From ea5a3dc8356bf1cf27bab9a5a0da5dfbbb82013d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2008 18:27:48 +1100 Subject: [XFS] kill sys_cred capable_cred has been unused for a while so we can kill it and sys_cred. That also means the cred argument to xfs_setattr and xfs_change_file_space can be removed now. SGI-PV: 988918 SGI-Modid: xfs-linux-melb:xfs-kern:32412a Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Tim Shimmin Signed-off-by: David Chinner Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy --- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h') diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h index 652721ce0ea5..98da2199bc23 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h +++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h @@ -27,12 +27,4 @@ typedef struct cred { /* EMPTY */ } cred_t; -extern struct cred *sys_cred; - -/* this is a hack.. (assumes sys_cred is the only cred_t in the system) */ -static inline int capable_cred(cred_t *cr, int cid) -{ - return (cr == sys_cred) ? 1 : capable(cid); -} - #endif /* __XFS_CRED_H__ */ -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 91b777125175077fb74025608dba87f100586c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2008 15:50:04 +1100 Subject: CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h | 2 +- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +- fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h') diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h index 98da2199bc23..e279d00779f4 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h +++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ * Credentials */ typedef struct cred { - /* EMPTY */ + /* EMPTY */ } cred_t; #endif /* __XFS_CRED_H__ */ diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c index d25694e8cd62..f1bd6c36e6fe 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c +++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl.c @@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr( * to the file owner ID, except in cases where the * CAP_FSETID capability is applicable. */ - if (current->fsuid != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) { + if (current_fsuid() != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) { code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM); goto error_return; } diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c index 8b3d1bdeb44b..a8cdd73999a4 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ xfs_acl_allow_set( return ENOTDIR; if (vp->i_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) return EROFS; - if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) + if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current_fsuid() && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) return EPERM; return 0; } @@ -413,13 +413,13 @@ xfs_acl_access( switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { case ACL_USER_OBJ: seen_userobj = 1; - if (fuid != current->fsuid) + if (fuid != current_fsuid()) continue; matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ; matched.ae_perm = allows; break; case ACL_USER: - if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid) + if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current_fsuid()) continue; matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER; matched.ae_perm = allows; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b