From 312e3f8aefb5dc9c2f052ba0ee35a2fd6baa5bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 09:30:54 +0000 Subject: thermal: Fix spelling mistake "disabed" -> "disabled" There is a spelling mistake in a comment, fix it. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311093054.5338-1-colin.king@canonical.com --- include/uapi/linux/thermal.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/thermal.h b/include/uapi/linux/thermal.h index c105054cbb57..9aa2fedfa309 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/thermal.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/thermal.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ enum thermal_genl_event { THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_UNSPEC, THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_CREATE, /* Thermal zone creation */ THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_DELETE, /* Thermal zone deletion */ - THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_DISABLE, /* Thermal zone disabed */ + THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_DISABLE, /* Thermal zone disabled */ THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_ENABLE, /* Thermal zone enabled */ THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_TRIP_UP, /* Trip point crossed the way up */ THERMAL_GENL_EVENT_TZ_TRIP_DOWN, /* Trip point crossed the way down */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 3093c3c7c136458af692d5c3d309a66c3c12d9f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnaud Pouliquen Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 15:04:09 +0100 Subject: rpmsg: Move RPMSG_ADDR_ANY in user API As the RPMSG_ADDR_ANY is a valid src or dst address that can be set by user applications, migrate its definition in user API. Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Reviewed-by: Mathieu Poirier Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311140413.31725-3-arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson --- include/linux/rpmsg.h | 3 +-- include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/rpmsg.h b/include/linux/rpmsg.h index a5db828b2420..d97dcd049f18 100644 --- a/include/linux/rpmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/rpmsg.h @@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include - -#define RPMSG_ADDR_ANY 0xFFFFFFFF +#include struct rpmsg_device; struct rpmsg_endpoint; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h b/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h index e14c6dab4223..5e00748da319 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include +#define RPMSG_ADDR_ANY 0xFFFFFFFF + /** * struct rpmsg_endpoint_info - endpoint info representation * @name: name of service -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 809328b40cfb152f75541aa3dcbbe4903098963b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnaud Pouliquen Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 15:04:10 +0100 Subject: rpmsg: Add short description of the IOCTL defined in UAPI. Add a description of the IOCTLs and provide information on the default value of the source and destination addresses. Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Reviewed-by: Mathieu Poirier Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311140413.31725-4-arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson --- include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h b/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h index 5e00748da319..f5ca8740f3fb 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/rpmsg.h @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ /** * struct rpmsg_endpoint_info - endpoint info representation * @name: name of service - * @src: local address - * @dst: destination address + * @src: local address. To set to RPMSG_ADDR_ANY if not used. + * @dst: destination address. To set to RPMSG_ADDR_ANY if not used. */ struct rpmsg_endpoint_info { char name[32]; @@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ struct rpmsg_endpoint_info { __u32 dst; }; +/** + * Instantiate a new rmpsg char device endpoint. + */ #define RPMSG_CREATE_EPT_IOCTL _IOW(0xb5, 0x1, struct rpmsg_endpoint_info) + +/** + * Destroy a rpmsg char device endpoint created by the RPMSG_CREATE_EPT_IOCTL. + */ #define RPMSG_DESTROY_EPT_IOCTL _IO(0xb5, 0x2) #endif -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From bb0f61533dfd6aa815a2719720c77d13f840b683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Pan Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 02:13:58 -0800 Subject: iommu/vt-d: Enable write protect propagation from guest Write protect bit, when set, inhibits supervisor writes to the read-only pages. In guest supervisor shared virtual addressing (SVA), write-protect should be honored upon guest bind supervisor PASID request. This patch extends the VT-d portion of the IOMMU UAPI to include WP bit. WPE bit of the supervisor PASID entry will be set to match CPU CR0.WP bit. Signed-off-by: Sanjay Kumar Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan Acked-by: Lu Baolu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614680040-1989-3-git-send-email-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 +++ include/uapi/linux/iommu.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index 629e3aee44fe..0bf7e0a76890 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -732,6 +732,9 @@ intel_pasid_setup_bind_data(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct pasid_entry *pte, return -EINVAL; } pasid_set_sre(pte); + /* Enable write protect WP if guest requested */ + if (pasid_data->flags & IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_WPE) + pasid_set_wpe(pte); } if (pasid_data->flags & IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_EAFE) { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/iommu.h b/include/uapi/linux/iommu.h index e1d9e75f2c94..59178fc229ca 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/iommu.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/iommu.h @@ -288,7 +288,8 @@ struct iommu_gpasid_bind_data_vtd { #define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_PWT (1 << 3) /* page-level write through */ #define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_EMTE (1 << 4) /* extended mem type enable */ #define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_CD (1 << 5) /* PASID-level cache disable */ -#define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_LAST (1 << 6) +#define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_WPE (1 << 6) /* Write protect enable */ +#define IOMMU_SVA_VTD_GPASID_LAST (1 << 7) __u64 flags; __u32 pat; __u32 emt; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 8b638081bd4520f63db1defc660666ec5f65bc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 09:07:30 -0500 Subject: dm ioctl: return UUID in DM_LIST_DEVICES_CMD result When LVM needs to find a device with a particular UUID it needs to ask for UUID for each device. This patch returns UUID directly in the list of devices, so that LVM doesn't have to query all the devices with an ioctl. The UUID is returned if the flag DM_UUID_FLAG is set in the parameters. Returning UUID is done in backward-compatible way. There's one unused 32-bit word value after the event number. This patch sets the bit DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_HAS_UUID if UUID is present and DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_DOESNT_HAVE_UUID if it isn't (if none of these bits is set, then we have an old kernel that doesn't support returning UUIDs). The UUID is stored after this word. The 'next' value is updated to point after the UUID, so that old version of libdevmapper will skip the UUID without attempting to interpret it. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer --- drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/dm-ioctl.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c index 272de8772d52..0812ac6e9d70 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c @@ -558,7 +558,9 @@ static int list_devices(struct file *filp, struct dm_ioctl *param, size_t param_ for (n = rb_first(&name_rb_tree); n; n = rb_next(n)) { hc = container_of(n, struct hash_cell, name_node); needed += align_val(offsetof(struct dm_name_list, name) + strlen(hc->name) + 1); - needed += align_val(sizeof(uint32_t)); + needed += align_val(sizeof(uint32_t) * 2); + if (param->flags & DM_UUID_FLAG && hc->uuid) + needed += align_val(strlen(hc->uuid) + 1); } /* @@ -577,6 +579,7 @@ static int list_devices(struct file *filp, struct dm_ioctl *param, size_t param_ * Now loop through filling out the names. */ for (n = rb_first(&name_rb_tree); n; n = rb_next(n)) { + void *uuid_ptr; hc = container_of(n, struct hash_cell, name_node); if (old_nl) old_nl->next = (uint32_t) ((void *) nl - @@ -588,8 +591,19 @@ static int list_devices(struct file *filp, struct dm_ioctl *param, size_t param_ old_nl = nl; event_nr = align_ptr(nl->name + strlen(hc->name) + 1); - *event_nr = dm_get_event_nr(hc->md); - nl = align_ptr(event_nr + 1); + event_nr[0] = dm_get_event_nr(hc->md); + event_nr[1] = 0; + uuid_ptr = align_ptr(event_nr + 2); + if (param->flags & DM_UUID_FLAG) { + if (hc->uuid) { + event_nr[1] |= DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_HAS_UUID; + strcpy(uuid_ptr, hc->uuid); + uuid_ptr = align_ptr(uuid_ptr + strlen(hc->uuid) + 1); + } else { + event_nr[1] |= DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_DOESNT_HAVE_UUID; + } + } + nl = uuid_ptr; } /* * If mismatch happens, security may be compromised due to buffer diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/dm-ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/dm-ioctl.h index fcff6669137b..e5c6e458bdf7 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/dm-ioctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/dm-ioctl.h @@ -193,8 +193,22 @@ struct dm_name_list { __u32 next; /* offset to the next record from the _start_ of this */ char name[0]; + + /* + * The following members can be accessed by taking a pointer that + * points immediately after the terminating zero character in "name" + * and aligning this pointer to next 8-byte boundary. + * Uuid is present if the flag DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_HAS_UUID is set. + * + * __u32 event_nr; + * __u32 flags; + * char uuid[0]; + */ }; +#define DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_HAS_UUID 1 +#define DM_NAME_LIST_FLAG_DOESNT_HAVE_UUID 2 + /* * Used to retrieve the target versions */ @@ -272,9 +286,9 @@ enum { #define DM_DEV_SET_GEOMETRY _IOWR(DM_IOCTL, DM_DEV_SET_GEOMETRY_CMD, struct dm_ioctl) #define DM_VERSION_MAJOR 4 -#define DM_VERSION_MINOR 44 +#define DM_VERSION_MINOR 45 #define DM_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL 0 -#define DM_VERSION_EXTRA "-ioctl (2021-02-01)" +#define DM_VERSION_EXTRA "-ioctl (2021-03-22)" /* Status bits */ #define DM_READONLY_FLAG (1 << 0) /* In/Out */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 547b60988e631f74ed025cf1ec50cfc17f49fd13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suzuki K Poulose Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2021 17:42:48 +0100 Subject: perf: aux: Add flags for the buffer format Allocate a byte for advertising the PMU specific format type of the given AUX record. A PMU could end up providing hardware trace data in multiple format in a single session. e.g, The format of hardware buffer produced by CoreSight ETM PMU depends on the type of the "sink" device used for collection for an event (Traditional TMC-ETR/Bs with formatting or TRBEs without any formatting). # Boring story of why this is needed. Goto The_End_of_Story for skipping. CoreSight ETM trace allows instruction level tracing of Arm CPUs. The ETM generates the CPU excecution trace and pumps it into CoreSight AMBA Trace Bus and is collected by a different CoreSight component (traditionally CoreSight TMC-ETR /ETB/ETF), called "sink". Important to note that there is no guarantee that every CPU has a dedicated sink. Thus multiple ETMs could pump the trace data into the same "sink" and thus they apply additional formatting of the trace data for the user to decode it properly and attribute the trace data to the corresponding ETM. However, with the introduction of Arm Trace buffer Extensions (TRBE), we now have a dedicated per-CPU architected sink for collecting the trace. Since the TRBE is always per-CPU, it doesn't apply any formatting of the trace. The support for this driver is under review [1]. Now a system could have a per-cpu TRBE and one or more shared TMC-ETRs on the system. A user could choose a "specific" sink for a perf session (e.g, a TMC-ETR) or the driver could automatically select the nearest sink for a given ETM. It is possible that some ETMs could end up using TMC-ETR (e.g, if the TRBE is not usable on the CPU) while the others using TRBE in a single perf session. Thus we now have "formatted" trace collected from TMC-ETR and "unformatted" trace collected from TRBE. However, we don't get into a situation where a single event could end up using TMC-ETR & TRBE. i.e, any AUX buffer is guaranteed to be either RAW or FORMATTED, but not a mix of both. As for perf decoding, we need to know the type of the data in the individual AUX buffers, so that it can set up the "OpenCSD" (library for decoding CoreSight trace) decoder instance appropriately. Thus the perf.data file must conatin the hints for the tool to decode the data correctly. Since this is a runtime variable, and perf tool doesn't have a control on what sink gets used (in case of automatic sink selection), we need this information made available from the PMU driver for each AUX record. # The_End_of_Story Cc: Peter Ziljstra Cc: alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: mingo@redhat.com Cc: will@kernel.org Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: mike.leach@linaro.org Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: jolsa@redhat.com Cc: Mathieu Poirier Reviewed by: Mike Leach Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210405164307.1720226-2-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier --- include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h index ad15e40d7f5d..f006eeab6f0e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1156,10 +1156,11 @@ enum perf_callchain_context { /** * PERF_RECORD_AUX::flags bits */ -#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_TRUNCATED 0x01 /* record was truncated to fit */ -#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x02 /* snapshot from overwrite mode */ -#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL 0x04 /* record contains gaps */ -#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_COLLISION 0x08 /* sample collided with another */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_TRUNCATED 0x01 /* record was truncated to fit */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x02 /* snapshot from overwrite mode */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL 0x04 /* record contains gaps */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_COLLISION 0x08 /* sample collided with another */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_PMU_FORMAT_TYPE_MASK 0xff00 /* PMU specific trace format type */ #define PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP (1UL << 0) #define PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT (1UL << 1) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 7dde51767ca5339ed33109056d92fdca05d56d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suzuki K Poulose Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2021 17:42:49 +0100 Subject: perf: aux: Add CoreSight PMU buffer formats CoreSight PMU supports aux-buffer for the ETM tracing. The trace generated by the ETM (associated with individual CPUs, like Intel PT) is captured by a separate IP (CoreSight TMC-ETR/ETF until now). The TMC-ETR applies formatting of the raw ETM trace data, as it can collect traces from multiple ETMs, with the TraceID to indicate the source of a given trace packet. Arm Trace Buffer Extension is new "sink" IP, attached to individual CPUs and thus do not provide additional formatting, like TMC-ETR. Additionally, a system could have both TRBE *and* TMC-ETR for the trace collection. e.g, TMC-ETR could be used as a single trace buffer to collect data from multiple ETMs to correlate the traces from different CPUs. It is possible to have a perf session where some events end up collecting the trace in TMC-ETR while the others in TRBE. Thus we need a way to identify the type of the trace for each AUX record. Define the trace formats exported by the CoreSight PMU. We don't define the flags following the "ETM" as this information is available to the user when issuing the session. What is missing is the additional formatting applied by the "sink" which is decided at the runtime and the user may not have a control on. So we define : - CORESIGHT format (indicates the Frame format) - RAW format (indicates the format of the source) The default value is CORESIGHT format for all the records (i,e == 0). Add the RAW format for others that use raw format. Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Mike Leach Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Leo Yan Cc: Anshuman Khandual Reviewed-by: Mike Leach Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210405164307.1720226-3-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier --- include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h index f006eeab6f0e..63971eaef127 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1162,6 +1162,10 @@ enum perf_callchain_context { #define PERF_AUX_FLAG_COLLISION 0x08 /* sample collided with another */ #define PERF_AUX_FLAG_PMU_FORMAT_TYPE_MASK 0xff00 /* PMU specific trace format type */ +/* CoreSight PMU AUX buffer formats */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_CORESIGHT_FORMAT_CORESIGHT 0x0000 /* Default for backward compatibility */ +#define PERF_AUX_FLAG_CORESIGHT_FORMAT_RAW 0x0100 /* Raw format of the source */ + #define PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP (1UL << 0) #define PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT (1UL << 1) #define PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP (1UL << 2) /* pid=cgroup id, per-cpu mode only */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 3bf725699bf62494b3e179f1795f08c7d749f061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianyong Wu Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 14:09:29 +0800 Subject: KVM: arm64: Add support for the KVM PTP service Implement the hypervisor side of the KVM PTP interface. The service offers wall time and cycle count from host to guest. The caller must specify whether they want the host's view of either the virtual or physical counter. Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209060932.212364-7-jianyong.wu@arm.com --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 10 +++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst | 25 ++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 16 ++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 107 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 38e327d4b479..987d99e39887 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -6724,3 +6724,13 @@ vcpu_info is set. The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE flag indicates that the runstate-related features KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADDR/_CURRENT/_DATA/_ADJUST are supported by the KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR/KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR ioctls. + +8.31 KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM +-------------------- + +:Architectures: arm64 + +This capability indicates that the KVM virtual PTP service is +supported in the host. A VMM can check whether the service is +available to the guest on migration. + diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst index 3e2b2aba90fc..78a9b670aafe 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst @@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ ARM hyp-abi psci pvtime + ptp_kvm diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..68cffb50d8bf --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +PTP_KVM support for arm/arm64 +============================= + +PTP_KVM is used for high precision time sync between host and guests. +It relies on transferring the wall clock and counter value from the +host to the guest using a KVM-specific hypercall. + +* ARM_SMCCC_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID: 0x86000001 + +This hypercall uses the SMC32/HVC32 calling convention: + +ARM_SMCCC_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID + ============= ========== ========== + Function ID: (uint32) 0x86000001 + Arguments: (uint32) KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER(0) + KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER(1) + Return Values: (int32) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or + (uint32) Upper 32 bits of wall clock time (r0) + (uint32) Lower 32 bits of wall clock time (r1) + (uint32) Upper 32 bits of counter (r2) + (uint32) Lower 32 bits of counter (r3) + Endianness: No Restrictions. + ============= ========== ========== diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index 7f06ba76698d..46401798c644 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) case KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT: case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG: case KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES: + case KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM: r = 1; break; case KVM_CAP_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c index 78d32c34d49c..30da78f72b3b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c @@ -9,6 +9,55 @@ #include #include +static void kvm_ptp_get_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *val) +{ + struct system_time_snapshot systime_snapshot; + u64 cycles = ~0UL; + u32 feature; + + /* + * system time and counter value must captured at the same + * time to keep consistency and precision. + */ + ktime_get_snapshot(&systime_snapshot); + + /* + * This is only valid if the current clocksource is the + * architected counter, as this is the only one the guest + * can see. + */ + if (systime_snapshot.cs_id != CSID_ARM_ARCH_COUNTER) + return; + + /* + * The guest selects one of the two reference counters + * (virtual or physical) with the first argument of the SMCCC + * call. In case the identifier is not supported, error out. + */ + feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu); + switch (feature) { + case KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER: + cycles = systime_snapshot.cycles - vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, CNTVOFF_EL2); + break; + case KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER: + cycles = systime_snapshot.cycles; + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* + * This relies on the top bit of val[0] never being set for + * valid values of system time, because that is *really* far + * in the future (about 292 years from 1970, and at that stage + * nobody will give a damn about it). + */ + val[0] = upper_32_bits(systime_snapshot.real); + val[1] = lower_32_bits(systime_snapshot.real); + val[2] = upper_32_bits(cycles); + val[3] = lower_32_bits(cycles); +} + int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u32 func_id = smccc_get_function(vcpu); @@ -79,6 +128,10 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) break; case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_FEATURES_FUNC_ID: val[0] = BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_FEATURES); + val[0] |= BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_PTP); + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID: + kvm_ptp_get_time(vcpu, val); break; case ARM_SMCCC_TRNG_VERSION: case ARM_SMCCC_TRNG_FEATURES: diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 1a27bd9493fe..6861489a1890 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ /* KVM "vendor specific" services */ #define ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_FEATURES 0 +#define ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_PTP 1 #define ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_FEATURES_2 127 #define ARM_SMCCC_KVM_NUM_FUNCS 128 @@ -114,6 +115,21 @@ #define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1 +/* + * ptp_kvm is a feature used for time sync between vm and host. + * ptp_kvm module in guest kernel will get service from host using + * this hypercall ID. + */ +#define ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_VENDOR_HYP, \ + ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_PTP) + +/* ptp_kvm counter type ID */ +#define KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER 0 +#define KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER 1 + /* Paravirtualised time calls (defined by ARM DEN0057A) */ #define ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_FEATURES \ ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f6afee209620..0e0f70c0d0dc 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192 #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194 +#define KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM 195 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 52a4c95f4d24b8bcb50745732f7b9f8513c49c5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivek Goyal Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 11:18:22 -0400 Subject: fuse: extend FUSE_SETXATTR request Fuse client needs to send additional information to file server when it calls SETXATTR(system.posix_acl_access), so add extra flags field to the structure. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/fuse/acl.c | 2 +- fs/fuse/fuse_i.h | 5 ++++- fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 +++- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 9 ++++++--- include/uapi/linux/fuse.h | 7 +++++++ 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c index e9c0f916349d..d31260a139d4 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/acl.c +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int fuse_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, return ret; } - ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0); + ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, 0); kfree(value); } else { ret = fuse_removexattr(inode, name); diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h index e7775d9c3314..979b680bb47e 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h @@ -668,6 +668,9 @@ struct fuse_conn { /** Is setxattr not implemented by fs? */ unsigned no_setxattr:1; + /** Does file server support extended setxattr */ + unsigned setxattr_ext:1; + /** Is getxattr not implemented by fs? */ unsigned no_getxattr:1; @@ -1171,7 +1174,7 @@ void fuse_unlock_inode(struct inode *inode, bool locked); bool fuse_lock_inode(struct inode *inode); int fuse_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags); + size_t size, int flags, unsigned int extra_flags); ssize_t fuse_getxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size); diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c index b0e18b470e91..06a68cfa76d8 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c @@ -1052,6 +1052,8 @@ static void process_init_reply(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, fc->handle_killpriv_v2 = 1; fm->sb->s_flags |= SB_NOSEC; } + if (arg->flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) + fc->setxattr_ext = 1; } else { ra_pages = fc->max_read / PAGE_SIZE; fc->no_lock = 1; @@ -1095,7 +1097,7 @@ void fuse_send_init(struct fuse_mount *fm) FUSE_PARALLEL_DIROPS | FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV | FUSE_POSIX_ACL | FUSE_ABORT_ERROR | FUSE_MAX_PAGES | FUSE_CACHE_SYMLINKS | FUSE_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT | FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA | - FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2; + FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 | FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT; #ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_DAX if (fm->fc->dax) ia->in.flags |= FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT; diff --git a/fs/fuse/xattr.c b/fs/fuse/xattr.c index 1a7d7ace54e1..61dfaf7b7d20 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/xattr.c +++ b/fs/fuse/xattr.