From 3d45f221ce627d13e2e6ef3274f06750c84a6542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 11:55:58 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extent and low on free metadata space When cloning an inline extent there are cases where we can not just copy the inline extent from the source range to the target range (e.g. when the target range starts at an offset greater than zero). In such cases we copy the inline extent's data into a page of the destination inode and then dirty that page. However, after that we will need to start a transaction for each processed extent and, if we are ever low on available metadata space, we may need to flush existing delalloc for all dirty inodes in an attempt to release metadata space - if that happens we may deadlock: * the async reclaim task queued a delalloc work to flush delalloc for the destination inode of the clone operation; * the task executing that delalloc work gets blocked waiting for the range with the dirty page to be unlocked, which is currently locked by the task doing the clone operation; * the async reclaim task blocks waiting for the delalloc work to complete; * the cloning task is waiting on the waitqueue of its reservation ticket while holding the range with the dirty page locked in the inode's io_tree; * if metadata space is not released by some other task (like delalloc for some other inode completing for example), the clone task waits forever and as a consequence the delalloc work and async reclaim tasks will hang forever as well. Releasing more space on the other hand may require starting a transaction, which will hang as well when trying to reserve metadata space, resulting in a deadlock between all these tasks. When this happens, traces like the following show up in dmesg/syslog: [87452.323003] INFO: task kworker/u16:11:1810830 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [87452.323644] Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [87452.324248] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [87452.324852] task:kworker/u16:11 state:D stack: 0 pid:1810830 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [87452.325520] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [87452.326136] Call Trace: [87452.326737] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0 [87452.327390] schedule+0x45/0xe0 [87452.328174] lock_extent_bits+0x1e6/0x2d0 [btrfs] [87452.328894] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [87452.329474] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x32c/0x390 [btrfs] [87452.330133] ? __mod_memcg_state+0x8e/0x160 [87452.330738] __extent_writepage+0x2d4/0x400 [btrfs] [87452.331405] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2b2/0x500 [btrfs] [87452.332007] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 [87452.332557] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 [87452.333127] extent_writepages+0x43/0x90 [btrfs] [87452.333653] ? lock_acquire+0x1a3/0x490 [87452.334177] do_writepages+0x43/0xe0 [87452.334699] ? __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa4/0x100 [87452.335720] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc5/0x100 [87452.336500] btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs] [87452.337216] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs] [87452.337838] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0 [87452.338437] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 [87452.339137] ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [87452.339884] kthread+0x153/0x170 [87452.340507] ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0 [87452.341153] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [87452.341806] INFO: task kworker/u16:1:2426217 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [87452.342487] Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [87452.343274] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [87452.344049] task:kworker/u16:1 state:D stack: 0 pid:2426217 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [87452.344974] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space [btrfs] [87452.345655] Call Trace: [87452.346305] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0 [87452.346947] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [87452.347676] ? wait_for_completion+0x81/0x110 [87452.348389] schedule+0x45/0xe0 [87452.349077] schedule_timeout+0x30c/0x580 [87452.349718] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [87452.350340] ? lock_acquire+0x1a3/0x490 [87452.351006] ? try_to_wake_up+0x7a/0xa20 [87452.351541] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 [87452.352040] ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 [87452.352517] ? wait_for_completion+0x81/0x110 [87452.353000] wait_for_completion+0xab/0x110 [87452.353490] start_delalloc_inodes+0x2af/0x390 [btrfs] [87452.353973] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x12d/0x250 [btrfs] [87452.354455] flush_space+0x24f/0x660 [btrfs] [87452.355063] btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x1bb/0x480 [btrfs] [87452.355565] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0 [87452.356024] worker_thread+0x20f/0x3b0 [87452.356487] ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [87452.356973] kthread+0x153/0x170 [87452.357434] ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0 [87452.357880] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 (...) < stack traces of several tasks waiting for the locks of the inodes of the clone operation > (...) [92867.444138] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3371bbe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052 [92867.444624] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3371bea0 RCX: 00007f61efe73f97 [92867.445116] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000560fbd5d7a40 RDI: 0000560fbd5d8960 [92867.445595] RBP: 00007ffc3371beb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [92867.446070] R10: 00007ffc3371b996 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [92867.446820] R13: 000000000000001f R14: 00007ffc3371bea0 R15: 00007ffc3371beb0 [92867.447361] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:2508238 ppid:2508153 flags:0x00004000 [92867.447920] Call Trace: [92867.448435] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0 [92867.448934] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [92867.449423] schedule+0x45/0xe0 [92867.449916] __reserve_bytes+0x4a4/0xb10 [btrfs] [92867.450576] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [92867.451202] btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes+0x29/0x190 [btrfs] [92867.451815] btrfs_block_rsv_add+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs] [92867.452412] start_transaction+0x2d1/0x760 [btrfs] [92867.453216] clone_copy_inline_extent+0x333/0x490 [btrfs] [92867.453848] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 [92867.454539] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x9a7/0xc30 [btrfs] [92867.455218] btrfs_clone+0x569/0x7e0 [btrfs] [92867.455952] btrfs_clone_files+0xf6/0x150 [btrfs] [92867.456588] btrfs_remap_file_range+0x324/0x3d0 [btrfs] [92867.457213] do_clone_file_range+0xd4/0x1f0 [92867.457828] vfs_clone_file_range+0x4d/0x230 [92867.458355] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 [92867.458890] ioctl_file_clone+0x8f/0xc0 [92867.459377] do_vfs_ioctl+0x342/0x750 [92867.459913] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x62/0xb0 [92867.460377] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [92867.460842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 (...) < stack traces of more tasks blocked on metadata reservation like the clone task above, because the async reclaim task has deadlocked > (...) Another thing to notice is that the worker task that is deadlocked when trying to flush the destination inode of the clone operation is at btrfs_invalidatepage(). This is simply because the clone operation has a destination offset greater than the i_size and we only update the i_size of the destination file after cloning an extent (just like we do in the buffered write path). Since the async reclaim path uses btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() to trigger the flushing of delalloc for all inodes that have delalloc, add a runtime flag to an inode to signal it should not be flushed, and for inodes with that flag set, start_delalloc_inodes() will simply skip them. When the cloning code needs to dirty a page to copy an inline extent, set that flag on the inode and then clear it when the clone operation finishes. This could be sporadically triggered with test case generic/269 from fstests, which exercises many fsstress processes running in parallel with several dd processes filling up the entire filesystem. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Fixes: 05a5a7621ce6 ("Btrfs: implement full reflink support for inline extents") Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h | 9 +++++++++ fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 3 ++- fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c | 2 +- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 15 +++++++++++---- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- fs/btrfs/reflink.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/space-info.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h index 555cbcef6585..d9bf53d9ff90 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h @@ -42,6 +42,15 @@ enum { * to an inode. */ BTRFS_INODE_NO_XATTRS, + /* + * Set when we are in a context where we need to start a transaction and + * have dirty pages with the respective file range locked. This is to + * ensure that when reserving space for the transaction, if we are low + * on available space and need to flush delalloc, we will not flush + * delalloc for this inode, because that could result in a deadlock (on + * the file range, inode's io_tree). + */ + BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, }; /* in memory btrfs inode */ diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 9dde7707873a..2674f24cf2e0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -3074,7 +3074,8 @@ int btrfs_truncate_inode_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, u32 min_type); int btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root); -int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr); +int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr, + bool in_reclaim_context); int btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end, unsigned int extra_bits, struct extent_state **cached_state); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c b/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c index a98e33f232d5..324f646d6e5e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static int btrfs_dev_replace_finishing(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, * flush all outstanding I/O and inode extent mappings before the * copy operation is declared as being finished */ - ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, U64_MAX); + ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, U64_MAX, false); if (ret) { mutex_unlock(&dev_replace->lock_finishing_cancel_unmount); return ret; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index 8e23780acfae..070716650df8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9390,7 +9390,8 @@ static struct btrfs_delalloc_work *btrfs_alloc_delalloc_work(struct inode *inode * some fairly slow code that needs optimization. This walks the list * of all the inodes with pending delalloc and forces them to disk. */ -static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot) +static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot, + bool in_reclaim_context) { struct btrfs_inode *binode; struct inode *inode; @@ -9411,6 +9412,11 @@ static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot list_move_tail(&binode->delalloc_inodes, &root->delalloc_inodes); + + if (in_reclaim_context && + test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, &binode->runtime_flags)) + continue; + inode = igrab(&binode->vfs_inode); if (!inode) { cond_resched_lock(&root->delalloc_lock); @@ -9464,10 +9470,11 @@ int btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root) if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state)) return -EROFS; - return start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, true); + return start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, true, false); } -int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr) +int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr, + bool in_reclaim_context) { struct btrfs_root *root; struct list_head splice; @@ -9490,7 +9497,7 @@ int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr) &fs_info->delalloc_roots); spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock); - ret = start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, false); + ret = start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, false, in_reclaim_context); btrfs_put_root(root); if (ret < 0) goto out; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 703212ff50a5..dde49a791f3e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -4951,7 +4951,7 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int case BTRFS_IOC_SYNC: { int ret; - ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, U64_MAX); + ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, U64_MAX, false); if (ret) return ret; ret = btrfs_sync_fs(inode->i_sb, 1); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/reflink.c b/fs/btrfs/reflink.c index ab80896315be..b03e7891394e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/reflink.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/reflink.c @@ -89,6 +89,19 @@ static int copy_inline_to_page(struct btrfs_inode *inode, if (ret) goto out_unlock; + /* + * After dirtying the page our caller will need to start a transaction, + * and if we are low on metadata free space, that can cause flushing of + * delalloc for all inodes in order to get metadata space released. + * However we are holding the range locked for the whole duration of + * the clone/dedupe operation, so we may deadlock if that happens and no + * other task releases enough space. So mark this inode as not being + * possible to flush to avoid such deadlock. We will clear that flag + * when we finish cloning all extents, since a transaction is started + * after finding each extent to clone. + */ + set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, &inode->runtime_flags); + if (comp_type == BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE) { char *map; @@ -549,6 +562,8 @@ process_slot: out: btrfs_free_path(path); kvfree(buf); + clear_bit(BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags); + return ret; } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c index 64099565ab8f..67e55c5479b8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static void shrink_delalloc(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, loops = 0; while ((delalloc_bytes || dio_bytes) && loops < 3) { - btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, items); + btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, items, true); loops++; if (wait_ordered && !trans) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9a664971569daf68254928149f580b4f5856d274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ethanwu Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 17:25:12 +0800 Subject: btrfs: correctly calculate item size used when item key collision happens Item key collision is allowed for some item types, like dir item and inode refs, but the overall item size is limited by the nodesize. item size(ins_len) passed from btrfs_insert_empty_items to btrfs_search_slot already contains size of btrfs_item. When btrfs_search_slot reaches leaf, we'll see if we need to split leaf. The check incorrectly reports that split leaf is required, because it treats the space required by the newly inserted item as btrfs_item + item data. But in item key collision case, only item data is actually needed, the newly inserted item could merge into the existing one. No new btrfs_item will be inserted. And split_leaf return EOVERFLOW from following code: if (extend && data_size + btrfs_item_size_nr(l, slot) + sizeof(struct btrfs_item) > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(fs_info)) return -EOVERFLOW; In most cases, when callers receive EOVERFLOW, they either return this error or handle in different ways. For example, in normal dir item creation the userspace will get errno EOVERFLOW; in inode ref case INODE_EXTREF is used instead. However, this is not the case for rename. To avoid the unrecoverable situation in rename, btrfs_check_dir_item_collision is called in early phase of rename. In this function, when item key collision is detected leaf space is checked: data_size = sizeof(*di) + name_len; if (data_size + btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot) + sizeof(struct btrfs_item) > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root->fs_info)) the sizeof(struct btrfs_item) + btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot) here refers to existing item size, the condition here correctly calculates the needed size for collision case rather than the wrong case above. The consequence of inconsistent condition check between btrfs_check_dir_item_collision and btrfs_search_slot when item key collision happens is that we might pass check here but fail later at btrfs_search_slot. Rename fails and volume is forced readonly [436149.586170] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [436149.586173] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [436149.586196] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16733 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:9870 btrfs_rename2+0x1938/0x1b70 [btrfs] [436149.586227] CPU: 0 PID: 16733 Comm: python Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc5+ #1 [436149.586228] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/05/2016 [436149.586238] RIP: 0010:btrfs_rename2+0x1938/0x1b70 [btrfs] [436149.586254] RSP: 0018:ffffa327043a7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [436149.586255] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8d8a17d13340 RCX: 0000000000000006 [436149.586256] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff8d8a7fc164b0 [436149.586257] RBP: ffffa327043a7da0 R08: 0000000000000560 R09: 7265282064657472 [436149.586258] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 6361736e61725420 R12: ffff8d8a0d4c8b08 [436149.586258] R13: ffff8d8a17d13340 R14: ffff8d8a33e0a540 R15: 00000000000001fe [436149.586260] FS: 00007fa313933740(0000) GS:ffff8d8a7fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [436149.586261] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [436149.586262] CR2: 000055d8d9c9a720 CR3: 000000007aae0003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [436149.586295] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [436149.586296] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [436149.586296] Call Trace: [436149.586311] vfs_rename+0x383/0x920 [436149.586313] ? vfs_rename+0x383/0x920 [436149.586315] do_renameat2+0x4ca/0x590 [436149.586317] __x64_sys_rename+0x20/0x30 [436149.586324] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x120 [436149.586330] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [436149.586332] RIP: 0033:0x7fa3133b1d37 [436149.586348] RSP: 002b:00007fffd3e43908 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052 [436149.586349] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa3133b1d30 RCX: 00007fa3133b1d37 [436149.586350] RDX: 000055d8da06b5e0 RSI: 000055d8da225d60 RDI: 000055d8da2c4da0 [436149.586351] RBP: 000055d8da2252f0 R08: 00007fa313782000 R09: 00000000000177e0 [436149.586351] R10: 000055d8da010680 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa313840b00 Thanks to Hans van Kranenburg for information about crc32 hash collision tools, I was able to reproduce the dir item collision with following python script. https://github.com/wutzuchieh/misc_tools/blob/master/crc32_forge.py Run it under a btrfs volume will trigger the abort transaction. It simply creates files and rename them to forged names that leads to hash collision. There are two ways to fix this. One is to simply revert the patch 878f2d2cb355 ("Btrfs: fix max dir item size calculation") to make the condition consistent although that patch is correct about the size. The other way is to handle the leaf space check correctly when collision happens. I prefer the second one since it correct leaf space check in collision case. This fix will not account sizeof(struct btrfs_item) when the item already exists. There are two places where ins_len doesn't contain sizeof(struct btrfs_item), however. 1. extent-tree.c: lookup_inline_extent_backref 2. file-item.c: btrfs_csum_file_blocks to make the logic of btrfs_search_slot more clear, we add a flag search_for_extension in btrfs_path. This flag indicates that ins_len passed to btrfs_search_slot doesn't contain sizeof(struct btrfs_item). When key exists, btrfs_search_slot will use the actual size needed to calculate the required leaf space. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: ethanwu Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 6 ++++++ fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 2 ++ fs/btrfs/file-item.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c index 07810891e204..cc89b63d65a4 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c @@ -2555,8 +2555,14 @@ out: * @p: Holds all btree nodes along the search path * @root: The root node of the tree * @key: The key we are looking for - * @ins_len: Indicates purpose of search, for inserts it is 1, for - * deletions it's -1. 0 for plain searches + * @ins_len: Indicates purpose of search: + * >0 for inserts it's size of item inserted (*) + * <0 for deletions + * 0 for plain searches, not modifying the tree + * + * (*) If size of item inserted doesn't include + * sizeof(struct btrfs_item), then p->search_for_extension must + * be set. * @cow: boolean should CoW operations be performed. Must always be 1 * when modifying the tree. * @@ -2717,6 +2723,20 @@ cow_done: if (level == 0) { p->slots[level] = slot; + /* + * Item key already exists. In this case, if we are + * allowed to insert the item (for example, in dir_item + * case, item key collision is allowed), it will be + * merged with the original item. Only the item size + * grows, no new btrfs item will be added. If + * search_for_extension is not set, ins_len already + * accounts the size btrfs_item, deduct it here so leaf + * space check will be correct. + */ + if (ret == 0 && ins_len > 0 && !p->search_for_extension) { + ASSERT(ins_len >= sizeof(struct btrfs_item)); + ins_len -= sizeof(struct btrfs_item); + } if (ins_len > 0 && btrfs_leaf_free_space(b) < ins_len) { if (write_lock_level < 1) { diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 2674f24cf2e0..3935d297d198 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -368,6 +368,12 @@ struct btrfs_path { unsigned int search_commit_root:1; unsigned int need_commit_sem:1; unsigned int skip_release_on_error:1; + /* + * Indicate that new item (btrfs_search_slot) is extending already + * existing item and ins_len contains only the data size and not item + * header (ie. sizeof(struct btrfs_item) is not included). + */ + unsigned int search_for_extension:1; }; #define BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_ITEM_SIZE(r) ((BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(r->fs_info) >> 4) - \ sizeof(struct btrfs_item)) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 56ea380f5a17..d79b8369e6aa 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -844,6 +844,7 @@ int lookup_inline_extent_backref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, want = extent_ref_type(parent, owner); if (insert) { extra_size = btrfs_extent_inline_ref_size(want); + path->search_for_extension = 1; path->keep_locks = 1; } else extra_size = -1; @@ -996,6 +997,7 @@ again: out: if (insert) { path->keep_locks = 0; + path->search_for_extension = 0; btrfs_unlock_up_safe(path, 1); } return err; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c index 1545c22ef280..6ccfc019ad90 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c @@ -1016,8 +1016,10 @@ again: } btrfs_release_path(path); + path->search_for_extension = 1; ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &file_key, path, csum_size, 1); + path->search_for_extension = 0; if (ret < 0) goto out; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ae5e070eaca9dbebde3459dd8f4c2756f8c097d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:24:47 +0800 Subject: btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're already holding a transaction There is a chance of racing for qgroup flushing which may lead to deadlock: Thread A | Thread B (not holding trans handle) | (holding a trans handle) --------------------------------+-------------------------------- __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta() | __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta() |- try_flush_qgroup() | |- try_flush_qgroup() |- QGROUP_FLUSHING bit set | | | | |- test_and_set_bit() | | |- wait_event() |- btrfs_join_transaction() | |- btrfs_commit_transaction()| !!! DEAD LOCK !!! Since thread A wants to commit transaction, but thread B is holding a transaction handle, blocking the commit. At the same time, thread B is waiting for thread A to finish its commit. This is just a hot fix, and would lead to more EDQUOT when we're near the qgroup limit. The proper fix would be to make all metadata/data reservations happen without holding a transaction handle. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c index fe3046007f52..47f27658eac1 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c @@ -3530,16 +3530,6 @@ static int try_flush_qgroup(struct btrfs_root *root) int ret; bool can_commit = true; - /* - * We don't want to run flush again and again, so if there is a running - * one, we won't try to start a new flush, but exit directly. - */ - if (test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, &root->state)) { - wait_event(root->qgroup_flush_wait, - !test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, &root->state)); - return 0; - } - /* * If current process holds a transaction, we shouldn't flush, as we * assume all space reservation happens before a transaction handle is @@ -3554,6 +3544,26 @@ static int try_flush_qgroup(struct btrfs_root *root) current->journal_info != BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB) can_commit = false; + /* + * We don't want to run flush again and again, so if there is a running + * one, we won't try to start a new flush, but exit directly. + */ + if (test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, &root->state)) { + /* + * We are already holding a transaction, thus we can block other + * threads from flushing. So exit right now. This increases + * the chance of EDQUOT for heavy load and near limit cases. + * But we can argue that if we're already near limit, EDQUOT is + * unavoidable anyway. + */ + if (!can_commit) + return 0; + + wait_event(root->qgroup_flush_wait, + !test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, &root->state)); + return 0; + } + ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(root); if (ret < 0) goto out; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 0b3f407e6728d990ae1630a02c7b952c21c288d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 12:09:02 +0000 Subject: btrfs: send: fix wrong file path when there is an inode with a pending rmdir When doing an incremental send, if we have a new inode that happens to have the same number that an old directory inode had in the base snapshot and that old directory has a pending rmdir operation, we end up computing a wrong path for the new inode, causing the receiver to fail. Example reproducer: $ cat test-send-rmdir.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null mount $DEV $MNT mkdir $MNT/dir touch $MNT/dir/file1 touch $MNT/dir/file2 touch $MNT/dir/file3 # Filesystem looks like: # # . (ino 256) # |----- dir/ (ino 257) # |----- file1 (ino 258) # |----- file2 (ino 259) # |----- file3 (ino 260) # btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap1 btrfs send -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT/snap1 # Now remove our directory and all its files. rm -fr $MNT/dir # Unmount the filesystem and mount it again. This is to ensure that # the next inode that is created ends up with the same inode number # that our directory "dir" had, 257, which is the first free "objectid" # available after mounting again the filesystem. umount $MNT mount $DEV $MNT # Now create a new file (it could be a directory as well). touch $MNT/newfile # Filesystem now looks like: # # . (ino 256) # |----- newfile (ino 257) # btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap2 btrfs send -f /tmp/snap2.send -p $MNT/snap1 $MNT/snap2 # Now unmount the filesystem, create a new one, mount it and try to apply # both send streams to recreate both snapshots. umount $DEV mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null mount $DEV $MNT btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap2.send $MNT umount $MNT When running the test, the receive operation for the incremental stream fails: $ ./test-send-rmdir.sh Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap1' At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap1 Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap2' At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap2 At subvol snap1 At snapshot snap2 ERROR: chown o257-9-0 failed: No such file or directory So fix this by tracking directories that have a pending rmdir by inode number and generation number, instead of only inode number. A test case for fstests follows soon. Reported-by: Massimo B. Tested-by: Massimo B. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6ae34776e85912960a253a8327068a892998e685.camel@gmx.net/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index d719a2755a40..ae97f4dbaff3 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ struct waiting_dir_move { * after this directory is moved, we can try to rmdir the ino rmdir_ino. */ u64 rmdir_ino; + u64 rmdir_gen; bool orphanized; }; @@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ static int is_waiting_for_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 ino); static struct waiting_dir_move * get_waiting_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 ino); -static int is_waiting_for_rm(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino); +static int is_waiting_for_rm(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino, u64 gen); static int need_send_hole(struct send_ctx *sctx) { @@ -2299,7 +2300,7 @@ static int get_cur_path(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 ino, u64 gen, fs_path_reset(name); - if (is_waiting_for_rm(sctx, ino)) { + if (is_waiting_for_rm(sctx, ino, gen)) { ret = gen_unique_name(sctx, ino, gen, name); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -2858,8 +2859,8 @@ out: return ret; } -static struct orphan_dir_info * -add_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) +static struct orphan_dir_info *add_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, + u64 dir_ino, u64 dir_gen) { struct rb_node **p = &sctx->orphan_dirs.rb_node; struct rb_node *parent = NULL; @@ -2868,20 +2869,23 @@ add_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) while (*p) { parent = *p; entry = rb_entry(parent, struct orphan_dir_info, node); - if (dir_ino < entry->ino) { + if (dir_ino < entry->ino) p = &(*p)->rb_left; - } else if (dir_ino > entry->ino) { + else if (dir_ino > entry->ino) p = &(*p)->rb_right; - } else { + else if (dir_gen < entry->gen) + p = &(*p)->rb_left; + else if (dir_gen > entry->gen) + p = &(*p)->rb_right; + else return entry; - } } odi = kmalloc(sizeof(*odi), GFP_KERNEL); if (!odi) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); odi->ino = dir_ino; - odi->gen = 0; + odi->gen = dir_gen; odi->last_dir_index_offset = 0; rb_link_node(&odi->node, parent, p); @@ -2889,8 +2893,8 @@ add_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) return odi; } -static struct orphan_dir_info * -get_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) +static struct orphan_dir_info *get_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, + u64 dir_ino, u64 gen) { struct rb_node *n = sctx->orphan_dirs.rb_node; struct orphan_dir_info *entry; @@ -2901,15 +2905,19 @@ get_orphan_dir_info(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) n = n->rb_left; else if (dir_ino > entry->ino) n = n->rb_right; + else if (gen < entry->gen) + n = n->rb_left; + else if (gen > entry->gen) + n = n->rb_right; else return entry; } return NULL; } -static int is_waiting_for_rm(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino) +static int is_waiting_for_rm(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir_ino, u64 gen) { - struct orphan_dir_info *odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir_ino); + struct orphan_dir_info *odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir_ino, gen); return odi != NULL; } @@ -2954,7 +2962,7 @@ static int can_rmdir(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir, u64 dir_gen, key.type = BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY; key.offset = 0; - odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir); + odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir, dir_gen); if (odi) key.offset = odi->last_dir_index_offset; @@ -2985,7 +2993,7 @@ static int can_rmdir(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir, u64 dir_gen, dm = get_waiting_dir_move(sctx, loc.objectid); if (dm) { - odi = add_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir); + odi = add_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir, dir_gen); if (IS_ERR(odi)) { ret = PTR_ERR(odi); goto out; @@ -2993,12 +3001,13 @@ static int can_rmdir(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 dir, u64 dir_gen, odi->gen = dir_gen; odi->last_dir_index_offset = found_key.offset; dm->rmdir_ino = dir; + dm->rmdir_gen = dir_gen; ret = 0; goto out; } if (loc.objectid > send_progress) { - odi = add_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir); + odi = add_orphan_dir_info(sctx, dir, dir_gen); if (IS_ERR(odi)) { ret = PTR_ERR(odi); goto out; @@ -3038,6 +3047,7 @@ static int add_waiting_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 ino, bool orphanized) return -ENOMEM; dm->ino = ino; dm->rmdir_ino = 0; + dm->rmdir_gen = 0; dm->orphanized = orphanized; while (*p) { @@ -3183,7 +3193,7 @@ static int path_loop(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct fs_path *name, while (ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID) { fs_path_reset(name); - if (is_waiting_for_rm(sctx, ino)) + if (is_waiting_for_rm(sctx, ino, gen)) break; if (is_waiting_for_move(sctx, ino)) { if (*ancestor_ino == 0) @@ -3223,6 +3233,7 @@ static int apply_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct pending_dir_move *pm) u64 parent_ino, parent_gen; struct waiting_dir_move *dm = NULL; u64 rmdir_ino = 0; + u64 rmdir_gen; u64 ancestor; bool is_orphan; int ret; @@ -3237,6 +3248,7 @@ static int apply_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct pending_dir_move *pm) dm = get_waiting_dir_move(sctx, pm->ino); ASSERT(dm); rmdir_ino = dm->rmdir_ino; + rmdir_gen = dm->rmdir_gen; is_orphan = dm->orphanized; free_waiting_dir_move(sctx, dm); @@ -3273,6 +3285,7 @@ static int apply_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct pending_dir_move *pm) dm = get_waiting_dir_move(sctx, pm->ino); ASSERT(dm); dm->rmdir_ino = rmdir_ino; + dm->rmdir_gen = rmdir_gen; } goto out; } @@ -3291,7 +3304,7 @@ static int apply_dir_move(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct pending_dir_move *pm) struct orphan_dir_info *odi; u64 gen; - odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, rmdir_ino); + odi = get_orphan_dir_info(sctx, rmdir_ino, rmdir_gen); if (!odi) { /* already deleted */ goto finish; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 675a4fc8f3149e93f35fb5739fd8d4764206ba0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 12:00:26 -0500 Subject: btrfs: tests: initialize test inodes location I noticed that sometimes the module failed to load because the self tests failed like this: BTRFS: selftest: fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c:963 miscount, wanted 1, got 0 This turned out to be because sometimes the btrfs ino would be the btree inode number, and thus we'd skip calling the set extent delalloc bit helper, and thus not adjust ->outstanding_extents. Fix this by making sure we initialize test inodes with a valid inode number so that we don't get random failures during self tests. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c | 10 ++++++++-- fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c b/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c index 8ca334d554af..6bd97bd4cb37 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c @@ -55,8 +55,14 @@ struct inode *btrfs_new_test_inode(void) struct inode *inode; inode = new_inode(test_mnt->mnt_sb); - if (inode) - inode_init_owner(inode, NULL, S_IFREG); + if (!inode) + return NULL; + + inode->i_mode = S_IFREG; + BTRFS_I(inode)->location.type = BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY; + BTRFS_I(inode)->location.objectid = BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID; + BTRFS_I(inode)->location.offset = 0; + inode_init_owner(inode, NULL, S_IFREG); return inode; } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c b/fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c index 04022069761d..c9874b12d337 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c @@ -232,11 +232,6 @@ static noinline int test_btrfs_get_extent(u32 sectorsize, u32 nodesize) return ret; } - inode->i_mode = S_IFREG; - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.type = BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY; - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.objectid = BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID; - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.offset = 0; - fs_info = btrfs_alloc_dummy_fs_info(nodesize, sectorsize); if (!fs_info) { test_std_err(TEST_ALLOC_FS_INFO); @@ -835,10 +830,6 @@ static int test_hole_first(u32 sectorsize, u32 nodesize) return ret; } - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.type = BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY; - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.objectid = BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID; - BTRFS_I(inode)->location.offset = 0; - fs_info = btrfs_alloc_dummy_fs_info(nodesize, sectorsize); if (!fs_info) { test_std_err(TEST_ALLOC_FS_INFO); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ea9ed87c73e87e044b2c58d658eb4ba5216bc488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 15:56:20 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix async discard stall Might happen that bg->discard_eligible_time was changed without rescheduling, so btrfs_discard_workfn() wakes up earlier than that new time, peek_discard_list() returns NULL, and all work halts and goes to sleep without further rescheduling even there are block groups to discard. It happens pretty often, but not so visible from the userspace because after some time it usually will be kicked off anyway by someone else calling btrfs_discard_reschedule_work(). Fix it by continue rescheduling if block group discard lists are not empty. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/discard.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/discard.c b/fs/btrfs/discard.c index 1db966bf85b2..36431d7e1334 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/discard.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/discard.c @@ -199,16 +199,15 @@ static struct btrfs_block_group *find_next_block_group( static struct btrfs_block_group *peek_discard_list( struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, enum btrfs_discard_state *discard_state, - int *discard_index) + int *discard_index, u64 now) { struct btrfs_block_group *block_group; - const u64 now = ktime_get_ns(); spin_lock(&discard_ctl->lock); again: block_group = find_next_block_group(discard_ctl, now); - if (block_group && now > block_group->discard_eligible_time) { + if (block_group && now >= block_group->discard_eligible_time) { if (block_group->discard_index == BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED && block_group->used != 0) { if (btrfs_is_block_group_data_only(block_group)) @@ -222,12 +221,11 @@ again: block_group->discard_state = BTRFS_DISCARD_EXTENTS; } discard_ctl->block_group = block_group; + } + if (block_group) { *discard_state = block_group->discard_state; *discard_index = block_group->discard_index; - } else { - block_group = NULL; } - spin_unlock(&discard_ctl->lock); return block_group; @@ -438,13 +436,18 @@ static void btrfs_discard_workfn(struct work_struct *work) int discard_index = 0; u64 trimmed = 0; u64 minlen = 0; + u64 now = ktime_get_ns(); discard_ctl = container_of(work, struct btrfs_discard_ctl, work.work); block_group = peek_discard_list(discard_ctl, &discard_state, - &discard_index); + &discard_index, now); if (!block_group || !btrfs_run_discard_work(discard_ctl)) return; + if (now < block_group->discard_eligible_time) { + btrfs_discard_schedule_work(discard_ctl, false); + return; + } /* Perform discarding */ minlen = discard_minlen[discard_index]; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1ea2872fc6f2aaee0a4b4f1578b83ffd9f55c6a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 15:56:21 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix racy access to discard_ctl data Because only one discard worker may be running at any given point, it could have been safe to modify ->prev_discard, etc. without synchronization, if not for @override flag in btrfs_discard_schedule_work() and delayed_work_pending() returning false while workfn is running. That may lead to torn reads of u64 for some architectures, but that's not a big problem as only slightly affects the discard rate. Suggested-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/discard.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/discard.c b/fs/btrfs/discard.c index 36431d7e1334..d641f451f840 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/discard.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/discard.c @@ -477,13 +477,6 @@ static void btrfs_discard_workfn(struct work_struct *work) discard_ctl->discard_extent_bytes += trimmed; } - /* - * Updated without locks as this is inside the workfn and nothing else - * is reading the values - */ - discard_ctl->prev_discard = trimmed; - discard_ctl->prev_discard_time = ktime_get_ns(); - /* Determine next steps for a block_group */ if (block_group->discard_cursor >= btrfs_block_group_end(block_group)) { if (discard_state == BTRFS_DISCARD_BITMAPS) { @@ -499,7 +492,10 @@ static void btrfs_discard_workfn(struct work_struct *work) } } + now = ktime_get_ns(); spin_lock(&discard_ctl->lock); + discard_ctl->prev_discard = trimmed; + discard_ctl->prev_discard_time = now; discard_ctl->block_group = NULL; spin_unlock(&discard_ctl->lock); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 8fc058597a283e9a37720abb0e8d68e342b9387d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 15:56:22 +0000 Subject: btrfs: merge critical sections of discard lock in workfn btrfs_discard_workfn() drops discard_ctl->lock just to take it again in a moment in btrfs_discard_schedule_work(). Avoid that and also reuse ktime. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/discard.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/discard.c b/fs/btrfs/discard.c index d641f451f840..2b8383d41144 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/discard.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/discard.c @@ -328,28 +328,15 @@ void btrfs_discard_queue_work(struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, btrfs_discard_schedule_work(discard_ctl, false); } -/** - * btrfs_discard_schedule_work - responsible for scheduling the discard work - * @discard_ctl: discard control - * @override: override the current timer - * - * Discards are issued by a delayed workqueue item. @override is used to - * update the current delay as the baseline delay interval is reevaluated on - * transaction commit. This is also maxed with any other rate limit. - */ -void btrfs_discard_schedule_work(struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, - bool override) +static void __btrfs_discard_schedule_work(struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, + u64 now, bool override) { struct btrfs_block_group *block_group; - const u64 now = ktime_get_ns(); - - spin_lock(&discard_ctl->lock); if (!btrfs_run_discard_work(discard_ctl)) - goto out; - + return; if (!override && delayed_work_pending(&discard_ctl->work)) - goto out; + return; block_group = find_next_block_group(discard_ctl, now); if (block_group) { @@ -391,7 +378,24 @@ void btrfs_discard_schedule_work(struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, mod_delayed_work(discard_ctl->discard_workers, &discard_ctl->work, nsecs_to_jiffies(delay)); } -out: +} + +/* + * btrfs_discard_schedule_work - responsible for scheduling the discard work + * @discard_ctl: discard control + * @override: override the current timer + * + * Discards are issued by a delayed workqueue item. @override is used to + * update the current delay as the baseline delay interval is reevaluated on + * transaction commit. This is also maxed with any other rate limit. + */ +void btrfs_discard_schedule_work(struct btrfs_discard_ctl *discard_ctl, + bool override) +{ + const u64 now = ktime_get_ns(); + + spin_lock(&discard_ctl->lock); + __btrfs_discard_schedule_work(discard_ctl, now, override); spin_unlock(&discard_ctl->lock); } @@ -497,9 +501,8 @@ static void btrfs_discard_workfn(struct work_struct *work) discard_ctl->prev_discard = trimmed; discard_ctl->prev_discard_time = now; discard_ctl->block_group = NULL; + __btrfs_discard_schedule_work(discard_ctl, now, false); spin_unlock(&discard_ctl->lock); - - btrfs_discard_schedule_work(discard_ctl, false); } /** -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From cb13eea3b49055bd78e6ddf39defd6340f7379fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 10:10:45 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix transaction leak and crash after RO remount caused by qgroup rescan If we remount a filesystem in RO mode while the qgroup rescan worker is running, we can end up having it still running after the remount is done, and at unmount time we may end up with an open transaction that ends up never getting committed. If that happens we end up with several memory leaks and can crash when hardware acceleration is unavailable for crc32c. Possibly it can lead to other nasty surprises too, due to use-after-free issues. The following steps explain how the problem happens. 1) We have a filesystem mounted in RW mode and the qgroup rescan worker is running; 2) We remount the filesystem in RO mode, and never stop/pause the rescan worker, so after the remount the rescan worker is still running. The important detail here is that the rescan task is still running after the remount operation committed any ongoing transaction through its call to btrfs_commit_super(); 3) The rescan is still running, and after the remount completed, the rescan worker started a transaction, after it finished iterating all leaves of the extent tree, to update the qgroup status item in the quotas tree. It does not commit the transaction, it only releases its handle on the transaction; 4) A filesystem unmount operation starts shortly after; 5) The unmount task, at close_ctree(), stops the transaction kthread, which had not had a chance to commit the open transaction since it was sleeping and the commit interval (default of 30 seconds) has not yet elapsed since the last time it committed a transaction; 6) So after stopping the transaction kthread we still have the transaction used to update the qgroup status item open. At close_ctree(), when the filesystem is in RO mode and no transaction abort happened (or the filesystem is in error mode), we do not expect to have any transaction open, so we do not call btrfs_commit_super(); 7) We then proceed to destroy the work queues, free the roots and block groups, etc. After that we drop the last reference on the btree inode by calling iput() on it. Since there are dirty pages for the btree inode, corresponding to the COWed extent buffer for the quotas btree, btree_write_cache_pages() is invoked to flush those dirty pages. This results in creating a bio and submitting it, which makes us end up at btrfs_submit_metadata_bio(); 8) At btrfs_submit_metadata_bio() we end up at the if-then-else branch that calls btrfs_wq_submit_bio(), because check_async_write() returned a value of 1. This value of 1 is because we did not have hardware acceleration available for crc32c, so BTRFS_FS_CSUM_IMPL_FAST was not set in fs_info->flags; 9) Then at btrfs_wq_submit_bio() we call btrfs_queue_work() against the workqueue at fs_info->workers, which was already freed before by the call to btrfs_stop_all_workers() at close_ctree(). This results in an invalid memory access due to a use-after-free, leading to a crash. When this happens, before the crash there are several warnings triggered, since we have reserved metadata space in a block group, the delayed refs reservation, etc: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:125 btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Code: f0 01 00 00 48 39 c2 75 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: ffff947ebc8b29c8 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b150a0 RDI: ffff947ebc8b2800 RBP: ffff947ebc8b2800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e4160 R14: ffff947ebc8b2988 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f37e2893320 CR3: 0000000138f68001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x17f/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c6 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-rsv.c:459 btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Code: 48 83 bb b0 03 00 00 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000033c000 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b0d8c1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff947ebc8b7000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481aca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561a79f76e20 CR3: 0000000138f68006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x24c/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c7 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3377 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 5 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Code: ad de 49 be 22 01 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbde8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff947ebeae1d08 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff947e9d823ae8 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff947ebeae1d08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ebeae1c00 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1475d98ea8 CR3: 0000000138f68005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c8 ]--- BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info 4 has 268238848 free, is not full BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info total=268435456, used=114688, pinned=0, reserved=16384, may_use=0, readonly=65536 BTRFS info (device sdc): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_refs_rsv: size 524288 reserved 0 And the crash, which only happens when we do not have crc32c hardware acceleration, produces the following trace immediately after those warnings: stack segment: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 2 PID: 1749129 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_queue_work+0x36/0x190 [btrfs] Code: 54 55 53 48 89 f3 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb27082443ae8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffff94810ee9ad90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff94810ee9ad90 RDI: ffff947ed8ee75a0 RBP: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947fa9b435a8 R13: ffff94810ee9ad90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff947e93dc0000 FS: 00007f3cfe974840(0000) GS:ffff9481ac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1b42995a70 CR3: 0000000127638003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_wq_submit_bio+0xb3/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0x44/0xc0 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x61/0x70 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0x414/0x450 [btrfs] ? kobject_put+0x9a/0x1d0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 ? free_debug_processing+0x1e1/0x2b0 do_writepages+0x43/0xe0 ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x650 writeback_single_inode+0xaf/0x120 write_inode_now+0x94/0xd0 iput+0x187/0x2b0 close_ctree+0x2c6/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f3cfebabee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffc9c9a05f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f3cfecd1264 RCX: 00007f3cfebabee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000562b6b478000 RBP: 0000562b6b473a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f3cfec6cbe0 R10: 0000562b6b479fe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000562b6b478000 R14: 0000562b6b473b40 R15: 0000562b6b473c60 Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5cc ]--- Finally when we remove the btrfs module (rmmod btrfs), there are several warnings about objects that were allocated from our slabs but were never freed, consequence of the transaction that was never committed and got leaked: ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_ref_head (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_ref_head on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000094c2ae56 objects=24 used=2 fp=0x000000002bfa2521 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x0000000050cbdd61 @offset=12104 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1894 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4292 cpu=2 pid=1729526 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x0000000086e9b0ff @offset=12776 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1900 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3141 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x17d/0x3d0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x248/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_ref_head: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 0b (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_tree_ref (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_tree_ref on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000011f78dc0 objects=37 used=2 fp=0x0000000032d55d91 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000001a340018 @offset=4408 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1917 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4167 cpu=4 pid=1729795 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x60/0xc40 [btrfs] create_subvol+0x56a/0x990 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1a92/0x36f0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x000000002b46292a @offset=13648 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1923 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3164 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_tree_ref: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_extent_op (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_extent_op on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x00000000f145ce2f objects=22 used=1 fp=0x00000000af0f92cf flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000004cf95ea8 @offset=6264 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] age=1931 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3173 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_extent_op: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 BTRFS: state leak: start 30408704 end 30425087 state 1 in tree 1 refs 1 Fix this issue by having the remount path stop the qgroup rescan worker when we are remounting RO and teach the rescan worker to stop when a remount is in progress. If later a remount in RW mode happens, we are already resuming the qgroup rescan worker through the call to btrfs_qgroup_rescan_resume(), so we do not need to worry about that. Tested-by: Fabian Vogt Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 13 ++++++++++--- fs/btrfs/super.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c index 47f27658eac1..808370ada888 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c @@ -3190,6 +3190,12 @@ out: return ret; } +static bool rescan_should_stop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info) || + test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING, &fs_info->fs_state); +} + static void btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(struct btrfs_work *work) { struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = container_of(work, struct btrfs_fs_info, @@ -3198,6 +3204,7 @@ static void btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(struct btrfs_work *work) struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = NULL; int err = -ENOMEM; int ret = 0; + bool stopped = false; path = btrfs_alloc_path(); if (!path) @@ -3210,7 +3217,7 @@ static void btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(struct btrfs_work *work) path->skip_locking = 1; err = 0; - while (!err && !btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info)) { + while (!err && !