From 53fc7a01df51f58b317ea5ab1607a1af65d6d4cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 17:17:48 -0500
Subject: audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved

The failure to add an audit rule due to audit locked gives no clue
what CONFIG_CHANGE operation failed.
Similarly the set operation is the only other operation that doesn't
give the "op=" field to indicate the action.
All other CONFIG_CHANGE records include an op= field to give a clue as
to what sort of configuration change is being executed.

Since these are the only CONFIG_CHANGE records that that do not have an
op= field, add them to bring them in line with the rest.

Old records:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1519812997.781:374): pid=610 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=... audit_enabled=2 res=0
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(2018-06-14 14:55:04.507:47) : audit_enabled=1 old=1 auid=unset ses=unset subj=... res=yes

New records:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1520958477.855:100): pid=610 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=... op=add_rule audit_enabled=2 res=0

type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(2018-06-14 14:55:04.507:47) : op=set audit_enabled=1 old=1 auid=unset ses=unset subj=... res=yes

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/59

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl line length problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 632d36059556..d412fb4ae6d5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return rc;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=set %s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
 	audit_log_session_info(ab);
 	rc = audit_log_task_context(ab);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1362,7 +1362,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
 			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-			audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s audit_enabled=%d res=0",
+					 msg_type == AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?
+						"add_rule" : "remove_rule",
+					 audit_enabled);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 			return -EPERM;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9e36a5d49c3a6fc4a2e0ba2dc11b27c4a8ae6303 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 17:17:50 -0500
Subject: audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging

Since the context is derived from the task parameter handed to
__audit_free(), hand the context to audit_kill_trees() so it can be used
to associate with a syscall record.  This requires adding the context
parameter to kill_rules() rather than using the current audit_context.

The callers of trim_marked() and evict_chunk() still have their context.

The EOE record was being issued prior to the pruning of the killed_tree
list.

Move the kill_trees call before the audit_log_exit call in
__audit_free() and __audit_syscall_exit() so that any pruned trees
CONFIG_CHANGE records are included with the associated syscall event by
the user library due to the EOE record flagging the end of the event.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/50
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/59

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed merge fuzz in kernel/audit_tree.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/audit.h      |  4 ++--
 kernel/audit_tree.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
 kernel/auditsc.c    | 12 ++++++------
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 91421679a168..6ffb70575082 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ extern void audit_trim_trees(void);
 extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new);
 extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree);
 extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list);
+extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
 #else
 #define audit_remove_tree_rule(rule) BUG()
 #define audit_add_tree_rule(rule) -EINVAL
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list);
 #define audit_put_tree(tree) (void)0
 #define audit_tag_tree(old, new) -EINVAL
 #define audit_tree_path(rule) ""	/* never called */
-#define audit_kill_trees(list) BUG()
+#define audit_kill_trees(context) BUG()
 #endif
 
 extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index d4af4d97f847..abfb112f26aa 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -524,13 +524,14 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
+static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_context *context,
+				       struct audit_krule *rule)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove_rule dir=");
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
-static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
+static void kill_rules(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_tree *tree)
 {
 	struct audit_krule *rule, *next;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
@@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
 		list_del_init(&rule->rlist);
 		if (rule->tree) {
 			/* not a half-baked one */
-			audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
+			audit_tree_log_remove_rule(context, rule);
 			if (entry->rule.exe)
 				audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
 			rule->tree = NULL;
@@ -633,7 +634,7 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tree *tree)
 		tree->goner = 1;
 		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
 		mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
-		kill_rules(tree);
+		kill_rules(audit_context(), tree);
 		list_del_init(&tree->list);
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 		prune_one(tree);
@@ -973,8 +974,10 @@ static void audit_schedule_prune(void)
  * ... and that one is done if evict_chunk() decides to delay until the end
  * of syscall.  Runs synchronously.
  */
-void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
+void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context)
 {
+	struct list_head *list = &context->killed_trees;
+
 	audit_ctl_lock();
 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
@@ -982,7 +985,7 @@ void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
 		struct audit_tree *victim;
 
 		victim = list_entry(list->next, struct audit_tree, list);
-		kill_rules(victim);
+		kill_rules(context, victim);
 		list_del_init(&victim->list);
 
