From cfd32acf7875d9dd83f82e1940098e88abeea439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 19:55:41 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86/mmu: Fix an inverted list_empty() check when zapping sptes

A recently introduced helper for handling zap vs. remote flush
incorrectly bails early, effectively leaking defunct shadow pages.
Manifests as a slab BUG when exiting KVM due to the shadow pages
being alive when their associated cache is destroyed.

==========================================================================
BUG kvm_mmu_page_header: Objects remaining in kvm_mmu_page_header on ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Slab 0x00000000fc436387 objects=26 used=23 fp=0x00000000d023caee ...
CPU: 6 PID: 4315 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G    B             5.1.0-rc2+ #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x46/0x5b
 slab_err+0xad/0xd0
 ? on_each_cpu_mask+0x3c/0x50
 ? ksm_migrate_page+0x60/0x60
 ? on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x7c/0xa0
 ? __kmalloc+0x1ca/0x1e0
 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x13a/0x310
 shutdown_cache+0xf/0x130
 kmem_cache_destroy+0x1d5/0x200
 kvm_mmu_module_exit+0xa/0x30 [kvm]
 kvm_arch_exit+0x45/0x60 [kvm]
 kvm_exit+0x6f/0x80 [kvm]
 vmx_exit+0x1a/0x50 [kvm_intel]
 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x153/0x1f0
 ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x88/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: a21136345cb6f ("KVM: x86/mmu: Split remote_flush+zap case out of kvm_mmu_flush_or_zap()")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index eee455a8a612..85f753728953 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(struct kvm *kvm,
 					struct list_head *invalid_list,
 					bool remote_flush)
 {
-	if (!remote_flush && !list_empty(invalid_list))
+	if (!remote_flush && list_empty(invalid_list))
 		return false;
 
 	if (!list_empty(invalid_list))
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 690908104e39d37947f89d76388c876ce4ec5fda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:16:17 +0200
Subject: KVM: nVMX: allow tests to use bad virtual-APIC page address

As mentioned in the comment, there are some special cases where we can simply
clear the TPR shadow bit from the CPU-based execution controls in the vmcs02.
Handle them so that we can remove some XFAILs from vmx.flat.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h    |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 7ec9bb1dd723..a22af5a85540 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -2873,20 +2873,27 @@ static void nested_get_vmcs12_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		/*
 		 * If translation failed, VM entry will fail because
 		 * prepare_vmcs02 set VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR to -1ull.
-		 * Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor
-		 * does but it's basically the only possibility we
-		 * have.  We could still enter the guest if CR8 load
-		 * exits are enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and
-		 * virtualize APIC access is disabled; in this case
-		 * the processor would never use the TPR shadow and we
-		 * could simply clear the bit from the execution
-		 * control.  But such a configuration is useless, so
-		 * let's keep the code simple.
 		 */
 		if (!is_error_page(page)) {
 			vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = page;
 			hpa = page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
 			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, hpa);
+		} else if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING) &&
+		           nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING) &&
+			   !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
+			/*
+			 * The processor will never use the TPR shadow, simply
+			 * clear the bit from the execution control.  Such a
+			 * configuration is useless, but it happens in tests.
+			 * For any other configuration, failing the vm entry is
+			 * _not_ what the processor does but it's basically the
+			 * only possibility we have.
+			 */
+			vmcs_clear_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
+		} else {
+			printk("bad virtual-APIC page address\n");
+			dump_vmcs();
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index ab432a930ae8..7a8f75fc6b7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5603,7 +5603,7 @@ static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
 	       vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
 }
 
-static void dump_vmcs(void)
+void dump_vmcs(void)
 {
 	u32 vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
 	u32 vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index a1e00d0a2482..f879529906b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -517,4 +517,6 @@ static inline void decache_tsc_multiplier(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vmx->current_tsc_ratio);
 }
 
+void dump_vmcs(void);
+
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2b27924bb1d48e3775f432b70bdad5e6dd4e7798 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:57:19 +0200
Subject: KVM: nVMX: always use early vmcs check when EPT is disabled

The remaining failures of vmx.flat when EPT is disabled are caused by
incorrectly reflecting VMfails to the L1 hypervisor.  What happens is
that nested_vmx_restore_host_state corrupts the guest CR3, reloading it
with the host's shadow CR3 instead, because it blindly loads GUEST_CR3
from the vmcs01.

For simplicity let's just always use hardware VMCS checks when EPT is
disabled.  This way, nested_vmx_restore_host_state is not reached at
all (or at least shouldn't be reached).

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c       | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index f0b0c90dd398..d213ec5c3766 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
 
 #define VMX_ABORT_SAVE_GUEST_MSR_FAIL        1
 #define VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL       2
+#define VMX_ABORT_VMCS_CORRUPTED             3
 #define VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL         4
 
 #endif /* _UAPIVMX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index a22af5a85540..6401eb7ef19c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3796,8 +3796,18 @@ static void nested_vmx_restore_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW));
 
 	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
-	vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
-	__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_CR3, (ulong *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+
+	/*
+	 * This is only valid if EPT is in use, otherwise the vmcs01 GUEST_CR3
+	 * points to shadow pages!  Fortunately we only get here after a WARN_ON
+	 * if EPT is disabled, so a VMabort is perfectly fine.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+		__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_CR3, (ulong *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+	} else {
+		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_VMCS_CORRUPTED);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Use ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu) to load the MMU's cached PDPTRs
@@ -5745,6 +5755,14 @@ __init int nested_vmx_hardware_setup(int (*exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *))
 {
 	int i;
 
+	/*
+	 * Without EPT it is not possible to restore L1's CR3 and PDPTR on
+	 * VMfail, because they are not available in vmcs01.  Just always
+	 * use hardware checks.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		nested_early_check = 1;
+
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs())
 		enable_shadow_vmcs = 0;
 	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From bc8a3d8925a8fa09fa550e0da115d95851ce33c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:07:30 -0700
Subject: kvm: mmu: Fix overflow on kvm mmu page limit calculation

KVM bases its memory usage limits on the total number of guest pages
across all memslots. However, those limits, and the calculations to
produce them, use 32 bit unsigned integers. This can result in overflow
if a VM has more guest pages that can be represented by a u32. As a
result of this overflow, KVM can use a low limit on the number of MMU
pages it will allocate. This makes KVM unable to map all of guest memory
at once, prompting spurious faults.

