			       cap.tpm_version.Minor,
+			       cap.tpm_version.revMajor,
+			       cap.tpm_version.revMinor);
+	}
+
 	return str - buf;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps_1_2);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps);
 
 ssize_t tpm_show_durations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			  char *buf)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 0df18b56b2c5..f32847872193 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ extern ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *, struct device_attribute *attr,
 				char *);
 extern ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *, struct device_attribute *attr,
 				char *);
-extern ssize_t tpm_show_caps_1_2(struct device *, struct device_attribute *attr,
-				char *);
 extern ssize_t tpm_store_cancel(struct device *, struct device_attribute *attr,
 				const char *, size_t);
 extern ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device *, struct device_attribute *attr,
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
index e33d8e551eff..fefd2aa5c81e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated, NULL);
-static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
index b2390b6173e7..a0d6ceb5d005 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated, NULL);
-static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
 
 static struct attribute *stm_tpm_attrs[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 838f04314814..2783a42aa732 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated,
 		   NULL);
-static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 5796d0157ce0..1b74459c0723 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated,
 		   NULL);
-static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps_1_2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 0a4182692ef2b0131ffc9ae523c2dea0cd636201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 00:29:14 +0200
Subject: tpm: cleanup checkpatch warnings

before we rename the file it might be a good idea to cleanup the long
persisting checkpatch warnings.
Since everything is really trivial, splitting the patch up would only
result in noise.

For the interested reader - here the checkpatch warnings:
(regrouped for easer readability)

ERROR: trailing whitespace
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org^I $
+ * $
+^I/* $
+^I   parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)  $

WARNING: unnecessary whitespace before a quoted newline
+			"invalid count value %x %zx \n", count, bufsiz);

ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
+	if ((rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count)) < 0) {

ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
+	len = tpm_transmit(chip,(u8 *) cmd, len);
 	                       ^

ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
+ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device * dev,
+				struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf)

WARNING: please, no space before tabs
+ * @chip_num: ^Itpm idx # or ANY$
+ * @res_buf: ^ITPM_PCR value$
+ * ^I^Isize of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)$
+ * @chip_num: ^Itpm idx # or AN&$
+ * @hash: ^Ihash value used to extend pcr value$

ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
+^I                                     TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);$

WARNING: line over 80 characters
+static bool wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, bool check_cancel,

ERROR: trailing whitespace
+ * Called from tpm_<specific>.c probe function only for devices $

total: 16 errors, 7 warnings, 1554 lines checked

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 72f0c68d466e..6ae41d337630 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@
  * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
  *
  * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
- * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org	 
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
  * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
  * License.
- * 
+ *
  * Note, the TPM chip is not interrupt driven (only polling)
  * and can have very long timeouts (minutes!). Hence the unusual
  * calls to msleep.
@@ -371,13 +371,14 @@ static ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
 		return -ENODATA;
 	if (count > bufsiz) {
 		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"invalid count value %x %zx \n", count, bufsiz);
+			"invalid count value %x %zx\n", count, bufsiz);
 		return -E2BIG;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
 
-	if ((rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count)) < 0) {
+	rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
+	if (rc < 0) {
 		dev_err(chip->dev,
 			"tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
 		goto out;
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
 {
 	int err;
 
-	len = tpm_transmit(chip,(u8 *) cmd, len);
+	len = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) cmd, len);
 	if (len <  0)
 		return len;
 	else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
@@ -658,7 +659,7 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			char *buf)
 {
 	cap_t cap;
@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled);
 
-ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			char *buf)
 {
 	cap_t cap;
@@ -690,7 +691,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active);
 
-ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
+ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			char *buf)
 {
 	cap_t cap;
@@ -706,8 +707,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned);
 
-ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device * dev,
-				struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
 	cap_t cap;
 	ssize_t rc;
@@ -769,10 +770,10 @@ static int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 
 /**
  * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
- * @chip_num: 	tpm idx # or ANY
+ * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
  * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to retrieve
- * @res_buf: 	TPM_PCR value
- * 		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
+ * @res_buf:	TPM_PCR value
+ *		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
  *
  * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
  * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
@@ -794,9 +795,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
 
 /**
  * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
- * @chip_num: 	tpm idx # or AN&
+ * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
  * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to extend
- * @hash: 	hash value used to extend pcr value
+ * @hash:	hash value used to extend pcr value
  *
  * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
  * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
@@ -847,8 +848,7 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	unsigned long duration;
 	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
 
-	duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip,
-	                                     TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
+	duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
 
 	loops = jiffies_to_msecs(duration) / delay_msec;
 
@@ -965,12 +965,12 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* 
+	/*
 	   ignore header 10 bytes
 	   algorithm 32 bits (1 == RSA )
 	   encscheme 16 bits
 	   sigscheme 16 bits
-	   parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)  
+	   parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)
 	   keylenbytes 32 bits
 	   256 byte modulus
 	   ignore checksum 20 bytes
@@ -1092,8 +1092,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_store_cancel(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_store_cancel);
 
-static bool wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, bool check_cancel,
-				   bool *canceled)
+static bool wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask,
+					bool check_cancel, bool *canceled)
 {
 	u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
 
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_release);
 
 /*
- * Called from tpm_<specific>.c probe function only for devices 
+ * Called from tpm_<specific>.c probe function only for devices
  * the driver has determined it should claim.  Prior to calling
  * this function the specific probe function has called pci_enable_device
  * upon errant exit from this function specific probe function should call
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9deb0eb7cad450cd942a0eca11a198f6d24cb3d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 12:00:51 -0600
Subject: tpm: Rename tpm.c to tpm-interface.c

This is preparation for making the tpm module multi-file. kbuild does
not like having a .c file with the same name as a module. We wish to
keep the tpm module name so that userspace doesn't see this change.