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
@@ -1017,7 +1020,7 @@ static void evict_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 		list_del_init(&owner->same_root);
 		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
 		if (!postponed) {
-			kill_rules(owner);
+			kill_rules(audit_context(), owner);
 			list_move(&owner->list, &prune_list);
 			need_prune = 1;
 		} else {
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6593a5207fb0..b585ceb2f7a2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1444,6 +1444,9 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (!context)
 		return;
 
+	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+		audit_kill_trees(context);
+
 	/* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
 	 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
 	 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
@@ -1460,9 +1463,6 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 			audit_log_exit();
 	}
 
-	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
-		audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
-
 	audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
 	audit_free_context(context);
 }
@@ -1537,6 +1537,9 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 	if (!context)
 		return;
 
+	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
+		audit_kill_trees(context);
+
 	if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
 		if (success)
 			context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
@@ -1571,9 +1574,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 	context->in_syscall = 0;
 	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
 
-	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
-		audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
-
 	audit_free_names(context);
 	unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
 	audit_free_aux(context);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 626abcd13d4ea2b67be3249a250046cf713f532a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 17:42:48 -0500
Subject: audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records

Tie syscall information to all CONFIG_CHANGE calls since they are all a
result of user actions.

Exclude user records from syscall context:
Since the function audit_log_common_recv_msg() is shared by a number of
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE and the entire range of AUDIT_USER_* record types,
and since the AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE message type has been converted to a
syscall accompanied record type, special-case the AUDIT_USER_* range of
messages so they remain standalone records.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/59
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/50

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fix line lengths in kernel/audit.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/audit.c          | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c |  2 +-
 kernel/audit_watch.c    |  2 +-
 kernel/auditfilter.c    |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d412fb4ae6d5..c2a7662cc254 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return rc;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "op=set %s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
@@ -1053,7 +1053,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
+static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,
+					struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
 {
 	uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
 	pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
@@ -1063,7 +1064,7 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	*ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
+	*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
 	if (unlikely(!*ab))
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u ", pid, uid);
@@ -1071,6 +1072,12 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
 	audit_log_task_context(*ab);
 }
 
+static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab,
+					   u16 msg_type)
+{
+	audit_log_common_recv_msg(NULL, ab, msg_type);
+}
+
 int is_audit_feature_set(int i)
 {
 	return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
@@ -1338,7 +1345,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 				if (err)
 					break;
 			}
-			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
+			audit_log_user_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
 			if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY)
 				audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.*s'",
 						 AUDIT_MESSAGE_TEXT_MAX,
@@ -1361,7 +1368,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
-			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+			audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+						  AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 			audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s audit_enabled=%d res=0",
 					 msg_type == AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?
 						"add_rule" : "remove_rule",
@@ -1376,7 +1384,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_TRIM:
 		audit_trim_trees();
-		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+		audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+					  AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1");
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 		break;
@@ -1406,8 +1415,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		/* OK, here comes... */
 		err = audit_tag_tree(old, new);
 
-		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-
+		audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+					  AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " op=make_equiv old=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, old);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " new=");
@@ -1474,7 +1483,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		old.enabled = t & AUDIT_TTY_ENABLE;
 		old.log_passwd = !!(t & AUDIT_TTY_LOG_PASSWD);
 
-		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+		audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
+					  AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " op=tty_set old-enabled=%d new-enabled=%d"
 				 " old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d",
 				 old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd,
diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
index cf4512a33675..37ae95cfb7f4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c
 
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return;
 	audit_log_session_info(ab);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 20ef9ba134b0..e8d1adeb2223 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void audit_watch_log_rule_change(struct audit_krule *r, struct audit_watc
 
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;
 	audit_log_session_info(ab);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index bf309f2592c4..26a80a9d43a9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;
 	audit_log_session_info(ab);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4b7d248b3a1de483ffe9d05c1debbf32a544164d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 17:06:39 -0500
Subject: audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to
 CONFIG_AUDIT

loginuid and sessionid (and audit_log_session_info) should be part of
CONFIG_AUDIT scope and not CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL since it is used in
CONFIG_CHANGE, ANOM_LINK, FEATURE_CHANGE (and INTEGRITY_RULE), none of
which are otherwise dependent on AUDITSYSCALL.

Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/104

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject line for better grep'ing]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c        |  6 ++--
 include/linux/audit.h | 42 +++++++++++++------------
 include/linux/sched.h |  2 +-
 init/init_task.c      |  2 +-
 kernel/audit.c        | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 84 --------------------------------------------------
 6 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 633a63462573..a23651ce6960 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_oom_score_adj_operations = {
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 #define TMPBUFLEN 11
 static ssize_t proc_loginuid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -3002,7 +3002,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 	ONE("oom_score",  S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
 	REG("oom_adj",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
 	REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	REG("loginuid",   S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
 	REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
 #endif
@@ -3390,7 +3390,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 	ONE("oom_score", S_IRUGO, proc_oom_score),
 	REG("oom_adj",   S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_adj_operations),
 	REG("oom_score_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_oom_score_adj_operations),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	REG("loginuid",  S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
 	REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index a625c29a2ea2..ecb5d317d6a2 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -159,6 +159,18 @@ extern int		    audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
 extern int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz);
 extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq);
 
+extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
+
+static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return tsk->loginuid;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return tsk->sessionid;
+}
+
 extern u32 audit_enabled;
 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 static inline __printf(4, 5)
@@ -201,6 +213,17 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 }
 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 { }
+
+static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return INVALID_UID;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
+}
+
 #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
@@ -323,17 +346,6 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
 extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
-extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
-
-static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return tsk->loginuid;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return tsk->sessionid;
-}
 
 extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
@@ -519,14 +531,6 @@ static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return INVALID_UID;
-}
-static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
-}
 static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 { }
 static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 89541d248893..f9788bb122c5 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 	struct callback_head		*task_works;
 
 	struct audit_context		*audit_context;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	kuid_t				loginuid;
 	unsigned int			sessionid;
 #endif
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index 5aebe3be4d7c..39c3109acc1a 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct task_struct init_task
 	.thread_pid	= &init_struct_pid,
 	.thread_group	= LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_task.thread_group),
 	.thread_node	= LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.thread_head),
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	.loginuid	= INVALID_UID,
 	.sessionid	= AUDIT_SID_UNSET,
 #endif
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c2a7662cc254..2a32f304223d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2335,6 +2335,91 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation)
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
+/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
+static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
+{
+	/* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
+	if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
+		return 0;
+	/* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
+	if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
+		return -EPERM;
+	/* it is set, you need permission */
+	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	/* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
+	if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID)
+				 && uid_valid(loginuid))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
+				   unsigned int oldsessionid,
+				   unsigned int sessionid, int rc)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
+	oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
+	loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
+	tty = audit_get_tty();
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
+			 oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
+			 oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
+	audit_put_tty(tty);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's loginuid
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
+int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+{
+	unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
+	kuid_t oldloginuid;
+	int rc;
+
+	oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+	oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+
+	rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* are we setting or clearing? */
+	if (uid_valid(loginuid)) {
+		sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+		if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET))
+			sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+	}
+
+	current->sessionid = sessionid;
+	current->loginuid = loginuid;
+out:
+	audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * audit_log_end - end one audit record
  * @ab: the audit_buffer
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b585ceb2f7a2..572d247957fb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1983,90 +1983,6 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
-static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
-static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
-{
-	/* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
-	if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
-		return 0;
-	/* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
-	if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
-		return -EPERM;
-	/* it is set, you need permission */
-	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
-		return -EPERM;
-	/* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
-	if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
-				   unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
-				   int rc)
-{
-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
-	struct tty_struct *tty;
-
-	if (!audit_enabled)
-		return;
-
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
-	if (!ab)
-		return;
-
-	uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
-	oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
-	loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
-	tty = audit_get_tty();
-
-	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
-	audit_log_task_context(ab);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
-			 oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
-			 oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
-	audit_put_tty(tty);
-	audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
- * @loginuid: loginuid value
- *
- * Returns 0.
- *
- * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
- */
-int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
-{
-	unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
-	kuid_t oldloginuid;
-	int rc;
-
-	oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-	oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-
-	rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* are we setting or clearing? */
-	if (uid_valid(loginuid)) {
-		sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
-		if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET))
-			sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
-	}
-
-	current->sessionid = sessionid;
-	current->loginuid = loginuid;
-out:
-	audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
-	return rc;
-}
-
 /**
  * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
  * @oflag: open flag
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2fec30e245a3b46fef89c4cb1f74eefc5fbb29a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 21:36:25 -0500
Subject: audit: add support for fcaps v3

V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")

Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing
fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records.

Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++--
 kernel/audit.c             | 6 ++++--
 kernel/audit.h             | 1 +
 kernel/auditsc.c           | 4 ++++
 security/commoncap.c       | 2 ++
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index f640dcbc880c..b769330e9380 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
 
 #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
 
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
@@ -25,11 +25,12 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
 } kernel_cap_t;
 
-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
+/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 	__u32 magic_etc;
 	kernel_cap_t permitted;
 	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+	kuid_t rootid;
 };
 
 #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2a32f304223d..3f3f1888cac7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2084,8 +2084,9 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 {
 	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
 	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x",
-			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
+			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
 }
 
 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
@@ -2104,6 +2105,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
 	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
 	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
 	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
 				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
 
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 6ffb70575082..deefdbe61a47 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct audit_cap_data {
 		kernel_cap_t	effective;	/* effective set of process */
 	};
 	kernel_cap_t		ambient;
+	kuid_t			rootid;
 };
 
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and bump
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 572d247957fb..c16beb25fd0a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1358,6 +1358,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 			audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
 			audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
 			audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
+					 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+						   axs->fcap.rootid));
 			break; }
 
 		}
@@ -2271,6 +2274,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
 	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
 	ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
 	ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
 
 	ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 232db019f051..c097f3568001 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -643,6 +643,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 	cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
 	cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
 
+	cpu_caps->rootid = rootkuid;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From a252f56a3c922197ef40dce8f8cc258ae75e0193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:34:59 -0500
Subject: audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic

Like commit 42d5e37654e4 ("audit: filter PATH records keyed on
filesystem magic") that addresses
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8

Any user or remote filesystem could become unavailable and effectively
block on a forced unmount.

    -a always,exit -S umount2 -F key=umount2

Provide a method to ignore these user and remote filesystems to prevent
them from being impossible to unmount.

Extend the "AUDIT_FILTER_FS" filter that uses the field type
AUDIT_FSTYPE keying off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic
identifier to filter specific filesystems to cover audit_inode() to address
this blockage.

An example rule would look like:
    -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x517B -F key=ignore_smb
    -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x6969 -F key=ignore_nfs

Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing
processes that touch removable filesystems.

Note: refactor __audit_inode_child() to remove two levels of if
indentation.

Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c16beb25fd0a..a2696ce790f9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1766,10 +1766,31 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	struct audit_names *n;
 	bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
+	int i;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!list_empty(list)) {
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+			for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+				struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+
+				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
+				    && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
+							f->op, f->val)
+				    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+					rcu_read_unlock();
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	if (!name)
 		goto out_alloc;
 
@@ -1878,14 +1899,12 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 			for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
 				struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 
-				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) {
-					if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
-					    f->op, f->val)) {
-						if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
-							rcu_read_unlock();
-							return;
-						}
-					}
+				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
+				    && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
+							f->op, f->val)
+				    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+					rcu_read_unlock();
+					return;
 				}
 			}
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 05c7a9cb2727cd3c3d8e767f48e5cd18486a8d16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 17:07:41 -0500
Subject: audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs

Pull together all the audit syscall watch, mark and tree prototypes and
stubs into the same ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/audit.h | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index deefdbe61a47..9acb8691ed87 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -268,25 +268,47 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 extern struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(void);
 extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
 
-/* audit watch functions */
+/* audit watch/mark/tree functions */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
 extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
-extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len, u32 op);
+extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
+			  u32 op);
 extern int audit_add_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, struct list_head **list);
 extern void audit_remove_watch_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
 extern char *audit_watch_path(struct audit_watch *watch);
-extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino,
+			       dev_t dev);
 
-extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pathname, int len);
+extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule,
+						    char *pathname, int len);
 extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
 extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark);
 extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
-extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark,
+			      unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
 extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old);
-extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
+extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			     struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
 
-#else
+extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode);
+extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk);
+extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk,
+			     struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op);
+extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
+extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
+extern void audit_trim_trees(void);
+extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new);
+extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
+extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
+
+extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
+extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				struct audit_context *ctx);
+extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 #define audit_put_watch(w) {}
 #define audit_get_watch(w) {}
 #define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
@@ -302,21 +324,7 @@ extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark
 #define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
 #define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL)
 #define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL)
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode);
-extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk);
-extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk, struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op);
-extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
-extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule);
-extern void audit_trim_trees(void);
-extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new);
-extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree);
-extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
-#else
 #define audit_remove_tree_rule(rule) BUG()
 #define audit_add_tree_rule(rule) -EINVAL
 #define audit_make_tree(rule, str, op) -EINVAL
@@ -325,7 +333,10 @@ extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context);
 #define audit_tag_tree(old, new) -EINVAL
 #define audit_tree_path(rule) ""	/* never called */
 #define audit_kill_trees(context) BUG()
-#endif
+
+#define audit_signal_info(s, t) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
 extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
 