Tested: Ran all kvm-unit-tests on an Intel Haswell machine. This patch
	introduced no new failures.

Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              | 13 ++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 159b5988292f..9b7b731a0032 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
 }
 
 #define KVM_PERMILLE_MMU_PAGES 20
-#define KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES 64
+#define KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES 64UL
 #define KVM_MMU_HASH_SHIFT 12
 #define KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES (1 << KVM_MMU_HASH_SHIFT)
 #define KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES 5
@@ -844,9 +844,9 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
-	unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages;
-	unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages;
-	unsigned int n_max_mmu_pages;
+	unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;
+	unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
+	unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
 	struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
 	/*
@@ -1256,8 +1256,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
 				   gfn_t gfn_offset, unsigned long mask);
 void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen);
-unsigned int kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm);
-void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int kvm_nr_mmu_pages);
+unsigned long kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long kvm_nr_mmu_pages);
 
 int load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned long cr3);
 bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 85f753728953..e10962dfc203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2007,7 +2007,7 @@ static int is_empty_shadow_page(u64 *spt)
  * aggregate version in order to make the slab shrinker
  * faster
  */
-static inline void kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, int nr)
+static inline void kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long nr)
 {
 	kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages += nr;
 	percpu_counter_add(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages, nr);
@@ -2763,7 +2763,7 @@ static bool prepare_zap_oldest_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm,
  * Changing the number of mmu pages allocated to the vm
  * Note: if goal_nr_mmu_pages is too small, you will get dead lock
  */
-void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int goal_nr_mmu_pages)
+void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long goal_nr_mmu_pages)
 {
 	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
 
@@ -6031,10 +6031,10 @@ out:
 /*
  * Calculate mmu pages needed for kvm.
  */
-unsigned int kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+unsigned long kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	unsigned int nr_mmu_pages;
-	unsigned int  nr_pages = 0;
+	unsigned long nr_mmu_pages;
+	unsigned long nr_pages = 0;
 	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
 	struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
 	int i;
@@ -6047,8 +6047,7 @@ unsigned int kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 
 	nr_mmu_pages = nr_pages * KVM_PERMILLE_MMU_PAGES / 1000;
-	nr_mmu_pages = max(nr_mmu_pages,
-			   (unsigned int) KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES);
+	nr_mmu_pages = max(nr_mmu_pages, KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES);
 
 	return nr_mmu_pages;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index bbdc60f2fae8..54c2a377795b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
 				u64 fault_address, char *insn, int insn_len);
 
-static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	if (kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages > kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages)
 		return kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages -
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 099b851dabaf..455f156f56ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4270,7 +4270,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm,
 }
 
 static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
-					  u32 kvm_nr_mmu_pages)
+					 unsigned long kvm_nr_mmu_pages)
 {
 	if (kvm_nr_mmu_pages < KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -4284,7 +4284,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+static unsigned long kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	return kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 4a58038b9e420276157785afa0a0bbb4b9bc2265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Suthikulpanit, Suravee" <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 08:12:28 +0000
Subject: Revert "svm: Fix AVIC incomplete IPI emulation"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This reverts commit bb218fbcfaaa3b115d4cd7a43c0ca164f3a96e57.

As Oren Twaig pointed out the old discussion:

  https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8292231/

that the change coud potentially cause an extra IPI to be sent to
the destination vcpu because the AVIC hardware already set the IRR bit
before the incomplete IPI #VMEXIT with id=1 (target vcpu is not running).
Since writting to ICR and ICR2 will also set the IRR. If something triggers
the destination vcpu to get scheduled before the emulation finishes, then
this could result in an additional IPI.

Also, the issue mentioned in the commit bb218fbcfaaa was misdiagnosed.

Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Oren Twaig <oren@scalemp.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index e0a791c3d4fc..d7b14c902052 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4517,14 +4517,25 @@ static int avic_incomplete_ipi_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, APIC_ICR, icrl);
 		break;
 	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_TARGET_NOT_RUNNING: {
+		int i;
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+		struct kvm *kvm = svm->vcpu.kvm;
 		struct kvm_lapic *apic = svm->vcpu.arch.apic;
 
 		/*
-		 * Update ICR high and low, then emulate sending IPI,
-		 * which is handled when writing APIC_ICR.
+		 * At this point, we expect that the AVIC HW has already
+		 * set the appropriate IRR bits on the valid target
+		 * vcpus. So, we just need to kick the appropriate vcpu.
 		 */
-		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, APIC_ICR2, icrh);
-		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, APIC_ICR, icrl);
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			bool m = kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, apic,
+						     icrl & KVM_APIC_SHORT_MASK,
+						     GET_APIC_DEST_FIELD(icrh),
+						     icrl & KVM_APIC_DEST_MASK);
+
+			if (m && !avic_vcpu_is_running(vcpu))
+				kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+		}
 		break;
 	}
 	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_TARGET:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e44e3eacccfd2294a1ce279f68452b1635d7fa82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Suthikulpanit, Suravee" <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 03:57:37 +0000
Subject: svm/avic: Fix invalidate logical APIC id entry

Only clear the valid bit when invalidate logical APIC id entry.
The current logic clear the valid bit, but also set the rest of
the bits (including reserved bits) to 1.