tpm-interface.c is chosen because the next several commits in the series
migrate items into tpm-sysfs.c, tpm-dev.c and tpm-class.c. All that will
be left is tpm command processing and interfacing code.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/Makefile        |    2 +
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 1554 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c           | 1554 --------------------------------------
 3 files changed, 1556 insertions(+), 1554 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
 delete mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index eb41ff97d0ad..83b8a9d7527e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 # Makefile for the kernel tpm device drivers.
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
+tpm-y := tpm-interface.o
+
 ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
 	obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o
 	tpm_bios-objs += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o tpm_ppi.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6ae41d337630
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1554 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * Note, the TPM chip is not interrupt driven (only polling)
+ * and can have very long timeouts (minutes!). Hence the unusual
+ * calls to msleep.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/freezer.h>
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+
+enum tpm_duration {
+	TPM_SHORT = 0,
+	TPM_MEDIUM = 1,
+	TPM_LONG = 2,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+};
+
+#define TPM_MAX_ORDINAL 243
+#define TSC_MAX_ORDINAL 12
+#define TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND 0x00
+#define TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND 0x40
+
+/*
+ * Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
+ * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
+ * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
+ */
+static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
+module_param_named(suspend_pcr, tpm_suspend_pcr, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(suspend_pcr,
+		 "PCR to use for dummy writes to faciltate flush on suspend.");
+
+static LIST_HEAD(tpm_chip_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(driver_lock);
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+
+/*
+ * Array with one entry per ordinal defining the maximum amount
+ * of time the chip could take to return the result.  The ordinal
+ * designation of short, medium or long is defined in a table in
+ * TCG Specification TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures Section 17. The
+ * values of the SHORT, MEDIUM, and LONG durations are retrieved
+ * from the chip during initialization with a call to tpm_get_timeouts.
+ */
+static const u8 tpm_ordinal_duration[TPM_MAX_ORDINAL] = {
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 0 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 5 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 10 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 15 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 20 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 25 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 30 */
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 35 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 40 */
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 45 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 50 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 55 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 60 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 65 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 70 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 75 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_LONG,		/* 80 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 85 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 90 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 95 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 100 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 105 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 110 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 115 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_LONG,		/* 120 */
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 125 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 130 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 135 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 140 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 145 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 150 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 155 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 160 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 165 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_LONG,		/* 170 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 175 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 180 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 185 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 190 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 195 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 200 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 205 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 210 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 215 */
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 220 */
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_SHORT,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 225 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 230 */
+	TPM_LONG,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 235 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_SHORT,		/* 240 */
+	TPM_UNDEFINED,
+	TPM_MEDIUM,
+};
+
+static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *) ptr;
+
+	schedule_work(&chip->work);
+}
+
+static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(work, struct tpm_chip, work);
+
+	mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+	memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+	mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns max number of jiffies to wait
+ */
+unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+					   u32 ordinal)
+{
+	int duration_idx = TPM_UNDEFINED;
+	int duration = 0;
+	u8 category = (ordinal >> 24) & 0xFF;
+
+	if ((category == TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND && ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) ||
+	    (category == TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND && ordinal < TSC_MAX_ORDINAL))
+		duration_idx = tpm_ordinal_duration[ordinal];
+
+	if (duration_idx != TPM_UNDEFINED)
+		duration = chip->vendor.duration[duration_idx];
+	if (duration <= 0)
+		return 2 * 60 * HZ;
+	else
+		return duration;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
+
+/*
+ * Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands
+ */
+static ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
+			    size_t bufsiz)
+{
+	ssize_t rc;
+	u32 count, ordinal;
+	unsigned long stop;
+
+	if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+		bufsiz = TPM_BUFSIZE;
+
+	count = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2)));
+	ordinal = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 6)));
+	if (count == 0)
+		return -ENODATA;
+	if (count > bufsiz) {
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"invalid count value %x %zx\n", count, bufsiz);
+		return -E2BIG;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+
+	rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (chip->vendor.irq)
+		goto out_recv;
+
+	stop = jiffies + tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, ordinal);
+	do {
+		u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
+		if ((status & chip->vendor.req_complete_mask) ==
+		    chip->vendor.req_complete_val)
+			goto out_recv;
+
+		if (chip->vendor.req_canceled(chip, status)) {
+			dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Canceled\n");
+			rc = -ECANCELED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);	/* CHECK */
+		rmb();
+	} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+
+	chip->vendor.cancel(chip);
+	dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Timed out\n");
+	rc = -ETIME;
+	goto out;
+
+out_recv:
+	rc = chip->vendor.recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
+
+enum tpm_capabilities {
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4),
+	TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5),
+	CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06),
+	CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A)
+};
+
+enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101),
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103),
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108),
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109),
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111),
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115),
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120),
+
+};
+
+static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
+			    int len, const char *desc)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	len = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) cmd, len);
+	if (len <  0)
+		return len;
+	else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	err = be32_to_cpu(cmd->header.out.return_code);
+	if (err != 0 && desc)
+		dev_err(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred %s\n", err, desc);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM cpu_to_be32(70)
+
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(22),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP
+};
+
+ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *dev, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
+		   const char *desc)
+{
+	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+	if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id;
+		/*subcap field not necessary */
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0);
+		tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32));
+	} else {
+		if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
+		    subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
+			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
+		else
+			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
+	}
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc);
+	if (!rc)
+		*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct	tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
+
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+			"attempting to determine the timeouts");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt);
+
+#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP cpu_to_be32(153)
+#define TPM_ST_CLEAR cpu_to_be16(1)
+#define TPM_ST_STATE cpu_to_be16(2)
+#define TPM_ST_DEACTIVATED cpu_to_be16(3)
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_startup_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(12),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_STARTUP
+};
+
+static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
+{
+	struct tpm_cmd_t start_cmd;
+	start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
+	start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
+	return transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+			    "attempting to start the TPM");
+}
+
+int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	struct timeout_t *timeout_cap;
+	struct duration_t *duration_cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+	u32 timeout;
+	unsigned int scale = 1;
+
+	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+
+	if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
+		/* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it.
+		   Execute a startup command. */
+		dev_info(chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP");
+		if (tpm_startup(chip, TPM_ST_CLEAR))
+			return rc;
+
+		tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
+		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+				  NULL);
+	}
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"A TPM error (%zd) occurred attempting to determine the timeouts\n",
+			rc);
+		goto duration;
+	}
+
+	if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
+	    be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
+	    != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout;
+	/* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
+	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a);
+	if (timeout && timeout < 1000) {
+		/* timeouts in msec rather usec */
+		scale = 1000;
+		chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted = true;
+	}
+	if (timeout)
+		chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
+	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b);
+	if (timeout)
+		chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
+	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c);
+	if (timeout)
+		chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
+	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d);
+	if (timeout)
+		chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
+
+duration:
+	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
+
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+			"attempting to determine the durations");
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
+	    be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
+	    != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 3 * sizeof(u32))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration;
+	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
+	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short));
+	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
+	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium));
+	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
+	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long));
+
+	/* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above
+	 * value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we
+	 * fix up the resulting too-small TPM_SHORT value to make things work.
+	 * We also scale the TPM_MEDIUM and -_LONG values by 1000.
+	 */
+	if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] < (HZ / 100)) {
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = HZ;
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] *= 1000;
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] *= 1000;
+		chip->vendor.duration_adjusted = true;
+		dev_info(chip->dev, "Adjusting TPM timeout parameters.");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
+
+#define TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST 83
+#define CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE 10
+
+static struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST),
+};
+
+/**
+ * tpm_continue_selftest -- run TPM's selftest
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error or a value > 0 representing
+ * a TPM error code.
+ */
+static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+
+	cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
+			  "continue selftest");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
+			 "attempting to determine the permanent enabled state");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.disable);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
+			 "attempting to determine the permanent active state");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.deactivated);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
+			 "attempting to determine the owner state");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device *dev,
+				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL, &cap,
+			 "attempting to determine the temporary state");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.stclear_flags.deactivated);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated);
+
+/*
+ * tpm_chip_find_get - return tpm_chip for given chip number
+ */
+static struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *pos, *chip = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) {
+		if (chip_num != TPM_ANY_NUM && chip_num != pos->dev_num)
+			continue;
+
+		if (try_module_get(pos->dev->driver->owner)) {
+			chip = pos;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return chip;
+}
+
+#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
+#define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
+static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
+};
+
+static int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+
+	cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
+	cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+			  "attempting to read a pcr value");
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		memcpy(res_buf, cmd.params.pcrread_out.pcr_result,
+		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
+ * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
+ * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to retrieve
+ * @res_buf:	TPM_PCR value
+ *		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
+ *
+ * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
+ * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
+ * the module usage count.
+ */
+int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	int rc;
+
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+	rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf);
+	tpm_chip_put(chip);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
+ * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
+ * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to extend
+ * @hash:	hash value used to extend pcr value
+ *
+ * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
+ * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
+ * the module usage count.
+ */
+#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
+#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
+static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
+};
+
+int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
+{
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
+	cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+	memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+			  "attempting extend a PCR value");
+
+	tpm_chip_put(chip);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_do_selftest - have the TPM continue its selftest and wait until it
+ *                   can receive further commands
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error or a value > 0 representing
+ * a TPM error code.
+ */
+int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int loops;
+	unsigned int delay_msec = 100;
+	unsigned long duration;
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+
+	duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
+
+	loops = jiffies_to_msecs(duration) / delay_msec;
+
+	rc = tpm_continue_selftest(chip);
+	/* This may fail if there was no TPM driver during a suspend/resume
+	 * cycle; some may return 10 (BAD_ORDINAL), others 28 (FAILEDSELFTEST)
+	 */
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	do {
+		/* Attempt to read a PCR value */
+		cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
+		cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(0);
+		rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE);
+		/* Some buggy TPMs will not respond to tpm_tis_ready() for
+		 * around 300ms while the self test is ongoing, keep trying
+		 * until the self test duration expires. */
+		if (rc == -ETIME) {
+			dev_info(chip->dev, HW_ERR "TPM command timed out during continue self test");
+			msleep(delay_msec);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		rc = be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.return_code);
+		if (rc == TPM_ERR_DISABLED || rc == TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED) {
+			dev_info(chip->dev,
+				 "TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x%X)\n", rc);
+			/* TPM is disabled and/or deactivated; driver can
+			 * proceed and TPM does handle commands for
+			 * suspend/resume correctly
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (rc != TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST)
+			return rc;
+		msleep(delay_msec);
+	} while (--loops > 0);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_do_selftest);
+
+int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	int rc;
+
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
+
+	tpm_chip_put(chip);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		      char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	ssize_t rc;
+	int i, j, num_pcrs;
+	char *str = buf;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap,
+			"attempting to determine the number of PCRS");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(cap.num_pcrs);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_pcrs; i++) {
+		rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, i, digest);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		str += sprintf(str, "PCR-%02d: ", i);
+		for (j = 0; j < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
+			str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", digest[j]);
+		str += sprintf(str, "\n");
+	}
+	return str - buf;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pcrs);
+
+#define  READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
+#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
+static struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
+};
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		       char *buf)
+{
+	u8 *data;
+	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	ssize_t err;
+	int i, rc;
+	char *str = buf;
+
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
+	err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+			"attempting to read the PUBEK");
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	   ignore header 10 bytes
+	   algorithm 32 bits (1 == RSA )
+	   encscheme 16 bits
+	   sigscheme 16 bits
+	   parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)
+	   keylenbytes 32 bits
+	   256 byte modulus
+	   ignore checksum 20 bytes
+	 */
+	data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer;
+	str +=
+	    sprintf(str,
+		    "Algorithm: %02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
+		    "Encscheme: %02X %02X\n"
+		    "Sigscheme: %02X %02X\n"
+		    "Parameters: %02X %02X %02X %02X "
+		    "%02X %02X %02X %02X "
+		    "%02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
+		    "Modulus length: %d\n"
+		    "Modulus:\n",
+		    data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3],
+		    data[4], data[5],
+		    data[6], data[7],
+		    data[12], data[13], data[14], data[15],
+		    data[16], data[17], data[18], data[19],
+		    data[20], data[21], data[22], data[23],
+		    be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + 24))));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", data[i + 28]);
+		if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
+			str += sprintf(str, "\n");
+	}
+out:
+	rc = str - buf;
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pubek);
+
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		      char *buf)
+{
+	cap_t cap;
+	ssize_t rc;
+	char *str = buf;
+
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
+			"attempting to determine the manufacturer");
+	if (rc)
+		return 0;
+	str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
+		       be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
+
+	/* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */
+	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
+			 "attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
+	if (!rc) {
+		str += sprintf(str,
+			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor,
+			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
+	} else {
+		/* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */
+		rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
+				"attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
+		if (rc)
+			return 0;
+		str += sprintf(str,
+			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
+			       cap.tpm_version.Major,
+			       cap.tpm_version.Minor,
+			       cap.tpm_version.revMajor,
+			       cap.tpm_version.revMinor);
+	}
+
+	return str - buf;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_durations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			  char *buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%d %d %d [%s]\n",
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT]),
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM]),
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG]),
+		       chip->vendor.duration_adjusted
+		       ? "adjusted" : "original");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_durations);
+
+ssize_t tpm_show_timeouts(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			  char *buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%d %d %d %d [%s]\n",
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_a),
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_b),
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_c),
+		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_d),
+		       chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted
+		       ? "adjusted" : "original");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_timeouts);
+
+ssize_t tpm_store_cancel(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	chip->vendor.cancel(chip);
+	return count;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_store_cancel);
+
+static bool wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask,
+					bool check_cancel, bool *canceled)
+{
+	u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
+
+	*canceled = false;
+	if ((status & mask) == mask)
+		return true;
+	if (check_cancel && chip->vendor.req_canceled(chip, status)) {
+		*canceled = true;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
+		      wait_queue_head_t *queue, bool check_cancel)
+{
+	unsigned long stop;
+	long rc;
+	u8 status;
+	bool canceled = false;
+
+	/* check current status */
+	status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
+	if ((status & mask) == mask)
+		return 0;
+
+	stop = jiffies + timeout;
+
+	if (chip->vendor.irq) {
+again:
+		timeout = stop - jiffies;
+		if ((long)timeout <= 0)
+			return -ETIME;
+		rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*queue,
+			wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(chip, mask, check_cancel,
+					       &canceled),
+			timeout);
+		if (rc > 0) {
+			if (canceled)
+				return -ECANCELED;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (rc == -ERESTARTSYS && freezing(current)) {
+			clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
+			goto again;
+		}
+	} else {
+		do {
+			msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);
+			status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
+			if ((status & mask) == mask)
+				return 0;
+		} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+	}
+	return -ETIME;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
+/*
+ * Device file system interface to the TPM
+ *
+ * It's assured that the chip will be opened just once,
+ * by the check of is_open variable, which is protected
+ * by driver_lock.
+ */
+int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct miscdevice *misc = file->private_data;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(misc, struct tpm_chip,
+					     vendor.miscdev);
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &chip->is_open)) {
+		dev_dbg(chip->dev, "Another process owns this TPM\n");
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	chip->data_buffer = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (chip->data_buffer == NULL) {
+		clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+
+	file->private_data = chip;
+	get_device(chip->dev);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_open);
+
+/*
+ * Called on file close
+ */
+int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
+
+	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
+	flush_work(&chip->work);
+	file->private_data = NULL;
+	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+	kzfree(chip->data_buffer);
+	clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
+	put_device(chip->dev);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_release);
+
+ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+		  size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
+	size_t in_size = size;
+	ssize_t out_size;
+
+	/* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
+	   either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout.
+	   This also prevents splitted buffered writes from blocking here.
+	*/
+	if (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+
+	if (copy_from_user
+	    (chip->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	/* atomic tpm command send and result receive */
+	out_size = tpm_transmit(chip, chip->data_buffer, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+	if (out_size < 0) {
+		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+		return out_size;
+	}
+
+	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, out_size);
+	mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+
+	/* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
+	mod_timer(&chip->user_read_timer, jiffies + (60 * HZ));
+
+	return in_size;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_write);
+
+ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+		 size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
+	ssize_t ret_size;
+	int rc;
+
+	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
+	flush_work(&chip->work);
+	ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
+	if (ret_size > 0) {	/* relay data */
+		ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
+		if (size < ret_size)
+			ret_size = size;
+
+		mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+		rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
+		memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
+		if (rc)
+			ret_size = -EFAULT;
+
+		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+	}
+
+	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+
+	return ret_size;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_read);
+
+void tpm_remove_hardware(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (chip == NULL) {
+		dev_err(dev, "No device data found\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&driver_lock);
+	list_del_rcu(&chip->list);
+	spin_unlock(&driver_lock);
+	synchronize_rcu();
+
+	misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
+	sysfs_remove_group(&dev->kobj, chip->vendor.attr_group);
+	tpm_remove_ppi(&dev->kobj);
+	tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip->bios_dir);
+
+	/* write it this way to be explicit (chip->dev == dev) */
+	put_device(chip->dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_hardware);
+
+#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
+#define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
+
+static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
+};
+
+/*
+ * We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
+ * so that it can be restored.
+ */
+int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+	int rc, try;
+
+	u8 dummy_hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
+	if (tpm_suspend_pcr) {
+		cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
+		cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
+		memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
+		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+				  "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
+	}
+
+	/* now do the actual savestate */
+	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
+		cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
+		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
+		 * this command then retry before giving up.  It can take
+		 * several seconds for this TPM to be ready.
+		 *
+		 * This can happen if the TPM has already been sent the
+		 * SaveState command before the driver has loaded.  TCG 1.2
+		 * specification states that any communication after SaveState
+		 * may cause the TPM to invalidate previously saved state.
+		 */
+		if (rc != TPM_WARN_RETRY)
+			break;
+		msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
+	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"Error (%d) sending savestate before suspend\n", rc);
+	else if (try > 0)
+		dev_warn(chip->dev, "TPM savestate took %dms\n",
+			 try * TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_suspend);
+
+/*
+ * Resume from a power safe. The BIOS already restored
+ * the TPM state.
+ */
+int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
+
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE	18
+static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
+};
+
+/**
+ * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
+ * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
+ * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
+ * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
+ *
+ * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
+ */
+int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	u32 recd, num_bytes = min_t(u32, max, TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA);
+	int err, total = 0, retries = 5;
+	u8 *dest = out;
+
+	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	do {
+		tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
+		tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
+
+		err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
+				   TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
+				   "attempting get random");
+		if (err)
+			break;
+
+		recd = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data_len);
+		memcpy(dest, tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data, recd);
+
+		dest += recd;
+		total += recd;
+		num_bytes -= recd;
+	} while (retries-- && total < max);
+
+	return total ? total : -EIO;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
+
+/* In case vendor provided release function, call it too.*/
+
+void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	if (!chip)
+		return;
+
+	if (chip->vendor.release)
+		chip->vendor.release(chip->dev);
+
+	clear_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
+
+
+/*
+ * Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
+ * release all allocated structures.
+ */
+void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (!chip)
+		return;
+
+	tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+
+	chip->release(dev);
+	kfree(chip);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_release);
+
+/*
+ * Called from tpm_<specific>.c probe function only for devices
+ * the driver has determined it should claim.  Prior to calling
+ * this function the specific probe function has called pci_enable_device
+ * upon errant exit from this function specific probe function should call
+ * pci_disable_device
+ */
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
+					const struct tpm_vendor_specific *entry)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+	/* Driver specific per-device data */
+	chip = kzalloc(sizeof(*chip), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (chip == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	mutex_init(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+	mutex_init(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->list);
+
+	INIT_WORK(&chip->work, timeout_work);
+
+	setup_timer(&chip->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
+			(unsigned long)chip);
+
+	memcpy(&chip->vendor, entry, sizeof(struct tpm_vendor_specific));
+
+	chip->dev_num = find_first_zero_bit(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+
+	if (chip->dev_num >= TPM_NUM_DEVICES) {
+		dev_err(dev, "No available tpm device numbers\n");
+		goto out_free;
+	} else if (chip->dev_num == 0)
+		chip->vendor.miscdev.minor = TPM_MINOR;
+	else
+		chip->vendor.miscdev.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+
+	set_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
+
+	scnprintf(chip->devname, sizeof(chip->devname), "%s%d", "tpm",
+		  chip->dev_num);
+	chip->vendor.miscdev.name = chip->devname;
+
+	chip->vendor.miscdev.parent = dev;
+	chip->dev = get_device(dev);
+	chip->release = dev->release;
+	dev->release = tpm_dev_release;
+	dev_set_drvdata(dev, chip);
+
+	if (misc_register(&chip->vendor.miscdev)) {
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"unable to misc_register %s, minor %d\n",
+			chip->vendor.miscdev.name,
+			chip->vendor.miscdev.minor);
+		goto put_device;
+	}
+
+	if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, chip->vendor.attr_group)) {
+		misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
+		goto put_device;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm_add_ppi(&dev->kobj)) {
+		misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
+		goto put_device;
+	}
+
+	chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip->devname);
+
+	/* Make chip available */
+	spin_lock(&driver_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(&chip->list, &tpm_chip_list);
+	spin_unlock(&driver_lock);
+
+	return chip;
+
+put_device:
+	put_device(chip->dev);
+out_free:
+	kfree(chip);
+	return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_register_hardware);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Leendert van Doorn (leendert@watson.ibm.com)");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM Driver");
+MODULE_VERSION("2.0");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ae41d337630..000000000000
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1554 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
- * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
- * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
- *
- * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
- * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- *
- * Note, the TPM chip is not interrupt driven (only polling)
- * and can have very long timeouts (minutes!). Hence the unusual
- * calls to msleep.
- *
- */
-
-#include <linux/poll.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/freezer.h>
-
-#include "tpm.h"
-#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
-
-enum tpm_duration {
-	TPM_SHORT = 0,
-	TPM_MEDIUM = 1,
-	TPM_LONG = 2,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-};
-
-#define TPM_MAX_ORDINAL 243
-#define TSC_MAX_ORDINAL 12
-#define TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND 0x00
-#define TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND 0x40
-
-/*
- * Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
- * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
- * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
- */
-static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
-module_param_named(suspend_pcr, tpm_suspend_pcr, uint, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(suspend_pcr,
-		 "PCR to use for dummy writes to faciltate flush on suspend.");
-
-static LIST_HEAD(tpm_chip_list);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(driver_lock);
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
-
-/*
- * Array with one entry per ordinal defining the maximum amount
- * of time the chip could take to return the result.  The ordinal
- * designation of short, medium or long is defined in a table in
- * TCG Specification TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures Section 17. The
- * values of the SHORT, MEDIUM, and LONG durations are retrieved
- * from the chip during initialization with a call to tpm_get_timeouts.
- */
-static const u8 tpm_ordinal_duration[TPM_MAX_ORDINAL] = {
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 0 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 5 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 10 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 15 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 20 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 25 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 30 */
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 35 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 40 */
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 45 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 50 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 55 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 60 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 65 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 70 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 75 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_LONG,		/* 80 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 85 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 90 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 95 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 100 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 105 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 110 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 115 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_LONG,		/* 120 */
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 125 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 130 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 135 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 140 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 145 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 150 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 155 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 160 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 165 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_LONG,		/* 170 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 175 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 180 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 185 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 190 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 195 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 200 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 205 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,		/* 210 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 215 */
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 220 */
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_SHORT,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 225 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 230 */
-	TPM_LONG,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,		/* 235 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_SHORT,		/* 240 */
-	TPM_UNDEFINED,
-	TPM_MEDIUM,
-};
-
-static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *) ptr;
-
-	schedule_work(&chip->work);
-}
-
-static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(work, struct tpm_chip, work);
-
-	mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
-	memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, TPM_BUFSIZE);
-	mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns max number of jiffies to wait
- */
-unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
-					   u32 ordinal)
-{
-	int duration_idx = TPM_UNDEFINED;
-	int duration = 0;
-	u8 category = (ordinal >> 24) & 0xFF;
-
-	if ((category == TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND && ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) ||
-	    (category == TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND && ordinal < TSC_MAX_ORDINAL))
-		duration_idx = tpm_ordinal_duration[ordinal];
-
-	if (duration_idx != TPM_UNDEFINED)
-		duration = chip->vendor.duration[duration_idx];
-	if (duration <= 0)
-		return 2 * 60 * HZ;
-	else
-		return duration;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
-
-/*
- * Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands
- */
-static ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
-			    size_t bufsiz)
-{
-	ssize_t rc;
-	u32 count, ordinal;
-	unsigned long stop;
-
-	if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
-		bufsiz = TPM_BUFSIZE;
-
-	count = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2)));
-	ordinal = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 6)));
-	if (count == 0)
-		return -ENODATA;
-	if (count > bufsiz) {
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"invalid count value %x %zx\n", count, bufsiz);
-		return -E2BIG;
-	}
-
-	mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
-
-	rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
-	if (rc < 0) {
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (chip->vendor.irq)
-		goto out_recv;
-
-	stop = jiffies + tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, ordinal);
-	do {
-		u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
-		if ((status & chip->vendor.req_complete_mask) ==
-		    chip->vendor.req_complete_val)
-			goto out_recv;
-
-		if (chip->vendor.req_canceled(chip, status)) {
-			dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Canceled\n");
-			rc = -ECANCELED;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);	/* CHECK */
-		rmb();
-	} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
-
-	chip->vendor.cancel(chip);
-	dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Timed out\n");
-	rc = -ETIME;
-	goto out;
-
-out_recv:
-	rc = chip->vendor.recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
-out:
-	mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
-#define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
-
-enum tpm_capabilities {
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4),
-	TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5),
-	CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06),
-	CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A)
-};
-
-enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101),
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103),
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108),
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109),
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111),
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115),
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120),
-
-};
-
-static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
-			    int len, const char *desc)
-{
-	int err;
-
-	len = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) cmd, len);
-	if (len <  0)
-		return len;
-	else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	err = be32_to_cpu(cmd->header.out.return_code);
-	if (err != 0 && desc)
-		dev_err(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred %s\n", err, desc);
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
-#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193)
-#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
-#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM cpu_to_be32(70)
-
-static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(22),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP
-};
-
-ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *dev, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
-		   const char *desc)
-{
-	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	int rc;
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-	if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id;
-		/*subcap field not necessary */
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0);
-		tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32));
-	} else {
-		if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
-		    subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
-			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
-		else
-			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
-	}
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc);
-	if (!rc)
-		*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
-	return rc;
-}
-
-void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	struct	tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-			"attempting to determine the timeouts");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt);
-
-#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP cpu_to_be32(153)
-#define TPM_ST_CLEAR cpu_to_be16(1)
-#define TPM_ST_STATE cpu_to_be16(2)
-#define TPM_ST_DEACTIVATED cpu_to_be16(3)
-static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_startup_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(12),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_STARTUP
-};
-
-static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
-{
-	struct tpm_cmd_t start_cmd;
-	start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
-	start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
-	return transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-			    "attempting to start the TPM");
-}
-
-int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	struct timeout_t *timeout_cap;
-	struct duration_t *duration_cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-	u32 timeout;
-	unsigned int scale = 1;
-
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
-
-	if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
-		/* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it.
-		   Execute a startup command. */
-		dev_info(chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP");
-		if (tpm_startup(chip, TPM_ST_CLEAR))
-			return rc;
-
-		tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-				  NULL);
-	}
-	if (rc) {
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"A TPM error (%zd) occurred attempting to determine the timeouts\n",
-			rc);
-		goto duration;
-	}
-
-	if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
-	    be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
-	    != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout;
-	/* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
-	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a);
-	if (timeout && timeout < 1000) {
-		/* timeouts in msec rather usec */
-		scale = 1000;
-		chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted = true;
-	}
-	if (timeout)
-		chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
-	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b);
-	if (timeout)
-		chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
-	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c);
-	if (timeout)
-		chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
-	timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d);
-	if (timeout)
-		chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
-
-duration:
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
-
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-			"attempting to determine the durations");
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
-	    be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
-	    != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 3 * sizeof(u32))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration;
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
-	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short));
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
-	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium));
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
-	    usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long));
-
-	/* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above
-	 * value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we
-	 * fix up the resulting too-small TPM_SHORT value to make things work.
-	 * We also scale the TPM_MEDIUM and -_LONG values by 1000.
-	 */
-	if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] < (HZ / 100)) {
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = HZ;
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] *= 1000;
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] *= 1000;
-		chip->vendor.duration_adjusted = true;
-		dev_info(chip->dev, "Adjusting TPM timeout parameters.");
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
-
-#define TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST 83
-#define CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE 10
-
-static struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
-	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST),
-};
-
-/**
- * tpm_continue_selftest -- run TPM's selftest
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error or a value > 0 representing
- * a TPM error code.
- */
-static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	int rc;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
-
-	cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
-			  "continue selftest");
-	return rc;
-}
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
-			 "attempting to determine the permanent enabled state");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.disable);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
-			 "attempting to determine the permanent active state");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.deactivated);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
-			 "attempting to determine the owner state");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device *dev,
-				struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL, &cap,
-			 "attempting to determine the temporary state");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.stclear_flags.deactivated);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated);
-
-/*
- * tpm_chip_find_get - return tpm_chip for given chip number
- */
-static struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *pos, *chip = NULL;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) {
-		if (chip_num != TPM_ANY_NUM && chip_num != pos->dev_num)
-			continue;
-
-		if (try_module_get(pos->dev->driver->owner)) {
-			chip = pos;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return chip;
-}
-
-#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
-#define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
-};
-
-static int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
-{
-	int rc;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
-
-	cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
-	cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
-			  "attempting to read a pcr value");
-
-	if (rc == 0)
-		memcpy(res_buf, cmd.params.pcrread_out.pcr_result,
-		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
- * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or ANY
- * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to retrieve
- * @res_buf:	TPM_PCR value
- *		size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
- *
- * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
- * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
- * the module usage count.
- */
-int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-	int rc;
-
-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-	rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf);
-	tpm_chip_put(chip);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
-
-/**
- * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
- * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
- * @pcr_idx:	pcr idx to extend
- * @hash:	hash value used to extend pcr value
- *
- * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
- * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
- * the module usage count.
- */
-#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
-#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
-};
-
-int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
-{
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
-	int rc;
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-
-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
-	cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
-	memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
-			  "attempting extend a PCR value");
-
-	tpm_chip_put(chip);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
-
-/**
- * tpm_do_selftest - have the TPM continue its selftest and wait until it
- *                   can receive further commands
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error or a value > 0 representing
- * a TPM error code.
- */
-int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	int rc;
-	unsigned int loops;
-	unsigned int delay_msec = 100;
-	unsigned long duration;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
-
-	duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
-
-	loops = jiffies_to_msecs(duration) / delay_msec;
-
-	rc = tpm_continue_selftest(chip);
-	/* This may fail if there was no TPM driver during a suspend/resume
-	 * cycle; some may return 10 (BAD_ORDINAL), others 28 (FAILEDSELFTEST)
-	 */
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	do {
-		/* Attempt to read a PCR value */
-		cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
-		cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(0);
-		rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE);
-		/* Some buggy TPMs will not respond to tpm_tis_ready() for
-		 * around 300ms while the self test is ongoing, keep trying
-		 * until the self test duration expires. */
-		if (rc == -ETIME) {
-			dev_info(chip->dev, HW_ERR "TPM command timed out during continue self test");
-			msleep(delay_msec);
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
-			return -EFAULT;
-
-		rc = be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.return_code);
-		if (rc == TPM_ERR_DISABLED || rc == TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED) {
-			dev_info(chip->dev,
-				 "TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x%X)\n", rc);
-			/* TPM is disabled and/or deactivated; driver can
-			 * proceed and TPM does handle commands for
-			 * suspend/resume correctly
-			 */
-			return 0;
-		}
-		if (rc != TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST)
-			return rc;
-		msleep(delay_msec);
-	} while (--loops > 0);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_do_selftest);
-
-int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-	int rc;
-
-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
-
-	tpm_chip_put(chip);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-		      char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	ssize_t rc;
-	int i, j, num_pcrs;
-	char *str = buf;
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the number of PCRS");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-
-	num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(cap.num_pcrs);
-	for (i = 0; i < num_pcrs; i++) {
-		rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, i, digest);
-		if (rc)
-			break;
-		str += sprintf(str, "PCR-%02d: ", i);
-		for (j = 0; j < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
-			str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", digest[j]);
-		str += sprintf(str, "\n");
-	}
-	return str - buf;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pcrs);
-
-#define  READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
-#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
-};
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-		       char *buf)
-{
-	u8 *data;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	ssize_t err;
-	int i, rc;
-	char *str = buf;
-
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
-	err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
-			"attempting to read the PUBEK");
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	   ignore header 10 bytes
-	   algorithm 32 bits (1 == RSA )
-	   encscheme 16 bits
-	   sigscheme 16 bits
-	   parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)
-	   keylenbytes 32 bits
-	   256 byte modulus
-	   ignore checksum 20 bytes
-	 */
-	data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer;
-	str +=
-	    sprintf(str,
-		    "Algorithm: %02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
-		    "Encscheme: %02X %02X\n"
-		    "Sigscheme: %02X %02X\n"
-		    "Parameters: %02X %02X %02X %02X "
-		    "%02X %02X %02X %02X "
-		    "%02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
-		    "Modulus length: %d\n"
-		    "Modulus:\n",
-		    data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3],
-		    data[4], data[5],
-		    data[6], data[7],
-		    data[12], data[13], data[14], data[15],
-		    data[16], data[17], data[18], data[19],
-		    data[20], data[21], data[22], data[23],
-		    be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + 24))));
-
-	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
-		str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", data[i + 28]);
-		if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
-			str += sprintf(str, "\n");
-	}
-out:
-	rc = str - buf;
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pubek);
-
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-		      char *buf)
-{
-	cap_t cap;
-	ssize_t rc;
-	char *str = buf;
-
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the manufacturer");
-	if (rc)
-		return 0;
-	str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
-		       be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
-
-	/* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */
-	rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
-			 "attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
-	if (!rc) {
-		str += sprintf(str,
-			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
-			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major,
-			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor,
-			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor,
-			       cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
-	} else {
-		/* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */
-		rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
-				"attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
-		if (rc)
-			return 0;
-		str += sprintf(str,
-			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
-			       cap.tpm_version.Major,
-			       cap.tpm_version.Minor,
-			       cap.tpm_version.revMajor,
-			       cap.tpm_version.revMinor);
-	}
-
-	return str - buf;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_durations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			  char *buf)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	return sprintf(buf, "%d %d %d [%s]\n",
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT]),
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM]),
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG]),
-		       chip->vendor.duration_adjusted
-		       ? "adjusted" : "original");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_durations);
-
-ssize_t tpm_show_timeouts(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			  char *buf)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	return sprintf(buf, "%d %d %d %d [%s]\n",
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_a),
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_b),
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_c),
-		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.timeout_d),
-		       chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted
-		       ? "adjusted" : "original");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_timeouts);
-
-ssize_t tpm_store_cancel(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			const char *buf, size_t count)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	chip->vendor.cancel(chip);
-	return count;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_store_cancel);
-
-static bool wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask,
-					bool check_cancel, bool *canceled)
-{
-	u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
-
-	*canceled = false;
-	if ((status & mask) == mask)
-		return true;
-	if (check_cancel && chip->vendor.req_canceled(chip, status)) {
-		*canceled = true;
-		return true;
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
-int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
-		      wait_queue_head_t *queue, bool check_cancel)
-{
-	unsigned long stop;
-	long rc;
-	u8 status;
-	bool canceled = false;
-
-	/* check current status */
-	status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
-	if ((status & mask) == mask)
-		return 0;
-
-	stop = jiffies + timeout;
-
-	if (chip->vendor.irq) {
-again:
-		timeout = stop - jiffies;
-		if ((long)timeout <= 0)
-			return -ETIME;
-		rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*queue,
-			wait_for_tpm_stat_cond(chip, mask, check_cancel,
-					       &canceled),
-			timeout);
-		if (rc > 0) {
-			if (canceled)
-				return -ECANCELED;
-			return 0;
-		}
-		if (rc == -ERESTARTSYS && freezing(current)) {
-			clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
-			goto again;
-		}
-	} else {
-		do {
-			msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);
-			status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
-			if ((status & mask) == mask)
-				return 0;
-		} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
-	}
-	return -ETIME;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
-/*
- * Device file system interface to the TPM
- *
- * It's assured that the chip will be opened just once,
- * by the check of is_open variable, which is protected
- * by driver_lock.
- */
-int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	struct miscdevice *misc = file->private_data;
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(misc, struct tpm_chip,
-					     vendor.miscdev);
-
-	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &chip->is_open)) {
-		dev_dbg(chip->dev, "Another process owns this TPM\n");
-		return -EBUSY;
-	}
-
-	chip->data_buffer = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (chip->data_buffer == NULL) {
-		clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
-
-	file->private_data = chip;
-	get_device(chip->dev);
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_open);
-
-/*
- * Called on file close
- */
-int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
-
-	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
-	flush_work(&chip->work);
-	file->private_data = NULL;
-	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
-	kzfree(chip->data_buffer);
-	clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
-	put_device(chip->dev);
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_release);
-
-ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-		  size_t size, loff_t *off)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
-	size_t in_size = size;
-	ssize_t out_size;
-
-	/* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
-	   either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout.
-	   This also prevents splitted buffered writes from blocking here.
-	*/
-	if (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
-	if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
-		return -E2BIG;
-
-	mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-
-	if (copy_from_user
-	    (chip->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
-		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-	/* atomic tpm command send and result receive */
-	out_size = tpm_transmit(chip, chip->data_buffer, TPM_BUFSIZE);
-	if (out_size < 0) {
-		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-		return out_size;
-	}
-
-	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, out_size);
-	mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-
-	/* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
-	mod_timer(&chip->user_read_timer, jiffies + (60 * HZ));
-
-	return in_size;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_write);
-
-ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-		 size_t size, loff_t *off)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
-	ssize_t ret_size;
-	int rc;
-
-	del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
-	flush_work(&chip->work);
-	ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
-	if (ret_size > 0) {	/* relay data */
-		ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
-		if (size < ret_size)
-			ret_size = size;
-
-		mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-		rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
-		memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
-		if (rc)
-			ret_size = -EFAULT;
-
-		mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-	}
-
-	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
-
-	return ret_size;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_read);
-
-void tpm_remove_hardware(struct device *dev)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	if (chip == NULL) {
-		dev_err(dev, "No device data found\n");
-		return;
-	}
-
-	spin_lock(&driver_lock);
-	list_del_rcu(&chip->list);
-	spin_unlock(&driver_lock);
-	synchronize_rcu();
-
-	misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
-	sysfs_remove_group(&dev->kobj, chip->vendor.attr_group);
-	tpm_remove_ppi(&dev->kobj);
-	tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip->bios_dir);
-
-	/* write it this way to be explicit (chip->dev == dev) */
-	put_device(chip->dev);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_hardware);
-
-#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
-#define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
-
-static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
-};
-
-/*
- * We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
- * so that it can be restored.
- */
-int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
-	int rc, try;
-
-	u8 dummy_hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
-
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	/* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
-	if (tpm_suspend_pcr) {
-		cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
-		cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
-		memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
-		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
-				  "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
-	}
-
-	/* now do the actual savestate */
-	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
-		cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
-		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
-
-		/*
-		 * If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
-		 * this command then retry before giving up.  It can take
-		 * several seconds for this TPM to be ready.
-		 *
-		 * This can happen if the TPM has already been sent the
-		 * SaveState command before the driver has loaded.  TCG 1.2
-		 * specification states that any communication after SaveState
-		 * may cause the TPM to invalidate previously saved state.
-		 */
-		if (rc != TPM_WARN_RETRY)
-			break;
-		msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
-	}
-
-	if (rc)
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"Error (%d) sending savestate before suspend\n", rc);
-	else if (try > 0)
-		dev_warn(chip->dev, "TPM savestate took %dms\n",
-			 try * TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_suspend);
-
-/*
- * Resume from a power safe. The BIOS already restored
- * the TPM state.
- */
-int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
-
-#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE	18
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
-	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
-};
-
-/**
- * tpm_get_random() - Get random bytes from the tpm's RNG
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
- * @out: destination buffer for the random bytes
- * @max: the max number of bytes to write to @out
- *
- * Returns < 0 on error and the number of bytes read on success
- */
-int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	u32 recd, num_bytes = min_t(u32, max, TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA);
-	int err, total = 0, retries = 5;
-	u8 *dest = out;
-
-	chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	do {
-		tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
-		tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
-
-		err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
-				   TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
-				   "attempting get random");
-		if (err)
-			break;
-
-		recd = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data_len);
-		memcpy(dest, tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_out.rng_data, recd);
-
-		dest += recd;
-		total += recd;
-		num_bytes -= recd;
-	} while (retries-- && total < max);
-
-	return total ? total : -EIO;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
-
-/* In case vendor provided release function, call it too.*/
-
-void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	if (!chip)
-		return;
-
-	if (chip->vendor.release)
-		chip->vendor.release(chip->dev);
-
-	clear_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
-
-
-/*
- * Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
- * release all allocated structures.
- */
-void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-
-	if (!chip)
-		return;
-
-	tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
-
-	chip->release(dev);
-	kfree(chip);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_release);
-
-/*
- * Called from tpm_<specific>.c probe function only for devices
- * the driver has determined it should claim.  Prior to calling
- * this function the specific probe function has called pci_enable_device
- * upon errant exit from this function specific probe function should call
- * pci_disable_device
- */
-struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
-					const struct tpm_vendor_specific *entry)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
-
-	/* Driver specific per-device data */
-	chip = kzalloc(sizeof(*chip), GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (chip == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-
-	mutex_init(&chip->buffer_mutex);
-	mutex_init(&chip->tpm_mutex);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chip->list);
-
-	INIT_WORK(&chip->work, timeout_work);
-
-	setup_timer(&chip->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
-			(unsigned long)chip);
-
-	memcpy(&chip->vendor, entry, sizeof(struct tpm_vendor_specific));
-
-	chip->dev_num = find_first_zero_bit(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
-
-	if (chip->dev_num >= TPM_NUM_DEVICES) {
-		dev_err(dev, "No available tpm device numbers\n");
-		goto out_free;
-	} else if (chip->dev_num == 0)
-		chip->vendor.miscdev.minor = TPM_MINOR;
-	else
-		chip->vendor.miscdev.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
-
-	set_bit(chip->dev_num, dev_mask);
-
-	scnprintf(chip->devname, sizeof(chip->devname), "%s%d", "tpm",
-		  chip->dev_num);
-	chip->vendor.miscdev.name = chip->devname;
-
-	chip->vendor.miscdev.parent = dev;
-	chip->dev = get_device(dev);
-	chip->release = dev->release;
-	dev->release = tpm_dev_release;
-	dev_set_drvdata(dev, chip);
-
-	if (misc_register(&chip->vendor.miscdev)) {
-		dev_err(chip->dev,
-			"unable to misc_register %s, minor %d\n",
-			chip->vendor.miscdev.name,
-			chip->vendor.miscdev.minor);
-		goto put_device;
-	}
-
-	if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, chip->vendor.attr_group)) {
-		misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
-		goto put_device;
-	}
-
-	if (tpm_add_ppi(&dev->kobj)) {
-		misc_deregister(&chip->vendor.miscdev);
-		goto put_device;
-	}
-
-	chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip->devname);
-
-	/* Make chip available */
-	spin_lock(&driver_lock);
-	list_add_rcu(&chip->list, &tpm_chip_list);
-	spin_unlock(&driver_lock);
-
-	return chip;
-
-put_device:
-	put_device(chip->dev);
-out_free:
-	kfree(chip);
-	return NULL;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_register_hardware);
-
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Leendert van Doorn (leendert@watson.ibm.com)");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TPM Driver");
-MODULE_VERSION("2.0");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 187eea0c353abd4ffa3a9cc86a660af9605fcb10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 22:51:09 -0600
Subject: tpm: Merge the tpm-bios module with tpm.o