(stopped = rescan_should_stop(fs_info))) { trans = btrfs_start_transaction(fs_info->fs_root, 0); if (IS_ERR(trans)) { err = PTR_ERR(trans); @@ -3253,7 +3260,7 @@ out: } mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); - if (!btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info)) + if (!stopped) fs_info->qgroup_flags &= ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN; if (trans) { ret = update_qgroup_status_item(trans); @@ -3272,7 +3279,7 @@ out: btrfs_end_transaction(trans); - if (btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info)) { + if (stopped) { btrfs_info(fs_info, "qgroup scan paused"); } else if (err >= 0) { btrfs_info(fs_info, "qgroup scan completed%s", diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index 022f20810089..b24fa62375e0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -1968,6 +1968,14 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) btrfs_scrub_cancel(fs_info); btrfs_pause_balance(fs_info); + /* + * Pause the qgroup rescan worker if it is running. We don't want + * it to be still running after we are in RO mode, as after that, + * by the time we unmount, it might have left a transaction open, + * so we would leak the transaction and/or crash. + */ + btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(fs_info, false); + ret = btrfs_commit_super(fs_info); if (ret) goto restore; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 638331fa56caeaa8b4d31cc1dfbe0ce989bcff67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 10:10:46 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix transaction leak and crash after cleaning up orphans on RO mount When we delete a root (subvolume or snapshot), at the very end of the operation, we attempt to remove the root's orphan item from the root tree, at btrfs_drop_snapshot(), by calling btrfs_del_orphan_item(). We ignore any error from btrfs_del_orphan_item() since it is not a serious problem and the next time the filesystem is mounted we remove such stray orphan items at btrfs_find_orphan_roots(). However if the filesystem is mounted RO and we have stray orphan items for any previously deleted root, we can end up leaking a transaction and other data structures when unmounting the filesystem, as well as crashing if we do not have hardware acceleration for crc32c available. The steps that lead to the transaction leak are the following: 1) The filesystem is mounted in RW mode; 2) A subvolume is deleted; 3) When the cleaner kthread runs btrfs_drop_snapshot() to delete the root, it gets a failure at btrfs_del_orphan_item(), which is ignored, due to an ENOMEM when allocating a path for example. So the orphan item for the root remains in the root tree; 4) The filesystem is unmounted; 5) The filesystem is mounted RO (-o ro). During the mount path we call btrfs_find_orphan_roots(), which iterates the root tree searching for orphan items. It finds the orphan item for our deleted root, and since it can not find the root, it starts a transaction to delete the orphan item (by calling btrfs_del_orphan_item()); 6) The RO mount completes; 7) Before the transaction kthread commits the transaction created for deleting the orphan item (i.e. less than 30 seconds elapsed since the mount, the default commit interval), a filesystem unmount operation is started; 8) At close_ctree(), we stop the transaction kthread, but we still have a transaction open with at least one dirty extent buffer, a leaf for the tree root which was COWed when deleting the orphan item; 9) We then proceed to destroy the work queues, free the roots and block groups, etc. After that we drop the last reference on the btree inode by calling iput() on it. Since there are dirty pages for the btree inode, corresponding to the COWed extent buffer, btree_write_cache_pages() is invoked to flush those dirty pages. This results in creating a bio and submitting it, which makes us end up at btrfs_submit_metadata_bio(); 10) At btrfs_submit_metadata_bio() we end up at the if-then-else branch that calls btrfs_wq_submit_bio(), because check_async_write() returned a value of 1. This value of 1 is because we did not have hardware acceleration available for crc32c, so BTRFS_FS_CSUM_IMPL_FAST was not set in fs_info->flags; 11) Then at btrfs_wq_submit_bio() we call btrfs_queue_work() against the workqueue at fs_info->workers, which was already freed before by the call to btrfs_stop_all_workers() at close_ctree(). This results in an invalid memory access due to a use-after-free, leading to a crash. When this happens, before the crash there are several warnings triggered, since we have reserved metadata space in a block group, the delayed refs reservation, etc: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:125 btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Code: f0 01 00 00 48 39 c2 75 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: ffff947ebc8b29c8 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b150a0 RDI: ffff947ebc8b2800 RBP: ffff947ebc8b2800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e4160 R14: ffff947ebc8b2988 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f37e2893320 CR3: 0000000138f68001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x17f/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c6 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-rsv.c:459 btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Code: 48 83 bb b0 03 00 00 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000033c000 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b0d8c1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff947ebc8b7000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481aca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561a79f76e20 CR3: 0000000138f68006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x24c/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c7 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3377 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 5 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Code: ad de 49 be 22 01 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbde8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff947ebeae1d08 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff947e9d823ae8 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff947ebeae1d08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ebeae1c00 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1475d98ea8 CR3: 0000000138f68005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c8 ]--- BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info 4 has 268238848 free, is not full BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info total=268435456, used=114688, pinned=0, reserved=16384, may_use=0, readonly=65536 BTRFS info (device sdc): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_refs_rsv: size 524288 reserved 0 And the crash, which only happens when we do not have crc32c hardware acceleration, produces the following trace immediately after those warnings: stack segment: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 2 PID: 1749129 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_queue_work+0x36/0x190 [btrfs] Code: 54 55 53 48 89 f3 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb27082443ae8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffff94810ee9ad90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff94810ee9ad90 RDI: ffff947ed8ee75a0 RBP: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947fa9b435a8 R13: ffff94810ee9ad90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff947e93dc0000 FS: 00007f3cfe974840(0000) GS:ffff9481ac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1b42995a70 CR3: 0000000127638003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_wq_submit_bio+0xb3/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0x44/0xc0 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x61/0x70 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0x414/0x450 [btrfs] ? kobject_put+0x9a/0x1d0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 ? free_debug_processing+0x1e1/0x2b0 do_writepages+0x43/0xe0 ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x650 writeback_single_inode+0xaf/0x120 write_inode_now+0x94/0xd0 iput+0x187/0x2b0 close_ctree+0x2c6/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f3cfebabee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffc9c9a05f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f3cfecd1264 RCX: 00007f3cfebabee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000562b6b478000 RBP: 0000562b6b473a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f3cfec6cbe0 R10: 0000562b6b479fe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000562b6b478000 R14: 0000562b6b473b40 R15: 0000562b6b473c60 Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5cc ]--- Finally when we remove the btrfs module (rmmod btrfs), there are several warnings about objects that were allocated from our slabs but were never freed, consequence of the transaction that was never committed and got leaked: ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_ref_head (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_ref_head on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000094c2ae56 objects=24 used=2 fp=0x000000002bfa2521 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x0000000050cbdd61 @offset=12104 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1894 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4292 cpu=2 pid=1729526 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x0000000086e9b0ff @offset=12776 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1900 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3141 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x17d/0x3d0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x248/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_ref_head: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 0b (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_tree_ref (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_tree_ref on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000011f78dc0 objects=37 used=2 fp=0x0000000032d55d91 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000001a340018 @offset=4408 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1917 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4167 cpu=4 pid=1729795 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x60/0xc40 [btrfs] create_subvol+0x56a/0x990 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1a92/0x36f0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x000000002b46292a @offset=13648 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1923 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3164 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_tree_ref: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_extent_op (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_extent_op on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x00000000f145ce2f objects=22 used=1 fp=0x00000000af0f92cf flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000004cf95ea8 @offset=6264 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] age=1931 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3173 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_extent_op: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 BTRFS: state leak: start 30408704 end 30425087 state 1 in tree 1 refs 1 So fix this by calling btrfs_find_orphan_roots() in the mount path only if we are mounting the filesystem in RW mode. It's pointless to have it called for RO mounts anyway, since despite adding any deleted roots to the list of dead roots, we will never have the roots deleted until the filesystem is remounted in RW mode, as the cleaner kthread does nothing when we are mounted in RO - btrfs_need_cleaner_sleep() always returns true and the cleaner spends all time sleeping, never cleaning dead roots. This is accomplished by moving the call to btrfs_find_orphan_roots() from open_ctree() to btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount(), which also guarantees that if later the filesystem is remounted RW, we populate the list of dead roots and have the cleaner task delete the dead roots. Tested-by: Fabian Vogt Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index 765deefda92b..e941cbae3991 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -2969,6 +2969,7 @@ int btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) } } + ret = btrfs_find_orphan_roots(fs_info); out: return ret; } @@ -3383,10 +3384,6 @@ int __cold open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_device } } - ret = btrfs_find_orphan_roots(fs_info); - if (ret) - goto fail_qgroup; - fs_info->fs_root = btrfs_get_fs_root(fs_info, BTRFS_FS_TREE_OBJECTID, true); if (IS_ERR(fs_info->fs_root)) { err = PTR_ERR(fs_info->fs_root); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a0a1db70df5f48576fea6d08f0a69c05f3ab4cf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 10:10:47 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix race between RO remount and the cleaner task When we are remounting a filesystem in RO mode we can race with the cleaner task and result in leaking a transaction if the filesystem is unmounted shortly after, before the transaction kthread had a chance to commit that transaction. That also results in a crash during unmount, due to a use-after-free, if hardware acceleration is not available for crc32c. The following sequence of steps explains how the race happens. 1) The filesystem is mounted in RW mode and the cleaner task is running. This means that currently BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING is set at fs_info->flags; 2) The cleaner task is currently running delayed iputs for example; 3) A filesystem RO remount operation starts; 4) The RO remount task calls btrfs_commit_super(), which commits any currently open transaction, and it finishes; 5) At this point the cleaner task is still running and it creates a new transaction by doing one of the following things: * When running the delayed iput() for an inode with a 0 link count, in which case at btrfs_evict_inode() we start a transaction through the call to evict_refill_and_join(), use it and then release its handle through btrfs_end_transaction(); * When deleting a dead root through btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot(), a transaction is started at btrfs_drop_snapshot() and then its handle is released through a call to btrfs_end_transaction_throttle(); * When the remount task was still running, and before the remount task called btrfs_delete_unused_bgs(), the cleaner task also called btrfs_delete_unused_bgs() and it picked and removed one block group from the list of unused block groups. Before the cleaner task started a transaction, through btrfs_start_trans_remove_block_group() at btrfs_delete_unused_bgs(), the remount task had already called btrfs_commit_super(); 6) So at this point the filesystem is in RO mode and we have an open transaction that was started by the cleaner task; 7) Shortly after a filesystem unmount operation starts. At close_ctree() we stop the transaction kthread before it had a chance to commit the transaction, since less than 30 seconds (the default commit interval) have elapsed since the last transaction was committed; 8) We end up calling iput() against the btree inode at close_ctree() while there is an open transaction, and since that transaction was used to update btrees by the cleaner, we have dirty pages in the btree inode due to COW operations on metadata extents, and therefore writeback is triggered for the btree inode. So btree_write_cache_pages() is invoked to flush those dirty pages during the final iput() on the btree inode. This results in creating a bio and submitting it, which makes us end up at btrfs_submit_metadata_bio(); 9) At btrfs_submit_metadata_bio() we end up at the if-then-else branch that calls btrfs_wq_submit_bio(), because check_async_write() returned a value of 1. This value of 1 is because we did not have hardware acceleration available for crc32c, so BTRFS_FS_CSUM_IMPL_FAST was not set in fs_info->flags; 10) Then at btrfs_wq_submit_bio() we call btrfs_queue_work() against the workqueue at fs_info->workers, which was already freed before by the call to btrfs_stop_all_workers() at close_ctree(). This results in an invalid memory access due to a use-after-free, leading to a crash. When this happens, before the crash there are several warnings triggered, since we have reserved metadata space in a block group, the delayed refs reservation, etc: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:125 btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 4 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x63/0xa0 [btrfs] Code: f0 01 00 00 48 39 c2 75 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: ffff947ebc8b29c8 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b150a0 RDI: ffff947ebc8b2800 RBP: ffff947ebc8b2800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e4160 R14: ffff947ebc8b2988 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f37e2893320 CR3: 0000000138f68001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x17f/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c6 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-rsv.c:459 btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_global_block_rsv+0x70/0xc0 [btrfs] Code: 48 83 bb b0 03 00 00 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbdd8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000033c000 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b0d8c1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff947ebc8b7000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ed73e4110 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481aca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561a79f76e20 CR3: 0000000138f68006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups+0x24c/0x2f0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c7 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1729896 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3377 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) CPU: 5 PID: 1729896 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x25d/0x2f0 [btrfs] Code: ad de 49 be 22 01 00 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb270826bbde8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff947ebeae1d08 RBX: ffff947ed73e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff947e9d823ae8 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff947ebeae1d08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947ebeae1c00 R13: ffff947ed73e5278 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f15edfea840(0000) GS:ffff9481ad200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1475d98ea8 CR3: 0000000138f68005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: close_ctree+0x2ba/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15ee221ee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffe9470f0f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f15ee347264 RCX: 00007f15ee221ee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000056169701d000 RBP: 0000561697018a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f15ee2e2be0 R10: 000056169701efe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000056169701d000 R14: 0000561697018b40 R15: 0000561697018c60 irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [] copy_process+0x8a0/0x1d70 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5c8 ]--- BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info 4 has 268238848 free, is not full BTRFS info (device sdc): space_info total=268435456, used=114688, pinned=0, reserved=16384, may_use=0, readonly=65536 BTRFS info (device sdc): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0 BTRFS info (device sdc): delayed_refs_rsv: size 524288 reserved 0 And the crash, which only happens when we do not have crc32c hardware acceleration, produces the following trace immediately after those warnings: stack segment: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 2 PID: 1749129 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_queue_work+0x36/0x190 [btrfs] Code: 54 55 53 48 89 f3 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb27082443ae8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffff94810ee9ad90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff94810ee9ad90 RDI: ffff947ed8ee75a0 RBP: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff947fa9b435a8 R13: ffff94810ee9ad90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff947e93dc0000 FS: 00007f3cfe974840(0000) GS:ffff9481ac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1b42995a70 CR3: 0000000127638003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: btrfs_wq_submit_bio+0xb3/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0x44/0xc0 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x61/0x70 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0x414/0x450 [btrfs] ? kobject_put+0x9a/0x1d0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 ? free_debug_processing+0x1e1/0x2b0 do_writepages+0x43/0xe0 ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x650 writeback_single_inode+0xaf/0x120 write_inode_now+0x94/0xd0 iput+0x187/0x2b0 close_ctree+0x2c6/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f3cfebabee7 Code: ff 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffc9c9a05f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f3cfecd1264 RCX: 00007f3cfebabee7 RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000562b6b478000 RBP: 0000562b6b473a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f3cfec6cbe0 R10: 0000562b6b479fe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000562b6b478000 R14: 0000562b6b473b40 R15: 0000562b6b473c60 Modules linked in: btrfs dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...) ---[ end trace dd74718fef1ed5cc ]--- Finally when we remove the btrfs module (rmmod btrfs), there are several warnings about objects that were allocated from our slabs but were never freed, consequence of the transaction that was never committed and got leaked: ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_ref_head (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_ref_head on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000094c2ae56 objects=24 used=2 fp=0x000000002bfa2521 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x0000000050cbdd61 @offset=12104 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1894 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4292 cpu=2 pid=1729526 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x0000000086e9b0ff @offset=12776 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] age=1900 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0xbb/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3141 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1117/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x17d/0x3d0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x248/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_ref_head: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x11/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 0b (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_tree_ref (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_tree_ref on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x0000000011f78dc0 objects=37 used=2 fp=0x0000000032d55d91 flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000001a340018 @offset=4408 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1917 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_free_tree_block+0x128/0x360 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x489/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=4167 cpu=4 pid=1729795 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x60/0xc40 [btrfs] create_subvol+0x56a/0x990 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1a92/0x36f0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 INFO: Object 0x000000002b46292a @offset=13648 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] age=1923 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x9e/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2bf/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3164 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x63d/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_tree_ref: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 btrfs_delayed_ref_exit+0x1d/0x35 [btrfs] exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 ============================================================================= BUG btrfs_delayed_extent_op (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining in btrfs_delayed_extent_op on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Slab 0x00000000f145ce2f objects=22 used=1 fp=0x00000000af0f92cf flags=0x17fffc000010200 CPU: 5 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 slab_err+0xb7/0xdc ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1ac/0x3c0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 kmem_cache_destroy+0x55/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 f5 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 INFO: Object 0x000000004cf95ea8 @offset=6264 INFO: Allocated in btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] age=1931 cpu=6 pid=1729873 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x109/0x1c0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x7bb/0x830 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e0/0x360 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x12d/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0xf7/0x220 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x62a/0xc40 [btrfs] btrfs_del_orphan_item+0x65/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_find_orphan_roots+0x1bf/0x200 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x125a/0x18a0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] INFO: Freed in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] age=3173 cpu=6 pid=1729803 kmem_cache_free+0x34c/0x3c0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xabd/0x1290 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x81/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0xfb/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xc40 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x113/0x2fa [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x68/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1bb/0x1c0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4b/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 kmem_cache_destroy btrfs_delayed_extent_op: Slab cache still has objects CPU: 3 PID: 1729921 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 kmem_cache_destroy+0x119/0x120 exit_btrfs_fs+0xa/0x59 [btrfs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x194/0x260 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x1e/0x40 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x55/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f693e305897 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f9 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffcf73eb508 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559df504f760 RCX: 00007f693e305897 RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000559df504f7c8 RBP: 00007ffcf73eb568 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f693e378ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffcf73eb740 R13: 00007ffcf73ec5a6 R14: 0000559df504f2a0 R15: 0000559df504f760 BTRFS: state leak: start 30408704 end 30425087 state 1 in tree 1 refs 1 So fix this by making the remount path to wait for the cleaner task before calling btrfs_commit_super(). The remount path now waits for the bit BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING to be cleared from fs_info->flags before calling btrfs_commit_super() and this ensures the cleaner can not start a transaction after that, because it sleeps when the filesystem is in RO mode and we have already flagged the filesystem as RO before waiting for BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING to be cleared. This also introduces a new flag BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO to be used for fs_info->fs_state when the filesystem is in RO mode. This is because we were doing the RO check using the flags of the superblock and setting the RO mode simply by ORing into the superblock's flags - those operations are not atomic and could result in the cleaner not seeing the update from the remount task after it clears BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING. Tested-by: Fabian Vogt Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 5 ++++- fs/btrfs/super.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 3935d297d198..0225c5208f44 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ enum { * defrag */ BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING, + /* Filesystem in RO mode */ + BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, /* Track if a transaction abort has been reported on this filesystem */ BTRFS_FS_STATE_TRANS_ABORTED, /* @@ -2892,10 +2894,26 @@ static inline int btrfs_fs_closing(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) * If we remount the fs to be R/O or umount the fs, the cleaner needn't do * anything except sleeping. This function is used to check the status of * the fs. + * We check for BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO to avoid races with a concurrent remount, + * since setting and checking for SB_RDONLY in the superblock's flags is not + * atomic. */ static inline int btrfs_need_cleaner_sleep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) { - return fs_info->sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY || btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info); + return test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state) || + btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info); +} + +static inline void btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(struct super_block *sb) +{ + sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &btrfs_sb(sb)->fs_state); +} + +static inline void btrfs_clear_sb_rdonly(struct super_block *sb) +{ + sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY; + clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &btrfs_sb(sb)->fs_state); } /* tree mod log functions from ctree.c */ diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index e941cbae3991..e7bcbd0b93ef 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ static int cleaner_kthread(void *arg) */ btrfs_delete_unused_bgs(fs_info); sleep: - clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags); + clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING, &fs_info->flags); if (kthread_should_park()) kthread_parkme(); if (kthread_should_stop()) @@ -2830,6 +2830,9 @@ static int init_mount_fs_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct super_block return -ENOMEM; btrfs_init_delayed_root(fs_info->delayed_root); + if (sb_rdonly(sb)) + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state); + return btrfs_alloc_stripe_hash_table(fs_info); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index b24fa62375e0..38740cc2919f 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ void __btrfs_handle_fs_error(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *function btrfs_discard_stop(fs_info); /* btrfs handle error by forcing the filesystem readonly */ - sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; + btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(sb); btrfs_info(fs_info, "forced readonly"); /* * Note that a running device replace operation is not canceled here @@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) /* avoid complains from lockdep et al. */ up(&fs_info->uuid_tree_rescan_sem); - sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; + btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(sb); /* * Setting SB_RDONLY will put the cleaner thread to @@ -1964,6 +1964,20 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) */ btrfs_delete_unused_bgs(fs_info); + /* + * The cleaner task could be already running before we set the + * flag BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO (and SB_RDONLY in the superblock). + * We must make sure that after we finish the remount, i.e. after + * we call btrfs_commit_super(), the cleaner can no longer start + * a transaction - either because it was dropping a dead root, + * running delayed iputs or deleting an unused block group (the + * cleaner picked a block group from the list of unused block + * groups before we were able to in the previous call to + * btrfs_delete_unused_bgs()). + */ + wait_on_bit(&fs_info->flags, BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING, + TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + btrfs_dev_replace_suspend_for_unmount(fs_info); btrfs_scrub_cancel(fs_info); btrfs_pause_balance(fs_info); @@ -2014,7 +2028,7 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) if (ret) goto restore; - sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY; + btrfs_clear_sb_rdonly(sb); set_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags); } @@ -2036,6 +2050,8 @@ restore: /* We've hit an error - don't reset SB_RDONLY */ if (sb_rdonly(sb)) old_flags |= SB_RDONLY; + if (!(old_flags & SB_RDONLY)) + clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state); sb->s_flags = old_flags; fs_info->mount_opt = old_opts; fs_info->compress_type = old_compress_type; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 7930e1c78c45..2c0aa03b6437 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -2593,7 +2593,7 @@ int btrfs_init_new_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path set_blocksize(device->bdev, BTRFS_BDEV_BLOCKSIZE); if (seeding_dev) { - sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY; + btrfs_clear_sb_rdonly(sb); ret = btrfs_prepare_sprout(fs_info); if (ret) { btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret); @@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ error_sysfs: mutex_unlock(&fs_info->fs_devices->device_list_mutex); error_trans: if (seeding_dev) - sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; + btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(sb); if (trans) btrfs_end_transaction(trans); error_free_zone: -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 0a31daa4b602ff6861fdf182236d64b2a353bace Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 10:10:48 +0000 Subject: btrfs: add assertion for empty list of transactions at late stage of umount Add an assertion to close_ctree(), after destroying all the work queues, to verify we do not have any transaction still open or committing at that at that point. If we have any, it means something is seriously wrong and that can cause memory leaks and use-after-free problems. This is motivated by the previous patches that fixed bugs where we ended up leaking an open transaction after unmounting the filesystem. Tested-by: Fabian Vogt Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index e7bcbd0b93ef..1dfd4b2d0e1e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -4181,6 +4181,9 @@ void __cold close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) invalidate_inode_pages2(fs_info->btree_inode->i_mapping); btrfs_stop_all_workers(fs_info); + /* We shouldn't have any transaction open at this point */ + ASSERT(list_empty(&fs_info->trans_list)); + clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags); free_root_pointers(fs_info, true); btrfs_free_fs_roots(fs_info); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a8cc263eb58ca133617662a5a5e07131d0ebf299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 10:10:49 +0000 Subject: btrfs: run delayed iputs when remounting RO to avoid leaking them When remounting RO, after setting the superblock with the RO flag, the cleaner task will start sleeping and do nothing, since the call to btrfs_need_cleaner_sleep() keeps returning 'true'. However, when the cleaner task goes to sleep, the list of delayed iputs may not be empty. As long as we are in RO mode, the cleaner task will keep sleeping and never run the delayed iputs. This means that if a filesystem unmount is started, we get into close_ctree() with a non-empty list of delayed iputs, and because the filesystem is in RO mode and is not in an error state (or a transaction aborted), btrfs_error_commit_super() and btrfs_commit_super(), which run the delayed iputs, are never called, and later we fail the assertion that checks if the delayed iputs list is empty: assertion failed: list_empty(&fs_info->delayed_iputs), in fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4049 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3153! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 1 PID: 3780621 Comm: umount Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-73 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x26 [btrfs] Code: 8b 7b 58 48 85 ff 74 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffb748c89bbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff9608f2584000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff91998988 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff9608f25870d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc0cbc500 R13: ffffffff92411750 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9608f2aab250 FS: 00007fcbfaa66c80(0000) GS:ffff960936c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fffc2c2dd38 CR3: 0000000235e54002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: close_ctree+0x1a2/0x2e6 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x93/0xc0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf9/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x20d/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fcbfaca6307 Code: eb 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007fffc2c2ed68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000558203b559b0 RCX: 00007fcbfaca6307 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000558203b55bc0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fffc2c2dad0 R10: 0000558203b55bf0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000558203b55bc0 R13: 00007fcbfadcc204 R14: 0000558203b55aa8 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_log_writes (...) ---[ end trace d44d303790049ef6 ]--- So fix this by making the remount RO path run any remaining delayed iputs after waiting for the cleaner to become inactive. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/super.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index 38740cc2919f..12d7d3be7cd4 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -1978,6 +1978,16 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) wait_on_bit(&fs_info->flags, BTRFS_FS_CLEANER_RUNNING, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + /* + * We've set the superblock to RO mode, so we might have made + * the cleaner task sleep without running all pending delayed + * iputs. Go through all the delayed iputs here, so that if an + * unmount happens without remounting RW we don't end up at + * finishing close_ctree() with a non-empty list of delayed + * iputs. + */ + btrfs_run_delayed_iputs(fs_info); + btrfs_dev_replace_suspend_for_unmount(fs_info); btrfs_scrub_cancel(fs_info); btrfs_pause_balance(fs_info); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 72d78717c6d06adf65d2e3dccc96d9e9dc978593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 12:26:14 -0500 Subject: nfsd: Fixes for nfsd4_encode_read_plus_data() Ensure that we encode the data payload + padding, and that we truncate the preallocated buffer to the actual read size. Fixes: 528b84934eb9 ("NFSD: Add READ_PLUS data support") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 45ee6b12ce5b..5dacc673ef17 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -4756,6 +4756,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_read_plus_data(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, resp->rqstp->rq_vec, read->rd_vlen, maxcount, eof); if (nfserr) return nfserr; + xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len + 16 + xdr_align_size(*maxcount)); tmp = htonl(NFS4_CONTENT_DATA); write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len, &tmp, 4); @@ -4763,6 +4764,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_read_plus_data(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 4, &tmp64, 8); tmp = htonl(*maxcount); write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 12, &tmp, 4); + + tmp = xdr_zero; + write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 16 + *maxcount, &tmp, + xdr_pad_size(*maxcount)); return nfs_ok; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b68f0cbd3f95f2df81e525c310a41fc73c2ed0d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 12:26:15 -0500 Subject: nfsd: Don't set eof on a truncated READ_PLUS If the READ_PLUS operation was truncated due to an error, then ensure we clear the 'eof' flag. Fixes: 9f0b5792f07d ("NFSD: Encode a full READ_PLUS reply") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 5dacc673ef17..20178f60f612 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -4860,14 +4860,15 @@ out: if (nfserr && segments == 0) xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len); else { - tmp = htonl(eof); - write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len, &tmp, 4); - tmp = htonl(segments); - write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 4, &tmp, 4); if (nfserr) { xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, last_segment); nfserr = nfs_ok; + eof = 0; } + tmp = htonl(eof); + write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len, &tmp, 4); + tmp = htonl(segments); + write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 4, &tmp, 4); } return nfserr; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From d6c9e4368cc6a61bf25c9c72437ced509c854563 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 12:28:23 -0500 Subject: NFSD: Fix sparse warning in nfssvc.c fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:36:6: warning: symbol 'inter_copy_offload_enable' was not declared. Should it be static? The parameter was added by commit ce0887ac96d3 ("NFSD add nfs4 inter ssc to nfsd4_copy"). Relocate it into the source file that uses it, and make it static. This approach is similar to the nfs4_disable_idmapping, cltrack_prog, and cltrack_legacy_disable module parameters. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 5 +++++ fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c | 6 ------ fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 4727b7f03c5b..8d6d2678abad 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ #include "pnfs.h" #include "trace.h" +static bool inter_copy_offload_enable; +module_param(inter_copy_offload_enable, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(inter_copy_offload_enable, + "Enable inter server to server copy offload. Default: false"); + #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL #include diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c index 00384c332f9b..f9c9f4c63cc7 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c @@ -33,12 +33,6 @@ #define NFSDDBG_FACILITY NFSDDBG_SVC -bool inter_copy_offload_enable; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inter_copy_offload_enable); -module_param(inter_copy_offload_enable, bool, 0644); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(inter_copy_offload_enable, - "Enable inter server to server copy offload. Default: false"); - extern struct svc_program nfsd_program; static int nfsd(void *vrqstp); #if defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V2_ACL) || defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h index a60ff5ce1a37..c300885ae75d 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h @@ -568,7 +568,6 @@ struct nfsd4_copy { struct nfs_fh c_fh; nfs4_stateid stateid; }; -extern bool inter_copy_offload_enable; struct nfsd4_seek { /* request */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 7b723008f9c95624c848fad661c01b06e47b20da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 12:28:58 -0500 Subject: NFSD: Restore NFSv4 decoding's SAVEMEM functionality While converting the NFSv4 decoder to use xdr_stream-based XDR processing, I removed the old SAVEMEM() macro. This macro wrapped a bit of logic that avoided a memory allocation by recognizing when the decoded item resides in a linear section of the Receive buffer. In that case, it returned a pointer into that buffer instead of allocating a bounce buffer. The bounce buffer is necessary only when xdr_inline_decode() has placed the decoded item in the xdr_stream's scratch buffer, which disappears the next time xdr_inline_decode() is called with that xdr_stream. That happens only if the data item crosses a page boundary in the receive buffer, an exceedingly rare occurrence. Allocating a bounce buffer every time results in a minor performance regression that was introduced by the recent NFSv4 decoder overhaul. Let's restore the previous behavior. On average, it saves about 1.5 kmalloc() calls per COMPOUND. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 20178f60f612..eaaa1605b5b5 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -147,6 +147,25 @@ svcxdr_dupstr(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, void *buf, u32 len) return p; } +static void * +svcxdr_savemem(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, __be32 *p, u32 len) +{ + __be32 *tmp; + + /* + * The location of the decoded data item is stable, + * so @p is OK to use. This is the common case. + */ + if (p != argp->xdr->scratch.iov_base) + return p; + + tmp = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, len); + if (!tmp) + return NULL; + memcpy(tmp, p, len); + return tmp; +} + /* * NFSv4 basic data type decoders */ @@ -183,11 +202,10 @@ nfsd4_decode_opaque(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct xdr_netobj *o) p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, len); if (!p) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - o->data = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, len); + o->data = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, len); if (!o->data) return nfserr_jukebox; o->len = len; - memcpy(o->data, p, len); return nfs_ok; } @@ -205,10 +223,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_component4(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, char **namp, u32 *lenp) status = check_filename((char *)p, *lenp); if (status) return status; - *namp = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, *lenp); + *namp = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, *lenp); if (!*namp) return nfserr_jukebox; - memcpy(*namp, p, *lenp); return nfs_ok; } @@ -1200,10 +1217,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_putfh(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_putfh *putfh) p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, putfh->pf_fhlen); if (!p) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - putfh->pf_fhval = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, putfh->pf_fhlen); + putfh->pf_fhval = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, putfh->pf_fhlen); if (!putfh->pf_fhval) return nfserr_jukebox; - memcpy(putfh->pf_fhval, p, putfh->pf_fhlen); return nfs_ok; } @@ -1318,24 +1334,20 @@ nfsd4_decode_setclientid(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_setclient p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, setclientid->se_callback_netid_len); if (!p) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - setclientid->se_callback_netid_val = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, + setclientid->se_callback_netid_val = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, setclientid->se_callback_netid_len); if (!setclientid->se_callback_netid_val) return nfserr_jukebox; - memcpy(setclientid->se_callback_netid_val, p, - setclientid->se_callback_netid_len); if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &setclientid->se_callback_addr_len) < 0) return nfserr_bad_xdr; p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, setclientid->se_callback_addr_len); if (!p) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - setclientid->se_callback_addr_val = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, + setclientid->se_callback_addr_val = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, setclientid->se_callback_addr_len); if (!setclientid->se_callback_addr_val) return nfserr_jukebox; - memcpy(setclientid->se_callback_addr_val, p, - setclientid->se_callback_addr_len); if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &setclientid->se_callback_ident) < 0) return nfserr_bad_xdr; @@ -1375,10 +1387,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_verify(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_verify *verify p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, verify->ve_attrlen); if (!p) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - verify->ve_attrval = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, verify->ve_attrlen); + verify->ve_attrval = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, verify->ve_attrlen); if (!verify->ve_attrval) return nfserr_jukebox; - memcpy(verify->ve_attrval, p, verify->ve_attrlen); return nfs_ok; } @@ -2333,10 +2344,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_compound(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp) p = xdr_inline_decode(argp->xdr, argp->taglen); if (!p) return 0; - argp->tag = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, argp->taglen); + argp->tag = svcxdr_savemem(argp, p, argp->taglen); if (!argp->tag) return 0; - memcpy(argp->tag, p, argp->taglen); max_reply += xdr_align_size(argp->taglen); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e789ca0cc1d51296832b8424fa4008ce6e9d1703 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:37 +0100 Subject: ext4: combine ext4_handle_error() and save_error_info() save_error_info() is always called together with ext4_handle_error(). Combine them into a single call and move unconditional bits out of save_error_info() into ext4_handle_error(). Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/super.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 4bbfb05aae58..cdf2a377d884 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -592,9 +592,6 @@ static void __save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; - if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) - return; /* We default to EFSCORRUPTED error... */ if (error == 0) error = EFSCORRUPTED; @@ -647,13 +644,19 @@ static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, * used to deal with unrecoverable failures such as journal IO errors or ENOMEM * at a critical moment in log management. */ -static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb, bool force_ro) +static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb, bool force_ro, int error, + __u32 ino, __u64 block, + const char *func, unsigned int line) { journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal; + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; if (test_opt(sb, WARN_ON_ERROR)) WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) + save_error_info(sb, error, ino, block, func, line); + if (sb_rdonly(sb) || (!force_ro && test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT))) return; @@ -710,8 +713,7 @@ void __ext4_error(struct super_block *sb, const char *function, sb->s_id, function, line, current->comm, &vaf); va_end(args); } - save_error_info(sb, error, 0, block, function, line); - ext4_handle_error(sb, force_ro); + ext4_handle_error(sb, force_ro, error, 0, block, function, line); } void __ext4_error_inode(struct inode *inode, const char *function, @@ -741,9 +743,8 @@ void __ext4_error_inode(struct inode *inode, const char *function, current->comm, &vaf); va_end(args); } - save_error_info(inode->i_sb, error, inode->i_ino, block, - function, line); - ext4_handle_error(inode->i_sb, false); + ext4_handle_error(inode->i_sb, false, error, inode->i_ino, block, + function, line); } void __ext4_error_file(struct file *file, const char *function, @@ -780,9 +781,8 @@ void __ext4_error_file(struct file *file, const char *function, current->comm, path, &vaf); va_end(args); } - save_error_info(inode->i_sb, EFSCORRUPTED, inode->i_ino, block, - function, line); - ext4_handle_error(inode->i_sb, false); + ext4_handle_error(inode->i_sb, false, EFSCORRUPTED, inode->i_ino, block, + function, line); } const char *ext4_decode_error(struct super_block *sb, int errno, @@ -849,8 +849,7 @@ void __ext4_std_error(struct super_block *sb, const char *function, sb->s_id, function, line, errstr); } - save_error_info(sb, -errno, 0, 0, function, line); - ext4_handle_error(sb, false); + ext4_handle_error(sb, false, -errno, 0, 0, function, line); } void __ext4_msg(struct super_block *sb, @@ -944,13 +943,14 @@ __acquires(bitlock) if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT)) { if (test_opt(sb, WARN_ON_ERROR)) WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; __save_error_info(sb, EFSCORRUPTED, ino, block, function, line); - schedule_work(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_error_work); + if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) + schedule_work(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_error_work); return; } ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp); - save_error_info(sb, EFSCORRUPTED, ino, block, function, line); - ext4_handle_error(sb, false); + ext4_handle_error(sb, false, EFSCORRUPTED, ino, block, function, line); /* * We only get here in the ERRORS_RO case; relocking the group * may be dangerous, but nothing bad will happen since the -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4392fbc4bab57db3760f0fb61258cb7089b37665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:38 +0100 Subject: ext4: drop sync argument of ext4_commit_super() Everybody passes 1 as sync argument of ext4_commit_super(). Just drop it. Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-3-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/super.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index cdf2a377d884..8bf31003416a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static struct ratelimit_state ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit; static int ext4_load_journal(struct super_block *, struct ext4_super_block *, unsigned long journal_devnum); static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root); -static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync); +static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb); static int ext4_mark_recovery_complete(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_super_block *es); static int ext4_clear_journal_err(struct super_block *sb, @@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, { __save_error_info(sb, error, ino, block, func, line); if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); } /* Deal with the reporting of failure conditions on a filesystem such as @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static void flush_stashed_error_work(struct work_struct *work) struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = container_of(work, struct ext4_sb_info, s_error_work); - ext4_commit_super(sbi->s_sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sbi->s_sb); } #define ext4_error_ratelimit(sb) \ @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb) es->s_state = cpu_to_le16(sbi->s_mount_state); } if (!sb_rdonly(sb)) - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); rcu_read_lock(); group_desc = rcu_dereference(sbi->s_group_desc); @@ -2642,7 +2642,7 @@ static int ext4_setup_super(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_super_block *es, if (sbi->s_journal) ext4_set_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb); - err = ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + err = ext4_commit_super(sb); done: if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG)) printk(KERN_INFO "[EXT4 FS bs=%lu, gc=%u, " @@ -4869,7 +4869,7 @@ no_journal: if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !sb_rdonly(sb) && !ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb); - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); } /* @@ -5424,7 +5424,7 @@ static int ext4_load_journal(struct super_block *sb, es->s_journal_dev = cpu_to_le32(journal_devnum); /* Make sure we flush the recovery flag to disk. */ - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); } return 0; @@ -5434,7 +5434,7 @@ err_out: return err; } -static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync) +static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es; @@ -5515,8 +5515,7 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync) BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty"); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); - if (sync) - lock_buffer(sbh); + lock_buffer(sbh); if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh) || !buffer_uptodate(sbh)) { /* * Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the @@ -5532,16 +5531,14 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync) set_buffer_uptodate(sbh); } mark_buffer_dirty(sbh); - if (sync) { - unlock_buffer(sbh); - error = __sync_dirty_buffer(sbh, - REQ_SYNC | (test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? REQ_FUA : 0)); - if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) { - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing " - "superblock"); - clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh); - set_buffer_uptodate(sbh); - } + unlock_buffer(sbh); + error = __sync_dirty_buffer(sbh, + REQ_SYNC | (test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? REQ_FUA : 0)); + if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing " + "superblock"); + clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh); + set_buffer_uptodate(sbh); } return error; } @@ -5572,7 +5569,7 @@ static int ext4_mark_recovery_complete(struct super_block *sb, if (ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb) && sb_rdonly(sb)) { ext4_clear_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb); - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); } out: jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); @@ -5614,7 +5611,7 @@ static int ext4_clear_journal_err(struct super_block *sb, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT4_ERROR_FS); - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); jbd2_journal_clear_err(journal); jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno(journal); @@ -5716,7 +5713,7 @@ static int ext4_freeze(struct super_block *sb) ext4_clear_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb); } - error = ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + error = ext4_commit_super(sb); out: if (journal) /* we rely on upper layer to stop further updates */ @@ -5738,7 +5735,7 @@ static int ext4_unfreeze(struct super_block *sb) ext4_set_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb); } - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + ext4_commit_super(sb); return 0; } @@ -5998,7 +5995,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) } if (sbi->s_journal == NULL && !(old_sb_flags & SB_RDONLY)) { - err = ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + err = ext4_commit_super(sb); if (err) goto restore_opts; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 05c2c00f3769abb9e323fcaca70d2de0b48af7ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:39 +0100 Subject: ext4: protect superblock modifications with a buffer lock Protect all superblock modifications (including checksum computation) with a superblock buffer lock. That way we are sure computed checksum matches current superblock contents (a mismatch could cause checksum failures in nojournal mode or if an unjournalled superblock update races with a journalled one). Also we avoid modifying superblock contents while it is being written out (which can cause DIF/DIX failures if we are running in nojournal mode). Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-4-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c | 1 - fs/ext4/file.c | 3 +++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 +++ fs/ext4/namei.c | 6 ++++++ fs/ext4/resize.c | 12 ++++++++++++ fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 3 +++ 7 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c index 1a0a827a7f34..c7e410c4ab7d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c @@ -379,7 +379,6 @@ int __ext4_handle_dirty_super(const char *where, unsigned int line, struct buffer_head *bh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh; int err = 0; - ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) { err = jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle, bh); if (err) diff --git a/fs/ext4/file.c b/fs/ext4/file.c index 3ed8c048fb12..26907d5835d0 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/file.c +++ b/fs/ext4/file.c @@ -809,8 +809,11 @@ static int ext4_sample_last_mounted(struct super_block *sb, err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh); if (err) goto out_journal; + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); strlcpy(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted, cp, sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted)); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); out_journal: ext4_journal_stop(handle); diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 27946882d4ce..27de6f0a33c8 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -5150,7 +5150,10 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); if (err) goto out_brelse; + lock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_set_feature_large_file(sb); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_handle_sync(handle); err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); } diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 7a890ff214f1..40970a509dcc 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -2978,7 +2978,10 @@ int ext4_orphan_add(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) (le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count))) { /* Insert this inode at the head of the on-disk orphan list */ NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan); + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); dirty = true; } list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &sbi->s_orphan); @@ -3061,7 +3064,10 @@ int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); goto out_brelse; } + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(inode->i_sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb); } else { diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c index 928700d57eb6..6155f2b9538c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/resize.c +++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c @@ -899,7 +899,10 @@ static int add_new_gdb(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_gdb_count++; ext4_kvfree_array_rcu(o_group_desc); + lock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); le16_add_cpu(&es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks, -1); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); if (err) ext4_std_error(sb, err); @@ -1384,6 +1387,7 @@ static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb, reserved_blocks *= blocks_count; do_div(reserved_blocks, 100); + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); ext4_blocks_count_set(es, ext4_blocks_count(es) + blocks_count); ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, ext4_free_blocks_count(es) + free_blocks); le32_add_cpu(&es->s_inodes_count, EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) * @@ -1421,6 +1425,8 @@ static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb, * active. */ ext4_r_blocks_count_set(es, ext4_r_blocks_count(es) + reserved_blocks); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); /* Update the free space counts */ percpu_counter_add(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, @@ -1717,8 +1723,11 @@ static int ext4_group_extend_no_check(struct super_block *sb, goto errout; } + lock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_blocks_count_set(es, o_blocks_count + add); ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, ext4_free_blocks_count(es) + add); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_debug("freeing blocks %llu through %llu\n", o_blocks_count, o_blocks_count + add); /* We add the blocks to the bitmap and set the group need init bit */ @@ -1874,10 +1883,13 @@ static int ext4_convert_meta_bg(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode) if (err) goto errout; + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); ext4_clear_feature_resize_inode(sb); ext4_set_feature_meta_bg(sb); sbi->s_es->s_first_meta_bg = cpu_to_le32(num_desc_blocks(sb, sbi->s_groups_count)); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); if (err) { diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 8bf31003416a..2d653ad14200 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5444,6 +5444,7 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) if (!sbh || block_device_ejected(sb)) return error; + lock_buffer(sbh); /* * If the file system is mounted read-only, don't update the * superblock write time. This avoids updating the superblock @@ -5515,7 +5516,6 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty"); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); - lock_buffer(sbh); if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh) || !buffer_uptodate(sbh)) { /* * Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 4e3b1f8c2e81..1db7ca778d69 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -792,7 +792,10 @@ static void ext4_xattr_update_super_block(handle_t *handle, BUFFER_TRACE(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh, "get_write_access"); if (ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh) == 0) { + lock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_set_feature_xattr(sb); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); } } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2d01ddc86606564fb08c56e3bc93a0693895f710 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:40 +0100 Subject: ext4: save error info to sb through journal if available If journalling is still working at the moment we get to writing error information to the superblock we cannot write directly to the superblock as such write could race with journalled update of the superblock and cause journal checksum failures, writing inconsistent information to the journal or other problems. We cannot journal the superblock directly from the error handling functions as we are running in uncertain context and could deadlock so just punt journalled superblock update to a workqueue. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-5-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/super.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 2d653ad14200..9a256c558e04 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static struct ratelimit_state ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit; static int ext4_load_journal(struct super_block *, struct ext4_super_block *, unsigned long journal_devnum); static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root); +static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb); static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb); static int ext4_mark_recovery_complete(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_super_block *es); @@ -586,9 +587,9 @@ static int ext4_errno_to_code(int errno) return EXT4_ERR_UNKNOWN; } -static void __save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, - __u32 ino, __u64 block, - const char *func, unsigned int line) +static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, + __u32 ino, __u64 block, + const char *func, unsigned int line) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); @@ -615,15 +616,6 @@ static void __save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, spin_unlock(&sbi->s_error_lock); } -static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, int error, - __u32 ino, __u64 block, - const char *func, unsigned int line) -{ - __save_error_info(sb, error, ino, block, func, line); - if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) - ext4_commit_super(sb); -} - /* Deal with the reporting of failure conditions on a filesystem such as * inconsistencies detected or read IO failures. * @@ -649,20 +641,35 @@ static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb, bool force_ro, int error, const char *func, unsigned int line) { journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal; + bool continue_fs = !force_ro && test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT); EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; if (test_opt(sb, WARN_ON_ERROR)) WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) + if (!continue_fs && !sb_rdonly(sb)) { + ext4_set_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED); + if (journal) + jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO); + } + + if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) { save_error_info(sb, error, ino, block, func, line); + /* + * In case the fs should keep running, we need to writeout + * superblock through the journal. Due to lock ordering + * constraints, it may not be safe to do it right here so we + * defer superblock flushing to a workqueue. + */ + if (continue_fs) + schedule_work(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_error_work); + else + ext4_commit_super(sb); + } - if (sb_rdonly(sb) || (!force_ro && test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT))) + if (sb_rdonly(sb) || continue_fs) return; - ext4_set_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED); - if (journal) - jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO); /* * We force ERRORS_RO behavior when system is rebooting. Otherwise we * could panic during 'reboot -f' as the underlying device got already @@ -685,7 +692,38 @@ static void flush_stashed_error_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = container_of(work, struct ext4_sb_info, s_error_work); + journal_t *journal = sbi->s_journal; + handle_t *handle; + /* + * If the journal is still running, we have to write out superblock + * through the journal to avoid collisions of other journalled sb + * updates. + * + * We use directly jbd2 functions here to avoid recursing back into + * ext4 error handling code during handling of previous errors. + */ + if (!sb_rdonly(sbi->s_sb) && journal) { + handle = jbd2_journal_start(journal, 1); + if (IS_ERR(handle)) + goto write_directly; + if (jbd2_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh)) { + jbd2_journal_stop(handle); + goto write_directly; + } + ext4_update_super(sbi->s_sb); + if (jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle, sbi->s_sbh)) { + jbd2_journal_stop(handle); + goto write_directly; + } + jbd2_journal_stop(handle); + return; + } +write_directly: + /* + * Write through journal failed. Write sb directly to get error info + * out and hope for the best. + */ ext4_commit_super(sbi->s_sb); } @@ -944,9 +982,11 @@ __acquires(bitlock) if (test_opt(sb, WARN_ON_ERROR)) WARN_ON_ONCE(1); EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS; - __save_error_info(sb, EFSCORRUPTED, ino, block, function, line); - if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) + if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) { + save_error_info(sb, EFSCORRUPTED, ino, block, function, + line); schedule_work(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_error_work); + } return; } ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp); @@ -5434,15 +5474,12 @@ err_out: return err; } -static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) +/* Copy state of EXT4_SB(sb) into buffer for on-disk superblock */ +static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es; struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh; - int error = 0; - - if (!sbh || block_device_ejected(sb)) - return error; lock_buffer(sbh); /* @@ -5514,8 +5551,20 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) } spin_unlock(&sbi->s_error_lock); - BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty"); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbh); +} + +static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh; + int error = 0; + + if (!sbh || block_device_ejected(sb)) + return error; + + ext4_update_super(sb); + if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh) || !buffer_uptodate(sbh)) { /* * Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the @@ -5530,8 +5579,8 @@ static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb) clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh); set_buffer_uptodate(sbh); } + BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty"); mark_buffer_dirty(sbh); - unlock_buffer(sbh); error = __sync_dirty_buffer(sbh, REQ_SYNC | (test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? REQ_FUA : 0)); if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e92ad03fa53498f12b3f5ecb8822adc3bf815b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:41 +0100 Subject: ext4: use sbi instead of EXT4_SB(sb) in ext4_update_super() No behavioral change. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-6-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/super.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 9a256c558e04..0f0db49031dc 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5478,8 +5478,8 @@ err_out: static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es; - struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh; + struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es; + struct buffer_head *sbh = sbi->s_sbh; lock_buffer(sbh); /* @@ -5496,21 +5496,20 @@ static void ext4_update_super(struct super_block *sb) ext4_update_tstamp(es, s_wtime); if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part) es->s_kbytes_written = - cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written + + cpu_to_le64(sbi->s_kbytes_written + ((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[STAT_WRITE]) - - EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1)); + sbi->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1)); else - es->s_kbytes_written = - cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written); - if (percpu_counter_initialized(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeclusters_counter)) + es->s_kbytes_written = cpu_to_le64(sbi->s_kbytes_written); + if (percpu_counter_initialized(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter)) ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es, - EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(sb), percpu_counter_sum_positive( - &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeclusters_counter))); - if (percpu_counter_initialized(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter)) + EXT4_C2B(sbi, percpu_counter_sum_positive( + &sbi->s_freeclusters_counter))); + if (percpu_counter_initialized(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter)) es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(percpu_counter_sum_positive( - &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter)); + &sbi->s_freeinodes_counter)); /* Copy error information to the on-disk superblock */ spin_lock(&sbi->s_error_lock); if (sbi->s_add_error_count > 0) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From dfd56c2c0c0dbb11be939b804ddc8d5395ab3432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:43 +0100 Subject: ext4: fix superblock checksum failure when setting password salt When setting password salt in the superblock, we forget to recompute the superblock checksum so it will not match until the next superblock modification which recomputes the checksum. Fix it. CC: Michael Halcrow Reported-by: Andreas Dilger Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-8-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c index f0381876a7e5..106bf149e8ca 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c @@ -1157,7 +1157,10 @@ resizefs_out: err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh); if (err) goto pwsalt_err_journal; + lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); generate_random_uuid(sbi->s_es->s_encrypt_pw_salt); + ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); + unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); pwsalt_err_journal: -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a3f5cf14ff917d46a4d491cf86210fd639d1ff38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:44 +0100 Subject: ext4: drop ext4_handle_dirty_super() The wrapper is now useless since it does what ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() does. Just remove it. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-9-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c | 16 ---------------- fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h | 5 ----- fs/ext4/file.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/ext4/namei.c | 4 ++-- fs/ext4/resize.c | 8 ++++---- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c index c7e410c4ab7d..be799040a415 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c @@ -372,19 +372,3 @@ int __ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(const char *where, unsigned int line, } return err; } - -int __ext4_handle_dirty_super(const char *where, unsigned int line, - handle_t *handle, struct super_block *sb) -{ - struct buffer_head *bh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh; - int err = 0; - - if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) { - err = jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle, bh); - if (err) - ext4_journal_abort_handle(where, line, __func__, - bh, handle, err); - } else - mark_buffer_dirty(bh); - return err; -} diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h index a124c68b0c75..0d2fa423b7ad 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h @@ -244,9 +244,6 @@ int __ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(const char *where, unsigned int line, handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh); -int __ext4_handle_dirty_super(const char *where, unsigned int line, - handle_t *handle, struct super_block *sb); - #define ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh) \ __ext4_journal_get_write_access(__func__, __LINE__, (handle), (bh)) #define ext4_forget(handle, is_metadata, inode, bh, block_nr) \ @@ -257,8 +254,6 @@ int __ext4_handle_dirty_super(const char *where, unsigned int line, #define ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh) \ __ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(__func__, __LINE__, (handle), (inode), \ (bh)) -#define ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb) \ - __ext4_handle_dirty_super(__func__, __LINE__, (handle), (sb)) handle_t *__ext4_journal_start_sb(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int line, int type, int blocks, int rsv_blocks, diff --git a/fs/ext4/file.c b/fs/ext4/file.c index 26907d5835d0..1cd3d26e3217 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/file.c +++ b/fs/ext4/file.c @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static int ext4_sample_last_mounted(struct super_block *sb, sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted)); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); - ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); out_journal: ext4_journal_stop(handle); out: diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 27de6f0a33c8..c173c8405856 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -5155,7 +5155,8 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_handle_sync(handle); - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); } ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, need_datasync); out_brelse: diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 40970a509dcc..a3b28ef2455a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -2988,7 +2988,7 @@ int ext4_orphan_add(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); if (dirty) { - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); rc = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc); if (!err) err = rc; @@ -3069,7 +3069,7 @@ int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) ext4_superblock_csum_set(inode->i_sb); unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); } else { struct ext4_iloc iloc2; struct inode *i_prev = diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c index 6155f2b9538c..bd0d185654f3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/resize.c +++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c @@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static int add_new_gdb(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, le16_add_cpu(&es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks, -1); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); if (err) ext4_std_error(sb, err); return err; @@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ static int ext4_flex_group_add(struct super_block *sb, ext4_update_super(sb, flex_gd); - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); exit_journal: err2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle); @@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ static int ext4_group_extend_no_check(struct super_block *sb, err = ext4_group_add_blocks(handle, sb, o_blocks_count, add); if (err) goto errout; - ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_debug("freed blocks %llu through %llu\n", o_blocks_count, o_blocks_count + add); errout: @@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ static int ext4_convert_meta_bg(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode) ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); - err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, sbi->s_sbh); if (err) { ext4_std_error(sb, err); goto errout; diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 1db7ca778d69..372208500f4e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ static void ext4_xattr_update_super_block(handle_t *handle, ext4_set_feature_xattr(sb); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); - ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); + ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); } } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 5a3b590d4b2db187faa6f06adc9a53d6199fb1f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 13:24:15 -0500 Subject: ext4: don't leak old mountpoint samples When the first file is opened, ext4 samples the mountpoint of the filesystem in 64 bytes of the super block. It does so using strlcpy(), this means that the remaining bytes in the super block string buffer are untouched. If the mount point before had a longer path than the current one, it can be reconstructed. Consider the case where the fs was mounted to "/media/johnjdeveloper" and later to "/". The super block buffer then contains "/\x00edia/johnjdeveloper". This case was seen in the wild and caused confusion how the name of a developer ands up on the super block of a filesystem used in production... Fix this by using strncpy() instead of strlcpy(). The superblock field is defined to be a fixed-size char array, and it is already marked using __nonstring in fs/ext4/ext4.h. The consumer of the field in e2fsprogs already assumes that in the case of a 64+ byte mount path, that s_last_mounted will not be NUL terminated. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X9ujIOJG/HqMr88R@mit.edu Reported-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/file.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/file.c b/fs/ext4/file.c index 1cd3d26e3217..349b27f0dda0 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/file.c +++ b/fs/ext4/file.c @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ static int ext4_sample_last_mounted(struct super_block *sb, if (err) goto out_journal; lock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); - strlcpy(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted, cp, + strncpy(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted, cp, sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted)); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); unlock_buffer(sbi->s_sbh); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2ca408d9c749c32288bc28725f9f12ba30299e8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Gerst Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 17:30:59 -0500 Subject: fanotify: Fix sys_fanotify_mark() on native x86-32 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Commit 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs. sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that takes the split args for native 32-bit. [ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ] Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments") Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Jan Kara Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com --- arch/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 17 +++++++---------- include/linux/syscalls.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 78c6f05b10f9..24862d15f3a3 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1105,6 +1105,12 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC bool +config ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64 + bool + help + If a 32-bit architecture requires 64-bit arguments to be split into + pairs of 32-bit arguments, select this option. + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig" diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 7b6dd10b162a..21f851179ff0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ config X86_32 select KMAP_LOCAL select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL select OLD_SIGACTION + select ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64 config X86_64 def_bool y diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c index 3e01d8f2ab90..dcab112e1f00 100644 --- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c +++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c @@ -1285,26 +1285,23 @@ fput_and_out: return ret; } +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fanotify_mark, int, fanotify_fd, unsigned int, flags, __u64, mask, int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname) { return do_fanotify_mark(fanotify_fd, flags, mask, dfd, pathname); } +#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(fanotify_mark, +#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64) || defined(CONFIG_COMPAT) +SYSCALL32_DEFINE6(fanotify_mark, int, fanotify_fd, unsigned int, flags, - __u32, mask0, __u32, mask1, int, dfd, + SC_ARG64(mask), int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname) { - return do_fanotify_mark(fanotify_fd, flags, -#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN - ((__u64)mask0 << 32) | mask1, -#else - ((__u64)mask1 << 32) | mask0, -#endif - dfd, pathname); + return do_fanotify_mark(fanotify_fd, flags, SC_VAL64(__u64, mask), + dfd, pathname); } #endif diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index f3929aff39cf..7688bc983de5 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -251,6 +251,30 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event) static inline long __do_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) #endif /* __SYSCALL_DEFINEx */ +/* For split 64-bit arguments on 32-bit architectures */ +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +#define SC_ARG64(name) u32, name##_lo, u32, name##_hi +#else +#define SC_ARG64(name) u32, name##_hi, u32, name##_lo +#endif +#define SC_VAL64(type, name) ((type) name##_hi << 32 | name##_lo) + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE1 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE2 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE3 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE4 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE5 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE6 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6 +#else +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE1 SYSCALL_DEFINE1 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE2 SYSCALL_DEFINE2 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE3 SYSCALL_DEFINE3 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE4 SYSCALL_DEFINE4 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE5 SYSCALL_DEFINE5 +#define SYSCALL32_DEFINE6 SYSCALL_DEFINE6 +#endif + /* * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory. -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 60267ba35c744d851dcd2d22ebaa240ca6aaa15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 17:19:58 +0100 Subject: ceph: reencode gid_list when reconnecting On reconnect, cap and dentry releases are dropped and the fields that follow must be reencoded into the freed space. Currently these are timestamp and gid_list, but gid_list isn't reencoded. This results in failed to decode message of type 24 v4: End of buffer errors on the MDS. While at it, make a change to encode gid_list unconditionally, without regard to what head/which version was used as a result of checking whether CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME is supported or not. URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/48618 Fixes: 4f1ddb1ea874 ("ceph: implement updated ceph_mds_request_head structure") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 98c15ff2e599..840587037b59 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2475,6 +2475,22 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry, return r; } +static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p, + const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +{ + struct ceph_timespec ts; + int i; + + ceph_encode_timespec64(&ts, &req->r_stamp); + ceph_encode_copy(p, &ts, sizeof(ts)); + + /* gid_list */ + ceph_encode_32(p, req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + for (i = 0; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) + ceph_encode_64(p, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, + req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); +} + /* * called under mdsc->mutex */ @@ -2491,7 +2507,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, u64 ino1 = 0, ino2 = 0; int pathlen1 = 0, pathlen2 = 0; bool freepath1 = false, freepath2 = false; - int len, i; + int len; u16 releases; void *p, *end; int ret; @@ -2517,17 +2533,10 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, goto out_free1; } - if (legacy) { - /* Old style */ - len = sizeof(*head); - } else { - /* New style: add gid_list and any later fields */ - len = sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head) + sizeof(u32) + - (sizeof(u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); - } - + len = legacy ? sizeof(*head) : sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head); len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 + 2*(1 + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u64)) + sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); + len += sizeof(u32) + (sizeof(u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) * @@ -2548,7 +2557,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(req->r_tid); /* - * The old ceph_mds_request_header didn't contain a version field, and + * The old ceph_mds_request_head didn't contain a version field, and * one was added when we moved the message version from 3->4. */ if (legacy) { @@ -2609,20 +2618,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases = cpu_to_le16(releases); - /* time stamp */ - { - struct ceph_timespec ts; - ceph_encode_timespec64(&ts, &req->r_stamp); - ceph_encode_copy(&p, &ts, sizeof(ts)); - } - - /* gid list */ - if (!legacy) { - ceph_encode_32(&p, req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); - for (i = 0; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) - ceph_encode_64(&p, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, - req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); - } + encode_timestamp_and_gids(&p, req); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(p > end)) { ceph_msg_put(msg); @@ -2730,13 +2726,8 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, /* remove cap/dentry releases from message */ rhead->num_releases = 0; - /* time stamp */ p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; - { - struct ceph_timespec ts; - ceph_encode_timespec64(&ts, &req->r_stamp); - ceph_encode_copy(&p, &ts, sizeof(ts)); - } + encode_timestamp_and_gids(&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len = cpu_to_le32(msg->front.iov_len); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 77788775c7132a8d93c6930ab1bd84fc743c7cb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 10:50:46 -0700 Subject: io_uring: don't assume mm is constant across submits If we COW the identity, we assume that ->mm never changes. But this isn't true of multiple processes end up sharing the ring. Hence treat id->mm like like any other process compontent when it comes to the identity mapping. This is pretty trivial, just moving the existing grab into io_grab_identity(), and including a check for the match. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Fixes: 1e6fa5216a0e ("io_uring: COW io_identity on mismatch") Reported-by: Christian Brauner : Tested-by: Christian Brauner : Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 7e35283fc0b1..eb4620ff638e 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1501,6 +1501,13 @@ static bool io_grab_identity(struct io_kiocb *req) spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_FILES; } + if (!(req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_MM) && + (def->work_flags & IO_WQ_WORK_MM)) { + if (id->mm != current->mm) + return false; + mmgrab(id->mm); + req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_MM; + } return true; } @@ -1525,13 +1532,6 @@ static void io_prep_async_work(struct io_kiocb *req) req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_UNBOUND; } - /* ->mm can never change on us */ - if (!(req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_MM) && - (def->work_flags & IO_WQ_WORK_MM)) { - mmgrab(id->mm); - req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_MM; - } - /* if we fail grabbing identity, we must COW, regrab, and retry */ if (io_grab_identity(req)) return; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 875b2376fd663832bf45f7285c9d26cb8c52929a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 19:47:06 -0800 Subject: fs: block_dev.c: fix kernel-doc warnings from struct block_device changes Fix new kernel-doc warnings in fs/block_dev.c: ../fs/block_dev.c:1066: warning: Excess function parameter 'whole' description in 'bd_abort_claiming' ../fs/block_dev.c:1837: warning: Function parameter or member 'dev' not described in 'lookup_bdev' Fixes: 4e7b5671c6a8 ("block: remove i_bdev") Fixes: 37c3fc9abb25 ("block: simplify the block device claiming interface") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Jens Axboe Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexander Viro Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/block_dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 9293045e128c..3e5b02f6606c 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -1055,7 +1055,6 @@ static void bd_finish_claiming(struct block_device *bdev, void *holder) /** * bd_abort_claiming - abort claiming of a block device * @bdev: block device of interest - * @whole: whole block device * @holder: holder that has claimed @bdev * * Abort claiming of a block device when the exclusive open failed. This can be @@ -1828,6 +1827,7 @@ const struct file_operations def_blk_fops = { /** * lookup_bdev - lookup a struct block_device by name * @pathname: special file representing the block device + * @dev: return value of the block device's dev_t * * Get a reference to the blockdevice at @pathname in the current * namespace if possible and return it. Return ERR_PTR(error) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1642b4450d20e31439c80c28256c8eee08684698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 21:34:14 +0000 Subject: io_uring: add a helper for setting a ref node Setting a new reference node to a file data is not trivial, don't repeat it, add and use a helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index eb4620ff638e..6372aba8d0c2 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -7231,6 +7231,16 @@ static void io_file_ref_kill(struct percpu_ref *ref) complete(&data->done); } +static void io_sqe_files_set_node(struct fixed_file_data *file_data, + struct fixed_file_ref_node *ref_node) +{ + spin_lock_bh(&file_data->lock); + file_data->node = ref_node; + list_add_tail(&ref_node->node, &file_data->ref_list); + spin_unlock_bh(&file_data->lock); + percpu_ref_get(&file_data->refs); +} + static int io_sqe_files_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { struct fixed_file_data *data = ctx->file_data; @@ -7758,11 +7768,7 @@ static int io_sqe_files_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg, return PTR_ERR(ref_node); } - file_data->node = ref_node; - spin_lock_bh(&file_data->lock); - list_add_tail(&ref_node->node, &file_data->ref_list); - spin_unlock_bh(&file_data->lock); - percpu_ref_get(&file_data->refs); + io_sqe_files_set_node(file_data, ref_node); return ret; out_fput: for (i = 0; i < ctx->nr_user_files; i++) { @@ -7918,11 +7924,7 @@ static int __io_sqe_files_update(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, if (needs_switch) { percpu_ref_kill(&data->node->refs); - spin_lock_bh(&data->lock); - list_add_tail(&ref_node->node, &data->ref_list); - data->node = ref_node; - spin_unlock_bh(&data->lock); - percpu_ref_get(&ctx->file_data->refs); + io_sqe_files_set_node(data, ref_node); } else destroy_fixed_file_ref_node(ref_node); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1ffc54220c444774b7f09e6d2121e732f8e19b94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 21:34:15 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix io_sqe_files_unregister() hangs io_sqe_files_unregister() uninterruptibly waits for enqueued ref nodes, however requests keeping them may never complete, e.g. because of some userspace dependency. Make sure it's interruptible otherwise it would hang forever. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 6372aba8d0c2..ca46f314640b 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -992,6 +992,10 @@ enum io_mem_account { ACCT_PINNED, }; +static void destroy_fixed_file_ref_node(struct fixed_file_ref_node *ref_node); +static struct fixed_file_ref_node *alloc_fixed_file_ref_node( + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); + static void __io_complete_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, long res, long res2, struct io_comp_state *cs); static void io_cqring_fill_event(struct io_kiocb *req, long res); @@ -7244,11 +7248,15 @@ static void io_sqe_files_set_node(struct fixed_file_data *file_data, static int io_sqe_files_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { struct fixed_file_data *data = ctx->file_data; - struct fixed_file_ref_node *ref_node = NULL; + struct fixed_file_ref_node *backup_node, *ref_node = NULL; unsigned nr_tables, i; + int ret; if (!data) return -ENXIO; + backup_node = alloc_fixed_file_ref_node(ctx); + if (!backup_node) + return -ENOMEM; spin_lock_bh(&data->lock); ref_node = data->node; @@ -7260,7 +7268,18 @@ static int io_sqe_files_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) /* wait for all refs nodes to complete */ flush_delayed_work(&ctx->file_put_work); - wait_for_completion(&data->done); + do { + ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&data->done); + if (!ret) + break; + ret = io_run_task_work_sig(); + if (ret < 0) { + percpu_ref_resurrect(&data->refs); + reinit_completion(&data->done); + io_sqe_files_set_node(data, backup_node); + return ret; + } + } while (1); __io_sqe_files_unregister(ctx); nr_tables = DIV_ROUND_UP(ctx->nr_user_files, IORING_MAX_FILES_TABLE); @@ -7271,6 +7290,7 @@ static int io_sqe_files_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) kfree(data); ctx->file_data = NULL; ctx->nr_user_files = 0; + destroy_fixed_file_ref_node(backup_node); return 0; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b1b6b5a30dce872f500dc43f067cba8e7f86fc7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 21:34:16 +0000 Subject: kernel/io_uring: cancel io_uring before task works For cancelling io_uring requests it needs either to be able to run currently enqueued task_works or having it shut down by that moment. Otherwise io_uring_cancel_files() may be waiting for requests that won't ever complete. Go with the first way and do cancellations before setting PF_EXITING and so before putting the task_work infrastructure into a transition state where task_work_run() would better not be called. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/file.c | 2 -- kernel/exit.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c index c0b60961c672..dab120b71e44 100644 --- a/fs/file.c +++ b/fs/file.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include unsigned int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024; unsigned int sysctl_nr_open_min = BITS_PER_LONG; @@ -428,7 +427,6 @@ void exit_files(struct task_struct *tsk) struct files_struct * files = tsk->files; if (files) { - io_uring_files_cancel(files); task_lock(tsk); tsk->files = NULL; task_unlock(tsk); diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 3594291a8542..04029e35e69a 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -776,6 +777,7 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code) schedule(); } + io_uring_files_cancel(tsk->files); exit_signals(tsk); /* sets PF_EXITING */ /* sync mm's RSS info before statistics gathering */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4f8b848788f77c7f5c3bd98febce66b7aa14785f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2021 22:43:52 +0100 Subject: zonefs: select CONFIG_CRC32 When CRC32 is disabled, zonefs cannot be linked: ld: fs/zonefs/super.o: in function `zonefs_fill_super': Add a Kconfig 'select' statement for it. Fixes: 8dcc1a9d90c1 ("fs: New zonefs file system") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal --- fs/zonefs/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/zonefs/Kconfig b/fs/zonefs/Kconfig index ef2697b78820..827278f937fe 100644 --- a/fs/zonefs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/zonefs/Kconfig @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config ZONEFS_FS depends on BLOCK depends on BLK_DEV_ZONED select FS_IOMAP + select CRC32 help zonefs is a simple file system which exposes zones of a zoned block device (e.g. host-managed or host-aware SMR disk drives) as files. -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 26982a89cad77c0efc1c0c79bee0e3d75e9281d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2020 22:37:58 +0000 Subject: afs: Work around strnlen() oops with CONFIG_FORTIFIED_SOURCE=y AFS has a structured layout in its directory contents (AFS dirs are downloaded as files and parsed locally by the client for lookup/readdir). The slots in the directory are defined by union afs_xdr_dirent. This, however, only directly allows a name of a length that will fit into that union. To support a longer name, the next 1-8 contiguous entries are annexed to the first one and the name flows across these. afs_dir_iterate_block() uses strnlen(), limited to the space to the end of the page, to find out how long the name is. This worked fine until 6a39e62abbaf. With that commit, the compiler determines the size of the array and asserts that the string fits inside that array. This is a problem for AFS because we *expect* it to overflow one or more arrays. A similar problem also occurs in afs_dir_scan_block() when a directory file is being locally edited to avoid the need to redownload it. There strlen() was being used safely because each page has the last byte set to 0 when the file is downloaded and validated (in afs_dir_check_page()). Fix this by changing the afs_xdr_dirent union name field to an indeterminate-length array and dropping the overflow field. (Note that whilst looking at this, I realised that the calculation of the number of slots a dirent used is non-standard and not quite right, but I'll address that in a separate patch.) The issue can be triggered by something like: touch /afs/example.com/thisisaveryveryverylongname and it generates a report that looks like: detected buffer overflow in strnlen ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1149! ... RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0xf/0x11 ... Call Trace: afs_dir_iterate_block+0x12b/0x35b afs_dir_iterate+0x14e/0x1ce afs_do_lookup+0x131/0x417 afs_lookup+0x24f/0x344 lookup_open.isra.0+0x1bb/0x27d open_last_lookups+0x166/0x237 path_openat+0xe0/0x159 do_filp_open+0x48/0xa4 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xf5/0x16e ? __clear_close_on_exec+0x13/0x22 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb do_sys_openat2+0x72/0xde do_sys_open+0x3b/0x58 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 6a39e62abbaf ("lib: string.h: detect intra-object overflow in fortified string functions") Reported-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Marc Dionne cc: Daniel Axtens --- fs/afs/xdr_fs.h | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h b/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h index 94f1f398eefa..c926430fd08a 100644 --- a/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h +++ b/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h @@ -54,10 +54,15 @@ union afs_xdr_dirent { __be16 hash_next; __be32 vnode; __be32 unique; - u8 name[16]; - u8 overflow[4]; /* if any char of the name (inc - * NUL) reaches here, consume - * the next dirent too */ + u8 name[]; + /* When determining the number of dirent slots needed to + * represent a directory entry, name should be assumed to be 16 + * bytes, due to a now-standardised (mis)calculation, but it is + * in fact 20 bytes in size. + * + * For names longer than (16 or) 20 bytes, extra slots should + * be annexed to this one using the extended_name format. + */ } u; u8 extended_name[32]; } __packed; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 366911cd762db02c2dd32fad1be96b72a66f205d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 10:39:57 +0000 Subject: afs: Fix directory entry size calculation The number of dirent records used by an AFS directory entry should be calculated using the assumption that there is a 16-byte name field in the first block, rather than a 20-byte name field (which is actually the case). This miscalculation is historic and effectively standard, so we have to use it. The calculation we need to use is: 1 + (((strlen(name) + 1) + 15) >> 5) where we are adding one to the strlen() result to account for the NUL termination. Fix this by the following means: (1) Create an inline function to do the calculation for a given name length. (2) Use the function to calculate the number of records used for a dirent in afs_dir_iterate_block(). Use this to move the over-end check out of the loop since it only needs to be done once. Further use this to only go through the loop for the 2nd+ records composing an entry. The only test there now is for if the record is allocated - and we already checked the first block at the top of the outer loop. (3) Add a max name length check in afs_dir_iterate_block(). (4) Make afs_edit_dir_add() and afs_edit_dir_remove() use the function from (1) to calculate the number of blocks rather than doing it incorrectly themselves. Fixes: 63a4681ff39c ("afs: Locally edit directory data for mkdir/create/unlink/...") Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Marc Dionne --- fs/afs/dir.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- fs/afs/dir_edit.c | 6 ++---- fs/afs/xdr_fs.h | 14 ++++++++++++- include/trace/events/afs.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/afs/dir.c b/fs/afs/dir.c index 9068d5578a26..7bd659ad959e 100644 --- a/fs/afs/dir.c +++ b/fs/afs/dir.c @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static int afs_dir_iterate_block(struct afs_vnode *dvnode, unsigned blkoff) { union afs_xdr_dirent *dire; - unsigned offset, next, curr; + unsigned offset, next, curr, nr_slots; size_t nlen; int tmp; @@ -363,13 +363,12 @@ static int afs_dir_iterate_block(struct afs_vnode *dvnode, offset < AFS_DIR_SLOTS_PER_BLOCK; offset = next ) { - next = offset + 1; - /* skip entries marked unused in the bitmap */ if (!(block->hdr.bitmap[offset / 8] & (1 << (offset % 8)))) { _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]: unused", blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), offset); + next = offset + 1; if (offset >= curr) ctx->pos = blkoff + next * sizeof(union afs_xdr_dirent); @@ -381,35 +380,39 @@ static int afs_dir_iterate_block(struct afs_vnode *dvnode, nlen = strnlen(dire->u.name, sizeof(*block) - offset * sizeof(union afs_xdr_dirent)); + if (nlen > AFSNAMEMAX - 1) { + _debug("ENT[%zu]: name too long (len %u/%zu)", + blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), + offset, nlen); + return afs_bad(dvnode, afs_file_error_dir_name_too_long); + } _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]: %s %zu \"%s\"", blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), offset, (offset < curr ? "skip" : "fill"), nlen, dire->u.name); - /* work out where the next possible entry is */ - for (tmp = nlen; tmp > 15; tmp -= sizeof(union afs_xdr_dirent)) { - if (next >= AFS_DIR_SLOTS_PER_BLOCK) { - _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]:" - " %u travelled beyond end dir block" - " (len %u/%zu)", - blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), - offset, next, tmp, nlen); - return afs_bad(dvnode, afs_file_error_dir_over_end); - } - if (!(block->hdr.bitmap[next / 8] & - (1 << (next % 8)))) { - _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]:" - " %u unmarked extension (len %u/%zu)", + nr_slots = afs_dir_calc_slots(nlen); + next = offset + nr_slots; + if (next > AFS_DIR_SLOTS_PER_BLOCK) { + _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]:" + " %u extends beyond end dir block" + " (len %zu)", + blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), + offset, next, nlen); + return afs_bad(dvnode, afs_file_error_dir_over_end); + } + + /* Check that the name-extension dirents are all allocated */ + for (tmp = 1; tmp < nr_slots; tmp++) { + unsigned int ix = offset + tmp; + if (!(block->hdr.bitmap[ix / 8] & (1 << (ix % 8)))) { + _debug("ENT[%zu.u]:" + " %u unmarked extension (%u/%u)", blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), - offset, next, tmp, nlen); + offset, tmp, nr_slots); return afs_bad(dvnode, afs_file_error_dir_unmarked_ext); } - - _debug("ENT[%zu.%u]: ext %u/%zu", - blkoff / sizeof(union afs_xdr_dir_block), - next, tmp, nlen); - next++; } /* skip if starts before the current position */ diff --git a/fs/afs/dir_edit.c b/fs/afs/dir_edit.c index 2ffe09abae7f..f4600c1353ad 100644 --- a/fs/afs/dir_edit.c +++ b/fs/afs/dir_edit.c @@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ void afs_edit_dir_add(struct afs_vnode *vnode, } /* Work out how many slots we're going to need. */ - need_slots = round_up(12 + name->len + 1 + 4, AFS_DIR_DIRENT_SIZE); - need_slots /= AFS_DIR_DIRENT_SIZE; + need_slots = afs_dir_calc_slots(name->len); meta_page = kmap(page0); meta = &meta_page->blocks[0]; @@ -393,8 +392,7 @@ void afs_edit_dir_remove(struct afs_vnode *vnode, } /* Work out how many slots we're going to discard. */ - need_slots = round_up(12 + name->len + 1 + 4, AFS_DIR_DIRENT_SIZE); - need_slots /= AFS_DIR_DIRENT_SIZE; + need_slots = afs_dir_calc_slots(name->len); meta_page = kmap(page0); meta = &meta_page->blocks[0]; diff --git a/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h b/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h index c926430fd08a..8ca868164507 100644 --- a/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h +++ b/fs/afs/xdr_fs.h @@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ union afs_xdr_dirent { /* When determining the number of dirent slots needed to * represent a directory entry, name should be assumed to be 16 * bytes, due to a now-standardised (mis)calculation, but it is - * in fact 20 bytes in size. + * in fact 20 bytes in size. afs_dir_calc_slots() should be + * used for this. * * For names longer than (16 or) 20 bytes, extra slots should * be annexed to this one using the extended_name format. @@ -101,4 +102,15 @@ struct afs_xdr_dir_page { union afs_xdr_dir_block blocks[AFS_DIR_BLOCKS_PER_PAGE]; }; +/* + * Calculate the number of dirent slots required for any given name length. + * The calculation is made assuming the part of the name in the first slot is + * 16 bytes, rather than 20, but this miscalculation is now standardised. + */ +static inline unsigned int afs_dir_calc_slots(size_t name_len) +{ + name_len++; /* NUL-terminated */ + return 1 + ((name_len + 15) / AFS_DIR_DIRENT_SIZE); +} + #endif /* XDR_FS_H */ diff --git a/include/trace/events/afs.h b/include/trace/events/afs.h index 4eef374d4413..4a5cc8c64be3 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/afs.h +++ b/include/trace/events/afs.h @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ enum afs_file_error { afs_file_error_dir_bad_magic, afs_file_error_dir_big, afs_file_error_dir_missing_page, + afs_file_error_dir_name_too_long, afs_file_error_dir_over_end, afs_file_error_dir_small, afs_file_error_dir_unmarked_ext, @@ -488,6 +489,7 @@ enum afs_cb_break_reason { EM(afs_file_error_dir_bad_magic, "DIR_BAD_MAGIC") \ EM(afs_file_error_dir_big, "DIR_BIG") \ EM(afs_file_error_dir_missing_page, "DIR_MISSING_PAGE") \ + EM(afs_file_error_dir_name_too_long, "DIR_NAME_TOO_LONG") \ EM(afs_file_error_dir_over_end, "DIR_ENT_OVER_END") \ EM(afs_file_error_dir_small, "DIR_SMALL") \ EM(afs_file_error_dir_unmarked_ext, "DIR_UNMARKED_EXT") \ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4972cf605f8a10784bb9ec9bdf3465892fb547c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 16:32:05 +0100 Subject: libceph, ceph: disambiguate ceph_connection_operations handlers Since a few years, kernel addresses are no longer included in oops dumps, at least on x86. All we get is a symbol name with offset and size. This is a problem for ceph_connection_operations handlers, especially con->ops->dispatch(). All three handlers have the same name and there is little context to disambiguate between e.g. monitor and OSD clients because almost everything is inlined. gdb sneakily stops at the first matching symbol, so one has to resort to nm and addr2line. Some of these are already prefixed with mon_, osd_ or mds_. Let's do the same for all others. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Acked-by: Jeff Layton --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- net/ceph/mon_client.c | 14 +++++++------- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 840587037b59..d87bd852ed96 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -5038,7 +5038,7 @@ bad: return; } -static struct ceph_connection *con_get(struct ceph_connection *con) +static struct ceph_connection *mds_get_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; @@ -5047,7 +5047,7 @@ static struct ceph_connection *con_get(struct ceph_connection *con) return NULL; } -static void con_put(struct ceph_connection *con) +static void mds_put_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; @@ -5058,7 +5058,7 @@ static void con_put(struct ceph_connection *con) * if the client is unresponsive for long enough, the mds will kill * the session entirely. */ -static void peer_reset(struct ceph_connection *con) +static void mds_peer_reset(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; @@ -5067,7 +5067,7 @@ static void peer_reset(struct ceph_connection *con) send_mds_reconnect(mdsc, s); } -static void dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) +static void mds_dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; @@ -5125,8 +5125,8 @@ out: * Note: returned pointer is the address of a structure that's * managed separately. Caller must *not* attempt to free it. */ -static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, - int *proto, int force_new) +static struct ceph_auth_handshake * +mds_get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, int *proto, int force_new) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; @@ -5142,7 +5142,7 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, return auth; } -static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, +static int mds_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; @@ -5153,7 +5153,7 @@ static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len); } -static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int mds_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; @@ -5165,7 +5165,7 @@ static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } -static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int mds_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc; @@ -5288,15 +5288,15 @@ static int mds_check_message_signature(struct ceph_msg *msg) } static const struct ceph_connection_operations mds_con_ops = { - .get = con_get, - .put = con_put, - .dispatch = dispatch, - .get_authorizer = get_authorizer, - .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge, - .verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply, - .invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer, - .peer_reset = peer_reset, + .get = mds_get_con, + .put = mds_put_con, .alloc_msg = mds_alloc_msg, + .dispatch = mds_dispatch, + .peer_reset = mds_peer_reset, + .get_authorizer = mds_get_authorizer, + .add_authorizer_challenge = mds_add_authorizer_challenge, + .verify_authorizer_reply = mds_verify_authorizer_reply, + .invalidate_authorizer = mds_invalidate_authorizer, .sign_message = mds_sign_message, .check_message_signature = mds_check_message_signature, .get_auth_request = mds_get_auth_request, diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c index b9d54ed9f338..195ceb8afb06 100644 --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c @@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ static int mon_handle_auth_bad_method(struct ceph_connection *con, /* * handle incoming message */ -static void dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) +static void mon_dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) { struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private; int type = le16_to_cpu(msg->hdr.type); @@ -1565,21 +1565,21 @@ static void mon_fault(struct ceph_connection *con) * will come from the messenger workqueue, which is drained prior to * mon_client destruction. */ -static struct ceph_connection *con_get(struct ceph_connection *con) +static struct ceph_connection *mon_get_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { return con; } -static void con_put(struct ceph_connection *con) +static void mon_put_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { } static const struct ceph_connection_operations mon_con_ops = { - .get = con_get, - .put = con_put, - .dispatch = dispatch, - .fault = mon_fault, + .get = mon_get_con, + .put = mon_put_con, .alloc_msg = mon_alloc_msg, + .dispatch = mon_dispatch, + .fault = mon_fault, .get_auth_request = mon_get_auth_request, .handle_auth_reply_more = mon_handle_auth_reply_more, .handle_auth_done = mon_handle_auth_done, diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 61229c5e22cb..ff8624a7c964 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -5412,7 +5412,7 @@ void ceph_osdc_cleanup(void) /* * handle incoming message */ -static void dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) +static void osd_dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) { struct ceph_osd *osd = con->private; struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = osd->o_osdc; @@ -5534,9 +5534,9 @@ static struct ceph_msg *alloc_msg_with_page_vector(struct ceph_msg_header *hdr) return m; } -static struct ceph_msg *alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con, - struct ceph_msg_header *hdr, - int *skip) +static struct ceph_msg *osd_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct ceph_msg_header *hdr, + int *skip) { struct ceph_osd *osd = con->private; int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type); @@ -5560,7 +5560,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con, /* * Wrappers to refcount containing ceph_osd struct */ -static struct ceph_connection *get_osd_con(struct ceph_connection *con) +static struct ceph_connection *osd_get_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_osd *osd = con->private; if (get_osd(osd)) @@ -5568,7 +5568,7 @@ static struct ceph_connection *get_osd_con(struct ceph_connection *con) return NULL; } -static void put_osd_con(struct ceph_connection *con) +static void osd_put_con(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_osd *osd = con->private; put_osd(osd); @@ -5582,8 +5582,8 @@ static void put_osd_con(struct ceph_connection *con) * Note: returned pointer is the address of a structure that's * managed separately. Caller must *not* attempt to free it. */ -static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, - int *proto, int force_new) +static struct ceph_auth_handshake * +osd_get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, int *proto, int force_new) { struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc; @@ -5599,7 +5599,7 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con, return auth; } -static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, +static int osd_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len) { struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; @@ -5610,7 +5610,7 @@ static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con, challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len); } -static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int osd_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc; @@ -5622,7 +5622,7 @@ static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con) NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } -static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int osd_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc; @@ -5731,18 +5731,18 @@ static int osd_check_message_signature(struct ceph_msg *msg) } static const struct ceph_connection_operations osd_con_ops = { - .get = get_osd_con, - .put = put_osd_con, - .dispatch = dispatch, - .get_authorizer = get_authorizer, - .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge, - .verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply, - .invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer, - .alloc_msg = alloc_msg, + .get = osd_get_con, + .put = osd_put_con, + .alloc_msg = osd_alloc_msg, + .dispatch = osd_dispatch, + .fault = osd_fault, .reencode_message = osd_reencode_message, + .get_authorizer = osd_get_authorizer, + .add_authorizer_challenge = osd_add_authorizer_challenge, + .verify_authorizer_reply = osd_verify_authorizer_reply, + .invalidate_authorizer = osd_invalidate_authorizer, .sign_message = osd_sign_message, .check_message_signature = osd_check_message_signature, - .fault = osd_fault, .get_auth_request = osd_get_auth_request, .handle_auth_reply_more = osd_handle_auth_reply_more, .handle_auth_done = osd_handle_auth_done, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a0a6df9afcaf439a6b4c88a3b522e3d05fdef46f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:25:34 -0500 Subject: umount(2): move the flag validity checks first Unfortunately, there's userland code that used to rely upon these checks being done before anything else to check for UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW support. That broke in 41525f56e256 ("fs: refactor ksys_umount"). Separate those from the rest of checks and move them to ksys_umount(); unlike everything else in there, this can be sanely done there. Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon Fixes: 41525f56e256 ("fs: refactor ksys_umount") Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/namespace.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index d2db7dfe232b..9d33909d0f9e 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1713,8 +1713,6 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags) { struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt); - if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW)) - return -EINVAL; if (!may_mount()) return -EPERM; if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root) @@ -1728,6 +1726,7 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags) return 0; } +// caller is responsible for flags being sane int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags) { struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt); @@ -1749,6 +1748,10 @@ static int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags) struct path path; int ret; + // basic validity checks done first + if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW)) lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW; ret = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 81b6d05ccad4f3d8a9dfb091fb46ad6978ee40e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 20:36:35 +0000 Subject: io_uring: synchronise IOPOLL on task_submit fail io_req_task_submit() might be called for IOPOLL, do the fail path under uring_lock to comply with IOPOLL synchronisation based solely on it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index ca46f314640b..5be33fd8b6bc 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2126,15 +2126,16 @@ static void io_req_task_cancel(struct callback_head *cb) static void __io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req) { struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + bool fail; - if (!__io_sq_thread_acquire_mm(ctx) && - !__io_sq_thread_acquire_files(ctx)) { - mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + fail = __io_sq_thread_acquire_mm(ctx) || + __io_sq_thread_acquire_files(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + if (!fail) __io_queue_sqe(req, NULL); - mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); - } else { + else __io_req_task_cancel(req, -EFAULT); - } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); } static void io_req_task_submit(struct callback_head *cb) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 6c503150ae33ee19036255cfda0998463613352c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 20:36:36 +0000 Subject: io_uring: patch up IOPOLL overflow_flush sync IOPOLL skips completion locking but keeps it under uring_lock, thus io_cqring_overflow_flush() and so io_cqring_events() need additional locking with uring_lock in some cases for IOPOLL. Remove __io_cqring_overflow_flush() from io_cqring_events(), introduce a wrapper around flush doing needed synchronisation and call it by hand. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 5be33fd8b6bc..445035b24a50 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1713,9 +1713,9 @@ static void io_cqring_ev_posted(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) } /* Returns true if there are no backlogged entries after the flush */ -static bool io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, - struct task_struct *tsk, - struct files_struct *files) +static bool __io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, + struct task_struct *tsk, + struct files_struct *files) { struct io_rings *rings = ctx->rings; struct io_kiocb *req, *tmp; @@ -1768,6 +1768,20 @@ static bool io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, return all_flushed; } +static void io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, + struct task_struct *tsk, + struct files_struct *files) +{ + if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) { + /* iopoll syncs against uring_lock, not completion_lock */ + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + __io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, force, tsk, files); + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + } +} + static void __io_cqring_fill_event(struct io_kiocb *req, long res, long cflags) { struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; @@ -2314,20 +2328,8 @@ static void io_double_put_req(struct io_kiocb *req) io_free_req(req); } -static unsigned io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool noflush) +static unsigned io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { - if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) { - /* - * noflush == true is from the waitqueue handler, just ensure - * we wake up the task, and the next invocation will flush the - * entries. We cannot safely to it from here. - */ - if (noflush) - return -1U; - - io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); - } - /* See comment at the top of this file */ smp_rmb(); return __io_cqring_events(ctx); @@ -2552,7 +2554,9 @@ static int io_iopoll_check(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, long min) * If we do, we can potentially be spinning for commands that * already triggered a CQE (eg in error). */ - if (io_cqring_events(ctx, false)) + if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) + __io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); + if (io_cqring_events(ctx)) break; /* @@ -6827,7 +6831,7 @@ static int io_submit_sqes(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned int nr) /* if we have a backlog and couldn't flush it all, return BUSY */ if (test_bit(0, &ctx->sq_check_overflow)) { - if (!io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL)) + if (!