Fixes: 98d90582be2e ('svm: Fix AVIC DFR and LDR handling')
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index d7b14c902052..933f19d840fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
 };
 
 #define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK	(0xFF)
+#define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_BIT			31
 #define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK		(1 << 31)
 
 #define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK	(0xFFULL)
@@ -4607,7 +4608,7 @@ static void avic_invalidate_logical_id_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	u32 *entry = avic_get_logical_id_entry(vcpu, svm->ldr_reg, flat);
 
 	if (entry)
-		WRITE_ONCE(*entry, (u32) ~AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK);
+		clear_bit(AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_BIT, (unsigned long *)entry);
 }
 
 static int avic_handle_ldr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 99c221796a810055974b54c02e8f53297e48d146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 16:06:42 +0200
Subject: KVM: x86: svm: make sure NMI is injected after nmi_singlestep

I noticed that apic test from kvm-unit-tests always hangs on my EPYC 7401P,
the hanging test nmi-after-sti is trying to deliver 30000 NMIs and tracing
shows that we're sometimes able to deliver a few but never all.

When we're trying to inject an NMI we may fail to do so immediately for
various reasons, however, we still need to inject it so enable_nmi_window()
arms nmi_singlestep mode. #DB occurs as expected, but we're not checking
for pending NMIs before entering the guest and unless there's a different
event to process, the NMI will never get delivered.

Make KVM_REQ_EVENT request on the vCPU from db_interception() to make sure
pending NMIs are checked and possibly injected.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 933f19d840fe..c6815aef2cac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -2693,6 +2693,7 @@ static int npf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = svm->vcpu.run;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 
 	if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
 	      (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
@@ -2703,6 +2704,8 @@ static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 	if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
 		disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+		/* Make sure we check for pending NMIs upon entry */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 	}
 
 	if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 1811d979c71621aafc7b879477202d286f7e863b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: WANG Chao <chao.wang@ucloud.cn>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:55:39 +0800
Subject: x86/kvm: move kvm_load/put_guest_xcr0 into atomic context

guest xcr0 could leak into host when MCE happens in guest mode. Because
do_machine_check() could schedule out at a few places.

For example:

kvm_load_guest_xcr0
...
kvm_x86_ops->run(vcpu) {
  vmx_vcpu_run
    vmx_complete_atomic_exit
      kvm_machine_check
        do_machine_check
          do_memory_failure
            memory_failure
              lock_page

In this case, host_xcr0 is 0x2ff, guest vcpu xcr0 is 0xff. After schedule
out, host cpu has guest xcr0 loaded (0xff).

In __switch_to {
     switch_fpu_finish
       copy_kernel_to_fpregs
         XRSTORS

If any bit i in XSTATE_BV[i] == 1 and xcr0[i] == 0, XRSTORS will
generate #GP (In this case, bit 9). Then ex_handler_fprestore kicks in
and tries to reinitialize fpu by restoring init fpu state. Same story as
last #GP, except we get DOUBLE FAULT this time.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: WANG Chao <chao.wang@ucloud.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 10 ++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h     |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index c6815aef2cac..675cecb3fa9c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5636,6 +5636,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
 
 	clgi();
+	kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
@@ -5781,6 +5782,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
 		kvm_before_interrupt(&svm->vcpu);
 
+	kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
 	stgi();
 
 	/* Any pending NMI will happen here */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 7a8f75fc6b7e..88060a621db2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6410,6 +6410,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
 		vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
+	kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
+
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
 	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
 	    vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
@@ -6506,6 +6508,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			__write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
 	}
 
+	kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
+
 	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
 	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 455f156f56ed..f05891b8df7c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ void kvm_lmsw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long msw)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
 
-static void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) &&
 			!vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded) {
@@ -810,8 +810,9 @@ static void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded = 1;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xcr0);
 
-static void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded) {
 		if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
@@ -819,6 +820,7 @@ static void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->guest_xcr0_loaded = 0;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_put_guest_xcr0);
 
 static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
 {
@@ -7865,8 +7867,6 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto cancel_injection;
 	}
 
-	kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
-
 	if (req_immediate_exit) {
 		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 		kvm_x86_ops->request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
@@ -7919,8 +7919,6 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
 	smp_wmb();
 
-	kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
-
 	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu);
 	kvm_x86_ops->handle_external_intr(vcpu);
 	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 28406aa1136d..aedc5d0d4989 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -347,4 +347,6 @@ static inline void kvm_after_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	__this_cpu_write(current_vcpu, NULL);
 }
 
+void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 672ff6cff80ca43bf3258410d2b887036969df5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 21:10:17 +0200
Subject: KVM: x86: Raise #GP when guest vCPU do not support PMU

Before this change, reading a VMware pseduo PMC will succeed even when
PMU is not supported by guest. This can easily be seen by running
kvm-unit-test vmware_backdoors with "-cpu host,-pmu" option.

Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
index 58ead7db71a3..e39741997893 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -281,9 +281,13 @@ static int kvm_pmu_rdpmc_vmware(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned idx, u64 *data)
 int kvm_pmu_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned idx, u64 *data)
 {
 	bool fast_mode = idx & (1u << 31);
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
 	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
 	u64 ctr_val;
 
+	if (!pmu->version)
+		return 1;
+
 	if (is_vmware_backdoor_pmc(idx))
 		return kvm_pmu_rdpmc_vmware(vcpu, idx, data);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e51bfdb68725dc052d16241ace40ea3140f938aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 21:09:17 +0200
Subject: KVM: nVMX: Expose RDPMC-exiting only when guest supports PMU

Issue was discovered when running kvm-unit-tests on KVM running as L1 on
top of Hyper-V.

When vmx_instruction_intercept unit-test attempts to run RDPMC to test
RDPMC-exiting, it is intercepted by L1 KVM which it's EXIT_REASON_RDPMC
handler raise #GP because vCPU exposed by Hyper-V doesn't support PMU.
Instead of unit-test expectation to be reflected with EXIT_REASON_RDPMC.