Now that we can have multiple .c files in the tpm module there is
no reason for tpm-bios.

tpm-bios exported several functions: tpm_bios_log_setup,
tpm_bios_log_teardown, tpm_add_ppi, and tpm_remove_ppi.

They are only used by tpm, and if tpm-bios is built then
tpm will unconditionally require them. Further, tpm-bios does
nothing on its own, it has no module_init function.

Thus we remove the exports and merge the modules to simplify things.

The Makefile conditions are changed slightly to match the code,
tpm_ppi is always required if CONFIG_ACPI is set.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/Makefile       | 7 +++----
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c | 3 ---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c      | 4 ----
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 83b8a9d7527e..15df2f38ae42 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
 tpm-y := tpm-interface.o
+tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o
 
 ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
-	obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o
-	tpm_bios-objs += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o tpm_ppi.o
+	tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o
 else
 ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM
-	obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm_bios.o
-	tpm_bios-objs += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o
+	tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o
 endif
 endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
index 84ddc557b8f8..59f7cb28260b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
@@ -406,7 +406,6 @@ out_tpm:
 out:
 	return NULL;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_bios_log_setup);
 
 void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **lst)
 {
@@ -415,5 +414,3 @@ void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **lst)
 	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
 		securityfs_remove(lst[i]);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_bios_log_teardown);
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c
index 2168d15bc728..8e562dc65601 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c
@@ -452,12 +452,8 @@ int tpm_add_ppi(struct kobject *parent)
 {
 	return sysfs_create_group(parent, &ppi_attr_grp);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_add_ppi);
 
 void tpm_remove_ppi(struct kobject *parent)
 {
 	sysfs_remove_group(parent, &ppi_attr_grp);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_ppi);
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4c336e4b1556f4b722ba597bc6e3df786968a600 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 12:43:13 -0600
Subject: tpm: Add support for the Nuvoton NPCT501 I2C TPM

This chip is/was also branded as a Winbond WPCT301.

Originally written by Dan Morav <dmorav@nuvoton.com> and posted to LKML:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/9/7/206

The original posting was not merged, I have taken it as a
starting point, forward ported, tested and revised the driver:
 - Rework interrupt handling to work properly with level triggered
   interrupts. The old version just locked up.
 - Synchronize various items with Peter Huewe's Infineon driver:
    * Add durations/timeouts sysfs calls
    * Remove I2C device auto-detection
    * Don't fiddle with chip->release
    * Call tpm_dev_vendor_release in the probe error path
    * Use MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE for the I2C ids
    * Provide OF compatible strings for DT support
    * Use SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS
    * Use module_i2c_driver
 - checkpatch cleanups
 - Testing on ARM Kirkwood with GPIO interrupts, with this device tree:
	tpm@57 {
                compatible = "nuvoton,npct501";
                reg = <0x57>;
                interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
                interrupts = <6 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
        };

Signed-off-by: Dan Morav <dmorav@nuvoton.com>
[jgg: revised and tested]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[phuewe: minor whitespace changes, fixed module name in kconfig]

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 .../devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt    |   2 +
 drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig                           |  10 +
 drivers/char/tpm/Makefile                          |   1 +
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c                 | 710 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 723 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c

diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
index ad6a73852f08..58454bdfa20e 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ mc,rv3029c2		Real Time Clock Module with I2C-Bus
 national,lm75		I2C TEMP SENSOR
 national,lm80		Serial Interface ACPI-Compatible Microprocessor System Hardware Monitor
 national,lm92		±0.33°C Accurate, 12-Bit + Sign Temperature Sensor and Thermal Window Comparator with Two-Wire Interface
+nuvoton,npct501		i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
 nxp,pca9556		Octal SMBus and I2C registered interface
 nxp,pca9557		8-bit I2C-bus and SMBus I/O port with reset
 nxp,pcf8563		Real-time clock/calendar
@@ -61,3 +62,4 @@ taos,tsl2550		Ambient Light Sensor with SMBUS/Two Wire Serial Interface
 ti,tsc2003		I2C Touch-Screen Controller
 ti,tmp102		Low Power Digital Temperature Sensor with SMBUS/Two Wire Serial Interface
 ti,tmp275		Digital Temperature Sensor
+winbond,wpct301		i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 94c0c74434ea..ade71c134a1a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -44,6 +44,16 @@ config TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON
 	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module
 	  will be called tpm_tis_i2c_infineon.
 