__io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL)) return -EBUSY; } @@ -7090,7 +7094,7 @@ struct io_wait_queue { unsigned nr_timeouts; }; -static inline bool io_should_wake(struct io_wait_queue *iowq, bool noflush) +static inline bool io_should_wake(struct io_wait_queue *iowq) { struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = iowq->ctx; @@ -7099,7 +7103,7 @@ static inline bool io_should_wake(struct io_wait_queue *iowq, bool noflush) * started waiting. For timeouts, we always want to return to userspace, * regardless of event count. */ - return io_cqring_events(ctx, noflush) >= iowq->to_wait || + return io_cqring_events(ctx) >= iowq->to_wait || atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts) != iowq->nr_timeouts; } @@ -7109,11 +7113,13 @@ static int io_wake_function(struct wait_queue_entry *curr, unsigned int mode, struct io_wait_queue *iowq = container_of(curr, struct io_wait_queue, wq); - /* use noflush == true, as we can't safely rely on locking context */ - if (!io_should_wake(iowq, true)) - return -1; - - return autoremove_wake_function(curr, mode, wake_flags, key); + /* + * Cannot safely flush overflowed CQEs from here, ensure we wake up + * the task, and the next invocation will do it. + */ + if (io_should_wake(iowq) || test_bit(0, &iowq->ctx->cq_check_overflow)) + return autoremove_wake_function(curr, mode, wake_flags, key); + return -1; } static int io_run_task_work_sig(void) @@ -7150,7 +7156,8 @@ static int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, int ret = 0; do { - if (io_cqring_events(ctx, false) >= min_events) + io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); + if (io_cqring_events(ctx) >= min_events) return 0; if (!io_run_task_work()) break; @@ -7178,6 +7185,7 @@ static int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, iowq.nr_timeouts = atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts); trace_io_uring_cqring_wait(ctx, min_events); do { + io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&ctx->wait, &iowq.wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); /* make sure we run task_work before checking for signals */ @@ -7186,8 +7194,10 @@ static int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, continue; else if (ret < 0) break; - if (io_should_wake(&iowq, false)) + if (io_should_wake(&iowq)) break; + if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) + continue; if (uts) { timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout); if (timeout == 0) { @@ -8625,7 +8635,8 @@ static __poll_t io_uring_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) smp_rmb(); if (!io_sqring_full(ctx)) mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; - if (io_cqring_events(ctx, false)) + io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); + if (io_cqring_events(ctx)) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; return mask; @@ -8683,7 +8694,7 @@ static void io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) /* if force is set, the ring is going away. always drop after that */ ctx->cq_overflow_flushed = 1; if (ctx->rings) - io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, NULL, NULL); + __io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, NULL, NULL); mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); io_kill_timeouts(ctx, NULL, NULL); @@ -8857,9 +8868,7 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } io_cancel_defer_files(ctx, task, files); - io_ring_submit_lock(ctx, (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL)); io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, task, files); - io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL)); if (!files) __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, task); @@ -9195,13 +9204,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(io_uring_enter, unsigned int, fd, u32, to_submit, */ ret = 0; if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { - if (!list_empty_careful(&ctx->cq_overflow_list)) { - bool needs_lock = ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL; + io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); - io_ring_submit_lock(ctx, needs_lock); - io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); - io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, needs_lock); - } if (flags & IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAKEUP) wake_up(&ctx->sq_data->wait); if (flags & IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAIT) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From de7f1d9e99d8b99e4e494ad8fcd91f0c4c5c9357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 20:43:29 +0000 Subject: io_uring: drop file refs after task cancel io_uring fds marked O_CLOEXEC and we explicitly cancel all requests before going through exec, so we don't want to leave task's file references to not our anymore io_uring instances. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 445035b24a50..85de42c42433 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8958,6 +8958,15 @@ static void io_uring_attempt_task_drop(struct file *file) io_uring_del_task_file(file); } +static void io_uring_remove_task_files(struct io_uring_task *tctx) +{ + struct file *file; + unsigned long index; + + xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, file) + io_uring_del_task_file(file); +} + void __io_uring_files_cancel(struct files_struct *files) { struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; @@ -8966,16 +8975,12 @@ void __io_uring_files_cancel(struct files_struct *files) /* make sure overflow events are dropped */ atomic_inc(&tctx->in_idle); - - xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, file) { - struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; - - io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, files); - if (files) - io_uring_del_task_file(file); - } - + xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, file) + io_uring_cancel_task_requests(file->private_data, files); atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle); + + if (files) + io_uring_remove_task_files(tctx); } static s64 tctx_inflight(struct io_uring_task *tctx) @@ -9038,6 +9043,8 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) } while (1); atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle); + + io_uring_remove_task_files(tctx); } static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 90df08538c07b7135703358a0c8c08d97889a704 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 20:43:30 +0000 Subject: io_uring: cancel more aggressively in exit_work While io_ring_exit_work() is running new requests of all sorts may be issued, so it should do a bit more to cancel them, otherwise they may just get stuck. e.g. in io-wq, in poll lists, etc. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 85de42c42433..5bccb235271f 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -992,6 +992,9 @@ enum io_mem_account { ACCT_PINNED, }; +static void __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct task_struct *task); + static void destroy_fixed_file_ref_node(struct fixed_file_ref_node *ref_node); static struct fixed_file_ref_node *alloc_fixed_file_ref_node( struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); @@ -8675,7 +8678,7 @@ static void io_ring_exit_work(struct work_struct *work) * as nobody else will be looking for them. */ do { - io_iopoll_try_reap_events(ctx); + __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, NULL); } while (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ctx->ref_comp, HZ/20)); io_ring_ctx_free(ctx); } @@ -8830,9 +8833,11 @@ static void __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, enum io_wq_cancel cret; bool ret = false; - cret = io_wq_cancel_cb(ctx->io_wq, io_cancel_task_cb, &cancel, true); - if (cret != IO_WQ_CANCEL_NOTFOUND) - ret = true; + if (ctx->io_wq) { + cret = io_wq_cancel_cb(ctx->io_wq, io_cancel_task_cb, + &cancel, true); + ret |= (cret != IO_WQ_CANCEL_NOTFOUND); + } /* SQPOLL thread does its own polling */ if (!(ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL)) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 170b3bbda08852277b97f4f0516df0785c939764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 21:53:40 +0800 Subject: io_uring: Delete useless variable ‘id’ in io_prep_async_work MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fix follow warning: fs/io_uring.c:1523:22: warning: variable ‘id’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] struct io_identity *id; ^~ Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 5bccb235271f..dc92ca5090a3 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1523,10 +1523,8 @@ static void io_prep_async_work(struct io_kiocb *req) { const struct io_op_def *def = &io_op_defs[req->opcode]; struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; - struct io_identity *id; io_req_init_async(req); - id = req->work.identity; if (req->flags & REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC) req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_CONCURRENT; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 3e2224c5867fead6c0b94b84727cc676ac6353a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 16:09:26 +0000 Subject: io_uring: Fix return value from alloc_fixed_file_ref_node alloc_fixed_file_ref_node() currently returns an ERR_PTR on failure. io_sqe_files_unregister() expects it to return NULL and since it can only return -ENOMEM, it makes more sense to change alloc_fixed_file_ref_node() to behave that way. Fixes: 1ffc54220c44 ("io_uring: fix io_sqe_files_unregister() hangs") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index dc92ca5090a3..27a8c226abf8 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -7696,12 +7696,12 @@ static struct fixed_file_ref_node *alloc_fixed_file_ref_node( ref_node = kzalloc(sizeof(*ref_node), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ref_node) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + return NULL; if (percpu_ref_init(&ref_node->refs, io_file_data_ref_zero, 0, GFP_KERNEL)) { kfree(ref_node); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + return NULL; } INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ref_node->node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ref_node->file_list); @@ -7795,9 +7795,9 @@ static int io_sqe_files_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg, } ref_node = alloc_fixed_file_ref_node(ctx); - if (IS_ERR(ref_node)) { + if (!ref_node) { io_sqe_files_unregister(ctx); - return PTR_ERR(ref_node); + return -ENOMEM; } io_sqe_files_set_node(file_data, ref_node); @@ -7897,8 +7897,8 @@ static int __io_sqe_files_update(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, return -EINVAL; ref_node = alloc_fixed_file_ref_node(ctx); - if (IS_ERR(ref_node)) - return PTR_ERR(ref_node); + if (!ref_node) + return -ENOMEM; done = 0; fds = u64_to_user_ptr(up->fds); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 3d1a90ab0ed93362ec8ac85cf291243c87260c21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Wysochanski Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 05:12:51 -0500 Subject: NFS4: Fix use-after-free in trace_event_raw_event_nfs4_set_lock It is only safe to call the tracepoint before rpc_put_task() because 'data' is freed inside nfs4_lock_release (rpc_release). Fixes: 48c9579a1afe ("Adding stateid information to tracepoints") Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index 0ce04e0e5d82..14acd2f79107 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -7111,9 +7111,9 @@ static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *f data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret); } else data->cancelled = true; + trace_nfs4_set_lock(fl, state, &data->res.stateid, cmd, ret); rpc_put_task(task); dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret); - trace_nfs4_set_lock(fl, state, &data->res.stateid, cmd, ret); return ret; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 80c18e4ac20c9cde420cb3ffab48c936147cf07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 03:15:41 +0000 Subject: io_uring: trigger eventfd for IOPOLL Make sure io_iopoll_complete() tries to wake up eventfd, which currently is skipped together with io_cqring_ev_posted() for non-SQPOLL IOPOLL. Add an iopoll version of io_cqring_ev_posted(), duplicates a bit of code, but they actually use different sets of wait queues may be for better. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 27a8c226abf8..91e517ad1421 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1713,6 +1713,16 @@ static void io_cqring_ev_posted(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); } +static void io_cqring_ev_posted_iopoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { + if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->wait)) + wake_up(&ctx->wait); + } + if (io_should_trigger_evfd(ctx)) + eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); +} + /* Returns true if there are no backlogged entries after the flush */ static bool __io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, struct task_struct *tsk, @@ -2428,8 +2438,7 @@ static void io_iopoll_complete(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned int *nr_events, } io_commit_cqring(ctx); - if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) - io_cqring_ev_posted(ctx); + io_cqring_ev_posted_iopoll(ctx); io_req_free_batch_finish(ctx, &rb); if (!list_empty(&again)) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4aa84f2ffa81f71e15e5cffc2cc6090dbee78f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 03:15:42 +0000 Subject: io_uring: dont kill fasync under completion_lock CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&new->fa_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&ctx->completion_lock); lock(&new->fa_lock); lock(&ctx->completion_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Move kill_fasync() out of io_commit_cqring() to io_cqring_ev_posted(), so it doesn't hold completion_lock while doing it. That saves from the reported deadlock, and it's just nice to shorten the locking time and untangle nested locks (compl_lock -> wq_head::lock). Reported-by: syzbot+91ca3f25bd7f795f019c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 91e517ad1421..401316fe2ae2 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1345,11 +1345,6 @@ static void __io_commit_cqring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) /* order cqe stores with ring update */ smp_store_release(&rings->cq.tail, ctx->cached_cq_tail); - - if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->cq_wait)) { - wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->cq_wait); - kill_fasync(&ctx->cq_fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - } } static void io_put_identity(struct io_uring_task *tctx, struct io_kiocb *req) @@ -1711,6 +1706,10 @@ static void io_cqring_ev_posted(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) wake_up(&ctx->sq_data->wait); if (io_should_trigger_evfd(ctx)) eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); + if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->cq_wait)) { + wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->cq_wait); + kill_fasync(&ctx->cq_fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + } } static void io_cqring_ev_posted_iopoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) @@ -1721,6 +1720,10 @@ static void io_cqring_ev_posted_iopoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) } if (io_should_trigger_evfd(ctx)) eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); + if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->cq_wait)) { + wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->cq_wait); + kill_fasync(&ctx->cq_fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + } } /* Returns true if there are no backlogged entries after the flush */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b1445e59cc9a10fdb8f83810ae1f4feb941ab36b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 03:15:43 +0000 Subject: io_uring: synchronise ev_posted() with waitqueues waitqueue_active() needs smp_mb() to be in sync with waitqueues modification, but we miss it in io_cqring_ev_posted*() apart from cq_wait() case. Take an smb_mb() out of wq_has_sleeper() making it waitqueue_active(), and place it a few lines before, so it can synchronise other waitqueue_active() as well. The patch doesn't add any additional overhead, so even if there are no problems currently, it's just safer to have it this way. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 401316fe2ae2..cb57e0360fcb 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1700,13 +1700,16 @@ static inline unsigned __io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) static void io_cqring_ev_posted(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { + /* see waitqueue_active() comment */ + smp_mb(); + if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->wait)) wake_up(&ctx->wait); if (ctx->sq_data && waitqueue_active(&ctx->sq_data->wait)) wake_up(&ctx->sq_data->wait); if (io_should_trigger_evfd(ctx)) eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); - if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->cq_wait)) { + if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->cq_wait)) { wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->cq_wait); kill_fasync(&ctx->cq_fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } @@ -1714,13 +1717,16 @@ static void io_cqring_ev_posted(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) static void io_cqring_ev_posted_iopoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { + /* see waitqueue_active() comment */ + smp_mb(); + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->wait)) wake_up(&ctx->wait); } if (io_should_trigger_evfd(ctx)) eventfd_signal(ctx->cq_ev_fd, 1); - if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->cq_wait)) { + if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->cq_wait)) { wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->cq_wait); kill_fasync(&ctx->cq_fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 71008734d27f2276fcef23a5e546d358430f2d52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:18:44 -0500 Subject: btrfs: print the actual offset in btrfs_root_name We're supposed to print the root_key.offset in btrfs_root_name in the case of a reloc root, not the objectid. Fix this helper to take the key so we have access to the offset when we need it. Fixes: 457f1864b569 ("btrfs: pretty print leaked root name") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 2 +- fs/btrfs/print-tree.c | 10 +++++----- fs/btrfs/print-tree.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index 1dfd4b2d0e1e..6b35b7e88136 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -1457,7 +1457,7 @@ void btrfs_check_leaked_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) root = list_first_entry(&fs_info->allocated_roots, struct btrfs_root, leak_list); btrfs_err(fs_info, "leaked root %s refcount %d", - btrfs_root_name(root->root_key.objectid, buf), + btrfs_root_name(&root->root_key, buf), refcount_read(&root->refs)); while (refcount_read(&root->refs) > 1) btrfs_put_root(root); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c index fe5e0026129d..aae1027bd76a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c @@ -26,22 +26,22 @@ static const struct root_name_map root_map[] = { { BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID, "DATA_RELOC_TREE" }, }; -const char *btrfs_root_name(u64 objectid, char *buf) +const char *btrfs_root_name(const struct btrfs_key *key, char *buf) { int i; - if (objectid == BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID) { + if (key->objectid == BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID) { snprintf(buf, BTRFS_ROOT_NAME_BUF_LEN, - "TREE_RELOC offset=%llu", objectid); + "TREE_RELOC offset=%llu", key->offset); return buf; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(root_map); i++) { - if (root_map[i].id == objectid) + if (root_map[i].id == key->objectid) return root_map[i].name; } - snprintf(buf, BTRFS_ROOT_NAME_BUF_LEN, "%llu", objectid); + snprintf(buf, BTRFS_ROOT_NAME_BUF_LEN, "%llu", key->objectid); return buf; } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.h b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.h index 78b99385a503..8c3e9319ec4e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.h @@ -11,6 +11,6 @@ void btrfs_print_leaf(struct extent_buffer *l); void btrfs_print_tree(struct extent_buffer *c, bool follow); -const char *btrfs_root_name(u64 objectid, char *buf); +const char *btrfs_root_name(const struct btrfs_key *key, char *buf); #endif -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 29b665cc51e8b602bf2a275734349494776e3dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Su Yue Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2021 17:28:03 +0800 Subject: btrfs: prevent NULL pointer dereference in extent_io_tree_panic Some extent io trees are initialized with NULL private member (e.g. btrfs_device::alloc_state and btrfs_fs_info::excluded_extents). Dereference of a NULL tree->private as inode pointer will cause panic. Pass tree->fs_info as it's known to be valid in all cases. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208929 Fixes: 05912a3c04eb ("btrfs: drop extent_io_ops::tree_fs_info callback") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain Signed-off-by: Su Yue Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index 6e3b72e63e42..c9cee458e001 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -676,9 +676,7 @@ alloc_extent_state_atomic(struct extent_state *prealloc) static void extent_io_tree_panic(struct extent_io_tree *tree, int err) { - struct inode *inode = tree->private_data; - - btrfs_panic(btrfs_sb(inode->i_sb), err, + btrfs_panic(tree->fs_info, err, "locking error: extent tree was modified by another thread while locked"); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 347fb0cfc9bab5195c6701e62eda488310d7938f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Su Yue Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2021 17:28:04 +0800 Subject: btrfs: tree-checker: check if chunk item end overflows While mounting a crafted image provided by user, kernel panics due to the invalid chunk item whose end is less than start. [66.387422] loop: module loaded [66.389773] loop0: detected capacity change from 262144 to 0 [66.427708] BTRFS: device fsid a62e00e8-e94e-4200-8217-12444de93c2e devid 1 transid 12 /dev/loop0 scanned by mount (613) [66.431061] BTRFS info (device loop0): disk space caching is enabled [66.431078] BTRFS info (device loop0): has skinny extents [66.437101] BTRFS error: insert state: end < start 29360127 37748736 [66.437136] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [66.437140] WARNING: CPU: 16 PID: 613 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:557 insert_state.cold+0x1a/0x46 [btrfs] [66.437369] CPU: 16 PID: 613 Comm: mount Tainted: G O 5.11.0-rc1-custom #45 [66.437374] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014 [66.437378] RIP: 0010:insert_state.cold+0x1a/0x46 [btrfs] [66.437420] RSP: 0018:ffff93e5414c3908 EFLAGS: 00010286 [66.437427] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001bfffff RCX: 0000000000000000 [66.437431] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb90d4660 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [66.437434] RBP: ffff93e5414c3938 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [66.437438] R10: ffff93e5414c3658 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ec782d72aa0 [66.437441] R13: ffff8ec78bc71628 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000002400000 [66.437447] FS: 00007f01386a8580(0000) GS:ffff8ec809000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [66.437451] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [66.437455] CR2: 00007f01382fa000 CR3: 0000000109a34000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [66.437460] PKRU: 55555554 [66.437464] Call Trace: [66.437475] set_extent_bit+0x652/0x740 [btrfs] [66.437539] set_extent_bits_nowait+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] [66.437576] add_extent_mapping+0x1e0/0x2f0 [btrfs] [66.437621] read_one_chunk+0x33c/0x420 [btrfs] [66.437674] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a4/0x870 [btrfs] [66.437708] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x18/0x40 [66.437739] open_ctree+0xb32/0x1734 [btrfs] [66.437781] ? bdi_register_va+0x1b/0x20 [66.437788] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 [66.437810] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xeb [btrfs] [66.437854] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x217/0x3b0 [66.437873] legacy_get_tree+0x34/0x60 [66.437880] vfs_get_tree+0x2d/0xc0 [66.437888] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x78/0xc0 [66.437897] vfs_kern_mount+0x13/0x20 [66.437902] btrfs_mount+0x11f/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.437940] ? kfree+0x5ff/0x670 [66.437944] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x217/0x3b0 [66.437962] legacy_get_tree+0x34/0x60 [66.437974] vfs_get_tree+0x2d/0xc0 [66.437983] path_mount+0x48c/0xd30 [66.437998] __x64_sys_mount+0x108/0x140 [66.438011] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x50 [66.438018] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [66.438023] RIP: 0033:0x7f0138827f6e [66.438033] RSP: 002b:00007ffecd79edf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [66.438040] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f013894c264 RCX: 00007f0138827f6e [66.438044] RDX: 00005593a4a41360 RSI: 00005593a4a33690 RDI: 00005593a4a3a6c0 [66.438047] RBP: 00005593a4a33440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [66.438050] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [66.438054] R13: 00005593a4a3a6c0 R14: 00005593a4a41360 R15: 00005593a4a33440 [66.438078] irq event stamp: 18169 [66.438082] hardirqs last enabled at (18175): [] console_unlock+0x4ff/0x5f0 [66.438088] hardirqs last disabled at (18180): [] console_unlock+0x467/0x5f0 [66.438092] softirqs last enabled at (16910): [] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [66.438097] softirqs last disabled at (16905): [] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [66.438103] ---[ end trace e114b111db64298b ]--- [66.438107] BTRFS error: found node 12582912 29360127 on insert of 37748736 29360127 [66.438127] BTRFS critical: panic in extent_io_tree_panic:679: locking error: extent tree was modified by another thread while locked (errno=-17 Object already exists) [66.441069] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [66.441072] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:679! [66.442064] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [66.443018] CPU: 16 PID: 613 Comm: mount Tainted: G W O 5.11.0-rc1-custom #45 [66.444538] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014 [66.446223] RIP: 0010:extent_io_tree_panic.isra.0+0x23/0x25 [btrfs] [66.450878] RSP: 0018:ffff93e5414c3948 EFLAGS: 00010246 [66.451840] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001bfffff RCX: 0000000000000000 [66.453141] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb90d4660 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [66.454445] RBP: ffff93e5414c3948 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [66.455743] R10: ffff93e5414c3658 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ec782d728c0 [66.457055] R13: ffff8ec78bc71628 R14: ffff8ec782d72aa0 R15: 0000000002400000 [66.458356] FS: 00007f01386a8580(0000) GS:ffff8ec809000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [66.459841] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [66.460895] CR2: 00007f01382fa000 CR3: 0000000109a34000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [66.462196] PKRU: 55555554 [66.462692] Call Trace: [66.463139] set_extent_bit.cold+0x30/0x98 [btrfs] [66.464049] set_extent_bits_nowait+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] [66.490466] add_extent_mapping+0x1e0/0x2f0 [btrfs] [66.514097] read_one_chunk+0x33c/0x420 [btrfs] [66.534976] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a4/0x870 [btrfs] [66.555718] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x18/0x40 [66.575758] open_ctree+0xb32/0x1734 [btrfs] [66.595272] ? bdi_register_va+0x1b/0x20 [66.614638] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 [66.633809] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xeb [btrfs] [66.652938] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x217/0x3b0 [66.671925] legacy_get_tree+0x34/0x60 [66.690300] vfs_get_tree+0x2d/0xc0 [66.708221] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x78/0xc0 [66.725808] vfs_kern_mount+0x13/0x20 [66.742730] btrfs_mount+0x11f/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.759350] ? kfree+0x5ff/0x670 [66.775441] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x217/0x3b0 [66.791750] legacy_get_tree+0x34/0x60 [66.807494] vfs_get_tree+0x2d/0xc0 [66.823349] path_mount+0x48c/0xd30 [66.838753] __x64_sys_mount+0x108/0x140 [66.854412] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x50 [66.869673] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [66.885093] RIP: 0033:0x7f0138827f6e [66.945613] RSP: 002b:00007ffecd79edf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [66.977214] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f013894c264 RCX: 00007f0138827f6e [66.994266] RDX: 00005593a4a41360 RSI: 00005593a4a33690 RDI: 00005593a4a3a6c0 [67.011544] RBP: 00005593a4a33440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [67.028836] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [67.045812] R13: 00005593a4a3a6c0 R14: 00005593a4a41360 R15: 00005593a4a33440 [67.216138] ---[ end trace e114b111db64298c ]--- [67.237089] RIP: 0010:extent_io_tree_panic.isra.0+0x23/0x25 [btrfs] [67.325317] RSP: 0018:ffff93e5414c3948 EFLAGS: 00010246 [67.347946] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001bfffff RCX: 0000000000000000 [67.371343] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb90d4660 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [67.394757] RBP: ffff93e5414c3948 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [67.418409] R10: ffff93e5414c3658 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ec782d728c0 [67.441906] R13: ffff8ec78bc71628 R14: ffff8ec782d72aa0 R15: 0000000002400000 [67.465436] FS: 00007f01386a8580(0000) GS:ffff8ec809000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [67.511660] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [67.535047] CR2: 00007f01382fa000 CR3: 0000000109a34000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [67.558449] PKRU: 55555554 [67.581146] note: mount[613] exited with preempt_count 2 The image has a chunk item which has a logical start 37748736 and length 18446744073701163008 (-8M). The calculated end 29360127 overflows. EEXIST was caught by insert_state() because of the duplicate end and extent_io_tree_panic() was called. Add overflow check of chunk item end to tree checker so it can be detected early at mount time. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208929 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain Signed-off-by: Su Yue Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c index 028e733e42f3..582061c7b547 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c @@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ int btrfs_check_chunk_valid(struct extent_buffer *leaf, { struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = leaf->fs_info; u64 length; + u64 chunk_end; u64 stripe_len; u16 num_stripes; u16 sub_stripes; @@ -814,6 +815,12 @@ int btrfs_check_chunk_valid(struct extent_buffer *leaf, "invalid chunk length, have %llu", length); return -EUCLEAN; } + if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(logical, length, &chunk_end))) { + chunk_err(leaf, chunk, logical, +"invalid chunk logical start and length, have logical start %llu length %llu", + logical, length); + return -EUCLEAN; + } if (unlikely(!is_power_of_2(stripe_len) || stripe_len != BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN)) { chunk_err(leaf, chunk, logical, "invalid chunk stripe length: %llu", -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 50e31ef486afe60f128d42fb9620e2a63172c15c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 21:29:34 +0800 Subject: btrfs: reloc: fix wrong file extent type check to avoid false ENOENT MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [BUG] There are several bug reports about recent kernel unable to relocate certain data block groups. Sometimes the error just goes away, but there is one reporter who can reproduce it reliably. The dmesg would look like: [438.260483] BTRFS info (device dm-10): balance: start -dvrange=34625344765952..34625344765953 [438.269018] BTRFS info (device dm-10): relocating block group 34625344765952 flags data|raid1 [450.439609] BTRFS info (device dm-10): found 167 extents, stage: move data extents [463.501781] BTRFS info (device dm-10): balance: ended with status: -2 [CAUSE] The ENOENT error is returned from the following call chain: add_data_references() |- delete_v1_space_cache(); |- if (!found) return -ENOENT; The variable @found is set to true if we find a data extent whose disk bytenr matches parameter @data_bytes. With extra debugging, the offending tree block looks like this: leaf bytenr = 42676709441536, data_bytenr = 34626327621632 ctime 1567904822.739884119 (2019-09-08 03:07:02) mtime 0.0 (1970-01-01 01:00:00) otime 0.0 (1970-01-01 01:00:00) item 27 key (51933 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 9854 itemsize 53 generation 1517381 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 34626327621632 nr 262144 <<< prealloc data offset 0 nr 262144 item 28 key (52262 ROOT_ITEM 0) itemoff 9415 itemsize 439 generation 2618893 root_dirid 256 bytenr 42677048360960 level 3 refs 1 lastsnap 2618893 byte_limit 0 bytes_used 5557338112 flags 0x0(none) uuid d0d4361f-d231-6d40-8901-fe506e4b2b53 Although item 27 has disk bytenr 34626327621632, which matches the data_bytenr, its type is prealloc, not reg. This makes the existing code skip that item, and return ENOENT. [FIX] The code is modified in commit 19b546d7a1b2 ("btrfs: relocation: Use btrfs_find_all_leafs to locate data extent parent tree leaves"), before that commit, we use something like "if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) continue;" But in that offending commit, we use (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG), ignoring BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC. Fix it by also checking BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC. Reported-by: Stéphane Lesimple Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/505cabfa88575ed6dbe7cb922d8914fb@lesimple.fr Fixes: 19b546d7a1b2 ("btrfs: relocation: Use btrfs_find_all_leafs to locate data extent parent tree leaves") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+ Tested-By: Stéphane Lesimple Reviewed-by: Su Yue Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c index 19b7db8b2117..df63ef64c5c0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c @@ -2975,11 +2975,16 @@ static int delete_v1_space_cache(struct extent_buffer *leaf, return 0; for (i = 0; i < btrfs_header_nritems(leaf); i++) { + u8 type; + btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, i); if (key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) continue; ei = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, i, struct btrfs_file_extent_item); - if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, ei) == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG && + type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, ei); + + if ((type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG || + type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) && btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, ei) == data_bytenr) { found = true; space_cache_ino = key.objectid; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 04a6a536bc3fd1436fc78c546c6b3ecdccbfaf6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Satya Tangirala Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2020 04:49:54 +0000 Subject: fs: Fix freeze_bdev()/thaw_bdev() accounting of bd_fsfreeze_sb freeze/thaw_bdev() currently use bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count to infer whether or not bdev->bd_fsfreeze_sb is valid (it's valid iff bd_fsfreeze_count is non-zero). thaw_bdev() doesn't nullify bd_fsfreeze_sb. But this means a freeze_bdev() call followed by a thaw_bdev() call can leave bd_fsfreeze_sb with a non-null value, while bd_fsfreeze_count is zero. If freeze_bdev() is called again, and this time get_active_super() returns NULL (e.g. because the FS is unmounted), we'll end up with bd_fsfreeze_count > 0, but bd_fsfreeze_sb is *untouched* - it stays the same (now garbage) value. A subsequent thaw_bdev() will decide that the bd_fsfreeze_sb value is legitimate (since bd_fsfreeze_count > 0), and attempt to use it. Fix this by always setting bd_fsfreeze_sb to NULL when bd_fsfreeze_count is successfully decremented to 0 in thaw_sb(). Alternatively, we could set bd_fsfreeze_sb to whatever get_active_super() returns in freeze_bdev() whenever bd_fsfreeze_count is successfully incremented to 1 from 0 (which can be achieved cleanly by moving the line currently setting bd_fsfreeze_sb to immediately after the "sync:" label, but it might be a little too subtle/easily overlooked in future). This fixes the currently panicking xfstests generic/085. Fixes: 040f04bd2e82 ("fs: simplify freeze_bdev/thaw_bdev") Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/block_dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 3e5b02f6606c..e454c5a81043 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -605,6 +605,8 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev) error = thaw_super(sb); if (error) bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count++; + else + bdev->bd_fsfreeze_sb = NULL; out: mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex); return error; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2d2f6f1b4799428d160c021dd652bc3e3593945e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 19:36:40 +0100 Subject: block: pre-initialize struct block_device in bdev_alloc_inode bdev_evict_inode and bdev_free_inode are also called for the root inode of bdevfs, for which bdev_alloc is never called. Move the zeroing o f struct block_device and the initialization of the bd_bdi field into bdev_alloc_inode to make sure they are initialized for the root inode as well. Fixes: e6cb53827ed6 ("block: initialize struct block_device in bdev_alloc") Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/block_dev.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index e454c5a81043..3b8963e228a1 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -776,8 +776,11 @@ static struct kmem_cache * bdev_cachep __read_mostly; static struct inode *bdev_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) { struct bdev_inode *ei = kmem_cache_alloc(bdev_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ei) return NULL; + memset(&ei->bdev, 0, sizeof(ei->bdev)); + ei->bdev.bd_bdi = &noop_backing_dev_info; return &ei->vfs_inode; } @@ -871,14 +874,12 @@ struct block_device *bdev_alloc(struct gendisk *disk, u8 partno) mapping_set_gfp_mask(&inode->i_data, GFP_USER); bdev = I_BDEV(inode); - memset(bdev, 0, sizeof(*bdev)); mutex_init(&bdev->bd_mutex); mutex_init(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex); spin_lock_init(&bdev->bd_size_lock); bdev->bd_disk = disk; bdev->bd_partno = partno; bdev->bd_inode = inode; - bdev->bd_bdi = &noop_backing_dev_info; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bdev->bd_holder_disks); #endif -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e076ab2a2ca70a0270232067cd49f76cd92efe64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 17:08:30 -0500 Subject: btrfs: shrink delalloc pages instead of full inodes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Commit 38d715f494f2 ("btrfs: use btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in shrink_delalloc") cleaned up how we do delalloc shrinking by utilizing some infrastructure we have in place to flush inodes that we use for device replace and snapshot. However this introduced a pretty serious performance regression. To reproduce the user untarred the source tarball of Firefox (360MiB xz compressed/1.5GiB uncompressed), and would see it take anywhere from 5 to 20 times as long to untar in 5.10 compared to 5.9. This was observed on fast devices (SSD and better) and not on HDD. The root cause is because before we would generally use the normal writeback path to reclaim delalloc space, and for this we would provide it with the number of pages we wanted to flush. The referenced commit changed this to flush that many inodes, which drastically increased the amount of space we were flushing in certain cases, which severely affected performance. We cannot revert this patch unfortunately because of 3d45f221ce62 ("btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extent and low on free metadata space") which requires the ability to skip flushing inodes that are being cloned in certain scenarios, which means we need to keep using our flushing infrastructure or risk re-introducing the deadlock. Instead to fix this problem we can go back to providing btrfs_start_delalloc_roots with a number of pages to flush, and then set up a writeback_control and utilize sync_inode() to handle the flushing for us. This gives us the same behavior we had prior to the fix, while still allowing us to avoid the deadlock that was fixed by Filipe. I redid the users original test and got the following results on one of our test machines (256GiB of ram, 56 cores, 2TiB Intel NVMe drive) 5.9 0m54.258s 5.10 1m26.212s 5.10+patch 0m38.800s 5.10+patch is significantly faster than plain 5.9 because of my patch series "Change data reservations to use the ticketing infra" which contained the patch that introduced the regression, but generally improved the overall ENOSPC flushing mechanisms. Additional testing on consumer-grade SSD (8GiB ram, 8 CPU) confirm the results: 5.10.5 4m00s 5.10.5+patch 1m08s 5.11-rc2 5m14s 5.11-rc2+patch 1m30s Reported-by: René Rebe Fixes: 38d715f494f2 ("btrfs: use btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in shrink_delalloc") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Tested-by: David Sterba Reviewed-by: David Sterba [ add my test results ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- fs/btrfs/space-info.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index 070716650df8..a8e0a6b038d3 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9390,7 +9390,8 @@ static struct btrfs_delalloc_work *btrfs_alloc_delalloc_work(struct inode *inode * some fairly slow code that needs optimization. This walks the list * of all the inodes with pending delalloc and forces them to disk. */ -static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot, +static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, + struct writeback_control *wbc, bool snapshot, bool in_reclaim_context) { struct btrfs_inode *binode; @@ -9399,6 +9400,7 @@ static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot struct list_head works; struct list_head splice; int ret = 0; + bool full_flush = wbc->nr_to_write == LONG_MAX; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&works); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&splice); @@ -9427,18 +9429,24 @@ static int start_delalloc_inodes(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 *nr, bool snapshot if (snapshot) set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_SNAPSHOT_FLUSH, &binode->runtime_flags); - work = btrfs_alloc_delalloc_work(inode); - if (!work) { - iput(inode); - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - list_add_tail(&work->list, &works); - btrfs_queue_work(root->fs_info->flush_workers, - &work->work); - if (*nr != U64_MAX) { - (*nr)--; - if (*nr == 0) + if (full_flush) { + work = btrfs_alloc_delalloc_work(inode); + if (!work) { + iput(inode); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + list_add_tail(&work->list, &works); + btrfs_queue_work(root->fs_info->flush_workers, + &work->work); + } else { + ret = sync_inode(inode, wbc); + if (!ret && + test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_HAS_ASYNC_EXTENT, + &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags)) + ret = sync_inode(inode, wbc); + btrfs_add_delayed_iput(inode); + if (ret || wbc->nr_to_write <= 0) goto out; } cond_resched(); @@ -9464,18 +9472,29 @@ out: int btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root) { + struct writeback_control wbc = { + .nr_to_write = LONG_MAX, + .sync_mode = WB_SYNC_NONE, + .range_start = 0, + .range_end = LLONG_MAX, + }; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info; - u64 nr = U64_MAX; if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state)) return -EROFS; - return start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, true, false); + return start_delalloc_inodes(root, &wbc, true, false); } int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr, bool in_reclaim_context) { + struct writeback_control wbc = { + .nr_to_write = (nr == U64_MAX) ? LONG_MAX : (unsigned long)nr, + .sync_mode = WB_SYNC_NONE, + .range_start = 0, + .range_end = LLONG_MAX, + }; struct btrfs_root *root; struct list_head splice; int ret; @@ -9489,6 +9508,13 @@ int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr, spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock); list_splice_init(&fs_info->delalloc_roots, &splice); while (!list_empty(&splice) && nr) { + /* + * Reset nr_to_write here so we know that we're doing a full + * flush. + */ + if (nr == U64_MAX) + wbc.nr_to_write = LONG_MAX; + root = list_first_entry(&splice, struct btrfs_root, delalloc_root); root = btrfs_grab_root(root); @@ -9497,9 +9523,9 @@ int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 nr, &fs_info->delalloc_roots); spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock); - ret = start_delalloc_inodes(root, &nr, false, in_reclaim_context); + ret = start_delalloc_inodes(root, &wbc, false, in_reclaim_context); btrfs_put_root(root); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0 || wbc.nr_to_write <= 0) goto out; spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c index 67e55c5479b8..e8347461c8dd 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c @@ -532,7 +532,9 @@ static void shrink_delalloc(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, loops = 0; while ((delalloc_bytes || dio_bytes) && loops < 3) { - btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, items, true); + u64 nr_pages = min(delalloc_bytes, to_reclaim) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(fs_info, nr_pages, true); loops++; if (wait_ordered && !trans) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ef0ba05538299f1391cbe097de36895bb36ecfe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 09:43:54 -0800 Subject: poll: fix performance regression due to out-of-line __put_user() The kernel test robot reported a -5.8% performance regression on the "poll2" test of will-it-scale, and bisected it to commit d55564cfc222 ("x86: Make __put_user() generate an out-of-line call"). I didn't expect an out-of-line __put_user() to matter, because no normal core code should use that non-checking legacy version of user access any more. But I had overlooked the very odd poll() usage, which does a __put_user() to update the 'revents' values of the poll array. Now, Al Viro correctly points out that instead of updating just the 'revents' field, it would be much simpler to just copy the _whole_ pollfd entry, and then we could just use "copy_to_user()" on the whole array of entries, the same way we use "copy_from_user()" a few lines earlier to get the original values. But that is not what we've traditionally done, and I worry that threaded applications might be concurrently modifying the other fields of the pollfd array. So while Al's suggestion is simpler - and perhaps worth trying in the future - this instead keeps the "just update revents" model. To fix the performance regression, use the modern "unsafe_put_user()" instead of __put_user(), with the proper "user_write_access_begin()" guarding in place. This improves code generation enormously. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210107134723.GA28532@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: kernel test robot Tested-by: Oliver Sang Cc: Al Viro Cc: David Laight Cc: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/select.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/select.c b/fs/select.c index ebfebdfe5c69..37aaa8317f3a 100644 --- a/fs/select.c +++ b/fs/select.c @@ -1011,14 +1011,17 @@ static int do_sys_poll(struct pollfd __user *ufds, unsigned int nfds, fdcount = do_poll(head, &table, end_time); poll_freewait(&table); + if (!user_write_access_begin(ufds, nfds * sizeof(*ufds))) + goto out_fds; + for (walk = head; walk; walk = walk->next) { struct pollfd *fds = walk->entries; int j; - for (j = 0; j < walk->len; j++, ufds++) - if (__put_user(fds[j].revents, &ufds->revents)) - goto out_fds; + for (j = walk->len; j; fds++, ufds++, j--) + unsafe_put_user(fds->revents, &ufds->revents, Efault); } + user_write_access_end(); err = fdcount; out_fds: @@ -1030,6 +1033,11 @@ out_fds: } return err; + +Efault: + user_write_access_end(); + err = -EFAULT; + goto out_fds; } static long do_restart_poll(struct restart_block *restart_block) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 55e6ac1e1f31c7f678d9f3c8d54c6f102e5f1550 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 20:57:22 +0000 Subject: io_uring: io_rw_reissue lockdep annotations We expect io_rw_reissue() to take place only during submission with uring_lock held. Add a lockdep annotation to check that invariant. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index cb57e0360fcb..55ba1922a349 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2692,6 +2692,8 @@ static bool io_rw_reissue(struct io_kiocb *req, long res) if ((res != -EAGAIN && res != -EOPNOTSUPP) || io_wq_current_is_worker()) return false; + lockdep_assert_held(&req->ctx->uring_lock); + ret = io_sq_thread_acquire_mm_files(req->ctx, req); if (io_resubmit_prep(req, ret)) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4f793dc40bc605b97624fd36baf085b3c35e8bfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 20:57:23 +0000 Subject: io_uring: inline io_uring_attempt_task_drop() A simple preparation change inlining io_uring_attempt_task_drop() into io_uring_flush(). Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 55ba1922a349..1c931e7a3948 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8964,23 +8964,6 @@ static void io_uring_del_task_file(struct file *file) fput(file); } -/* - * Drop task note for this file if we're the only ones that hold it after - * pending fput() - */ -static void io_uring_attempt_task_drop(struct file *file) -{ - if (!current->io_uring) - return; - /* - * fput() is pending, will be 2 if the only other ref is our potential - * task file note. If the task is exiting, drop regardless of count. - */ - if (fatal_signal_pending(current) || (current->flags & PF_EXITING) || - atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) == 2) - io_uring_del_task_file(file); -} - static void io_uring_remove_task_files(struct io_uring_task *tctx) { struct file *file; @@ -9072,7 +9055,17 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) { - io_uring_attempt_task_drop(file); + if (!current->io_uring) + return 0; + + /* + * fput() is pending, will be 2 if the only other ref is our potential + * task file note. If the task is exiting, drop regardless of count. + */ + if (fatal_signal_pending(current) || (current->flags & PF_EXITING) || + atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) == 2) + io_uring_del_task_file(file); + return 0; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 6b5733eb638b7068ab7cb34e663b55a1d1892d85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 20:57:24 +0000 Subject: io_uring: add warn_once for io_uring_flush() files_cancel() should cancel all relevant requests and drop file notes, so we should never have file notes after that, including on-exit fput and flush. Add a WARN_ONCE to be sure. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 1c931e7a3948..f39671a0d84f 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9055,17 +9055,23 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) { - if (!current->io_uring) + struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; + + if (!tctx) return 0; + /* we should have cancelled and erased it before PF_EXITING */ + WARN_ON_ONCE((current->flags & PF_EXITING) && + xa_load(&tctx->xa, (unsigned long)file)); + /* * fput() is pending, will be 2 if the only other ref is our potential * task file note. If the task is exiting, drop regardless of count. */ - if (fatal_signal_pending(current) || (current->flags & PF_EXITING) || - atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) == 2) - io_uring_del_task_file(file); + if (atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) != 2) + return 0; + io_uring_del_task_file(file); return 0; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From d9d05217cb6990b9a56e13b56e7a1b71e2551f6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 20:57:25 +0000 Subject: io_uring: stop SQPOLL submit on creator's death When the creator of SQPOLL io_uring dies (i.e. sqo_task), we don't want its internals like ->files and ->mm to be poked by the SQPOLL task, it have never been nice and recently got racy. That can happen when the owner undergoes destruction and SQPOLL tasks tries to submit new requests in parallel, and so calls io_sq_thread_acquire*(). That patch halts SQPOLL submissions when sqo_task dies by introducing sqo_dead flag. Once set, the SQPOLL task must not do any submission, which is synchronised by uring_lock as well as the new flag. The tricky part is to make sure that disabling always happens, that means either the ring is discovered by creator's do_exit() -> cancel, or if the final close() happens before it's done by the creator. The last is guaranteed by the fact that for SQPOLL the creator task and only it holds exactly one file note, so either it pins up to do_exit() or removed by the creator on the final put in flush. (see comments in uring_flush() around file->f_count == 2). One more place that can trigger io_sq_thread_acquire_*() is __io_req_task_submit(). Shoot off requests on sqo_dead there, even though actually we don't need to. That's because cancellation of sqo_task should wait for the request before going any further. note 1: io_disable_sqo_submit() does io_ring_set_wakeup_flag() so the caller would enter the ring to get an error, but it still doesn't guarantee that the flag won't be cleared. note 2: if final __userspace__ close happens not from the creator task, the file note will pin the ring until the task dies. Fixed: b1b6b5a30dce8 ("kernel/io_uring: cancel io_uring before task works") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index f39671a0d84f..2f305c097bd5 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx { unsigned int drain_next: 1; unsigned int eventfd_async: 1; unsigned int restricted: 1; + unsigned int sqo_dead: 1; /* * Ring buffer of indices into array of io_uring_sqe, which is @@ -2160,12 +2161,11 @@ static void io_req_task_cancel(struct callback_head *cb) static void __io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req) { struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; - bool fail; - fail = __io_sq_thread_acquire_mm(ctx) || - __io_sq_thread_acquire_files(ctx); mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); - if (!fail) + if (!ctx->sqo_dead && + !__io_sq_thread_acquire_mm(ctx) && + !__io_sq_thread_acquire_files(ctx)) __io_queue_sqe(req, NULL); else __io_req_task_cancel(req, -EFAULT); @@ -6954,7 +6954,8 @@ static int __io_sq_thread(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool cap_entries) if (!list_empty(&ctx->iopoll_list)) io_do_iopoll(ctx, &nr_events, 0); - if (to_submit && likely(!percpu_ref_is_dying(&ctx->refs))) + if (to_submit && !ctx->sqo_dead && + likely(!percpu_ref_is_dying(&ctx->refs))) ret = io_submit_sqes(ctx, to_submit); mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); } @@ -8712,6 +8713,10 @@ static void io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); percpu_ref_kill(&ctx->refs); + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && !ctx->sqo_dead)) + ctx->sqo_dead = 1; + /* if force is set, the ring is going away. always drop after that */ ctx->cq_overflow_flushed = 1; if (ctx->rings) @@ -8874,6 +8879,18 @@ static void __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } } +static void io_disable_sqo_submit(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task != current); + + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); + ctx->sqo_dead = 1; + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + + /* make sure callers enter the ring to get error */ + io_ring_set_wakeup_flag(ctx); +} + /* * We need to iteratively cancel requests, in case a request has dependent * hard links. These persist even for failure of cancelations, hence keep @@ -8885,6 +8902,8 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct task_struct *task = current; if ((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && ctx->sq_data) { + /* for SQPOLL only sqo_task has task notes */ + io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); task = ctx->sq_data->thread; atomic_inc(&task->io_uring->in_idle); io_sq_thread_park(ctx->sq_data); @@ -9056,6 +9075,7 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) { struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; if (!tctx) return 0; @@ -9071,7 +9091,16 @@ static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) if (atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) != 2) return 0; - io_uring_del_task_file(file); + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { + /* there is only one file note, which is owned by sqo_task */ + WARN_ON_ONCE((ctx->sqo_task == current) == + !xa_load(&tctx->xa, (unsigned long)file)); + + io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); + } + + if (!(ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) || ctx->sqo_task == current) + io_uring_del_task_file(file); return 0; } @@ -9145,8 +9174,9 @@ static unsigned long io_uring_nommu_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, #endif /* !CONFIG_MMU */ -static void io_sqpoll_wait_sq(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +static int io_sqpoll_wait_sq(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { + int ret = 0; DEFINE_WAIT(wait); do { @@ -9155,6 +9185,11 @@ static void io_sqpoll_wait_sq(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) prepare_to_wait(&ctx->sqo_sq_wait, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + if (unlikely(ctx->sqo_dead)) { + ret = -EOWNERDEAD; + goto out; + } + if (!io_sqring_full(ctx)) break; @@ -9162,6 +9197,8 @@ static void io_sqpoll_wait_sq(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) } while (!signal_pending(current)); finish_wait(&ctx->sqo_sq_wait, &wait); +out: + return ret; } static int io_get_ext_arg(unsigned flags, const void __user *argp, size_t *argsz, @@ -9235,10 +9272,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(io_uring_enter, unsigned int, fd, u32, to_submit, if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL); + ret = -EOWNERDEAD; + if (unlikely(ctx->sqo_dead)) + goto out; if (flags & IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAKEUP) wake_up(&ctx->sq_data->wait); - if (flags & IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAIT) - io_sqpoll_wait_sq(ctx); + if (flags & IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAIT) { + ret = io_sqpoll_wait_sq(ctx); + if (ret) + goto out; + } submitted = to_submit; } else if (to_submit) { ret = io_uring_add_task_file(ctx, f.file); @@ -9665,6 +9708,7 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, trace_io_uring_create(ret, ctx, p->sq_entries, p->cq_entries, p->flags); return ret; err: + io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill(ctx); return ret; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c98e9daa59a611ff4e163689815f40380c912415 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Scott Mayhew Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 08:54:32 -0500 Subject: NFS: Adjust fs_context error logging Several existing dprink()/dfprintk() calls were converted to use the new mount API logging macros by commit ce8866f0913f ("NFS: Attach supplementary error information to fs_context"). If the fs_context was not created using fsopen() then it will not have had a log buffer allocated for it, and the new mount API logging macros will wind up calling printk(). This can result in syslog messages being logged where previously there were none... most notably "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path", which can happen if the client is auto-negotiating a protocol version with an NFS server that doesn't support the higher v4.x versions. Convert the nfs_errorf(), nfs_invalf(), and nfs_warnf() macros to check for the existence of the fs_context's log buffer and call dprintk() if it doesn't exist. Add nfs_ferrorf(), nfs_finvalf(), and nfs_warnf(), which do the same thing but take an NFS debug flag as an argument and call dfprintk(). Finally, modify the "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path" message to use nfs_ferrorf(). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207385 Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington Fixes: ce8866f0913f ("NFS: Attach supplementary error information to fs_context.") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/internal.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/nfs/nfs4super.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h index b840d0a91c9d..6bdee7ab3a6c 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/internal.h +++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h @@ -136,9 +136,29 @@ struct nfs_fs_context { } clone_data; }; -#define nfs_errorf(fc, fmt, ...) errorf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) -#define nfs_invalf(fc, fmt, ...) invalf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) -#define nfs_warnf(fc, fmt, ...) warnf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) +#define nfs_errorf(fc, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + errorf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dprintk(fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); })) + +#define nfs_ferrorf(fc, fac, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + errorf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dfprintk(fac, fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); })) + +#define nfs_invalf(fc, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + invalf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dprintk(fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); -EINVAL; })) + +#define nfs_finvalf(fc, fac, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + invalf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dfprintk(fac, fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); -EINVAL; })) + +#define nfs_warnf(fc, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + warnf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dprintk(fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); })) + +#define nfs_fwarnf(fc, fac, fmt, ...) ((fc)->log.log ? \ + warnf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__) : \ + ({ dfprintk(fac, fmt "\n", ## __VA_ARGS__); })) static inline struct nfs_fs_context *nfs_fc2context(const struct fs_context *fc) { diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c index 984cc42ee54d..d09bcfd7db89 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ int nfs4_try_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) fc, ctx->nfs_server.hostname, ctx->nfs_server.export_path); if (err) { - nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path"); + nfs_ferrorf(fc, MOUNT, "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path"); dfprintk(MOUNT, "<-- nfs4_try_get_tree() = %d [error]\n", err); } else { dfprintk(MOUNT, "<-- nfs4_try_get_tree() = 0\n"); @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int nfs4_get_referral_tree(struct fs_context *fc) fc, ctx->nfs_server.hostname, ctx->nfs_server.export_path); if (err) { - nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path"); + nfs_ferrorf(fc, MOUNT, "NFS4: Couldn't follow remote path"); dfprintk(MOUNT, "<-- nfs4_get_referral_tree() = %d [error]\n", err); } else { dfprintk(MOUNT, "<-- nfs4_get_referral_tree() = 0\n"); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 67bbceedc9bb8ad48993a8bd6486054756d711f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 13:35:46 -0500 Subject: pNFS: Mark layout for return if return-on-close was not sent If the layout return-on-close failed because the layoutreturn was never sent, then we should mark the layout for return again. Fixes: 9c47b18cf722 ("pNFS: Ensure we do clear the return-on-close layout stateid on fatal errors") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 07f59dc8cb2e..ccc89fab1802 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -1560,12 +1560,18 @@ void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, int ret) { struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo = args->layout; + struct inode *inode = args->inode; const nfs4_stateid *arg_stateid = NULL; const nfs4_stateid *res_stateid = NULL; struct nfs4_xdr_opaque_data *ld_private = args->ld_private; switch (ret) { case -NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT: + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + if (pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo) && + nfs4_stateid_match_other(&args->stateid, &lo->plh_stateid)) + pnfs_set_plh_return_info(lo, args->range.iomode, 0); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); break; case 0: if (res->lrs_present) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 078000d02d57f02dde61de4901f289672e98c8bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 13:18:03 -0500 Subject: pNFS: We want return-on-close to complete when evicting the inode If the inode is being evicted, it should be safe to run return-on-close, so we should do it to ensure we don't inadvertently leak layout segments. Fixes: 1c5bd76d17cc ("pNFS: Enable layoutreturn operation for return-on-close") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 26 ++++++++++---------------- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 8 +++----- fs/nfs/pnfs.h | 8 +++----- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index 14acd2f79107..2f4679a62712 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -3536,10 +3536,8 @@ static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data) trace_nfs4_close(state, &calldata->arg, &calldata->res, task->tk_status); /* Handle Layoutreturn errors */ - if (pnfs_roc_done(task, calldata->inode, - &calldata->arg.lr_args, - &calldata->res.lr_res, - &calldata->res.lr_ret) == -EAGAIN) + if (pnfs_roc_done(task, &calldata->arg.lr_args, &calldata->res.lr_res, + &calldata->res.lr_ret) == -EAGAIN) goto out_restart; /* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing @@ -6384,10 +6382,8 @@ static void nfs4_delegreturn_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata) trace_nfs4_delegreturn_exit(&data->args, &data->res, task->tk_status); /* Handle Layoutreturn errors */ - if (pnfs_roc_done(task, data->inode, - &data->args.lr_args, - &data->res.lr_res, - &data->res.lr_ret) == -EAGAIN) + if (pnfs_roc_done(task, &data->args.lr_args, &data->res.lr_res, + &data->res.lr_ret) == -EAGAIN) goto out_restart; switch (task->tk_status) { @@ -6441,10 +6437,10 @@ static void nfs4_delegreturn_release(void *calldata) struct nfs4_delegreturndata *data = calldata; struct inode *inode = data->inode; + if (data->lr.roc) + pnfs_roc_release(&data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res, + data->res.lr_ret); if (inode) { - if (data->lr.roc) - pnfs_roc_release(&data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res, - data->res.lr_ret); nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc(inode, &data->fattr); nfs_iput_and_deactive(inode); } @@ -6520,16 +6516,14 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_delegreturn(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, nfs_fattr_init(data->res.fattr); data->timestamp = jiffies; data->rpc_status = 0; - data->lr.roc = pnfs_roc(inode, &data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res, cred); data->inode = nfs_igrab_and_active(inode); - if (data->inode) { + if (data->inode || issync) { + data->lr.roc = pnfs_roc(inode, &data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res, + cred); if (data->lr.roc) { data->args.lr_args = &data->lr.arg; data->res.lr_res = &data->lr.res; } - } else if (data->lr.roc) { - pnfs_roc_release(&data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res, 0); - data->lr.roc = false; } task_setup_data.callback_data = data; diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index ccc89fab1802..a18b1992b2fb 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -1509,10 +1509,8 @@ out_noroc: return false; } -int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *inode, - struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp, - struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, - int *ret) +int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp, + struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, int *ret) { struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *arg = *argpp; int retval = -EAGAIN; @@ -1545,7 +1543,7 @@ int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *inode, return 0; case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID: if (!nfs4_layout_refresh_old_stateid(&arg->stateid, - &arg->range, inode)) + &arg->range, arg->inode)) break; *ret = -NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT; return -EAGAIN; diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.h b/fs/nfs/pnfs.h index bbd3de1025f2..d810ae674f4e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.h +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.h @@ -297,10 +297,8 @@ bool pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res, const struct cred *cred); -int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *inode, - struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp, - struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, - int *ret); +int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp, + struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, int *ret); void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res, int ret); @@ -772,7 +770,7 @@ pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino, } static inline int -pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *inode, +pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, int *ret) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c18d1e17ba2f6a1c9257b0b5d2882a6e3f772673 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 15:01:18 -0500 Subject: pNFS: Clean up pnfs_layoutreturn_free_lsegs() Remove the check for whether or not the stateid is NULL, and fix up the callers. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index a18b1992b2fb..16a37214aba9 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ void pnfs_layoutreturn_free_lsegs(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, LIST_HEAD(freeme); spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo) || !arg_stateid || + if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo) || !nfs4_stateid_match_other(&lo->plh_stateid, arg_stateid)) goto out_unlock; if (stateid) { @@ -1559,7 +1559,6 @@ void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, { struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo = args->layout; struct inode *inode = args->inode; - const nfs4_stateid *arg_stateid = NULL; const nfs4_stateid *res_stateid = NULL; struct nfs4_xdr_opaque_data *ld_private = args->ld_private; @@ -1569,6 +1568,7 @@ void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, if (pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo) && nfs4_stateid_match_other(&args->stateid, &lo->plh_stateid)) pnfs_set_plh_return_info(lo, args->range.iomode, 0); + pnfs_clear_layoutreturn_waitbit(lo); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); break; case 0: @@ -1576,11 +1576,10 @@ void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args, res_stateid = &res->stateid; fallthrough; default: - arg_stateid = &args->stateid; + pnfs_layoutreturn_free_lsegs(lo, &args->stateid, &args->range, + res_stateid); } trace_nfs4_layoutreturn_on_close(args->inode, &args->stateid, ret); - pnfs_layoutreturn_free_lsegs(lo, arg_stateid, &args->range, - res_stateid); if (ld_private && ld_private->ops && ld_private->ops->free) ld_private->ops->free(ld_private); pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2c8d5fc37fe2384a9bdb6965443ab9224d46f704 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 06:43:45 -0500 Subject: pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn If a layout return is in progress, we should wait for it to complete, in case the layout segment we are picking up gets returned too. Fixes: 30cb3ee299cb ("pNFS: Handle NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID on layoutreturn by bumping the state seqid") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 16a37214aba9..fc13a3c8bc48 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2018,6 +2018,27 @@ lookup_again: goto lookup_again; } + /* + * Because we free lsegs when sending LAYOUTRETURN, we need to wait + * for LAYOUTRETURN. + */ + if (test_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN, &lo->plh_flags)) { + spin_unlock(&ino->i_lock); + dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__); + lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo)); + if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) { + pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); + dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__); + trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, + lseg, + PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY); + goto lookup_again; + } + trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, + PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETURN); + goto out_put_layout_hdr; + } + lseg = pnfs_find_lseg(lo, &arg, strict_iomode); if (lseg) { trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, @@ -2070,28 +2091,6 @@ lookup_again: nfs4_stateid_copy(&stateid, &lo->plh_stateid); } - /* - * Because we free lsegs before sending LAYOUTRETURN, we need to wait - * for LAYOUTRETURN even if first is true. - */ - if (test_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN, &lo->plh_flags)) { - spin_unlock(&ino->i_lock); - dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__); - lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo)); - if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) { - if (first) - pnfs_clear_first_layoutget(lo); - pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); - dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__); - trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, - lseg, PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY); - goto lookup_again; - } - trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, - PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETURN); - goto out_put_layout_hdr; - } - if (pnfs_layoutgets_blocked(lo)) { trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_BLOCKED); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1757655d780d9d29bc4b60e708342e94924f7ef3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: NFS/pNFS: Don't call pnfs_free_bucket_lseg() before removing the request In pnfs_generic_clear_request_commit(), we try calling pnfs_free_bucket_lseg() before we remove the request from the DS bucket. That will always fail, since the point is to test for whether or not that bucket is empty. Fixes: c84bea59449a ("NFS/pNFS: Simplify bucket layout segment reference counting") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c | 14 +++++--------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c index 2efcfdd348a1..df20bbe8d15e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c @@ -78,22 +78,18 @@ void pnfs_generic_clear_request_commit(struct nfs_page *req, struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo) { - struct pnfs_layout_segment *freeme = NULL; + struct pnfs_commit_bucket *bucket = NULL; if (!test_and_clear_bit(PG_COMMIT_TO_DS, &req->wb_flags)) goto out; cinfo->ds->nwritten--; - if (list_is_singular(&req->wb_list)) { - struct pnfs_commit_bucket *bucket; - + if (list_is_singular(&req->wb_list)) bucket = list_first_entry(&req->wb_list, - struct pnfs_commit_bucket, - written); - freeme = pnfs_free_bucket_lseg(bucket); - } + struct pnfs_commit_bucket, written); out: nfs_request_remove_commit_list(req, cinfo); - pnfs_put_lseg(freeme); + if (bucket) + pnfs_put_lseg(pnfs_free_bucket_lseg(bucket)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pnfs_generic_clear_request_commit); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 46c9ea1d4fee4cf1f8cc6001b9c14aae61b3d502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 11:54:57 -0500 Subject: NFS/pNFS: Don't leak DS commits in pnfs_generic_retry_commit() We must ensure that we pass a layout segment to nfs_retry_commit() when we're cleaning up after pnfs_bucket_alloc_ds_commits(). Otherwise, requests that should be committed to the DS will get committed to the MDS. Do so by ensuring that pnfs_bucket_get_committing() always tries to return a layout segment when it returns a non-empty page list. Fixes: c84bea59449a ("NFS/pNFS: Simplify bucket layout segment reference counting") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c index df20bbe8d15e..49d3389bd813 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c @@ -403,12 +403,16 @@ pnfs_bucket_get_committing(struct list_head *head, struct pnfs_commit_bucket *bucket, struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo) { + struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg; struct list_head *pos; list_for_each(pos, &bucket->committing) cinfo->ds->ncommitting--; list_splice_init(&bucket->committing, head); - return pnfs_free_bucket_lseg(bucket); + lseg = pnfs_free_bucket_lseg(bucket); + if (!lseg) + lseg = pnfs_get_lseg(bucket->lseg); + return lseg; } static struct nfs_commit_data * @@ -420,8 +424,6 @@ pnfs_bucket_fetch_commitdata(struct pnfs_commit_bucket *bucket, if (!data) return NULL; data->lseg = pnfs_bucket_get_committing(&data->pages, bucket, cinfo); - if (!data->lseg) - data->lseg = pnfs_get_lseg(bucket->lseg); return data; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From cb2856c5971723910a86b7d1d0cf623d6919cbc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 14:13:22 -0500 Subject: NFS/pNFS: Fix a leak of the layout 'plh_outstanding' counter If we exit _lgopen_prepare_attached() without setting a layout, we will currently leak the plh_outstanding counter. Fixes: 411ae722d10a ("pNFS: Wait for stale layoutget calls to complete in pnfs_update_layout()") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index fc13a3c8bc48..4f274f21c4ab 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2244,6 +2244,7 @@ static void _lgopen_prepare_attached(struct nfs4_opendata *data, &rng, GFP_KERNEL); if (!lgp) { pnfs_clear_first_layoutget(lo); + nfs_layoutget_end(lo); pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); return; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 113aac6d567bda783af36d08f73bfda47d8e9a40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 15:46:06 -0500 Subject: NFS: nfs_delegation_find_inode_server must first reference the superblock Before referencing the inode, we must ensure that the superblock can be referenced. Otherwise, we can end up with iput() calling superblock operations that are no longer valid or accessible. Fixes: e39d8a186ed0 ("NFSv4: Fix an Oops during delegation callbacks") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/delegation.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/delegation.c b/fs/nfs/delegation.c index 816e1427f17e..04bf8066980c 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/delegation.c +++ b/fs/nfs/delegation.c @@ -1011,22 +1011,24 @@ nfs_delegation_find_inode_server(struct nfs_server *server, const struct nfs_fh *fhandle) { struct nfs_delegation *delegation; - struct inode *freeme, *res = NULL; + struct super_block *freeme = NULL; + struct inode *res = NULL; list_for_each_entry_rcu(delegation, &server->delegations, super_list) { spin_lock(&delegation->lock); if (delegation->inode != NULL && !test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_REVOKED, &delegation->flags) && nfs_compare_fh(fhandle, &NFS_I(delegation->inode)->fh) == 0) { - freeme = igrab(delegation->inode); - if (freeme && nfs_sb_active(freeme->i_sb)) - res = freeme; + if (nfs_sb_active(server->super)) { + freeme = server->super; + res = igrab(delegation->inode); + } spin_unlock(&delegation->lock); if (res != NULL) return res; if (freeme) { rcu_read_unlock(); - iput(freeme); + nfs_sb_deactive(freeme); rcu_read_lock(); } return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 896567ee7f17a8a736cda8a28cc987228410a2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 15:58:08 -0500 Subject: NFS: nfs_igrab_and_active must first reference the superblock Before referencing the inode, we must ensure that the superblock can be referenced. Otherwise, we can end up with iput() calling superblock operations that are no longer valid or accessible. Fixes: ea7c38fef0b7 ("NFSv4: Ensure we reference the inode for return-on-close in delegreturn") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/internal.h | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h index 6bdee7ab3a6c..62d3189745cd 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/internal.h +++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h @@ -599,12 +599,14 @@ extern void nfs4_test_session_trunk(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, static inline struct inode *nfs_igrab_and_active(struct inode *inode) { - inode = igrab(inode); - if (inode != NULL && !nfs_sb_active(inode->i_sb)) { - iput(inode); - inode = NULL; + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + + if (sb && nfs_sb_active(sb)) { + if (igrab(inode)) + return inode; + nfs_sb_deactive(sb); } - return inode; + return NULL; } static inline void nfs_iput_and_deactive(struct inode *inode) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From d434ab6db524ab1efd0afad4ffa1ee65ca6ac097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 04:00:30 +0000 Subject: io_uring: drop mm and files after task_work_run __io_req_task_submit() run by task_work can set mm and files, but io_sq_thread() in some cases, and because __io_sq_thread_acquire_mm() and __io_sq_thread_acquire_files() do a simple current->mm/files check it may end up submitting IO with mm/files of another task. We also need to drop it after in the end to drop potentially grabbed references to them. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 2f305c097bd5..7af74c1ec909 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -7056,6 +7056,7 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data) if (sqt_spin || !time_after(jiffies, timeout)) { io_run_task_work(); + io_sq_thread_drop_mm_files(); cond_resched(); if (sqt_spin) timeout = jiffies + sqd->sq_thread_idle; @@ -7093,6 +7094,7 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data) } io_run_task_work(); + io_sq_thread_drop_mm_files(); if (cur_css) io_sq_thread_unassociate_blkcg(); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 621fadc22365f3cf307bcd9048e3372e9ee9cdcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 04:00:31 +0000 Subject: io_uring: don't take files/mm for a dead task In rare cases a task may be exiting while io_ring_exit_work() trying to cancel/wait its requests. It's ok for __io_sq_thread_acquire_mm() because of SQPOLL check, but is not for __io_sq_thread_acquire_files(). Play safe and fail for both of them. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 7af74c1ec909..b0e6d8e607a3 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1106,6 +1106,9 @@ static void io_sq_thread_drop_mm_files(void) static int __io_sq_thread_acquire_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { + if (current->flags & PF_EXITING) + return -EFAULT; + if (!current->files) { struct files_struct *files; struct nsproxy *nsproxy; @@ -1133,6 +1136,8 @@ static int __io_sq_thread_acquire_mm(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { struct mm_struct *mm; + if (current->flags & PF_EXITING) + return -EFAULT; if (current->mm) return 0; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 51b2ee7d006a736a9126e8111d1f24e4fd0afaa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:01:29 -0500 Subject: nfsd4: readdirplus shouldn't return parent of export If you export a subdirectory of a filesystem, a READDIRPLUS on the root of that export will return the filehandle of the parent with the ".." entry. The filehandle is optional, so let's just not return the filehandle for ".." if we're at the root of an export. Note that once the client learns one filehandle outside of the export, they can trivially access the rest of the export using further lookups. However, it is also not very difficult to guess filehandles outside of the export. So exporting a subdirectory of a filesystem should considered equivalent to providing access to the entire filesystem. To avoid confusion, we recommend only exporting entire filesystems. Reported-by: Youjipeng Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c index 821db21ba072..34b880211e5e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c @@ -865,9 +865,14 @@ compose_entry_fh(struct nfsd3_readdirres *cd, struct svc_fh *fhp, if (isdotent(name, namlen)) { if (namlen == 2) { dchild = dget_parent(dparent); - /* filesystem root - cannot return filehandle for ".." */ + /* + * Don't return filehandle for ".." if we're at + * the filesystem or export root: + */ if (dchild == dparent) goto out; + if (dparent == exp->ex_path.dentry) + goto out; } else dchild = dget(dparent); } else -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 14ff8e1970c03831bf64cf098f56e6ba83349170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Sterba Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 17:06:10 +0100 Subject: btrfs: no need to run delayed refs after commit_fs_roots during commit The inode number cache has been removed in this dev cycle, there's one more leftover. We don't need to run the delayed refs again after commit_fs_roots as stated in the comment, because btrfs_save_ino_cache is no more since 5297199a8bca ("btrfs: remove inode number cache feature"). Nothing else between commit_fs_roots and btrfs_qgroup_account_extents could create new delayed refs so the qgroup consistency should be safe. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c index 8e0f7a1029c6..6af7f2bf92de 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c @@ -2264,14 +2264,6 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) */ btrfs_free_log_root_tree(trans, fs_info); - /* - * commit_fs_roots() can call btrfs_save_ino_cache(), which generates - * new delayed refs. Must handle them or qgroup can be wrong. - */ - ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, (unsigned long)-1); - if (ret) - goto unlock_tree_log; - /* * Since fs roots are all committed, we can get a quite accurate * new_roots. So let's do quota accounting. -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 518837e65068c385dddc0a87b3e577c8be7c13b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 11:41:42 +0000 Subject: btrfs: send: fix invalid clone operations when cloning from the same file and root When an incremental send finds an extent that is shared, it checks which file extent items in the range refer to that extent, and for those it emits clone operations, while for others it emits regular write operations to avoid corruption at the destination (as described and fixed by commit d906d49fc5f4 ("Btrfs: send, fix file corruption due to incorrect cloning operations")). However when the root we are cloning from is the send root, we are cloning from the inode currently being processed and the source file range has several extent items that partially point to the desired extent, with an offset smaller than the offset in the file extent item for the range we want to clone into, it can cause the algorithm to issue a clone operation that starts at the current eof of the file being processed in the receiver side, in which case the receiver will fail, with EINVAL, when attempting to execute the clone operation. Example reproducer: $ cat test-send-clone.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null mount $DEV $MNT # Create our test file with a single and large extent (1M) and with # different content for different file ranges that will be reflinked # later. xfs_io -f \ -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 128K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 128K 128K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xef 256K 256K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0x1a 512K 512K" \ $MNT/foobar btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap1 btrfs send -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT/snap1 # Now do a series of changes to our file such that we end up with # different parts of the extent reflinked into different file offsets # and we overwrite a large part of the extent too, so no file extent # items refer to that part that was overwritten. This used to confuse # the algorithm used by the kernel to figure out which file ranges to # clone, making it attempt to clone from a source range starting at # the current eof of the file, resulting in the receiver to fail since # it is an invalid clone operation. # xfs_io -c "reflink $MNT/foobar 64K 1M 960K" \ -c "reflink $MNT/foobar 0K 512K 256K" \ -c "reflink $MNT/foobar 512K 128K 256K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0x73 384K 640K" \ $MNT/foobar btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap2 btrfs send -f /tmp/snap2.send -p $MNT/snap1 $MNT/snap2 echo -e "\nFile digest in the original filesystem:" md5sum $MNT/snap2/foobar # Now unmount the filesystem, create a new one, mount it and try to # apply both send streams to recreate both snapshots. umount $DEV mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null mount $DEV $MNT btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap2.send $MNT # Must match what we got in the original filesystem of course. echo -e "\nFile digest in the new filesystem:" md5sum $MNT/snap2/foobar umount $MNT When running the reproducer, the incremental send operation fails due to an invalid clone operation: $ ./test-send-clone.sh wrote 131072/131072 bytes at offset 0 128 KiB, 32 ops; 0.0015 sec (80.906 MiB/sec and 20711.9741 ops/sec) wrote 131072/131072 bytes at offset 131072 128 KiB, 32 ops; 0.0013 sec (90.514 MiB/sec and 23171.6148 ops/sec) wrote 262144/262144 bytes at offset 262144 256 KiB, 64 ops; 0.0025 sec (98.270 MiB/sec and 25157.2327 ops/sec) wrote 524288/524288 bytes at offset 524288 512 KiB, 128 ops; 0.0052 sec (95.730 MiB/sec and 24506.9883 ops/sec) Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap1' At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap1 linked 983040/983040 bytes at offset 1048576 960 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0006 sec (1.419 GiB/sec and 1550.3876 ops/sec) linked 262144/262144 bytes at offset 524288 256 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0020 sec (120.192 MiB/sec and 480.7692 ops/sec) linked 262144/262144 bytes at offset 131072 256 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0018 sec (133.833 MiB/sec and 535.3319 ops/sec) wrote 655360/655360 bytes at offset 393216 640 KiB, 160 ops; 0.0093 sec (66.781 MiB/sec and 17095.8436 ops/sec) Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap2' At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap2 File digest in the original filesystem: 9c13c61cb0b9f5abf45344375cb04dfa /mnt/sdi/snap2/foobar At subvol snap1 At snapshot snap2 ERROR: failed to clone extents to foobar: Invalid argument File digest in the new filesystem: 132f0396da8f48d2e667196bff882cfc /mnt/sdi/snap2/foobar The clone operation is invalid because its source range starts at the current eof of the file in the receiver, causing the receiver to get an EINVAL error from the clone operation when attempting it. For the example above, what happens is the following: 1) When processing the extent at file offset 1M, the algorithm checks that the extent is shared and can be (fully or partially) found at file offset 0. At this point the file has a size (and eof) of 1M at the receiver; 2) It finds that our extent item at file offset 1M has a data offset of 64K and, since the file extent item at file offset 0 has a data offset of 0, it issues a clone operation, from the same file and root, that has a source range offset of 64K, destination offset of 1M and a length of 64K, since the extent item at file offset 0 refers only to the first 128K of the shared extent. After this clone operation, the file size (and eof) at the receiver is increased from 1M to 1088K (1M + 64K); 3) Now there's still 896K (960K - 64K) of data left to clone or write, so it checks for the next file extent item, which starts at file offset 128K. This file extent item has a data offset of 0 and a length of 256K, so a clone operation with a source range offset of 256K, a destination offset of 1088K (1M + 64K) and length of 128K is issued. After this operation the file size (and eof) at the receiver increases from 1088K to 1216K (1088K + 128K); 4) Now there's still 768K (896K - 128K) of data left to clone or write, so it checks for the next file extent item, located at file offset 384K. This file extent item points to a different extent, not the one we want to clone, with a length of 640K. So we issue a write operation into the file range 1216K (1088K + 128K, end of the last clone operation), with a length of 640K and with a data matching the one we can find for that range in send root. After this operation, the file size (and eof) at the receiver increases from 1216K to 1856K (1216K + 640K); 5) Now there's still 128K (768K - 640K) of data left to clone or write, so we look into the file extent item, which is for file offset 1M and it points to the extent we want to clone, with a data offset of 64K and a length of 960K. However this matches the file offset we started with, the start of the range to clone into. So we can't for sure find any file extent item from here onwards with the rest of the data we want to clone, yet we proceed and since the file extent item points to the shared extent, with a data offset of 64K, we issue a clone operation with a source range starting at file offset 1856K, which matches the file extent item's offset, 1M, plus the amount of data cloned and written so far, which is 64K (step 2) + 128K (step 3) + 640K (step 4). This clone operation is invalid since the source range offset matches the current eof of the file in the receiver. We should have stopped looking for extents to clone at this point and instead fallback to write, which would simply the contain the data in the file range from 1856K to 1856K + 128K. So fix this by stopping the loop that looks for file ranges to clone at clone_range() when we reach the current eof of the file being processed, if we are cloning from the same file and using the send root as the clone root. This ensures any data not yet cloned will be sent to the receiver through a write operation. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Massimo B. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6ae34776e85912960a253a8327068a892998e685.camel@gmx.net/ Fixes: 11f2069c113e ("Btrfs: send, allow clone operations within the same file") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index ae97f4dbaff3..78a35374d492 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -5512,6 +5512,21 @@ static int clone_range(struct send_ctx *sctx, break; offset += clone_len; clone_root->offset += clone_len; + + /* + * If we are cloning from the file we are currently processing, + * and using the send root as the clone root, we must stop once + * the current clone offset reaches the current eof of the file + * at the receiver, otherwise we would issue an invalid clone + * operation (source range going beyond eof) and cause the + * receiver to fail. So if we reach the current eof, bail out + * and fallback to a regular write. + */ + if (clone_root->root == sctx->send_root && + clone_root->ino == sctx->cur_ino && + clone_root->offset >= sctx->cur_inode_next_write_offset) + break; + data_offset += clone_len; next: path->slots[0]++; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b4411616c26f26c4017b8fa4d3538b1a02028733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:42:24 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix null-deref in io_disable_sqo_submit general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000022: 0000 [#1] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000110-0x0000000000000117] RIP: 0010:io_ring_set_wakeup_flag fs/io_uring.c:6929 [inline] RIP: 0010:io_disable_sqo_submit+0xdb/0x130 fs/io_uring.c:8891 Call Trace: io_uring_create fs/io_uring.c:9711 [inline] io_uring_setup+0x12b1/0x38e0 fs/io_uring.c:9739 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 io_disable_sqo_submit() might be called before user rings were allocated, don't do io_ring_set_wakeup_flag() in those cases. Reported-by: syzbot+ab412638aeb652ded540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d9d05217cb69 ("io_uring: stop SQPOLL submit on creator's death") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index b0e6d8e607a3..66db2c46ab82 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8895,7 +8895,8 @@ static void io_disable_sqo_submit(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); /* make sure callers enter the ring to get error */ - io_ring_set_wakeup_flag(ctx); + if (ctx->rings) + io_ring_set_wakeup_flag(ctx); } /* -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 06585c497b55045ec21aa8128e340f6a6587351c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:42:25 +0000 Subject: io_uring: do sqo disable on install_fd error WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8494 at fs/io_uring.c:8717 io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill+0x4f2/0x600 fs/io_uring.c:8717 Call Trace: io_uring_release+0x3e/0x50 fs/io_uring.c:8759 __fput+0x283/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:140 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:174 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x249/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:201 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:302 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 failed io_uring_install_fd() is a special case, we don't do io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill() directly but defer it to fput, though still need to io_disable_sqo_submit() before. note: it doesn't fix any real problem, just a warning. That's because sqring won't be available to the userspace in this case and so SQPOLL won't submit anything. Reported-by: syzbot+9c9c35374c0ecac06516@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d9d05217cb69 ("io_uring: stop SQPOLL submit on creator's death") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 66db2c46ab82..372be9caf340 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9708,6 +9708,7 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, */ ret = io_uring_install_fd(ctx, file); if (ret < 0) { + io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); /* fput will clean it up */ fput(file); return ret; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1e249cb5b7fc09ff216aa5a12f6c302e434e88f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 11:02:43 -0800 Subject: fs: fix lazytime expiration handling in __writeback_single_inode() When lazytime is enabled and an inode is being written due to its in-memory updated timestamps having expired, either due to a sync() or syncfs() system call or due to dirtytime_expire_interval having elapsed, the VFS needs to inform the filesystem so that the filesystem can copy the inode's timestamps out to the on-disk data structures. This is done by __writeback_single_inode() calling mark_inode_dirty_sync(), which then calls ->dirty_inode(I_DIRTY_SYNC). However, this occurs after __writeback_single_inode() has already cleared the dirty flags from ->i_state. This causes two bugs: - mark_inode_dirty_sync() redirties the inode, causing it to remain dirty. This wastefully causes the inode to be written twice. But more importantly, it breaks cases where sync_filesystem() is expected to clean dirty inodes. This includes the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl (as reported at https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200306004555.GB225345@gmail.com), as well as possibly filesystem freezing (freeze_super()). - Since ->i_state doesn't contain I_DIRTY_TIME when ->dirty_inode() is called from __writeback_single_inode() for lazytime expiration, xfs_fs_dirty_inode() ignores the notification. (XFS only cares about lazytime expirations, and it assumes that i_state will contain I_DIRTY_TIME during those.) Therefore, lazy timestamps aren't persisted by sync(), syncfs(), or dirtytime_expire_interval on XFS. Fix this by moving the call to mark_inode_dirty_sync() to earlier in __writeback_single_inode(), before the dirty flags are cleared from i_state. This makes filesystems be properly notified of the timestamp expiration, and it avoids incorrectly redirtying the inode. This fixes xfstest generic/580 (which tests FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY) when run on ext4 or f2fs with lazytime enabled. It also fixes the new lazytime xfstest I've proposed, which reproduces the above-mentioned XFS bug (https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105005818.92978-1-ebiggers@kernel.org). Alternatively, we could call ->dirty_inode(I_DIRTY_SYNC) directly. But due to the introduction of I_SYNC_QUEUED, mark_inode_dirty_sync() is the right thing to do because mark_inode_dirty_sync() now knows not to move the inode to a writeback list if it is currently queued for sync. Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Depends-on: 5afced3bf281 ("writeback: Avoid skipping inode writeback") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112190253.64307-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Suggested-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jan Kara --- fs/fs-writeback.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/fs-writeback.c b/fs/fs-writeback.c index acfb55834af2..c41cb887eb7d 100644 --- a/fs/fs-writeback.c +++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -1474,21 +1474,25 @@ __writeback_single_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc) } /* - * Some filesystems may redirty the inode during the writeback - * due to delalloc, clear dirty metadata flags right before - * write_inode() + * If the inode has dirty timestamps and we need to write them, call + * mark_inode_dirty_sync() to notify the filesystem about it and to + * change I_DIRTY_TIME into I_DIRTY_SYNC. */ - spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - - dirty = inode->i_state & I_DIRTY; if ((inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_TIME) && - ((dirty & I_DIRTY_INODE) || - wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL || wbc->for_sync || + (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL || wbc->for_sync || time_after(jiffies, inode->dirtied_time_when + dirtytime_expire_interval * HZ))) { - dirty |= I_DIRTY_TIME; trace_writeback_lazytime(inode); + mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode); } + + /* + * Some filesystems may redirty the inode during the writeback + * due to delalloc, clear dirty metadata flags right before + * write_inode() + */ + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + dirty = inode->i_state & I_DIRTY; inode->i_state &= ~dirty; /* @@ -1509,8 +1513,6 @@ __writeback_single_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc) spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); - if (dirty & I_DIRTY_TIME) - mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode); /* Don't write the inode if only I_DIRTY_PAGES was set */ if (dirty & ~I_DIRTY_PAGES) { int err = write_inode(inode, wbc); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 77b6ec01c29aade01701aa30bf1469acc7f2be76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Rix Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 12:21:26 -0800 Subject: cifs: check pointer before freeing clang static analysis reports this problem dfs_cache.c:591:2: warning: Argument to kfree() is a constant address (18446744073709551614), which is not memory allocated by malloc() kfree(vi); ^~~~~~~~~ In dfs_cache_del_vol() the volume info pointer 'vi' being freed is the return of a call to find_vol(). The large constant address is find_vol() returning an error. Add an error check to dfs_cache_del_vol() similar to the one done in dfs_cache_update_vol(). Fixes: 54be1f6c1c37 ("cifs: Add DFS cache routines") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor CC: # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c index 6ad6ba5f6ebe..0fdb0de7ff86 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c +++ b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c @@ -1260,7 +1260,8 @@ void dfs_cache_del_vol(const char *fullpath) vi = find_vol(fullpath); spin_unlock(&vol_list_lock); - kref_put(&vi->refcnt, vol_release); + if (!IS_ERR(vi)) + kref_put(&vi->refcnt, vol_release); } /** -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2659d3bff3e1b000f49907d0839178b101a89887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 14:16:16 -0300 Subject: cifs: fix interrupted close commands Retry close command if it gets interrupted to not leak open handles on the server. Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Reported-by: Duncan Findlay Suggested-by: Pavel Shilovsky Fixes: 6988a619f5b7 ("cifs: allow syscalls to be restarted in __smb_send_rqst()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewd-by: Pavel Shilovsky Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 067eb44c7baa..794fc3b68b4f 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -3248,7 +3248,7 @@ close_exit: free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp); /* retry close in a worker thread if this one is interrupted */ - if (rc == -EINTR) { + if (is_interrupt_error(rc)) { int tmp_rc; tmp_rc = smb2_handle_cancelled_close(tcon, persistent_fid, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c13e7af042270724b42a466edc48a70a43f571f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Menglong Dong Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 01:13:40 -0800 Subject: fs: cifs: remove unneeded variable in smb3_fs_context_dup 'rc' in smb3_fs_context_dup is not used and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 0afccbbed2e6..076bcadc756a 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -303,8 +303,6 @@ do { \ int smb3_fs_context_dup(struct smb3_fs_context *new_ctx, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) { - int rc = 0; - memcpy(new_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); new_ctx->prepath = NULL; new_ctx->mount_options = NULL; @@ -327,7 +325,7 @@ smb3_fs_context_dup(struct smb3_fs_context *new_ctx, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx DUP_CTX_STR(nodename); DUP_CTX_STR(iocharset); - return rc; + return 0; } static int -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ed6b1920f84bc5c3d666dc383ff3bbc60f0f62a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YANG LI Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 17:15:28 +0800 Subject: cifs: connect: style: Simplify bool comparison Fix the following coccicheck warning: ./fs/cifs/connect.c:3740:6-21: WARNING: Comparison of 0/1 to bool variable Signed-off-by: YANG LI Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index b9df85506938..5d39129406ea 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -3740,7 +3740,7 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, if (!ses->binding) { ses->capabilities = server->capabilities; - if (linuxExtEnabled == 0) + if (!linuxExtEnabled) ses->capabilities &= (~server->vals->cap_unix); if (ses->auth_key.response) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e54fd0716c3db20c0cba73fee2c3a4274b08c24e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YANG LI Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 14:35:45 +0800 Subject: cifs: style: replace one-element array with flexible-array There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use "flexible array members"[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9/process/ deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays Signed-off-by: YANG LI Reported-by: Abaci Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h index 204a622b89ed..d85edf5d1429 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ struct smb2_rdma_transform_capabilities_context { __le16 TransformCount; __u16 Reserved1; __u32 Reserved2; - __le16 RDMATransformIds[1]; + __le16 RDMATransformIds[]; } __packed; /* Signing algorithms */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From f010505b78a4fa8d5b6480752566e7313fb5ca6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcelo Diop-Gonzalez Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 11:54:40 -0500 Subject: io_uring: flush timeouts that should already have expired Right now io_flush_timeouts() checks if the current number of events is equal to ->timeout.target_seq, but this will miss some timeouts if there have been more than 1 event added since the last time they were flushed (possible in io_submit_flush_completions(), for example). Fix it by recording the last sequence at which timeouts were flushed so that the number of events seen can be compared to the number of events needed without overflow. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Diop-Gonzalez Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 372be9caf340..06cc79d39586 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx { unsigned cq_entries; unsigned cq_mask; atomic_t cq_timeouts; + unsigned cq_last_tm_flush; unsigned long cq_check_overflow; struct wait_queue_head cq_wait; struct fasync_struct *cq_fasync; @@ -1639,19 +1640,38 @@ static void __io_queue_deferred(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) static void io_flush_timeouts(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { - while (!list_empty(&ctx->timeout_list)) { + u32 seq; + + if (list_empty(&ctx->timeout_list)) + return; + + seq = ctx->cached_cq_tail - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts); + + do { + u32 events_needed, events_got; struct io_kiocb *req = list_first_entry(&ctx->timeout_list, struct io_kiocb, timeout.list); if (io_is_timeout_noseq(req)) break; - if (req->timeout.target_seq != ctx->cached_cq_tail - - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts)) + + /* + * Since seq can easily wrap around over time, subtract + * the last seq at which timeouts were flushed before comparing. + * Assuming not more than 2^31-1 events have happened since, + * these subtractions won't have wrapped, so we can check if + * target is in [last_seq, current_seq] by comparing the two. + */ + events_needed = req->timeout.target_seq - ctx->cq_last_tm_flush; + events_got = seq - ctx->cq_last_tm_flush; + if (events_got < events_needed) break; list_del_init(&req->timeout.list); io_kill_timeout(req); - } + } while (!list_empty(&ctx->timeout_list)); + + ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = seq; } static void io_commit_cqring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) @@ -5837,6 +5857,12 @@ static int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req) tail = ctx->cached_cq_tail - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts); req->timeout.target_seq = tail + off; + /* Update the last seq here in case io_flush_timeouts() hasn't. + * This is safe because ->completion_lock is held, and submissions + * and completions are never mixed in the same ->completion_lock section. + */ + ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = tail; + /* * Insertion sort, ensuring the first entry in the list is always * the one we need first. -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 23dd561ad9eae02b4d51bb502fe4e1a0666e9567 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yi Li Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 11:38:27 +0800 Subject: ext4: use IS_ERR instead of IS_ERR_OR_NULL and set inode null when IS_ERR 1: ext4_iget/ext4_find_extent never returns NULL, use IS_ERR instead of IS_ERR_OR_NULL to fix this. 2: ext4_fc_replay_inode should set the inode to NULL when IS_ERR. and go to call iput properly. Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path") Signed-off-by: Yi Li Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201230033827.3996064-1-yili@winhong.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/fast_commit.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c index 4fcc21c25e79..6b5489273c85 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c +++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c @@ -1318,14 +1318,14 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_unlink(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) entry.len = darg.dname_len; inode = ext4_iget(sb, darg.ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode %d not found", darg.ino); return 0; } old_parent = ext4_iget(sb, darg.parent_ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(old_parent)) { + if (IS_ERR(old_parent)) { jbd_debug(1, "Dir with inode %d not found", darg.parent_ino); iput(inode); return 0; @@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_link(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) darg.parent_ino, darg.dname_len); inode = ext4_iget(sb, darg.ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode not found."); return 0; } @@ -1466,10 +1466,11 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, tag, ino, 0, 0); inode = ext4_iget(sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (!IS_ERR(inode)) { ext4_ext_clear_bb(inode); iput(inode); } + inode = NULL; ext4_fc_record_modified_inode(sb, ino); @@ -1512,7 +1513,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) /* Given that we just wrote the inode on disk, this SHOULD succeed. */ inode = ext4_iget(sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode not found."); return -EFSCORRUPTED; } @@ -1564,7 +1565,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_create(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) goto out; inode = ext4_iget(sb, darg.ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "inode %d not found.", darg.ino); inode = NULL; ret = -EINVAL; @@ -1577,7 +1578,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_create(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) * dot and dot dot dirents are setup properly. */ dir = ext4_iget(sb, darg.parent_ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dir)) { + if (IS_ERR(dir)) { jbd_debug(1, "Dir %d not found.", darg.ino); goto out; } @@ -1653,7 +1654,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(struct super_block *sb, inode = ext4_iget(sb, le32_to_cpu(fc_add_ex->fc_ino), EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode not found."); return 0; } @@ -1777,7 +1778,7 @@ ext4_fc_replay_del_range(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl) le32_to_cpu(lrange->fc_ino), cur, remaining); inode = ext4_iget(sb, le32_to_cpu(lrange->fc_ino), EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode %d not found", le32_to_cpu(lrange->fc_ino)); return 0; } @@ -1832,7 +1833,7 @@ static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters(struct super_block *sb) for (i = 0; i < state->fc_modified_inodes_used; i++) { inode = ext4_iget(sb, state->fc_modified_inodes[i], EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) { + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { jbd_debug(1, "Inode %d not found.", state->fc_modified_inodes[i]); continue; @@ -1849,7 +1850,7 @@ static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters(struct super_block *sb) if (ret > 0) { path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map.m_lblk, NULL, 0); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path)) { + if (!IS_ERR(path)) { for (j = 0; j < path->p_depth; j++) ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, path[j].p_block, 1, 1); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 31e203e09f036f48e7c567c2d32df0196bbd303f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daejun Park Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 18:48:51 +0900 Subject: ext4: fix wrong list_splice in ext4_fc_cleanup After full/fast commit, entries in staging queue are promoted to main queue. In ext4_fs_cleanup function, it splice to staging queue to staging queue. Fixes: aa75f4d3daaeb ("ext4: main fast-commit commit path") Signed-off-by: Daejun Park Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201230094851epcms2p6eeead8cc984379b37b2efd21af90fd1a@epcms2p6 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/fast_commit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c index 6b5489273c85..ec5316fbcd1d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c +++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ static void ext4_fc_cleanup(journal_t *journal, int full) list_splice_init(&sbi->s_fc_dentry_q[FC_Q_STAGING], &sbi->s_fc_dentry_q[FC_Q_MAIN]); list_splice_init(&sbi->s_fc_q[FC_Q_STAGING], - &sbi->s_fc_q[FC_Q_STAGING]); + &sbi->s_fc_q[FC_Q_MAIN]); ext4_clear_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FC_COMMITTING); ext4_clear_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FC_INELIGIBLE); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 6b4b8e6b4ad8553660421d6360678b3811d5deb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yangerkun Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 14:28:57 +0800 Subject: ext4: fix bug for rename with RENAME_WHITEOUT We got a "deleted inode referenced" warning cross our fsstress test. The bug can be reproduced easily with following steps: cd /dev/shm mkdir test/ fallocate -l 128M img mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 img mount img test/ dd if=/dev/zero of=test/foo bs=1M count=128 mkdir test/dir/ && cd test/dir/ for ((i=0;i<1000;i++)); do touch file$i; done # consume all block cd ~ && renameat2(AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/file1, AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/dst_file, RENAME_WHITEOUT) # ext4_add_entry in ext4_rename will return ENOSPC!! cd /dev/shm/ && umount test/ && mount img test/ && ls -li test/dir/file1 We will get the output: "ls: cannot access 'test/dir/file1': Structure needs cleaning" and the dmesg show: "EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_lookup:1626: inode #2049: comm ls: deleted inode referenced: 139" ext4_rename will create a special inode for whiteout and use this 'ino' to replace the source file's dir entry 'ino'. Once error happens latter(the error above was the ENOSPC return from ext4_add_entry in ext4_rename since all space has been consumed), the cleanup do drop the nlink for whiteout, but forget to restore 'ino' with source file. This will trigger the bug describle as above. Signed-off-by: yangerkun Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: cd808deced43 ("ext4: support RENAME_WHITEOUT") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105062857.3566-1-yangerkun@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index a3b28ef2455a..fa625a247e9a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3601,9 +3601,6 @@ static int ext4_setent(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, return retval2; } } - brelse(ent->bh); - ent->bh = NULL; - return retval; } @@ -3802,6 +3799,7 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, } } + old_file_type = old.de->file_type; if (IS_DIRSYNC(old.dir) || IS_DIRSYNC(new.dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); @@ -3829,7 +3827,6 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, force_reread = (new.dir->i_ino == old.dir->i_ino && ext4_test_inode_flag(new.dir, EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA)); - old_file_type = old.de->file_type; if (whiteout) { /* * Do this before adding a new entry, so the old entry is sure @@ -3927,15 +3924,19 @@ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, retval = 0; end_rename: - brelse(old.dir_bh); - brelse(old.bh); - brelse(new.bh); if (whiteout) { - if (retval) + if (retval) { + ext4_setent(handle, &old, + old.inode->i_ino, old_file_type); drop_nlink(whiteout); + } unlock_new_inode(whiteout); iput(whiteout); + } + brelse(old.dir_bh); + brelse(old.bh); + brelse(new.bh); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); return retval; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e9f53353e166a67dfe4f8295100f8ac39d6cf10b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daejun Park Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 10:32:42 +0900 Subject: ext4: remove expensive flush on fast commit In the fast commit, it adds REQ_FUA and REQ_PREFLUSH on each fast commit block when barrier is enabled. However, in recovery phase, ext4 compares CRC value in the tail. So it is sufficient to add REQ_FUA and REQ_PREFLUSH on the block that has tail. Signed-off-by: Daejun Park Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106013242epcms2p5b6b4ed8ca86f29456fdf56aa580e74b4@epcms2p5 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/fast_commit.