The reason vmx_instruction_intercept unit-test attempts to run RDPMC
even though Hyper-V doesn't support PMU is because L1 expose to L2
support for RDPMC-exiting. Which is reasonable to assume that is
supported only in case CPU supports PMU to being with.

Above issue can easily be simulated by modifying
vmx_instruction_intercept config in x86/unittests.cfg to run QEMU with
"-cpu host,+vmx,-pmu" and run unit-test.

To handle issue, change KVM to expose RDPMC-exiting only when guest
supports PMU.

Reported-by: Saar Amar <saaramar@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 88060a621db2..5866e9e9f1e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6856,6 +6856,30 @@ static void nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
+static bool guest_cpuid_has_pmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	union cpuid10_eax eax;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0xa, 0);
+	if (!entry)
+		return false;
+
+	eax.full = entry->eax;
+	return (eax.split.version_id > 0);
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool pmu_enabled = guest_cpuid_has_pmu(vcpu);
+
+	if (pmu_enabled)
+		vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_high |= CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING;
+	else
+		vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_high &= ~CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING;
+}
+
 static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -6944,6 +6968,7 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) {
 		nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
 		nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(vcpu);
+		nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_update(vcpu);
 	}
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From ed19321fb6571214f410b30322e4ad6e6b7c3915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 08:03:09 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86: Load SMRAM in a single shot when leaving SMM

RSM emulation is currently broken on VMX when the interrupted guest has
CR4.VMXE=1.  Rather than dance around the issue of HF_SMM_MASK being set
when loading SMSTATE into architectural state, ideally RSM emulation
itself would be reworked to clear HF_SMM_MASK prior to loading non-SMM
architectural state.

Ostensibly, the only motivation for having HF_SMM_MASK set throughout
the loading of state from the SMRAM save state area is so that the
memory accesses from GET_SMSTATE() are tagged with role.smm.  Load
all of the SMRAM save state area from guest memory at the beginning of
RSM emulation, and load state from the buffer instead of reading guest
memory one-by-one.

This paves the way for clearing HF_SMM_MASK prior to loading state,
and also aligns RSM with the enter_smm() behavior, which fills a
buffer and writes SMRAM save state in a single go.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |   3 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |   5 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c             | 149 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                 |  20 ++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |   5 +-
 6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index 93c4bf598fb0..ec489c432850 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
 
 	unsigned (*get_hflags)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 	void (*set_hflags)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned hflags);
-	int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase);
+	int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     const char *smstate);
 
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9b7b731a0032..a9d03af34030 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 
 	int (*smi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*pre_enter_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
-	int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 smbase);
+	int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
 	int (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
@@ -1592,4 +1592,7 @@ static inline int kvm_cpu_get_apicid(int mps_cpu)
 #define put_smstate(type, buf, offset, val)                      \
 	*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00) = val
 
+#define GET_SMSTATE(type, buf, offset)		\
+	(*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00))
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index c338984c850d..ae0d289b50fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2339,16 +2339,6 @@ static int emulator_has_longmode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	return edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_LM);
 }
 
-#define GET_SMSTATE(type, smbase, offset)				  \
-	({								  \
-	 type __val;							  \
-	 int r = ctxt->ops->read_phys(ctxt, smbase + offset, &__val,      \
-				      sizeof(__val));			  \
-	 if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)					  \
-		 return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;				  \
-	 __val;								  \
-	})
-
 static void rsm_set_desc_flags(struct desc_struct *desc, u32 flags)
 {
 	desc->g    = (flags >> 23) & 1;
@@ -2361,27 +2351,29 @@ static void rsm_set_desc_flags(struct desc_struct *desc, u32 flags)
 	desc->type = (flags >>  8) & 15;
 }
 
-static int rsm_load_seg_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
+static int rsm_load_seg_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, const char *smstate,
+			   int n)
 {
 	struct desc_struct desc;
 	int offset;
 	u16 selector;
 
-	selector = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fa8 + n * 4);
+	selector = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fa8 + n * 4);
 
 	if (n < 3)
 		offset = 0x7f84 + n * 12;
 	else
 		offset = 0x7f2c + (n - 3) * 12;
 
-	set_desc_base(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 8));
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 4));
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset));
+	set_desc_base(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset + 8));
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset + 4));
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset));
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, 0, n);
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
-static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
+static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, const char *smstate,
+			   int n)
 {
 	struct desc_struct desc;
 	int offset;
@@ -2390,11 +2382,11 @@ static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase, int n)
 
 	offset = 0x7e00 + n * 16;
 
-	selector =                GET_SMSTATE(u16, smbase, offset);
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, GET_SMSTATE(u16, smbase, offset + 2) << 8);
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 4));
-	set_desc_base(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 8));
-	base3 =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, offset + 12);
+	selector =                GET_SMSTATE(u16, smstate, offset);
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, GET_SMSTATE(u16, smstate, offset + 2) << 8);
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset + 4));
+	set_desc_base(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset + 8));
+	base3 =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, offset + 12);
 
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, n);
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
@@ -2445,7 +2437,8 @@ static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
-static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
+static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     const char *smstate)
 {
 	struct desc_struct desc;
 	struct desc_ptr dt;
@@ -2453,53 +2446,54 @@ static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 	u32 val, cr0, cr3, cr4;
 	int i;
 
-	cr0 =                      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7ffc);
-	cr3 =                      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7ff8);
-	ctxt->eflags =             GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7ff4) | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
-	ctxt->_eip =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7ff0);
+	cr0 =                      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ffc);
+	cr3 =                      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ff8);
+	ctxt->eflags =             GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ff4) | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	ctxt->_eip =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ff0);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fd0 + i * 4);
+		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fd0 + i * 4);
 