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include int fuse_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) + size_t size, int flags, unsigned int extra_flags) { struct fuse_mount *fm = get_fuse_mount(inode); FUSE_ARGS(args); @@ -25,10 +25,13 @@ int fuse_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg)); inarg.size = size; inarg.flags = flags; + inarg.setxattr_flags = extra_flags; + args.opcode = FUSE_SETXATTR; args.nodeid = get_node_id(inode); args.in_numargs = 3; - args.in_args[0].size = sizeof(inarg); + args.in_args[0].size = fm->fc->setxattr_ext ? + sizeof(inarg) : FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE; args.in_args[0].value = &inarg; args.in_args[1].size = strlen(name) + 1; args.in_args[1].value = name; @@ -199,7 +202,7 @@ static int fuse_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, if (!value) return fuse_removexattr(inode, name); - return fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, flags); + return fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, flags, 0); } static bool no_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h index 54442612c48b..390f7b4c889d 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ * 7.33 * - add FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2, FUSE_WRITE_KILL_SUIDGID, FATTR_KILL_SUIDGID * - add FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID + * - extend fuse_setxattr_in, add FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT */ #ifndef _LINUX_FUSE_H @@ -330,6 +331,7 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { * does not have CAP_FSETID. Additionally upon * write/truncate sgid is killed only if file has group * execute permission. (Same as Linux VFS behavior). + * FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT: Server supports extended struct fuse_setxattr_in */ #define FUSE_ASYNC_READ (1 << 0) #define FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS (1 << 1) @@ -360,6 +362,7 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { #define FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT (1 << 26) #define FUSE_SUBMOUNTS (1 << 27) #define FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 (1 << 28) +#define FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29) /** * CUSE INIT request/reply flags @@ -681,9 +684,13 @@ struct fuse_fsync_in { uint32_t padding; }; +#define FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE 8 + struct fuse_setxattr_in { uint32_t size; uint32_t flags; + uint32_t setxattr_flags; + uint32_t padding; }; struct fuse_getxattr_in { -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 550a7d3bc0c4049ef8d36ff4d9ed7082ee8cb5ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivek Goyal Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 11:18:23 -0400 Subject: fuse: add a flag FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID to kill SGID When posix access ACL is set, it can have an effect on file mode and it can also need to clear SGID if. - None of caller's group/supplementary groups match file owner group. AND - Caller is not priviliged (No CAP_FSETID). As of now fuser server is responsible for changing the file mode as well. But it does not know whether to clear SGID or not. So add a flag FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID and send this info with SETXATTR to let file server know that sgid needs to be cleared as well. Reported-by: Luis Henriques Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- fs/fuse/acl.c | 7 ++++++- include/uapi/linux/fuse.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c index d31260a139d4..52b165319be1 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/acl.c +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ int fuse_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, return -EINVAL; if (acl) { + unsigned int extra_flags = 0; /* * Fuse userspace is responsible for updating access * permissions in the inode, if needed. fuse_setxattr @@ -94,7 +95,11 @@ int fuse_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, return ret; } - ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, 0); + if (!in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(&init_user_ns, inode)) && + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FSETID)) + extra_flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID; + + ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, extra_flags); kfree(value); } else { ret = fuse_removexattr(inode, name); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h index 390f7b4c889d..271ae90a9bb7 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ * - add FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2, FUSE_WRITE_KILL_SUIDGID, FATTR_KILL_SUIDGID * - add FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID * - extend fuse_setxattr_in, add FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT + * - add FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID */ #ifndef _LINUX_FUSE_H @@ -454,6 +455,12 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { */ #define FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID (1 << 0) +/** + * setxattr flags + * FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID: Clear SGID when system.posix_acl_access is set + */ +#define FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID (1 << 0) + enum fuse_opcode { FUSE_LOOKUP = 1, FUSE_FORGET = 2, /* no reply */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 8b13c36493d8cb56fc3b386507873c5412b7108d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2021 10:24:07 -0400 Subject: KVM: introduce KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 This capability will allow the user to know which KVM_GUESTDBG_* bits are supported. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky Message-Id: <20210401135451.1004564-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 3 +++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 38e327d4b479..9778b2434c03 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -3357,6 +3357,9 @@ indicating the number of supported registers. For ppc, the KVM_CAP_PPC_GUEST_DEBUG_SSTEP capability indicates whether the single-step debug event (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP) is supported. +Also when supported, KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 capability indicates the +supported KVM_GUESTDBG_* bits in the control field. + When debug events exit the main run loop with the reason KVM_EXIT_DEBUG with the kvm_debug_exit_arch part of the kvm_run structure containing architecture specific debug information. diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f6afee209620..727010788eff 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192 #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194 +#define KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 195 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From fe7e948837f312d87853b3fce743795d1ae3715a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 16:21:43 +1200 Subject: KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file. The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default. Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 1b94cced0105..414b7fe1cf7b 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -6207,6 +6207,29 @@ KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them. This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided by POWER10 processor. +7.25 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE +---------------------- + +:Architectures: x86 +:Target: VM +:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs +:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested + attribute is not supported by KVM. + +KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or +more priveleged enclave attributes. args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid +SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted +by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY). + +The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide +additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY +is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable +system fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions +by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by +default. + +See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details. + 8. Other capabilities. ====================== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 29365c11bf27..2ae061586677 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) * expected to derive it from supported XCR0. */ entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | - /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | + SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | SGX_ATTR_KSS; entry->ebx &= 0; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index d4063bec8ce3..d4cdab15238b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -3804,6 +3805,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR: case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER: case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: +#endif r = 1; break; case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2: @@ -5392,6 +5396,23 @@ split_irqchip_unlock: kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true; r = 0; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: { + unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0; + + r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]); + if (r) + break; + + /* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */ + if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) && + !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) + kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true; + else + r = -EINVAL; + break; + } +#endif default: r = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 727010788eff..162b7e044c8b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1079,6 +1079,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194 #define KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 195 +#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 196 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 54526d1fd59338fd6a381dbd806b7ccbae3aa4aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Tempelman Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 22:32:14 +0000 Subject: KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots. The primary benefits of this are that: 1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they can't accidentally clobber each other. 2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT). This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching a vCPU to the primary VM. This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest. This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror. For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly. Signed-off-by: Nathan Tempelman Message-Id: <20210408223214.2582277-1-natet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 18 ++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 6 +++ 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 414b7fe1cf7b..fd4a84911355 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -6207,6 +6207,22 @@ KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them. This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided by POWER10 processor. +7.24 KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM +------------------------------------- + +Architectures: x86 SEV enabled +Type: vm +Parameters: args[0] is the fd of the source vm +Returns: 0 on success; ENOTTY on error + +This capability enables userspace to copy encryption context from the vm +indicated by the fd to the vm this is called on. + +This is intended to support in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. This +allows the in-guest workload to maintain its own NPTs and keeps the two vms +from accidentally clobbering each other with interrupts and the like (separate +APIC/MSRs/etc). + 7.25 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE ---------------------- @@ -6749,4 +6765,4 @@ in the kernel based fast path. If they can not be handled by the kernel, they will get passed on to user space. So user space still has to have an implementation for these despite the in kernel acceleration. -This capability is always enabled. \ No newline at end of file +This capability is always enabled. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index c5c96386cc76..6e195f7df4f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1349,6 +1349,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp); int (*mem_enc_reg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp); int (*mem_enc_unreg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp); + int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd); int (*get_msr_feature)(struct kvm_msr_entry *entry); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index bb4bf5ffb104..4bf79dbc3eeb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(void) return ret; } +static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner; +} + /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid) { @@ -1122,6 +1127,12 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); + /* enc_context_owner handles all memory enc operations */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + switch (sev_cmd.id) { case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT: if (!sev_es) { @@ -1185,6 +1196,10 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; + /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) + return -EINVAL; + if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX) return -EINVAL; @@ -1251,6 +1266,10 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct enc_region *region; int ret; + /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); if (!sev_guest(kvm)) { @@ -1281,6 +1300,71 @@ failed: return ret; } +int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) +{ + struct file *source_kvm_file; + struct kvm *source_kvm; + struct kvm_sev_info *mirror_sev; + unsigned int asid; + int ret; + + source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd); + if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) { + ret = -EBADF; + goto e_source_put; + } + + source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data; + mutex_lock(&source_kvm->lock); + + if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto e_source_unlock; + } + + /* Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || source_kvm == kvm) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto e_source_unlock; + } + + asid = to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info.asid; + + /* + * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't + * disappear until we're done with it + */ + kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm); + + fput(source_kvm_file); + mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock); + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); + + if (sev_guest(kvm)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto e_mirror_unlock; + } + + /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */ + mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm; + mirror_sev->asid = asid; + mirror_sev->active = true; + + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); + return 0; + +e_mirror_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); + kvm_put_kvm(source_kvm); + return ret; +e_source_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock); +e_source_put: + fput(source_kvm_file); + return ret; +} + void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; @@ -1290,6 +1374,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return; + /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) { + kvm_put_kvm(sev->enc_context_owner); + return; + } + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 86e42d42637e..cd8c333ed2dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -4589,6 +4589,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .mem_enc_reg_region = svm_register_enc_region, .mem_enc_unreg_region = svm_unregister_enc_region, + .vm_copy_enc_context_from = svm_vm_copy_asid_from, + .can_emulate_instruction = svm_can_emulate_instruction, .apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 7deb7a057004..454da1c1d9b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ + struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */ }; struct kvm_svm { @@ -580,6 +581,7 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range); int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range); +int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd); void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); void sev_hardware_teardown(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index d4cdab15238b..a5eeca55810f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -3808,6 +3808,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: #endif + case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM: r = 1; break; case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2: @@ -4714,7 +4715,6 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); return 0; - default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -5413,6 +5413,11 @@ split_irqchip_unlock: break; } #endif + case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM: + r = -EINVAL; + if (kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from) + r = kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from(kvm, cap->args[0]); + return r; default: r = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 82b066db37cb..c306b4c3674e 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -654,6 +654,7 @@ void kvm_exit(void); void kvm_get_kvm(struct kvm *kvm); void kvm_put_kvm(struct kvm *kvm); +bool file_is_kvm(struct file *file); void kvm_put_kvm_no_destroy(struct kvm *kvm); static inline struct kvm_memslots *__kvm_memslots(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 162b7e044c8b..37f0a329da6a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1080,6 +1080,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194 #define KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 195 #define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 196 +#define KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM 197 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 545a28387c33..48c1e4842908 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -4197,6 +4197,12 @@ static struct file_operations kvm_vm_fops = { KVM_COMPAT(kvm_vm_compat_ioctl), }; +bool file_is_kvm(struct file *file) +{ + return file && file->f_op == &kvm_vm_fops; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(file_is_kvm); + static int kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm(unsigned long type) { int r; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 4cfdd47d6d95aca4fb8d6cfbe73392472d353f82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brijesh Singh Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:53:14 +0000 Subject: KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Message-Id: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 30 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/psp-sev.h | 8 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 12 +++ 4 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 34ce2d1fcb89..db5c3fb2bab5 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -290,6 +290,36 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 len; }; +11. KVM_SEV_SEND_START +---------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an +outgoing guest encryption context. + +If session_len is zero on entry, the length of the guest session information is +written to session_len and all other fields are not used. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + struct kvm_sev_send_start { + __u32 policy; /* guest policy */ + + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr; /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */ + __u32 pdh_cert_len; + + __u64 plat_certs_uaddr; /* platform certificate chain */ + __u32 plat_certs_len; + + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr; /* AMD certificate */ + __u32 amd_certs_len; + + __u64 session_uaddr; /* Guest session information */ + __u32 session_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 4bf79dbc3eeb..9f5312956d5e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1111,6 +1111,131 @@ e_free: return ret; } +/* Userspace wants to query session length. */ +static int +__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, + struct kvm_sev_send_start *params) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_start *data; + int ret; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + params->session_len = data->session_len; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start))) + ret = -EFAULT; + +out: + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + +static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_start *data; + struct kvm_sev_send_start params; + void *amd_certs, *session_data; + void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */ + if (!params.session_len) + return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp, + ¶ms); + + /* some sanity checks */ + if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len || + !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */ + session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!session_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */ + pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr, + params.pdh_cert_len); + if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert); + goto e_free_session; + } + + plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr, + params.plat_certs_len); + if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs); + goto e_free_pdh; + } + + amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr, + params.amd_certs_len); + if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs); + goto e_free_plat_cert; + } + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (data == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto e_free_amd_cert; + } + + /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */ + data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert); + data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len; + data->plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs); + data->plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len; + data->amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs); + data->amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len; + data->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data); + data->session_len = params.session_len; + data->handle = sev->handle; + + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error); + + if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr, + session_data, params.session_len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto e_free; + } + + params.policy = data->policy; + params.session_len = data->session_len; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start))) + ret = -EFAULT; + +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_free_amd_cert: + kfree(amd_certs); +e_free_plat_cert: + kfree(plat_certs); +e_free_pdh: + kfree(pdh_cert); +e_free_session: + kfree(session_data); + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1173,6 +1298,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT: r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_START: + r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h index b801ead1e2bb..73da511b9423 100644 --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h @@ -326,11 +326,11 @@ struct sev_data_send_start { u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */ u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In */ u32 reserved1; - u64 plat_cert_address; /* In */ - u32 plat_cert_len; /* In */ + u64 plat_certs_address; /* In */ + u32 plat_certs_len; /* In */ u32 reserved2; - u64 amd_cert_address; /* In */ - u32 amd_cert_len; /* In */ + u64 amd_certs_address; /* In */ + u32 amd_certs_len; /* In */ u32 reserved3; u64 session_address; /* In */ u32 session_len; /* In/Out */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 37f0a329da6a..11b3e528d35d 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1732,6 +1732,18 @@ struct kvm_sev_attestation_report { __u32 len; }; +struct kvm_sev_send_start { + __u32 policy; + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr; + __u32 pdh_cert_len; + __u64 plat_certs_uaddr; + __u32 plat_certs_len; + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr; + __u32 amd_certs_len; + __u64 session_uaddr; + __u32 session_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From d3d1af85e2c75bb57da51535a6e182c7c45eceb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brijesh Singh Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:53:55 +0000 Subject: KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Message-Id: Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 28 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ 3 files changed, 162 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index db5c3fb2bab5..79da88a14135 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -320,6 +320,34 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 session_len; }; +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the +outgoing guest memory region with the encryption context creating using +KVM_SEV_SEND_START. + +If hdr_len or trans_len are zero on entry, the length of the packet header and +transport region are written to hdr_len and trans_len respectively, and all +other fields are not used. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ + __u32 hdr_len; + + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the source memory region to be encrypted */ + __u32 guest_len; + + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the destination memory region */ + __u32 trans_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 9f5312956d5e..a534ec9ae172 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock); unsigned int max_sev_asid; static unsigned int min_sev_asid; +static unsigned long sev_me_mask; static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap; @@ -1236,6 +1237,126 @@ e_free_session: return ret; } +/* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */ +static int +__sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; + int ret; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + params->hdr_len = data->hdr_len; + params->trans_len = data->trans_len; + + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + ret = -EFAULT; + +out: + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + +static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params; + void *hdr, *trans_data; + struct page **guest_page; + unsigned long n; + int ret, offset; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */ + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) + return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms); + + if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr || + !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Pin guest memory */ + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + if (!guest_page) + return -EFAULT; + + /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */ + ret = -ENOMEM; + hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!hdr) + goto e_unpin; + + trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!trans_data) + goto e_free_hdr; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + goto e_free_trans_data; + + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + + offset; + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + data->handle = sev->handle; + + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); + + if (ret) + goto e_free; + + /* copy transport buffer to user space */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr, + trans_data, params.trans_len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto e_free; + } + + /* Copy packet header to userspace. */ + ret = copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr, + params.hdr_len); + +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_free_trans_data: + kfree(trans_data); +e_free_hdr: + kfree(hdr); +e_unpin: + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); + + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1301,6 +1422,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_START: r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: + r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -1559,6 +1683,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */ min_sev_asid = edx; + sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f); /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */ sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 11b3e528d35d..d07be69f402f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1744,6 +1744,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_start { __u32 session_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; + __u32 hdr_len; + __u64 guest_uaddr; + __u32 guest_len; + __u64 trans_uaddr; + __u32 trans_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 5569e2e7a650dfffd4df7635662b2f92162d6501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Rutherford Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 05:01:20 -0400 Subject: KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL command After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later. Reviewed-by: Nathan Tempelman Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 1 + include/linux/psp-sev.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 03f2518cfbeb..c36a12975763 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -356,6 +356,15 @@ issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error +14. KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL +------------------------ + +After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the +SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled +migration can restart with a new target later. + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index f25c52a2dc14..552f47787143 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1377,6 +1377,26 @@ static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_cancel *data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1448,6 +1468,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL: + r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index cb9b4c4e371e..4172a1afa0db 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd) case SEV_CMD_DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_download_firmware); case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: return sizeof(struct sev_data_get_id); case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_attestation_report); + case SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_cancel); default: return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h index 73da511b9423..d48a7192e881 100644 --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ enum sev_cmd { SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA = 0x041, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x042, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH = 0x043, + SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL = 0x044, /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */ SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START = 0x050, @@ -392,6 +393,15 @@ struct sev_data_send_finish { u32 handle; /* In */ } __packed; +/** + * struct sev_data_send_cancel - SEND_CANCEL command parameters + * + * @handle: handle of the VM to process + */ +struct sev_data_send_cancel { + u32 handle; /* In */ +} __packed; + /** * struct sev_data_receive_start - RECEIVE_START command parameters * diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index d07be69f402f..5d1adeb13739 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1674,6 +1674,8 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { KVM_SEV_CERT_EXPORT, /* Attestation report */ KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT, + /* Guest Migration Extension */ + KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL, KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, }; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From af43cbbf954b50ca97d5e7bb56c2edc6ffd209ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brijesh Singh Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:54:50 +0000 Subject: KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Message-Id: Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 29 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index c36a12975763..86c9b36f4a57 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -365,6 +365,35 @@ migration can restart with a new target later. Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START +------------------------ + +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption +context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must +provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session +information. + +Parameters: struct kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out) + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_receive_start { + __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */ + __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */ + + __u64 pdh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */ + __u32 pdh_len; + + __u64 session_uaddr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */ + __u32 session_len; + }; + +On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value. + +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 552f47787143..3e5064c69124 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1397,6 +1397,84 @@ static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_receive_start *start; + struct kvm_sev_receive_start params; + int *error = &argp->error; + void *session_data; + void *pdh_data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + /* Get parameter from the userspace */ + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* some sanity checks */ + if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len || + !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len) + return -EINVAL; + + pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len); + if (IS_ERR(pdh_data)) + return PTR_ERR(pdh_data); + + session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, + params.session_len); + if (IS_ERR(session_data)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(session_data); + goto e_free_pdh; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!start) + goto e_free_session; + + start->handle = params.handle; + start->policy = params.policy; + start->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data); + start->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len; + start->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data); + start->session_len = params.session_len; + + /* create memory encryption context */ + ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, start, + error); + if (ret) + goto e_free; + + /* Bind ASID to this guest */ + ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error); + if (ret) + goto e_free; + + params.handle = start->handle; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle); + goto e_free; + } + + sev->handle = start->handle; + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; + +e_free: + kfree(start); +e_free_session: + kfree(session_data); +e_free_pdh: + kfree(pdh_data); + + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1471,6 +1549,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL: r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: + r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 5d1adeb13739..248d1d266bc3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1755,6 +1755,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { __u32 trans_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_receive_start { + __u32 handle; + __u32 policy; + __u64 pdh_uaddr; + __u32 pdh_len; + __u64 session_uaddr; + __u32 session_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 15fb7de1a7f5af0d5910ca4352b26f887543e26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brijesh Singh Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:55:17 +0000 Subject: KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Message-Id: Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 86c9b36f4a57..bb94c6e3615f 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -394,6 +394,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. +16. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ + __u32 hdr_len; + + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ + __u32 guest_len; + + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ + __u32 trans_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 3e5064c69124..ff6435527a67 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1475,6 +1475,82 @@ e_free_pdh: return ret; } +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; + struct page **guest_page; + unsigned long n; + int ret, offset; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) + return PTR_ERR(hdr); + + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + goto e_free_hdr; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + goto e_free_trans; + + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* Pin guest memory */ + ret = -EFAULT; + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + if (!guest_page) + goto e_free; + + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + + offset; + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + data->handle = sev->handle; + + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, + &argp->error); + + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); + +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_free_trans: + kfree(trans); +e_free_hdr: + kfree(hdr); + + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1552,6 +1628,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 248d1d266bc3..d76533498543 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1764,6 +1764,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { __u32 session_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; + __u32 hdr_len; + __u64 guest_uaddr; + __u32 guest_len; + __u64 trans_uaddr; + __u32 trans_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From cb2c7d1a1776057c9a1f48ed1250d85e94d4850d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:17 +0200 Subject: landlock: Support filesystem access-control MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro Cc: Anton Ivanov Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/um/Kconfig | 1 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 76 +++++ security/landlock/Kconfig | 2 +- security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/fs.c | 692 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/fs.h | 70 +++++ security/landlock/limits.h | 4 + security/landlock/ruleset.c | 4 + security/landlock/setup.c | 7 + security/landlock/setup.h | 2 + 12 files changed, 866 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 87a2738dfdec..70ec117efa8a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10003,6 +10003,7 @@ L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported W: https://landlock.io T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git +F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h F: security/landlock/ K: landlock K: LANDLOCK diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index ecfd3520b676..8160ab7e3e03 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1013,6 +1013,13 @@ config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT bool +config ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES + def_bool n + help + An arch should select this symbol if it doesn't keep track of inode + instances on its own, but instead relies on something else (e.g. the + host kernel for an UML kernel). + config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT bool diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig index c3030db3325f..57cfd9a1c082 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options" config UML bool default y + select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1a81b5a8b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Landlock - User space API + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H + +/** + * DOC: fs_access + * + * A set of actions on kernel objects may be defined by an attribute (e.g. + * &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) including a bitmask of access. + * + * Filesystem flags + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of actions on + * files and directories. Files or directories opened before the sandboxing + * are not subject to these restrictions. + * + * A file can only receive these access rights: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. + * + * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The + * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the + * directories beneath it: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR: Open a directory or list its content. + * + * However, the following access rights only apply to the content of a + * directory, not the directory itself: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR: Remove an empty directory or rename one. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE: Unlink (or rename) a file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR: Create (or rename or link) a character + * device. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR: Create (or rename) a directory. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG: Create (or rename or link) a regular file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK: Create (or rename or link) a UNIX domain + * socket. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO: Create (or rename or link) a named pipe. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK: Create (or rename or link) a block device. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM: Create (or rename or link) a symbolic link. + * + * .. warning:: + * + * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions + * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, + * :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, + * :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, + * :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, + * :manpage:`access(2)`. + * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. + */ +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE (1ULL << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE (1ULL << 1) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE (1ULL << 2) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR (1ULL << 3) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR (1ULL << 4) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE (1ULL << 5) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR (1ULL << 6) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR (1ULL << 7) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG (1ULL << 8) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK (1ULL << 9) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO (1ULL << 10) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12) + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig index c1e862a38410..8e33c4e8ffb8 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK bool "Landlock support" - depends on SECURITY + depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES select SECURITY_PATH help Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index f1d1eb72fa76..92e3d80ab8ed 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \ - cred.o ptrace.o + cred.o ptrace.o fs.o diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..97b8e421f617 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,692 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" +#include "cred.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "object.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/* Underlying object management */ + +static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object) + __releases(object->lock) +{ + struct inode *const inode = object->underobj; + struct super_block *sb; + + if (!inode) { + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + return; + } + + /* + * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference + * to the underlying inode. + */ + object->underobj = NULL; + /* + * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted, + * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput(). + */ + sb = inode->i_sb; + atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + /* + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and + * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. It is therefore + * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); + /* + * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object(). + */ + + iput(inode); + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)) + wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); +} + +static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = { + .release = release_inode +}; + +/* Ruleset management */ + +static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) +{ + struct landlock_object *object, *new_object; + struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode); + + rcu_read_lock(); +retry: + object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object); + if (object) { + if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return object; + } + /* + * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going + * away. Wait for release_inode(), then retry. + */ + spin_lock(&object->lock); + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + goto retry; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without + * holding any locks). + */ + new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode); + if (IS_ERR(new_object)) + return new_object; + + /* + * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or + * hook_sb_delete(). + */ + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) { + /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */ + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + kfree(new_object); + + rcu_read_lock(); + goto retry; + } + + /* + * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock + * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the + * related object. + */ + ihold(inode); + rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + return new_object; +} + +/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */ +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + +/* + * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd(). + */ +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights) +{ + int err; + struct landlock_object *object; + + /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */ + if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != + ACCESS_FILE) + return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]; + object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); + if (IS_ERR(object)) + return PTR_ERR(object); + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights); + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); + /* + * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule() + * increments the refcount for the new object if needed. + */ + landlock_put_object(object); + return err; +} + +/* Access-control management */ + +static inline u64 unmask_layers( + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request, + u64 layer_mask) +{ + const struct landlock_rule *rule; + const struct inode *inode; + size_t i; + + if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) + /* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */ + return layer_mask; + inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); + rcu_read_lock(); + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, + rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!rule) + return layer_mask; + + /* + * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule + * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses, + * regardless of their position in the layer stack. We must then check + * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to + * the last one. + */ + for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) { + const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i]; + const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1); + + /* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */ + if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) { + layer_mask &= ~layer_level; + + if (layer_mask == 0) + return layer_mask; + } + } + return layer_mask; +} + +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_request) +{ + bool allowed = false; + struct path walker_path; + u64 layer_mask; + size_t i; + + /* Make sure all layers can be checked. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + + if (!access_request) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) + return 0; + /* + * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable + * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through + * /proc//fd/ . + */ + if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || + (d_is_positive(path->dentry) && + unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + /* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */ + layer_mask = 0; + for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) { + if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request) + layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); + } + /* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */ + if (layer_mask == 0) + return 0; + + walker_path = *path; + path_get(&walker_path); + /* + * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant + * restriction. + */ + while (true) { + struct dentry *parent_dentry; + + layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path, + access_request, layer_mask); + if (layer_mask == 0) { + /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ + allowed = true; + break; + } + +jump_up: + if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { + if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { + /* Ignores hidden mount points. */ + goto jump_up; + } else { + /* + * Stops at the real root. Denies access + * because not all layers have granted access. + */ + allowed = false; + break; + } + } + if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) { + /* + * Stops at disconnected root directories. Only allows + * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is + * reachable through /proc//ns/). + */ + allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL); + break; + } + parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry); + dput(walker_path.dentry); + walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry; + } + path_put(&walker_path); + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; +} + +static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, + const u32 access_request) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); +} + +/* Inode hooks */ + +static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode) +{ + /* + * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by + * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete(). + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object); +} + +/* Super-block hooks */ + +/* + * Release the inodes used in a security policy. + * + * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes() + */ +static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) +{ + struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL; + + if (!landlock_initialized) + return; + + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { + struct landlock_object *object; + + /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ + if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) + continue; + + /* + * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g. + * from get_inode_object()). + */ + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + /* + * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE to protect against a race + * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which + * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a + * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also + * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. + */ + if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + continue; + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); + if (!object) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + continue; + } + /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */ + __iget(inode); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + + /* + * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we + * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we + * will just wait for it to finish. + */ + spin_lock(&object->lock); + if (object->underobj == inode) { + object->underobj = NULL; + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, + * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee + * that it is safe to reset + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. + * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); + /* + * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was + * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the + * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop + * walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will + * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at + * least two references to it. + */ + iput(inode); + } else { + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + } + + if (prev_inode) { + /* + * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference + * that we just set in this loop walk. Therefore we + * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't + * disappear from under us until the next loop walk. + */ + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + /* + * We can now actually put the inode reference from the + * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore. + */ + iput(prev_inode); + cond_resched(); + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + } + prev_inode = inode; + } + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + + /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */ + if (prev_inode) + iput(prev_inode); + /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */ + wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read( + &landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)); +} + +/* + * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem + * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files + * not previously allowed. + * + * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked + * processes. Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a + * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide + * access-control security policy. + * + * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount + * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process. Indeed, we could + * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into + * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point. + * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically + * inherit these new constraints. Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons, + * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag). + */ +static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name, + const struct path *const path, const char *const type, + const unsigned long flags, void *const data) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path, + const struct path *const to_path) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* + * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which + * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden. + */ +static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* + * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace. It must + * then be forbidden for a landlocked process. + * + * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root + * directory of the current process. Moreover, it can be used to restrict the + * view of the filesystem. + */ +static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, + const struct path *const new_path) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* Path hooks */ + +static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) +{ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFLNK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; + case 0: + /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ + case S_IFREG: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; + case S_IFDIR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; + case S_IFCHR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; + case S_IFBLK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; + case S_IFIFO: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; + case S_IFSOCK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not + * handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more + * privileges by being accessible from the destination. This is getting more + * complex when dealing with multiple layers. The whole picture can be seen as + * a multilayer partial ordering problem. A future version of Landlock will + * deal with that. + */ +static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, + const struct path *const new_dir, + struct dentry *const new_dentry) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ + if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry) + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ + return -EXDEV; + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) + return -ENOENT; + return check_access_path(dom, new_dir, + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); +} + +static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + if (d_is_negative(dentry)) + return 0; + return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; +} + +static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, + struct dentry *const old_dentry, + const struct path *const new_dir, + struct dentry *const new_dentry) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ + if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry) + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ + return -EXDEV; + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) + return -ENOENT; + /* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */ + return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) | + maybe_remove(new_dentry) | + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); +} + +static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR); +} + +static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode, + const unsigned int dev) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode)); +} + +static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM); +} + +static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE); +} + +static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); +} + +/* File hooks */ + +static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file) +{ + u32 access = 0; + + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { + /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */ + if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; + } + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; + /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */ + if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; + return access; +} + +static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* + * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may + * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock + * evolution. + */ + return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file)); +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..187284b421c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/fs.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/** + * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob + * + * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e. + * underlying object). + */ +struct landlock_inode_security { + /** + * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object. All assignments of a + * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock. However, + * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected + * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to + * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and + * hook_sb_delete()). Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require + * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check + * performed by get_inode_object(). + */ + struct landlock_object __rcu *object; +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob + * + * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode(). + */ +struct landlock_superblock_security { + /** + * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that + * are being released by release_inode(). + * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs . + */ + atomic_long_t inode_refs; +}; + +static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode( + const struct inode *const inode) +{ + return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; +} + +static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *landlock_superblock( + const struct super_block *const superblock) +{ + return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} + +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void); + +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_hierarchy); + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h index b734f597bb0e..2a0a1095ee27 100644 --- a/security/landlock/limits.h +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h @@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H #include +#include #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 64 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) + #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c index 2e616f6d5274..ec72b9262bf3 100644 --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c @@ -116,9 +116,11 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void) .num_rules = ~0, .num_layers = ~0, }; + typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0; BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES); BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); } /** @@ -217,9 +219,11 @@ static void build_check_layer(void) { const struct landlock_layer layer = { .level = ~0, + .access = ~0, }; BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); } /* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */ diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index a5d6ef334991..f8e8e980454c 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -11,17 +11,24 @@ #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" +#include "fs.h" #include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" +bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; + struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security), + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security), }; static int __init landlock_init(void) { landlock_add_cred_hooks(); landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); + landlock_add_fs_hooks(); + landlock_initialized = true; pr_info("Up and running.\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h index 9fdbf33fcc33..1daffab1ab4b 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.h +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include +extern bool landlock_initialized; + extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes; #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 265885daf3e5082eb9f6e2a23bdbf9ba4456a21b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:18 +0200 Subject: landlock: Add syscall implementations MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes to sandbox themselves: * landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file descriptor. * landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor. * landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace. All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to enable extensibility. Here are the motivations for these new syscalls: * A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including /dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more restrictions to itself. * Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version) fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy. All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each architecture. See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a following commit): * Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst * Documentation/security/landlock.rst Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/syscalls.h | 7 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 53 +++++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 + security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 442 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 508 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscalls.c (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 2839dc9a7c01..fa3971012e1c 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ struct io_uring_params; struct clone_args; struct open_how; struct mount_attr; +struct landlock_ruleset_attr; +enum landlock_rule_type; #include #include @@ -1041,6 +1043,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t __user *info, unsigned int flags); asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *attr, + size_t size, __u32 flags); +asmlinkage long sys_landlock_add_rule(int ruleset_fd, enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, + const void __user *rule_attr, __u32 flags); +asmlinkage long sys_landlock_restrict_self(int ruleset_fd, __u32 flags); /* * Architecture-specific system calls diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h index b1a81b5a8b86..ba946a1e40b2 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -9,6 +9,59 @@ #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H #define _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H +#include + +/** + * struct landlock_ruleset_attr - Ruleset definition + * + * Argument of sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). This structure can grow in + * future versions. + */ +struct landlock_ruleset_attr { + /** + * @handled_access_fs: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Filesystem flags`_) + * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no + * rule explicitly allow them. This is needed for backward + * compatibility reasons. + */ + __u64 handled_access_fs; +}; + +/** + * enum landlock_rule_type - Landlock rule type + * + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule(). + */ +enum landlock_rule_type { + /** + * @LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: Type of a &struct + * landlock_path_beneath_attr . + */ + LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1, +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_path_beneath_attr - Path hierarchy definition + * + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule(). + */ +struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { + /** + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed actions for this file hierarchy + * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_). + */ + __u64 allowed_access; + /** + * @parent_fd: File descriptor, open with ``O_PATH``, which identifies + * the parent directory of a file hierarchy, or just a file. + */ + __s32 parent_fd; + /* + * This struct is packed to avoid trailing reserved members. + * Cf. security/landlock/syscalls.c:build_check_abi() + */ +} __attribute__((packed)); + /** * DOC: fs_access * diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 19aa806890d5..cce430cf2ff2 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -266,6 +266,11 @@ COND_SYSCALL(request_key); COND_SYSCALL(keyctl); COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(keyctl); +/* security/landlock/syscalls.c */ +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_create_ruleset); +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_add_rule); +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_restrict_self); + /* arch/example/kernel/sys_example.c */ /* mm/fadvise.c */ diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 92e3d80ab8ed..7bbd2f413b3e 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o -landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \ +landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ cred.o ptrace.o fs.o diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..93620ad7593b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c @@ -0,0 +1,442 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - System call implementations and user space interfaces + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cred.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/** + * copy_min_struct_from_user - Safe future-proof argument copying + * + * Extend copy_struct_from_user() to check for consistent user buffer. + * + * @dst: Kernel space pointer or NULL. + * @ksize: Actual size of the data pointed to by @dst. + * @ksize_min: Minimal required size to be copied. + * @src: User space pointer or NULL. + * @usize: (Alleged) size of the data pointed to by @src. + */ +static __always_inline int copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst, + const size_t ksize, const size_t ksize_min, + const void __user *const src, const size_t usize) +{ + /* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst); + if (!src) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Checks size ranges. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0); + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min); + if (usize < ksize_min) + return -EINVAL; + if (usize > PAGE_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + /* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */ + return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize); +} + +/* + * This function only contains arithmetic operations with constants, leading to + * BUILD_BUG_ON(). The related code is evaluated and checked at build time, + * but it is then ignored thanks to compiler optimizations. + */ +static void build_check_abi(void) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; + + /* + * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no + * hole in them, then checks that all architectures have the same + * struct size. + */ + ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8); + + path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); + path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); +} + +/* Ruleset handling */ + +static int fop_ruleset_release(struct inode *const inode, + struct file *const filp) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset = filp->private_data; + + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t fop_dummy_read(struct file *const filp, char __user *const buf, + const size_t size, loff_t *const ppos) +{ + /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_READ. */ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static ssize_t fop_dummy_write(struct file *const filp, + const char __user *const buf, const size_t size, + loff_t *const ppos) +{ + /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_WRITE. */ + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * A ruleset file descriptor enables to build a ruleset by adding (i.e. + * writing) rule after rule, without relying on the task's context. This + * reentrant design is also used in a read way to enforce the ruleset on the + * current task. + */ +static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { + .release = fop_ruleset_release, + .read = fop_dummy_read, + .write = fop_dummy_write, +}; + +/** + * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset + * + * @attr: Pointer to a &struct landlock_ruleset_attr identifying the scope of + * the new ruleset. + * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for + * backward and forward compatibility). + * @flags: Must be 0. + * + * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the + * related file descriptor on success. + * + * Possible returned errors are: + * + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or unknown access, or too small @size; + * - E2BIG or EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies; + * - ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs. + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset, + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr, + const size_t, size, const __u32, flags) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; + int err, ruleset_fd; + + /* Build-time checks. */ + build_check_abi(); + + if (!landlock_initialized) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* No flag for now. */ + if (flags) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Copies raw user space buffer. */ + err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), + offsetofend(typeof(ruleset_attr), handled_access_fs), + attr, size); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Checks content (and 32-bits cast). */ + if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) != + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */ + ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); + + /* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */ + ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("landlock-ruleset", &ruleset_fops, + ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); + if (ruleset_fd < 0) + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); + return ruleset_fd; +} + +/* + * Returns an owned ruleset from a FD. It is thus needed to call + * landlock_put_ruleset() on the return value. + */ +static struct landlock_ruleset *get_ruleset_from_fd(const int fd, + const fmode_t mode) +{ + struct fd ruleset_f; + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; + + ruleset_f = fdget(fd); + if (!ruleset_f.file) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); + + /* Checks FD type and access right. */ + if (ruleset_f.file->f_op != &ruleset_fops) { + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EBADFD); + goto out_fdput; + } + if (!(ruleset_f.file->f_mode & mode)) { + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + goto out_fdput; + } + ruleset = ruleset_f.file->private_data; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) { + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto out_fdput; + } + landlock_get_ruleset(ruleset); + +out_fdput: + fdput(ruleset_f); + return ruleset; +} + +/* Path handling */ + +/* + * @path: Must call put_path(@path) after the call if it succeeded. + */ +static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path) +{ + struct fd f; + int err = 0; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(fd, + ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd)); + + /* Handles O_PATH. */ + f = fdget_raw(fd); + if (!f.file) + return -EBADF; + /* + * Forbids ruleset FDs, internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs), including + * pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. sockfs, + * pipefs). + */ + if ((f.file->f_op == &ruleset_fops) || + (f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) || + (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || + d_is_negative(f.file->f_path.dentry) || + IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry))) { + err = -EBADFD; + goto out_fdput; + } + *path = f.file->f_path; + path_get(path); + +out_fdput: + fdput(f); + return err; +} + +/** + * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset + * + * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended + * with the new rule. + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). + * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct + * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). + * @flags: Must be 0. + * + * This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing + * ruleset. + * + * Possible returned errors are: + * + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. + * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's + * accesses); + * - ENOMSG: Empty accesses (e.g. &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); + * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread, or a + * member of @rule_attr is not a file descriptor as expected; + * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor, or a member of + * @rule_attr is not the expected file descriptor type (e.g. file open + * without O_PATH); + * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no write access to the underlying ruleset; + * - EFAULT: @rule_attr inconsistency. + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, + const int, ruleset_fd, const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type, + const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags) +{ + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; + struct path path; + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; + int res, err; + + if (!landlock_initialized) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* No flag for now. */ + if (flags) + return -EINVAL; + + if (rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ + res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr, + sizeof(path_beneath_attr)); + if (res) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */ + ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_WRITE); + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); + + /* + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) + * are ignored in path walks. + */ + if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) { + err = -ENOMSG; + goto out_put_ruleset; + } + /* + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints + * (ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). + */ + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) != + ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_ruleset; + } + + /* Gets and checks the new rule. */ + err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path); + if (err) + goto out_put_ruleset; + + /* Imports the new rule. */ + err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path, + path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); + path_put(&path); + +out_put_ruleset: + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); + return err; +} + +/* Enforcement */ + +/** + * sys_landlock_restrict_self - Enforce a ruleset on the calling thread + * + * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target. + * @flags: Must be 0. + * + * This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current + * thread. Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its + * namespace or is running with no_new_privs. This avoids scenarios where + * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children. + * + * Possible returned errors are: + * + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0. + * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread; + * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor; + * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the + * current thread is not running with no_new_privs, or it doesn't have + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace. + * - E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current + * thread. + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, + const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32, flags) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *ruleset; + struct cred *new_cred; + struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred; + int err; + + if (!landlock_initialized) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* No flag for now. */ + if (flags) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be + * returned. + */ + if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && + !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */ + ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ); + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); + + /* Prepares new credentials. */ + new_cred = prepare_creds(); + if (!new_cred) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_put_ruleset; + } + new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred); + + /* + * There is no possible race condition while copying and manipulating + * the current credentials because they are dedicated per thread. + */ + new_dom = landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset); + if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) { + err = PTR_ERR(new_dom); + goto out_put_creds; + } + + /* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */ + landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain); + new_llcred->domain = new_dom; + + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); + return commit_creds(new_cred); + +out_put_creds: + abort_creds(new_cred); + +out_put_ruleset: + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); + return err; +} -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 3532b0b4352ce79400b0aa68414f1a0fc422b920 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:23 +0200 Subject: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 8 +++++ security/landlock/syscalls.c | 17 +++++++--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h index ba946a1e40b2..b3d952067f59 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr { __u64 handled_access_fs; }; +/* + * sys_landlock_create_ruleset() flags: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI + * version. + */ +#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION (1U << 0) + /** * enum landlock_rule_type - Landlock rule type * diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c index 93620ad7593b..32396962f04d 100644 --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c @@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { .write = fop_dummy_write, }; +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 1 + /** * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset * @@ -135,15 +137,19 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { * the new ruleset. * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for * backward and forward compatibility). - * @flags: Must be 0. + * @flags: Supported value: %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION. * * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the * related file descriptor on success. * + * If @flags is %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION and @attr is NULL and @size is + * 0, then the returned value is the highest supported Landlock ABI version + * (starting at 1). + * * Possible returned errors are: * * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; - * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or unknown access, or too small @size; + * - EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or too small @size; * - E2BIG or EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies; * - ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs. */ @@ -161,9 +167,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset, if (!landlock_initialized) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - /* No flag for now. */ - if (flags) + if (flags) { + if ((flags == LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION) + && !attr && !size) + return LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION; return -EINVAL; + } /* Copies raw user space buffer. */ err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c index 262c3c8d953a..ca40abe9daa8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c @@ -63,6 +63,53 @@ TEST(inconsistent_attr) { free(buf); } +TEST(abi_version) { + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }; + ASSERT_EQ(1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, + LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, + LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, sizeof(ruleset_attr), + LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), + LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, + LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION | 1 << 31)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); +} + +TEST(inval_create_ruleset_flags) { + const int last_flag = LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION; + const int invalid_flag = last_flag << 1; + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }; + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, invalid_flag)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, invalid_flag)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, sizeof(ruleset_attr), + invalid_flag)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), invalid_flag)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); +} + TEST(empty_path_beneath_attr) { const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From d83e682e301071313e390e2f5ba2f6ca2ebc1848 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Kossifidis Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 03:55:35 +0300 Subject: RISC-V: Add EM_RISCV to kexec UAPI header Add RISC-V to the list of supported kexec architectures, we need to add the definition early-on so that later patches can use it. EM_RISCV is 243 as per ELF psABI specification here: https://github.com/riscv/riscv-elf-psabi-doc/blob/master/riscv-elf.md Signed-off-by: Nick Kossifidis Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt --- include/uapi/linux/kexec.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h b/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h index 05669c87a0af..778dc191c265 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #define KEXEC_ARCH_MIPS_LE (10 << 16) #define KEXEC_ARCH_MIPS ( 8 << 16) #define KEXEC_ARCH_AARCH64 (183 << 16) +#define KEXEC_ARCH_RISCV (243 << 16) /* The artificial cap on the number of segments passed to kexec_load. */ #define KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX 16 -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 94604548aa7163fa14b837149bb0cb708bc613bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 17:44:04 +0200 Subject: seg6: add counters support for SRv6 Behaviors This patch provides counters for SRv6 Behaviors as defined in [1], section 6. For each SRv6 Behavior instance, counters defined in [1] are: - the total number of packets that have been correctly processed; - the total amount of traffic in bytes of all packets that have been correctly processed; In addition, this patch introduces a new counter that counts the number of packets that have NOT been properly processed (i.e. errors) by an SRv6 Behavior instance. Counters are not only interesting for network monitoring purposes (i.e. counting the number of packets processed by a given behavior) but they also provide a simple tool for checking whether a behavior instance is working as we expect or not. Counters can be useful for troubleshooting misconfigured SRv6 networks. Indeed, an SRv6 Behavior can silently drop packets for very different reasons (i.e. wrong SID configuration, interfaces set with SID addresses, etc) without any notification/message to the user. Due to the nature of SRv6 networks, diagnostic tools such as ping and traceroute may be ineffective: paths used for reaching a given router can be totally different from the ones followed by probe packets. In addition, paths are often asymmetrical and this makes it even more difficult to keep up with the journey of the packets and to understand which behaviors are actually processing our traffic. When counters are enabled on an SRv6 Behavior instance, it is possible to verify if packets are actually processed by such behavior and what is the outcome of the processing. Therefore, the counters for SRv6 Behaviors offer an non-invasive observability point which can be leveraged for both traffic monitoring and troubleshooting purposes. [1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986.html#name-counters Troubleshooting using SRv6 Behavior counters -------------------------------------------- Let's make a brief example to see how helpful counters can be for SRv6 networks. Let's consider a node where an SRv6 End Behavior receives an SRv6 packet whose Segment Left (SL) is equal to 0. In this case, the End Behavior (which accepts only packets with SL >= 1) discards the packet and increases the error counter. This information can be leveraged by the network operator for troubleshooting. Indeed, the error counter is telling the user that the packet: (i) arrived at the node; (ii) the packet has been taken into account by the SRv6 End behavior; (iii) but an error has occurred during the processing. The error (iii) could be caused by different reasons, such as wrong route settings on the node or due to an invalid SID List carried by the SRv6 packet. Anyway, the error counter is used to exclude that the packet did not arrive at the node or it has not been processed by the behavior at all. Turning on/off counters for SRv6 Behaviors ------------------------------------------ Each SRv6 Behavior instance can be configured, at the time of its creation, to make use of counters. This is done through iproute2 which allows the user to create an SRv6 Behavior instance specifying the optional "count" attribute as shown in the following example: $ ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End count dev eth0 per-behavior counters can be shown by adding "-s" to the iproute2 command line, i.e.: $ ip -s -6 route show 2001:db8::1 2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End packets 0 bytes 0 errors 0 dev eth0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Impact of counters for SRv6 Behaviors on performance ==================================================== To determine the performance impact due to the introduction of counters in the SRv6 Behavior subsystem, we have carried out extensive tests. We chose to test the throughput achieved by the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior because, among all the other behaviors implemented so far, it reaches the highest throughput which is around 1.5 Mpps (per core at 2.4 GHz on a Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3) on kernel 5.12-rc2 using packets of size ~ 100 bytes. Three different tests were conducted in order to evaluate the overall throughput of the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior in the following scenarios: 1) vanilla kernel (without the SRv6 Behavior counters patch) and a single instance of an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior; 2) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned off; 3) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned on. All tests were performed on a testbed deployed on the CloudLab facilities [2], a flexible infrastructure dedicated to scientific research on the future of Cloud Computing. Results of tests are shown in the following table: Scenario (1): average 1504764,81 pps (~1504,76 kpps); std. dev 3956,82 pps Scenario (2): average 1501469,78 pps (~1501,47 kpps); std. dev 2979,85 pps Scenario (3): average 1501315,13 pps (~1501,32 kpps); std. dev 2956,00 pps As can be observed, throughputs achieved in scenarios (2),(3) did not suffer any observable degradation compared to scenario (1). Thanks to Jakub Kicinski and David Ahern for their valuable suggestions and comments provided during the discussion of the proposed RFCs. [2] https://www.cloudlab.us Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/uapi/linux/seg6_local.h | 30 ++++++ net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seg6_local.h b/include/uapi/linux/seg6_local.h index 3b39ef1dbb46..5ae3ace84de0 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/seg6_local.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seg6_local.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum { SEG6_LOCAL_OIF, SEG6_LOCAL_BPF, SEG6_LOCAL_VRFTABLE, + SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS, __SEG6_LOCAL_MAX, }; #define SEG6_LOCAL_MAX (__SEG6_LOCAL_MAX - 1) @@ -78,4 +79,33 @@ enum { #define SEG6_LOCAL_BPF_PROG_MAX (__SEG6_LOCAL_BPF_PROG_MAX - 1) +/* SRv6 Behavior counters are encoded as netlink attributes guaranteeing the + * correct alignment. + * Each counter is identified by a different attribute type (i.e. + * SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS). + * + * - SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS: identifies a counter that counts the number of + * packets that have been CORRECTLY processed by an SRv6 Behavior instance + * (i.e., packets that generate errors or are dropped are NOT counted). + * + * - SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES: identifies a counter that counts the total amount + * of traffic in bytes of all packets that have been CORRECTLY processed by + * an SRv6 Behavior instance (i.e., packets that generate errors or are + * dropped are NOT counted). + * + * - SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS: identifies a counter that counts the number of + * packets that have NOT been properly processed by an SRv6 Behavior instance + * (i.e., packets that generate errors or are dropped). + */ +enum { + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_UNSPEC, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PAD, /* pad for 64 bits values */ + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS, + __SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX, +}; + +#define SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX (__SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX - 1) + #endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c index bd7140885e60..4ff38cb08f4b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c @@ -93,6 +93,35 @@ struct seg6_end_dt_info { int hdrlen; }; +struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters { + u64_stats_t packets; + u64_stats_t bytes; + u64_stats_t errors; + + struct u64_stats_sync syncp; +}; + +/* This struct groups all the SRv6 Behavior counters supported so far. + * + * put_nla_counters() makes use of this data structure to collect all counter + * values after the per-CPU counter evaluation has been performed. + * Finally, each counter value (in seg6_local_counters) is stored in the + * corresponding netlink attribute and sent to user space. + * + * NB: we don't want to expose this structure to user space! + */ +struct seg6_local_counters { + __u64 packets; + __u64 bytes; + __u64 errors; +}; + +#define seg6_local_alloc_pcpu_counters(__gfp) \ + __netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters, \ + ((__gfp) | __GFP_ZERO)) + +#define SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS) + struct seg6_local_lwt { int action; struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh; @@ -105,6 +134,7 @@ struct seg6_local_lwt { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV struct seg6_end_dt_info dt_info; #endif + struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters __percpu *pcpu_counters; int headroom; struct seg6_action_desc *desc; @@ -878,36 +908,43 @@ static struct seg6_action_desc seg6_action_table[] = { { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END, .attrs = 0, + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_X, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_NH6), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_x, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_T, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_TABLE), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_t, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_DX2, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_OIF), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_dx2, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_DX6, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_NH6), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_dx6, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_DX4, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_NH4), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_dx4, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_DT4, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_VRFTABLE), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, #ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV .input = input_action_end_dt4, .slwt_ops = { @@ -919,30 +956,35 @@ static struct seg6_action_desc seg6_action_table[] = { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_DT6, #ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV .attrs = 0, - .optattrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_TABLE) | + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS | + SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_TABLE) | SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_VRFTABLE), .slwt_ops = { .build_state = seg6_end_dt6_build, }, #else .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_TABLE), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, #endif .input = input_action_end_dt6, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_SRH), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_b6, }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6_ENCAP, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_SRH), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_b6_encap, .static_headroom = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), }, { .action = SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_BPF, .attrs = SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_BPF), + .optattrs = SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS, .input = input_action_end_bpf, }, @@ -963,11 +1005,36 @@ static struct seg6_action_desc *__get_action_desc(int action) return NULL; } +static bool seg6_lwtunnel_counters_enabled(struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) +{ + return slwt->parsed_optattrs & SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS; +} + +static void seg6_local_update_counters(struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt, + unsigned int len, int err) +{ + struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters *pcounters; + + pcounters = this_cpu_ptr(slwt->pcpu_counters); + u64_stats_update_begin(&pcounters->syncp); + + if (likely(!err)) { + u64_stats_inc(&pcounters->packets); + u64_stats_add(&pcounters->bytes, len); + } else { + u64_stats_inc(&pcounters->errors); + } + + u64_stats_update_end(&pcounters->syncp); +} + static int seg6_local_input(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct dst_entry *orig_dst = skb_dst(skb); struct seg6_action_desc *desc; struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt; + unsigned int len = skb->len; + int rc; if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { kfree_skb(skb); @@ -977,7 +1044,14 @@ static int seg6_local_input(struct sk_buff *skb) slwt = seg6_local_lwtunnel(orig_dst->lwtstate); desc = slwt->desc; - return desc->input(skb, slwt); + rc = desc->input(skb, slwt); + + if (!seg6_lwtunnel_counters_enabled(slwt)) + return rc; + + seg6_local_update_counters(slwt, len, rc); + + return rc; } static const struct nla_policy seg6_local_policy[SEG6_LOCAL_MAX + 1] = { @@ -992,6 +1066,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy seg6_local_policy[SEG6_LOCAL_MAX + 1] = { [SEG6_LOCAL_IIF] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [SEG6_LOCAL_OIF] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [SEG6_LOCAL_BPF] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, + [SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, }; static int parse_nla_srh(struct nlattr **attrs, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) @@ -1296,6 +1371,112 @@ static void destroy_attr_bpf(struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) bpf_prog_put(slwt->bpf.prog); } +static const struct +nla_policy seg6_local_counters_policy[SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX + 1] = { + [SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, + [SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, + [SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS] = { .type = NLA_U64 }, +}; + +static int parse_nla_counters(struct nlattr **attrs, + struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) +{ + struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters __percpu *pcounters; + struct nlattr *tb[SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX + 1]; + int ret; + + ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_MAX, + attrs[SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS], + seg6_local_counters_policy, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* basic support for SRv6 Behavior counters requires at least: + * packets, bytes and errors. + */ + if (!tb[SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS] || !tb[SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES] || + !tb[SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS]) + return -EINVAL; + + /* counters are always zero initialized */ + pcounters = seg6_local_alloc_pcpu_counters(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pcounters) + return -ENOMEM; + + slwt->pcpu_counters = pcounters; + + return 0; +} + +static int seg6_local_fill_nla_counters(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct seg6_local_counters *counters) +{ + if (nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS, counters->packets, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PAD)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + if (nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES, counters->bytes, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PAD)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + if (nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS, counters->errors, + SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PAD)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + return 0; +} + +static int put_nla_counters(struct sk_buff *skb, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) +{ + struct seg6_local_counters counters = { 0, 0, 0 }; + struct nlattr *nest; + int rc, i; + + nest = nla_nest_start(skb, SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS); + if (!nest) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + struct pcpu_seg6_local_counters *pcounters; + u64 packets, bytes, errors; + unsigned int start; + + pcounters = per_cpu_ptr(slwt->pcpu_counters, i); + do { + start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq(&pcounters->syncp); + + packets = u64_stats_read(&pcounters->packets); + bytes = u64_stats_read(&pcounters->bytes); + errors = u64_stats_read(&pcounters->errors); + + } while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_irq(&pcounters->syncp, start)); + + counters.packets += packets; + counters.bytes += bytes; + counters.errors += errors; + } + + rc = seg6_local_fill_nla_counters(skb, &counters); + if (rc < 0) { + nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest); + return rc; + } + + return nla_nest_end(skb, nest); +} + +static int cmp_nla_counters(struct seg6_local_lwt *a, struct seg6_local_lwt *b) +{ + /* a and b are equal if both have pcpu_counters set or not */ + return (!!((unsigned long)a->pcpu_counters)) ^ + (!!((unsigned long)b->pcpu_counters)); +} + +static void destroy_attr_counters(struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) +{ + free_percpu(slwt->pcpu_counters); +} + struct seg6_action_param { int (*parse)(struct nlattr **attrs, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt); int (*put)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt); @@ -1343,6 +1524,10 @@ static struct seg6_action_param seg6_action_params[SEG6_LOCAL_MAX + 1] = { .put = put_nla_vrftable, .cmp = cmp_nla_vrftable }, + [SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS] = { .parse = parse_nla_counters, + .put = put_nla_counters, + .cmp = cmp_nla_counters, + .destroy = destroy_attr_counters }, }; /* call the destroy() callback (if available) for each set attribute in @@ -1645,6 +1830,15 @@ static int seg6_local_get_encap_size(struct lwtunnel_state *lwt) if (attrs & SEG6_F_ATTR(SEG6_LOCAL_VRFTABLE)) nlsize += nla_total_size(4); + if (attrs & SEG6_F_LOCAL_COUNTERS) + nlsize += nla_total_size(0) + /* nest SEG6_LOCAL_COUNTERS */ + /* SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_PACKETS */ + nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(__u64)) + + /* SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_BYTES */ + nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(__u64)) + + /* SEG6_LOCAL_CNT_ERRORS */ + nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(__u64)); + return nlsize; } -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From c7d13358b6a2f49f81a34aa323a2d0878a0532a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 14:00:13 +0200 Subject: netfilter: xt_SECMARK: add new revision to fix structure layout This extension breaks when trying to delete rules, add a new revision to fix this. Fixes: 5e6874cdb8de ("[SECMARK]: Add xtables SECMARK target") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h | 6 +++ net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h index 1f2a708413f5..beb2cadba8a9 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h @@ -20,4 +20,10 @@ struct xt_secmark_target_info { char secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX]; }; +struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 { + __u8 mode; + char secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX]; + __u32 secid; +}; + #endif /*_XT_SECMARK_H_target */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c index 75625d13e976..498a0bf6f044 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c @@ -24,10 +24,9 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("ip6t_SECMARK"); static u8 mode; static unsigned int -secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) +secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info) { u32 secmark = 0; - const struct xt_secmark_target_info *info = par->targinfo; switch (mode) { case SECMARK_MODE_SEL: @@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) return XT_CONTINUE; } -static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) +static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info) { int err; @@ -73,15 +72,15 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) return 0; } -static int secmark_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) +static int +secmark_tg_check(const char *table, struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info) { - struct xt_secmark_target_info *info = par->targinfo; int err; - if (strcmp(par->table, "mangle") != 0 && - strcmp(par->table, "security") != 0) { + if (strcmp(table, "mangle") != 0 && + strcmp(table, "security") != 0) { pr_info_ratelimited("only valid in \'mangle\' or \'security\' table, not \'%s\'\n", - par->table); + table); return -EINVAL; } @@ -116,25 +115,76 @@ static void secmark_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) } } -static struct xt_target secmark_tg_reg __read_mostly = { - .name = "SECMARK", - .revision = 0, - .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, - .checkentry = secmark_tg_check, - .destroy = secmark_tg_destroy, - .target = secmark_tg, - .targetsize = sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info), - .me = THIS_MODULE, +static int secmark_tg_check_v0(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) +{ + struct xt_secmark_target_info *info = par->targinfo; + struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 newinfo = { + .mode = info->mode, + }; + int ret; + + memcpy(newinfo.secctx, info->secctx, SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX); + + ret = secmark_tg_check(par->table, &newinfo); + info->secid = newinfo.secid; + + return ret; +} + +static unsigned int +secmark_tg_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_secmark_target_info *info = par->targinfo; + struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 newinfo = { + .secid = info->secid, + }; + + return secmark_tg(skb, &newinfo); +} + +static int secmark_tg_check_v1(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) +{ + return secmark_tg_check(par->table, par->targinfo); +} + +static unsigned int +secmark_tg_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) +{ + return secmark_tg(skb, par->targinfo); +} + +static struct xt_target secmark_tg_reg[] __read_mostly = { + { + .name = "SECMARK", + .revision = 0, + .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, + .checkentry = secmark_tg_check_v0, + .destroy = secmark_tg_destroy, + .target = secmark_tg_v0, + .targetsize = sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info), + .me = THIS_MODULE, + }, + { + .name = "SECMARK", + .revision = 1, + .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, + .checkentry = secmark_tg_check_v1, + .destroy = secmark_tg_destroy, + .target = secmark_tg_v1, + .targetsize = sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1), + .usersize = offsetof(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1, secid), + .me = THIS_MODULE, + }, }; static int __init secmark_tg_init(void) { - return xt_register_target(&secmark_tg_reg); + return xt_register_targets(secmark_tg_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(secmark_tg_reg)); } static void __exit secmark_tg_exit(void) { - xt_unregister_target(&secmark_tg_reg); + xt_unregister_targets(secmark_tg_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(secmark_tg_reg)); } module_init(secmark_tg_init); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 77b8aeb9da0490357f1f5a2b0d12125e6332c37a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 09:52:02 -0600 Subject: vfio/pci: Revert nvlink removal uAPI breakage Revert the uAPI changes from the below commit with notice that these regions and capabilities are no longer provided. Fixes: b392a1989170 ("vfio/pci: remove vfio_pci_nvlink2") Reported-by: Greg Kurz Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz Tested-by: Greg Kurz Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Message-Id: <162014341432.3807030.11054087109120670135.stgit@omen> --- include/uapi/linux/vfio.h | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/vfio.h b/include/uapi/linux/vfio.h index 34b1f53a3901..ef33ea002b0b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/vfio.