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c index ec5316fbcd1d..0a14a7c87bf8 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c +++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c @@ -604,13 +604,13 @@ void ext4_fc_track_range(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t star trace_ext4_fc_track_range(inode, start, end, ret); } -static void ext4_fc_submit_bh(struct super_block *sb) +static void ext4_fc_submit_bh(struct super_block *sb, bool is_tail) { int write_flags = REQ_SYNC; struct buffer_head *bh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_fc_bh; - /* TODO: REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH is unnecessarily expensive. */ - if (test_opt(sb, BARRIER)) + /* Add REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH only its tail */ + if (test_opt(sb, BARRIER) && is_tail) write_flags |= REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH; lock_buffer(bh); set_buffer_dirty(bh); @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static u8 *ext4_fc_reserve_space(struct super_block *sb, int len, u32 *crc) *crc = ext4_chksum(sbi, *crc, tl, sizeof(*tl)); if (pad_len > 0) ext4_fc_memzero(sb, tl + 1, pad_len, crc); - ext4_fc_submit_bh(sb); + ext4_fc_submit_bh(sb, false); ret = jbd2_fc_get_buf(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, &bh); if (ret) @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_write_tail(struct super_block *sb, u32 crc) tail.fc_crc = cpu_to_le32(crc); ext4_fc_memcpy(sb, dst, &tail.fc_crc, sizeof(tail.fc_crc), NULL); - ext4_fc_submit_bh(sb); + ext4_fc_submit_bh(sb, true); return 0; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a8d13dbccb137c46fead2ec1a4f1fbc8cfc9ea91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 16:04:23 -0700 Subject: io_uring: ensure finish_wait() is always called in __io_uring_task_cancel() If we enter with requests pending and performm cancelations, we'll have a different inflight count before and after calling prepare_to_wait(). This causes the loop to restart. If we actually ended up canceling everything, or everything completed in-between, then we'll break out of the loop without calling finish_wait() on the waitqueue. This can trigger a warning on exit_signals(), as we leave the task state in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE. Put a finish_wait() after the loop to catch that case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 06cc79d39586..985a9e3f976d 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9101,6 +9101,7 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait); } while (1); + finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait); atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle); io_uring_remove_task_files(tctx); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 29a951dfb3c3263c3a0f3bd9f7f2c2cfde4baedb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 13:13:41 -0800 Subject: mm: fix clear_refs_write locking Turning page table entries read-only requires the mmap_sem held for writing. So stop doing the odd games with turning things from read locks to write locks and back. Just get the write lock. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 32 +++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index ee5a235b3056..ab7d700b2caa 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -1215,41 +1215,26 @@ static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, .type = type, }; + if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { + count = -EINTR; + goto out_mm; + } if (type == CLEAR_REFS_MM_HIWATER_RSS) { - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { - count = -EINTR; - goto out_mm; - } - /* * Writing 5 to /proc/pid/clear_refs resets the peak * resident set size to this mm's current rss value. */ reset_mm_hiwater_rss(mm); - mmap_write_unlock(mm); - goto out_mm; + goto out_unlock; } - if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) { - count = -EINTR; - goto out_mm; - } tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1); if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) { for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY)) continue; - mmap_read_unlock(mm); - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { - count = -EINTR; - goto out_mm; - } - for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { - vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_SOFTDIRTY; - vma_set_page_prot(vma); - } - mmap_write_downgrade(mm); - break; + vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_SOFTDIRTY; + vma_set_page_prot(vma); } mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, MMU_NOTIFY_SOFT_DIRTY, @@ -1261,7 +1246,8 @@ static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (type == CLEAR_REFS_SOFT_DIRTY) mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range); tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, 0, -1); - mmap_read_unlock(mm); +out_unlock: + mmap_write_unlock(mm); out_mm: mmput(mm); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9348b73c2e1bfea74ccd4a44fb4ccc7276ab9623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2021 17:09:10 -0800 Subject: mm: don't play games with pinned pages in clear_page_refs Turning a pinned page read-only breaks the pinning after COW. Don't do it. The whole "track page soft dirty" state doesn't work with pinned pages anyway, since the page might be dirtied by the pinning entity without ever being noticed in the page tables. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index ab7d700b2caa..602e3a52884d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -1035,6 +1035,25 @@ struct clear_refs_private { }; #ifdef CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY + +#define is_cow_mapping(flags) (((flags) & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE) + +static inline bool pte_is_pinned(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t pte) +{ + struct page *page; + + if (!pte_write(pte)) + return false; + if (!is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) + return false; + if (likely(!atomic_read(&vma->vm_mm->has_pinned))) + return false; + page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, pte); + if (!page) + return false; + return page_maybe_dma_pinned(page); +} + static inline void clear_soft_dirty(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *pte) { @@ -1049,6 +1068,8 @@ static inline void clear_soft_dirty(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (pte_present(ptent)) { pte_t old_pte; + if (pte_is_pinned(vma, addr, ptent)) + return; old_pte = ptep_modify_prot_start(vma, addr, pte); ptent = pte_wrprotect(old_pte); ptent = pte_clear_soft_dirty(ptent); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c93cc9e16d88e0f5ea95d2d65d58a8a4dab258bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 11:52:11 -0700 Subject: io_uring: iopoll requests should also wake task ->in_idle state If we're freeing/finishing iopoll requests, ensure we check if the task is in idling in terms of cancelation. Otherwise we could end up waiting forever in __io_uring_task_cancel() if the task has active iopoll requests that need cancelation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 985a9e3f976d..5cda878b69cf 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2270,6 +2270,8 @@ static void io_req_free_batch_finish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx = rb->task->io_uring; percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, rb->task_refs); + if (atomic_read(&tctx->in_idle)) + wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct_many(rb->task, rb->task_refs); rb->task = NULL; } @@ -2288,6 +2290,8 @@ static void io_req_free_batch(struct req_batch *rb, struct io_kiocb *req) struct io_uring_task *tctx = rb->task->io_uring; percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, rb->task_refs); + if (atomic_read(&tctx->in_idle)) + wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct_many(rb->task, rb->task_refs); } rb->task = req->task; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 6b393a1ff1746a1c91bd95cbb2d79b104d8f15ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 05:32:29 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix false positive sqo warning on flush WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9094 at fs/io_uring.c:8884 io_disable_sqo_submit+0x106/0x130 fs/io_uring.c:8884 Call Trace: io_uring_flush+0x28b/0x3a0 fs/io_uring.c:9099 filp_close+0xb4/0x170 fs/open.c:1280 close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:626 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1299 [inline] __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1297 [inline] __x64_sys_close+0x2f/0xa0 fs/open.c:1297 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 io_uring's final close() may be triggered by any task not only the creator. It's well handled by io_uring_flush() including SQPOLL case, though a warning in io_disable_sqo_submit() will fallaciously fire by moving this warning out to the only call site that matters. Reported-by: syzbot+2f5d1785dc624932da78@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 5cda878b69cf..616c5f732a26 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8918,8 +8918,6 @@ static void __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, static void io_disable_sqo_submit(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task != current); - mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); ctx->sqo_dead = 1; mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); @@ -8941,6 +8939,7 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, if ((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && ctx->sq_data) { /* for SQPOLL only sqo_task has task notes */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task != current); io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); task = ctx->sq_data->thread; atomic_inc(&task->io_uring->in_idle); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4325cb498cb743dacaa3edbec398c5255f476ef6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 05:32:30 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix uring_flush in exit_files() warning WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11100 at fs/io_uring.c:9096 io_uring_flush+0x326/0x3a0 fs/io_uring.c:9096 RIP: 0010:io_uring_flush+0x326/0x3a0 fs/io_uring.c:9096 Call Trace: filp_close+0xb4/0x170 fs/open.c:1280 close_files fs/file.c:401 [inline] put_files_struct fs/file.c:416 [inline] put_files_struct+0x1cc/0x350 fs/file.c:413 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:433 do_exit+0xc22/0x2ae0 kernel/exit.c:820 do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922 get_signal+0x3e9/0x20a0 kernel/signal.c:2770 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a8/0x1eb0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:811 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:147 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x148/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:201 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:302 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 An SQPOLL ring creator task may have gotten rid of its file note during exit and called io_disable_sqo_submit(), but the io_uring is still left referenced through fdtable, which will be put during close_files() and cause a false positive warning. First split the warning into two for more clarity when is hit, and the add sqo_dead check to handle the described case. Reported-by: syzbot+a32b546d58dde07875a1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 616c5f732a26..d494c4269fc5 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9131,7 +9131,10 @@ static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) { /* there is only one file note, which is owned by sqo_task */ - WARN_ON_ONCE((ctx->sqo_task == current) == + WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task != current && + xa_load(&tctx->xa, (unsigned long)file)); + /* sqo_dead check is for when this happens after cancellation */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task == current && !ctx->sqo_dead && !xa_load(&tctx->xa, (unsigned long)file)); io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 0b5cd6c32b14413bf87e10ee62be3162588dcbe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2021 02:29:56 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix skipping disabling sqo on exec If there are no requests at the time __io_uring_task_cancel() is called, tctx_inflight() returns zero and and it terminates not getting a chance to go through __io_uring_files_cancel() and do io_disable_sqo_submit(). And we absolutely want them disabled by the time cancellation ends. Reported-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Fixes: d9d05217cb69 ("io_uring: stop SQPOLL submit on creator's death") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index d494c4269fc5..383ff6ed3734 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9085,6 +9085,10 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) /* make sure overflow events are dropped */ atomic_inc(&tctx->in_idle); + /* trigger io_disable_sqo_submit() */ + if (tctx->sqpoll) + __io_uring_files_cancel(NULL); + do { /* read completions before cancelations */ inflight = tctx_inflight(tctx); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2be449fcf38ff7e44cf76a2bba1376e923637eb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiapeng Zhong Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 17:09:20 +0800 Subject: fs/cifs: Assign boolean values to a bool variable Fix the following coccicheck warnings: ./fs/cifs/connect.c:3386:2-21: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable. Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Zhong Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 5d39129406ea..7c3325c0fadc 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ cifs_get_tcon(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) if (ses->server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_DIRECTORY_LEASING) tcon->nohandlecache = ctx->nohandlecache; else - tcon->nohandlecache = 1; + tcon->nohandlecache = true; tcon->nodelete = ctx->nodelete; tcon->local_lease = ctx->local_lease; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcon->pending_opens); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 16a78851e1f52eaed7034b75707d3662b4b13b77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiapeng Zhong Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 18:02:23 +0800 Subject: fs/cifs: Simplify bool comparison. Fix the follow warnings: ./fs/cifs/connect.c: WARNING: Comparison of 0/1 to bool variable Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Zhong Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 7c3325c0fadc..c8ef24bac94f 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ void reset_cifs_unix_caps(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, } else if (ctx) tcon->unix_ext = 1; /* Unix Extensions supported */ - if (tcon->unix_ext == 0) { + if (!tcon->unix_ext) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "Unix extensions disabled so not set on reconnect\n"); return; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 5cdc4a6950a883594e9640b1decb3fcf6222a594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lianzhi chang Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 15:57:41 +0800 Subject: udf: fix the problem that the disc content is not displayed When the capacity of the disc is too large (assuming the 4.7G specification), the disc (UDF file system) will be burned multiple times in the windows (Multisession Usage). When the remaining capacity of the CD is less than 300M (estimated value, for reference only), open the CD in the Linux system, the content of the CD is displayed as blank (the kernel will say "No VRS found"). Windows can display the contents of the CD normally. Through analysis, in the "fs/udf/super.c": udf_check_vsd function, the actual value of VSD_MAX_SECTOR_OFFSET may be much larger than 0x800000. According to the current code logic, it is found that the type of sbi->s_session is "__s32", when the remaining capacity of the disc is less than 300M (take a set of test values: sector=3154903040, sbi->s_session=1540464, sb->s_blocksize_bits=11 ), the calculation result of "sbi->s_session << sb->s_blocksize_bits" will overflow. Therefore, it is necessary to convert the type of s_session to "loff_t" (when udf_check_vsd starts, assign a value to _sector, which is also converted in this way), so that the result will not overflow, and then the content of the disc can be displayed normally. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114075741.30448-1-changlianzhi@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: lianzhi chang Signed-off-by: Jan Kara --- fs/udf/super.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index 5bef3a68395d..d0df217f4712 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -705,6 +705,7 @@ static int udf_check_vsd(struct super_block *sb) struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; int nsr = 0; struct udf_sb_info *sbi; + loff_t session_offset; sbi = UDF_SB(sb); if (sb->s_blocksize < sizeof(struct volStructDesc)) @@ -712,7 +713,8 @@ static int udf_check_vsd(struct super_block *sb) else sectorsize = sb->s_blocksize; - sector += (((loff_t)sbi->s_session) << sb->s_blocksize_bits); + session_offset = (loff_t)sbi->s_session << sb->s_blocksize_bits; + sector += session_offset; udf_debug("Starting at sector %u (%lu byte sectors)\n", (unsigned int)(sector >> sb->s_blocksize_bits), @@ -757,8 +759,7 @@ static int udf_check_vsd(struct super_block *sb) if (nsr > 0) return 1; - else if (!bh && sector - (sbi->s_session << sb->s_blocksize_bits) == - VSD_FIRST_SECTOR_OFFSET) + else if (!bh && sector - session_offset == VSD_FIRST_SECTOR_OFFSET) return -1; else return 0; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 18d3bff411c8d46d40537483bdc0b61b33ce0371 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:22:05 -0500 Subject: btrfs: don't get an EINTR during drop_snapshot for reloc This was partially fixed by f3e3d9cc3525 ("btrfs: avoid possible signal interruption of btrfs_drop_snapshot() on relocation tree"), however it missed a spot when we restart a trans handle because we need to end the transaction. The fix is the same, simply use btrfs_join_transaction() instead of btrfs_start_transaction() when deleting reloc roots. Fixes: f3e3d9cc3525 ("btrfs: avoid possible signal interruption of btrfs_drop_snapshot() on relocation tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index d79b8369e6aa..30b1a630dc2f 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5549,7 +5549,15 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) goto out_free; } - trans = btrfs_start_transaction(tree_root, 0); + /* + * Use join to avoid potential EINTR from transaction + * start. See wait_reserve_ticket and the whole + * reservation callchain. + */ + if (for_reloc) + trans = btrfs_join_transaction(tree_root); + else + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(tree_root, 0); if (IS_ERR(trans)) { err = PTR_ERR(trans); goto out_free; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 49ecc679ab48b40ca799bf94b327d5284eac9e46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:22:11 -0500 Subject: btrfs: do not double free backref nodes on error Zygo reported the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112402950 by task btrfs/28836 CPU: 0 PID: 28836 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.10.0-e35f27394290-for-next+ #23 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbc/0xf9 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x210 ? record_print_text.cold.34+0x11/0x11 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 kasan_report.cold.10+0x20/0x37 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 __asan_load8+0x69/0x90 btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 btrfs_backref_release_cache+0x83/0x1b0 relocate_block_group+0x394/0x780 ? merge_reloc_roots+0x4a0/0x4a0 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x120/0x120 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xa06/0xcb0 ? _copy_from_user+0x83/0xc0 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x18/0x30 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? lock_downgrade+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? handle_mm_fault+0xad6/0x2150 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xfc/0x9d0 ? ioctl_file_clone+0xe0/0xe0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags+0x26/0x30 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc3/0xf0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1b/0x60 ? do_syscall_64+0x13/0x80 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? __fget_light+0xae/0x110 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f4c4bdfe427 Allocated by task 28836: kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.18+0xbe/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x410/0xcb0 btrfs_backref_alloc_node+0x46/0xf0 btrfs_backref_add_tree_node+0x60d/0x11d0 build_backref_tree+0xc5/0x700 relocate_tree_blocks+0x2be/0xb90 relocate_block_group+0x2eb/0x780 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 28836: kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xf3/0x140 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 kfree+0xde/0x200 btrfs_backref_error_cleanup+0x452/0x530 build_backref_tree+0x1a5/0x700 relocate_tree_blocks+0x2be/0xb90 relocate_block_group+0x2eb/0x780 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This occurred because we freed our backref node in btrfs_backref_error_cleanup(), but then tried to free it again in btrfs_backref_release_cache(). This is because btrfs_backref_release_cache() will cycle through all of the cache->leaves nodes and free them up. However btrfs_backref_error_cleanup() freed the backref node with btrfs_backref_free_node(), which simply kfree()d the backref node without unlinking it from the cache. Change this to a btrfs_backref_drop_node(), which does the appropriate cleanup and removes the node from the cache->leaves list, so when we go to free the remaining cache we don't trip over items we've already dropped. Fixes: 75bfb9aff45e ("Btrfs: cleanup error handling in build_backref_tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/backref.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/backref.c b/fs/btrfs/backref.c index 02d7d7b2563b..9cadacf3ec27 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/backref.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/backref.c @@ -3117,7 +3117,7 @@ void btrfs_backref_error_cleanup(struct btrfs_backref_cache *cache, list_del_init(&lower->list); if (lower == node) node = NULL; - btrfs_backref_free_node(cache, lower); + btrfs_backref_drop_node(cache, lower); } btrfs_backref_cleanup_node(cache, node); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From fb286100974e7239af243bc2255a52f29442f9c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:22:14 -0500 Subject: btrfs: fix lockdep splat in btrfs_recover_relocation While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ mount/779 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 but task is already holding lock: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: start_transaction+0x444/0x700 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by mount/779: #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ #217 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0 ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 ? capable+0x3a/0x60 path_mount+0x433/0xc10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup the balance_ctl. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 2c0aa03b6437..0c7f4f6237e8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -4318,6 +4318,8 @@ int btrfs_recover_balance(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) btrfs_warn(fs_info, "balance: cannot set exclusive op status, resume manually"); + btrfs_release_path(path); + mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex); BUG_ON(fs_info->balance_ctl); spin_lock(&fs_info->balance_lock); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 34d1eb0e599875064955a74712f08ff14c8e3d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:22:17 -0500 Subject: btrfs: don't clear ret in btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups If we fail to update a block group item in the loop we'll break, however we'll do btrfs_run_delayed_refs and lose our error value in ret, and thus not clean up properly. Fix this by only running the delayed refs if there was no failure. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/block-group.c b/fs/btrfs/block-group.c index 52f2198d44c9..0886e81e5540 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/block-group.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/block-group.c @@ -2669,7 +2669,8 @@ again: * Go through delayed refs for all the stuff we've just kicked off * and then loop back (just once) */ - ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, 0); + if (!ret) + ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, 0); if (!ret && loops == 0) { loops++; spin_lock(&cur_trans->dirty_bgs_lock); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From db58465f1121086b524be80be39d1fedbe5387f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 16:11:12 +0000 Subject: cachefiles: Drop superfluous readpages aops NULL check After the recent actions to convert readpages aops to readahead, the NULL checks of readpages aops in cachefiles_read_or_alloc_page() may hit falsely. More badly, it's an ASSERT() call, and this panics. Drop the superfluous NULL checks for fixing this regression. [DH: Note that cachefiles never actually used readpages, so this check was never actually necessary] BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208883 BugLink: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1175245 Fixes: 9ae326a69004 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/cachefiles/rdwr.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/rdwr.c b/fs/cachefiles/rdwr.c index 8bda092e60c5..e027c718ca01 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/rdwr.c +++ b/fs/cachefiles/rdwr.c @@ -413,7 +413,6 @@ int cachefiles_read_or_alloc_page(struct fscache_retrieval *op, inode = d_backing_inode(object->backer); ASSERT(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)); - ASSERT(inode->i_mapping->a_ops->readpages); /* calculate the shift required to use bmap */ shift = PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits; @@ -713,7 +712,6 @@ int cachefiles_read_or_alloc_pages(struct fscache_retrieval *op, inode = d_backing_inode(object->backer); ASSERT(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)); - ASSERT(inode->i_mapping->a_ops->readpages); /* calculate the shift required to use bmap */ shift = PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 4eaad21a6ac9865df7f31983232ed5928450458d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 21:46:29 +0100 Subject: kernfs: implement ->read_iter Switch kernfs to implement the read_iter method instead of plain old read to prepare to supporting splice and sendfile again. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210120204631.274206-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/kernfs/file.c | 35 ++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index f277d023ebcd..8276e4c8722d 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "kernfs-internal.h" @@ -180,11 +181,10 @@ static const struct seq_operations kernfs_seq_ops = { * it difficult to use seq_file. Implement simplistic custom buffering for * bin files. */ -static ssize_t kernfs_file_direct_read(struct kernfs_open_file *of, - char __user *user_buf, size_t count, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t kernfs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { - ssize_t len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); + struct kernfs_open_file *of = kernfs_of(iocb->ki_filp); + ssize_t len = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(iter), PAGE_SIZE); const struct kernfs_ops *ops; char *buf; @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_direct_read(struct kernfs_open_file *of, of->event = atomic_read(&of->kn->attr.open->event); ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); if (ops->read) - len = ops->read(of, buf, len, *ppos); + len = ops->read(of, buf, len, iocb->ki_pos); else len = -EINVAL; @@ -220,12 +220,12 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_direct_read(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (len < 0) goto out_free; - if (copy_to_user(user_buf, buf, len)) { + if (copy_to_iter(buf, len, iter) != len) { len = -EFAULT; goto out_free; } - *ppos += len; + iocb->ki_pos += len; out_free: if (buf == of->prealloc_buf) @@ -235,22 +235,11 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_file_direct_read(struct kernfs_open_file *of, return len; } -/** - * kernfs_fop_read - kernfs vfs read callback - * @file: file pointer - * @user_buf: data to write - * @count: number of bytes - * @ppos: starting offset - */ -static ssize_t kernfs_fop_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t kernfs_fop_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { - struct kernfs_open_file *of = kernfs_of(file); - - if (of->kn->flags & KERNFS_HAS_SEQ_SHOW) - return seq_read(file, user_buf, count, ppos); - else - return kernfs_file_direct_read(of, user_buf, count, ppos); + if (kernfs_of(iocb->ki_filp)->kn->flags & KERNFS_HAS_SEQ_SHOW) + return seq_read_iter(iocb, iter); + return kernfs_file_read_iter(iocb, iter); } /** @@ -960,7 +949,7 @@ void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernfs_notify); const struct file_operations kernfs_file_fops = { - .read = kernfs_fop_read, + .read_iter = kernfs_fop_read_iter, .write = kernfs_fop_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .mmap = kernfs_fop_mmap, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From cc099e0b399889c6485c88368b19824b087c9f8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 21:46:30 +0100 Subject: kernfs: implement ->write_iter Switch kernfs to implement the write_iter method instead of plain old write to prepare to supporting splice and sendfile again. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210120204631.274206-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/kernfs/file.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index 8276e4c8722d..b1a5cccf189e 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -242,13 +242,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) return kernfs_file_read_iter(iocb, iter); } -/** - * kernfs_fop_write - kernfs vfs write callback - * @file: file pointer - * @user_buf: data to write - * @count: number of bytes - * @ppos: starting offset - * +/* * Copy data in from userland and pass it to the matching kernfs write * operation. * @@ -258,20 +252,18 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) * modify only the the value you're changing, then write entire buffer * back. */ -static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { - struct kernfs_open_file *of = kernfs_of(file); + struct kernfs_open_file *of = kernfs_of(iocb->ki_filp); + ssize_t len = iov_iter_count(iter); const struct kernfs_ops *ops; - ssize_t len; char *buf; if (of->atomic_write_len) { - len = count; if (len > of->atomic_write_len) return -E2BIG; } else { - len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); + len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE); } buf = of->prealloc_buf; @@ -282,7 +274,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf, if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len)) { + if (copy_from_iter(buf, len, iter) != len) { len = -EFAULT; goto out_free; } @@ -301,7 +293,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf, ops = kernfs_ops(of->kn); if (ops->write) - len = ops->write(of, buf, len, *ppos); + len = ops->write(of, buf, len, iocb->ki_pos); else len = -EINVAL; @@ -309,7 +301,7 @@ static ssize_t kernfs_fop_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf, mutex_unlock(&of->mutex); if (len > 0) - *ppos += len; + iocb->ki_pos += len; out_free: if (buf == of->prealloc_buf) @@ -662,7 +654,7 @@ static int kernfs_fop_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /* * Write path needs to atomic_write_len outside active reference. - * Cache it in open_file. See kernfs_fop_write() for details. + * Cache it in open_file. See kernfs_fop_write_iter() for details. */ of->atomic_write_len = ops->atomic_write_len; @@ -950,7 +942,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernfs_notify); const struct file_operations kernfs_file_fops = { .read_iter = kernfs_fop_read_iter, - .write = kernfs_fop_write, + .write_iter = kernfs_fop_write_iter, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .mmap = kernfs_fop_mmap, .open = kernfs_fop_open, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From f2d6c2708bd84ca953fa6b6ca5717e79eb0140c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 21:46:31 +0100 Subject: kernfs: wire up ->splice_read and ->splice_write Wire up the splice_read and splice_write methods to the default helpers using ->read_iter and ->write_iter now that those are implemented for kernfs. This restores support to use splice and sendfile on kernfs files. Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Reported-by: Siddharth Gupta Tested-by: Siddharth Gupta Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210120204631.274206-4-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/kernfs/file.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index b1a5cccf189e..c75719312147 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -949,6 +949,8 @@ const struct file_operations kernfs_file_fops = { .release = kernfs_fop_release, .poll = kernfs_fop_poll, .fsync = noop_fsync, + .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, }; /** -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 607ec89ed18f49ca59689572659b9c0076f1991f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 10:10:54 -0700 Subject: io_uring: fix SQPOLL IORING_OP_CLOSE cancelation state IORING_OP_CLOSE is special in terms of cancelation, since it has an intermediate state where we've removed the file descriptor but hasn't closed the file yet. For that reason, it's currently marked with IO_WQ_WORK_NO_CANCEL to prevent cancelation. This ensures that the op is always run even if canceled, to prevent leaving us with a live file but an fd that is gone. However, with SQPOLL, since a cancel request doesn't carry any resources on behalf of the request being canceled, if we cancel before any of the close op has been run, we can end up with io-wq not having the ->files assigned. This can result in the following oops reported by Joseph: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000d8 PGD 800000010b76f067 P4D 800000010b76f067 PUD 10b462067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 1788 Comm: io_uring-sq Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x19d/0x18c0 Code: 00 00 8b 1d fd 56 dd 08 85 db 0f 85 43 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 98 7b 95 82 48 c7 c7 57 96 93 82 e8 9a bc f5 ff 0f 0b e9 2b 05 00 00 <48> 81 3f c0 ca 67 8a b8 00 00 00 00 41 0f 45 c0 89 04 24 e9 81 fe RSP: 0018:ffffc90001933828 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000000d8 RBP: 0000000000000246 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888106e8a140 R15: 00000000000000d8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000d8 CR3: 0000000106efa004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0x31a/0x440 ? close_fd_get_file+0x39/0x160 ? __lock_acquire+0x647/0x18c0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 ? close_fd_get_file+0x39/0x160 close_fd_get_file+0x39/0x160 io_issue_sqe+0x1334/0x14e0 ? lock_acquire+0x31a/0x440 ? __io_free_req+0xcf/0x2e0 ? __io_free_req+0x175/0x2e0 ? find_held_lock+0x28/0xb0 ? io_wq_submit_work+0x7f/0x240 io_wq_submit_work+0x7f/0x240 io_wq_cancel_cb+0x161/0x580 ? io_wqe_wake_worker+0x114/0x360 ? io_uring_get_socket+0x40/0x40 io_async_find_and_cancel+0x3b/0x140 io_issue_sqe+0xbe1/0x14e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x647/0x18c0 ? __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x5f0 __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x5f0 ? io_req_prep+0xdb/0x1150 ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xb0 ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xb0 ? io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x4b0 io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x4b0 io_submit_sqes+0xd7e/0x12a0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? io_sq_thread+0x3ae/0x940 io_sq_thread+0x207/0x940 ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xc0/0xc0 ? __ia32_sys_io_uring_enter+0x650/0x650 kthread+0x134/0x180 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fix this by moving the IO_WQ_WORK_NO_CANCEL until _after_ we've modified the fdtable. Canceling before this point is totally fine, and running it in the io-wq context _after_ that point is also fine. For 5.12, we'll handle this internally and get rid of the no-cancel flag, as IORING_OP_CLOSE is the only user of it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b5dba59e0cf7 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_CLOSE") Reported-by: "Abaci " Reviewed-and-tested-by: Joseph Qi Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 383ff6ed3734..e4c1cdf0325d 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -4472,7 +4472,6 @@ static int io_close_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) * io_wq_work.flags, so initialize io_wq_work firstly. */ io_req_init_async(req); - req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_NO_CANCEL; if (unlikely(req->ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL)) return -EINVAL; @@ -4505,6 +4504,8 @@ static int io_close(struct io_kiocb *req, bool force_nonblock, /* if the file has a flush method, be safe and punt to async */ if (close->put_file->f_op->flush && force_nonblock) { + /* not safe to cancel at this point */ + req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_NO_CANCEL; /* was never set, but play safe */ req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NOWAIT; /* avoid grabbing files - we don't need the files */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9a173346bd9e16ab19c7addb8862d95a5cea9feb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 12:01:08 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix short read retries for non-reg files Sockets and other non-regular files may actually expect short reads to happen, don't retry reads for them. Because non-reg files don't set FMODE_BUF_RASYNC and so it won't do second/retry do_read, we can filter out those cases after first do_read() attempt with ret>0. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Suggested-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index e4c1cdf0325d..862113a9364f 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -3552,7 +3552,7 @@ static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, bool force_nonblock, /* read it all, or we did blocking attempt. no retry. */ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || !force_nonblock || - (req->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) + (req->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) || !(req->flags & REQ_F_ISREG)) goto done; io_size -= ret; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 214a5ea081e77346e4963dd6d20c5539ff8b6ae6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 08:22:48 +1000 Subject: cifs: do not fail __smb_send_rqst if non-fatal signals are pending RHBZ 1848178 The original intent of returning an error in this function in the patch: "CIFS: Mask off signals when sending SMB packets" was to avoid interrupting packet send in the middle of sending the data (and thus breaking an SMB connection), but we also don't want to fail the request for non-fatal signals even before we have had a chance to try to send it (the reported problem could be reproduced e.g. by exiting a child process when the parent process was in the midst of calling futimens to update a file's timestamps). In addition, since the signal may remain pending when we enter the sending loop, we may end up not sending the whole packet before TCP buffers become full. In this case the code returns -EINTR but what we need here is to return -ERESTARTSYS instead to allow system calls to be restarted. Fixes: b30c74c73c78 ("CIFS: Mask off signals when sending SMB packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/transport.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/transport.c b/fs/cifs/transport.c index e9abb41aa89b..95ef26b555b9 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/transport.c +++ b/fs/cifs/transport.c @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ __smb_send_rqst(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, if (ssocket == NULL) return -EAGAIN; - if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "signal pending before send request\n"); return -ERESTARTSYS; } @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ unmask: if (signal_pending(current) && (total_len != send_length)) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "signal is pending after attempt to send\n"); - rc = -EINTR; + rc = -ERESTARTSYS; } /* uncork it */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9d5c8190683a462dbc787658467a0da17011ea5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2021 15:08:14 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix sleeping under spin in __io_clean_op [ 27.629441] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at fs/file.c:402 [ 27.631317] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1012, name: io_wqe_worker-0 [ 27.633220] 1 lock held by io_wqe_worker-0/1012: [ 27.634286] #0: ffff888105e26c98 (&ctx->completion_lock) {....}-{2:2}, at: __io_req_complete.part.102+0x30/0x70 [ 27.649249] Call Trace: [ 27.649874] dump_stack+0xac/0xe3 [ 27.650666] ___might_sleep+0x284/0x2c0 [ 27.651566] put_files_struct+0xb8/0x120 [ 27.652481] __io_clean_op+0x10c/0x2a0 [ 27.653362] __io_cqring_fill_event+0x2c1/0x350 [ 27.654399] __io_req_complete.part.102+0x41/0x70 [ 27.655464] io_openat2+0x151/0x300 [ 27.656297] io_issue_sqe+0x6c/0x14e0 [ 27.660991] io_wq_submit_work+0x7f/0x240 [ 27.662890] io_worker_handle_work+0x501/0x8a0 [ 27.664836] io_wqe_worker+0x158/0x520 [ 27.667726] kthread+0x134/0x180 [ 27.669641] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Instead of cleaning files on overflow, return back overflow cancellation into io_uring_cancel_files(). Previously it was racy to clean REQ_F_OVERFLOW flag, but we got rid of it, and can do it through repetitive attempts targeting all matching requests. Reported-by: Abaci Reported-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Xiaoguang Wang Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 862113a9364f..8a98afed50cd 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1025,6 +1025,7 @@ static ssize_t io_import_iovec(int rw, struct io_kiocb *req, static int io_setup_async_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct iovec *iovec, const struct iovec *fast_iov, struct iov_iter *iter, bool force); +static void io_req_drop_files(struct io_kiocb *req); static struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; @@ -1048,8 +1049,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(io_uring_get_socket); static inline void io_clean_op(struct io_kiocb *req) { - if (req->flags & (REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP | REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED | - REQ_F_INFLIGHT)) + if (req->flags & (REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP | REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED)) __io_clean_op(req); } @@ -1394,6 +1394,8 @@ static void io_req_clean_work(struct io_kiocb *req) free_fs_struct(fs); req->work.flags &= ~IO_WQ_WORK_FS; } + if (req->flags & REQ_F_INFLIGHT) + io_req_drop_files(req); io_put_identity(req->task->io_uring, req); } @@ -6230,9 +6232,6 @@ static void __io_clean_op(struct io_kiocb *req) } req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; } - - if (req->flags & REQ_F_INFLIGHT) - io_req_drop_files(req); } static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req, bool force_nonblock, @@ -8879,6 +8878,7 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, io_wq_cancel_cb(ctx->io_wq, io_cancel_task_cb, &cancel, true); io_poll_remove_all(ctx, task, files); io_kill_timeouts(ctx, task, files); + io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, task, files); /* cancellations _may_ trigger task work */ io_run_task_work(); schedule(); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 02a13674fa0e8dd326de8b9f4514b41b03d99003 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 15:49:31 -0700 Subject: io_uring: account io_uring internal files as REQ_F_INFLIGHT We need to actively cancel anything that introduces a potential circular loop, where io_uring holds a reference to itself. If the file in question is an io_uring file, then add the request to the inflight list. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 8a98afed50cd..c07913ec0cca 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1075,8 +1075,11 @@ static bool io_match_task(struct io_kiocb *head, return true; io_for_each_link(req, head) { - if ((req->flags & REQ_F_WORK_INITIALIZED) && - (req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_FILES) && + if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_WORK_INITIALIZED)) + continue; + if (req->file && req->file->f_op == &io_uring_fops) + return true; + if ((req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_FILES) && req->work.identity->files == files) return true; } @@ -1505,11 +1508,14 @@ static bool io_grab_identity(struct io_kiocb *req) return false; atomic_inc(&id->files->count); get_nsproxy(id->nsproxy); - req->flags |= REQ_F_INFLIGHT; - spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); - list_add(&req->inflight_entry, &ctx->inflight_list); - spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_INFLIGHT)) { + req->flags |= REQ_F_INFLIGHT; + + spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + list_add(&req->inflight_entry, &ctx->inflight_list); + spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + } req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_FILES; } if (!(req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_MM) && @@ -6164,8 +6170,10 @@ static void io_req_drop_files(struct io_kiocb *req) struct io_uring_task *tctx = req->task->io_uring; unsigned long flags; - put_files_struct(req->work.identity->files); - put_nsproxy(req->work.identity->nsproxy); + if (req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_FILES) { + put_files_struct(req->work.identity->files); + put_nsproxy(req->work.identity->nsproxy); + } spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->inflight_lock, flags); list_del(&req->inflight_entry); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->inflight_lock, flags); @@ -6450,6 +6458,15 @@ static struct file *io_file_get(struct io_submit_state *state, file = __io_file_get(state, fd); } + if (file && file->f_op == &io_uring_fops) { + io_req_init_async(req); + req->flags |= REQ_F_INFLIGHT; + + spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + list_add(&req->inflight_entry, &ctx->inflight_list); + spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + } + return file; } @@ -8860,8 +8877,7 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); list_for_each_entry(req, &ctx->inflight_list, inflight_entry) { - if (req->task != task || - req->work.identity->files != files) + if (!io_match_task(req, task, files)) continue; found = true; break; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 697edcb0e4eadc41645fe88c991fe6a206b1a08d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaoming Ni Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 21:02:16 -0800 Subject: proc_sysctl: fix oops caused by incorrect command parameters The process_sysctl_arg() does not check whether val is empty before invoking strlen(val). If the command line parameter () is incorrectly configured and val is empty, oops is triggered. For example: "hung_task_panic=1" is incorrectly written as "hung_task_panic", oops is triggered. The call stack is as follows: Kernel command line: .... hung_task_panic ...... Call trace: __pi_strlen+0x10/0x98 parse_args+0x278/0x344 do_sysctl_args+0x8c/0xfc kernel_init+0x5c/0xf4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 To fix it, check whether "val" is empty when "phram" is a sysctl field. Error codes are returned in the failure branch, and error logs are generated by parse_args(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118133029.28580-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com Fixes: 3db978d480e2843 ("kernel/sysctl: support setting sysctl parameters from kernel command line") Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Luis Chamberlain Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Iurii Zaikin Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Heiner Kallweit Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: [5.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index 317899222d7f..d2018f70d1fa 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -1770,6 +1770,12 @@ static int process_sysctl_arg(char *param, char *val, return 0; } + if (!val) + return -EINVAL; + len = strlen(val); + if (len == 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* * To set sysctl options, we use a temporary mount of proc, look up the * respective sys/ file and write to it. To avoid mounting it when no @@ -1811,7 +1817,6 @@ static int process_sysctl_arg(char *param, char *val, file, param, val); goto out; } - len = strlen(val); wret = kernel_write(file, val, len, &pos); if (wret < 0) { err = wret; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 84965ff8a84f0368b154c9b367b62e59c1193f30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 15:51:11 -0700 Subject: io_uring: if we see flush on exit, cancel related tasks Ensure we match tasks that belong to a dead or dying task as well, as we need to reap those in addition to those belonging to the exiting task. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reported-by: Josef Grieb Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index c07913ec0cca..695fe00bafdc 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1069,8 +1069,12 @@ static bool io_match_task(struct io_kiocb *head, { struct io_kiocb *req; - if (task && head->task != task) + if (task && head->task != task) { + /* in terms of cancelation, always match if req task is dead */ + if (head->task->flags & PF_EXITING) + return true; return false; + } if (!files) return true; @@ -9136,6 +9140,9 @@ static int io_uring_flush(struct file *file, void *data) struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; + if (fatal_signal_pending(current) || (current->flags & PF_EXITING)) + io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, NULL); + if (!tctx) return 0; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b18032bb0a883cd7edd22a7fe6c57e1059b81ed0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2021 16:58:56 -0700 Subject: io_uring: only call io_cqring_ev_posted() if events were posted This normally doesn't cause any extra harm, but it does mean that we'll increment the eventfd notification count, if one has been registered with the ring. This can confuse applications, when they see more notifications on the eventfd side than are available in the ring. Do the nice thing and only increment this count, if we actually posted (or even overflowed) events. Reported-and-tested-by: Dan Melnic Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 695fe00bafdc..2166c469789d 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1779,12 +1779,13 @@ static bool __io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, struct io_kiocb *req, *tmp; struct io_uring_cqe *cqe; unsigned long flags; - bool all_flushed; + bool all_flushed, posted; LIST_HEAD(list); if (!force && __io_cqring_events(ctx) == rings->cq_ring_entries) return false; + posted = false; spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->completion_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry_safe(req, tmp, &ctx->cq_overflow_list, compl.list) { if (!io_match_task(req, tsk, files)) @@ -1804,6 +1805,7 @@ static bool __io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, WRITE_ONCE(ctx->rings->cq_overflow, ctx->cached_cq_overflow); } + posted = true; } all_flushed = list_empty(&ctx->cq_overflow_list); @@ -1813,9 +1815,11 @@ static bool __io_cqring_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, bool force, ctx->rings->sq_flags &= ~IORING_SQ_CQ_OVERFLOW; } - io_commit_cqring(ctx); + if (posted) + io_commit_cqring(ctx); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->completion_lock, flags); - io_cqring_ev_posted(ctx); + if (posted) + io_cqring_ev_posted(ctx); while (!list_empty(&list)) { req = list_first_entry(&list, struct io_kiocb, compl.list); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 814b84971388cd5fb182f2e914265b3827758455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 16:34:37 -0500 Subject: pNFS/NFSv4: Fix a layout segment leak in pnfs_layout_process() If the server returns a new stateid that does not match the one in our cache, then pnfs_layout_process() will leak the layout segments returned by pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid(). Fixes: 9888d837f3cf ("pNFS: Force a retry of LAYOUTGET if the stateid doesn't match our cache") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 4f274f21c4ab..e68e6f8cb407 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2417,6 +2417,7 @@ out_forget: spin_unlock(&ino->i_lock); lseg->pls_layout = lo; NFS_SERVER(ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->free_lseg(lseg); + pnfs_free_lseg_list(&free_me); return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 08bd8dbe88825760e953759d7ec212903a026c75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 17:11:42 -0500 Subject: pNFS/NFSv4: Try to return invalid layout in pnfs_layout_process() If the server returns a new stateid that does not match the one in our cache, then try to return the one we hold instead of just invalidating it on the client side. This ensures that both client and server will agree that the stateid is invalid. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index e68e6f8cb407..d6262289cf4a 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2398,7 +2398,13 @@ pnfs_layout_process(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp) * We got an entirely new state ID. Mark all segments for the * inode invalid, and retry the layoutget */ - pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid(lo, &free_me); + struct pnfs_layout_range range = { + .iomode = IOMODE_ANY, + .length = NFS4_MAX_UINT64, + }; + pnfs_set_plh_return_info(lo, IOMODE_ANY, 0); + pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return(lo, &lo->plh_return_segs, + &range, 0); goto out_forget; } @@ -2417,7 +2423,6 @@ out_forget: spin_unlock(&ino->i_lock); lseg->pls_layout = lo; NFS_SERVER(ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->free_lseg(lseg); - pnfs_free_lseg_list(&free_me); return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 1bcf34fdac5f8c2fcd16796495db75744612ca27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 13:51:50 -0500 Subject: pNFS/NFSv4: Update the layout barrier when we schedule a layoutreturn When we're scheduling a layoutreturn, we need to ignore any further incoming layouts with sequence ids that are going to be affected by the layout return. Fixes: 44ea8dfce021 ("NFS/pnfs: Reference the layout cred in pnfs_prepare_layoutreturn()") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index d6262289cf4a..acb63ec00053 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -324,6 +324,21 @@ pnfs_grab_inode_layout_hdr(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) return NULL; } +/* + * Compare 2 layout stateid sequence ids, to see which is newer, + * taking into account wraparound issues. + */ +static bool pnfs_seqid_is_newer(u32 s1, u32 s2) +{ + return (s32)(s1 - s2) > 0; +} + +static void pnfs_barrier_update(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, u32 newseq) +{ + if (pnfs_seqid_is_newer(newseq, lo->plh_barrier)) + lo->plh_barrier = newseq; +} + static void pnfs_set_plh_return_info(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, enum pnfs_iomode iomode, u32 seq) @@ -335,6 +350,7 @@ pnfs_set_plh_return_info(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, enum pnfs_iomode iomode, if (seq != 0) { WARN_ON_ONCE(lo->plh_return_seq != 0 && lo->plh_return_seq != seq); lo->plh_return_seq = seq; + pnfs_barrier_update(lo, seq); } } @@ -639,15 +655,6 @@ static int mark_lseg_invalid(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg, return rv; } -/* - * Compare 2 layout stateid sequence ids, to see which is newer, - * taking into account wraparound issues. - */ -static bool pnfs_seqid_is_newer(u32 s1, u32 s2) -{ - return (s32)(s1 - s2) > 0; -} - static bool pnfs_should_free_range(const struct pnfs_layout_range *lseg_range, const struct pnfs_layout_range *recall_range) @@ -984,8 +991,7 @@ pnfs_set_layout_stateid(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, const nfs4_stateid *new, new_barrier = be32_to_cpu(new->seqid); else if (new_barrier == 0) return; - if (pnfs_seqid_is_newer(new_barrier, lo->plh_barrier)) - lo->plh_barrier = new_barrier; + pnfs_barrier_update(lo, new_barrier); } static bool @@ -1183,20 +1189,17 @@ pnfs_prepare_layoutreturn(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, return false; set_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN, &lo->plh_flags); pnfs_get_layout_hdr(lo); + nfs4_stateid_copy(stateid, &lo->plh_stateid); + *cred = get_cred(lo->plh_lc_cred); if (test_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN_REQUESTED, &lo->plh_flags)) { - nfs4_stateid_copy(stateid, &lo->plh_stateid); - *cred = get_cred(lo->plh_lc_cred); if (lo->plh_return_seq != 0) stateid->seqid = cpu_to_be32(lo->plh_return_seq); if (iomode != NULL) *iomode = lo->plh_return_iomode; pnfs_clear_layoutreturn_info(lo); - return true; - } - nfs4_stateid_copy(stateid, &lo->plh_stateid); - *cred = get_cred(lo->plh_lc_cred); - if (iomode != NULL) + } else if (iomode != NULL) *iomode = IOMODE_ANY; + pnfs_barrier_update(lo, be32_to_cpu(stateid->seqid)); return true; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From d29b468da4f940bd2bff2628ba8d2d652671d244 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 10:05:51 -0500 Subject: pNFS/NFSv4: Improve rejection of out-of-order layouts If a layoutget ends up being reordered w.r.t. a layoutreturn, e.g. due to a layoutget-on-open not knowing a priori which file to lock, then we must assume the layout is no longer being considered valid state by the server. Incrementally improve our ability to reject such states by using the cached old stateid in conjunction with the plh_barrier to try to identify them. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index acb63ec00053..af64b4e6fd1f 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ pnfs_layout_stateid_blocked(const struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo, { u32 seqid = be32_to_cpu(stateid->seqid); - return !pnfs_seqid_is_newer(seqid, lo->plh_barrier); + return !pnfs_seqid_is_newer(seqid, lo->plh_barrier) && lo->plh_barrier; } /* lget is set to 1 if called from inside send_layoutget call chain */ @@ -1912,6 +1912,11 @@ static void nfs_layoutget_end(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) wake_up_var(&lo->plh_outstanding); } +static bool pnfs_is_first_layoutget(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) +{ + return test_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_FIRST_LAYOUTGET, &lo->plh_flags); +} + static void pnfs_clear_first_layoutget(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) { unsigned long *bitlock = &lo->plh_flags; @@ -2386,17 +2391,17 @@ pnfs_layout_process(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp) goto out_forget; } - if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo)) { - /* We have a completely new layout */ - pnfs_set_layout_stateid(lo, &res->stateid, lgp->cred, true); - } else if (nfs4_stateid_match_other(&lo->plh_stateid, &res->stateid)) { + if (nfs4_stateid_match_other(&lo->plh_stateid, &res->stateid)) { /* existing state ID, make sure the sequence number matches. */ if (pnfs_layout_stateid_blocked(lo, &res->stateid)) { + if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo) && + pnfs_is_first_layoutget(lo)) + lo->plh_barrier = 0; dprintk("%s forget reply due to sequence\n", __func__); goto out_forget; } pnfs_set_layout_stateid(lo, &res->stateid, lgp->cred, false); - } else { + } else if (pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo)) { /* * We got an entirely new state ID. Mark all segments for the * inode invalid, and retry the layoutget @@ -2409,6 +2414,11 @@ pnfs_layout_process(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp) pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return(lo, &lo->plh_return_segs, &range, 0); goto out_forget; + } else { + /* We have a completely new layout */ + if (!pnfs_is_first_layoutget(lo)) + goto out_forget; + pnfs_set_layout_stateid(lo, &res->stateid, lgp->cred, true); } pnfs_get_lseg(lseg); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 2f96e40212d435b328459ba6b3956395eed8fa9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 16:26:17 -0500 Subject: btrfs: fix possible free space tree corruption with online conversion While running btrfs/011 in a loop I would often ASSERT() while trying to add a new free space entry that already existed, or get an EEXIST while adding a new block to the extent tree, which is another indication of double allocation. This occurs because when we do the free space tree population, we create the new root and then populate the tree and commit the transaction. The problem is when you create a new root, the root node and commit root node are the same. During this initial transaction commit we will run all of the delayed refs that were paused during the free space tree generation, and thus begin to cache block groups. While caching block groups the caching thread will be reading from the main root for the free space tree, so as we make allocations we'll be changing the free space tree, which can cause us to add the same range twice which results in either the ASSERT(ret != -EEXIST); in __btrfs_add_free_space, or in a variety of different errors when running delayed refs because of a double allocation. Fix this by marking the fs_info as unsafe to load the free space tree, and fall back on the old slow method. We could be smarter than this, for example caching the block group while we're populating the free space tree, but since this is a serious problem I've opted for the simplest solution. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Fixes: a5ed91828518 ("Btrfs: implement the free space B-tree") Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 10 +++++++++- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 3 +++ fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/block-group.c b/fs/btrfs/block-group.c index 0886e81e5540..48ebc106a606 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/block-group.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/block-group.c @@ -673,7 +673,15 @@ static noinline void caching_thread(struct btrfs_work *work) wake_up(&caching_ctl->wait); } - if (btrfs_fs_compat_ro(fs_info, FREE_SPACE_TREE)) + /* + * If we are in the transaction that populated the free space tree we + * can't actually cache from the free space tree as our commit root and + * real root are the same, so we could change the contents of the blocks + * while caching. Instead do the slow caching in this case, and after + * the transaction has committed we will be safe. + */ + if (btrfs_fs_compat_ro(fs_info, FREE_SPACE_TREE) && + !(test_bit(BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, &fs_info->flags))) ret = load_free_space_tree(caching_ctl); else ret = load_extent_tree_free(caching_ctl); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 0225c5208f44..47ca8edafb5e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -564,6 +564,9 @@ enum { /* Indicate that we need to cleanup space cache v1 */ BTRFS_FS_CLEANUP_SPACE_CACHE_V1, + + /* Indicate that we can't trust the free space tree for caching yet */ + BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, }; /* diff --git a/fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c index e33a65bd9a0c..a33bca94d133 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c @@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ int btrfs_create_free_space_tree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) return PTR_ERR(trans); set_bit(BTRFS_FS_CREATING_FREE_SPACE_TREE, &fs_info->flags); + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, &fs_info->flags); free_space_root = btrfs_create_tree(trans, BTRFS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_OBJECTID); if (IS_ERR(free_space_root)) { @@ -1171,11 +1172,18 @@ int btrfs_create_free_space_tree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(fs_info, FREE_SPACE_TREE); btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(fs_info, FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID); clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_CREATING_FREE_SPACE_TREE, &fs_info->flags); + ret = btrfs_commit_transaction(trans); - return btrfs_commit_transaction(trans); + /* + * Now that we've committed the transaction any reading of our commit + * root will be safe, so we can cache from the free space tree now. + */ + clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, &fs_info->flags); + return ret; abort: clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_CREATING_FREE_SPACE_TREE, &fs_info->flags); + clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, &fs_info->flags); btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret); btrfs_end_transaction(trans); return ret; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c41ec4529d3448df8998950d7bada757a1b321cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Su Yue Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 19:39:10 +0800 Subject: btrfs: fix lockdep warning due to seqcount_mutex on 32bit arch This effectively reverts commit d5c8238849e7 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t"). While running fstests on 32 bits test box, many tests failed because of warnings in dmesg. One of those warnings (btrfs/003): [66.441317] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 9251 at include/linux/seqlock.h:279 btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0 [btrfs] [66.441446] CPU: 6 PID: 9251 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G O 5.11.0-rc4-custom+ #5 [66.441449] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014 [66.441451] EIP: btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0 [btrfs] [66.441472] EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: c576070c EDX: c6b15803 [66.441475] ESI: 10000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c56fbcfc ESP: c56fbc70 [66.441477] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246 [66.441481] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 05c8da20 CR3: 04b20000 CR4: 00350ed0 [66.441485] Call Trace: [66.441510] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0xb1/0x100 [btrfs] [66.441529] ? btrfs_lookup_block_group+0x17/0x20 [btrfs] [66.441562] btrfs_balance+0x8ed/0x13b0 [btrfs] [66.441586] ? btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x333/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.441619] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x11 [66.441643] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x333/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.441664] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441683] btrfs_ioctl+0x414/0x2ae0 [btrfs] [66.441700] ? __lock_acquire+0x35f/0x2650 [66.441717] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x87/0x120 [66.441720] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd0/0x1e0 [66.441724] ? call_rcu+0x2d3/0x530 [66.441731] ? __might_fault+0x41/0x90 [66.441736] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x15/0x50 [66.441740] ? sched_clock+0x8/0x10 [66.441745] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x13/0x180 [66.441750] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441750] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441768] __ia32_sys_ioctl+0x165/0x8a0 [66.441773] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x11 [66.441785] ? __might_fault+0x89/0x90 [66.441791] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x54/0x80 [66.441796] do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x70 [66.441801] do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20 [66.441805] entry_SYSENTER_32+0x9f/0xf2 [66.441808] EIP: 0xab7b5549 [66.441814] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: c4009420 EDX: bfa91f5c [66.441816] ESI: 00000003 EDI: 00000001 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfa91e98 [66.441818] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000292 [66.441833] irq event stamp: 42579 [66.441835] hardirqs last enabled at (42585): [] console_unlock+0x495/0x590 [66.441838] hardirqs last disabled at (42590): [] console_unlock+0x405/0x590 [66.441840] softirqs last enabled at (41698): [] call_on_stack+0x1c/0x60 [66.441843] softirqs last disabled at (41681): [] call_on_stack+0x1c/0x60 ======================================================================== btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0: __seqprop_mutex_assert at linux/./include/linux/seqlock.h:279 (inlined by) btrfs_device_set_bytes_used at linux/fs/btrfs/volumes.h:212 (inlined by) btrfs_remove_chunk at linux/fs/btrfs/volumes.c:2994 ======================================================================== The warning is produced by lockdep_assert_held() in __seqprop_mutex_assert() if CONFIG_LOCKDEP is enabled. And "olumes.c:2994 is btrfs_device_set_bytes_used() with mutex lock fs_info->chunk_mutex held already. After adding some debug prints, the cause was found that many __alloc_device() are called with NULL @fs_info (during scanning ioctl). Inside the function, btrfs_device_data_ordered_init() is expanded to seqcount_mutex_init(). In this scenario, its second parameter info->chunk_mutex is &NULL->chunk_mutex which equals to offsetof(struct btrfs_fs_info, chunk_mutex) unexpectedly. Thus, seqcount_mutex_init() is called in wrong way. And later btrfs_device_get/set helpers trigger lockdep warnings. The device and filesystem object lifetimes are different and we'd have to synchronize initialization of the btrfs_device::data_seqcount with the fs_info, possibly using some additional synchronization. It would still not prevent concurrent access to the seqcount lock when it's used for read and initialization. Commit d5c8238849e7 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t") does not mention a particular problem being fixed so revert should not cause any harm and we'll get the lockdep warning fixed. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210139 Reported-by: Erhard F Fixes: d5c8238849e7 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 CC: Davidlohr Bueso Signed-off-by: Su Yue Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 2 +- fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 11 ++++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 0c7f4f6237e8..b900cc7849b6 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static struct btrfs_device *__alloc_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) atomic_set(&dev->reada_in_flight, 0); atomic_set(&dev->dev_stats_ccnt, 0); - btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(dev, fs_info); + btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(dev); INIT_RADIX_TREE(&dev->reada_zones, GFP_NOFS & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM); INIT_RADIX_TREE(&dev->reada_extents, GFP_NOFS & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM); extent_io_tree_init(fs_info, &dev->alloc_state, diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.h b/fs/btrfs/volumes.h index 1997a4649a66..c43663d9c22e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.h @@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ struct btrfs_io_geometry { #if BITS_PER_LONG==32 && defined(CONFIG_SMP) #include #define __BTRFS_NEED_DEVICE_DATA_ORDERED -#define btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(device, info) \ - seqcount_mutex_init(&device->data_seqcount, &info->chunk_mutex) +#define btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(device) \ + seqcount_init(&device->data_seqcount) #else -#define btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(device, info) do { } while (0) +#define btrfs_device_data_ordered_init(device) do { } while (0) #endif #define BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE (0) @@ -76,8 +76,7 @@ struct btrfs_device { blk_status_t last_flush_error; #ifdef __BTRFS_NEED_DEVICE_DATA_ORDERED - /* A seqcount_t with associated chunk_mutex (for lockdep) */ - seqcount_mutex_t data_seqcount; + seqcount_t data_seqcount; #endif /* the internal btrfs device id */ @@ -168,9 +167,11 @@ btrfs_device_get_##name(const struct btrfs_device *dev) \ static inline void \ btrfs_device_set_##name(struct btrfs_device *dev, u64 size) \ { \ + preempt_disable(); \ write_seqcount_begin(&dev->data_seqcount); \ dev->name = size; \ write_seqcount_end(&dev->data_seqcount); \ + preempt_enable(); \ } #elif BITS_PER_LONG==32 && defined(CONFIG_PREEMPTION) #define BTRFS_DEVICE_GETSET_FUNCS(name) \ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9ad6d91f056b99dbe59a262810cb342519ea8d39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 19:07:45 +0000 Subject: btrfs: fix log replay failure due to race with space cache rebuild After a sudden power failure we may end up with a space cache on disk that is not valid and needs to be rebuilt from scratch. If that happens, during log replay when we attempt to pin an extent buffer from a log tree, at btrfs_pin_extent_for_log_replay(), we do not wait for the space cache to be rebuilt through the call to: btrfs_cache_block_group(cache, 1); That is because that only waits for the task (work queue job) that loads the space cache to change the cache state from BTRFS_CACHE_FAST to any other value. That is ok when the space cache on disk exists and is valid, but when the cache is not valid and needs to be rebuilt, it ends up returning as soon as the cache state changes to BTRFS_CACHE_STARTED (done at caching_thread()). So this means that we can end up trying to unpin a range which is not yet marked as free in the block group. This results in the call to btrfs_remove_free_space() to return -EINVAL to btrfs_pin_extent_for_log_replay(), which in turn makes the log replay fail as well as mounting the filesystem. More specifically the -EINVAL comes from free_space_cache.c:remove_from_bitmap(), because the requested range is not marked as free space (ones in the bitmap), we have the following condition triggered: static noinline int remove_from_bitmap(struct btrfs_free_space_ctl *ctl, (...) if (ret < 0 || search_start != *offset) return -EINVAL; (...) It's the "search_start != *offset" that results in the condition being evaluated to true. When this happens we got the following in dmesg/syslog: [72383.415114] BTRFS: device fsid 32b95b69-0ea9-496a-9f02-3f5a56dc9322 devid 1 transid 1432 /dev/sdb scanned by mount (3816007) [72383.417837] BTRFS info (device sdb): disk space caching is enabled [72383.418536] BTRFS info (device sdb): has skinny extents [72383.423846] BTRFS info (device sdb): start tree-log replay [72383.426416] BTRFS warning (device sdb): block group 30408704 has wrong amount of free space [72383.427686] BTRFS warning (device sdb): failed to load free space cache for block group 30408704, rebuilding it now [72383.454291] BTRFS: error (device sdb) in btrfs_recover_log_trees:6203: errno=-22 unknown (Failed to pin buffers while recovering log root tree.) [72383.456725] BTRFS: error (device sdb) in btrfs_replay_log:2253: errno=-22 unknown (Failed to recover log tree) [72383.460241] BTRFS error (device sdb): open_ctree failed We also mark the range for the extent buffer in the excluded extents io tree. That is fine when the space cache is valid on disk and we can load it, in which case it causes no problems. However, for the case where we need to rebuild the space cache, because it is either invalid or it is missing, having the extent buffer range marked in the excluded extents io tree leads to a -EINVAL failure from the call to btrfs_remove_free_space(), resulting in the log replay and mount to fail. This is because by having the range marked in the excluded extents io tree, the caching thread ends up never adding the range of the extent buffer as free space in the block group since the calls to add_new_free_space(), called from load_extent_tree_free(), filter out any ranges that are marked as excluded extents. So fix this by making sure that during log replay we wait for the caching task to finish completely when we need to rebuild a space cache, and also drop the need to mark the extent buffer range in the excluded extents io tree, as well as clearing ranges from that tree at btrfs_finish_extent_commit(). This started to happen with some frequency on large filesystems having block groups with a lot of fragmentation since the recent commit e747853cae3ae3 ("btrfs: load free space cache asynchronously"), but in fact the issue has been there for years, it was just much less likely to happen. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 61 +++++++++++++++----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 30b1a630dc2f..0c335dae5af7 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -2602,8 +2602,6 @@ int btrfs_pin_extent_for_log_replay(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_block_group *cache; int ret; - btrfs_add_excluded_extent(trans->fs_info, bytenr, num_bytes); - cache = btrfs_lookup_block_group(trans->fs_info, bytenr); if (!cache) return -EINVAL; @@ -2615,11 +2613,19 @@ int btrfs_pin_extent_for_log_replay(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, * the pinned extents. */ btrfs_cache_block_group(cache, 1); + /* + * Make sure we wait until the cache is completely built in case it is + * missing or is invalid and therefore needs to be rebuilt. + */ + ret = btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_done(cache); + if (ret) + goto out; pin_down_extent(trans, cache, bytenr, num_bytes, 0); /* remove us from the free space cache (if we're there at all) */ ret = btrfs_remove_free_space(cache, bytenr, num_bytes); +out: btrfs_put_block_group(cache); return ret; } @@ -2629,50 +2635,22 @@ static int __exclude_logged_extent(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, { int ret; struct btrfs_block_group *block_group; - struct btrfs_caching_control *caching_ctl; block_group = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, start); if (!block_group) return -EINVAL; - btrfs_cache_block_group(block_group, 0); - caching_ctl = btrfs_get_caching_control(block_group); - - if (!caching_ctl) { - /* Logic error */ - BUG_ON(!btrfs_block_group_done(block_group)); - ret = btrfs_remove_free_space(block_group, start, num_bytes); - } else { - /* - * We must wait for v1 caching to finish, otherwise we may not - * remove our space. - */ - btrfs_wait_space_cache_v1_finished(block_group, caching_ctl); - mutex_lock(&caching_ctl->mutex); - - if (start >= caching_ctl->progress) { - ret = btrfs_add_excluded_extent(fs_info, start, - num_bytes); - } else if (start + num_bytes <= caching_ctl->progress) { - ret = btrfs_remove_free_space(block_group, - start, num_bytes); - } else { - num_bytes = caching_ctl->progress - start; - ret = btrfs_remove_free_space(block_group, - start, num_bytes); - if (ret) - goto out_lock; + btrfs_cache_block_group(block_group, 1); + /* + * Make sure we wait until the cache is completely built in case it is + * missing or is invalid and therefore needs to be rebuilt. + */ + ret = btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_done(block_group); + if (ret) + goto out; - num_bytes = (start + num_bytes) - - caching_ctl->progress; - start = caching_ctl->progress; - ret = btrfs_add_excluded_extent(fs_info, start, - num_bytes); - } -out_lock: - mutex_unlock(&caching_ctl->mutex); - btrfs_put_caching_control(caching_ctl); - } + ret = btrfs_remove_free_space(block_group, start, num_bytes); +out: btrfs_put_block_group(block_group); return ret; } @@ -2863,9 +2841,6 @@ int btrfs_finish_extent_commit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) mutex_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); break; } - if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_LOG_RECOVERING, &fs_info->flags)) - clear_extent_bits(&fs_info->excluded_extents, start, - end, EXTENT_UPTODATE); if (btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, DISCARD_SYNC)) ret = btrfs_discard_extent(fs_info, start, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From f8ad8187c3b536ee2b10502a8340c014204a1af0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 10:16:15 +0100 Subject: fs/pipe: allow sendfile() to pipe again After commit 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") sendfile() could no longer send data from a real file to a pipe, breaking for example certain cgit setups (e.g. when running behind fcgiwrap), because in this case cgit will try to do exactly this: sendfile() to a pipe. Fix this by using iter_file_splice_write for the splice_write method of pipes, as suggested by Christoph. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Tested-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/pipe.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c index c5989cfd564d..39c96845a72f 100644 --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -1206,6 +1206,7 @@ const struct file_operations pipefifo_fops = { .unlocked_ioctl = pipe_ioctl, .release = pipe_release, .fasync = pipe_fasync, + .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, }; /* -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 0b964446c63f9d7d7cd1809ee39277b4f73916b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 17:22:03 +0100 Subject: ecryptfs: fix uid translation for setxattr on security.capability Prior to commit 7c03e2cda4a5 ("vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()") the translation of nscap->rootid did not take stacked filesystems (overlayfs and ecryptfs) into account. That patch fixed the overlay case, but made the ecryptfs case worse. Restore old the behavior for ecryptfs that existed before the overlayfs fix. This does not fix ecryptfs's handling of complex user namespace setups, but it does make sure existing setups don't regress. Reported-by: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Tyler Hicks Fixes: 7c03e2cda4a5 ("vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()") Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks --- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c index e23752d9a79f..58d0f7187997 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c @@ -1016,15 +1016,19 @@ ecryptfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, { int rc; struct dentry *lower_dentry; + struct inode *lower_inode; lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry); - if (!(d_inode(lower_dentry)->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { + lower_inode = d_inode(lower_dentry); + if (!(lower_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } - rc = vfs_setxattr(lower_dentry, name, value, size, flags); + inode_lock(lower_inode); + rc = __vfs_setxattr_locked(lower_dentry, name, value, size, flags, NULL); + inode_unlock(lower_inode); if (!rc && inode) - fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, d_inode(lower_dentry)); + fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode); out: return rc; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a1bb3cd58913338e1b627ea6b8c03c2ae82d293f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 15:28:26 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix __io_uring_files_cancel() with TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE If the tctx inflight number haven't changed because of cancellation, __io_uring_task_cancel() will continue leaving the task in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state, that's not expected by __io_uring_files_cancel(). Ensure we always call finish_wait() before retrying. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 2166c469789d..09aada153a71 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -9124,16 +9124,15 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void) prepare_to_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); /* - * If we've seen completions, retry. This avoids a race where - * a completion comes in before we did prepare_to_wait(). + * If we've seen completions, retry without waiting. This + * avoids a race where a completion comes in before we did + * prepare_to_wait(). */ - if (inflight != tctx_inflight(tctx)) - continue; - schedule(); + if (inflight == tctx_inflight(tctx)) + schedule(); finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait); } while (1); - finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait); atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle); io_uring_remove_task_files(tctx); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ca70f00bed6cb255b7a9b91aa18a2717c9217f70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 15:28:27 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix cancellation taking mutex while TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2 set at [<00000000ced9dbfc>] prepare_to_wait+0x1f4/0x3b0 kernel/sched/wait.c:262 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19888 at kernel/sched/core.c:7853 __might_sleep+0xed/0x100 kernel/sched/core.c:7848 RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0xed/0x100 kernel/sched/core.c:7848 Call Trace: __mutex_lock_common+0xc4/0x2ef0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:935 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1a/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1118 io_wq_submit_work+0x39a/0x720 fs/io_uring.c:6411 io_run_cancel fs/io-wq.c:856 [inline] io_wqe_cancel_pending_work fs/io-wq.c:990 [inline] io_wq_cancel_cb+0x614/0xcb0 fs/io-wq.c:1027 io_uring_cancel_files fs/io_uring.c:8874 [inline] io_uring_cancel_task_requests fs/io_uring.c:8952 [inline] __io_uring_files_cancel+0x115d/0x19e0 fs/io_uring.c:9038 io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:51 [inline] do_exit+0x2e6/0x2490 kernel/exit.c:780 do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:922 get_signal+0x16b5/0x2030 kernel/signal.c:2770 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8e/0x6a0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:811 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:147 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xac/0x1e0 kernel/entry/common.c:201 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x48/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:302 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Rewrite io_uring_cancel_files() to mimic __io_uring_task_cancel()'s counting scheme, so it does all the heavy work before setting TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reported-by: syzbot+f655445043a26a7cfab8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov [axboe: fix inverted task check] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 09aada153a71..bb0270eeb8cb 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8873,30 +8873,31 @@ static void io_cancel_defer_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } } +static int io_uring_count_inflight(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct task_struct *task, + struct files_struct *files) +{ + struct io_kiocb *req; + int cnt = 0; + + spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + list_for_each_entry(req, &ctx->inflight_list, inflight_entry) + cnt += io_match_task(req, task, files); + spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + return cnt; +} + static void io_uring_cancel_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct task_struct *task, struct files_struct *files) { while (!list_empty_careful(&ctx->inflight_list)) { struct io_task_cancel cancel = { .task = task, .files = files }; - struct io_kiocb *req; DEFINE_WAIT(wait); - bool found = false; - - spin_lock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); - list_for_each_entry(req, &ctx->inflight_list, inflight_entry) { - if (!io_match_task(req, task, files)) - continue; - found = true; - break; - } - if (found) - prepare_to_wait(&task->io_uring->wait, &wait, - TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); - spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->inflight_lock); + int inflight; - /* We need to keep going until we don't find a matching req */ - if (!found) + inflight = io_uring_count_inflight(ctx, task, files); + if (!inflight) break; io_wq_cancel_cb(ctx->io_wq, io_cancel_task_cb, &cancel, true); @@ -8905,7 +8906,11 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_files(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, task, files); /* cancellations _may_ trigger task work */ io_run_task_work(); - schedule(); + + prepare_to_wait(&task->io_uring->wait, &wait, + TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + if (inflight == io_uring_count_inflight(ctx, task, files)) + schedule(); finish_wait(&task->io_uring->wait, &wait); } } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 907d1df30a51cc1a1d25414a00cde0494b83df7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 23:35:10 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix wqe->lock/completion_lock deadlock Joseph reports following deadlock: CPU0: ... io_kill_linked_timeout // &ctx->completion_lock io_commit_cqring __io_queue_deferred __io_queue_async_work io_wq_enqueue io_wqe_enqueue // &wqe->lock CPU1: ... __io_uring_files_cancel io_wq_cancel_cb io_wqe_cancel_pending_work // &wqe->lock io_cancel_task_cb // &ctx->completion_lock Only __io_queue_deferred() calls queue_async_work() while holding ctx->completion_lock, enqueue drained requests via io_req_task_queue() instead. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reported-by: Joseph Qi Tested-by: Joseph Qi Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index bb0270eeb8cb..c218deaf73a9 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static int io_setup_async_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct iovec *iovec, const struct iovec *fast_iov, struct iov_iter *iter, bool force); static void io_req_drop_files(struct io_kiocb *req); +static void io_req_task_queue(struct io_kiocb *req); static struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; @@ -1634,18 +1635,11 @@ static void __io_queue_deferred(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) do { struct io_defer_entry *de = list_first_entry(&ctx->defer_list, struct io_defer_entry, list); - struct io_kiocb *link; if (req_need_defer(de->req, de->seq)) break; list_del_init(&de->list); - /* punt-init is done before queueing for defer */ - link = __io_queue_async_work(de->req); - if (link) { - __io_queue_linked_timeout(link); - /* drop submission reference */ - io_put_req_deferred(link, 1); - } + io_req_task_queue(de->req); kfree(de); } while (!list_empty(&ctx->defer_list)); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 8dc932d3e8afb65e12eba7495f046c83884c49bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Mikityanskiy Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 21:59:07 +0200 Subject: Revert "block: simplify set_init_blocksize" to regain lost performance The cited commit introduced a serious regression with SATA write speed, as found by bisecting. This patch reverts this commit, which restores write speed back to the values observed before this commit. The performance tests were done on a Helios4 NAS (2nd batch) with 4 HDDs (WD8003FFBX) using dd (bs=1M count=2000). "Direct" is a test with a single HDD, the rest are different RAID levels built over the first partitions of 4 HDDs. Test results are in MB/s, R is read, W is write. | Direct | RAID0 | RAID10 f2 | RAID10 n2 | RAID6 ----------------+--------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------- 9011495c9466 | R:256 | R:313 | R:276 | R:313 | R:323 (before faulty) | W:254 | W:253 | W:195 | W:204 | W:117 ----------------+--------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------- 5ff9f19231a0 | R:257 | R:398 | R:312 | R:344 | R:391 (faulty commit) | W:154 | W:122 | W:67.7 | W:66.6 | W:67.2 ----------------+--------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------- 5.10.10 | R:256 | R:401 | R:312 | R:356 | R:375 unpatched | W:149 | W:123 | W:64 | W:64.1 | W:61.5 ----------------+--------+-------+-----------+-----------+-------- 5.10.10 | R:255 | R:396 | R:312 | R:340 | R:393 patched | W:247 | W:274 | W:220 | W:225 | W:121 Applying this patch doesn't hurt read performance, while improves the write speed by 1.5x - 3.5x (more impact on RAID tests). The write speed is restored back to the state before the faulty commit, and even a bit higher in RAID tests (which aren't HDD-bound on this device) - that is likely related to other optimizations done between the faulty commit and 5.10.10 which also improved the read speed. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Fixes: 5ff9f19231a0 ("block: simplify set_init_blocksize") Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Jens Axboe Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/block_dev.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 3b8963e228a1..235b5042672e 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -130,7 +130,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(truncate_bdev_range); static void set_init_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev) { - bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bdev_logical_block_size(bdev)); + unsigned int bsize = bdev_logical_block_size(bdev); + loff_t size = i_size_read(bdev->bd_inode); + + while (bsize < PAGE_SIZE) { + if (size & bsize) + break; + bsize <<= 1; + } + bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bsize); } int set_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev, int size) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 6195ba09822c87cad09189bbf550d0fbe714687a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao Xu Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 15:14:09 +0800 Subject: io_uring: fix flush cqring overflow list while TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE Abaci reported the follow warning: [ 27.073425] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [] prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x3a/0xc0 [ 27.075805] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 951 at kernel/sched/core.c:7853 __might_sleep+0x80/0xa0 [ 27.077604] Modules linked in: [ 27.078379] CPU: 0 PID: 951 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.11.0-rc3+ #1 [ 27.079637] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 27.080852] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x80/0xa0 [ 27.081835] Code: 65 48 8b 04 25 80 71 01 00 48 8b 90 c0 15 00 00 48 8b 70 18 48 c7 c7 08 39 95 82 c6 05 f9 5f de 08 01 48 89 d1 e8 00 c6 fa ff 0b eb bf 41 0f b6 f5 48 c7 c7 40 23 c9 82 e8 f3 48 ec 00 eb a7 [ 27.084521] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fe3ce8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 27.085350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82956083 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 27.086348] RDX: ffff8881057a0000 RSI: ffffffff8118cc9e RDI: ffff88813bc28570 [ 27.087598] RBP: 00000000000003a7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 27.088819] R10: ffffc90000fe3e00 R11: 00000000fffef9f0 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 27.089819] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810576eb80 R15: ffff88810576e800 [ 27.091058] FS: 00007f7b144cf740(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 27.092775] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 27.093796] CR2: 00000000022da7b8 CR3: 000000010b928002 CR4: 00000000003706f0 [ 27.094778] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 27.095780] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 27.097011] Call Trace: [ 27.097685] __mutex_lock+0x5d/0xa30 [ 27.098565] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x71/0xc0 [ 27.099412] ? io_cqring_overflow_flush.part.101+0x6d/0x70 [ 27.100441] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe9/0x1c0 [ 27.101537] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40 [ 27.102656] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x110 [ 27.103459] ? io_cqring_overflow_flush.part.101+0x6d/0x70 [ 27.104317] io_cqring_overflow_flush.part.101+0x6d/0x70 [ 27.105113] io_cqring_wait+0x36e/0x4d0 [ 27.105770] ? find_held_lock+0x28/0xb0 [ 27.106370] ? io_uring_remove_task_files+0xa0/0xa0 [ 27.107076] __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x4fb/0x640 [ 27.107801] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x59/0xa0 [ 27.108562] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe9/0x1c0 [ 27.109684] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x26/0x70 [ 27.110731] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 27.111296] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 27.112056] RIP: 0033:0x7f7b13dc8239 [ 27.112663] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 27 ec 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 27.115113] RSP: 002b:00007ffd6d7f5c88 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa [ 27.116562] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7b13dc8239 [ 27.117961] RDX: 000000000000478e RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 27.118925] RBP: 00007ffd6d7f5cb0 R08: 0000000020000040 R09: 0000000000000008 [ 27.119773] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 0000000000400480 [ 27.120614] R13: 00007ffd6d7f5d90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 27.121490] irq event stamp: 5635 [ 27.121946] hardirqs last enabled at (5643): [] console_unlock+0x5c4/0x740 [ 27.123476] hardirqs last disabled at (5652): [] console_unlock+0x4e7/0x740 [ 27.125192] softirqs last enabled at (5272): [] __do_softirq+0x3c5/0x5aa [ 27.126430] softirqs last disabled at (5267): [] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 [ 27.127634] ---[ end trace 289d7e28fa60f928 ]--- This is caused by calling io_cqring_overflow_flush() which may sleep after calling prepare_to_wait_exclusive() which set task state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE Reported-by: Abaci Fixes: 6c503150ae33 ("io_uring: patch up IOPOLL overflow_flush sync") Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Hao Xu Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index c218deaf73a9..ae388cc52843 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -7268,14 +7268,18 @@ static int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); /* make sure we run task_work before checking for signals */ ret = io_run_task_work_sig(); - if (ret > 0) + if (ret > 0) { + finish_wait(&ctx->wait, &iowq.wq); continue; + } else if (ret < 0) break; if (io_should_wake(&iowq)) break; - if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) + if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) { + finish_wait(&ctx->wait, &iowq.wq); continue; + } if (uts) { timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout); if (timeout == 0) { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 9efb069de4ba748d284f6129e71de239f801053a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:22:48 +0100 Subject: ovl: add warning on user_ns mismatch Currently there's no way to create an overlay filesystem outside of the current user namespace. Make sure that if this assumption changes it doesn't go unnoticed. Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 2bd570cbe8a4..82cd6d55a5a1 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -1923,6 +1923,10 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) unsigned int numlower; int err; + err = -EIO; + if (WARN_ON(sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns())) + goto out; + sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations; err = -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 554677b97257b0b69378bd74e521edb7e94769ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:22:48 +0100 Subject: ovl: perform vfs_getxattr() with mounter creds The vfs_getxattr() in ovl_xattr_set() is used to check whether an xattr exist on a lower layer file that is to be removed. If the xattr does not exist, then no need to copy up the file. This call of vfs_getxattr() wasn't wrapped in credential override, and this is probably okay. But for consitency wrap this instance as well. Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c index d739e14c6814..cf41bcb664bc 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c @@ -352,7 +352,9 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, goto out; if (!value && !upperdentry) { + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, NULL, 0); + revert_creds(old_cred); if (err < 0) goto out_drop_write; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b854cc659dcb80f172cb35dbedc15d39d49c383f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 08:36:11 +0800 Subject: ovl: avoid deadlock on directory ioctl The function ovl_dir_real_file() currently uses the inode lock to serialize writes to the od->upperfile field. However, this function will get called by ovl_ioctl_set_flags(), which utilizes the inode lock too. In this case ovl_dir_real_file() will try to claim a lock that is owned by a function in its call stack, which won't get released before ovl_dir_real_file() returns. Fix by replacing the open coded compare and exchange by an explicit atomic op. Fixes: 61536bed2149 ("ovl: support [S|G]ETFLAGS and FS[S|G]ETXATTR ioctls for directories") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10 Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng Tested-by: Icenowy Zheng Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 23 +++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index 01620ebae1bd..60d751f28fea 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ struct file *ovl_dir_real_file(const struct file *file, bool want_upper) struct ovl_dir_file *od = file->private_data; struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; - struct file *realfile = od->realfile; + struct file *old, *realfile = od->realfile; if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(ovl_path_type(dentry))) return want_upper ? NULL : realfile; @@ -874,29 +874,20 @@ struct file *ovl_dir_real_file(const struct file *file, bool want_upper) * Need to check if we started out being a lower dir, but got copied up */ if (!od->is_upper) { - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - realfile = READ_ONCE(od->upperfile); if (!realfile) { struct path upperpath; ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath); realfile = ovl_dir_open_realfile(file, &upperpath); + if (IS_ERR(realfile)) + return realfile; - inode_lock(inode); - if (!od->upperfile) { - if (IS_ERR(realfile)) { - inode_unlock(inode); - return realfile; - } - smp_store_release(&od->upperfile, realfile); - } else { - /* somebody has beaten us to it */ - if (!IS_ERR(realfile)) - fput(realfile); - realfile = od->upperfile; + old = cmpxchg_release(&od->upperfile, NULL, realfile); + if (old) { + fput(realfile); + realfile = old; } - inode_unlock(inode); } } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e04527fefba6e4e66492f122cf8cc6314f3cf3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liangyan Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2020 11:06:26 +0800 Subject: ovl: fix dentry leak in ovl_get_redirect MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We need to lock d_parent->d_lock before dget_dlock, or this may have d_lockref updated parallelly like calltrace below which will cause dentry->d_lockref leak and risk a crash. CPU 0 CPU 1 ovl_set_redirect lookup_fast ovl_get_redirect __d_lookup dget_dlock //no lock protection here spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock) dentry->d_lockref.count++ dentry->d_lockref.count++ [   49.799059] PGD 800000061fed7067 P4D 800000061fed7067 PUD 61fec5067 PMD 0 [   49.799689] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [   49.800019] CPU: 2 PID: 2332 Comm: node Not tainted 4.19.24-7.20.al7.x86_64 #1 [   49.800678] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8a46cfe 04/01/2014 [   49.801380] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20 [   49.803470] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246 [   49.803949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000 [   49.804600] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088 [   49.805252] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040 [   49.805898] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000 [   49.806548] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0 [   49.807200] FS:  00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [   49.807935] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [   49.808461] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0 [   49.809113] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [   49.809758] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [   49.810410] Call Trace: [   49.810653]  d_delete+0x2c/0xb0 [   49.810951]  vfs_rmdir+0xfd/0x120 [   49.811264]  do_rmdir+0x14f/0x1a0 [   49.811573]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x190 [   49.811917]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [   49.812385] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbf505ffd7 [   49.814404] RSP: 002b:00007ffbedffada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054 [   49.815098] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffbedffb640 RCX: 00007ffbf505ffd7 [   49.815744] RDX: 0000000004449700 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000006c8cd50 [   49.816394] RBP: 00007ffbedffaea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000017d0b [   49.817038] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000012 [   49.817687] R13: 00000000072823d8 R14: 00007ffbedffb700 R15: 00000000072823d8 [   49.818338] Modules linked in: pvpanic cirrusfb button qemu_fw_cfg atkbd libps2 i8042 [   49.819052] CR2: 0000000000000088 [   49.819368] ---[ end trace 4e652b8aa299aa2d ]--- [   49.819796] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20 [   49.821880] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246 [   49.822363] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000 [   49.823008] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088 [   49.823658] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040 [   49.825404] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000 [   49.827147] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0 [   49.828890] FS:  00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [   49.830725] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [   49.832359] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0 [   49.834085] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [   49.835792] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Cc: Fixes: a6c606551141 ("ovl: redirect on rename-dir") Signed-off-by: Liangyan Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Suggested-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c index 28a075b5f5b2..d1efa3a5a503 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c @@ -992,8 +992,8 @@ static char *ovl_get_redirect(struct dentry *dentry, bool abs_redirect) buflen -= thislen; memcpy(&buf[buflen], name, thislen); - tmp = dget_dlock(d->d_parent); spin_unlock(&d->d_lock); + tmp = dget_parent(d); dput(d); d = tmp; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 03fedf93593c82538b18476d8c4f0e8f8435ea70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2020 12:16:08 +0200 Subject: ovl: skip getxattr of security labels When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will intercept in inode_getxattr hooks. When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an xattr returned by listxattr. This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized, because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr(). ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr(). Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security labels. Reported-by: Michael Labriola Tested-by: Michael Labriola Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c index e5b616c93e11..0fed532efa68 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c @@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *old, if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, name)) continue; + + error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name); + if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP) + break; + if (error == 1) { + error = 0; + continue; /* Discard */ + } retry: size = vfs_getxattr(old, name, value, value_size); if (size == -ERANGE) @@ -107,13 +115,6 @@ retry: goto retry; } - error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name); - if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP) - break; - if (error == 1) { - error = 0; - continue; /* Discard */ - } error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0); if (error) { if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP || ovl_must_copy_xattr(name)) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 335d3fc57941e5c6164c69d439aec1cb7a800876 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sargun Dhillon Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 16:10:43 -0800 Subject: ovl: implement volatile-specific fsync error behaviour Overlayfs's volatile option allows the user to bypass all forced sync calls to the upperdir filesystem. This comes at the cost of safety. We can never ensure that the user's data is intact, but we can make a best effort to expose whether or not the data is likely to be in a bad state. The best way to handle this in the time being is that if an overlayfs's upperdir experiences an error after a volatile mount occurs, that error will be returned on fsync, fdatasync, sync, and syncfs. This is contradictory to the traditional behaviour of VFS which fails the call once, and only raises an error if a subsequent fsync error has occurred, and been raised by the filesystem. One awkward aspect of the patch is that we have to manually set the superblock's errseq_t after the sync_fs callback as opposed to just returning an error from syncfs. This is because the call chain looks something like this: sys_syncfs -> sync_filesystem -> __sync_filesystem -> /* The return value is ignored here sb->s_op->sync_fs(sb) _sync_blockdev /* Where the VFS fetches the error to raise to userspace */ errseq_check_and_advance Because of this we call errseq_set every time the sync_fs callback occurs. Due to the nature of this seen / unseen dichotomy, if the upperdir is an inconsistent state at the initial mount time, overlayfs will refuse to mount, as overlayfs cannot get a snapshot of the upperdir's errseq that will increment on error until the user calls syncfs. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein Fixes: c86243b090bc ("ovl: provide a mount option "volatile"") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 8 ++++++++ fs/overlayfs/file.c | 5 +++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 2 ++ fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 5 +++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst index 587a93973929..78240e29b0bb 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst @@ -586,6 +586,14 @@ without significant effort. The advantage of mounting with the "volatile" option is that all forms of sync calls to the upper filesystem are omitted. +In order to avoid a giving a false sense of safety, the syncfs (and fsync) +semantics of volatile mounts are slightly different than that of the rest of +VFS. If any writeback error occurs on the upperdir's filesystem after a +volatile mount takes place, all sync functions will return an error. Once this +condition is reached, the filesystem will not recover, and every subsequent sync +call will return an error, even if the upperdir has not experience a new error +since the last sync call. + When overlay is mounted with "volatile" option, the directory "$workdir/work/incompat/volatile" is created. During next mount, overlay checks for this directory and refuses to mount if present. This is a strong diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c index bd9dd38347ae..077d3ad343f6 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c @@ -398,8 +398,9 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) const struct cred *old_cred; int ret; - if (!ovl_should_sync(OVL_FS(file_inode(file)->i_sb))) - return 0; + ret = ovl_sync_status(OVL_FS(file_inode(file)->i_sb)); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; ret = ovl_real_fdget_meta(file, &real, !datasync); if (ret) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index b487e48c7fd4..cb4e2d60ecf9 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry); bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry); char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry, int padding); +int ovl_sync_status(struct ovl_fs *ofs); static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h index fbd5e27ce66b..63efee554f69 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ struct ovl_fs { atomic_long_t last_ino; /* Whiteout dentry cache */ struct dentry *whiteout; + /* r/o snapshot of upperdir sb's only taken on volatile mounts */ + errseq_t errseq; }; static inline struct vfsmount *ovl_upper_mnt(struct ovl_fs *ofs) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index 60d751f28fea..f404a78e6b60 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -900,8 +900,9 @@ static int ovl_dir_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, struct file *realfile; int err; - if (!ovl_should_sync(OVL_FS(file->f_path.dentry->d_sb))) - return 0; + err = ovl_sync_status(OVL_FS(file->f_path.dentry->d_sb)); + if (err <= 0) + return err; realfile = ovl_dir_real_file(file, true); err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(realfile); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 82cd6d55a5a1..d58b8f2bf9d0 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -264,11 +264,20 @@ static int ovl_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait) struct super_block *upper_sb; int ret; - if (!ovl_upper_mnt(ofs)) - return 0; + ret = ovl_sync_status(ofs); + /* + * We have to always set the err, because the return value isn't + * checked in syncfs, and instead indirectly return an error via + * the sb's writeback errseq, which VFS inspects after this call. + */ + if (ret < 0) { + errseq_set(&sb->s_wb_err, -EIO); + return -EIO; + } + + if (!ret) + return ret; - if (!ovl_should_sync(ofs)) - return 0; /* * Not called for sync(2) call or an emergency sync (SB_I_SKIP_SYNC). * All the super blocks will be iterated, including upper_sb. @@ -1993,6 +2002,8 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) sb->s_op = &ovl_super_operations; if (ofs->config.upperdir) { + struct super_block *upper_sb; + if (!ofs->config.workdir) { pr_err("missing 'workdir'\n"); goto out_err; @@ -2002,6 +2013,16 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) if (err) goto out_err; + upper_sb = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs)->mnt_sb; + if (!ovl_should_sync(ofs)) { + ofs->errseq = errseq_sample(&upper_sb->s_wb_err); + if (errseq_check(&upper_sb->s_wb_err, ofs->errseq)) { + err = -EIO; + pr_err("Cannot mount volatile when upperdir has an unseen error. Sync upperdir fs to clear state.\n"); + goto out_err; + } + } + err = ovl_get_workdir(sb, ofs, &upperpath); if (err) goto out_err; @@ -2009,9 +2030,8 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) if (!ofs->workdir) sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY; - sb->s_stack_depth = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs)->mnt_sb->s_stack_depth; - sb->s_time_gran = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs)->mnt_sb->s_time_gran; - + sb->s_stack_depth = upper_sb->s_stack_depth; + sb->s_time_gran = upper_sb->s_time_gran; } oe = ovl_get_lowerstack(sb, splitlower, numlower, ofs, layers); err = PTR_ERR(oe); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c index 6569031af3cd..9826b003f1d2 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c @@ -962,3 +962,30 @@ err_free: kfree(buf); return ERR_PTR(res); } + +/* + * ovl_sync_status() - Check fs sync status for volatile mounts + * + * Returns 1 if this is not a volatile mount and a real sync is required. + * + * Returns 0 if syncing can be skipped because mount is volatile, and no errors + * have occurred on the upperdir since the mount. + * + * Returns -errno if it is a volatile mount, and the error that occurred since + * the last mount. If the error code changes, it'll return the latest error + * code. + */ + +int ovl_sync_status(struct ovl_fs *ofs) +{ + struct vfsmount *mnt; + + if (ovl_should_sync(ofs)) + return 1; + + mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs); + if (!mnt) + return 0; + + return errseq_check(&mnt->mnt_sb->s_wb_err, ofs->errseq); +} -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 19d51588125fb7abe258e85b412710486a3d9219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Harvey Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 13:44:35 -0800 Subject: cifs: ignore auto and noauto options if given In 24e0a1eff9e2, the noauto and auto options were missed when migrating to the new mount API. As a result, users with noauto in their fstab mount options are now unable to mount cifs filesystems, as they'll receive an "Unknown parameter" error. This restores the old behaviour of ignoring noauto and auto if they're given. Fixes: 24e0a1eff9e2 ("cifs: switch to new mount api") Signed-off-by: Adam Harvey Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 076bcadc756a..62818b142e2e 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ const struct fs_parameter_spec smb3_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_flag_no("exec", Opt_ignore), fsparam_flag_no("dev", Opt_ignore), fsparam_flag_no("mand", Opt_ignore), + fsparam_flag_no("auto", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("cred", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("credentials", Opt_ignore), {} -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From c9b8cd6a39c48b2827c0925b648b221b5f8ef25d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 11:20:22 -0600 Subject: cifs: fix mounts to subdirectories of target The "prefixpath" mount option needs to be ignored which was missed in the recent conversion to the new mount API (prefixpath would be set by the mount helper if mounting a subdirectory of the root of a share e.g. //server/share/subdir) Fixes: 24e0a1eff9e2 ("cifs: switch to new mount api") Suggested-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg --- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 62818b142e2e..818c413db82d 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ const struct fs_parameter_spec smb3_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_flag_no("auto", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("cred", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("credentials", Opt_ignore), + fsparam_string("prefixpath", Opt_ignore), {} }; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From f609cbb8911e40e15f9055e8f945f926ac906924 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 18:39:24 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix list corruption for splice file_get kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! Call Trace: __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline] list_add include/linux/list.h:86 [inline] io_file_get+0x8cc/0xdb0 fs/io_uring.c:6466 __io_splice_prep+0x1bc/0x530 fs/io_uring.c:3866 io_splice_prep fs/io_uring.c:3920 [inline] io_req_prep+0x3546/0x4e80 fs/io_uring.c:6081 io_queue_sqe+0x609/0x10d0 fs/io_uring.c:6628 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6705 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0x1495/0x2720 fs/io_uring.c:6953 __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0x107d/0x1f30 fs/io_uring.c:9353 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 io_file_get() may be called from splice, and so REQ_F_INFLIGHT may already be set. Fixes: 02a13674fa0e8 ("io_uring: account io_uring internal files as REQ_F_INFLIGHT") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reported-by: syzbot+6879187cf57845801267@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index ae388cc52843..39ae1f821cef 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -6460,7 +6460,8 @@ static struct file *io_file_get(struct io_submit_state *state, file = __io_file_get(state, fd); } - if (file && file->f_op == &io_uring_fops) { + if (file && file->f_op == &io_uring_fops && + !(req->flags & REQ_F_INFLIGHT)) { io_req_init_async(req); req->flags |= REQ_F_INFLIGHT; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 70b2c60d3797bffe182dddb9bb55975b9be5889a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 18:39:25 +0000 Subject: io_uring: fix sqo ownership false positive warning WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21359 at fs/io_uring.c:9042 io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0xe55/0x10c0 fs/io_uring.c:9042 Call Trace: io_uring_flush+0x47b/0x6e0 fs/io_uring.c:9227 filp_close+0xb4/0x170 fs/open.c:1295 close_files fs/file.c:403 [inline] put_files_struct fs/file.c:418 [inline] put_files_struct+0x1cc/0x350 fs/file.c:415 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:435 do_exit+0xc22/0x2ae0 kernel/exit.c:820 do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922 get_signal+0x427/0x20f0 kernel/signal.c:2773 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a8/0x1eb0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:811 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:147 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x148/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:201 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:302 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Now io_uring_cancel_task_requests() can be called not through file notes but directly, remove a WARN_ONCE() there that give us false positives. That check is not very important and we catch it in other places. Fixes: 84965ff8a84f0 ("io_uring: if we see flush on exit, cancel related tasks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Reported-by: syzbot+3e3d9bd0c6ce9efbc3ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 39ae1f821cef..12bf7180c0f1 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8967,8 +8967,6 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct task_struct *task = current; if ((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && ctx->sq_data) { - /* for SQPOLL only sqo_task has task notes */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task != current); io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx); task = ctx->sq_data->thread; atomic_inc(&task->io_uring->in_idle); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From bd2f0b43c1c864fa653342c5c074bfcd29f10934 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 16:43:03 -0600 Subject: cifs: returning mount parm processing errors correctly During additional testing of the updated cifs.ko with the new mount API support, we found a few additional cases where we were logging errors, but not returning them to the user. For example: a) invalid security mechanisms b) invalid cache options c) unsupported rdma d) invalid smb dialect requested Fixes: 24e0a1eff9e2 ("cifs: switch to new mount api") Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 818c413db82d..27354417e988 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc) if (ctx->rdma && ctx->vals->protocol_id < SMB30_PROT_ID) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "SMB Direct requires Version >=3.0\n"); - return -1; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } #ifndef CONFIG_KEYS @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc) /* make sure UNC has a share name */ if (strlen(ctx->UNC) < 3 || !strchr(ctx->UNC + 3, '\\')) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "Malformed UNC. Unable to find share name.