-	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fcc);
+	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fcc);
 	ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, 6, (val & DR6_VOLATILE) | DR6_FIXED_1);
-	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fc8);
+	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fc8);
 	ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, 7, (val & DR7_VOLATILE) | DR7_FIXED_1);
 
-	selector =                 GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fc4);
-	set_desc_base(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f64));
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f60));
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f5c));
+	selector =                 GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fc4);
+	set_desc_base(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f64));
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f60));
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f5c));
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
 
-	selector =                 GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7fc0);
-	set_desc_base(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f80));
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f7c));
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f78));
+	selector =                 GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fc0);
+	set_desc_base(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f80));
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,      GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f7c));
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f78));
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
 
-	dt.address =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f74);
-	dt.size =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f70);
+	dt.address =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f74);
+	dt.size =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f70);
 	ctxt->ops->set_gdt(ctxt, &dt);
 
-	dt.address =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f58);
-	dt.size =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f54);
+	dt.address =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f58);
+	dt.size =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f54);
 	ctxt->ops->set_idt(ctxt, &dt);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
-		int r = rsm_load_seg_32(ctxt, smbase, i);
+		int r = rsm_load_seg_32(ctxt, smstate, i);
 		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 			return r;
 	}
 
-	cr4 = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f14);
+	cr4 = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f14);
 
-	ctxt->ops->set_smbase(ctxt, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7ef8));
+	ctxt->ops->set_smbase(ctxt, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ef8));
 
 	return rsm_enter_protected_mode(ctxt, cr0, cr3, cr4);
 }
 
-static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
+static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     const char *smstate)
 {
 	struct desc_struct desc;
 	struct desc_ptr dt;
@@ -2509,43 +2503,43 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 	int i, r;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7ff8 - i * 8);
+		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ff8 - i * 8);
 
-	ctxt->_eip   = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7f78);
-	ctxt->eflags = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f70) | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	ctxt->_eip   = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f78);
+	ctxt->eflags = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f70) | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
 
-	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f68);
+	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f68);
 	ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, 6, (val & DR6_VOLATILE) | DR6_FIXED_1);
-	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f60);
+	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f60);
 	ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, 7, (val & DR7_VOLATILE) | DR7_FIXED_1);
 
-	cr0 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7f58);
-	cr3 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7f50);
-	cr4 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7f48);
-	ctxt->ops->set_smbase(ctxt, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7f00));
-	val =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7ed0);
+	cr0 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f58);
+	cr3 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f50);
+	cr4 =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f48);
+	ctxt->ops->set_smbase(ctxt, GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7f00));
+	val =                       GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed0);
 	ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, val & ~EFER_LMA);
 
-	selector =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e90);
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e92) << 8);
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e94));
-	set_desc_base(&desc,        GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e98));
-	base3 =                     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e9c);
+	selector =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e90);
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e92) << 8);
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e94));
+	set_desc_base(&desc,        GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e98));
+	base3 =                     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e9c);
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, VCPU_SREG_TR);
 
-	dt.size =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e84);
-	dt.address =                GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7e88);
+	dt.size =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e84);
+	dt.address =                GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7e88);
 	ctxt->ops->set_idt(ctxt, &dt);
 
-	selector =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e70);
-	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e72) << 8);
-	set_desc_limit(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e74));
-	set_desc_base(&desc,        GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e78));
-	base3 =                     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e7c);
+	selector =                  GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e70);
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc,   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e72) << 8);
+	set_desc_limit(&desc,       GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e74));
+	set_desc_base(&desc,        GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e78));
+	base3 =                     GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e7c);
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
 
-	dt.size =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smbase, 0x7e64);
-	dt.address =                GET_SMSTATE(u64, smbase, 0x7e68);
+	dt.size =                   GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7e64);
+	dt.address =                GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7e68);
 	ctxt->ops->set_gdt(ctxt, &dt);
 
 	r = rsm_enter_protected_mode(ctxt, cr0, cr3, cr4);
@@ -2553,7 +2547,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 		return r;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
-		r = rsm_load_seg_64(ctxt, smbase, i);
+		r = rsm_load_seg_64(ctxt, smstate, i);
 		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 			return r;
 	}
@@ -2564,12 +2558,19 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
 static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
 	unsigned long cr0, cr4, efer;
+	char buf[512];
 	u64 smbase;
 	int ret;
 
 	if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_MASK) == 0)
 		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
 
+	smbase = ctxt->ops->get_smbase(ctxt);
+
+	ret = ctxt->ops->read_phys(ctxt, smbase + 0xfe00, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
 	/*
 	 * Get back to real mode, to prepare a safe state in which to load
 	 * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER.  It's all a bit more complicated if the vCPU
@@ -2605,20 +2606,18 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	efer = 0;
 	ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, efer);
 
-	smbase = ctxt->ops->get_smbase(ctxt);
-
 	/*
 	 * Give pre_leave_smm() a chance to make ISA-specific changes to the
 	 * vCPU state (e.g. enter guest mode) before loading state from the SMM
 	 * state-save area.
 	 */
-	if (ctxt->ops->pre_leave_smm(ctxt, smbase))
+	if (ctxt->ops->pre_leave_smm(ctxt, buf))
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
 	if (emulator_has_longmode(ctxt))
-		ret = rsm_load_state_64(ctxt, smbase + 0x8000);
+		ret = rsm_load_state_64(ctxt, buf);
 	else
-		ret = rsm_load_state_32(ctxt, smbase + 0x8000);
+		ret = rsm_load_state_32(ctxt, buf);
 
 	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
 		/* FIXME: should triple fault */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 675cecb3fa9c..6b1cd73e4053 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -6232,27 +6232,23 @@ static int svm_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int svm_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 smbase)
+static int svm_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
 	struct page *page;
-	struct {
-		u64 guest;
-		u64 vmcb;
-	} svm_state_save;
+	u64 guest;
+	u64 vmcb;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, smbase + 0xfed8, &svm_state_save,
-				  sizeof(svm_state_save));
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	guest = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8);
+	vmcb = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0);
 