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/vfio.h @@ -333,10 +333,21 @@ struct vfio_region_info_cap_type { #define VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_INTEL_IGD_LPC_CFG (3) /* 10de vendor PCI sub-types */ -/* subtype 1 was VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_NVIDIA_NVLINK2_RAM, don't use */ +/* + * NVIDIA GPU NVlink2 RAM is coherent RAM mapped onto the host address space. + * + * Deprecated, region no longer provided + */ +#define VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_NVIDIA_NVLINK2_RAM (1) /* 1014 vendor PCI sub-types */ -/* subtype 1 was VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_IBM_NVLINK2_ATSD, don't use */ +/* + * IBM NPU NVlink2 ATSD (Address Translation Shootdown) register of NPU + * to do TLB invalidation on a GPU. + * + * Deprecated, region no longer provided + */ +#define VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_IBM_NVLINK2_ATSD (1) /* sub-types for VFIO_REGION_TYPE_GFX */ #define VFIO_REGION_SUBTYPE_GFX_EDID (1) @@ -630,9 +641,36 @@ struct vfio_device_migration_info { */ #define VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_MSIX_MAPPABLE 3 -/* subtype 4 was VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_NVLINK2_SSATGT, don't use */ +/* + * Capability with compressed real address (aka SSA - small system address) + * where GPU RAM is mapped on a system bus. Used by a GPU for DMA routing + * and by the userspace to associate a NVLink bridge with a GPU. + * + * Deprecated, capability no longer provided + */ +#define VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_NVLINK2_SSATGT 4 + +struct vfio_region_info_cap_nvlink2_ssatgt { + struct vfio_info_cap_header header; + __u64 tgt; +}; -/* subtype 5 was VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_NVLINK2_LNKSPD, don't use */ +/* + * Capability with an NVLink link speed. The value is read by + * the NVlink2 bridge driver from the bridge's "ibm,nvlink-speed" + * property in the device tree. The value is fixed in the hardware + * and failing to provide the correct value results in the link + * not working with no indication from the driver why. + * + * Deprecated, capability no longer provided + */ +#define VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_NVLINK2_LNKSPD 5 + +struct vfio_region_info_cap_nvlink2_lnkspd { + struct vfio_info_cap_header header; + __u32 link_speed; + __u32 __pad; +}; /** * VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO - _IOWR(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 9, -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 7677f7fd8be76659cd2d0db8ff4093bbb51c20e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axel Rasmussen Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 18:35:36 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: add minor fault registration mode Patch series "userfaultfd: add minor fault handling", v9. Overview ======== This series adds a new userfaultfd feature, UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS. When enabled (via the UFFDIO_API ioctl), this feature means that any hugetlbfs VMAs registered with UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING will *also* get events for "minor" faults. By "minor" fault, I mean the following situation: Let there exist two mappings (i.e., VMAs) to the same page(s) (shared memory). One of the mappings is registered with userfaultfd (in minor mode), and the other is not. Via the non-UFFD mapping, the underlying pages have already been allocated & filled with some contents. The UFFD mapping has not yet been faulted in; when it is touched for the first time, this results in what I'm calling a "minor" fault. As a concrete example, when working with hugetlbfs, we have huge_pte_none(), but find_lock_page() finds an existing page. We also add a new ioctl to resolve such faults: UFFDIO_CONTINUE. The idea is, userspace resolves the fault by either a) doing nothing if the contents are already correct, or b) updating the underlying contents using the second, non-UFFD mapping (via memcpy/memset or similar, or something fancier like RDMA, or etc...). In either case, userspace issues UFFDIO_CONTINUE to tell the kernel "I have ensured the page contents are correct, carry on setting up the mapping". Use Case ======== Consider the use case of VM live migration (e.g. under QEMU/KVM): 1. While a VM is still running, we copy the contents of its memory to a target machine. The pages are populated on the target by writing to the non-UFFD mapping, using the setup described above. The VM is still running (and therefore its memory is likely changing), so this may be repeated several times, until we decide the target is "up to date enough". 2. We pause the VM on the source, and start executing on the target machine. During this gap, the VM's user(s) will *see* a pause, so it is desirable to minimize this window. 3. Between the last time any page was copied from the source to the target, and when the VM was paused, the contents of that page may have changed - and therefore the copy we have on the target machine is out of date. Although we can keep track of which pages are out of date, for VMs with large amounts of memory, it is "slow" to transfer this information to the target machine. We want to resume execution before such a transfer would complete. 4. So, the guest begins executing on the target machine. The first time it touches its memory (via the UFFD-registered mapping), userspace wants to intercept this fault. Userspace checks whether or not the page is up to date, and if not, copies the updated page from the source machine, via the non-UFFD mapping. Finally, whether a copy was performed or not, userspace issues a UFFDIO_CONTINUE ioctl to tell the kernel "I have ensured the page contents are correct, carry on setting up the mapping". We don't have to do all of the final updates on-demand. The userfaultfd manager can, in the background, also copy over updated pages once it receives the map of which pages are up-to-date or not. Interaction with Existing APIs ============================== Because this is a feature, a registered VMA could potentially receive both missing and minor faults. I spent some time thinking through how the existing API interacts with the new feature: UFFDIO_CONTINUE cannot be used to resolve non-minor faults, as it does not allocate a new page. If UFFDIO_CONTINUE is used on a non-minor fault: - For non-shared memory or shmem, -EINVAL is returned. - For hugetlb, -EFAULT is returned. UFFDIO_COPY and UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE cannot be used to resolve minor faults. Without modifications, the existing codepath assumes a new page needs to be allocated. This is okay, since userspace must have a second non-UFFD-registered mapping anyway, thus there isn't much reason to want to use these in any case (just memcpy or memset or similar). - If UFFDIO_COPY is used on a minor fault, -EEXIST is returned. - If UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE is used on a minor fault, -EEXIST is returned (or -EINVAL in the case of hugetlb, as UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE is unsupported in any case). - UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT simply doesn't work with shared memory, and returns -ENOENT in that case (regardless of the kind of fault). Future Work =========== This series only supports hugetlbfs. I have a second series in flight to support shmem as well, extending the functionality. This series is more mature than the shmem support at this point, and the functionality works fully on hugetlbfs, so this series can be merged first and then shmem support will follow. This patch (of 6): This feature allows userspace to intercept "minor" faults. By "minor" faults, I mean the following situation: Let there exist two mappings (i.e., VMAs) to the same page(s). One of the mappings is registered with userfaultfd (in minor mode), and the other is not. Via the non-UFFD mapping, the underlying pages have already been allocated & filled with some contents. The UFFD mapping has not yet been faulted in; when it is touched for the first time, this results in what I'm calling a "minor" fault. As a concrete example, when working with hugetlbfs, we have huge_pte_none(), but find_lock_page() finds an existing page. This commit adds the new registration mode, and sets the relevant flag on the VMAs being registered. In the hugetlb fault path, if we find that we have huge_pte_none(), but find_lock_page() does indeed find an existing page, then we have a "minor" fault, and if the VMA has the userfaultfd registration flag, we call into userfaultfd to handle it. This is implemented as a new registration mode, instead of an API feature. This is because the alternative implementation has significant drawbacks [1]. However, doing it this was requires we allocate a VM_* flag for the new registration mode. On 32-bit systems, there are no unused bits, so this feature is only supported on architectures with CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS. When attempting to register a VMA in MINOR mode on 32-bit architectures, we return -EINVAL. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1380226/ [peterx@redhat.com: fix minor fault page leak] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210322175132.36659-1-peterx@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210301222728.176417-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210301222728.176417-2-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen Reviewed-by: Peter Xu Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Chinwen Chang Cc: Huang Ying Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Lokesh Gidra Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: "Michal Koutn" Cc: Michel Lespinasse Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Nicholas Piggin Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Shaohua Li Cc: Shawn Anastasio Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Steven Price Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Adam Ruprecht Cc: Axel Rasmussen Cc: Cannon Matthews Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Mina Almasry Cc: Oliver Upton Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 ++ fs/userfaultfd.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/mm.h | 7 ++++ include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 15 +++++++- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 7 ++++ include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 15 +++++++- init/Kconfig | 5 +++ mm/hugetlb.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 10 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 7f2a80091337..04c69f606537 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ config ARM64 select SWIOTLB select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK + select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR if USERFAULTFD help ARM 64-bit (AArch64) Linux support. diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index dac15f646f79..1c350e8782ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD + select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index e862cab69583..fc9784544b24 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)] = "", #endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR + [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui", +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ }; size_t i; diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index e5ce3b4e6c3d..ba35cafa8b0d 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -197,24 +197,21 @@ static inline struct uffd_msg userfault_msg(unsigned long address, msg_init(&msg); msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT; msg.arg.pagefault.address = address; + /* + * These flags indicate why the userfault occurred: + * - UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP indicates a write protect fault. + * - UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_MINOR indicates a minor fault. + * - Neither of these flags being set indicates a MISSING fault. + * + * Separately, UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE indicates it was a write + * fault. Otherwise, it was a read fault. + */ if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) - /* - * If UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was set in the - * uffdio_api.features and UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE - * was not set in a UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT, it means it - * was a read fault, otherwise if set it means it's - * a write fault. - */ msg.arg.pagefault.flags |= UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (reason & VM_UFFD_WP) - /* - * If UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was set in the - * uffdio_api.features and UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP was - * not set in a UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT, it means it was - * a missing fault, otherwise if set it means it's a - * write protect fault. - */ msg.arg.pagefault.flags |= UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP; + if (reason & VM_UFFD_MINOR) + msg.arg.pagefault.flags |= UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_MINOR; if (features & UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID) msg.arg.pagefault.feat.ptid = task_pid_vnr(current); return msg; @@ -401,8 +398,10 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason) BUG_ON(ctx->mm != mm); - VM_BUG_ON(reason & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING|VM_UFFD_WP)); - VM_BUG_ON(!(reason & VM_UFFD_MISSING) ^ !!(reason & VM_UFFD_WP)); + /* Any unrecognized flag is a bug. */ + VM_BUG_ON(reason & ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS); + /* 0 or > 1 flags set is a bug; we expect exactly 1. */ + VM_BUG_ON(!reason || (reason & (reason - 1))); if (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS) goto out; @@ -612,7 +611,7 @@ static void userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx == release_new_ctx) { vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX; - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_UFFD_WP | VM_UFFD_MISSING); + vma->vm_flags &= ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS; } mmap_write_unlock(mm); @@ -644,7 +643,7 @@ int dup_userfaultfd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct list_head *fcs) octx = vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx; if (!octx || !(octx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK)) { vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX; - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_UFFD_WP | VM_UFFD_MISSING); + vma->vm_flags &= ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS; return 0; } @@ -726,7 +725,7 @@ void mremap_userfaultfd_prep(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } else { /* Drop uffd context if remap feature not enabled */ vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX; - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_UFFD_WP | VM_UFFD_MISSING); + vma->vm_flags &= ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS; } } @@ -867,12 +866,12 @@ static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { cond_resched(); BUG_ON(!!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^ - !!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP))); + !!(vma->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS)); if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx) { prev = vma; continue; } - new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP); + new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS; prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, new_flags, vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff, @@ -1262,9 +1261,19 @@ static inline bool vma_can_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags) { /* FIXME: add WP support to hugetlbfs and shmem */ - return vma_is_anonymous(vma) || - ((is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || vma_is_shmem(vma)) && - !(vm_flags & VM_UFFD_WP)); + if (vm_flags & VM_UFFD_WP) { + if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || vma_is_shmem(vma)) + return false; + } + + if (vm_flags & VM_UFFD_MINOR) { + /* FIXME: Add minor fault interception for shmem. */ + if (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) + return false; + } + + return vma_is_anonymous(vma) || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || + vma_is_shmem(vma); } static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, @@ -1290,14 +1299,19 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, ret = -EINVAL; if (!uffdio_register.mode) goto out; - if (uffdio_register.mode & ~(UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING| - UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP)) + if (uffdio_register.mode & ~UFFD_API_REGISTER_MODES) goto out; vm_flags = 0; if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING) vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_MISSING; if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP) vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_WP; + if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR) { +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR + goto out; +#endif + vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_MINOR; + } ret = validate_range(mm, &uffdio_register.range.start, uffdio_register.range.len); @@ -1341,7 +1355,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, cond_resched(); BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^ - !!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP))); + !!(cur->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS)); /* check not compatible vmas */ ret = -EINVAL; @@ -1421,8 +1435,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, start = vma->vm_start; vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end); - new_flags = (vma->vm_flags & - ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING|VM_UFFD_WP)) | vm_flags; + new_flags = (vma->vm_flags & ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS) | vm_flags; prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags, vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff, vma_policy(vma), @@ -1544,7 +1557,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, cond_resched(); BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^ - !!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP))); + !!(cur->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS)); /* * Check not compatible vmas, not strictly required @@ -1595,7 +1608,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, wake_userfault(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx, &range); } - new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP); + new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~__VM_UFFD_FLAGS; prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags, vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff, vma_policy(vma), @@ -1863,6 +1876,9 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, goto err_out; /* report all available features and ioctls to userland */ uffdio_api.features = UFFD_API_FEATURES; +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR + uffdio_api.features &= ~UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS; +#endif uffdio_api.ioctls = UFFD_API_IOCTLS; ret = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(buf, &uffdio_api, sizeof(uffdio_api))) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 011f43605807..1dbb53c44243 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -372,6 +372,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); # define VM_GROWSUP VM_NONE #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR +# define VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT 37 +# define VM_UFFD_MINOR BIT(VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT) /* UFFD minor faults */ +#else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ +# define VM_UFFD_MINOR VM_NONE +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ + /* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */ #define VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP (VM_RAND_READ | VM_SEQ_READ) diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h index c63ccdae3eab..0390e5ac63b3 100644 --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ #include #include +/* The set of all possible UFFD-related VM flags. */ +#define __VM_UFFD_FLAGS (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP | VM_UFFD_MINOR) + /* * CAREFUL: Check include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h when defining * new flags, since they might collide with O_* ones. We want @@ -71,6 +74,11 @@ static inline bool userfaultfd_wp(struct vm_area_struct *vma) return vma->vm_flags & VM_UFFD_WP; } +static inline bool userfaultfd_minor(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return vma->vm_flags & VM_UFFD_MINOR; +} + static inline bool userfaultfd_pte_wp(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pte_t pte) { @@ -85,7 +93,7 @@ static inline bool userfaultfd_huge_pmd_wp(struct vm_area_struct *vma, static inline bool userfaultfd_armed(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - return vma->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP); + return vma->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS; } extern int dup_userfaultfd(struct vm_area_struct *, struct list_head *); @@ -132,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool userfaultfd_wp(struct vm_area_struct *vma) return false; } +static inline bool userfaultfd_minor(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return false; +} + static inline bool userfaultfd_pte_wp(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pte_t pte) { diff --git a/include/trace/events/mmflags.h b/include/trace/events/mmflags.h index 67018d367b9f..629c7a0eaff2 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/mmflags.h +++ b/include/trace/events/mmflags.h @@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ IF_HAVE_PG_ARCH_2(PG_arch_2, "arch_2" ) #define IF_HAVE_VM_SOFTDIRTY(flag,name) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR +# define IF_HAVE_UFFD_MINOR(flag, name) {flag, name}, +#else +# define IF_HAVE_UFFD_MINOR(flag, name) +#endif + #define __def_vmaflag_names \ {VM_READ, "read" }, \ {VM_WRITE, "write" }, \ @@ -148,6 +154,7 @@ IF_HAVE_PG_ARCH_2(PG_arch_2, "arch_2" ) {VM_MAYSHARE, "mayshare" }, \ {VM_GROWSDOWN, "growsdown" }, \ {VM_UFFD_MISSING, "uffd_missing" }, \ +IF_HAVE_UFFD_MINOR(VM_UFFD_MINOR, "uffd_minor" ) \ {VM_PFNMAP, "pfnmap" }, \ {VM_DENYWRITE, "denywrite" }, \ {VM_UFFD_WP, "uffd_wp" }, \ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h index 5f2d88212f7c..f24dd4fcbad9 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h @@ -19,15 +19,19 @@ * means the userland is reading). */ #define UFFD_API ((__u64)0xAA) +#define UFFD_API_REGISTER_MODES (UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING | \ + UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP | \ + UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR) #define UFFD_API_FEATURES (UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP | \ UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK | \ UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMAP | \ - UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMOVE | \ + UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMOVE | \ UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_UNMAP | \ UFFD_FEATURE_MISSING_HUGETLBFS | \ UFFD_FEATURE_MISSING_SHMEM | \ UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS | \ - UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID) + UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID | \ + UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS) #define UFFD_API_IOCTLS \ ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_REGISTER | \ (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_UNREGISTER | \ @@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ struct uffd_msg { /* flags for UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT */ #define UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WRITE (1<<0) /* If this was a write fault */ #define UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP (1<<1) /* If reason is VM_UFFD_WP */ +#define UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_MINOR (1<<2) /* If reason is VM_UFFD_MINOR */ struct uffdio_api { /* userland asks for an API number and the features to enable */ @@ -171,6 +176,10 @@ struct uffdio_api { * * UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID pid of the page faulted task_struct will * be returned, if feature is not requested 0 will be returned. + * + * UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS indicates that minor faults + * can be intercepted (via REGISTER_MODE_MINOR) for + * hugetlbfs-backed pages. */ #define UFFD_FEATURE_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP (1<<0) #define UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK (1<<1) @@ -181,6 +190,7 @@ struct uffdio_api { #define UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_UNMAP (1<<6) #define UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS (1<<7) #define UFFD_FEATURE_THREAD_ID (1<<8) +#define UFFD_FEATURE_MINOR_HUGETLBFS (1<<9) __u64 features; __u64 ioctls; @@ -195,6 +205,7 @@ struct uffdio_register { struct uffdio_range range; #define UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING ((__u64)1<<0) #define UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP ((__u64)1<<1) +#define UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR ((__u64)1<<2) __u64 mode; /* diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 9acb7762e971..1413413fcb9f 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1644,6 +1644,11 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP help Arch has userfaultfd write protection support +config HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR + bool + help + Arch has userfaultfd minor fault support + config MEMBARRIER bool "Enable membarrier() system call" if EXPERT default y diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index b5977d9709ad..84530876b2ae 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -4469,6 +4469,44 @@ int huge_add_to_page_cache(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping, return 0; } +static inline vm_fault_t hugetlb_handle_userfault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct address_space *mapping, + pgoff_t idx, + unsigned int flags, + unsigned long haddr, + unsigned long reason) +{ + vm_fault_t ret; + u32 hash; + struct vm_fault vmf = { + .vma = vma, + .address = haddr, + .flags = flags, + + /* + * Hard to debug if it ends up being + * used by a callee that assumes + * something about the other + * uninitialized fields... same as in + * memory.c + */ + }; + + /* + * hugetlb_fault_mutex and i_mmap_rwsem must be + * dropped before handling userfault. Reacquire + * after handling fault to make calling code simpler. + */ + hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(mapping, idx); + mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); + i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping); + ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, reason); + i_mmap_lock_read(mapping); + mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); + + return ret; +} + static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx, @@ -4507,35 +4545,11 @@ static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct mm_struct *mm, retry: page = find_lock_page(mapping, idx); if (!page) { - /* - * Check for page in userfault range - */ + /* Check for page in userfault range */ if (userfaultfd_missing(vma)) { - u32 hash; - struct vm_fault vmf = { - .vma = vma, - .address = haddr, - .flags = flags, - /* - * Hard to debug if it ends up being - * used by a callee that assumes - * something about the other - * uninitialized fields... same as in - * memory.c - */ - }; - - /* - * hugetlb_fault_mutex and i_mmap_rwsem must be - * dropped before handling userfault. Reacquire - * after handling fault to make calling code simpler. - */ - hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(mapping, idx); - mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); - i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping); - ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING); - i_mmap_lock_read(mapping); - mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); + ret = hugetlb_handle_userfault(vma, mapping, idx, + flags, haddr, + VM_UFFD_MISSING); goto out; } @@ -4591,6 +4605,16 @@ retry: VM_FAULT_SET_HINDEX(hstate_index(h)); goto backout_unlocked; } + + /* Check for page in userfault range. */ + if (userfaultfd_minor(vma)) { + unlock_page(page); + put_page(page); + ret = hugetlb_handle_userfault(vma, mapping, idx, + flags, haddr, + VM_UFFD_MINOR); + goto out; + } } /* -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From f619147104c8ea71e120e4936d2b68ec11a1e527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axel Rasmussen Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 18:35:49 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: add UFFDIO_CONTINUE ioctl This ioctl is how userspace ought to resolve "minor" userfaults. The idea is, userspace is notified that a minor fault has occurred. It might change the contents of the page using its second non-UFFD mapping, or not. Then, it calls UFFDIO_CONTINUE to tell the kernel "I have ensured the page contents are correct, carry on setting up the mapping". Note that it doesn't make much sense to use UFFDIO_{COPY,ZEROPAGE} for MINOR registered VMAs. ZEROPAGE maps the VMA to the zero page; but in the minor fault case, we already have some pre-existing underlying page. Likewise, UFFDIO_COPY isn't useful if we have a second non-UFFD mapping. We'd just use memcpy() or similar instead. It turns out hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte() already does very close to what we want, if an existing page is provided via `struct page **pagep`. We already special-case the behavior a bit for the UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE case, so just extend that design: add an enum for the three modes of operation, and make the small adjustments needed for the MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE case. (Basically, look up the existing page, and avoid adding the existing page to the page cache or calling set_page_huge_active() on it.) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210301222728.176417-5-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen Reviewed-by: Peter Xu Cc: Adam Ruprecht Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: Cannon Matthews Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Chinwen Chang Cc: David Rientjes Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Huang Ying Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Lokesh Gidra Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: "Michal Koutn" Cc: Michel Lespinasse Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Mina Almasry Cc: Nicholas Piggin Cc: Oliver Upton Cc: Shaohua Li Cc: Shawn Anastasio Cc: Steven Price Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/hugetlb.h | 3 ++ include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 18 +++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 21 +++++++++++-- mm/hugetlb.c | 40 +++++++++++++++--------- mm/userfaultfd.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------- 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index ba35cafa8b0d..14f92285d04f 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -1487,6 +1487,10 @@ out_unlock: if (!(uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP)) ioctls_out &= ~((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT); + /* CONTINUE ioctl is only supported for MINOR ranges. */ + if (!(uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MINOR)) + ioctls_out &= ~((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE); + /* * Now that we scanned all vmas we can already tell * userland which ioctls methods are guaranteed to @@ -1840,6 +1844,66 @@ static int userfaultfd_writeprotect(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, return ret; } +static int userfaultfd_continue(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, unsigned long arg) +{ + __s64 ret; + struct uffdio_continue uffdio_continue; + struct uffdio_continue __user *user_uffdio_continue; + struct userfaultfd_wake_range range; + + user_uffdio_continue = (struct uffdio_continue __user *)arg; + + ret = -EAGAIN; + if (READ_ONCE(ctx->mmap_changing)) + goto out; + + ret = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_continue, user_uffdio_continue, + /* don't copy the output fields */ + sizeof(uffdio_continue) - (sizeof(__s64)))) + goto out; + + ret = validate_range(ctx->mm, &uffdio_continue.range.start, + uffdio_continue.range.len); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = -EINVAL; + /* double check for wraparound just in case. */ + if (uffdio_continue.range.start + uffdio_continue.range.len <= + uffdio_continue.range.start) { + goto out; + } + if (uffdio_continue.mode & ~UFFDIO_CONTINUE_MODE_DONTWAKE) + goto out; + + if (mmget_not_zero(ctx->mm)) { + ret = mcopy_continue(ctx->mm, uffdio_continue.range.start, + uffdio_continue.range.len, + &ctx->mmap_changing); + mmput(ctx->mm); + } else { + return -ESRCH; + } + + if (unlikely(put_user(ret, &user_uffdio_continue->mapped))) + return -EFAULT; + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* len == 0 would wake all */ + BUG_ON(!ret); + range.len = ret; + if (!(uffdio_continue.mode & UFFDIO_CONTINUE_MODE_DONTWAKE)) { + range.start = uffdio_continue.range.start; + wake_userfault(ctx, &range); + } + ret = range.len == uffdio_continue.range.len ? 0 : -EAGAIN; + +out: + return ret; +} + static inline unsigned int uffd_ctx_features(__u64 user_features) { /* @@ -1927,6 +1991,9 @@ static long userfaultfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, case UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT: ret = userfaultfd_writeprotect(ctx, arg); break; + case UFFDIO_CONTINUE: + ret = userfaultfd_continue(ctx, arg); + break; } return ret; } diff --git a/include/linux/hugetlb.h b/include/linux/hugetlb.h index a1dbe4568707..b92f25ccef58 100644 --- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h +++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include struct ctl_table; struct user_struct; @@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pte_t *dst_pte, struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long dst_addr, unsigned long src_addr, + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mode, struct page **pagep); #endif /* CONFIG_USERFAULTFD */ bool hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode, long from, long to, @@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ static inline int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long dst_addr, unsigned long src_addr, + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mode, struct page **pagep) { BUG(); diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h index e060d5f77cc5..794d1538b8ba 100644 --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h @@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd; extern vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason); +/* + * The mode of operation for __mcopy_atomic and its helpers. + * + * This is almost an implementation detail (mcopy_atomic below doesn't take this + * as a parameter), but it's exposed here because memory-kind-specific + * implementations (e.g. hugetlbfs) need to know the mode of operation. + */ +enum mcopy_atomic_mode { + /* A normal copy_from_user into the destination range. */ + MCOPY_ATOMIC_NORMAL, + /* Don't copy; map the destination range to the zero page. */ + MCOPY_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE, + /* Just install pte(s) with the existing page(s) in the page cache. */ + MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE, +}; + extern ssize_t mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long src_start, unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing, __u64 mode); @@ -44,6 +60,8 @@ extern ssize_t mfill_zeropage(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing); +extern ssize_t mcopy_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, + unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing); extern int mwriteprotect_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long len, bool enable_wp, bool *mmap_changing); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h index f24dd4fcbad9..bafbeb1a2624 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h @@ -40,10 +40,12 @@ ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WAKE | \ (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \ (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE | \ - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT) + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT | \ + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE) #define UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC \ ((__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_WAKE | \ - (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY) + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_COPY | \ + (__u64)1 << _UFFDIO_CONTINUE) /* * Valid ioctl command number range with this API is from 0x00 to @@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ #define _UFFDIO_COPY (0x03) #define _UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE (0x04) #define _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT (0x06) +#define _UFFDIO_CONTINUE (0x07) #define _UFFDIO_API (0x3F) /* userfaultfd ioctl ids */ @@ -77,6 +80,8 @@ struct uffdio_zeropage) #define UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT _IOWR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT, \ struct uffdio_writeprotect) +#define UFFDIO_CONTINUE _IOR(UFFDIO, _UFFDIO_CONTINUE, \ + struct uffdio_continue) /* read() structure */ struct uffd_msg { @@ -268,6 +273,18 @@ struct uffdio_writeprotect { __u64 mode; }; +struct uffdio_continue { + struct uffdio_range range; +#define UFFDIO_CONTINUE_MODE_DONTWAKE ((__u64)1<<0) + __u64 mode; + + /* + * Fields below here are written by the ioctl and must be at the end: + * the copy_from_user will not read past here. + */ + __s64 mapped; +}; + /* * Flags for the userfaultfd(2) system call itself. */ diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index b105a455124d..533e5a26e437 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include "internal.h" @@ -4865,8 +4864,10 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long dst_addr, unsigned long src_addr, + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mode, struct page **pagep) { + bool is_continue = (mode == MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE); struct address_space *mapping; pgoff_t idx; unsigned long size; @@ -4876,8 +4877,17 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, spinlock_t *ptl; int ret; struct page *page; + int writable; - if (!*pagep) { + mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping; + idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr); + + if (is_continue) { + ret = -EFAULT; + page = find_lock_page(mapping, idx); + if (!page) + goto out; + } else if (!*pagep) { ret = -ENOMEM; page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0); if (IS_ERR(page)) @@ -4906,13 +4916,8 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, */ __SetPageUptodate(page); - mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping; - idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr); - - /* - * If shared, add to page cache - */ - if (vm_shared) { + /* Add shared, newly allocated pages to the page cache. */ + if (vm_shared && !is_continue) { size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h); ret = -EFAULT; if (idx >= size) @@ -4957,8 +4962,14 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, dst_vma, dst_addr); } - _dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE); - if (dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + /* For CONTINUE on a non-shared VMA, don't set VM_WRITE for CoW. */ + if (is_continue && !vm_shared) + writable = 0; + else + writable = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE; + + _dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, writable); + if (writable) _dst_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte); _dst_pte = pte_mkyoung(_dst_pte); @@ -4972,15 +4983,16 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte); spin_unlock(ptl); - SetHPageMigratable(page); - if (vm_shared) + if (!is_continue) + SetHPageMigratable(page); + if (vm_shared || is_continue) unlock_page(page); ret = 0; out: return ret; out_release_unlock: spin_unlock(ptl); - if (vm_shared) + if (vm_shared || is_continue) unlock_page(page); out_release_nounlock: put_page(page); diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c index 063cbb17e8d8..e14b3820c6a8 100644 --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long src_start, unsigned long len, - bool zeropage) + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mode) { int vm_alloc_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED; int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED; @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, * by THP. Since we can not reliably insert a zero page, this * feature is not supported. */ - if (zeropage) { + if (mode == MCOPY_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE) { mmap_read_unlock(dst_mm); return -EINVAL; } @@ -273,8 +273,6 @@ retry: } while (src_addr < src_start + len) { - pte_t dst_pteval; - BUG_ON(dst_addr >= dst_start + len); /* @@ -297,16 +295,16 @@ retry: goto out_unlock; } - err = -EEXIST; - dst_pteval = huge_ptep_get(dst_pte); - if (!huge_pte_none(dst_pteval)) { + if (mode != MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE && + !huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(dst_pte))) { + err = -EEXIST; mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping); goto out_unlock; } err = hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pte, dst_vma, - dst_addr, src_addr, &page); + dst_addr, src_addr, mode, &page); mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]); i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping); @@ -408,7 +406,7 @@ extern ssize_t __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long src_start, unsigned long len, - bool zeropage); + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mode); #endif /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, @@ -458,7 +456,7 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long src_start, unsigned long len, - bool zeropage, + enum mcopy_atomic_mode mcopy_mode, bool *mmap_changing, __u64 mode) { @@ -469,6 +467,7 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, long copied; struct page *page; bool wp_copy; + bool zeropage = (mcopy_mode == MCOPY_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE); /* * Sanitize the command parameters: @@ -527,10 +526,12 @@ retry: */ if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(dst_vma)) return __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(dst_mm, dst_vma, dst_start, - src_start, len, zeropage); + src_start, len, mcopy_mode); if (!vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && !vma_is_shmem(dst_vma)) goto out_unlock; + if (mcopy_mode == MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE) + goto out_unlock; /* * Ensure the dst_vma has a anon_vma or this page @@ -626,14 +627,22 @@ ssize_t mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start, unsigned long src_start, unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing, __u64 mode) { - return __mcopy_atomic(dst_mm, dst_start, src_start, len, false, - mmap_changing, mode); + return __mcopy_atomic(dst_mm, dst_start, src_start, len, + MCOPY_ATOMIC_NORMAL, mmap_changing, mode); } ssize_t mfill_zeropage(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing) { - return __mcopy_atomic(dst_mm, start, 0, len, true, mmap_changing, 0); + return __mcopy_atomic(dst_mm, start, 0, len, MCOPY_ATOMIC_ZEROPAGE, + mmap_changing, 0); +} + +ssize_t mcopy_continue(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start, + unsigned long len, bool *mmap_changing) +{ + return __mcopy_atomic(dst_mm, start, 0, len, MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE, + mmap_changing, 0); } int mwriteprotect_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long start, -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From b6676de8d7b48724d4cd3a3742c62fa525baa904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Hansen Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 18:36:01 -0700 Subject: mm/vmscan: move RECLAIM* bits to uapi header It is currently not obvious that the RECLAIM_* bits are part of the uapi since they are defined in vmscan.c. Move them to a uapi header to make it obvious. This should have no functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210219172557.08074910@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Ben Widawsky Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador Acked-by: David Rientjes Acked-by: Christoph Lameter Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Daniel Wagner Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Huang Ying Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Qian Cai Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/uapi/linux/mempolicy.h | 7 +++++++ mm/vmscan.c | 8 -------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mempolicy.h b/include/uapi/linux/mempolicy.h index 8948467b3992..4832fd0b5642 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/mempolicy.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mempolicy.h @@ -64,5 +64,12 @@ enum { #define MPOL_F_MOF (1 << 3) /* this policy wants migrate on fault */ #define MPOL_F_MORON (1 << 4) /* Migrate On protnone Reference On Node */ +/* + * These bit locations are exposed in the vm.zone_reclaim_mode sysctl + * ABI. New bits are OK, but existing bits can never change. + */ +#define RECLAIM_ZONE (1<<0) /* Run shrink_inactive_list on the zone */ +#define RECLAIM_WRITE (1<<1) /* Writeout pages during reclaim */ +#define RECLAIM_UNMAP (1<<2) /* Unmap pages during reclaim */ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_MEMPOLICY_H */ diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index 42aaef30633e..671143dbf809 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -4086,14 +4086,6 @@ module_init(kswapd_init) */ int node_reclaim_mode __read_mostly; -/* - * These bit locations are exposed in the vm.zone_reclaim_mode sysctl - * ABI. New bits are OK, but existing bits can never change. - */ -#define RECLAIM_ZONE (1<<0) /* Run shrink_inactive_list on the zone */ -#define RECLAIM_WRITE (1<<1) /* Writeout pages during reclaim */ -#define RECLAIM_UNMAP (1<<2) /* Unmap pages during reclaim */ - /* * Priority for NODE_RECLAIM. This determines the fraction of pages * of a node considered for each zone_reclaim. 4 scans 1/16th of -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From fa60ce2cb4506701c43bd4cf3ca23d970daf1b9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 18:06:44 -0700 Subject: treewide: remove editor modelines and cruft The section "19) Editor modelines and other cruft" in Documentation/process/coding-style.rst clearly says, "Do not include any of these in source files." I recently receive a patch to explicitly add a new one. Let's do treewide cleanups, otherwise some people follow the existing code and attempt to upstream their favoriate editor setups. It is even nicer if scripts/checkpatch.pl can check it. If we like to impose coding style in an editor-independent manner, I think editorconfig (patch [1]) is a saner solution. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200703073143.423557-1-danny@kdrag0n.dev/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324054457.1477489-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda [auxdisplay] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/m68k/atari/time.c | 7 ------- arch/parisc/include/asm/pdc_chassis.h | 1 - arch/um/drivers/cow.h | 7 ------- drivers/auxdisplay/panel.c | 7 ------- drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_drv.c | 1 - drivers/media/usb/pwc/pwc-uncompress.c | 3 --- drivers/net/ethernet/adaptec/starfire.c | 8 -------- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/atarilance.c | 8 -------- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c | 7 ------- .../net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_nortel.c | 8 -------- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_pci.c | 8 -------- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_plx.c | 8 -------- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_tmd.c | 8 -------- drivers/parport/parport_ip32.c | 12 ------------ drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell_rbu.c | 3 --- drivers/scsi/53c700.c | 1 - drivers/scsi/53c700.h | 1 - drivers/scsi/ch.c | 6 ------ drivers/scsi/ips.c | 20 -------------------- drivers/scsi/ips.h | 20 -------------------- drivers/scsi/lasi700.c | 1 - drivers/scsi/megaraid/mbox_defs.h | 2 -- drivers/scsi/megaraid/mega_common.h | 2 -- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.c | 2 -- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.h | 2 -- drivers/scsi/qla1280.c | 12 ------------ drivers/scsi/sni_53c710.c | 1 - drivers/video/fbdev/matrox/matroxfb_base.c | 9 --------- drivers/video/fbdev/vga16fb.c | 10 ---------- fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h | 4 +--- fs/configfs/dir.c | 4 +--- fs/configfs/file.c | 4 +--- fs/configfs/inode.c | 4 +--- fs/configfs/item.c | 4 +--- fs/configfs/mount.c | 4 +--- fs/configfs/symlink.c | 4 +--- fs/nfs/dir.c | 7 ------- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 6 ------ fs/nfs/nfs4renewd.c | 6 ------ fs/nfs/nfs4state.c | 6 ------ fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 6 ------ fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 6 ------ fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 6 ------ fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 6 ------ fs/ocfs2/acl.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/acl.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/alloc.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/aops.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/netdebug.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_heartbeat.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_nodemanager.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp_internal.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dcache.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dcache.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dir.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmapi.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmast.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmthread.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/export.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/export.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/file.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/file.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/filecheck.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/filecheck.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/inode.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/journal.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/journal.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/localalloc.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/locks.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/locks.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/mmap.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/move_extents.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/move_extents.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/namei.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/namei.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs1_fs_compat.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_ioctl.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockid.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockingver.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/reservations.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/reservations.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/resize.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/resize.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/slot_map.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/stack_o2cb.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/stackglue.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/super.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/symlink.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/symlink.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/sysfile.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/uptodate.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.h | 4 +--- fs/reiserfs/procfs.c | 10 ---------- include/linux/configfs.h | 4 +--- include/linux/genl_magic_func.h | 1 - include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h | 1 - include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h | 11 ----------- include/uapi/linux/nfs4.h | 6 ------ include/xen/interface/elfnote.h | 10 ---------- include/xen/interface/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h | 10 ---------- include/xen/interface/io/xenbus.h | 10 ---------- samples/configfs/configfs_sample.c | 2 -- tools/usb/hcd-tests.sh | 2 -- 157 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 627 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/arch/m68k/atari/time.c b/arch/m68k/atari/time.c index 1068670cb741..7e44d0e9d0f8 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/atari/time.c +++ b/arch/m68k/atari/time.c @@ -317,10 +317,3 @@ int atari_tt_hwclk( int op, struct rtc_time *t ) return( 0 ); } - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 4 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/pdc_chassis.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/pdc_chassis.h index ae3e108d22ad..d6d82f53d3d0 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/pdc_chassis.h +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/pdc_chassis.h @@ -365,4 +365,3 @@ void parisc_pdc_chassis_init(void); PDC_CHASSIS_EOM_SET ) #endif /* _PARISC_PDC_CHASSIS_H */ -/* vim: set ts=8 */ diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/cow.h b/arch/um/drivers/cow.h index 103adac691ed..9a67c017000f 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/cow.h +++ b/arch/um/drivers/cow.h @@ -24,10 +24,3 @@ extern void cow_sizes(int version, __u64 size, int sectorsize, int align, int *data_offset_out); #endif - -/* - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-file-style: "linux" - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/panel.