From a628e7b87e100befac9702aa0c3b9848a7685e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Wright Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2011 17:21:49 -0800 Subject: pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read This reintroduces commit 47970b1b which was subsequently reverted as f00eaeea. The original change was broken and caused X startup failures and generally made privileged processes incapable of reading device dependent config space. The normal capable() interface returns true on success, but the LSM interface returns 0 on success. This thinko is now fixed in this patch, and has been confirmed to work properly. So, once again...Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps from sysfs file open to read device dependent config space") caused the capability check to bypass security modules and potentially auditing. Rectify this by calling security_capable() when checking the open file's capabilities for config space reads. Reported-by: Eric Paris Tested-by: Dave Young Acked-by: James Morris Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Alex Riesen Cc: Sedat Dilek Cc: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Chris Wright Signed-off-by: James Morris --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 8ecaac983923..ea25e5bfcf23 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include "pci.h" @@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, u8 *data = (u8*) buf; /* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */ - if (cap_raised(filp->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { size = dev->cfg_size; } else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) { size = 128; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b