From 5d2787cf0b210d2925e8d44e2e79241385249d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 16:40:46 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key

Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/key.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 7321ab8ef949..5f5b1129dc92 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN	0x0001	/* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA	0x0002	/* not in quota */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED	0x0004	/* Key should be flagged as trusted */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN	0x0008	/* Key is built into kernel */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From b44a7dfc6fa16e01f2497c9fa62c3926f94be174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 16:02:29 -0500
Subject: vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel

For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux.
These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just
this though to load a file into a local buffer.  There are minor but
important checks differences on each.  This patch set is the first
attempt at resolving some of these differences.

This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel
with the corresponding security post-read hook and function.

Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu
v3:
- additional bounds checking - Luis
v2:
- To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/exec.c                 | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h        |  1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  9 ++++++++
 include/linux/security.h  |  7 +++++++
 security/security.c       |  8 +++++++
 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index dcd4ac7d3f1e..6b6668baa44a 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -831,6 +832,58 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
 
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+		     loff_t max_size)
+{
+	loff_t i_size, pos;
+	ssize_t bytes = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+	if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
+		return -EFBIG;
+	if (i_size <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+	if (!*buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	pos = 0;
+	while (pos < i_size) {
+		bytes = kernel_read(file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
+				    i_size - pos);
+		if (bytes < 0) {
+			ret = bytes;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (bytes == 0)
+			break;
+		pos += bytes;
+	}
+
+	if (pos != i_size) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size);
+	if (!ret)
+		*size = pos;
+
+out:
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		vfree(*buf);
+		*buf = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
+
 ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
 {
 	ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index ae681002100a..9a83d82b61ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2577,6 +2577,7 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
 extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
+extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 71969de4058c..f82631cc7248 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -561,6 +561,13 @@
  *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
  *	this argument will be NULL.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_read_file:
+ *	Read a file specified by userspace.
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ *	by the kernel.
+ *	@buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
+ *	@size length of the file contents.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_fix_setuid:
  *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
  *	identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
@@ -1457,6 +1464,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
 	int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -1716,6 +1724,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
 	struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4824a4ccaf1c..f30f5647d1e1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -866,6 +867,12 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
+						 char *buf, loff_t size)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 					   const struct cred *old,
 					   int flags)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e8ffd92ae2eb..c98dd6bf4ebd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -910,6 +910,12 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	return ima_module_check(file);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
+
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
@@ -1697,6 +1703,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
 	.kernel_module_from_file =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+	.kernel_post_read_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_post_read_file),
 	.task_fix_setuid =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
 	.task_setpgid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From bc8ca5b92d54f6f005fa73ad546f02fca26ddd85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 10:07:32 -0500
Subject: vfs: define kernel_read_file_id enumeration

To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch
defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the
caller identifier as an argument.

Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY.

Changelog v3:
- Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/exec.c                 | 4 ++--
 include/linux/fs.h        | 7 ++++++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h  | 7 +++++--
 security/security.c       | 5 +++--
 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 6b6668baa44a..1138dc502c77 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
 
 int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
-		     loff_t max_size)
+		     loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	loff_t i_size, pos;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size);
+	ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
 	if (!ret)
 		*size = pos;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 9a83d82b61ac..aa84bcb9c368 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2576,8 +2576,13 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
 #endif
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
+enum kernel_read_file_id {
+	READING_MAX_ID
+};
+
 extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
-extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t);
+extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+			    enum kernel_read_file_id);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f82631cc7248..2337f33913c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@
  *	by the kernel.
  *	@buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
  *	@size length of the file contents.
+ *	@id kernel read file identifier
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_fix_setuid:
  *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
@@ -1464,7 +1465,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
-	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size);
+	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
 	int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f30f5647d1e1..b68ce94e4e00 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct cred;
@@ -301,7 +302,8 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
-int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size);
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -868,7 +870,8 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
-						 char *buf, loff_t size)
+						 char *buf, loff_t size,
+						 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c98dd6bf4ebd..5b96eabaafd4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -910,9 +910,10 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	return ima_module_check(file);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size)
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From cf2222178645e545e96717b2825601321ce4745c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 17:57:47 -0500
Subject: ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in
 memory

This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.

Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()

v1:
- split patch

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/ima.h                   |  8 +++++++
 include/linux/security.h              |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  4 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  6 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   |  1 +
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  7 ++++--
 security/security.c                   |  7 +++++-
 9 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 120ccc53fcb7..d29a6a23fc19 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -52,6 +54,12 @@ static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b68ce94e4e00..d920718dc845 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 2c5262f2823f..0b7134c04165 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
@@ -152,7 +153,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, enum hash_algo algo);
+			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			    enum hash_algo algo);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 8750254506a9..370e42dfc5c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, enum hash_algo algo)
+			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+			    enum hash_algo algo)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -210,7 +211,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 		hash.hdr.algo = algo;
 
-		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+		result = (!buf) ?  ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
+			ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
 		if (!result) {
 			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
 			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 288844908788..cb0d0ff1137b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, ima_hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1be99a27a7f3..757765354158 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask,
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
 	if (rc != 0) {
 		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
 			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ out:
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
-		return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+		return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+					   MMAP_CHECK, 0);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -292,7 +293,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+				   BPRM_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 {
-	return process_measurement(file,
+	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				   FILE_CHECK, opened);
 }
@@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 #endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
+	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -343,7 +345,34 @@ int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
 		return 0;
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
+	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy.  Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+{
+	enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK;
+
+	if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+			return -EACCES;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b089ebef6648..cfbe86f476d0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 5efe2ecc538d..9a0ea4c4e3dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -49,12 +49,14 @@
 #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED	0x00008000
 #define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE	0x00010000
 #define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED	0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
 				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE)
+				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
 #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
 				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED)
+				 IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
 	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
 };
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5b96eabaafd4..ef4c65a9fd17 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -913,7 +913,12 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From 09596b94f7d28595602482e69ed954deab707437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 12:39:22 -0500
Subject: vfs: define kernel_read_file_from_path

This patch defines kernel_read_file_from_path(), a wrapper for the VFS
common kernel_read_file().

Changelog:
- revert error msg regression - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
- Separated from the IMA patch

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/exec.c          | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1138dc502c77..64cb3bc788c1 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -884,6 +884,25 @@ out:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
 
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+			       loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!path || !*path)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+	ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+	fput(file);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
+
 ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
 {
 	ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index aa84bcb9c368..00fa5c45fd63 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2583,6 +2583,8 @@ enum kernel_read_file_id {
 extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
 extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
 			    enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+				      enum kernel_read_file_id);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From e40ba6d56b41754b37b995dbc8035b2b3a6afd8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 12:39:22 -0500
Subject: firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel version

Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().

Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.

Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer.  The firmware is read once.

This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.

Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/base/firmware_class.c     | 52 ++++++++-------------------------------
 include/linux/fs.h                |  1 +
 include/linux/ima.h               |  6 -----
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         | 11 ---------
 include/linux/security.h          |  7 ------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 21 ++++++++--------
 security/security.c               | 13 ----------
 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index c743a2f18c33..a414008ea64c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/async.h>
 #include <linux/pm.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
@@ -291,37 +292,6 @@ static const char * const fw_path[] = {
 module_param_string(path, fw_path_para, sizeof(fw_path_para), 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(path, "customized firmware image search path with a higher priority than default path");
 