@@ -335,14 +346,5 @@ extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
 
 extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
-#else
-#define audit_signal_info(s,t) AUDIT_DISABLED
-#define audit_filter_inodes(t,c) AUDIT_DISABLED
-#endif
-
 extern void audit_ctl_lock(void);
 extern void audit_ctl_unlock(void);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 57d4657716aca81ef4d7ec23e8123d26e3d28954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:35:00 -0500
Subject: audit: ignore fcaps on umount

Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while
it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.

Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
 * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
 * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem.  We
 * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
 * and avoid revalidating the last component.

This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.

Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/namei.c            |  2 +-
 fs/namespace.c        |  2 ++
 include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++++-----
 include/linux/namei.h |  3 +++
 kernel/audit.c        | 10 +++++++++-
 kernel/audit.h        |  2 +-
 kernel/auditsc.c      |  6 +++---
 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 914178cdbe94..87d7710a2e1d 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ filename_mountpoint(int dfd, struct filename *name, struct path *path,
 	if (unlikely(error == -ESTALE))
 		error = path_mountpoint(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
 	if (likely(!error))
-		audit_inode(name, path->dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(name, path->dentry, flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL);
 	restore_nameidata();
 	putname(name);
 	return error;
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index a677b59efd74..e5de0e372df2 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1640,6 +1640,8 @@ int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
 	if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
 
+	lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_NO_EVAL;
+
 	retval = user_path_mountpoint_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
 	if (retval)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index ecb5d317d6a2..29251b18331a 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>  /* LOOKUP_* */
 #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
 
 #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -248,6 +249,7 @@ extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
 
 #define AUDIT_INODE_PARENT	1	/* dentry represents the parent */
 #define AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN	2	/* audit record should be hidden */
+#define AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL	4	/* audit record incomplete */
 extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int flags);
 extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
@@ -308,12 +310,15 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
-				unsigned int parent) {
+				unsigned int flags) {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) {
-		unsigned int flags = 0;
-		if (parent)
-			flags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry, flags);
+		unsigned int aflags = 0;
+
+		if (flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)
+			aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
+		if (flags & LOOKUP_NO_EVAL)
+			aflags |= AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL;
+		__audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
 	}
 }
 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index a78606e8e3df..9138b4471dbf 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
  *  - internal "there are more path components" flag
  *  - dentry cache is untrusted; force a real lookup
  *  - suppress terminal automount
+ *  - skip revalidation
+ *  - don't fetch xattrs on audit_inode
  */
 #define LOOKUP_FOLLOW		0x0001
 #define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY	0x0002
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 #define LOOKUP_REVAL		0x0020
 #define LOOKUP_RCU		0x0040
 #define LOOKUP_NO_REVAL		0x0080
+#define LOOKUP_NO_EVAL		0x0100
 
 /*
  * Intent data
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 3f3f1888cac7..b7177a8def2e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2082,6 +2082,10 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
 
 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 {
+	if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
+		return;
+	}
 	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
 	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
@@ -2114,7 +2118,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		      struct inode *inode)
+		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
@@ -2123,6 +2127,10 @@ void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
 	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
+		name->fcap_ver = -1;
+		return;
+	}
 	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 9acb8691ed87..002f0f7ba732 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
 
 extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
 			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     struct inode *inode);
+			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
 extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
 			  kernel_cap_t *cap);
 extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a2696ce790f9..68da71001096 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ out:
 		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
 	}
 	handle_path(dentry);
-	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
+	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
 }
 
 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
@@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
 		if (!n)
 			return;
-		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
+		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
 	}
 
 	if (!found_child) {
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 	}
 
 	if (inode)
-		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
+		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
 	else
 		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 90462a5bd30c6ed91c6758e59537d047d7878ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 11:52:11 -0500
Subject: audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match