-	if (svm_state_save.guest) {
+	if (guest) {
 		vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
-		nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, svm_state_save.vmcb, &page);
+		nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, vmcb, &page);
 		if (nested_vmcb)
-			enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, svm_state_save.vmcb, nested_vmcb, page);
+			enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, vmcb, nested_vmcb, page);
 		else
 			ret = 1;
 		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 5866e9e9f1e0..14ea25eadde8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7398,7 +7398,7 @@ static int vmx_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int vmx_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 smbase)
+static int vmx_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	int ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index f05891b8df7c..6ee1f9e5d3fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -5963,9 +5963,10 @@ static void emulator_set_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned emul_fla
 	kvm_set_hflags(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), emul_flags);
 }
 
-static int emulator_pre_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u64 smbase)
+static int emulator_pre_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				  const char *smstate)
 {
-	return kvm_x86_ops->pre_leave_smm(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), smbase);
+	return kvm_x86_ops->pre_leave_smm(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), smstate);
 }
 
 static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c5833c7a43a66bfe2f36439cb2f1281a588668af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 08:03:10 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86: Open code kvm_set_hflags

Prepare for clearing HF_SMM_MASK prior to loading state from the SMRAM
save state map, i.e. kvm_smm_changed() needs to be called after state
has been loaded and so cannot be done automatically when setting
hflags from RSM.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c             |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 | 33 +++++++++++++++------------------
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index ec489c432850..feab24cac610 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
 	void (*set_hflags)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned hflags);
 	int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			     const char *smstate);
+	void (*post_leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index ae0d289b50fe..a6b282853253 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2629,6 +2629,9 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 	ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) &
 		~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK));
+
+	ctxt->ops->post_leave_smm(ctxt);
+
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 6ee1f9e5d3fb..472bbbbe153a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3530,7 +3530,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved));
 }
 
-static void kvm_set_hflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned emul_flags);
+static void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					      struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
@@ -3590,12 +3590,13 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vcpu->arch.apic->sipi_vector = events->sipi_vector;
 
 	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM) {
-		u32 hflags = vcpu->arch.hflags;
-		if (events->smi.smm)
-			hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
-		else
-			hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
-		kvm_set_hflags(vcpu, hflags);
+		if (!!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK) != events->smi.smm) {
+			if (events->smi.smm)
+				vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
+			else
+				vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
+			kvm_smm_changed(vcpu);
+		}
 
 		vcpu->arch.smi_pending = events->smi.pending;
 
@@ -5960,7 +5961,7 @@ static unsigned emulator_get_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static void emulator_set_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned emul_flags)
 {
-	kvm_set_hflags(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), emul_flags);
+	emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)->arch.hflags = emul_flags;
 }
 
 static int emulator_pre_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -5969,6 +5970,11 @@ static int emulator_pre_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	return kvm_x86_ops->pre_leave_smm(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), smstate);
 }
 
+static void emulator_post_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	kvm_smm_changed(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
 static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
 	.read_gpr            = emulator_read_gpr,
 	.write_gpr           = emulator_write_gpr,
@@ -6009,6 +6015,7 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
 	.get_hflags          = emulator_get_hflags,
 	.set_hflags          = emulator_set_hflags,
 	.pre_leave_smm       = emulator_pre_leave_smm,
+	.post_leave_smm      = emulator_post_leave_smm,
 };
 
 static void toggle_interruptibility(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mask)
@@ -6250,16 +6257,6 @@ static void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
 }
 
-static void kvm_set_hflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned emul_flags)
-{
-	unsigned changed = vcpu->arch.hflags ^ emul_flags;
-
-	vcpu->arch.hflags = emul_flags;
-
-	if (changed & HF_SMM_MASK)
-		kvm_smm_changed(vcpu);
-}
-
 static int kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(unsigned long addr, u32 type, u32 dr7,
 				unsigned long *db)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 9ec19493fb86d6d5fbf9286b94ff21e56ef66376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 08:03:11 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86: clear SMM flags before loading state while leaving SMM

RSM emulation is currently broken on VMX when the interrupted guest has
CR4.VMXE=1.  Stop dancing around the issue of HF_SMM_MASK being set when
loading SMSTATE into architectural state, e.g. by toggling it for
problematic flows, and simply clear HF_SMM_MASK prior to loading
architectural state (from SMRAM save state area).

Reported-by: Jon Doron <arilou@gmail.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Fixes: 5bea5123cbf0 ("KVM: VMX: check nested state and CR4.VMXE against SMM")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     | 12 ++++--------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  2 --
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index a6b282853253..f526acee2eed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2571,6 +2571,12 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
+	if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
+		ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false);
+
+	ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) &
+		~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK));
+
 	/*
 	 * Get back to real mode, to prepare a safe state in which to load
 	 * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER.  It's all a bit more complicated if the vCPU
@@ -2624,12 +2630,6 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 	}
 
-	if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
-		ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false);
-
-	ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) &
-		~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK));
-
 	ctxt->ops->post_leave_smm(ctxt);
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 6b1cd73e4053..406b558abfef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -6239,21 +6239,17 @@ static int svm_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 	struct page *page;
 	u64 guest;
 	u64 vmcb;
-	int ret;
 
 	guest = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8);
 	vmcb = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0);
 
 	if (guest) {
-		vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
 		nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, vmcb, &page);
-		if (nested_vmcb)
-			enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, vmcb, nested_vmcb, page);
-		else
-			ret = 1;
-		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
+		if (!nested_vmcb)
+			return 1;
+		enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, vmcb, nested_vmcb, page);
 	}
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 14ea25eadde8..b4e7d645275a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7409,9 +7409,7 @@ static int vmx_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 	}
 
 	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
-		vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
 		ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
-		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 8f4dc2e77cdfaf7e644ef29693fa229db29ee1de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 08:10:47 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86: Don't clear EFER during SMM transitions for 32-bit vCPU

Neither AMD nor Intel CPUs have an EFER field in the legacy SMRAM save
state area, i.e. don't save/restore EFER across SMM transitions.  KVM
somewhat models this, e.g. doesn't clear EFER on entry to SMM if the
guest doesn't support long mode.  But during RSM, KVM unconditionally
clears EFER so that it can get back to pure 32-bit mode in order to
start loading CRs with their actual non-SMM values.

