From fb041bb7c0a918b95c6889fc965cdc4a75b4c0ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:59:00 +0000 Subject: locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t The generic implementation of refcount_t should be good enough for everybody, so remove ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT and REFCOUNT_FULL entirely, leaving the generic implementation enabled unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Hanjun Guo Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121115902.2551-9-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/Kconfig | 21 ------- arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 - arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig | 1 - arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 6 -- arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h | 126 -------------------------------------- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 49 --------------- 8 files changed, 206 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 5f8a5d84dbbe..8bcc1c746142 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -892,27 +892,6 @@ config STRICT_MODULE_RWX config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA bool -config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT - bool - help - An architecture selects this when it has implemented refcount_t - using open coded assembly primitives that provide an optimized - refcount_t implementation, possibly at the expense of some full - refcount state checks of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y. - - The refcount overflow check behavior, however, must be retained. - Catching overflows is the primary security concern for protecting - against bugs in reference counts. - -config REFCOUNT_FULL - bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" - help - Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast - unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked - implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections - against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in - security flaw exploits. - config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H bool help diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 8a50efb559f3..0d3c5d7cceb7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ config ARM select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 select PCI_SYSCALL if PCI select PERF_USE_VMALLOC - select REFCOUNT_FULL select RTC_LIB select SYS_SUPPORTS_APM_EMULATION # Above selects are sorted alphabetically; please add new ones diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 41a9b4257b72..bc990d3abfe9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ config ARM64 select PCI_SYSCALL if PCI select POWER_RESET select POWER_SUPPLY - select REFCOUNT_FULL select SPARSE_IRQ select SWIOTLB select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig index 38d64030aacf..2e60c80395ab 100644 --- a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig +++ b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ CONFIG_OPROFILE=m CONFIG_KPROBES=y CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y CONFIG_STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST=y -CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y CONFIG_LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS=y CONFIG_MODULES=y CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index d6e1faa28c58..fa6274f1e370 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ config X86 select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_MCSAFE if X86_64 && X86_MCE select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index 3ff577c0b102..5a0c14ebef70 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -139,9 +139,6 @@ # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext) -# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount) - # define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry) \ .pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist","aw" ; \ _ASM_ALIGN ; \ @@ -170,9 +167,6 @@ # define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext) -# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount) - /* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */ #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h deleted file mode 100644 index 232f856e0db0..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef __ASM_X86_REFCOUNT_H -#define __ASM_X86_REFCOUNT_H -/* - * x86-specific implementation of refcount_t. Based on PAX_REFCOUNT from - * PaX/grsecurity. - */ -#include -#include - -/* - * This is the first portion of the refcount error handling, which lives in - * .text.unlikely, and is jumped to from the CPU flag check (in the - * following macros). This saves the refcount value location into CX for - * the exception handler to use (in mm/extable.c), and then triggers the - * central refcount exception. The fixup address for the exception points - * back to the regular execution flow in .text. - */ -#define _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION \ - ".pushsection .text..refcount\n" \ - "111:\tlea %[var], %%" _ASM_CX "\n" \ - "112:\t" ASM_UD2 "\n" \ - ASM_UNREACHABLE \ - ".popsection\n" \ - "113:\n" \ - _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(112b, 113b) - -/* Trigger refcount exception if refcount result is negative. */ -#define REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO \ - "js 111f\n\t" \ - _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION - -/* Trigger refcount exception if refcount result is zero or negative. */ -#define REFCOUNT_CHECK_LE_ZERO \ - "jz 111f\n\t" \ - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - -/* Trigger refcount exception unconditionally. */ -#define REFCOUNT_ERROR \ - "jmp 111f\n\t" \ - _REFCOUNT_EXCEPTION - -static __always_inline void refcount_add(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "addl %1,%0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : "ir" (i) - : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r) -{ - asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t" - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LE_ZERO - : [var] "+m" (r->refs.counter) - : : "cc", "cx"); -} - -static __always_inline __must_check -bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - bool ret = GEN_BINARY_SUFFIXED_RMWcc(LOCK_PREFIX "subl", - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO, - r->refs.counter, e, "er", i, "cx"); - - if (ret) { - smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); - return true; - } - - return false; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r) -{ - bool ret = GEN_UNARY_SUFFIXED_RMWcc(LOCK_PREFIX "decl", - REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO, - r->refs.counter, e, "cx"); - - if (ret) { - smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); - return true; - } - - return false; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check -bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r) -{ - int c, result; - - c = atomic_read(&(r->refs)); - do { - if (unlikely(c == 0)) - return false; - - result = c + i; - - /* Did we try to increment from/to an undesirable state? */ - if (unlikely(c < 0 || c == INT_MAX || result < c)) { - asm volatile(REFCOUNT_ERROR - : : [var] "m" (r->refs.counter) - : "cc", "cx"); - break; - } - - } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&(r->refs), &c, result)); - - return c != 0; -} - -static __always_inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r) -{ - return refcount_add_not_zero(1, r); -} - -#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c index 4d75bc656f97..30bb0bd3b1b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c @@ -44,55 +44,6 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault); -/* - * Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the - * result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub. - */ -__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) -{ - /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */ - *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2; - - /* - * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not - * the fault location, and not the actually overflowing - * instruction, which is the instruction before the "js", but - * since that instruction could be a variety of lengths, just - * report the location after the overflow, which should be close - * enough for finding the overflow, as it's at least back in - * the function, having returned from .text.unlikely. - */ - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); - - /* - * This function has been called because either a negative refcount - * value was seen by any of the refcount functions, or a zero - * refcount value was seen by refcount_dec(). - * - * If we crossed from INT_MAX to INT_MIN, OF (Overflow Flag: result - * wrapped around) will be set. Additionally, seeing the refcount - * reach 0 will set ZF (Zero Flag: result was zero). In each of - * these cases we want a report, since it's a boundary condition. - * The SF case is not reported since it indicates post-boundary - * manipulations below zero or above INT_MAX. And if none of the - * flags are set, something has gone very wrong, so report it. - */ - if (regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_OF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF)) { - bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF; - - refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow"); - } else if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) == 0) { - /* Report if none of OF, ZF, nor SF are set. */ - refcount_error_report(regs, "unexpected saturation"); - } - - return true; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_refcount); - /* * Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get * here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state) -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b