The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  4 +---
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 ++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                |  2 +-
 kernel/auditsc.c                    | 21 ++++++++++++---------
 security/apparmor/audit.c           |  3 +--
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h   |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  6 ++----
 security/security.c                 |  6 ++----
 security/selinux/include/audit.h    |  4 +---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  3 +--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  4 +---
 12 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 9a0bdf91e646..d0b5c7a05832 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1344,7 +1344,6 @@
  *	@field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
  *	@op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
  *	@rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
- *	@actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
  *	Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
  *
  * @audit_rule_free:
@@ -1764,8 +1763,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 				void **lsmrule);
 	int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
-	int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-				struct audit_context *actx);
+	int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
 	void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dbfb5a66babb..e8febec62ffb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1674,8 +1674,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-			      struct audit_context *actx);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -1692,7 +1691,7 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 }
 
 static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-				   void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+					    void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 26a80a9d43a9..add360b46b38 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-							f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
+						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
 				}
 				break;
 			case AUDIT_EXE:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 68da71001096..7d37cb1e4aef 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -631,9 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
-				                                  f->op,
-				                                  f->lsm_rule,
-				                                  ctx);
+								   f->op,
+								   f->lsm_rule);
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -647,13 +646,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-					           name->osid, f->type, f->op,
-					           f->lsm_rule, ctx);
+								name->osid,
+								f->type,
+								f->op,
+								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
-						if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
-									      f->op, f->lsm_rule,
-									      ctx)) {
+						if (security_audit_rule_match(
+								n->osid,
+								f->type,
+								f->op,
+								f->lsm_rule)) {
 							++result;
 							break;
 						}
@@ -664,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					break;
 				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
 							      f->type, f->op,
-							      f->lsm_rule, ctx))
+							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
 			}
 			break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index eeaddfe0c0fb..5a8b9cded4f2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-			struct audit_context *actx)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	struct aa_label *label;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index b8c8b1066b0a..ee559bc2acb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
 int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-			struct audit_context *actx);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
 
 #endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..026163f37ba1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -307,8 +307,7 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 }
 
 static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule,
-					     struct audit_context *actx)
+					     void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..26fa9d9723f6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ retry:
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
-							rule->lsm[i].rule,
-							NULL);
+							rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -349,8 +348,7 @@ retry:
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
-							rule->lsm[i].rule,
-							NULL);
+							rule->lsm[i].rule);
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f1b8d2587639..5f954b179a8e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1783,11 +1783,9 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-			      struct audit_context *actx)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
-				actx);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..e51a81ffb8c9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -46,13 +46,11 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  *	@field: the field this rule refers to
  *	@op: the operater the rule uses
  *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- *	@actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
  *
  *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
  *	-errno on failure.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
-			     struct audit_context *actx);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index dd44126c8d14..0b7e33f6aa59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3376,8 +3376,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-			     struct audit_context *actx)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct context *ctxt;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 430d4f35e55c..403513df42fc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4393,13 +4393,11 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
  * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
  * @op: required testing operator
  * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
- * @actx: audit context associated with the check
  *
  * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
  * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-				  struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 5f3d544f1671d214cd26e45bda326f921455256e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 22:45:17 -0500
Subject: audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL

Remove audit_context from struct task_struct and struct audit_buffer
when CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled but CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is not.

Also, audit_log_name() (and supporting inode and fcaps functions) should
have been put back in auditsc.c when soft and hard link logging was
normalized since it is only used by syscall auditing.

See github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/105

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 include/linux/sched.h |   4 +-
 kernel/audit.c        | 157 -------------------------------------------------
 kernel/audit.h        |   9 ---
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 167 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index f9788bb122c5..765119df759a 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -885,8 +885,10 @@ struct task_struct {
 
 	struct callback_head		*task_works;
 
-	struct audit_context		*audit_context;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+	struct audit_context		*audit_context;
+#endif
 	kuid_t				loginuid;
 	unsigned int			sessionid;
 #endif
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index b7177a8def2e..c89ea48c70a6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2067,163 +2067,6 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
 }
 
