From e7d2b41e5c773c1e00f0f30519b9790ba7e4a58c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Müller Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 19:07:48 +0200 Subject: crypto: ecdh - check validity of Z before export SP800-56A rev3 section 5.7.1.2 step 2 mandates that the validity of the calculated shared secret is verified before the data is returned to the caller. Thus, the export function and the validity check functions are reversed. In addition, the sensitive variables of priv and rand_z are zeroized. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/ecc.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'crypto') diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c index 86c324936a2b..c8b259e59704 100644 --- a/crypto/ecc.c +++ b/crypto/ecc.c @@ -1495,11 +1495,16 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, ecc_point_mult(product, pk, priv, rand_z, curve, ndigits); - ecc_swap_digits(product->x, secret, ndigits); - - if (ecc_point_is_zero(product)) + if (ecc_point_is_zero(product)) { ret = -EFAULT; + goto err_validity; + } + + ecc_swap_digits(product->x, secret, ndigits); +err_validity: + memzero_explicit(priv, sizeof(priv)); + memzero_explicit(rand_z, sizeof(rand_z)); ecc_free_point(product); err_alloc_product: ecc_free_point(pk); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b