+config TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON
+	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Nuvoton)"
+	depends on I2C
+	---help---
+	  If you have a TPM security chip with an I2C interface from
+	  Nuvoton Technology Corp. say Yes and it will be accessible
+	  from within Linux.
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module
+	  will be called tpm_i2c_nuvoton.
+
 config TCG_NSC
 	tristate "National Semiconductor TPM Interface"
 	depends on X86
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 15df2f38ae42..07ee67cf3341 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ endif
 endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON) += tpm_i2c_infineon.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON) += tpm_i2c_nuvoton.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_NSC) += tpm_nsc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_ATMEL) += tpm_atmel.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_INFINEON) += tpm_infineon.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6276fea01ff0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c
@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * Nuvoton TPM I2C Device Driver Interface for WPCT301/NPCT501,
+ * based on the TCG TPM Interface Spec version 1.2.
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011, Nuvoton Technology Corporation.
+ *  Dan Morav <dan.morav@nuvoton.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2013, Obsidian Research Corp.
+ *  Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Nuvoton contact information: APC.Support@nuvoton.com
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/i2c.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+/* I2C interface offsets */
+#define TPM_STS                0x00
+#define TPM_BURST_COUNT        0x01
+#define TPM_DATA_FIFO_W        0x20
+#define TPM_DATA_FIFO_R        0x40
+#define TPM_VID_DID_RID        0x60
+/* TPM command header size */
+#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE        10
+#define TPM_RETRY      5
+/*
+ * I2C bus device maximum buffer size w/o counting I2C address or command
+ * i.e. max size required for I2C write is 34 = addr, command, 32 bytes data
+ */
+#define TPM_I2C_MAX_BUF_SIZE           32
+#define TPM_I2C_RETRY_COUNT            32
+#define TPM_I2C_BUS_DELAY              1       /* msec */
+#define TPM_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_SHORT      2       /* msec */
+#define TPM_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_LONG       10      /* msec */
+
+#define I2C_DRIVER_NAME "tpm_i2c_nuvoton"
+
+struct priv_data {
+	unsigned int intrs;
+};
+
+static s32 i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(struct i2c_client *client, u8 offset, u8 size,
+				u8 *data)
+{
+	s32 status;
+
+	status = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(client, offset, size, data);
+	dev_dbg(&client->dev,
+		"%s(offset=%u size=%u data=%*ph) -> sts=%d\n", __func__,
+		offset, size, (int)size, data, status);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static s32 i2c_nuvoton_write_buf(struct i2c_client *client, u8 offset, u8 size,
+				 u8 *data)
+{
+	s32 status;
+
+	status = i2c_smbus_write_i2c_block_data(client, offset, size, data);
+	dev_dbg(&client->dev,
+		"%s(offset=%u size=%u data=%*ph) -> sts=%d\n", __func__,
+		offset, size, (int)size, data, status);
+	return status;
+}
+
+#define TPM_STS_VALID          0x80
+#define TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY  0x40
+#define TPM_STS_GO             0x20
+#define TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL     0x10
+#define TPM_STS_EXPECT         0x08
+#define TPM_STS_RESPONSE_RETRY 0x02
+#define TPM_STS_ERR_VAL        0x07    /* bit2...bit0 reads always 0 */
+
+#define TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT  750     /* ms */
+#define TPM_I2C_LONG_TIMEOUT   2000    /* 2 sec */
+
+/* read TPM_STS register */
+static u8 i2c_nuvoton_read_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev);
+	s32 status;
+	u8 data;
+
+	status = i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(client, TPM_STS, 1, &data);
+	if (status <= 0) {
+		dev_err(chip->dev, "%s() error return %d\n", __func__,
+			status);
+		data = TPM_STS_ERR_VAL;
+	}
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+/* write byte to TPM_STS register */
+static s32 i2c_nuvoton_write_status(struct i2c_client *client, u8 data)
+{
+	s32 status;
+	int i;
+
+	/* this causes the current command to be aborted */
+	for (i = 0, status = -1; i < TPM_I2C_RETRY_COUNT && status < 0; i++) {
+		status = i2c_nuvoton_write_buf(client, TPM_STS, 1, &data);
+		msleep(TPM_I2C_BUS_DELAY);
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+
+/* write commandReady to TPM_STS register */
+static void i2c_nuvoton_ready(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev);
+	s32 status;
+
+	/* this causes the current command to be aborted */
+	status = i2c_nuvoton_write_status(client, TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY);
+	if (status < 0)
+		dev_err(chip->dev,
+			"%s() fail to write TPM_STS.commandReady\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/* read burstCount field from TPM_STS register
+ * return -1 on fail to read */
+static int i2c_nuvoton_get_burstcount(struct i2c_client *client,
+				      struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	unsigned long stop = jiffies + chip->vendor.timeout_d;
+	s32 status;
+	int burst_count = -1;
+	u8 data;
+
+	/* wait for burstcount to be non-zero */
+	do {
+		/* in I2C burstCount is 1 byte */
+		status = i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(client, TPM_BURST_COUNT, 1,
+					      &data);
+		if (status > 0 && data > 0) {
+			burst_count = min_t(u8, TPM_I2C_MAX_BUF_SIZE, data);
+			break;
+		}
+		msleep(TPM_I2C_BUS_DELAY);
+	} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+
+	return burst_count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * WPCT301/NPCT501 SINT# supports only dataAvail
+ * any call to this function which is not waiting for dataAvail will
+ * set queue to NULL to avoid waiting for interrupt
+ */
+static bool i2c_nuvoton_check_status(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, u8 value)
+{
+	u8 status = i2c_nuvoton_read_status(chip);
+	return (status != TPM_STS_ERR_VAL) && ((status & mask) == value);
+}
+
+static int i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, u8 value,
+				     u32 timeout, wait_queue_head_t *queue)
+{
+	if (chip->vendor.irq && queue) {
+		s32 rc;
+		DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
+		struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+		unsigned int cur_intrs = priv->intrs;
+
+		enable_irq(chip->vendor.irq);
+		rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*queue,
+						      cur_intrs != priv->intrs,
+						      timeout);
+		if (rc > 0)
+			return 0;
+		/* At this point we know that the SINT pin is asserted, so we
+		 * do not need to do i2c_nuvoton_check_status */
+	} else {
+		unsigned long ten_msec, stop;
+		bool status_valid;
+
+		/* check current status */
+		status_valid = i2c_nuvoton_check_status(chip, mask, value);
+		if (status_valid)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* use polling to wait for the event */
+		ten_msec = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_LONG);
+		stop = jiffies + timeout;
+		do {
+			if (time_before(jiffies, ten_msec))
+				msleep(TPM_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_SHORT);
+			else
+				msleep(TPM_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_LONG);
+			status_valid = i2c_nuvoton_check_status(chip, mask,
+								value);
+			if (status_valid)
+				return 0;
+		} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
+	}
+	dev_err(chip->dev, "%s(%02x, %02x) -> timeout\n", __func__, mask,
+		value);
+	return -ETIMEDOUT;
+}
+
+/* wait for dataAvail field to be set in the TPM_STS register */
+static int i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_data_avail(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 timeout,
+					   wait_queue_head_t *queue)
+{
+	return i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(chip,
+					 TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+					 TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+					 timeout, queue);
+}
+
+/* Read @count bytes into @buf from TPM_RD_FIFO register */
+static int i2c_nuvoton_recv_data(struct i2c_client *client,
+				 struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	s32 rc;
+	int burst_count, bytes2read, size = 0;
+
+	while (size < count &&
+	       i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_data_avail(chip,
+					       chip->vendor.timeout_c,
+					       &chip->vendor.read_queue) == 0) {
+		burst_count = i2c_nuvoton_get_burstcount(client, chip);
+		if (burst_count < 0) {
+			dev_err(chip->dev,
+				"%s() fail to read burstCount=%d\n", __func__,
+				burst_count);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		bytes2read = min_t(size_t, burst_count, count - size);
+		rc = i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(client, TPM_DATA_FIFO_R,
+					  bytes2read, &buf[size]);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			dev_err(chip->dev,
+				"%s() fail on i2c_nuvoton_read_buf()=%d\n",
+				__func__, rc);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		dev_dbg(chip->dev, "%s(%d):", __func__, bytes2read);
+		size += bytes2read;
+	}
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+/* Read TPM command results */
+static int i2c_nuvoton_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct device *dev = chip->dev;
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev);
+	s32 rc;
+	int expected, status, burst_count, retries, size = 0;
+
+	if (count < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+		i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);    /* return to idle */
+		dev_err(dev, "%s() count < header size\n", __func__);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	for (retries = 0; retries < TPM_RETRY; retries++) {
+		if (retries > 0) {
+			/* if this is not the first trial, set responseRetry */
+			i2c_nuvoton_write_status(client,
+						 TPM_STS_RESPONSE_RETRY);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * read first available (> 10 bytes), including:
+		 * tag, paramsize, and result
+		 */
+		status = i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_data_avail(
+			chip, chip->vendor.timeout_c, &chip->vendor.read_queue);
+		if (status != 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() timeout on dataAvail\n", __func__);
+			size = -ETIMEDOUT;
+			continue;
+		}
+		burst_count = i2c_nuvoton_get_burstcount(client, chip);
+		if (burst_count < 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() fail to get burstCount\n", __func__);
+			size = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		size = i2c_nuvoton_recv_data(client, chip, buf,
+					     burst_count);
+		if (size < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() fail to read header\n", __func__);
+			size = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * convert number of expected bytes field from big endian 32 bit
+		 * to machine native
+		 */
+		expected = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *) (buf + 2));
+		if (expected > count) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() expected > count\n", __func__);
+			size = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		rc = i2c_nuvoton_recv_data(client, chip, &buf[size],
+					   expected - size);
+		size += rc;
+		if (rc < 0 || size < expected) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() fail to read remainder of result\n",
+				__func__);
+			size = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(
+			    chip, TPM_STS_VALID | TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL,
+			    TPM_STS_VALID, chip->vendor.timeout_c,
+			    NULL)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() error left over data\n", __func__);
+			size = -ETIMEDOUT;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+	dev_dbg(chip->dev, "%s() -> %d\n", __func__, size);
+	return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send TPM command.
+ *
+ * If interrupts are used (signaled by an irq set in the vendor structure)
+ * tpm.c can skip polling for the data to be available as the interrupt is
+ * waited for here
+ */
+static int i2c_nuvoton_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct device *dev = chip->dev;
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev);
+	u32 ordinal;
+	size_t count = 0;
+	int burst_count, bytes2write, retries, rc = -EIO;
+
+	for (retries = 0; retries < TPM_RETRY; retries++) {
+		i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+		if (i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(chip, TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+					      TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+					      chip->vendor.timeout_b, NULL)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() timeout on commandReady\n",
+				__func__);
+			rc = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		rc = 0;
+		while (count < len - 1) {
+			burst_count = i2c_nuvoton_get_burstcount(client,
+								 chip);
+			if (burst_count < 0) {
+				dev_err(dev, "%s() fail get burstCount\n",
+					__func__);
+				rc = -EIO;
+				break;
+			}
+			bytes2write = min_t(size_t, burst_count,
+					    len - 1 - count);
+			rc = i2c_nuvoton_write_buf(client, TPM_DATA_FIFO_W,
+						   bytes2write, &buf[count]);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				dev_err(dev, "%s() fail i2cWriteBuf\n",
+					__func__);
+				break;
+			}
+			dev_dbg(dev, "%s(%d):", __func__, bytes2write);
+			count += bytes2write;
+			rc = i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(chip,
+						       TPM_STS_VALID |
+						       TPM_STS_EXPECT,
+						       TPM_STS_VALID |
+						       TPM_STS_EXPECT,
+						       chip->vendor.timeout_c,
+						       NULL);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				dev_err(dev, "%s() timeout on Expect\n",
+					__func__);
+				rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (rc < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* write last byte */
+		rc = i2c_nuvoton_write_buf(client, TPM_DATA_FIFO_W, 1,
+					   &buf[count]);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() fail to write last byte\n",
+				__func__);
+			rc = -EIO;
+			continue;
+		}
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s(last): %02x", __func__, buf[count]);
+		rc = i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(chip,
+					       TPM_STS_VALID | TPM_STS_EXPECT,
+					       TPM_STS_VALID,
+					       chip->vendor.timeout_c, NULL);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() timeout on Expect to clear\n",
+				__func__);
+			rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		/* retries == TPM_RETRY */
+		i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/* execute the TPM command */
+	rc = i2c_nuvoton_write_status(client, TPM_STS_GO);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		dev_err(dev, "%s() fail to write Go\n", __func__);
+		i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	ordinal = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 6)));
+	rc = i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_data_avail(chip,
+					     tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip,
+								       ordinal),
+					     &chip->vendor.read_queue);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(dev, "%s() timeout command duration\n", __func__);
+		i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s() -> %zd\n", __func__, len);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static bool i2c_nuvoton_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
+{
+	return (status == TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations i2c_nuvoton_ops = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.llseek = no_llseek,
+	.open = tpm_open,
+	.read = tpm_read,
+	.write = tpm_write,
+	.release = tpm_release,
+};
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pubek, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pubek, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pcrs, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pcrs, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *i2c_nuvoton_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_pubek.attr,
+	&dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
+	&dev_attr_enabled.attr,
+	&dev_attr_active.attr,
+	&dev_attr_owned.attr,
+	&dev_attr_temp_deactivated.attr,
+	&dev_attr_caps.attr,
+	&dev_attr_cancel.attr,
+	&dev_attr_durations.attr,
+	&dev_attr_timeouts.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group i2c_nuvoton_attr_grp = {
+	.attrs = i2c_nuvoton_attrs
+};
+
+static const struct tpm_vendor_specific tpm_i2c = {
+	.status = i2c_nuvoton_read_status,
+	.recv = i2c_nuvoton_recv,
+	.send = i2c_nuvoton_send,
+	.cancel = i2c_nuvoton_ready,
+	.req_complete_mask = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+	.req_complete_val = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
+	.req_canceled = i2c_nuvoton_req_canceled,
+	.attr_group = &i2c_nuvoton_attr_grp,
+	.miscdev.fops = &i2c_nuvoton_ops,
+};
+
+/* The only purpose for the handler is to signal to any waiting threads that
+ * the interrupt is currently being asserted. The driver does not do any
+ * processing triggered by interrupts, and the chip provides no way to mask at
+ * the source (plus that would be slow over I2C). Run the IRQ as a one-shot,
+ * this means it cannot be shared. */
+static irqreturn_t i2c_nuvoton_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_id;
+	struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+
+	priv->intrs++;
+	wake_up(&chip->vendor.read_queue);
+	disable_irq_nosync(chip->vendor.irq);
+	return IRQ_HANDLED;
+}
+
+static int get_vid(struct i2c_client *client, u32 *res)
+{
+	static const u8 vid_did_rid_value[] = { 0x50, 0x10, 0xfe };
+	u32 temp;
+	s32 rc;
+
+	if (!i2c_check_functionality(client->adapter, I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_BYTE_DATA))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	rc = i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(client, TPM_VID_DID_RID, 4, (u8 *)&temp);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* check WPCT301 values - ignore RID */
+	if (memcmp(&temp, vid_did_rid_value, sizeof(vid_did_rid_value))) {
+		/*
+		 * f/w rev 2.81 has an issue where the VID_DID_RID is not
+		 * reporting the right value. so give it another chance at
+		 * offset 0x20 (FIFO_W).
+		 */
+		rc = i2c_nuvoton_read_buf(client, TPM_DATA_FIFO_W, 4,
+					  (u8 *) (&temp));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* check WPCT301 values - ignore RID */
+		if (memcmp(&temp, vid_did_rid_value,
+			   sizeof(vid_did_rid_value)))
+			return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	*res = temp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int i2c_nuvoton_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
+			     const struct i2c_device_id *id)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	struct device *dev = &client->dev;
+	u32 vid = 0;
+
+	rc = get_vid(client, &vid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	dev_info(dev, "VID: %04X DID: %02X RID: %02X\n", (u16) vid,
+		 (u8) (vid >> 16), (u8) (vid >> 24));
+
+	chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_i2c);
+	if (!chip) {
+		dev_err(dev, "%s() error in tpm_register_hardware\n", __func__);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	chip->vendor.priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct priv_data),
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.read_queue);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.int_queue);
+
+	/* Default timeouts */
+	chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+
+	/*
+	 * I2C intfcaps (interrupt capabilitieis) in the chip are hard coded to:
+	 *   TPM_INTF_INT_LEVEL_LOW | TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT
+	 * The IRQ should be set in the i2c_board_info (which is done
+	 * automatically in of_i2c_register_devices, for device tree users */
+	chip->vendor.irq = client->irq;
+
+	if (chip->vendor.irq) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s() chip-vendor.irq\n", __func__);
+		rc = devm_request_irq(dev, chip->vendor.irq,
+				      i2c_nuvoton_int_handler,
+				      IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW,
+				      chip->vendor.miscdev.name,
+				      chip);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s() Unable to request irq: %d for use\n",
+				__func__, chip->vendor.irq);
+			chip->vendor.irq = 0;
+		} else {
+			/* Clear any pending interrupt */
+			i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+			/* - wait for TPM_STS==0xA0 (stsValid, commandReady) */
+			rc = i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat(chip,
+						       TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+						       TPM_STS_COMMAND_READY,
+						       chip->vendor.timeout_b,
+						       NULL);
+			if (rc == 0) {
+				/*
+				 * TIS is in ready state
+				 * write dummy byte to enter reception state
+				 * TPM_DATA_FIFO_W <- rc (0)
+				 */
+				rc = i2c_nuvoton_write_buf(client,
+							   TPM_DATA_FIFO_W,
+							   1, (u8 *) (&rc));
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto out_err;
+				/* TPM_STS <- 0x40 (commandReady) */
+				i2c_nuvoton_ready(chip);
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * timeout_b reached - command was
+				 * aborted. TIS should now be in idle state -
+				 * only TPM_STS_VALID should be set
+				 */
+				if (i2c_nuvoton_read_status(chip) !=
+				    TPM_STS_VALID) {
+					rc = -EIO;
+					goto out_err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm_do_selftest(chip)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_err:
+	tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+	tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int i2c_nuvoton_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &(client->dev);
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (chip)
+		tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+	tpm_remove_hardware(dev);
+	kfree(chip);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static const struct i2c_device_id i2c_nuvoton_id[] = {
+	{I2C_DRIVER_NAME, 0},
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, i2c_nuvoton_id);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF
+static const struct of_device_id i2c_nuvoton_of_match[] = {
+	{.compatible = "nuvoton,npct501"},
+	{.compatible = "winbond,wpct301"},
+	{},
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, i2c_nuvoton_of_match);
+#endif
+
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(i2c_nuvoton_pm_ops, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
+
+static struct i2c_driver i2c_nuvoton_driver = {
+	.id_table = i2c_nuvoton_id,
+	.probe = i2c_nuvoton_probe,
+	.remove = i2c_nuvoton_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name = I2C_DRIVER_NAME,
+		.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+		.pm = &i2c_nuvoton_pm_ops,
+		.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(i2c_nuvoton_of_match),
+	},
+};
+
+module_i2c_driver(i2c_nuvoton_driver);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Dan Morav (dan.morav@nuvoton.com)");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Nuvoton TPM I2C Driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a2871c62e1865c45f87a9343de76f727fb7a0ffd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 12:43:36 -0600
Subject: tpm: Add support for Atmel I2C TPMs

This is based on the work of Teddy Reed <teddy@prosauce.org> published
on GitHub:
 https://github.com/theopolis/tpm-i2c-atmel.git
 34894b988b67e0ae55088d6388e77b0dbf10c07d

That driver was never merged, I have taken it as a starting port,
forward ported, tested and revised the driver:
 - Make it broadly textually similar to the Infineon and Nuvoton I2C
   driver
 - Place everything in a format suitable for mainline inclusion
 - Use high level I2C functions i2c_master_send and
   i2c_master_recv for data xfer
 - Use the timeout system from the core code, by faking out a status
   register
 - Only I2C transfer the number of bytes in the reply, not a fixed
   message size.
 - checkpatch cleanups
 - Testing on ARM Kirkwood, with this device tree, using a
   AT97SC3204T-X1A180
        tpm@29 {
                compatible = "atmel,at97sc3204t";
                reg = <0x29>;
        };

Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy@prosauce.org>
[jgg: revised and tested]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[phuewe: minor whitespace changes]

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 .../devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt    |   1 +
 drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig                           |   9 +
 drivers/char/tpm/Makefile                          |   1 +
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c                   | 284 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 295 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c

diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
index 58454bdfa20e..f1fb26eed0e9 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ adi,adt7461		+/-1C TDM Extended Temp Range I.C
 adt7461			+/-1C TDM Extended Temp Range I.C
 at,24c08		i2c serial eeprom  (24cxx)
 atmel,24c02		i2c serial eeprom  (24cxx)
+atmel,at97sc3204t	i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
 catalyst,24c32		i2c serial eeprom
 dallas,ds1307		64 x 8, Serial, I2C Real-Time Clock
 dallas,ds1338		I2C RTC with 56-Byte NV RAM
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index ade71c134a1a..f9085860b716 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@ config TCG_TIS
 	  from within Linux.  To compile this driver as a module, choose
 	  M here; the module will be called tpm_tis.
 
+config TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL
+	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Atmel)"
+	depends on I2C
+	---help---
+	  If you have an Atmel I2C TPM security chip say Yes and it will be
+	  accessible from within Linux.
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module will
+	  be called tpm_tis_i2c_atmel.
+
 config TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON
 	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Infineon)"
 	depends on I2C
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 07ee67cf3341..b80a4000daee 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM
 endif
 endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL) += tpm_i2c_atmel.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON) += tpm_i2c_infineon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON) += tpm_i2c_nuvoton.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_NSC) += tpm_nsc.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3cd7fe481a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * ATMEL I2C TPM AT97SC3204T
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 V Lab Technologies
+ *  Teddy Reed <teddy@prosauce.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2013, Obsidian Research Corp.
+ *  Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+ * Device driver for ATMEL I2C TPMs.
+ *
+ * Teddy Reed determined the basic I2C command flow, unlike other I2C TPM
+ * devices the raw TCG formatted TPM command data is written via I2C and then
+ * raw TCG formatted TPM command data is returned via I2C.
+ *
+ * TGC status/locality/etc functions seen in the LPC implementation do not
+ * seem to be present.
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/i2c.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+#define I2C_DRIVER_NAME "tpm_i2c_atmel"
+
+#define TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT  750     /* ms */
+#define TPM_I2C_LONG_TIMEOUT   2000    /* 2 sec */
+
+#define ATMEL_STS_OK 1
+
+struct priv_data {
+	size_t len;
+	/* This is the amount we read on the first try. 25 was chosen to fit a
+	 * fair number of read responses in the buffer so a 2nd retry can be
+	 * avoided in small message cases. */
+	u8 buffer[sizeof(struct tpm_output_header) + 25];
+};
+
+static int i2c_atmel_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev);
+	s32 status;
+
+	priv->len = 0;
+
+	if (len <= 2)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	status = i2c_master_send(client, buf, len);
+
+	dev_dbg(chip->dev,
+		"%s(buf=%*ph len=%0zx) -> sts=%d\n", __func__,
+		(int)min_t(size_t, 64, len), buf, len, status);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static int i2c_atmel_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev);
+	struct tpm_output_header *hdr =
+		(struct tpm_output_header *)priv->buffer;
+	u32 expected_len;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (priv->len == 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	/* Get the message size from the message header, if we didn't get the
+	 * whole message in read_status then we need to re-read the
+	 * message. */
+	expected_len = be32_to_cpu(hdr->length);
+	if (expected_len > count)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (priv->len >= expected_len) {
+		dev_dbg(chip->dev,
+			"%s early(buf=%*ph count=%0zx) -> ret=%d\n", __func__,
+			(int)min_t(size_t, 64, expected_len), buf, count,
+			expected_len);
+		memcpy(buf, priv->buffer, expected_len);
+		return expected_len;
+	}
+
+	rc = i2c_master_recv(client, buf, expected_len);
+	dev_dbg(chip->dev,
+		"%s reread(buf=%*ph count=%0zx) -> ret=%d\n", __func__,
+		(int)min_t(size_t, 64, expected_len), buf, count,
+		expected_len);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void i2c_atmel_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	dev_err(chip->dev, "TPM operation cancellation was requested, but is not supported");
+}
+
+static u8 i2c_atmel_read_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(chip->dev);
+	int rc;
+
+	/* The TPM fails the I2C read until it is ready, so we do the entire
+	 * transfer here and buffer it locally. This way the common code can
+	 * properly handle the timeouts. */
+	priv->len = 0;
+	memset(priv->buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->buffer));
+
+
+	/* Once the TPM has completed the command the command remains readable
+	 * until another command is issued. */
+	rc = i2c_master_recv(client, priv->buffer, sizeof(priv->buffer));
+	dev_dbg(chip->dev,
+		"%s: sts=%d", __func__, rc);
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	priv->len = rc;
+
+	return ATMEL_STS_OK;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations i2c_atmel_ops = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.llseek = no_llseek,
+	.open = tpm_open,
+	.read = tpm_read,
+	.write = tpm_write,
+	.release = tpm_release,
+};
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pubek, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pubek, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(pcrs, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_pcrs, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(enabled, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_enabled, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_active, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(owned, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_owned, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(temp_deactivated, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_temp_deactivated, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(caps, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_caps, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(cancel, S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP, NULL, tpm_store_cancel);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(durations, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_durations, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(timeouts, S_IRUGO, tpm_show_timeouts, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *i2c_atmel_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_pubek.attr,
+	&dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
+	&dev_attr_enabled.attr,
+	&dev_attr_active.attr,
+	&dev_attr_owned.attr,
+	&dev_attr_temp_deactivated.attr,
+	&dev_attr_caps.attr,
+	&dev_attr_cancel.attr,
+	&dev_attr_durations.attr,
+	&dev_attr_timeouts.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group i2c_atmel_attr_grp = {
+	.attrs = i2c_atmel_attrs
+};
+
+static bool i2c_atmel_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct tpm_vendor_specific i2c_atmel = {
+	.status = i2c_atmel_read_status,
+	.recv = i2c_atmel_recv,
+	.send = i2c_atmel_send,
+	.cancel = i2c_atmel_cancel,
+	.req_complete_mask = ATMEL_STS_OK,
+	.req_complete_val = ATMEL_STS_OK,
+	.req_canceled = i2c_atmel_req_canceled,
+	.attr_group = &i2c_atmel_attr_grp,
+	.miscdev.fops = &i2c_atmel_ops,
+};
+
+static int i2c_atmel_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
+			   const struct i2c_device_id *id)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip;
+	struct device *dev = &client->dev;
+
+	if (!i2c_check_functionality(client->adapter, I2C_FUNC_I2C))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &i2c_atmel);
+	if (!chip) {
+		dev_err(dev, "%s() error in tpm_register_hardware\n", __func__);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	chip->vendor.priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct priv_data),
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	/* Default timeouts */
+	chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM_I2C_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.irq = 0;
+
+	/* There is no known way to probe for this device, and all version
+	 * information seems to be read via TPM commands. Thus we rely on the
+	 * TPM startup process in the common code to detect the device. */
+	if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (tpm_do_selftest(chip)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_err:
+	tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+	tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int i2c_atmel_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
+{
+	struct device *dev = &(client->dev);
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (chip)
+		tpm_dev_vendor_release(chip);
+	tpm_remove_hardware(dev);
+	kfree(chip);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct i2c_device_id i2c_atmel_id[] = {
+	{I2C_DRIVER_NAME, 0},
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, i2c_atmel_id);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF
+static const struct of_device_id i2c_atmel_of_match[] = {
+	{.compatible = "atmel,at97sc3204t"},
+	{},
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, i2c_atmel_of_match);
+#endif
+
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(i2c_atmel_pm_ops, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
+
+static struct i2c_driver i2c_atmel_driver = {
+	.id_table = i2c_atmel_id,
+	.probe = i2c_atmel_probe,
+	.remove = i2c_atmel_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name = I2C_DRIVER_NAME,
+		.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+		.pm = &i2c_atmel_pm_ops,
+		.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(i2c_atmel_of_match),
+	},
+};
+
+module_i2c_driver(i2c_atmel_driver);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Atmel TPM I2C Driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b3f2436addff1a18db44bf6abff7a1bd14fc4696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 01:12:15 +0200
Subject: tpm: Fix module name description in Kconfig for tpm_i2c_infineon

This patch changes the displayed module name from
tpm_tis_i2c_infineon to its actual name tpm_i2c_infineon.