-void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
-		return;
-	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
-		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
-}
-
-static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
-{
-	if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
-		return;
-	}
-	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
-	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
-			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
-}
-
-static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
-				   const struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!dentry)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
-	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
-	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
-	name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
-	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
-				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
-{
-	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
-	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
-	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
-	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
-	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
-		name->fcap_ver = -1;
-		return;
-	}
-	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
- * @context: audit_context for the task
- * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
- * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
- * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
- * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
- */
-void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
-		    const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
-{
-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
-	if (!ab)
-		return;
-
-	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
-
-	if (path)
-		audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
-	else if (n->name) {
-		switch (n->name_len) {
-		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
-			/* log the full path */
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
-			break;
-		case 0:
-			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
-			 * directory component is the cwd */
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
-			break;
-		default:
-			/* log the name's directory component */
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
-						    n->name_len);
-		}
-	} else
-		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
-
-	if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
-				 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
-				 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
-				 n->ino,
-				 MAJOR(n->dev),
-				 MINOR(n->dev),
-				 n->mode,
-				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
-				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
-				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
-				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		char *ctx = NULL;
-		u32 len;
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
-			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
-			if (call_panic)
-				*call_panic = 2;
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* log the audit_names record type */
-	switch(n->type) {
-	case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
-		break;
-	default:
-		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
-		break;
-	}
-
-	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
-	audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
 	char *ctx = NULL;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 002f0f7ba732..82734f438ddd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -213,15 +213,6 @@ extern bool audit_ever_enabled;
 
 extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
 
-extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
-			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
-extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
-			  kernel_cap_t *cap);
-extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
-			   struct audit_names *n, const struct path *path,
-			   int record_num, int *call_panic);
-
 extern int auditd_test_task(struct task_struct *task);
 
 #define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS	32
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7d37cb1e4aef..d1eab1d4a930 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1139,6 +1139,32 @@ out:
 	kfree(buf_head);
 }
 
+void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
+		return;
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+	if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
+		return;
+	}
+	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
+	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
+			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
+}
+
 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1261,6 +1287,97 @@ static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
 	return len;
 }
 
+/*
+ * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
+ * @context: audit_context for the task
+ * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
+ * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
+ * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
+ * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
+ */
+static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
+		    const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
+
+	if (path)
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
+	else if (n->name) {
+		switch (n->name_len) {
+		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+			/* log the full path */
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
+			 * directory component is the cwd
+			 */
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* log the name's directory component */
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
+						    n->name_len);
+		}
+	} else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+	if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+				 n->ino,
+				 MAJOR(n->dev),
+				 MINOR(n->dev),
+				 n->mode,
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
+				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
+				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
+				 MINOR(n->rdev));
+	if (n->osid != 0) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+			if (call_panic)
+				*call_panic = 2;
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* log the audit_names record type */
+	switch (n->type) {
+	case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
+		break;
+	default:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
 {
 	int res;
@@ -1756,6 +1873,47 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 		get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
 }
 
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+				   const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
+	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
+				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
+	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
+	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
+	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
+		name->fcap_ver = -1;
+		return;
+	}
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
 /**
  * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 18f5c1d567a5d16aa6ebac6a2f42e51fc5030baa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 17:19:06 -0500
Subject: audit: join tty records to their syscall

AUDIT_TTY records were logged as seperate events from their syscall
records.  Join them so they are logged as the single event that they
are.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/106

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
index 28f87fd6a28e..9f906a5b8e81 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,
 	uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
 	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
 	if (ab) {
 		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From cd108b5c51db30aa01657322bb89e48c98216ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 16:06:30 -0500
Subject: audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes

auditsc_get_stamp() and audit_serial() are internal audit functions so
move their prototypes from include/linux/audit.h to kernel/audit.h
so they are not visible to the rest of the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 9 ---------
 kernel/audit.h        | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 29251b18331a..1e69d9fe16da 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -348,10 +348,6 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 }
 
 				/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
-extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
-extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
-			      struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
-
 extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
 extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -531,11 +527,6 @@ static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
 static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names,
 						const char *old_names, int res)
 { }
-static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
-			      struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 { }
 static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 82734f438ddd..958d5b8fc1b3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
 
 /* audit watch/mark/tree functions */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
+extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+			      struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+
 extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
 extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
 extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
@@ -300,6 +304,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				struct audit_context *ctx);
 extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
 #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
 #define audit_put_watch(w) {}
 #define audit_get_watch(w) {}
 #define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 131d34cb07957151c369366b158690057d2bce5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:46:00 -0600
Subject: audit: mark expected switch fall-through
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.

This patch fixes the following warning:

kernel/auditfilter.c: In function ‘audit_krule_to_data’:
kernel/auditfilter.c:668:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
    if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
       ^
kernel/auditfilter.c:674:3: note: here
   default:
   ^~~~~~~

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

Notice that, in this particular case, the code comment is modified
in accordance with what GCC is expecting to find.

This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index add360b46b38..63f8b3f26fab 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
 				break;
 			}
-			/* fallthrough if set */
+			/* fall through - if set */
 		default:
 			data->values[i] = f->val;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b