\n"); - return -1; + return -ENOENT; } if (!ctx->got_ip) { @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc) if (!cifs_convert_address((struct sockaddr *)&ctx->dstaddr, &ctx->UNC[2], len)) { pr_err("Unable to determine destination address\n"); - return -1; + return -EHOSTUNREACH; } } @@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, return 0; cifs_parse_mount_err: - return 1; + return -EINVAL; } int smb3_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 3a7efd1ad269ccaf9c1423364d97c9661ba6dafa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 23:23:42 +0000 Subject: io_uring: reinforce cancel on flush during exit What 84965ff8a84f0 ("io_uring: if we see flush on exit, cancel related tasks") really wants is to cancel all relevant REQ_F_INFLIGHT requests reliably. That can be achieved by io_uring_cancel_files(), but we'll miss it calling io_uring_cancel_task_requests(files=NULL) from io_uring_flush(), because it will go through __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(). Just always call io_uring_cancel_files() during cancel, it's good enough for now. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 12bf7180c0f1..38c6cbe1ab38 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8976,10 +8976,9 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, io_cancel_defer_files(ctx, task, files); io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, true, task, files); + io_uring_cancel_files(ctx, task, files); if (!files) __io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, task); - else - io_uring_cancel_files(ctx, task, files); if ((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && ctx->sq_data) { atomic_dec(&task->io_uring->in_idle); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 0d4873f9aa4ff8fc1d63a5755395b794d32ce046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 21:35:10 -0600 Subject: cifs: fix dfs domain referrals The new mount API requires additional changes to how DFS is handled. Additional testing of DFS uncovered problems with domain based DFS referrals (a follow on patch addresses DFS links) which this patch addresses. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c | 12 ++++++++---- fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/cifsproto.h | 6 ++++-- fs/cifs/connect.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 8 +++++--- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c index e4c6ae47a796..6b1ce4efb591 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c @@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ cifs_build_devname(char *nodename, const char *prepath) * Caller is responsible for freeing returned value if it is not error. */ char *cifs_compose_mount_options(const char *sb_mountdata, - const char *fullpath, - const struct dfs_info3_param *ref) + const char *fullpath, + const struct dfs_info3_param *ref, + char **devname) { int rc; char *name; @@ -231,7 +232,10 @@ char *cifs_compose_mount_options(const char *sb_mountdata, strcat(mountdata, "ip="); strcat(mountdata, srvIP); - kfree(name); + if (devname) + *devname = name; + else + kfree(name); /*cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: parent mountdata: %s\n", __func__, sb_mountdata);*/ /*cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: submount mountdata: %s\n", __func__, mountdata );*/ @@ -278,7 +282,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *cifs_dfs_do_mount(struct dentry *mntpt, /* strip first '\' from fullpath */ mountdata = cifs_compose_mount_options(cifs_sb->ctx->mount_options, - fullpath + 1, NULL); + fullpath + 1, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(mountdata)) { kfree(devname); return (struct vfsmount *)mountdata; diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c index ce0d0037fd0a..e46da536ed33 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ cifs_smb3_do_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, goto out; } - rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(cifs_sb->ctx); + rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(cifs_sb->ctx, NULL, old_ctx->UNC); if (rc) { root = ERR_PTR(rc); goto out; diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h b/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h index 340ff81ee87b..32f7a013402e 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsproto.h @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ extern char *cifs_build_path_to_root(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, int add_treename); extern char *build_wildcard_path_from_dentry(struct dentry *direntry); extern char *cifs_compose_mount_options(const char *sb_mountdata, - const char *fullpath, const struct dfs_info3_param *ref); + const char *fullpath, const struct dfs_info3_param *ref, + char **devname); /* extern void renew_parental_timestamps(struct dentry *direntry);*/ extern struct mid_q_entry *AllocMidQEntry(const struct smb_hdr *smb_buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server); @@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ extern void cifs_wake_up_task(struct mid_q_entry *mid); extern int cifs_handle_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry *mid); extern int smb3_parse_devname(const char *devname, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx); +extern int smb3_parse_opt(const char *options, const char *key, char **val); extern bool cifs_match_ipaddr(struct sockaddr *srcaddr, struct sockaddr *rhs); extern int cifs_discard_remaining_data(struct TCP_Server_Info *server); extern int cifs_call_async(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, @@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ extern int SMBencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, const unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24); extern int -cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx); +cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, const char *mntopts, const char *devname); extern struct TCP_Server_Info * cifs_find_tcp_session(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx); diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index c8ef24bac94f..10fe6d6d2dee 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2972,17 +2972,20 @@ expand_dfs_referral(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, rc = dfs_cache_find(xid, ses, cifs_sb->local_nls, cifs_remap(cifs_sb), ref_path, &referral, NULL); if (!rc) { + char *fake_devname = NULL; + mdata = cifs_compose_mount_options(cifs_sb->ctx->mount_options, - full_path + 1, &referral); + full_path + 1, &referral, + &fake_devname); free_dfs_info_param(&referral); if (IS_ERR(mdata)) { rc = PTR_ERR(mdata); mdata = NULL; } else { - smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents(ctx); - rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(ctx); + rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(ctx, mdata, fake_devname); } + kfree(fake_devname); kfree(cifs_sb->ctx->mount_options); cifs_sb->ctx->mount_options = mdata; } @@ -3036,6 +3039,7 @@ static int setup_dfs_tgt_conn(const char *path, const char *full_path, struct dfs_info3_param ref = {0}; char *mdata = NULL; struct smb3_fs_context fake_ctx = {NULL}; + char *fake_devname = NULL; cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: dfs path: %s\n", __func__, path); @@ -3044,16 +3048,18 @@ static int setup_dfs_tgt_conn(const char *path, const char *full_path, return rc; mdata = cifs_compose_mount_options(cifs_sb->ctx->mount_options, - full_path + 1, &ref); + full_path + 1, &ref, + &fake_devname); free_dfs_info_param(&ref); if (IS_ERR(mdata)) { rc = PTR_ERR(mdata); mdata = NULL; } else - rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(&fake_ctx); + rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(&fake_ctx, mdata, fake_devname); kfree(mdata); + kfree(fake_devname); if (!rc) { /* @@ -3122,10 +3128,24 @@ static int do_dfs_failover(const char *path, const char *full_path, struct cifs_ * we should pass a clone of the original context? */ int -cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) +cifs_setup_volume_info(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, const char *mntopts, const char *devname) { int rc = 0; + smb3_parse_devname(devname, ctx); + + if (mntopts) { + char *ip; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: mntopts=%s\n", __func__, mntopts); + rc = smb3_parse_opt(mntopts, "ip", &ip); + if (!rc && !cifs_convert_address((struct sockaddr *)&ctx->dstaddr, ip, + strlen(ip))) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: failed to convert ip address\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + if (ctx->nullauth) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "Anonymous login\n"); kfree(ctx->username); diff --git a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c index 0fdb0de7ff86..4950ab0486ae 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c +++ b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c @@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ static struct cifs_ses *find_root_ses(struct vol_info *vi, int rc; struct cache_entry *ce; struct dfs_info3_param ref = {0}; - char *mdata = NULL; + char *mdata = NULL, *devname = NULL; struct TCP_Server_Info *server; struct cifs_ses *ses; struct smb3_fs_context ctx = {NULL}; @@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ static struct cifs_ses *find_root_ses(struct vol_info *vi, up_read(&htable_rw_lock); - mdata = cifs_compose_mount_options(vi->mntdata, rpath, &ref); + mdata = cifs_compose_mount_options(vi->mntdata, rpath, &ref, + &devname); free_dfs_info_param(&ref); if (IS_ERR(mdata)) { @@ -1453,7 +1454,7 @@ static struct cifs_ses *find_root_ses(struct vol_info *vi, goto out; } - rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(&ctx); + rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(&ctx, NULL, devname); if (rc) { ses = ERR_PTR(rc); @@ -1472,6 +1473,7 @@ out: smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents(&ctx); kfree(mdata); kfree(rpath); + kfree(devname); return ses; } diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 27354417e988..5111aadfdb6b 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -401,6 +401,37 @@ cifs_parse_smb_version(char *value, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, bool is_smb3) return 0; } +int smb3_parse_opt(const char *options, const char *key, char **val) +{ + int rc = -ENOENT; + char *opts, *orig, *p; + + orig = opts = kstrdup(options, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + while ((p = strsep(&opts, ","))) { + char *nval; + + if (!*p) + continue; + if (strncasecmp(p, key, strlen(key))) + continue; + nval = strchr(p, '='); + if (nval) { + if (nval == p) + continue; + *nval++ = 0; + *val = kstrndup(nval, strlen(nval), GFP_KERNEL); + rc = !*val ? -ENOMEM : 0; + goto out; + } + } +out: + kfree(orig); + return rc; +} + /* * Parse a devname into substrings and populate the ctx->UNC and ctx->prepath * fields with the result. Returns 0 on success and an error otherwise -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 5399d52233c47905bbf97dcbaa2d7a9cc31670ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 23:53:50 +0000 Subject: rxrpc: Fix deadlock around release of dst cached on udp tunnel AF_RXRPC sockets use UDP ports in encap mode. This causes socket and dst from an incoming packet to get stolen and attached to the UDP socket from whence it is leaked when that socket is closed. When a network namespace is removed, the wait for dst records to be cleaned up happens before the cleanup of the rxrpc and UDP socket, meaning that the wait never finishes. Fix this by moving the rxrpc (and, by dependence, the afs) private per-network namespace registrations to the device group rather than subsys group. This allows cached rxrpc local endpoints to be cleared and their UDP sockets closed before we try waiting for the dst records. The symptom is that lines looking like the following: unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free get emitted at regular intervals after running something like the referenced syzbot test. Thanks to Vadim for tracking this down and work out the fix. Reported-by: syzbot+df400f2f24a1677cd7e0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Vadim Fedorenko Fixes: 5271953cad31 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook") Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Vadim Fedorenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161196443016.3868642.5577440140646403533.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- fs/afs/main.c | 6 +++--- net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/afs/main.c b/fs/afs/main.c index accdd8970e7c..b2975256dadb 100644 --- a/fs/afs/main.c +++ b/fs/afs/main.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int __init afs_init(void) goto error_cache; #endif - ret = register_pernet_subsys(&afs_net_ops); + ret = register_pernet_device(&afs_net_ops); if (ret < 0) goto error_net; @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int __init afs_init(void) error_proc: afs_fs_exit(); error_fs: - unregister_pernet_subsys(&afs_net_ops); + unregister_pernet_device(&afs_net_ops); error_net: #ifdef CONFIG_AFS_FSCACHE fscache_unregister_netfs(&afs_cache_netfs); @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static void __exit afs_exit(void) proc_remove(afs_proc_symlink); afs_fs_exit(); - unregister_pernet_subsys(&afs_net_ops); + unregister_pernet_device(&afs_net_ops); #ifdef CONFIG_AFS_FSCACHE fscache_unregister_netfs(&afs_cache_netfs); #endif diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c index 0a2f4817ec6c..41671af6b33f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ static int __init af_rxrpc_init(void) goto error_security; } - ret = register_pernet_subsys(&rxrpc_net_ops); + ret = register_pernet_device(&rxrpc_net_ops); if (ret) goto error_pernet; @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ error_key_type: error_sock: proto_unregister(&rxrpc_proto); error_proto: - unregister_pernet_subsys(&rxrpc_net_ops); + unregister_pernet_device(&rxrpc_net_ops); error_pernet: rxrpc_exit_security(); error_security: @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ static void __exit af_rxrpc_exit(void) unregister_key_type(&key_type_rxrpc); sock_unregister(PF_RXRPC); proto_unregister(&rxrpc_proto); - unregister_pernet_subsys(&rxrpc_net_ops); + unregister_pernet_device(&rxrpc_net_ops); ASSERTCMP(atomic_read(&rxrpc_n_tx_skbs), ==, 0); ASSERTCMP(atomic_read(&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs), ==, 0); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 8d8d1dbefc423d42d626cf5b81aac214870ebaab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 20:36:54 -0600 Subject: smb3: Fix out-of-bounds bug in SMB2_negotiate() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit While addressing some warnings generated by -Warray-bounds, I found this bug that was introduced back in 2017: CC [M] fs/cifs/smb2pdu.o fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c: In function ‘SMB2_negotiate’: fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c:822:16: warning: array subscript 1 is above array bounds of ‘__le16[1]’ {aka ‘short unsigned int[1]’} [-Warray-bounds] 822 | req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c:823:16: warning: array subscript 2 is above array bounds of ‘__le16[1]’ {aka ‘short unsigned int[1]’} [-Warray-bounds] 823 | req->Dialects[2] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c:824:16: warning: array subscript 3 is above array bounds of ‘__le16[1]’ {aka ‘short unsigned int[1]’} [-Warray-bounds] 824 | req->Dialects[3] = cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c:816:16: warning: array subscript 1 is above array bounds of ‘__le16[1]’ {aka ‘short unsigned int[1]’} [-Warray-bounds] 816 | req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ At the time, the size of array _Dialects_ was changed from 1 to 3 in struct validate_negotiate_info_req, and then in 2019 it was changed from 3 to 4, but those changes were never made in struct smb2_negotiate_req, which has led to a 3 and a half years old out-of-bounds bug in function SMB2_negotiate() (fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c). Fix this by increasing the size of array _Dialects_ in struct smb2_negotiate_req to 4. Fixes: 9764c02fcbad ("SMB3: Add support for multidialect negotiate (SMB2.1 and later)") Fixes: d5c7076b772a ("smb3: add smb3.1.1 to default dialect list") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h index d85edf5d1429..a5a9e33c0d73 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ struct smb2_negotiate_req { __le32 NegotiateContextOffset; /* SMB3.1.1 only. MBZ earlier */ __le16 NegotiateContextCount; /* SMB3.1.1 only. MBZ earlier */ __le16 Reserved2; - __le16 Dialects[1]; /* One dialect (vers=) at a time for now */ + __le16 Dialects[4]; /* BB expand this if autonegotiate > 4 dialects */ } __packed; /* Dialects */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From d7e10d47691d1702db1cd1edcc689d3031eefc67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaoguang Wang Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 17:20:56 +0800 Subject: io_uring: don't modify identity's files uncess identity is cowed Abaci Robot reported following panic: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 800000010ef3f067 P4D 800000010ef3f067 PUD 10d9df067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 1869 Comm: io_wqe_worker-0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:put_files_struct+0x1b/0x120 Code: 24 18 c7 00 f4 ff ff ff e9 4d fd ff ff 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 e8 b5 6b db ff 41 ff 0e 74 13 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 9c RSP: 0000:ffffc90002147d48 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810d9a5300 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88810d87c280 RSI: ffffffff8144ba6b RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff81431500 R10: ffff8881001be000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810ac2f800 R13: ffff88810af38a00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881057130c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010dbaa002 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __io_clean_op+0x10c/0x2a0 io_dismantle_req+0x3c7/0x600 __io_free_req+0x34/0x280 io_put_req+0x63/0xb0 io_worker_handle_work+0x60e/0x830 ? io_wqe_worker+0x135/0x520 io_wqe_worker+0x158/0x520 ? __kthread_parkme+0x96/0xc0 ? io_worker_handle_work+0x830/0x830 kthread+0x134/0x180 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace c358ca86af95b1e7 ]--- I guess case below can trigger above panic: there're two threads which operates different io_uring ctxs and share same sqthread identity, and later one thread exits, io_uring_cancel_task_requests() will clear task->io_uring->identity->files to be NULL in sqpoll mode, then another ctx that uses same identity will panic. Indeed we don't need to clear task->io_uring->identity->files here, io_grab_identity() should handle identity->files changes well, if task->io_uring->identity->files is not equal to current->files, io_cow_identity() should handle this changes well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 38c6cbe1ab38..5d3348d66f06 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8982,12 +8982,6 @@ static void io_uring_cancel_task_requests(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, if ((ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) && ctx->sq_data) { atomic_dec(&task->io_uring->in_idle); - /* - * If the files that are going away are the ones in the thread - * identity, clear them out. - */ - if (task->io_uring->identity->files == files) - task->io_uring->identity->files = NULL; io_sq_thread_unpark(ctx->sq_data); } } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From aec18a57edad562d620f7d19016de1fc0cc2208c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 19:22:46 +0000 Subject: io_uring: drop mm/files between task_work_submit Since SQPOLL task can be shared and so task_work entries can be a mix of them, we need to drop mm and files before trying to issue next request. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 5d3348d66f06..1f68105a41ed 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2205,6 +2205,9 @@ static void __io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req) else __io_req_task_cancel(req, -EFAULT); mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) + io_sq_thread_drop_mm_files(); } static void io_req_task_submit(struct callback_head *cb) -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 91792bb8089b63b7b780251eb83939348ac58a64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Shilovsky Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 22:34:32 -0600 Subject: smb3: fix crediting for compounding when only one request in flight Currently we try to guess if a compound request is going to succeed waiting for credits or not based on the number of requests in flight. This approach doesn't work correctly all the time because there may be only one request in flight which is going to bring multiple credits satisfying the compound request. Change the behavior to fail a request only if there are no requests in flight at all and proceed waiting for credits otherwise. Cc: # 5.1+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/transport.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/transport.c b/fs/cifs/transport.c index 95ef26b555b9..4a2b836eb017 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/transport.c +++ b/fs/cifs/transport.c @@ -666,10 +666,22 @@ wait_for_compound_request(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num, if (*credits < num) { /* - * Return immediately if not too many requests in flight since - * we will likely be stuck on waiting for credits. + * If the server is tight on resources or just gives us less + * credits for other reasons (e.g. requests are coming out of + * order and the server delays granting more credits until it + * processes a missing mid) and we exhausted most available + * credits there may be situations when we try to send + * a compound request but we don't have enough credits. At this + * point the client needs to decide if it should wait for + * additional credits or fail the request. If at least one + * request is in flight there is a high probability that the + * server will return enough credits to satisfy this compound + * request. + * + * Return immediately if no requests in flight since we will be + * stuck on waiting for credits. */ - if (server->in_flight < num - *credits) { + if (server->in_flight == 0) { spin_unlock(&server->req_lock); trace_smb3_insufficient_credits(server->CurrentMid, server->hostname, scredits, sin_flight); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 585fc0d2871c9318c949fbf45b1f081edd489e96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muchun Song Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 18:32:03 -0800 Subject: mm: hugetlbfs: fix cannot migrate the fallocated HugeTLB page If a new hugetlb page is allocated during fallocate it will not be marked as active (set_page_huge_active) which will result in a later isolate_huge_page failure when the page migration code would like to move that page. Such a failure would be unexpected and wrong. Only export set_page_huge_active, just leave clear_page_huge_active as static. Because there are no external users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210115124942.46403-3-songmuchun@bytedance.com Fixes: 70c3547e36f5 (hugetlbfs: add hugetlbfs_fallocate()) Signed-off-by: Muchun Song Acked-by: Michal Hocko Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Yang Shi Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 3 ++- include/linux/hugetlb.h | 2 ++ mm/hugetlb.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c index b5c109703daa..21c20fd5f9ee 100644 --- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c @@ -735,9 +735,10 @@ static long hugetlbfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); + set_page_huge_active(page); /* * unlock_page because locked by add_to_page_cache() - * page_put due to reference from alloc_huge_page() + * put_page() due to reference from alloc_huge_page() */ unlock_page(page); put_page(page); diff --git a/include/linux/hugetlb.h b/include/linux/hugetlb.h index ebca2ef02212..b5807f23caf8 100644 --- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h +++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h @@ -770,6 +770,8 @@ static inline void huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } #endif +void set_page_huge_active(struct page *page); + #else /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ struct hstate {}; diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index 18f6ee317900..6f0e242d38ca 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ bool page_huge_active(struct page *page) } /* never called for tail page */ -static void set_page_huge_active(struct page *page) +void set_page_huge_active(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHeadHuge(page), page); SetPagePrivate(&page[1]); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 21b200d091826a83aafc95d847139b2b0582f6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aurelien Aptel Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 15:42:48 +0100 Subject: cifs: report error instead of invalid when revalidating a dentry fails Assuming - //HOST/a is mounted on /mnt - //HOST/b is mounted on /mnt/b On a slow connection, running 'df' and killing it while it's processing /mnt/b can make cifs_get_inode_info() returns -ERESTARTSYS. This triggers the following chain of events: => the dentry revalidation fail => dentry is put and released => superblock associated with the dentry is put => /mnt/b is unmounted This patch makes cifs_d_revalidate() return the error instead of 0 (invalid) when cifs_revalidate_dentry() fails, except for ENOENT (file deleted) and ESTALE (file recreated). Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel Suggested-by: Shyam Prasad N Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/dir.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/dir.c b/fs/cifs/dir.c index 68900f1629bf..97ac363b5df1 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/dir.c +++ b/fs/cifs/dir.c @@ -737,6 +737,7 @@ static int cifs_d_revalidate(struct dentry *direntry, unsigned int flags) { struct inode *inode; + int rc; if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) return -ECHILD; @@ -746,8 +747,25 @@ cifs_d_revalidate(struct dentry *direntry, unsigned int flags) if ((flags & LOOKUP_REVAL) && !CIFS_CACHE_READ(CIFS_I(inode))) CIFS_I(inode)->time = 0; /* force reval */ - if (cifs_revalidate_dentry(direntry)) - return 0; + rc = cifs_revalidate_dentry(direntry); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "cifs_revalidate_dentry failed with rc=%d", rc); + switch (rc) { + case -ENOENT: + case -ESTALE: + /* + * Those errors mean the dentry is invalid + * (file was deleted or recreated) + */ + return 0; + default: + /* + * Otherwise some unexpected error happened + * report it as-is to VFS layer + */ + return rc; + } + } else { /* * If the inode wasn't known to be a dfs entry when -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From abd4af47d3fb64157133bd35de25d39a21a31122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 16:48:31 +1000 Subject: cifs: fix dfs-links This fixes a regression following dfs links that was introduced in the patch series for the new mount api. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 10fe6d6d2dee..76e4d8d8b3a6 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2983,6 +2983,14 @@ expand_dfs_referral(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, rc = PTR_ERR(mdata); mdata = NULL; } else { + /* + * We can not clear out the whole structure since we + * no longer have an explicit function to parse + * a mount-string. Instead we need to clear out the + * individual fields that are no longer valid. + */ + kfree(ctx->prepath); + ctx->prepath = NULL; rc = cifs_setup_volume_info(ctx, mdata, fake_devname); } kfree(fake_devname); -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From e812cbbbbbb15adbbbee176baa1e8bda53059bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phillip Lougher Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:41:50 -0800 Subject: squashfs: avoid out of bounds writes in decompressors Patch series "Squashfs: fix BIO migration regression and add sanity checks". Patch [1/4] fixes a regression introduced by the "migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO" patch, which has produced a number of Sysbot/Syzkaller reports. Patches [2/4], [3/4], and [4/4] fix a number of filesystem corruption issues which have produced Sysbot reports in the id, inode and xattr lookup code. Each patch has been tested against the Sysbot reproducers using the given kernel configuration. They have the appropriate "Reported-by:" lines added. Additionally, all of the reproducer filesystems are indirectly fixed by patch [4/4] due to the fact they all have xattr corruption which is now detected there. Additional testing with other configurations and architectures (32bit, big endian), and normal filesystems has also been done to trap any inadvertent regressions caused by the additional sanity checks. This patch (of 4): This is a regression introduced by the patch "migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO". Sysbot/Syskaller has reported a number of "out of bounds writes" and "unable to handle kernel paging request in squashfs_decompress" errors which have been identified as a regression introduced by the above patch. Specifically, the patch removed the following sanity check if (length < 0 || length > output->length || (index + length) > msblk->bytes_used) This check did two things: 1. It ensured any reads were not beyond the end of the filesystem 2. It ensured that the "length" field read from the filesystem was within the expected maximum length. Without this any corrupted values can over-run allocated buffers. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-2-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Fixes: 93e72b3c612adc ("squashfs: migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO") Reported-by: syzbot+6fba78f99b9afd4b5634@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher Cc: Philippe Liard Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/squashfs/block.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/block.c b/fs/squashfs/block.c index 8a19773b5a0b..45f44425d856 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/block.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/block.c @@ -196,9 +196,15 @@ int squashfs_read_data(struct super_block *sb, u64 index, int length, length = SQUASHFS_COMPRESSED_SIZE(length); index += 2; - TRACE("Block @ 0x%llx, %scompressed size %d\n", index, + TRACE("Block @ 0x%llx, %scompressed size %d\n", index - 2, compressed ? "" : "un", length); } + if (length < 0 || length > output->length || + (index + length) > msblk->bytes_used) { + res = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (next_index) *next_index = index + length; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From f37aa4c7366e23f91b81d00bafd6a7ab54e4a381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phillip Lougher Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:41:53 -0800 Subject: squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup Sysbot has reported a number of "slab-out-of-bounds reads" and "use-after-free read" errors which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted index value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption. 1. It checks against corruption of the ids count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read. In the case of a too large ids count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values. 2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-3-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher Reported-by: syzbot+b06d57ba83f604522af2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c021ba012da41ee9807c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+5024636e8b5fd19f0f19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+bcbc661df46657d0fa4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/squashfs/id.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h | 1 + fs/squashfs/super.c | 6 +++--- fs/squashfs/xattr.h | 10 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/id.c b/fs/squashfs/id.c index 6be5afe7287d..11581bf31af4 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/id.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/id.c @@ -35,10 +35,15 @@ int squashfs_get_id(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int index, struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; int block = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK(index); int offset = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_OFFSET(index); - u64 start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->id_table[block]); + u64 start_block; __le32 disk_id; int err; + if (index >= msblk->ids) + return -EINVAL; + + start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->id_table[block]); + err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &disk_id, &start_block, &offset, sizeof(disk_id)); if (err < 0) @@ -56,7 +61,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 id_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned short no_ids) { unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_BYTES(no_ids); + unsigned int indexes = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCKS(no_ids); + int n; __le64 *table; + u64 start, end; TRACE("In read_id_index_table, length %d\n", length); @@ -67,20 +75,36 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(struct super_block *sb, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* - * length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check - * also traps instances where id_table_start is incorrectly larger - * than the next table start + * The computed size of the index table (length bytes) should exactly + * match the table start and end points */ - if (id_table_start + length > next_table) + if (length != (next_table - id_table_start)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); table = squashfs_read_table(sb, id_table_start, length); + if (IS_ERR(table)) + return table; /* - * table[0] points to the first id lookup table metadata block, this - * should be less than id_table_start + * table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations + * of the compressed id blocks. Each entry should be less than + * the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them + * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. table[indexes - 1] + * should be less than id_table_start, and again the difference + * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less */ - if (!IS_ERR(table) && le64_to_cpu(table[0]) >= id_table_start) { + for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) { + start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]); + end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]); + + if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { + kfree(table); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + } + + start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]); + if (start >= id_table_start || (id_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { kfree(table); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } diff --git a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h index 34c21ffb6df3..166e98806265 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h @@ -64,5 +64,6 @@ struct squashfs_sb_info { unsigned int inodes; unsigned int fragments; int xattr_ids; + unsigned int ids; }; #endif diff --git a/fs/squashfs/super.c b/fs/squashfs/super.c index d6c6593ec169..88cc94be1076 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/super.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/super.c @@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) msblk->directory_table = le64_to_cpu(sblk->directory_table_start); msblk->inodes = le32_to_cpu(sblk->inodes); msblk->fragments = le32_to_cpu(sblk->fragments); + msblk->ids = le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids); flags = le16_to_cpu(sblk->flags); TRACE("Found valid superblock on %pg\n", sb->s_bdev); @@ -177,7 +178,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) TRACE("Block size %d\n", msblk->block_size); TRACE("Number of inodes %d\n", msblk->inodes); TRACE("Number of fragments %d\n", msblk->fragments); - TRACE("Number of ids %d\n", le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids)); + TRACE("Number of ids %d\n", msblk->ids); TRACE("sblk->inode_table_start %llx\n", msblk->inode_table); TRACE("sblk->directory_table_start %llx\n", msblk->directory_table); TRACE("sblk->fragment_table_start %llx\n", @@ -236,8 +237,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) allocate_id_index_table: /* Allocate and read id index table */ msblk->id_table = squashfs_read_id_index_table(sb, - le64_to_cpu(sblk->id_table_start), next_table, - le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids)); + le64_to_cpu(sblk->id_table_start), next_table, msblk->ids); if (IS_ERR(msblk->id_table)) { errorf(fc, "unable to read id index table"); err = PTR_ERR(msblk->id_table); diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr.h b/fs/squashfs/xattr.h index 184129afd456..d8a270d3ac4c 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr.h @@ -17,8 +17,16 @@ extern int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_block *, unsigned int, int *, static inline __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 start, u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids) { + struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table; + + id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, sizeof(*id_table)); + if (IS_ERR(id_table)) + return (__le64 *) id_table; + + *xattr_table_start = le64_to_cpu(id_table->xattr_table_start); + kfree(id_table); + ERROR("Xattrs in filesystem, these will be ignored\n"); - *xattr_table_start = start; return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From eabac19e40c095543def79cb6ffeb3a8588aaff4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phillip Lougher Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:41:56 -0800 Subject: squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup Sysbot has reported an "slab-out-of-bounds read" error which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted "ino_num" value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption. 1. It checks against corruption of the inodes count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read. In the case of a too large inodes count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values. 2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. [phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/527909353.754618.1612769948607@webmail.123-reg.co.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-4-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher Reported-by: syzbot+04419e3ff19d2970ea28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/squashfs/export.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/export.c b/fs/squashfs/export.c index ae2c87bb0fbe..eb02072d28dd 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/export.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/export.c @@ -41,12 +41,17 @@ static long long squashfs_inode_lookup(struct super_block *sb, int ino_num) struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; int blk = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK(ino_num - 1); int offset = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_OFFSET(ino_num - 1); - u64 start = le64_to_cpu(msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]); + u64 start; __le64 ino; int err; TRACE("Entered squashfs_inode_lookup, inode_number = %d\n", ino_num); + if (ino_num == 0 || (ino_num - 1) >= msblk->inodes) + return -EINVAL; + + start = le64_to_cpu(msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]); + err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &ino, &start, &offset, sizeof(ino)); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -111,7 +116,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 lookup_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned int inodes) { unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_BYTES(inodes); + unsigned int indexes = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCKS(inodes); + int n; __le64 *table; + u64 start, end; TRACE("In read_inode_lookup_table, length %d\n", length); @@ -121,20 +129,37 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table(struct super_block *sb, if (inodes == 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check - * also traps instances where lookup_table_start is incorrectly larger - * than the next table start + /* + * The computed size of the lookup table (length bytes) should exactly + * match the table start and end points */ - if (lookup_table_start + length > next_table) + if (length != (next_table - lookup_table_start)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); table = squashfs_read_table(sb, lookup_table_start, length); + if (IS_ERR(table)) + return table; /* - * table[0] points to the first inode lookup table metadata block, - * this should be less than lookup_table_start + * table0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations + * of the compressed inode lookup blocks. Each entry should be + * less than the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference + * between them should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. + * table[indexes - 1] should be less than lookup_table_start, and + * again the difference should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less */ - if (!IS_ERR(table) && le64_to_cpu(table[0]) >= lookup_table_start) { + for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) { + start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]); + end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]); + + if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { + kfree(table); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + } + + start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]); + if (start >= lookup_table_start || (lookup_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { kfree(table); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 506220d2ba21791314af569211ffd8870b8208fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phillip Lougher Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:42:00 -0800 Subject: squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup Sysbot has reported a warning where a kmalloc() attempt exceeds the maximum limit. This has been identified as corruption of the xattr_ids count when reading the xattr id lookup table. This patch adds a number of additional sanity checks to detect this corruption and others. 1. It checks for a corrupted xattr index read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This would cause an out of bounds read. 2. It checks against corruption of the xattr_ids count. This can either lead to the above kmalloc failure, or a smaller than expected table to be read. 3. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. [phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/270245655.754655.1612770082682@webmail.123-reg.co.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-5-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher Reported-by: syzbot+2ccea6339d368360800d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c index d99e08464554..ead66670b41a 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c @@ -31,10 +31,15 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int index, struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; int block = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK(index); int offset = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_OFFSET(index); - u64 start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->xattr_id_table[block]); + u64 start_block; struct squashfs_xattr_id id; int err; + if (index >= msblk->xattr_ids) + return -EINVAL; + + start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->xattr_id_table[block]); + err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &id, &start_block, &offset, sizeof(id)); if (err < 0) @@ -50,13 +55,17 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int index, /* * Read uncompressed xattr id lookup table indexes from disk into memory */ -__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 start, +__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 table_start, u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids) { - unsigned int len; + struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info; + unsigned int len, indexes; struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table; + __le64 *table; + u64 start, end; + int n; - id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, sizeof(*id_table)); + id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, table_start, sizeof(*id_table)); if (IS_ERR(id_table)) return (__le64 *) id_table; @@ -70,13 +79,52 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 start, if (*xattr_ids == 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* xattr_table should be less than start */ - if (*xattr_table_start >= start) + len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids); + indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids); + + /* + * The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly + * match the table start and end points + */ + start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table); + end = msblk->bytes_used; + + if (len != (end - start)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids); + table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, len); + if (IS_ERR(table)) + return table; + + /* table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations + * of the compressed xattr id blocks. Each entry should be less than + * the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them + * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. table[indexes - 1] + * should be less than table_start, and again the difference + * shouls be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less. + * + * Finally xattr_table_start should be less than table[0]. + */ + for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) { + start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]); + end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]); + + if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { + kfree(table); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + } + + start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]); + if (start >= table_start || (table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) { + kfree(table); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } - TRACE("In read_xattr_index_table, length %d\n", len); + if (*xattr_table_start >= le64_to_cpu(table[0])) { + kfree(table); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } - return squashfs_read_table(sb, start + sizeof(*id_table), len); + return table; } -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From b85a7a8bb5736998b8a681937a9749b350c17988 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seth Forshee Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:42:14 -0800 Subject: tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 on s390 Currently there is an assumption in tmpfs that 64-bit architectures also have a 64-bit ino_t. This is not true on s390 which has a 32-bit ino_t. With CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64=y tmpfs mounts will get 64-bit inode numbers and display "inode64" in the mount options, but passing the "inode64" mount option will fail. This leads to the following behavior: # mkdir mnt # mount -t tmpfs nodev mnt # mount -o remount,rw mnt mount: /home/ubuntu/mnt: mount point not mounted or bad option. As mount sees "inode64" in the mount options and thus passes it in the options for the remount. So prevent CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 from being selected on s390. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210205230620.518245-1-seth.forshee@canonical.com Fixes: ea3271f7196c ("tmpfs: support 64-bit inums per-sb") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Acked-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: Chris Down Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Amir Goldstein Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: [5.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig index aa4c12282301..3347ec7bd837 100644 --- a/fs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/Kconfig @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ config TMPFS_XATTR config TMPFS_INODE64 bool "Use 64-bit ino_t by default in tmpfs" - depends on TMPFS && 64BIT + depends on TMPFS && 64BIT && !S390 default n help tmpfs has historically used only inode numbers as wide as an unsigned -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From ad69c389ec110ea54f8b0c0884b255340ef1c736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seth Forshee Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:42:17 -0800 Subject: tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 on alpha As with s390, alpha is a 64-bit architecture with a 32-bit ino_t. With CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64=y tmpfs mounts will get 64-bit inode numbers and display "inode64" in the mount options, whereas passing "inode64" in the mount options will fail. This leads to erroneous behaviours such as this: # mkdir mnt # mount -t tmpfs nodev mnt # mount -o remount,rw mnt mount: /home/ubuntu/mnt: mount point not mounted or bad option. Prevent CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 from being selected on alpha. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210208215726.608197-1-seth.forshee@canonical.com Fixes: ea3271f7196c ("tmpfs: support 64-bit inums per-sb") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Acked-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: Chris Down Cc: Amir Goldstein Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Cc: Matt Turner Cc: [5.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig index 3347ec7bd837..da524c4d7b7e 100644 --- a/fs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/Kconfig @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ config TMPFS_XATTR config TMPFS_INODE64 bool "Use 64-bit ino_t by default in tmpfs" - depends on TMPFS && 64BIT && !S390 + depends on TMPFS && 64BIT && !(S390 || ALPHA) default n help tmpfs has historically used only inode numbers as wide as an unsigned -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a0f85e38a3c23a334d9ea111cfa4fcfa4b3f9b64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 11:55:47 +1000 Subject: cifs: do not disable noperm if multiuser mount option is not provided Fixes small regression in implementation of new mount API. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Reported-by: Hyunchul Lee Tested-by: Hyunchul Lee Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 5111aadfdb6b..1b1c56e52395 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -1533,8 +1533,8 @@ void smb3_update_mnt_flags(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= (CIFS_MOUNT_MULTIUSER | CIFS_MOUNT_NO_PERM); else - cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags &= ~(CIFS_MOUNT_MULTIUSER | - CIFS_MOUNT_NO_PERM); + cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags &= ~CIFS_MOUNT_MULTIUSER; + if (ctx->strict_io) cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_STRICT_IO; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a35d8f016e0b68634035217d06d1c53863456b50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joachim Henke Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 13:42:36 -0800 Subject: nilfs2: make splice write available again Since 5.10, splice() or sendfile() to NILFS2 return EINVAL. This was caused by commit 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops"). This patch initializes the splice_write field in file_operations, like most file systems do, to restore the functionality. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1612784101-14353-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Joachim Henke Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi Cc: [5.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/nilfs2/file.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/file.c b/fs/nilfs2/file.c index 64bc81363c6c..e1bd592ce700 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/file.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/file.c @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ const struct file_operations nilfs_file_operations = { /* .release = nilfs_release_file, */ .fsync = nilfs_sync_file, .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, }; const struct inode_operations nilfs_file_inode_operations = { -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 92c75f7594d5060a4cb240f0e987a802f8486b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 12:37:58 -0700 Subject: Revert "io_uring: don't take fs for recvmsg/sendmsg" This reverts commit 10cad2c40dcb04bb46b2bf399e00ca5ea93d36b0. Petr reports that with this commit in place, io_uring fails the chroot test (CVE-202-29373). We do need to retain ->fs for send/recvmsg, so revert this commit. Reported-by: Petr Vorel Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 1f68105a41ed..931671082e61 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -857,7 +857,8 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = { .pollout = 1, .needs_async_data = 1, .async_size = sizeof(struct io_async_msghdr), - .work_flags = IO_WQ_WORK_MM | IO_WQ_WORK_BLKCG, + .work_flags = IO_WQ_WORK_MM | IO_WQ_WORK_BLKCG | + IO_WQ_WORK_FS, }, [IORING_OP_RECVMSG] = { .needs_file = 1, @@ -866,7 +867,8 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = { .buffer_select = 1, .needs_async_data = 1, .async_size = sizeof(struct io_async_msghdr), - .work_flags = IO_WQ_WORK_MM | IO_WQ_WORK_BLKCG, + .work_flags = IO_WQ_WORK_MM | IO_WQ_WORK_BLKCG | + IO_WQ_WORK_FS, }, [IORING_OP_TIMEOUT] = { .needs_async_data = 1, -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From af1a3d2ba9543e99d78914d8fb88b61d0531d9a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronnie Sahlberg Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 16:06:16 +1000 Subject: cifs: In the new mount api we get the full devname as source= so we no longer need to handle or parse the UNC= and prefixpath= options that mount.cifs are generating. This also fixes a bug in the mount command option where the devname would be truncated into just //server/share because we were looking at the truncated UNC value and not the full path. I.e. in the mount command output the devive //server/share/path would show up as just //server/share Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/fs_context.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- fs/cifs/fs_context.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c index e46da536ed33..ab883e84e116 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ cifs_show_cache_flavor(struct seq_file *s, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) static int cifs_show_devname(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) { struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(root->d_sb); - char *devname = kstrdup(cifs_sb->ctx->UNC, GFP_KERNEL); + char *devname = kstrdup(cifs_sb->ctx->source, GFP_KERNEL); if (devname == NULL) seq_puts(m, "none"); diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c index 1b1c56e52395..12a5da0230b5 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c @@ -148,7 +148,6 @@ const struct fs_parameter_spec smb3_fs_parameters[] = { /* Mount options which take string value */ fsparam_string("source", Opt_source), - fsparam_string("unc", Opt_source), fsparam_string("user", Opt_user), fsparam_string("username", Opt_user), fsparam_string("pass", Opt_pass), @@ -178,6 +177,11 @@ const struct fs_parameter_spec smb3_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_flag_no("auto", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("cred", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("credentials", Opt_ignore), + /* + * UNC and prefixpath is now extracted from Opt_source + * in the new mount API so we can just ignore them going forward. + */ + fsparam_string("unc", Opt_ignore), fsparam_string("prefixpath", Opt_ignore), {} }; @@ -313,6 +317,7 @@ smb3_fs_context_dup(struct smb3_fs_context *new_ctx, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx new_ctx->password = NULL; new_ctx->domainname = NULL; new_ctx->UNC = NULL; + new_ctx->source = NULL; new_ctx->iocharset = NULL; /* @@ -323,6 +328,7 @@ smb3_fs_context_dup(struct smb3_fs_context *new_ctx, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx DUP_CTX_STR(username); DUP_CTX_STR(password); DUP_CTX_STR(UNC); + DUP_CTX_STR(source); DUP_CTX_STR(domainname); DUP_CTX_STR(nodename); DUP_CTX_STR(iocharset); @@ -732,6 +738,7 @@ static int smb3_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc) * just use what we already have in cifs_sb->ctx. */ STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, UNC); + STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, source); STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, username); STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, password); STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, domainname); @@ -974,6 +981,11 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unknown error parsing devname\n"); goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } + ctx->source = kstrdup(param->string, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ctx->source == NULL) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "OOM when copying UNC string\n"); + goto cifs_parse_mount_err; + } fc->source = kstrdup(param->string, GFP_KERNEL); if (fc->source == NULL) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "OOM when copying UNC string\n"); @@ -1396,6 +1408,8 @@ smb3_cleanup_fs_context_contents(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) ctx->password = NULL; kfree(ctx->UNC); ctx->UNC = NULL; + kfree(ctx->source); + ctx->source = NULL; kfree(ctx->domainname); ctx->domainname = NULL; kfree(ctx->nodename); diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.h b/fs/cifs/fs_context.h index 3358b33abcd0..1c44a460e2c0 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.h +++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.h @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ struct smb3_fs_context { char *username; char *password; char *domainname; + char *source; char *UNC; char *nodename; char *iocharset; /* local code page for mapping to and from Unicode */ -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From a738c93fb1c17e386a09304b517b1c6b2a6a5a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Prasad N Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 03:26:54 -0800 Subject: cifs: Set CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH flag on setting cifs_sb->prepath. While debugging another issue today, Steve and I noticed that if a subdir for a file share is already mounted on the client, any new mount of any other subdir (or the file share root) of the same share results in sharing the cifs superblock, which e.g. can result in incorrect device name. While setting prefix path for the root of a cifs_sb, CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH flag should also be set. Without it, prepath is not even considered in some places, and output of "mount" and various /proc/<>/*mount* related options can be missing part of the device name. Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 76e4d8d8b3a6..4bb9decbbf27 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2756,6 +2756,7 @@ int cifs_setup_cifs_sb(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) cifs_sb->prepath = kstrdup(ctx->prepath, GFP_KERNEL); if (cifs_sb->prepath == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH; } return 0; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7 From 83c68bbcb6ac2dbbcaf12e2281a29a9f73b97d0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Su Yue Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 16:38:28 +0800 Subject: btrfs: initialize fs_info::csum_size earlier in open_ctree User reported that btrfs-progs misc-tests/028-superblock-recover fails: [TEST/misc] 028-superblock-recover unexpected success: mounted fs with corrupted superblock test failed for case 028-superblock-recover The test case expects that a broken image with bad superblock will be rejected to be mounted. However, the test image just passed csum check of superblock and was successfully mounted. Commit 55fc29bed8dd ("btrfs: use cached value of fs_info::csum_size everywhere") replaces all calls to btrfs_super_csum_size by fs_info::csum_size. The calls include the place where fs_info->csum_size is not initialized. So btrfs_check_super_csum() passes because memcmp() with len 0 always returns 0. Fix it by caching csum size in btrfs_fs_info::csum_size once we know the csum type in superblock is valid in open_ctree(). Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/250 Fixes: 55fc29bed8dd ("btrfs: use cached value of fs_info::csum_size everywhere") Signed-off-by: Su Yue Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index 6b35b7e88136..07a2b4f69b10 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -3044,6 +3044,8 @@ int __cold open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_device goto fail_alloc; } + fs_info->csum_size = btrfs_super_csum_size(disk_super); + ret = btrfs_init_csum_hash(fs_info, csum_type); if (ret) { err = ret; @@ -3161,7 +3163,6 @@ int __cold open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_device fs_info->nodesize = nodesize; fs_info->sectorsize = sectorsize; fs_info->sectorsize_bits = ilog2(sectorsize); - fs_info->csum_size = btrfs_super_csum_size(disk_super); fs_info->csums_per_leaf = BTRFS_MAX_ITEM_SIZE(fs_info) / fs_info->csum_size; fs_info->stripesize = stripesize; -- cgit v1.3-8-gc7d7