-static int fw_read_file_contents(struct file *file, struct firmware_buf *fw_buf)
-{
-	int size;
-	char *buf;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
-	if (size <= 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	buf = vmalloc(size);
-	if (!buf)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	rc = kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
-	if (rc != size) {
-		if (rc > 0)
-			rc = -EIO;
-		goto fail;
-	}
-	rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
-	if (rc)
-		goto fail;
-	fw_buf->data = buf;
-	fw_buf->size = size;
-	return 0;
-fail:
-	vfree(buf);
-	return rc;
-}
-
 static void fw_finish_direct_load(struct device *device,
 				  struct firmware_buf *buf)
 {
@@ -334,6 +304,7 @@ static void fw_finish_direct_load(struct device *device,
 static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
 				       struct firmware_buf *buf)
 {
+	loff_t size;
 	int i, len;
 	int rc = -ENOENT;
 	char *path;
@@ -343,8 +314,6 @@ static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fw_path); i++) {
-		struct file *file;
-
 		/* skip the unset customized path */
 		if (!fw_path[i][0])
 			continue;
@@ -356,18 +325,16 @@ static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(file))
-			continue;
-		rc = fw_read_file_contents(file, buf);
-		fput(file);
+		buf->size = 0;
+		rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &buf->data, &size,
+						INT_MAX, READING_FIRMWARE);
 		if (rc) {
 			dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
 				 path, rc);
 			continue;
 		}
-		dev_dbg(device, "direct-loading %s\n",
-			buf->fw_id);
+		dev_dbg(device, "direct-loading %s\n", buf->fw_id);
+		buf->size = size;
 		fw_finish_direct_load(device, buf);
 		break;
 	}
@@ -689,8 +656,9 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
 				dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
 					__func__);
 			else
-				rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(NULL,
-						fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size);
+				rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
+						fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size,
+						READING_FIRMWARE);
 
 			/*
 			 * Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 00fa5c45fd63..c8bc4d8c843f 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2577,6 +2577,7 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
 enum kernel_read_file_id {
+	READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
 	READING_MAX_ID
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index d29a6a23fc19..7aea4863c244 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 
@@ -49,11 +48,6 @@ static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2337f33913c1..7d04a1220223 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -541,15 +541,6 @@
  *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
  *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
  *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_fw_from_file:
- *	Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
- *	was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
- *	by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
- *	@buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
- *	@size length of the firmware contents.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @kernel_module_request:
  *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
@@ -1462,7 +1453,6 @@ union security_list_options {
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
 	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -1725,7 +1715,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head cred_transfer;
 	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
-	struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d920718dc845..cee1349e1155 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -300,7 +300,6 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -854,12 +853,6 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
-					       char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 757765354158..e9651be17b72 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -337,17 +337,6 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
-int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	if (!file) {
-		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
-		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
@@ -366,12 +355,22 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK;
 
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
 		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
 			return -EACCES;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE)
+		func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
+
 	return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ef4c65a9fd17..cd85be61c416 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -884,17 +884,6 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
-
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
@@ -1703,8 +1692,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
 	.kernel_create_files_as =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
-	.kernel_fw_from_file =
-		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file),
 	.kernel_module_request =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
 	.kernel_module_from_file =
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From 39eeb4fb97f60dbdfc823c1a673a8844b9226b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2016 22:23:26 -0500
Subject: security: define kernel_read_file hook

The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.

Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/exec.c                         |  4 ++++
 include/linux/ima.h               |  6 ++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/security.h          |  7 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c               | 13 +++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 64cb3bc788c1..8aaa38666119 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -842,6 +842,10 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
 	if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
 		return -EFBIG;
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 7aea4863c244..6adcaea8101c 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
+extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 
@@ -48,6 +49,11 @@ static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7d04a1220223..d32b7bd13635 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -552,6 +552,12 @@
  *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
  *	this argument will be NULL.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_read_file:
+ *	Read a file specified by userspace.
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ *	by the kernel.
+ *	@id kernel read file identifier
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @kernel_post_read_file:
  *	Read a file specified by userspace.
  *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
@@ -1455,6 +1461,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1715,6 +1722,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head cred_transfer;
 	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
+	struct list_head kernel_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cee1349e1155..071fb747fdbb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -863,6 +864,12 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
 						 char *buf, loff_t size,
 						 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e9651be17b72..bbb80df28fb1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -337,6 +337,22 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ *
+ * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
+ * in terms of the policy identifier.  Appraising the integrity of
+ * a file requires a file descriptor.
+ *
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index cd85be61c416..8e699f98a600 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -899,6 +899,17 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	return ima_module_check(file);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_read_file(file, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
+
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
@@ -1696,6 +1707,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
 	.kernel_module_from_file =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+	.kernel_read_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_read_file),
 	.kernel_post_read_file =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_post_read_file),
 	.task_fix_setuid =
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From b844f0ecbc5626ec26cfc70cb144a4c9b85dc3f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 08:36:21 -0500
Subject: vfs: define kernel_copy_file_from_fd()

This patch defines kernel_read_file_from_fd(), a wrapper for the VFS
common kernel_read_file().