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index f9085860b716..dd7a82bfa7cf 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ config TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON
 	  Specification 0.20 say Yes and it will be accessible from within
 	  Linux.
 	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module
-	  will be called tpm_tis_i2c_infineon.
+	  will be called tpm_i2c_infineon.
 
 config TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON
 	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Nuvoton)"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4ef4c943a0eabd2e0cd37d07c3a6b1da8e73efdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 01:14:47 +0200
Subject: tpm: use tabs instead of whitespaces in Kconfig

just like the other entries

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index dd7a82bfa7cf..1a65838888cd 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -101,14 +101,14 @@ config TCG_IBMVTPM
 	  as a module, choose M here; the module will be called tpm_ibmvtpm.
 
 config TCG_ST33_I2C
-        tristate "STMicroelectronics ST33 I2C TPM"
-        depends on I2C
-        depends on GPIOLIB
-        ---help---
-        If you have a TPM security chip from STMicroelectronics working with
-        an I2C bus say Yes and it will be accessible from within Linux.
-        To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module will be
-        called tpm_stm_st33_i2c.
+	tristate "STMicroelectronics ST33 I2C TPM"
+	depends on I2C
+	depends on GPIOLIB
+	---help---
+	  If you have a TPM security chip from STMicroelectronics working with
+	  an I2C bus say Yes and it will be accessible from within Linux.
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module will be
+	  called tpm_stm_st33_i2c.
 
 config TCG_XEN
 	tristate "XEN TPM Interface"
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 089bc8e95ae07b1ada14069935c30fd88204c21c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 15:56:13 +0900
Subject: ima: fix script messages

Fix checkpatch, lindent, etc, warnings/errors

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c            |  2 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  |  6 +++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c        |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 10 +++++-----
 security/integrity/integrity.h         |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 0b759e17a131..198e60903685 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 };
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-					const char *digest, int digestlen)
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
 {
 	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
index b1753e98bf9a..46408b9e62e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
-int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr)
+int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattr)
 {
 	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2d4becab8918..e3230d6a8d96 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   int func)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				 int func, enum integrity_status status)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
 		break;
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
 {
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
 		break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 38477c9c3415..5f0fd113433a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	 * against concurrent list-extension
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next,
-			    struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+	qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, struct ima_queue_entry, later);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	(*pos)++;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e9508d5bbfcf..0f359df6344c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -244,9 +244,9 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	return process_measurement(bprm->file,
-				 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
-				 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
-				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+				   (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
+				   bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
+				   MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
 	return process_measurement(file, NULL,
-				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-				 FILE_CHECK);
+				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+				   FILE_CHECK);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index c42fb7a70dee..f86731649f54 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-					const char *digest, int digestlen);
+			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
 #else
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 08de59eb144d7c41351a467442f898d720f0f15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 07:34:02 -0400
Subject: Revert "ima: policy for RAMFS"

This reverts commit 4c2c392763a682354fac65b6a569adec4e4b5387.

Everything in the initramfs should be measured and appraised,
but until the initramfs has extended attribute support, at
least measured.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 399433ad614e..a9c3d3cd1990 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ee08997fee16f10be23c9748d609dbdf3baab8e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 15:40:01 +0300
Subject: crypto: provide single place for hash algo information

This patch provides a single place for information about hash algorithms,
such as hash sizes and kernel driver names, which will be used by IMA
and the public key code.

Changelog:
- Fix sparse and checkpatch warnings
- Move hash algo enums to uapi for userspace signing functions.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---
 crypto/Kconfig                 |  3 +++
 crypto/Makefile                |  1 +
 crypto/hash_info.c             | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/hash_info.h     | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 crypto/hash_info.c
 create mode 100644 include/crypto/hash_info.h
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 69ce573f1224..ba061b091d9f 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1386,6 +1386,9 @@ config CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
 	  This option enables the user-spaces interface for symmetric
 	  key cipher algorithms.
 
+config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	bool
+
 source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
 source crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
 
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 80019ba8da3a..b3a7e807e08b 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -104,3 +104,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) += algif_skcipher.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS) += xor.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE) += async_tx/
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys/
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO) += hash_info.o
diff --git a/crypto/hash_info.c b/crypto/hash_info.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3e7ff46f26e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/hash_info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Hash Info: Hash algorithms information
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = {
+	[HASH_ALGO_MD4]		= "md4",
+	[HASH_ALGO_MD5]		= "md5",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]	= "sha1",
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160]	= "rmd160",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA256]	= "sha256",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA384]	= "sha384",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA512]	= "sha512",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA224]	= "sha224",
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_128]	= "rmd128",
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_256]	= "rmd256",
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_320]	= "rmd320",
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_256]	= "wp256",
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_384]	= "wp384",
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_512]	= "wp512",
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_128]	= "tgr128",
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_160]	= "tgr160",
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_192]	= "tgr192",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_algo_name);
+
+const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = {
+	[HASH_ALGO_MD4]		= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_MD5]		= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160]	= RMD160_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA256]	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA384]	= SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA512]	= SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA224]	= SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_128]	= RMD128_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_256]	= RMD256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_320]	= RMD320_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_256]	= WP256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_384]	= WP384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_WP_512]	= WP512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_128]	= TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_160]	= TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_192]	= TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_digest_size);
diff --git a/include/crypto/hash_info.h b/include/crypto/hash_info.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e1e5a3e5dd1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/hash_info.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Hash Info: Hash algorithms information
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_HASH_INFO_H
+#define _CRYPTO_HASH_INFO_H
+
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <crypto/md5.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/hash_info.h>
+
+/* not defined in include/crypto/ */
+#define RMD128_DIGEST_SIZE      16
+#define RMD160_DIGEST_SIZE	20
+#define RMD256_DIGEST_SIZE      32
+#define RMD320_DIGEST_SIZE      40
+
+/* not defined in include/crypto/ */
+#define WP512_DIGEST_SIZE	64
+#define WP384_DIGEST_SIZE	48
+#define WP256_DIGEST_SIZE	32
+
+/* not defined in include/crypto/ */
+#define TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+#define TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE 24
+
+extern const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
+extern const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_HASH_INFO_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h b/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ca18c45f8304
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Hash Info: Hash algorithms information
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_HASH_INFO_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_HASH_INFO_H
+
+enum hash_algo {
+	HASH_ALGO_MD4,
+	HASH_ALGO_MD5,
+	HASH_ALGO_SHA1,
+	HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160,
+	HASH_ALGO_SHA256,
+	HASH_ALGO_SHA384,
+	HASH_ALGO_SHA512,
+	HASH_ALGO_SHA224,
+	HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_128,
+	HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_256,
+	HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_320,
+	HASH_ALGO_WP_256,
+	HASH_ALGO_WP_384,
+	HASH_ALGO_WP_512,
+	HASH_ALGO_TGR_128,
+	HASH_ALGO_TGR_160,
+	HASH_ALGO_TGR_192,
+	HASH_ALGO__LAST
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_HASH_INFO_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 3fe78ca2fb1d61ea598e63fcbf38aec76b36b3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 15:58:15 +0300
Subject: keys: change asymmetric keys to use common hash definitions

This patch makes use of the newly defined common hash algorithm info,
replacing, for example, PKEY_HASH with HASH_ALGO.

Changelog:
- Lindent fixes - Mimi

CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig            |  1 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c       | 12 ------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c              | 14 +++++++-------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 12 ++++++------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      |  2 ++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |  9 ++++-----
 include/crypto/public_key.h               | 18 ++++--------------
 kernel/module_signing.c                   |  8 ++++----
 8 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 862b01fe6172..82e7d6b0c276 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 	tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype"
 	select MPILIB
 	select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	help
 	  This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling.
 	  If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 49ac8d848ed1..97eb001960b9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -36,18 +36,6 @@ const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
 
-const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
-	[PKEY_HASH_MD4]		= "md4",
-	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= "md5",
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA1]	= "sha1",
-	[PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160]	= "rmd160",
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA256]	= "sha256",
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA384]	= "sha384",
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA512]	= "sha512",
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA224]	= "sha224",
-};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo_name);
-
 const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
 	[PKEY_ID_PGP]		= "PGP",
 	[PKEY_ID_X509]		= "X509",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
index 4a6a0696f8a3..90a17f59ba28 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ static const struct {
 	size_t size;
 } RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
 #define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
-	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= _(MD5),
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA1]	= _(SHA1),
-	[PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160]	= _(RIPE_MD_160),
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA256]	= _(SHA256),
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA384]	= _(SHA384),
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA512]	= _(SHA512),
-	[PKEY_HASH_SHA224]	= _(SHA224),
+	[HASH_ALGO_MD5]		= _(MD5),
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]	= _(SHA1),
+	[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160]	= _(RIPE_MD_160),
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA256]	= _(SHA256),
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA384]	= _(SHA384),
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA512]	= _(SHA512),
+	[HASH_ALGO_SHA224]	= _(SHA224),
 #undef _
 };
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 144201ccba0c..29893162497c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -154,32 +154,32 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
 
 	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA384;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA512;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 
 	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
-		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA224;
 		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 87d9cc26f630..04c81bd0f3f2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
 	struct tm	valid_from;
 	struct tm	valid_to;
+	enum pkey_algo	pkey_algo : 8;		/* Public key algorithm */
+	enum hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
 	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
 	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 6abc27f2e8a5..0a6bfad54916 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	    cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
 	    !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] ||
 	    !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] ||
-	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
+	    !hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
 		ret = -ENOPKG;
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
@@ -213,9 +213,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
-	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
-		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
-		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
+	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s\n",
+		 hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
 
 	if (!cert->fingerprint) {
 		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index b34fda4dcabf..fc09732613ad 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
 
 #include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 enum pkey_algo {
 	PKEY_ALGO_DSA,
@@ -25,19 +26,8 @@ enum pkey_algo {
 extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
 extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
 
-enum pkey_hash_algo {
-	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
-	PKEY_HASH_MD5,
-	PKEY_HASH_SHA1,
-	PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160,
-	PKEY_HASH_SHA256,
-	PKEY_HASH_SHA384,
-	PKEY_HASH_SHA512,
-	PKEY_HASH_SHA224,
-	PKEY_HASH__LAST
-};
-
-extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
+/* asymmetric key implementation supports only up to SHA224 */
+#define PKEY_HASH__LAST		(HASH_ALGO_SHA224 + 1)
 
 enum pkey_id_type {
 	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
@@ -91,7 +81,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
 	u8 digest_size;			/* Number of bytes in digest */
 	u8 nr_mpi;			/* Occupancy of mpi[] */
 	enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
-	enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
+	enum hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
 	union {
 		MPI mpi[2];
 		struct {
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 0b6b870dc5e4..be5b8fac4bd0 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  */
 struct module_signature {
 	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [enum pkey_algo] */
-	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
+	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
 	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [enum pkey_id_type] */
 	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name */
 	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier */
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct module_signature {
 /*
  * Digest the module contents.
  */
-static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
+static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum hash_algo hash,
 						    const void *mod,
 						    unsigned long modlen)
 {
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
 	 */
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
 
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
 	if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
-	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
+	    !hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
 	key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c7c8bb237fdbff932b5e431aebee5ce862ea07d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:43:56 +0300
Subject: ima: provide support for arbitrary hash algorithms

In preparation of supporting more hash algorithms with larger hash sizes
needed for signature verification, this patch replaces the 20 byte sized
digest, with a more flexible structure.  The new structure includes the
hash algorithm, digest size, and digest.

Changelog:
- recalculate filedata hash for the measurement list, if the signature
  hash digest size is greater than 20 bytes.
- use generic HASH_ALGO_
- make ima_calc_file_hash static
- scripts lindent and checkpatch fixes

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h     |  2 --
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig           |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  7 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c         | 32 +++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c    | 20 +++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c      | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  6 ++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h           | 15 ++++++++--
 9 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 04c81bd0f3f2..87d9cc26f630 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
 	struct tm	valid_from;
 	struct tm	valid_to;
-	enum pkey_algo	pkey_algo : 8;		/* Public key algorithm */
-	enum hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
 	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
 	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 0a6bfad54916..f83300b6e8c1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
-	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s\n",
+	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
+		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
 		 hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
 
 	if (!cert->fingerprint) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 39196abaff0d..e6628e783df1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index b3dd616560f7..eb86032f4f1e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
-extern char *ima_hash;
+extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
 /* IMA inode template definition */
@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
 int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
+			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1c03e8f1e0e1..e531fe22e582 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 	int result;
+	struct ima_digest_data hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
 	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
@@ -51,14 +52,14 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 
 	if (!violation) {
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-						entry->template_len,
-						entry->digest);
+					      entry->template_len, &hash);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
 					    entry->template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
+		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.digest, hash.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
 	return result;
@@ -147,8 +148,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
-		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
+		/* use default hash algorithm */
+		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
 		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
 			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
@@ -196,7 +198,21 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	if (iint->ima_hash.algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct ima_digest_data hash;
+
+		hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash);
+		if (result)
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+					    result, 0);
+		else
+			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.digest,
+			       hash.length);
+	} else
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash.digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash.length);
 	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -212,14 +228,14 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1];
+	char hash[(iint->ima_hash.length * 2) + 1];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
-		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash.length; i++)
+		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash.digest[i]);
 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index e3230d6a8d96..3833b0fa7108 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			  struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	iint->ima_hash.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
 	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
-				      sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0);
+				     &iint->ima_hash.type,
+				     1 + iint->ima_hash.length, 0);
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -159,8 +159,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
-			    IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc - 1 == iint->ima_hash.length)
+			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash.length);
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (rc) {
 			cause = "invalid-hash";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -172,8 +176,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
 					     xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
-					     iint->ima_xattr.digest,
-					     IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash.length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		} else if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index a02e0791cf15..2fd178651467 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
@@ -28,10 +29,11 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
 
-	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ima_hash, 0, 0);
+	ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm);
-		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", ima_hash, rc);
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
+		       hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -40,17 +42,19 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 /*
  * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
  */
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
+static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
+				  struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				  struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
 	char *rbuf;
 	int rc, read = 0;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
@@ -85,17 +89,42 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 	}
 	kfree(rbuf);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (hash->algo != ima_hash_algo && hash->algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash->algo], 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+			       hash_algo_name[hash->algo], rc);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm);
+
+	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
  */
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest)
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -105,7 +134,11 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest)
 	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, data, len, digest);
+	/* this function uses default algo */
+	hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(ima_shash_tfm);
+
+	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
 }
 
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 0f359df6344c..7708c2120d9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -35,11 +36,12 @@ int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 int ima_appraise;
 #endif
 
-char *ima_hash = "sha1";
+int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
-		ima_hash = "md5";
+		ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index f86731649f54..0b02ea868e30 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -59,20 +59,29 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
 	u8 type;
 	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-}  __attribute__((packed));
+} __packed;
+
+#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	64
+
+struct ima_digest_data {
+	u8 algo;
+	u8 length;
+	u8 type;
+	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
 
 /* integrity data associated with an inode */
 struct integrity_iint_cache {
-	struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
+	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned long flags;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
 	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+	struct ima_digest_data ima_hash;
 };
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d3634d0f426bdeb433cb288bdbb0a5e16cf3dbbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:44:04 +0300
Subject: ima: read and use signature hash algorithm

All files on the filesystem, currently, are hashed using the same hash
algorithm.  In preparation for files from different packages being
signed using different hash algorithms, this patch adds support for
reading the signature hash algorithm from the 'security.ima' extended
attribute and calculates the appropriate file data hash based on it.

Changelog:
- fix scripts Lindent and checkpatch msgs - Mimi
- fix md5 support for older version, which occupied 20 bytes in the
  xattr, not the expected 16 bytes.  Fix the comparison to compare
  only the first 16 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 11 ---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h           | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c       | 12 ++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 11 +++++++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h         | 11 +++++++++
 6 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index b4754667659d..9eae4809006b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -19,17 +19,6 @@
 
 #include "integrity.h"
 
-/*
- * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
- */
-struct signature_v2_hdr {
-	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
-	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
-	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific*/
-	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
-	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
-} __packed;
-
 /*
  * Request an asymmetric key.
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index eb86032f4f1e..efcdef2bf1bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -99,7 +99,9 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file);
+			    struct file *file,
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+			    int *xattr_len);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -132,17 +134,25 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   int func);
+void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		       struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
 					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
-					   const unsigned char *filename)
+					   const unsigned char *filename,
+					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+					   int xattr_len)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -163,6 +173,19 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
+
+static inline void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+				     int xattr_len,
+				     struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index e531fe22e582..1dba98e2d7e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -139,17 +139,27 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file)
+			    struct file *file,
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+			    int *xattr_len)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
 
+	if (xattr_value)
+		*xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_dentry, xattr_value);
+
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
 		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+		if (xattr_value)
+			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len,
+					  &iint->ima_hash);
+
 		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
 		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3833b0fa7108..00708a3052cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -107,6 +107,34 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
 	}
 }
 
+void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		       struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+
+	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 0 || xattr_len <= 1 + sizeof(*sig))
+		return;
+
+	sig = (typeof(sig)) xattr_value->digest;
+
+	if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || sig->version != 2)
+		return;
+
+	hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+}
+
+int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return 0;
+
+	return vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value,
+				  0, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
@@ -116,23 +144,22 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			     int xattr_len)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	const char *op = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
-	int rc;
+	int rc = xattr_len;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
-				0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
 		if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
 			goto out;
@@ -159,7 +186,10 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (rc - 1 == iint->ima_hash.length)
+		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash.length)
+			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+			 */
 			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash.length);
@@ -207,7 +237,6 @@ out:
 		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
 	}
 	ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
-	kfree(xattr_value);
 	return status;
 }
 
@@ -223,7 +252,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 7708c2120d9c..95b5df2c6501 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+	int xattr_len = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -187,7 +189,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out_digsig;
 
@@ -198,7 +203,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
@@ -207,6 +213,7 @@ out_digsig:
 		rc = -EACCES;
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	kfree(xattr_value);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0b02ea868e30..ea2318983d97 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ */
+struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
+	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
+	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
+	uint16_t sig_size;	/* signature size */
+	uint8_t sig[0];		/* signature payload */
+} __packed;
+
 /* integrity data associated with an inode */
 struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b1aaab22e263d0cca1effe319b7d2bf895444219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:12:03 +0900
Subject: ima: pass full xattr with the signature

For possibility to use xattr type for new signature formats,
pass full xattr to the signature verification function.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 1 +
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 198e60903685..b4af4ebc5be2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -44,9 +44,10 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 		}
 	}
 
-	switch (sig[0]) {
+	switch (sig[1]) {
 	case 1:
-		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+		/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
+		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
 				     digest, digestlen);
 	case 2:
 		return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index af9b6852f4e1..336b3ddfe63f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	xattr_len = rc - 1;
+	xattr_len = rc;
 
 	/* check value type */
 	switch (xattr_data->type) {
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
-					xattr_data->digest, xattr_len,
+					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (!rc) {
 			/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 00708a3052cc..e1865a6e80ec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
-					     xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value, rc,
 					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
 					     iint->ima_hash.length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index ea2318983d97..aead6b2b5488 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
  * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
  */
 struct signature_v2_hdr {
+	uint8_t type;		/* xattr type */
 	uint8_t version;	/* signature format version */
 	uint8_t	hash_algo;	/* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */
 	uint32_t keyid;		/* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a35c3fb6490cc1d3446e4781693408100113c4fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 10:44:04 +0300
Subject: ima: use dynamically allocated hash storage

For each inode in the IMA policy, an iint is allocated.  To support
larger hash digests, the iint digest size changed from 20 bytes to
the maximum supported hash digest size.  Instead of allocating the
maximum size, which most likely is not needed, this patch dynamically
allocates the needed hash storage.

