From bfeb7e399bacae4ee46ad978f5fce3e47f0978d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yauheni Kaliuta Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 12:01:49 +0300 Subject: bpf: Use bpf_capable() instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN for blinding decision The full CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for blinding looks too strict nowadays. These days given unprivileged BPF is disabled by default, the main users for constant blinding coming from unprivileged in particular via cBPF -> eBPF migration (e.g. old-style socket filters). Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220831090655.156434-1-ykaliuta@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220905090149.61221-1-ykaliuta@redhat.com --- include/linux/filter.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 527ae1d64e27..75335432fcbc 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog) return false; if (!bpf_jit_harden) return false; - if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_capable()) return false; return true; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b