Changelog:
- Separated from the kernel modules patch
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/exec.c          | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 8aaa38666119..9bdf0edf570d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -907,6 +907,22 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
 
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+			     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
+	int ret = -EBADF;
+
+	if (!f.file)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+out:
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
+
 ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
 {
 	ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index c8bc4d8c843f..9c85deae1bf2 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2586,6 +2586,8 @@ extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
 			    enum kernel_read_file_id);
 extern int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
 				      enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+				    enum kernel_read_file_id);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From a1db74209483a24c861c848b4bb79a4d945ef6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 07:35:30 -0500
Subject: module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel version

Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().

Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.

The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module.  Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook.  Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.

This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
---
 include/linux/fs.h                |  1 +
 include/linux/ima.h               |  6 ----
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  7 ----
 include/linux/security.h          |  5 ---
 kernel/module.c                   | 68 +++++----------------------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 ++++++++------------
 security/security.c               | 12 -------
 7 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 9c85deae1bf2..fb08b668c37a 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2578,6 +2578,7 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
 enum kernel_read_file_id {
 	READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
+	READING_MODULE,
 	READING_MAX_ID
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 6adcaea8101c..e6516cbbe9bf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -44,11 +43,6 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index d32b7bd13635..cdee11cbcdf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -546,12 +546,6 @@
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
  *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
  *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_module_from_file:
- *	Load a kernel module from userspace.
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
- *	this argument will be NULL.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @kernel_read_file:
  *	Read a file specified by userspace.
  *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
@@ -1725,7 +1719,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head kernel_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
 	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
-	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
 	struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
 	struct list_head task_setpgid;
 	struct list_head task_getpgid;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 071fb747fdbb..157f0cb1e4d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -859,11 +859,6 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
 					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8358f4697c0c..955410928696 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
 	if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
-	err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+	err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2672,63 +2672,6 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
-static int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info)
-{
-	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
-	int err;
-	struct kstat stat;
-	loff_t pos;
-	ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
-	if (!f.file)
-		return -ENOEXEC;
-
-	err = security_kernel_module_from_file(f.file);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
-		err = -EFBIG;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
-	if (stat.size == 0) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	info->hdr = vmalloc(stat.size);
-	if (!info->hdr) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	pos = 0;
-	while (pos < stat.size) {
-		bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(info->hdr) + pos,
-				    stat.size - pos);
-		if (bytes < 0) {
-			vfree(info->hdr);
-			err = bytes;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if (bytes == 0)
-			break;
-		pos += bytes;
-	}
-	info->len = pos;
-
-out:
-	fdput(f);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static void free_copy(struct load_info *info)
 {
 	vfree(info->hdr);
@@ -3589,8 +3532,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
 {
-	int err;
 	struct load_info info = { };
+	loff_t size;
+	void *hdr;
+	int err;
 
 	err = may_init_module();
 	if (err)
@@ -3602,9 +3547,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
 		      |MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	err = copy_module_from_fd(fd, &info);
+	err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
+				       READING_MODULE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	info.hdr = hdr;
+	info.len = size;
 
 	return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index bbb80df28fb1..5da0b9c00072 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -315,28 +315,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
-/**
- * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
- * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
- *
- * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
- *
- * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
- * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
- */
-int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
-{
-	if (!file) {
-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
-		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-#endif
-		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
-	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
@@ -350,6 +328,14 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
  */
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+#endif
+		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -378,6 +364,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
 		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
 			return -EACCES;
@@ -386,6 +375,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE)
 		func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
+	else if (read_id == READING_MODULE)
+		func = MODULE_CHECK;
 
 	return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e699f98a600..3644b0344d29 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -889,16 +889,6 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_module_check(file);
-}
-
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -1705,8 +1695,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
 	.kernel_module_request =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
-	.kernel_module_from_file =
-		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
 	.kernel_read_file =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_read_file),
 	.kernel_post_read_file =
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From b804defe4297157a9ff45863769efe9a01953398 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 20:59:14 -0500
Subject: kexec: replace call to copy_file_from_fd() with kernel version

Replace copy_file_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().