Changelog:
- fix krealloc bug

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/iint.c             |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++-----
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  4 +--
 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 74522dbd10a6..c49d3f14cbec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 
 static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1dba98e2d7e9..5a7942e20814 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 	int result;
-	struct ima_digest_data hash;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
 	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
@@ -52,14 +55,14 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 
 	if (!violation) {
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-					      entry->template_len, &hash);
+					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
 					    entry->template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
-		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.digest, hash.length);
+		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
 	return result;
@@ -146,6 +149,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	if (xattr_value)
 		*xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_dentry, xattr_value);
@@ -154,16 +161,23 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
-		iint->ima_hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
 
 		if (xattr_value)
-			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len,
-					  &iint->ima_hash);
+			ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len, &hash.hdr);
 
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &iint->ima_hash);
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 		if (!result) {
-			iint->version = i_version;
-			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
+						GFP_NOFS);
+			if (tmpbuf) {
+				iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+				memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+				iint->version = i_version;
+				iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+			} else
+				result = -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
 	if (result)
@@ -208,21 +222,24 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	if (iint->ima_hash.algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct ima_digest_data hash;
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct {
+			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		} hash;
 
-		hash.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash);
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result)
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
 					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
 					    result, 0);
 		else
-			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.digest,
-			       hash.length);
+			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+			       hash.hdr.length);
 	} else
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash.digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash.length);
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash->length);
 	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
@@ -238,14 +255,14 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(iint->ima_hash.length * 2) + 1];
+	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash.length; i++)
-		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash.digest[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
+		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index e1865a6e80ec..116630ca5ff3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_hash.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	iint->ima_hash->type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
 	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     &iint->ima_hash.type,
-				     1 + iint->ima_hash.length, 0);
+				     &iint->ima_hash->type,
+				     1 + iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash.length)
+		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
 			 */
 			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash.digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash.length);
+				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash->length);
 		else
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (rc) {
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
 					     (const char *)xattr_value, rc,
-					     iint->ima_hash.digest,
-					     iint->ima_hash.length);
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		} else if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index aead6b2b5488..5429ca59125b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 algo;
 	u8 length;
 	u8 type;
-	u8 digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 digest[0];
 } __packed;
 
 /*
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
-	struct ima_digest_data ima_hash;
+	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
 };
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 140d802240a4ba3351494b4ab199964b96f87493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 20:29:47 -0400
Subject: ima: differentiate between template hash and file data hash sizes

The TPM v1.2 limits the template hash size to 20 bytes.  This
patch differentiates between the template hash size, as defined
in the ima_template_entry, and the file data hash size, as
defined in the ima_template_data.  Subsequent patches add support
for different file data hash algorithms.

Change log:
- hash digest definition in ima_store_template() should be TPM_DIGEST_SIZE

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c     | 10 +++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c  |  4 ++--
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index efcdef2bf1bc..52393edfbfd9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct ima_template_data {
 };
 
 struct ima_template_entry {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
+	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
 	const char *template_name;
 	int template_len;
 	struct ima_template_data template;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 5a7942e20814..2cc5dcc6bdeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	int result;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
 	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 2fd178651467..872c6698067c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
  */
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 {
-	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc, i;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
 		ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
 		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 	if (!rc)
 		crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 5f0fd113433a..c35cfb5b3c5e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
 
 	/* 2nd: template digest */
-	ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
 	namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
@@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest)
+static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
 }
 
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
 
 	switch (show) {
 	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
-		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest);
+		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
 		break;
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 
 	/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
-	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest);
+	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
 	seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 162ea723db3d..9d0243c10558 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ err_out:
 
 int __init ima_init(void)
 {
-	u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc;
 
 	ima_used_chip = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index ff63fe00c195..e63ff3369f10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
 	key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
-		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		if (rc == 0) {
 			ret = qe;
 			break;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
 	char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
 	int audit_info = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 723326b927b675daf4223fe31d7428eca68f194b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2013 17:40:01 +0300
Subject: ima: provide dedicated hash algo allocation function

This patch provides dedicated hash algo allocation and
deallocation function which can be used by different clients.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 872c6698067c..e5d3ebf18436 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -39,6 +39,28 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+			       hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
+		}
+	}
+	return tfm;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
  */
@@ -57,6 +79,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
@@ -98,25 +122,16 @@ out:
 
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (hash->algo != ima_hash_algo && hash->algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash->algo], 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
-			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
-			       hash_algo_name[hash->algo], rc);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
-
-	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
 	rc = ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(file, hash, tfm);
 
-	if (tfm != ima_shash_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
 
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ea593993d361748e795f5eb783a5fb5144fb2df9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:24 +0200
Subject: ima: support arbitrary hash algorithms in ima_calc_buffer_hash

ima_calc_buffer_hash will be used with different hash algorithms.
This patch provides support for arbitrary hash algorithms in
ima_calc_buffer_hash.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 2cc5dcc6bdeb..bc1d1282a06f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
@@ -54,6 +55,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
 
 	if (!violation) {
+		/* this function uses default algo */
+		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
 					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index e5d3ebf18436..e2be2524a372 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -139,23 +139,39 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 /*
  * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
  */
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static int ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(const void *buf, int len,
+				    struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+				    struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
-	/* this function uses default algo */
-	hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
-	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(ima_shash_tfm);
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
 	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
 }
 
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	rc = ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 {
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 09ef54359c4ad49c01a12503b2c510b424ecf059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:25 +0200
Subject: ima: ima_calc_boot_agregate must use SHA1

With multiple hash algorithms, ima_hash_tfm is no longer guaranteed to be sha1.
Need to force to use sha1.

Changelog:
- pass ima_digest_data to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() instead of char *
  (Roberto Sassu);
- create an ima_digest_data structure in ima_add_boot_aggregate()
  (Roberto Sassu);
- pass hash->algo to ima_alloc_tfm() (Roberto Sassu, reported by Dmitry).
- "move hash definition in ima_add_boot_aggregate()" commit hunk to here.
- sparse warning fix - Fengguang Wu

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   | 10 +++++++++-
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 52393edfbfd9..e0e1cde6e674 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index e2be2524a372..22be23f13b3d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -184,16 +184,17 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 /*
  * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
  */
-int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
+					      struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	int rc, i;
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
-		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)];
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
 
-	desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
+	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
@@ -210,3 +211,20 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
 		crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest);
 	return rc;
 }
+
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int rc;
+
+	tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	rc = ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(hash->digest, tfm);
+
+	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 9d0243c10558..77cd5005f2db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
@@ -46,6 +47,10 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 1;
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
 
 	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry)
@@ -56,12 +61,15 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	if (ima_used_chip) {
 		violation = 0;
-		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest);
+		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
+		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
 	if (result < 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7d802a227b7f26c89f13dab09767e6b0aebd9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:26 +0200
Subject: ima: pass the file descriptor to ima_add_violation()

Pass the file descriptor instead of the inode to ima_add_violation(),
to make the latter consistent with ima_store_measurement() in
preparation for the new template architecture.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++---
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e0e1cde6e674..d7bec6f37b61 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bc1d1282a06f..98160a3259fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
  * value is invalidated.
  */
-void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 95b5df2c6501..5e8b1f7becd2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -94,10 +94,9 @@ out:
 		pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
-				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(inode, pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(file, pathname,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9803d413f41db86fdf0097f1af781fe2e68f474c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:27 +0200
Subject: ima: pass the filename argument up to ima_add_template_entry()

Pass the filename argument to ima_add_template_entry() in order to
eliminate a dependency on template specific data (third argument of
integrity_audit_msg).

This change is required because, with the new template management
mechanism, the generation of a new measurement entry will be performed
by new specific functions (introduced in next patches) and the current IMA
code will not be aware anymore of how data is stored in the entry payload.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h       | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c   | 9 +++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c  | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 6 +++---
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d7bec6f37b61..27d2ffbd0763 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ int ima_fs_init(void);
 void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
 int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-			   const char *op, struct inode *inode);
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
 			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-		       struct inode *inode);
+		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 98160a3259fe..a0fe5041310a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
-		       int violation, struct inode *inode)
+		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
+		       const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		}
 		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
 	}
-	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
+	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
 	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
 err_out:
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 	if (result < 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 77cd5005f2db..d42fac308aaa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
 		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
 	return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index e63ff3369f10..d85e99761f4f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
  * and extend the pcr.
  */
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-			   const char *op, struct inode *inode)
+			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
+			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
@@ -141,8 +142,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	}
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-			    entry->template.file_name,
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 			    op, audit_cause, result, audit_info);
 	return result;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7bc5f447ce9d01e19394b5399bf1a4fcebf0f8dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:28 +0200
Subject: ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API

Instead of allocating and initializing the template entry from multiple
places (eg. boot aggregate, violation, and regular measurements), this
patch defines a new function called ima_alloc_init_template().  The new
function allocates and initializes the measurement entry with the inode
digest and the filename.

In respect to the current behavior, it truncates the file name passed
in the 'filename' argument if the latter's size is greater than 255 bytes
and the passed file descriptor is NULL.

Changelog:
- initialize 'hash' variable for non TPM case - Mimi
- conform to expectation for 'iint' to be defined as a pointer. - Mimi
- add missing 'file' dependency for recalculating file hash. - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  3 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 24 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 27d2ffbd0763..da03d3389619 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a0fe5041310a..29dd43de823a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -23,6 +23,62 @@
 
 static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
 
+/*
+ * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
+ */
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+{
+	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	e = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!e)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(&(e)->template, 0, sizeof(e->template));
+	if (!iint)		/* IMA measurement violation entry */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct {
+			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+		} hash;
+
+		if (!file) {
+			result = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+
+		inode = file_inode(file);
+		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+		hash.hdr.length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+		if (result) {
+			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+					    filename, "collect_data",
+					    "failed", result, 0);
+			goto out_free;
+		} else
+			memcpy(e->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
+			       hash.hdr.length);
+	} else
+		memcpy(e->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
+		       iint->ima_hash->length);
+out:
+	strcpy(e->template.file_name,
+	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX && file != NULL) ?
+	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
+	*entry = e;
+	return 0;
+out_free:
+	kfree(e);
+	return result;
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
  *
@@ -90,13 +146,11 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry) {
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, &entry);
+	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
 	}
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
 		kfree(entry);
@@ -220,34 +274,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry) {
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, &entry);
+	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
 		return;
 	}
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct {
-			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-		} hash;
-
-		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
-		if (result)
-			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-					    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
-					    result, 0);
-		else
-			memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-			       hash.hdr.length);
-	} else
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash->length);
-	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
-	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
-	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index d42fac308aaa..50e15e6336c4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -43,34 +43,36 @@ int ima_used_chip;
 static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
 	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
-	int violation = 1;
+	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!entry)
-		goto err_out;
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+	iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+	iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
 
-	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name,
-		IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 	if (ima_used_chip) {
-		violation = 0;
-		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
-		memcpy(entry->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-		       hash.hdr.length);
 	}
+
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+					 &entry);
+	if (result < 0)
+		return;
+
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From adf53a778a0a5a5dc9103509da4a9719046e5310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:29 +0200
Subject: ima: new templates management mechanism
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
and pathname.  The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1).  The
pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters.  To
overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
templates.

The main reason to introduce this feature is that, each time a new
template is defined, the functions that generate and display the
measurement list would include the code for handling a new format and,
thus, would significantly grow over time.

This patch set solves this problem by separating the template management
from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the definition
of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine which
information should be included in the measurement list, and a template
field, to generate and display data of a given type.

To define a new template field, developers define the field identifier
and implement two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate
and display measurement entries.  Initially, this patch set defines the
following template fields (support for additional data types will be
added later):
 - 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
        calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
 - 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to
        255 bytes;
 - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
           algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
           prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
 - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.

Defining a new template descriptor requires specifying the template format,
a string of field identifiers separated by the '|' character.  This patch
set defines the following template descriptors:
 - "ima": its format is 'd|n';
 - "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'

Further details about the new template architecture can be found in
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt.

Changelog:
- don't defer calling ima_init_template() - Mimi
- don't define ima_lookup_template_desc() until used - Mimi
- squashed with documentation patch - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/security/00-INDEX          |   2 +
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt |  87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  29 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c    | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c

diff --git a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
index 414235c1fcfc..45c82fd3e9d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
+++ b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
@@ -22,3 +22,5 @@ keys.txt
 	- description of the kernel key retention service.
 tomoyo.txt
 	- documentation on the TOMOYO Linux Security Module.
+IMA-templates.txt
+	- documentation on the template management mechanism for IMA.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a777e5f1df5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+                       IMA Template Management Mechanism
+
+
+==== INTRODUCTION ====
+
+The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
+and pathname. The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1).
+The pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters.
+To overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
+necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
+templates. For example, information that could be possibly reported are
+the inode UID/GID or the LSM labels either of the inode and of the process
+that is accessing it.
+
+However, the main problem to introduce this feature is that, each time
+a new template is defined, the functions that generate and display
+the measurements list would include the code for handling a new format
+and, thus, would significantly grow over the time.
+
+The proposed solution solves this problem by separating the template
+management from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the
+definition of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine
+which information should be included in the measurement list; a template
+field, to generate and display data of a given type.
+
+Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
+a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
+two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
+measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
+specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
+by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
+to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
+template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
+possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
+the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
+all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
+of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
+
+After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
+(new function defined within the patches for the new template management
+mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
+descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
+introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
+phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
+the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
+but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
+associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
+to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
+
+The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
+The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
+the template descriptor used to produce that entry and call the show()
+method for each item of the array of template fields structures.
+
+
+
+==== SUPPORTED TEMPLATE FIELDS AND DESCRIPTORS ====
+
+In the following, there is the list of supported template fields
+('<identifier>': description), that can be used to define new template
+descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
+(support for more data types will be added later):
+
+ - 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
+        calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
+ - 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to 255 bytes;
+ - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
+           algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
+           prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
+ - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.
+
+
+Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
+ - "ima": its format is 'd|n';
+ - "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'.
+
+
+
+==== USE ====
+
+To specify the template descriptor to be used to generate measurement entries,
+currently the following methods are supported:
+
+ - select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
+   configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
+ - specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
+   the 'ima_template=' parameter.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 56dfee7cbf61..7fe4ae37dbea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index da03d3389619..c85718f1f623 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -36,12 +36,39 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
 #define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
 
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN	16
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX	15
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
+/* IMA template field data definition */
+struct ima_field_data {
+	u8 *data;
+	u32 len;
+};
+
+/* IMA template field definition */
+struct ima_template_field {
+	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
+	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+};
+
+/* IMA template descriptor definition */
+struct ima_template_desc {
+	char *name;
+	char *fmt;
+	int num_fields;
+	struct ima_template_field **fields;
+};
+
 /* IMA inode template definition */
 struct ima_template_data {
 	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
@@ -79,6 +106,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 
+int ima_init_template(void);
+
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
  */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 50e15e6336c4..f84aec5412f3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	rc = ima_init_crypto();
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
+	rc = ima_init_template();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
 	ima_init_policy();
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7e86783ccf51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template.c
+ *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
+ */
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
+};
+
+static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+};
+
+static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
+							const char *field_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported_fields); i++)
+		if (strncmp(supported_fields[i].field_id, field_id,
+			    IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) == 0)
+			return &supported_fields[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ima_template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
+{
+	char c;
+	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
+	int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+	while (i < template_fmt_len) {
+		c = template_fmt[i];
+		if (c == '|')
+			j++;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return j + 1;
+}
+
+static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
+				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+				     int *num_fields)
+{
+	char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt;
+	int template_num_fields = ima_template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
+	int i, result = 0;
+
+	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (*fields == NULL) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
+	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
+		struct ima_template_field *f = ima_lookup_template_field(c);
+
+		if (!f) {
+			result = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		(*fields)[i] = f;
+	}
+	*num_fields = i;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(*fields);
+	*fields = NULL;
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int init_defined_templates(void)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	/* Init defined templates. */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
+		struct ima_template_desc *template = &defined_templates[i];
+
+		result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+						   &(template->fields),
+						   &(template->num_fields));
+		if (result < 0)
+			return result;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+int ima_init_template(void)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	result = init_defined_templates();
+	if (result < 0)
+		return result;
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 3ce1217d6cd5dfa82a9db5c2a999cc1bb01490d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:30 +0200
Subject: ima: define template fields library and new helpers

This patch defines a library containing two initial template fields,
inode digest (d) and file name (n), the 'ima' template descriptor,
whose format is 'd|n', and two helper functions,
ima_write_template_field_data() and ima_show_template_field_data().

Changelog:
- replace ima_eventname_init() parameter NULL checking with BUG_ON.
  (suggested by Mimi)
- include "new template fields for inode digest (d) and file name (n)"
  definitions to fix a compiler warning.  - Mimi
- unnecessary to prefix static function names with 'ima_'. remove
  prefix to resolve Lindent formatting changes. - Mimi
- abbreviated/removed inline comments - Mimi
- always send the template field length - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile           |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |   5 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c           |   4 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  15 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |  31 +++++
 6 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 7fe4ae37dbea..d79263d2fdbf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c85718f1f623..e1f081d65dbf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN	16
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX	15
 
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima"
+#define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
@@ -105,6 +108,8 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
 
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index c35cfb5b3c5e..414862e1904b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 }
 
-static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
+void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
 {
 	while (datalen--)
 		seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 {
 	int i;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 7e86783ccf51..810042264396 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -13,15 +13,20 @@
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
 #include "ima.h"
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
+	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME,.fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+	{.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
+	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
-static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
-							const char *field_id)
+static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -32,7 +37,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field *ima_lookup_template_field(
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int ima_template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
+static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt)
 {
 	char c;
 	int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt);
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
 	char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt;
-	int template_num_fields = ima_template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
+	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
 	int i, result = 0;
 
 	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
@@ -66,7 +71,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt,
 	}
 	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
 	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
-		struct ima_template_field *f = ima_lookup_template_field(c);
+		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
 
 		if (!f) {
 			result = -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e13fc7c04ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.c
+ *      Library of supported template fields.
+ */
+#include "ima_template_lib.h"
+
+enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING };
+static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
+	u32 buflen;
+
+	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
+		buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+		buflen = datalen + 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		buflen = datalen;
+	}
+
+	buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace all space characters with underscore for event names and
+	 * strings. This avoid that, during the parsing of a measurements list,
+	 * filenames with spaces or that end with the suffix ' (deleted)' are
+	 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
+	 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
+	 */
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+		for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
+			if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
+				*buf_ptr = '_';
+	}
+
+	field_data->data = buf;
+	field_data->len = buflen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
+		ima_print_digest(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+		break;
+	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+		seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
+					  enum ima_show_type show,
+					  enum data_formats datafmt,
+					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+	if (!field_data->len)
+		return;
+	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+}
+
+static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
+					 enum ima_show_type show,
+					 enum data_formats datafmt,
+					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	switch (show) {
+	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
+		ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+}
+
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	} hash;
+	u8 *cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int result;
+
+	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
+		goto out;
+
+	if (iint->ima_hash->algo == ima_hash_algo) {
+		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!file)		/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	inode = file_inode(file);
+	hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+	if (result) {
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+				    filename, "collect_data",
+				    "failed", result, 0);
+		return result;
+	}
+out:
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					     DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event.
+ */
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
+	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
+
+	if (filename) {
+		cur_filename = filename;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
+
+		if (cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (file) {
+		cur_filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
+	} else
+		/*
+		 * Truncate filename if the latter is too long and
+		 * the file descriptor is not available.
+		 */
+		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
+out:
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
+					     DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, field_data);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2cecc83a928d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Author: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_template_lib.h
+ *      Header for the library of supported template fields.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4d7aeee73f5304bf195aa2904f8eb1d7b2e8fe52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:32 +0200
Subject: ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

This patch adds support for the new template 'ima-ng', whose format
is defined as 'd-ng|n-ng'.  These new field definitions remove the
size limitations of the original 'ima' template.  Further, the 'd-ng'
field prefixes the inode digest with the hash algorithim, when
displaying the new larger digest sizes.