Clear EFER only when it will be written when loading the non-SMM state
so as to preserve bits that can theoretically be set on 32-bit vCPUs,
e.g. KVM always emulates EFER_SCE.

And because CR4.PAE is cleared only to play nice with EFER, wrap that
code in the long mode check as well.  Note, this may result in a
compiler warning about cr4 being consumed uninitialized.  Re-read CR4
even though it's technically unnecessary, as doing so allows for more
readable code and RSM emulation is not a performance critical path.

Fixes: 660a5d517aaab ("KVM: x86: save/load state on SMM switch")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index f526acee2eed..f3284827c432 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2582,15 +2582,13 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	 * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER.  It's all a bit more complicated if the vCPU
 	 * supports long mode.
 	 */
-	cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
 	if (emulator_has_longmode(ctxt)) {
 		struct desc_struct cs_desc;
 
 		/* Zero CR4.PCIDE before CR0.PG.  */
-		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
+		cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)
 			ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
-			cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PCIDE;
-		}
 
 		/* A 32-bit code segment is required to clear EFER.LMA.  */
 		memset(&cs_desc, 0, sizeof(cs_desc));
@@ -2604,13 +2602,16 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
 		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE));
 
-	/* Now clear CR4.PAE (which must be done before clearing EFER.LME).  */
-	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
-		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
+	if (emulator_has_longmode(ctxt)) {
+		/* Clear CR4.PAE before clearing EFER.LME. */
+		cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
+			ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
 
-	/* And finally go back to 32-bit mode.  */
-	efer = 0;
-	ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, efer);
+		/* And finally go back to 32-bit mode.  */
+		efer = 0;
+		ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, efer);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Give pre_leave_smm() a chance to make ISA-specific changes to the
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From b68f3cc7d978943fcf85148165b00594c38db776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 08:10:48 -0700
Subject: KVM: x86: Always use 32-bit SMRAM save state for 32-bit kernels

Invoking the 64-bit variation on a 32-bit kenrel will crash the guest,
trigger a WARN, and/or lead to a buffer overrun in the host, e.g.
rsm_load_state_64() writes r8-r15 unconditionally, but enum kvm_reg and
thus x86_emulate_ctxt._regs only define r8-r15 for CONFIG_X86_64.

KVM allows userspace to report long mode support via CPUID, even though
the guest is all but guaranteed to crash if it actually tries to enable
long mode.  But, a pure 32-bit guest that is ignorant of long mode will
happily plod along.

SMM complicates things as 64-bit CPUs use a different SMRAM save state
area.  KVM handles this correctly for 64-bit kernels, e.g. uses the
legacy save state map if userspace has hid long mode from the guest,
but doesn't fare well when userspace reports long mode support on a
32-bit host kernel (32-bit KVM doesn't support 64-bit guests).

Since the alternative is to crash the guest, e.g. by not loading state
or explicitly requesting shutdown, unconditionally use the legacy SMRAM
save state map for 32-bit KVM.  If a guest has managed to get far enough
to handle SMIs when running under a weird/buggy userspace hypervisor,
then don't deliberately crash the guest since there are no downsides
(from KVM's perspective) to allow it to continue running.

Fixes: 660a5d517aaab ("KVM: x86: save/load state on SMM switch")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index f3284827c432..d0d5dd44b4f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2331,12 +2331,16 @@ static int em_lseg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static int emulator_has_longmode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
 
 	eax = 0x80000001;
 	ecx = 0;
 	ctxt->ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
 	return edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_LM);
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
 }
 
 static void rsm_set_desc_flags(struct desc_struct *desc, u32 flags)
@@ -2372,6 +2376,7 @@ static int rsm_load_seg_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, const char *smstate,
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, const char *smstate,
 			   int n)
 {
@@ -2391,6 +2396,7 @@ static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, const char *smstate,
 	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, n);
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
+#endif
 
 static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 				    u64 cr0, u64 cr3, u64 cr4)
@@ -2492,6 +2498,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	return rsm_enter_protected_mode(ctxt, cr0, cr3, cr4);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			     const char *smstate)
 {
@@ -2554,6 +2561,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
+#endif
 
 static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2621,9 +2629,11 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (ctxt->ops->pre_leave_smm(ctxt, buf))
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	if (emulator_has_longmode(ctxt))
 		ret = rsm_load_state_64(ctxt, buf);
 	else
+#endif
 		ret = rsm_load_state_32(ctxt, buf);
 
 	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 472bbbbe153a..f10fef561573 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7441,9 +7441,9 @@ static void enter_smm_save_state_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *buf)
 	put_smstate(u32, buf, 0x7ef8, vcpu->arch.smbase);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *buf)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	struct desc_ptr dt;
 	struct kvm_segment seg;
 	unsigned long val;
@@ -7493,10 +7493,8 @@ static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *buf)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
 		enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, buf, i);
-#else
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-#endif
 }
+#endif
 
 static void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
@@ -7507,9 +7505,11 @@ static void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	trace_kvm_enter_smm(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu->arch.smbase, true);
 	memset(buf, 0, 512);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
 		enter_smm_save_state_64(vcpu, buf);
 	else
+#endif
 		enter_smm_save_state_32(vcpu, buf);
 