Two new identifiers named READING_KEXEC_IMAGE and READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS
are defined for measuring, appraising or auditing the kexec image and
initramfs.

Changelog v3:
- return -EBADF, not -ENOEXEC
- identifier change
- split patch, moving copy_file_from_fd() to a separate patch
- split patch, moving IMA changes to a separate patch
v0:
- use kstat file size type loff_t, not size_t
- Calculate the file hash from the in memory buffer - Dave Young

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h  |  2 ++
 kernel/kexec_file.c | 73 +++++++----------------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index fb08b668c37a..52567252288e 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2579,6 +2579,8 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 enum kernel_read_file_id {
 	READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
 	READING_MODULE,
+	READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
+	READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
 	READING_MAX_ID
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 007b791f676d..b696c3f3708f 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -33,65 +34,6 @@ size_t __weak kexec_purgatory_size = 0;
 
 static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image);
 
-static int copy_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, unsigned long *buf_len)
-{
-	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
-	int ret;
-	struct kstat stat;
-	loff_t pos;
-	ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
-	if (!f.file)
-		return -EBADF;
-
-	ret = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
-		ret = -EFBIG;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
-	if (stat.size == 0) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	*buf = vmalloc(stat.size);
-	if (!*buf) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	pos = 0;
-	while (pos < stat.size) {
-		bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
-				    stat.size - pos);
-		if (bytes < 0) {
-			vfree(*buf);
-			ret = bytes;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		if (bytes == 0)
-			break;
-		pos += bytes;
-	}
-
-	if (pos != stat.size) {
-		ret = -EBADF;
-		vfree(*buf);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	*buf_len = pos;
-out:
-	fdput(f);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 /* Architectures can provide this probe function */
 int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 					 unsigned long buf_len)
@@ -182,16 +124,17 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	void *ldata;
+	loff_t size;
 
-	ret = copy_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
-				&image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
+				       &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
+	image->kernel_buf_len = size;
 
 	/* Call arch image probe handlers */
 	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
 					    image->kernel_buf_len);
-
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -206,10 +149,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 #endif
 	/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
 	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
-		ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
-					&image->initrd_buf_len);
+		ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
+					       &size, INT_MAX,
+					       READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
+		image->initrd_buf_len = size;
 	}
 
 	if (cmdline_len) {
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490


From 7429b092811fb20c6a5b261c2c116a6a90cb9a29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:47:01 +0300
Subject: ima: load policy using path

We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies
since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents
of the policy directly in, as follows:

cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy

If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load
the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file
signature if it has one.  This patch adds support to load the IMA
policy with a given path as follows:

echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

Changelog v4+:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers
v3:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch
v2:
- after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read()
  to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi)
- Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h              |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'include/linux')

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 52567252288e..e514f76db04f 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2581,6 +2581,7 @@ enum kernel_read_file_id {
 	READING_MODULE,
 	READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
 	READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
+	READING_POLICY,
 	READING_MAX_ID
 };
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index f355231997b4..a6c61b351f36 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -258,6 +259,43 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+{
+	void *data;
+	char *datap;
+	loff_t size;
+	int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+	char *p;
+
+	/* remove \n */
+	datap = path;
+	strsep(&datap, "\n");
+
+	rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	datap = data;
+	while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
+		pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
+		rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			break;
+		size -= rc;
+	}
+
+	vfree(data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+	else if (size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		return pathlen;
+}
+
 static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -286,9 +324,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
 	if (result < 0)
 		goto out_free;
-	result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
 
+	if (data[0] == '/')
+		result = ima_read_policy(data);
+	else 
+		result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
 out_free:
 	kfree(data);
 out:
-- 
cgit v1.3-6-gb490