Change log:
- scripts/Lindent fixes  - Mimi
- "always true comparison" - reported by Fengguang Wu, resolved Dmitry
- initialize hash_algo variable to HASH_ALGO__LAST
- always prefix digest with hash algorithm - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |   7 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |   8 ++
 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 810042264396..bf38d1af3cfd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
-	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME,.fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
+	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
+	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -24,6 +25,10 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
 	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index e13fc7c04ebc..7d841448f246 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -12,9 +12,25 @@
  * File: ima_template_lib.c
  *      Library of supported template fields.
  */
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
-enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING };
+static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
+{
+	if (algo == HASH_ALGO_SHA1 || algo == HASH_ALGO_MD5)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+enum data_formats {
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
+	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
+	DATA_FMT_STRING
+};
+
 static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
@@ -62,12 +78,22 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
+	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+
 	switch (datafmt) {
+	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
+		buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
+		if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
+			seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+
+		/* skip ':' and '\0' */
+		buf_ptr += 2;
+		buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
-		ima_print_digest(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+		ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen);
 		break;
 	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
-		seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
+		seq_printf(m, "%s", buf_ptr);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -108,14 +134,59 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
 }
 
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+				     field_data);
+}
+
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
+static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
+				       struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+				       bool size_limit)
+{
+	/*
+	 * digest formats:
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
+	 *  - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+	 *    where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algoritm is not
+	 *    SHA1 or MD5
+	 */
+	u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
+	u32 offset = 0;
+
+	if (!size_limit) {
+		fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
+		if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+			offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1,
+					   "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+		buffer[offset] = ':';
+		offset += 2;
+	}
+
+	if (digest)
+		memcpy(buffer + offset, digest, digestsize);
+	else
+		/*
+		 * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation.
+		 * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset of
+		 * IMA_DIGEST_SIZE.
+		 */
+		offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize,
+					     fmt, field_data);
+}
+
 /*
- * This function writes the digest of an event.
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -125,8 +196,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
-	u8 *cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
-	u32 cur_digestsize = IMA_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	int result;
 
@@ -135,7 +206,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo == ima_hash_algo) {
+	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
 		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
 		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
 		goto out;
@@ -145,7 +216,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	inode = file_inode(file);
-	hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
+	hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
+	    ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
 	if (result) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
@@ -153,20 +225,46 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 				    "failed", result, 0);
 		return result;
 	}
+	cur_digest = hash.hdr.digest;
+	cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
 out:
-	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
-					     DATA_FMT_DIGEST, field_data);
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, -1,
+					   field_data, true);
 }
 
 /*
- * This function writes the name of an event.
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+
+	/* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
+	if (!iint)
+		goto out;
+
+	cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+out:
+	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+					   hash_algo, field_data, false);
+}
+
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     struct file *file,
+				     const unsigned char *filename,
+				     struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+				     bool size_limit)
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+	enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
+	    DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
 
 	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
 
@@ -174,7 +272,7 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		cur_filename = filename;
 		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
 
-		if (cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
+		if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -189,5 +287,27 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
 out:
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
-					     DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, field_data);
+					     fmt, field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
+					 field_data, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
+ */
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
+					 field_data, false);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 2cecc83a928d..16c5e7810234 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 
 void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+				 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
@@ -28,4 +30,10 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a71dc65d30a472409f05d247f4eab91b14acf2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:33 +0200
Subject: ima: switch to new template management mechanism

This patch performs the switch to the new template mechanism by modifying
the functions ima_alloc_init_template(), ima_measurements_show() and
ima_ascii_measurements_show(). The old function ima_template_show() was
removed as it is no longer needed. Also, if the template descriptor used
to generate a measurement entry is not 'ima', the whole length of field
data stored for an entry is provided before the data itself through the
binary_runtime_measurement interface.

Changelog:
- unnecessary to use strncmp() (Mimi Zohar)
- create new variable 'field' in ima_alloc_init_template() (Roberto Sassu)
- use GFP_NOFS flag in ima_alloc_init_template() (Roberto Sassu)
- new variable 'num_fields' in ima_store_template() (Roberto Sassu,
  proposed by Mimi Zohar)
- rename ima_calc_buffer_hash/template_hash() to ima_calc_field_array_hash(),
  something more generic (Mimi, requested by Dmitry)
- sparse error fix - Fengguang Wu
- fix lindent warnings
- always include the field length in the template data length
- include the template field length variable size in the template data length
- include both the template field data and field length in the template digest
  calculation. Simplifies verifying the template digest. (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 19 ++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 75 ++++++++++++-----------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c   | 34 ++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c       | 54 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 22 ++++++++++
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e1f081d65dbf..72d013e190b1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -72,17 +72,11 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
 	struct ima_template_field **fields;
 };
 
-/* IMA inode template definition */
-struct ima_template_data {
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
-	char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1];	/* name + \0 */
-};
-
 struct ima_template_entry {
 	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
-	const char *template_name;
-	int template_len;
-	struct ima_template_data template;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
+	u32 template_data_len;
+	struct ima_field_data template_data[0];	/* template related data */
 };
 
 struct ima_queue_entry {
@@ -102,14 +96,16 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len,
-			 struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
 void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
+int ima_init_template(void);
 
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
@@ -146,7 +142,6 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
-void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 29dd43de823a..baa348179527 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
-static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
-
 /*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
@@ -30,52 +28,32 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
-	struct ima_template_entry *e;
-	int result = 0;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i, result = 0;
 
-	e = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!e)
+	*entry = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry) + template_desc->num_fields *
+			 sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!*entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(&(e)->template, 0, sizeof(e->template));
-	if (!iint)		/* IMA measurement violation entry */
-		goto out;
-
-	if (iint->ima_hash->algo != ima_hash_algo) {
-		struct inode *inode;
-		struct {
-			struct ima_digest_data hdr;
-			char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-		} hash;
+	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
+		u32 len;
 
-		if (!file) {
-			result = -EINVAL;
-			goto out_free;
-		}
+		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
+					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
+		if (result != 0)
+			goto out;
 
-		inode = file_inode(file);
-		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-		hash.hdr.length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
-		if (result) {
-			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-					    filename, "collect_data",
-					    "failed", result, 0);
-			goto out_free;
-		} else
-			memcpy(e->template.digest, hash.hdr.digest,
-			       hash.hdr.length);
-	} else
-		memcpy(e->template.digest, iint->ima_hash->digest,
-		       iint->ima_hash->length);
-out:
-	strcpy(e->template.file_name,
-	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX && file != NULL) ?
-	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
-	*entry = e;
+		len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len;
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
+		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
+	}
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	return 0;
-out_free:
-	kfree(e);
+out:
+	kfree(*entry);
+	*entry = NULL;
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -101,24 +79,23 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
 	int result;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
-	entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
-	entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
-
 	if (!violation) {
+		int num_fields = entry->template_desc->num_fields;
+
 		/* this function uses default algo */
 		hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
-					      entry->template_len, &hash.hdr);
+		result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
+						   num_fields, &hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-					    entry->template_name, op,
+					    template_name, op,
 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
 			return result;
 		}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 22be23f13b3d..676e0292dfec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -137,26 +137,46 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 }
 
 /*
- * Calculate the hash of a given buffer
+ * Calculate the hash of template data
  */
-static int ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(const void *buf, int len,
-				    struct ima_digest_data *hash,
-				    struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
+					 int num_fields,
+					 struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+					 struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct shash_desc shash;
 		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)];
 	} desc;
+	int rc, i;
 
 	desc.shash.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.shash.flags = 0;
 
 	hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
 
-	return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, buf, len, hash->digest);
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
+					 (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
+					 sizeof(field_data[i].len));
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
+					 field_data[i].len);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
-int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields,
+			      struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	int rc;
@@ -165,7 +185,7 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, int len, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	rc = ima_calc_buffer_hash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+	rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, num_fields, hash, tfm);
 
 	ima_free_tfm(tfm);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 414862e1904b..d47a7c86a21d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
  *       char[20]=template digest
  *       32bit-le=template name size
  *       char[n]=template name
+ *       [eventdata length]
  *       eventdata[n]=template specific data
  */
 static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
 	int namelen;
 	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
 	e = qe->entry;
@@ -136,15 +138,22 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
-	namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
+	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
 	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
-	ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
+
+	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
+	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+		ima_putc(m, &e->template_data_len,
+			 sizeof(e->template_data_len));
 
-	/* 5th:  template specific data */
-	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
-			  IMA_SHOW_BINARY);
+	/* 6th:  template specific data */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_BINARY,
+							&e->template_data[i]);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -175,33 +184,13 @@ void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
 }
 
-void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
-{
-	struct ima_template_data *entry = e;
-	int namelen;
-
-	switch (show) {
-	case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
-		ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
-		break;
-	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
-		ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-		namelen = strlen(entry->file_name);
-		ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
-		ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen);
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
-}
-
 /* print in ascii */
 static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
 	e = qe->entry;
@@ -215,11 +204,18 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
-	seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
+	seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
 
 	/* 4th:  template specific data */
-	ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
-			  IMA_SHOW_ASCII);
+	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+		if (e->template_data[i].len == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_ASCII,
+							&e->template_data[i]);
+	}
+	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index bf38d1af3cfd..1c4cf194592c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -31,6 +31,20 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 };
 
+static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+
+static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
+		if (strcmp(defined_templates[i].name, name) == 0)
+			return defined_templates + i;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -110,6 +124,14 @@ static int init_defined_templates(void)
 	return result;
 }
 
+struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
+{
+	if (!ima_template)
+		ima_template = lookup_template_desc(IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
+
+	return ima_template;
+}
+
 int ima_init_template(void)
 {
 	int result;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 5278aa52f35003ddafda80b0243b3693f935b134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:38 +0200
Subject: ima: add audit log support for larger hashes

Different files might be signed based on different hash algorithms.
This patch prefixes the audit log measurement hash with the hash
algorithm.

Changelog:
- use generic HASH_ALGO defintions
- use ':' as delimiter between the hash algorithm and the digest
  (Roberto Sassu)
- always include the hash algorithm used when audit-logging a measurement

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index baa348179527..5fcc80695d87 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
+	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
+	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
@@ -287,7 +289,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash);
+	snprintf(algo_hash, sizeof(algo_hash), "%s:%s", algo_name, hash);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash);
 
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From add1c05dceb495a45036d66cdcbb3b2306de26c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:39 +0200
Subject: ima: defer determining the appraisal hash algorithm for 'ima'
 template

The same hash algorithm should be used for calculating the file
data hash for the IMA measurement list, as for appraising the file
data integrity.  (The appraise hash algorithm is stored in the
'security.ima' extended attribute.)  The exception is when the
reference file data hash digest, stored in the extended attribute,
is larger than the one supported by the template.  In this case,
the file data hash needs to be calculated twice, once for the
measurement list and, again, for appraisal.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5e8b1f7becd2..0b11bb49ac4f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
@@ -188,7 +189,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+			xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+	} else
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4286587dccd43d4f81fa227e413ed7e909895342 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:34 +0200
Subject: ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template

This patch adds a Kconfig option to select the default IMA
measurement list template.  The 'ima' template limited the
filedata hash to 20 bytes and the pathname to 255 charaters.
The 'ima-ng' measurement list template permits larger hash
digests and longer pathnames.

Changelog:
- keep 'select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO' in 'config IMA' section (Kconfig)
  (Roberto Sassu);
- removed trailing whitespaces (Roberto Sassu).
- Lindent fixes

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e6628e783df1..de26cc873ae6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -46,6 +46,31 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default template"
+	default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	depends on IMA
+	help
+	  Select the default IMA measurement template.
+
+	  The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a
+	  hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
+	  limited to 255 characters.  The 'ima-ng' measurement list
+	  template permits both larger hash digests and longer
+	  pathnames.
+
+	config IMA_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima"
+	config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-ng (default)"
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
+	string
+	depends on IMA
+	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
+	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
 	depends on IMA
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 1c4cf194592c..c28ff9bf8f32 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int init_defined_templates(void)
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 {
 	if (!ima_template)
-		ima_template = lookup_template_desc(IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
-
+		ima_template =
+		    lookup_template_desc(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
 	return ima_template;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9b9d4ce592d283fc4c01da746c02a840c499bb7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:35 +0200
Subject: ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured
 default

This patch allows users to specify from the kernel command line the
template descriptor, among those defined, that will be used to generate
and display measurement entries. If an user specifies a wrong template,
IMA reverts to the template descriptor set in the kernel configuration.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt   |  5 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 1a036cd972fb..2b78cb55ac34 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1190,6 +1190,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
 			opened for read by uid=0.
 
+	ima_template=   [IMA]
+			Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
+			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+			Default: "ima-ng"
+
 	init=		[KNL]
 			Format: <full_path>
 			Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index c28ff9bf8f32..000221419f6c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
  * File: ima_template.c
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #include "ima.h"
 #include "ima_template_lib.h"
 
@@ -32,6 +34,35 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+
+static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	int template_len = strlen(str);
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
+	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
+	 */
+	template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
+	if (!template_desc)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
+	 * by the 'ima' template.
+	 */
+	if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
+	    ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
+		pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ima_template = template_desc;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e7a2ad7eb6f48ad80c70a22dd8167fb34b409466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 12:16:37 +0200
Subject: ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms

The IMA measurement list contains two hashes - a template data hash
and a filedata hash.  The template data hash is committed to the TPM,
which is limited, by the TPM v1.2 specification, to 20 bytes.  The
filedata hash is defined as 20 bytes as well.

Now that support for variable length measurement list templates was
added, the filedata hash is not limited to 20 bytes.  This patch adds
Kconfig support for defining larger default filedata hash algorithms
and replacing the builtin default with one specified on the kernel
command line.

<uapi/linux/hash_info.h> contains a list of hash algorithms.  The
Kconfig default hash algorithm is a subset of this list, but any hash
algorithm included in the list can be specified at boot, using the
'ima_hash=' kernel command line option.

Changelog v2:
- update Kconfig

Changelog:
- support hashes that are configured
- use generic HASH_ALGO_ definitions
- add Kconfig support
- hash_setup must be called only once (Dmitry)
- removed trailing whitespaces (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig      | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2b78cb55ac34..1e8761c89a2c 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1181,9 +1181,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			owned by uid=0.
 
 	ima_hash=	[IMA]
-			Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
+			Format: { md5 | sha1 | rmd160 | sha256 | sha384
+				   | sha512 | ... }
 			default: "sha1"
 
+			The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
+			in crypto/hash_info.h.
+
 	ima_tcb		[IMA]
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index de26cc873ae6..351a58ed56ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -71,6 +71,41 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
+	default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	depends on IMA
+	help
+	   Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
+	   list, integrity appraisal and audit log.  The compiled default
+	   hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command
+	   line 'ima_hash=' option.
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+		bool "SHA1 (default)"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA1
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+		bool "SHA256"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+		bool "SHA512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+
+	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+		bool "WP512"
+		depends on CRYPTO_WP512 && !IMA_TEMPLATE
+endchoice
+
+config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
+	string
+	depends on IMA
+	default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
+	default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
+	default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
+	default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
+
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
 	depends on IMA
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 0b11bb49ac4f..14d4cb557894 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -37,11 +37,32 @@ int ima_appraise;
 #endif
 
 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+static int hash_setup_done;
 
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
-	if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
-		ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i;
+
+	if (hash_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
+			ima_hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	hash_setup_done = 1;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
@@ -306,6 +327,7 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
+	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
 	error = ima_init();
 	if (!error)
 		ima_initialized = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 3ea7a56067e663278470c04fd655adf809e72d4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 11:22:51 +0300
Subject: ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr

All files labeled with 'security.ima' hashes, are hashed using the
same hash algorithm.  Changing from one hash algorithm to another,
requires relabeling the filesystem.  This patch defines a new xattr
type, which includes the hash algorithm, permitting different files
to be hashed with different algorithms.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 13 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 116630ca5ff3..734e9468aca0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -45,10 +46,22 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-	iint->ima_hash->type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
-	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
-				     &iint->ima_hash->type,
-				     1 + iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	int rc, offset;
+	u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+
+	if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+		offset = 1;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	} else {
+		offset = 0;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
+		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
+	}
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				   &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
+				   (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
+				   iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
@@ -112,15 +125,31 @@ void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 {
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
 
-	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 0 || xattr_len <= 1 + sizeof(*sig))
+	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
 		return;
 
-	sig = (typeof(sig)) xattr_value->digest;
-
-	if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || sig->version != 2)
-		return;
-
-	hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+		if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
+			return;
+		hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+		break;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		hash->algo = xattr_value->digest[0];
+		break;
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		/* this is for backward compatibility */
+		if (xattr_len == 21) {
+			unsigned int zero = 0;
+			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
+				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+			else
+				hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		} else if (xattr_len == 17)
+			hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -153,7 +182,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	const char *op = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
-	int rc = xattr_len;
+	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
@@ -180,17 +209,21 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		hash_start = 1;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
 		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
 			cause = "IMA signature required";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			break;
 		}
-		if (xattr_len - 1 >= iint->ima_hash->length)
+		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
+				iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
 			 */
-			rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest,
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start],
 				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash->length);
 		else
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 5429ca59125b..2fb5e53e927f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
 	EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
 	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
 };
 
 struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
@@ -66,7 +67,17 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
 struct ima_digest_data {
 	u8 algo;
 	u8 length;
-	u8 type;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8 unused;
+			u8 type;
+		} sha1;
+		struct {
+			u8 type;
+			u8 algo;
+		} ng;
+		u8 data[2];
+	} xattr;
 	u8 digest[0];
 } __packed;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b5dfd8075bc26636d11c3d8888940198afbf5112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 11:47:45 -0700
Subject: Smack: Ptrace access check mode

When the ptrace security hooks were split the addition of
a mode parameter was not taken advantage of in the Smack
ptrace access check. This changes the access check from
always looking for read and write access to using the
passed mode. This will make use of /proc much happier.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 88d366e55793..b0be893ad44d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From dd0c6e86f66080869ca0a48c78fb9bfbe4cf156f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 05:37:18 -0700
Subject: apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during
 reporting

Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/capability.c         | 15 +++++----------
 security/apparmor/domain.c             |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/capability.h |  5 ++---
 security/apparmor/include/ipc.h        |  4 ++--
 security/apparmor/ipc.c                |  9 ++++-----
 security/apparmor/lsm.c                |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 84d1f5f53877..1101c6f64bb7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 
 /**
  * audit_caps - audit a capability
- * @profile: profile confining task (NOT NULL)
- * @task: task capability test was performed against (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
  * @cap: capability tested
  * @error: error code returned by test
  *
@@ -63,8 +62,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  *
  * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success,  error code on failure
  */
-static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
-		      int cap, int error)
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
 {
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
@@ -73,7 +71,6 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
 	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	sa.u.cap = cap;
-	sa.aad->tsk = task;
 	sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
 	sa.aad->error = error;
 
@@ -124,8 +121,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
 
 /**
  * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
- * @task: task doing capability test against (NOT NULL)
- * @profile: profile confining @task (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile being tested against (NOT NULL)
  * @cap: capability to be tested
  * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
  *
@@ -133,8 +129,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
  *
  * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
  */
-int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
-	       int audit)
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
 {
 	int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
 
@@ -144,5 +139,5 @@ int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
 		return error;
 	}
 
-	return audit_caps(profile, task, cap, error);
+	return audit_caps(profile, cap, error);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 26c607c971f5..e5538a12d162 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
 	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
 		goto out;
 
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
index 2e7c9d6a2f3b..fc3fa381d850 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2013 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ struct aa_caps {
 
 extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_caps[];
 
-int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
-	       int audit);
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit);
 
 static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
 {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index aeda0fbc8b2f..288ca76e2fb1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 
 struct aa_profile;
 
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
-		  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode);
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+		  unsigned int mode);
 
 int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
 	      unsigned int mode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index c51d2266587e..777ac1c47253 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -54,15 +54,14 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
 
 /**
  * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer_task: task who will do the tracing  (NOT NULL)
  * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
  * @tracee: task to be traced
  * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
  */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
-		  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+		  unsigned int mode)
 {
 	/* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
 	 *       rules,
@@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
 	if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
 		return 0;
 	/* log this capability request */
-	return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+	return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
 	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
 		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
 
-		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
+		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
 		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
 
 		aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index fb99e18123b4..4257b7e2796b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 	if (!error) {
 		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 		if (!unconfined(profile))
-			error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
+			error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 61e3fb8acaea0ca4303ef123bae7edf8435dc2b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 05:37:26 -0700
Subject: apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct

Now that aa_capabile no longer sets the task field it can be removed
and the lsm_audit version of the field can be used.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/audit.c | 10 ++--------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 031d2d9dd695..e32c4483fba1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
-	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current;
 
 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
@@ -149,12 +149,6 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
 	}
-
-	if (sa->aad->tsk) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
-	}
-
 }
 
 /**
@@ -212,7 +206,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 
 	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
 		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
-				    sa->aad->tsk ?  sa->aad->tsk : current);
+				    sa->u.tsk ?  sa->u.tsk : current);
 
 	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
 		return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4a7fc3018f05f4305723b508b12f3be13b7c4875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 05:39:02 -0700
Subject: apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging

The reporting of the parent task info is a vestage from old versions of
apparmor. The need for this information was removed by unique null-
profiles before apparmor was upstreamed so remove this info from logging.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/audit.c         | 6 ------
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 1 -
 2 files changed, 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index e32c4483fba1..89c78658031f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
-	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current;
 
 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
@@ -132,11 +131,6 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 
 	if (sa->aad->profile) {
 		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
-		pid_t pid;
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
-		rcu_read_unlock();
-		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
 		if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
 			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 30e8d7687259..ba3dfd17f23f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 	void *profile;
 	const char *name;
 	const char *info;
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union {
 		void *target;
 		struct {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 51775fe736f053329faf0f5de7c679ee4cb0023d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 05:46:03 -0700
Subject: apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()

Unless task == current ptrace_parent(task) is not safe even under
rcu_read_lock() and most of the current users are not right.