 	/*
@@ -7567,8 +7567,10 @@ static void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_GS);
 	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_SS);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
 		kvm_x86_ops->set_efer(vcpu, 0);
+#endif
 
 	kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
 	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From be43c440eb5d0ccfdb0d67d5a4c9d579ff988b75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariprasad Kelam <hariprasad.kelam@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2019 15:06:58 +0530
Subject: KVM: x86: fix warning Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Changed passing argument as "0 to NULL" which resolves below sparse warning

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3096:61: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hariprasad.kelam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index f10fef561573..a0d1fc80ac5a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3095,7 +3095,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE:
 		r = kvm_x86_ops->get_nested_state ?
-			kvm_x86_ops->get_nested_state(NULL, 0, 0) : 0;
+			kvm_x86_ops->get_nested_state(NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 1d487e9bf8ba66a7174c56a0029c54b1eca8f99c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 11:16:47 +0200
Subject: KVM: fix spectrev1 gadgets

These were found with smatch, and then generalized when applicable.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c     |  4 +++-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 10 ++++++----
 virt/kvm/irqchip.c       |  5 +++--
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c      |  6 ++++--
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 991fdf7fc17f..9bf70cf84564 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_apic_map_get_logical_dest(struct kvm_apic_map *map,
 		if (offset <= max_apic_id) {
 			u8 cluster_size = min(max_apic_id - offset + 1, 16U);
 
+			offset = array_index_nospec(offset, map->max_apic_id + 1);
 			*cluster = &map->phys_map[offset];
 			*mask = dest_id & (0xffff >> (16 - cluster_size));
 		} else {
@@ -901,7 +902,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic(struct kvm *kvm,
 		if (irq->dest_id > map->max_apic_id) {
 			*bitmap = 0;
 		} else {
-			*dst = &map->phys_map[irq->dest_id];
+			u32 dest_id = array_index_nospec(irq->dest_id, map->max_apic_id + 1);
+			*dst = &map->phys_map[dest_id];
 			*bitmap = 1;
 		}
 		return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 9d55c63db09b..640a03642766 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/irqbypass.h>
 #include <linux/swait.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/signal.h>
 
 #include <linux/kvm.h>
@@ -513,10 +514,10 @@ static inline struct kvm_io_bus *kvm_get_bus(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus idx)
 
 static inline struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_get_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, int i)
 {
-	/* Pairs with smp_wmb() in kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu, in case
-	 * the caller has read kvm->online_vcpus before (as is the case
-	 * for kvm_for_each_vcpu, for example).
-	 */
+	int num_vcpus = atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus);
+	i = array_index_nospec(i, num_vcpus);
+
+	/* Pairs with smp_wmb() in kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu.  */
 	smp_rmb();
 	return kvm->vcpus[i];
 }
@@ -600,6 +601,7 @@ void kvm_put_kvm(struct kvm *kvm);
 
 static inline struct kvm_memslots *__kvm_memslots(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id)
 {
+	as_id = array_index_nospec(as_id, KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM);
 	return srcu_dereference_check(kvm->memslots[as_id], &kvm->srcu,
 			lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock) ||
 			!refcount_read(&kvm->users_count));
diff --git a/virt/kvm/irqchip.c b/virt/kvm/irqchip.c
index 3547b0d8c91e..79e59e4fa3dc 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/irqchip.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/irqchip.c
@@ -144,18 +144,19 @@ static int setup_routing_entry(struct kvm *kvm,
 {
 	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *ei;
 	int r;
+	u32 gsi = array_index_nospec(ue->gsi, KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES);
 
 	/*
 	 * Do not allow GSI to be mapped to the same irqchip more than once.
 	 * Allow only one to one mapping between GSI and non-irqchip routing.
 	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(ei, &rt->map[ue->gsi], link)
+	hlist_for_each_entry(ei, &rt->map[gsi], link)
 		if (ei->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP ||
 		    ue->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP ||
 		    ue->u.irqchip.irqchip == ei->irqchip.irqchip)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-	e->gsi = ue->gsi;
+	e->gsi = gsi;
 	e->type = ue->type;
 	r = kvm_set_routing_entry(kvm, e, ue);
 	if (r)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 55fe8e20d8fd..dc8edc97ba85 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -2977,12 +2977,14 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
 	struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
 	struct kvm_device *dev;
 	bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
+	int type;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
+	type = array_index_nospec(cd->type, ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table));
+	ops = kvm_device_ops_table[type];
 	if (ops == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
@@ -2997,7 +2999,7 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
 	dev->kvm = kvm;
 
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-	ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
+	ret = ops->create(dev, type);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 		kfree(dev);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7a223e06b1a411cef6c4cd7a9b9a33c8d225b10e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 15:12:20 +0100
Subject: KVM: x86: avoid misreporting level-triggered irqs as edge-triggered
 in tracing

In __apic_accept_irq() interface trig_mode is int and actually on some code
paths it is set above u8:

kvm_apic_set_irq() extracts it from 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' where trig_mode
is u16. This is done on purpose as e.g. kvm_set_msi_irq() sets it to
(1 << 15) & e->msi.data

kvm_apic_local_deliver sets it to reg & (1 << 15).

Fix the immediate issue by making 'tm' into u16. We may also want to adjust
__apic_accept_irq() interface and use proper sizes for vector, level,
trig_mode but this is not urgent.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/trace.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/x86')

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
index 6432d08c7de7..4d47a2631d1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
@@ -438,13 +438,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apic_ipi,
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apic_accept_irq,
-	    TP_PROTO(__u32 apicid, __u16 dm, __u8 tm, __u8 vec),
+	    TP_PROTO(__u32 apicid, __u16 dm, __u16 tm, __u8 vec),
 	    TP_ARGS(apicid, dm, tm, vec),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
 		__field(	__u32,		apicid		)
 		__field(	__u16,		dm		)
-		__field(	__u8,		tm		)
+		__field(	__u16,		tm		)
 		__field(	__u8,		vec		)
 	),
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b