So may_change_ptraced_domain(task) looks wrong as well. However it
is always called with task == current so the code is actually fine.
Remove this argument to make this fact clear.

Note: perhaps we should simply kill ptrace_parent(), it buys almost
nothing. And it is obviously racy, perhaps this should be fixed.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index e5538a12d162..452567d3a08e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -50,23 +50,21 @@ void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
 
 /**
  * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
- * @task: task we want to change profile of   (NOT NULL)
  * @to_profile: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
  *
- * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
  * to trace the new domain
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
  */
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
-				     struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_profile *to_profile)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tracer;
 	struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
+	tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
 	if (tracer)
 		/* released below */
 		tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
@@ -477,7 +475,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile);
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
 		if (error) {
 			aa_put_profile(new_profile);
 			goto audit;
@@ -690,7 +688,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
 			}
 		}
 
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(hat);
 		if (error) {
 			info = "ptraced";
 			error = -EPERM;
@@ -829,7 +827,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 	}
 
 	/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
-	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
+	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target);
 	if (error) {
 		info = "ptrace prevents transition";
 		goto audit;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2eaf6b5dcafda2b8c22930eff7f48a364fce1741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 11:15:23 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean

Having the big_keys functionality as a module is very marginally useful.
The userspace code that would use this functionality will get odd error
messages from the keys layer if the module isn't loaded.  The code itself
is fairly small, so just have this as a boolean option and not a tristate.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 53d8748c9564..a4f3f8c48d6e 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 	  removed if they expire (a default timeout is set upon creation).
 
 config BIG_KEYS
-	tristate "Large payload keys"
+	bool "Large payload keys"
 	depends on KEYS
 	depends on TMPFS
 	help
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 74792b0001ee85b845dc82c1a716c6052c2db9de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 11:15:24 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set

key_reject_and_link() marking a key as negative and setting the error with
which it was negated races with keyring searches and other things that read
that error.

The fix is to switch the order in which the assignments are done in
key_reject_and_link() and to use memory barriers.

Kudos to Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> and Scott Mayhew
<smayhew@redhat.com> for tracking this down.

This may be the cause of:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000070
IP: [<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80
PGD c6b2c3067 PUD c59879067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/cache/index2/shared_cpu_map
CPU 0
Modules linked in: ...

Pid: 13359, comm: amqzxma0 Not tainted 2.6.32-358.20.1.el6.x86_64 #1 IBM System x3650 M3 -[7945PSJ]-/00J6159
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81219011>] wait_for_key_construction+0x31/0x80
RSP: 0018:ffff880c6ab33758  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffff81219080 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffffffff81219060 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff880c6ab33768 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880adfcbce40
R13: ffffffffa03afb84 R14: ffff880adfcbce40 R15: ffff880adfcbce43
FS:  00007f29b8042700(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 0000000c613dc000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process amqzxma0 (pid: 13359, threadinfo ffff880c6ab32000, task ffff880c610deae0)
Stack:
 ffff880adfcbce40 0000000000000000 ffff880c6ab337b8 ffffffff81219695
<d> 0000000000000000 ffff880a000000d0 ffff880c6ab337a8 000000000000000f
<d> ffffffffa03afb93 000000000000000f ffff88186c7882c0 0000000000000014
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81219695>] request_key+0x65/0xa0
 [<ffffffffa03a0885>] nfs_idmap_request_key+0xc5/0x170 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa03a0eb4>] nfs_idmap_lookup_id+0x34/0x80 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa03a1255>] nfs_map_group_to_gid+0x75/0xa0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa039a9ad>] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xbdd/0xfb0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffff81057310>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x30/0x50
 [<ffffffff8100988e>] ? __switch_to+0x26e/0x320
 [<ffffffffa039ae03>] decode_getfattr+0x83/0xe0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa039b69f>] nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x8f/0xa0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa02dada4>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0x84/0xb0 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffffa039b610>] ? nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x0/0xa0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa02cf923>] call_decode+0x1b3/0x800 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffff81096de0>] ? wake_bit_function+0x0/0x50
 [<ffffffffa02cf770>] ? call_decode+0x0/0x800 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffffa02d99a7>] __rpc_execute+0x77/0x350 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffff81096c67>] ? bit_waitqueue+0x17/0xd0
 [<ffffffffa02d9ce1>] rpc_execute+0x61/0xa0 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffffa02d03a5>] rpc_run_task+0x75/0x90 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffffa02d04c2>] rpc_call_sync+0x42/0x70 [sunrpc]
 [<ffffffffa038ff80>] _nfs4_call_sync+0x30/0x40 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa038836c>] _nfs4_proc_getattr+0xac/0xc0 [nfs]
 [<ffffffff810aac87>] ? futex_wait+0x227/0x380
 [<ffffffffa038b856>] nfs4_proc_getattr+0x56/0x80 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa0371403>] __nfs_revalidate_inode+0xe3/0x220 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa037158e>] nfs_revalidate_mapping+0x4e/0x170 [nfs]
 [<ffffffffa036f147>] nfs_file_read+0x77/0x130 [nfs]
 [<ffffffff811811aa>] do_sync_read+0xfa/0x140
 [<ffffffff81096da0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
 [<ffffffff8100bb8e>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
 [<ffffffff8100b9ce>] ? common_interrupt+0xe/0x13
 [<ffffffff81228ffb>] ? selinux_file_permission+0xfb/0x150
 [<ffffffff8121bed6>] ? security_file_permission+0x16/0x20
 [<ffffffff81181a95>] vfs_read+0xb5/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81181bd1>] sys_read+0x51/0x90
 [<ffffffff810dc685>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290
 [<ffffffff8100b072>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/key.c         | 3 ++-
 security/keys/keyring.c     | 1 +
 security/keys/request_key.c | 4 +++-
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index d331ea9ef380..55d110f0aced 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -557,9 +557,10 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
 		/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
 		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
+		key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
+		smp_wmb();
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
-		key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
 		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 9b6f6e09b50c..8c05ebd7203d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
+			smp_rmb();
 			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
 			kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
 			goto skipped;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index df94827103d0..381411941cc1 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -596,8 +596,10 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
 			  intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
+		smp_rmb();
 		return key->type_data.reject_error;
+	}
 	return key_validate(key);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 034faeb9ef390d58239e1dce748143f6b35a0d9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 11:15:24 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink

If a key is displaced from a keyring by a matching one, then four more bytes
of quota are allocated to the keyring - despite the fact that the keyring does
not change in size.

Further, when a key is unlinked from a keyring, the four bytes of quota
allocated the link isn't recovered and returned to the user's pool.

The first can be tested by repeating:

	keyctl add big_key a fred @s
	cat /proc/key-users

(Don't put it in a shell loop otherwise the garbage collector won't have time
to clear the displaced keys, thus affecting the result).

This was causing the kerberos keyring to run out of room fairly quickly.

The second can be tested by:

	cat /proc/key-users
	a=`keyctl add user a a @s`
	cat /proc/key-users
	keyctl unlink $a
	sleep 1 # Give RCU a chance to delete the key
	cat /proc/key-users

assuming no system activity that otherwise adds/removes keys, the amount of
key data allocated should go up (say 40/20000 -> 47/20000) and then return to
the original value at the end.

Reported-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/keyring.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 8c05ebd7203d..d80311e571c3 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1063,12 +1063,6 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-				  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error_sem;
-
 	/* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the
 	 * keyring tree.
 	 */
@@ -1078,17 +1072,25 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
 				  NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
-		goto error_quota;
+		goto error_sem;
+	}
+
+	/* If we're not replacing a link in-place then we're going to need some
+	 * extra quota.
+	 */
+	if (!edit->dead_leaf) {
+		ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+					  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_cancel;
 	}
 
 	*_edit = edit;
 	kleave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
 
-error_quota:
-	/* undo the quota changes */
-	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+error_cancel:
+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
 error_sem:
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
@@ -1146,7 +1148,7 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	if (edit) {
+	if (edit && !edit->dead_leaf) {
 		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
 				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
 		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
@@ -1243,6 +1245,7 @@ int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 		goto error;
 
 	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
+	key_payload_reserve(keyring, keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
 	ret = 0;
 
 error:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From d2b86970245b64652c4d7799e707dd8bd1533b64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 11:23:02 +0800
Subject: KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/big_key.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 5f9defc4a807..2cf5e62d67af 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
 		 */
 		file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(file))
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
 			goto err_quota;
+		}
 
 		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
 		if (written != datalen) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 6ef4d2eaf5a46d4ab6db02612b5e883b834017b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 09:11:28 +0800
Subject: kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro
 GLOBAL()

If a macro is only used within 2 times, and also its contents are
within 2 lines, recommend to expand it to shrink code line.

For our case, the macro is not portable either: some architectures'
assembler may use another character to mark newline in a macro (e.g.
'`' for arc), which will cause issue.

If still want to use macro and let it portable enough, it will also
need include additional header file (e.g "#include <linux/linkage.h>",
although it also need be fixed).


Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/system_certificates.S | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
index 552d47b2d463..4aef390671cb 100644
--- a/kernel/system_certificates.S
+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
-#define GLOBAL(name)	\
-	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name);	\
-	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name):
-
 	__INITRODATA
 
-GLOBAL(system_certificate_list)
+	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
 	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
-GLOBAL(system_certificate_list_end)
+	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_end)
+VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list_end):
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From bcbc9b0cf6d8f340a1d166e414f4612b353f7a9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 11:15:00 -0400
Subject: ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature

This patch defines a new template called 'ima-sig', which includes
the file signature in the template data, in addition to the file's
digest and pathname.

A template is composed of a set of fields.  Associated with each
field is an initialization and display function.  This patch defines
a new template field called 'sig', the initialization function
ima_eventsig_init(), and the display function ima_show_template_sig().

This patch modifies the .field_init() function definition to include
the 'security.ima' extended attribute and length.

Changelog:
- remove unused code (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- avoid calling ima_write_template_field_data() unnecesarily (Roberto Sassu)
- rename DATA_FMT_SIG to DATA_FMT_HEX
- cleanup ima_eventsig_init() based on Roberto's comments

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig            |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 10 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          | 14 ++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 12 +++++++++-
 8 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 351a58ed56ab..81a27971d884 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ choice
 		bool "ima"
 	config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
 		bool "ima-ng (default)"
+	config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
+		bool "ima-sig"
 endchoice
 
 config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
 	depends on IMA
 	default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
+	default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
 
 choice
 	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 72d013e190b1..bf03c6a16cc8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ struct ima_template_field {
 	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
 	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
-			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 };
@@ -134,12 +135,15 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
 			    int *xattr_len);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 5fcc80695d87..0e7540863fc2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
  */
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	int i, result = 0;
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		u32 len;
 
 		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
+					   xattr_value, xattr_len,
 					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
 		if (result != 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -123,7 +125,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename,
+					 NULL, 0, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
@@ -239,7 +242,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
  */
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			   int xattr_len)
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -251,7 +256,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename,
+					 xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index f84aec5412f3..15f34bd40abe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	}
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
-					 &entry);
+					 NULL, 0, &entry);
 	if (result < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 14d4cb557894..149ee1119f87 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
-		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname);
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 000221419f6c..4e5da990630b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
 	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
+	{.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 7d841448f246..6d66ad6ed265 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ enum data_formats {
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
 	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
-	DATA_FMT_STRING
+	DATA_FMT_STRING,
+	DATA_FMT_HEX
 };
 
 static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
@@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 		buf_ptr += 2;
 		buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
+	case DATA_FMT_HEX:
+		if (!buflen)
+			break;
 		ima_print_digest(m, buf_ptr, buflen);
 		break;
 	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
@@ -147,6 +151,12 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	ima_show_template_field_data(m, show, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
+}
+
 static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
 				       struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 				       bool size_limit)
@@ -190,6 +200,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -237,7 +248,8 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
 	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
@@ -295,6 +307,7 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
@@ -306,8 +319,29 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
  */
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
 					 field_data, false);
 }
+
+/*
+ *  ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
+ */
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		      const unsigned char *filename,
+		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, fmt,
+					   field_data);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 16c5e7810234..63f6b52cb1c2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -24,16 +24,26 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 				 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			 const unsigned char *filename,
+			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 		       const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			  const unsigned char *filename,
+			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+		      const unsigned char *filename,
+		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 217091dd7a7a1bdac027ddb7c5a25f6ac0b8e241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 08:47:43 -0400
Subject: ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  8 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index b4af4ebc5be2..77ca965ab684 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
 
@@ -21,11 +23,19 @@
 
 static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+	".evm",
+	".module",
+	".ima",
+};
+#else
 static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 	"_evm",
 	"_module",
 	"_ima",
 };
+#endif
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
@@ -35,7 +45,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {
 		keyring[id] =
-			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+		    request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
 		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
 			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
 			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
@@ -56,3 +66,21 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	const struct user_struct *user = cred->user;
+
+	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
+				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, user->uid_keyring);
+	if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
+		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
+	else
+		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n",
+			keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id]));
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 81a27971d884..dad8d4ca2437 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -123,3 +123,11 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
 	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default y
+	help
+	   This option requires that all keys added to the _ima
+	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 734e9468aca0..46353ee517f6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -381,3 +381,14 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	}
 	return result;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static int __init init_ima_keyring(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(init_ima_keyring);
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..b9e7c133734a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -137,12 +137,19 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 		      int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
 static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 				    int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+
+static int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From dbed71416332d24e4e9ba26dcf90cd86a93c06f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 15:11:14 +0000
Subject: KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB

The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB directly in Kconfig as the
'select' directive is not recursive and is thus MPILIB is not enabled by
selecting MPILIB_EXTRA.

Without this, the following errors can occur:

	crypto/built-in.o: In function `RSA_verify_signature':
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d347): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d354): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d36e): undefined reference to `mpi_cmp_ui'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d382): undefined reference to `mpi_cmp'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d391): undefined reference to `mpi_alloc'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3b0): undefined reference to `mpi_powm'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3c3): undefined reference to `mpi_free'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3d8): undefined reference to `mpi_get_buffer'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d4d4): undefined reference to `mpi_free'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d503): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 82e7d6b0c276..03a6eb95ab50 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
 	tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
 	select MPILIB_EXTRA
+	select MPILIB
 	help
 	  This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From fbf8c53f1a2ac7610ed124043600dc074992e71b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2013 14:01:51 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()

If the UID is specified by userspace when calling the KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
function and the process does not have the CAP_SETUID capability, then the
function will return -EPERM if the current process's uid, suid, euid and fsuid
all match the requested UID.  This is incorrect.

Fix it such that when a non-privileged caller requests a persistent keyring by
a specific UID they can only request their own (ie. the specified UID matches
either then process's UID or the process's EUID).

This can be tested by logging in as the user and doing:

	keyctl get_persistent @p
	keyctl get_persistent @p `id -u`
	keyctl get_persistent @p 0

The first two should successfully print the same key ID.  The third should do
the same if called by UID 0 or indicate Operation Not Permitted otherwise.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/persistent.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 82f4957a7acf..0ad3ee283781 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -144,10 +144,8 @@ long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
 		/* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not
 		 * sufficiently privileged.
 		 */
-		if (uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
-		    uid_eq(uid, current_suid()) &&
-		    uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
-		    uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()) &&
+		if (!uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
+		    !uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
 		    !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 97826c821ec6724fc359d9b7840dc10af914c641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 16:51:06 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation

In the big_key_instantiate() function we return 0 if kernel_write() returns us
an error rather than returning an error.  This can potentially lead to
dentry_open() giving a BUG when called from big_key_read() with an unset
tmpfile path.

	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at fs/open.c:798!
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8119bbd1>] dentry_open+0xd1/0xe0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff812350c5>] big_key_read+0x55/0x100
	 [<ffffffff81231084>] keyctl_read_key+0xb4/0xe0
	 [<ffffffff81231e58>] SyS_keyctl+0xf8/0x1d0
	 [<ffffffff815bb799>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b


Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/big_key.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 2cf5e62d67af..7f44c3207a9b 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
 		if (written != datalen) {
+			ret = written;
 			if (written >= 0)
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto err_fput;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 62fe318256befbd1b4a6765e71d9c997f768fe79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2013 13:02:31 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner

Key pointers stored in the keyring are marked in bit 1 to indicate if they
point to a keyring.  We need to strip off this bit before using the pointer
when iterating over the keyring for the purpose of looking for links to garbage
collect.

This means that expirable keyrings aren't correctly expiring because the
checker is seeing their key pointer with 2 added to it.

Since the fix for this involves knowing about the internals of the keyring,
key_gc_keyring() is moved to keyring.c and merged into keyring_gc().

This can be tested by:

	echo 2 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
	keyctl timeout `keyctl add keyring qwerty "" @s` 2
	cat /proc/keys
	sleep 5; cat /proc/keys

which should see a keyring called "qwerty" appear in the session keyring and
then disappear after it expires, and:

	echo 2 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
	a=`keyctl get_persistent @s`
	b=`keyctl add keyring 0 "" $a`
	keyctl add user a a $b
	keyctl timeout $b 2
	cat /proc/keys
	sleep 5; cat /proc/keys

which should see a keyring called "0" with a key called "a" in it appear in the
user's persistent keyring (which will be attached to the session keyring) and
then both the "0" keyring and the "a" key should disappear when the "0" keyring
expires.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/gc.c      | 42 +-----------------------------------------
 security/keys/keyring.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index cce621c33dce..d3222b6d7d59 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -130,46 +130,6 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
 	kleave("");
 }
 
-static int key_gc_keyring_func(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
-{
-	const struct key *key = object;
-	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
-	return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
-}
-
-/*
- * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.
- *
- * Not called with any locks held.  The keyring's key struct will not be
- * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
- */
-static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
-{
-	int result;
-
-	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
-
-	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-		goto dont_gc;
-
-	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
-				     key_gc_keyring_func, &limit);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (result == true)
-		goto do_gc;
-
-dont_gc:
-	kleave(" [no gc]");
-	return;
-
-do_gc:
-	keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
-	kleave(" [gc]");
-}
-
 /*
  * Garbage collect a list of unreferenced, detached keys
  */
@@ -388,7 +348,7 @@ found_unreferenced_key:
 	 */
 found_keyring:
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
-	key_gc_keyring(key, limit);
+	keyring_gc(key, limit);
 	goto maybe_resched;
 
 	/* We found a dead key that is still referenced.  Reset its type and
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d80311e571c3..69f0cb7bab7e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool gc_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
+static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
 {
 	struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
 	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
@@ -1315,22 +1315,47 @@ static bool gc_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
+{
+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
+	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
+
+	key_check(key);
+	return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
+}
+
 /*
- * Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring, replacing the old list with
- * a new one with the pointers all shuffled down.
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.
  *
- * Dead keys are classed as oned that are flagged as being dead or are revoked,
- * expired or negative keys that were revoked or expired before the specified
- * limit.
+ * Not called with any locks held.  The keyring's key struct will not be
+ * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
  */
 void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 {
-	kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description);
+	int result;
+
+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
 
+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
+				     keyring_gc_check_iterator, &limit);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (result == true)
+		goto do_gc;
+
+dont_gc:
+	kleave(" [no gc]");
+	return;
+
+do_gc:
 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 	assoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-		       gc_iterator, &limit);
+		       keyring_gc_select_iterator, &limit);
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-
-	kleave("");
+	kleave(" [gc]");
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b