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/panel.c index ff5755ee5694..eba04c0de7eb 100644 --- a/drivers/auxdisplay/panel.c +++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/panel.c @@ -1737,10 +1737,3 @@ module_init(panel_init_module); module_exit(panel_cleanup_module); MODULE_AUTHOR("Willy Tarreau"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 4 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_drv.c index 1864467f1063..6754f578fed2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_drv.c @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -/* vim: set ts=8 sw=8 tw=78 ai noexpandtab */ /* qxl_drv.c -- QXL driver -*- linux-c -*- * * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/pwc/pwc-uncompress.c b/drivers/media/usb/pwc/pwc-uncompress.c index abfc88391036..68bc3829c6b3 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/pwc/pwc-uncompress.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/pwc/pwc-uncompress.c @@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ Please send bug reports and support requests to . The decompression routines have been implemented by reverse-engineering the Nemosoft binary pwcx module. Caveat emptor. - - - vim: set ts=8: */ #include diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/adaptec/starfire.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/adaptec/starfire.c index 555299737b51..7965e5e3c985 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/adaptec/starfire.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/adaptec/starfire.c @@ -2070,11 +2070,3 @@ static void __exit starfire_cleanup (void) module_init(starfire_init); module_exit(starfire_cleanup); - - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/atarilance.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/atarilance.c index 961796abab35..c1eab916438f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/atarilance.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/atarilance.c @@ -1156,11 +1156,3 @@ static void __exit atarilance_module_exit(void) module_init(atarilance_module_init); module_exit(atarilance_module_exit); #endif /* MODULE */ - - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 4 - * tab-width: 4 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c index aa412506832d..4100ab07e6b7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c @@ -3029,10 +3029,3 @@ static void __exit pcnet32_cleanup_module(void) module_init(pcnet32_init_module); module_exit(pcnet32_cleanup_module); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 4 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_nortel.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_nortel.c index 96a03d10a080..18bd0d9876c2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_nortel.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_nortel.c @@ -312,11 +312,3 @@ static void __exit orinoco_nortel_exit(void) module_init(orinoco_nortel_init); module_exit(orinoco_nortel_exit); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_pci.c index f3c86b07b1b9..7e3a6dd60c15 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_pci.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_pci.c @@ -255,11 +255,3 @@ static void __exit orinoco_pci_exit(void) module_init(orinoco_pci_init); module_exit(orinoco_pci_exit); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_plx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_plx.c index 16dada94c774..73e6ae124013 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_plx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_plx.c @@ -360,11 +360,3 @@ static void __exit orinoco_plx_exit(void) module_init(orinoco_plx_init); module_exit(orinoco_plx_exit); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_tmd.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_tmd.c index 9a9d335611ac..939d5a1dce97 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_tmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/orinoco_tmd.c @@ -235,11 +235,3 @@ static void __exit orinoco_tmd_exit(void) module_init(orinoco_tmd_init); module_exit(orinoco_tmd_exit); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/parport/parport_ip32.c b/drivers/parport/parport_ip32.c index 48b084e86dc6..0919ed99ba94 100644 --- a/drivers/parport/parport_ip32.c +++ b/drivers/parport/parport_ip32.c @@ -2224,15 +2224,3 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(features, ", bit 2: hardware SPP mode" ", bit 3: hardware EPP mode" ", bit 4: hardware ECP mode"); - -/*--- Inform (X)Emacs about preferred coding style ---------------------*/ -/* - * Local Variables: - * mode: c - * c-file-style: "linux" - * indent-tabs-mode: t - * tab-width: 8 - * fill-column: 78 - * ispell-local-dictionary: "american" - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell_rbu.c b/drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell_rbu.c index 03c3ff34bcf5..085ad0a0d22e 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell_rbu.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell_rbu.c @@ -675,6 +675,3 @@ static __exit void dcdrbu_exit(void) module_exit(dcdrbu_exit); module_init(dcdrbu_init); - -/* vim:noet:ts=8:sw=8 -*/ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/53c700.c b/drivers/scsi/53c700.c index ab42feab233f..77ccb96e5ed4 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/53c700.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/53c700.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8 -*- */ /* NCR (or Symbios) 53c700 and 53c700-66 Driver * diff --git a/drivers/scsi/53c700.h b/drivers/scsi/53c700.h index c9f8c497babb..2df347ca91af 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/53c700.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/53c700.h @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8 -*- */ /* Driver for 53c700 and 53c700-66 chips from NCR and Symbios * diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ch.c b/drivers/scsi/ch.c index cb74ab1ae5a4..9b89c26ccfdb 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ch.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ch.c @@ -1058,9 +1058,3 @@ static void __exit exit_ch_module(void) module_init(init_ch_module); module_exit(exit_ch_module); - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ips.c b/drivers/scsi/ips.c index 1a3c534826ba..bc33d54a4011 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ips.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ips.c @@ -7099,23 +7099,3 @@ ips_init_phase2(int index) MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("IBM ServeRAID Adapter Driver " IPS_VER_STRING); MODULE_VERSION(IPS_VER_STRING); - - -/* - * Overrides for Emacs so that we almost follow Linus's tabbing style. - * Emacs will notice this stuff at the end of the file and automatically - * adjust the settings for this buffer only. This must remain at the end - * of the file. - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 2 - * c-brace-imaginary-offset: 0 - * c-brace-offset: -2 - * c-argdecl-indent: 2 - * c-label-offset: -2 - * c-continued-statement-offset: 2 - * c-continued-brace-offset: 0 - * indent-tabs-mode: nil - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ips.h b/drivers/scsi/ips.h index 6c0678fb9a67..65edf000e447 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ips.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/ips.h @@ -1211,23 +1211,3 @@ typedef struct { IPS_COMPAT_TAMPA, \ IPS_COMPAT_KEYWEST \ } - - -/* - * Overrides for Emacs so that we almost follow Linus's tabbing style. - * Emacs will notice this stuff at the end of the file and automatically - * adjust the settings for this buffer only. This must remain at the end - * of the file. - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-indent-level: 2 - * c-brace-imaginary-offset: 0 - * c-brace-offset: -2 - * c-argdecl-indent: 2 - * c-label-offset: -2 - * c-continued-statement-offset: 2 - * c-continued-brace-offset: 0 - * indent-tabs-mode: nil - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lasi700.c b/drivers/scsi/lasi700.c index de71d240a56f..6d14a7a94d0b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lasi700.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lasi700.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8 -*- */ /* PARISC LASI driver for the 53c700 chip * diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mbox_defs.h b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mbox_defs.h index 01a1bfb8ea2a..f0ef8f7f82c1 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mbox_defs.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mbox_defs.h @@ -781,5 +781,3 @@ typedef struct { } __attribute__ ((packed)) mbox_sgl32; #endif // _MRAID_MBOX_DEFS_H_ - -/* vim: set ts=8 sw=8 tw=78: */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mega_common.h b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mega_common.h index 3a7596e47a88..2ad0aa2f837d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mega_common.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/mega_common.h @@ -282,5 +282,3 @@ struct mraid_pci_blk { }; #endif // _MEGA_COMMON_H_ - -// vim: set ts=8 sw=8 tw=78: diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.c index b1a2d3536add..145fde302d7d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.c @@ -4068,5 +4068,3 @@ megaraid_sysfs_show_ldnum(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha */ module_init(megaraid_init); module_exit(megaraid_exit); - -/* vim: set ts=8 sw=8 tw=78 ai si: */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.h b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.h index 3e4347c6dab1..d2fe7f69cd5d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mbox.h @@ -230,5 +230,3 @@ typedef struct { #define WROUTDOOR(rdev, value) writel(value, (rdev)->baseaddr + 0x2C) #endif // _MEGARAID_H_ - -// vim: set ts=8 sw=8 tw=78: diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla1280.c b/drivers/scsi/qla1280.c index 8f35174a1f9a..928da90b79be 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla1280.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla1280.c @@ -4403,15 +4403,3 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("qlogic/1040.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("qlogic/1280.bin"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("qlogic/12160.bin"); MODULE_VERSION(QLA1280_VERSION); - -/* - * Overrides for Emacs so that we almost follow Linus's tabbing style. - * Emacs will notice this stuff at the end of the file and automatically - * adjust the settings for this buffer only. This must remain at the end - * of the file. - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sni_53c710.c b/drivers/scsi/sni_53c710.c index 97c6f81b1d2a..678651b9b4dd 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/sni_53c710.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sni_53c710.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8 -*- */ /* SNI RM driver * diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/matrox/matroxfb_base.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/matrox/matroxfb_base.c index a3853421b263..4325bf7f388c 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/matrox/matroxfb_base.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/matrox/matroxfb_base.c @@ -2608,12 +2608,3 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(matroxfb_register_driver); EXPORT_SYMBOL(matroxfb_unregister_driver); EXPORT_SYMBOL(matroxfb_wait_for_sync); EXPORT_SYMBOL(matroxfb_enable_irq); - -/* - * Overrides for Emacs so that we follow Linus's tabbing style. - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ - diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/vga16fb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/vga16fb.c index 1e8a38a7967d..e2757ff1c23d 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/vga16fb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/vga16fb.c @@ -1451,13 +1451,3 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Legacy VGA framebuffer device driver"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); module_init(vga16fb_init); module_exit(vga16fb_exit); - - -/* - * Overrides for Emacs so that we follow Linus's tabbing style. - * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ - diff --git a/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h b/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h index 9a3aed249692..c0395363eab9 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h +++ b/fs/configfs/configfs_internal.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset:8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * configfs_internal.h - Internal stuff for configfs * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c index b6098e02e20b..ac5e0c0e9181 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dir.c - Operations for configfs directories. * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/configfs/file.c b/fs/configfs/file.c index da8351d1e455..e26060dae70a 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/file.c +++ b/fs/configfs/file.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * file.c - operations for regular (text) files. * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/configfs/inode.c b/fs/configfs/inode.c index 42c348bb2903..eb5ec3e46283 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/configfs/inode.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * inode.c - basic inode and dentry operations. * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/configfs/item.c b/fs/configfs/item.c index 704a4356f137..254170a82aa3 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/item.c +++ b/fs/configfs/item.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * item.c - library routines for handling generic config items * * Based on kobject: diff --git a/fs/configfs/mount.c b/fs/configfs/mount.c index 0c6e8cf61953..c2d820063ec4 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/mount.c +++ b/fs/configfs/mount.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * mount.c - operations for initializing and mounting configfs. * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c index 77c854364e60..0623c3edcfb9 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c +++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * symlink.c - operations for configfs symlinks. * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index fc4f490f2d78..3d8e3698d3df 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -3004,10 +3004,3 @@ out_notsup: goto out; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_permission); - -/* - * Local variables: - * version-control: t - * kept-new-versions: 5 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index c65c4b41e2c1..545010d6cbf3 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -10427,9 +10427,3 @@ const struct xattr_handler *nfs4_xattr_handlers[] = { #endif NULL }; - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4renewd.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4renewd.c index ff876dda7f06..db3811af0796 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4renewd.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4renewd.c @@ -149,9 +149,3 @@ void nfs4_set_lease_period(struct nfs_client *clp, /* Cap maximum reconnect timeout at 1/2 lease period */ rpc_set_connect_timeout(clp->cl_rpcclient, lease, lease >> 1); } - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c index 3a51351bdc6a..2eec5bbb55c8 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4state.c @@ -2695,9 +2695,3 @@ static int nfs4_run_state_manager(void *ptr) module_put_and_exit(0); return 0; } - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c index ac6b79ee9355..d4fd3be0e8ca 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c @@ -7629,9 +7629,3 @@ const struct rpc_version nfs_version4 = { .procs = nfs4_procedures, .counts = nfs_version4_counts, }; - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index daf43b980d4b..f4ce93d7f26e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -3317,9 +3317,3 @@ const struct svc_version nfsd_version4 = { .vs_rpcb_optnl = true, .vs_need_cong_ctrl = true, }; - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index e0f06d3cbd44..7abeccb975b2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -5448,9 +5448,3 @@ nfs4svc_encode_compoundres(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p) nfsd4_sequence_done(resp); return 1; } - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h index fe540a3415c6..a7c425254fee 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h @@ -866,9 +866,3 @@ struct nfsd4_operation { #endif - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c index 5259badabb56..5c72a7e6d6c5 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * acl.c * * Copyright (C) 2004, 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/acl.h b/fs/ocfs2/acl.h index 4e86450917b2..f59d8d0a61fa 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/acl.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/acl.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * acl.h * * Copyright (C) 2004, 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c index 78710788c237..e032f2e2c2c5 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * alloc.c * * Extent allocs and frees diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.h b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.h index 7f973dd76dbc..4af7abaa6e40 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * alloc.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/aops.c b/fs/ocfs2/aops.c index ad20403b383f..1294925ac94a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/aops.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/aops.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2002, 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/aops.h b/fs/ocfs2/aops.h index 70ed4382750d..3a520117fa59 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/aops.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/aops.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2002, 2004, 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.c b/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.c index dabfef9c2bc0..863a5316030b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * blockcheck.c * * Checksum and ECC codes for the OCFS2 userspace library. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.h b/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.h index 8f17d2c85f40..d0578e98ee8d 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/blockcheck.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * blockcheck.h * * Checksum and ECC codes for the OCFS2 userspace library. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c index f0b104e483d8..e7758778abef 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * io.c * * Buffer cache handling diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.h b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.h index 1c5e533fba04..2d51649fc090 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_buffer_head.h * * Buffer cache handling functions defined diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c index 12a7590601dd..e829c2595543 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.h index beed31ea86cf..1d4100abf6f8 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * heartbeat.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.c index 1d696c96b8b2..810d32815593 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.h index 446e452ac7a6..b73fc42e46ff 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/masklog.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/netdebug.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/netdebug.c index 667a5c5e1f66..7524994e3199 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/netdebug.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/netdebug.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * netdebug.c * * debug functionality for o2net diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c index 7a7640c59f3c..bb82e6b1ff4e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.h index 3e0006631cc4..3490e77a952d 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * nodemanager.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_heartbeat.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_heartbeat.h index 760d850be11e..6088c9f974dd 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_heartbeat.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_heartbeat.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_heartbeat.h * * On-disk structures for ocfs2_heartbeat diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_nodemanager.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_nodemanager.h index 21ad307419a8..c9a0b77443e7 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_nodemanager.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/ocfs2_nodemanager.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_nodemanager.h * * Header describing the interface between userspace and the kernel diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.c index cea739be77c4..189c111bc371 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: +/* * * Copyright (C) 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.h index 6d45ce8b18a1..d64bf4482a4a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/quorum.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c index d6067c3d84c1..022f716c74ff 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * sys.c * * OCFS2 cluster sysfs interface diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.h index ce380517cf17..70aaba65317e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * sys.h * * Function prototypes for o2cb sysfs interface diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c index 3bd8119bed5e..f660c0dbdb63 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: +/* * * Copyright (C) 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. * diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h index 736338f45c59..a75b551d31c7 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * tcp.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp_internal.h b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp_internal.h index e6a2b9dfcd16..601c99bd2611 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp_internal.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp_internal.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * Copyright (C) 2005 Oracle. All rights reserved. */ diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dcache.c b/fs/ocfs2/dcache.c index 42a61eecdacd..04fc8344063a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dcache.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dcache.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dcache.c * * dentry cache handling code diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dcache.h b/fs/ocfs2/dcache.h index 3686a52ba143..7f246c5692d8 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dcache.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dcache.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dcache.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dir.c b/fs/ocfs2/dir.c index bdfba9db558a..bd8d534f11cb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dir.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dir.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dir.c * * Creates, reads, walks and deletes directory-nodes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dir.h b/fs/ocfs2/dir.h index e3e7d5dd29e8..4b9f5a12c7d2 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dir.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dir.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dir.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmapi.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmapi.h index 6456c0fbcbb2..bae60ca2672a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmapi.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmapi.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmapi.h * * externally exported dlm interfaces diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmast.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmast.c index 70a10764f249..c681ba957932 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmast.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmast.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmast.c * * AST and BAST functionality for local and remote nodes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h index 58d57e25d384..fd2022712167 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmcommon.h * * Copyright (C) 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.c index 6051edc33aef..450d46eefab3 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmconvert.c * * underlying calls for lock conversion diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.h index 12d9c28bc52f..1f371716513b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmconvert.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmconvert.h * * Copyright (C) 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c index 4b8b41d23e91..d442cf5dda8a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmdebug.c * * debug functionality for the dlm diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.h index f8fd8680a4b6..e08f7357e7ec 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmdebug.h * * Copyright (C) 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.c index 357cfc702ce3..9f90fc9551e1 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmdomain.c * * defines domain join / leave apis diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.h index 7c21664d23d0..815abe30ad09 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdomain.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmdomain.h * * Copyright (C) 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c index 83f0760e4fba..041fd1791ae7 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmlock.c * * underlying calls for lock creation diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c index f105746063ed..4960a6de768d 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmmod.c * * standalone DLM module diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c index afc51736686c..0e7aad1b11cc 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmrecovery.c * * recovery stuff diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmthread.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmthread.c index 5ccc4ff0b82a..c350bd4df770 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmthread.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmthread.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmthread.c * * standalone DLM module diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c index dcb17ca8ae74..61103b2d69fb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmunlock.c * * underlying calls for unlocking locks diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c index b2870f1a31df..fa0a14f199eb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmfs.c * * Code which implements the kernel side of a minimal userspace diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c index 339f098d9592..29f183a15798 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * userdlm.c * * Code which implements the kernel side of a minimal userspace diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.h index 0558ae768200..47ba18eac423 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmfs/userdlm.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * userdlm.h * * Userspace dlm defines diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c index 0fbe8bf7190f..48fd369c29a4 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmglue.c * * Code which implements an OCFS2 specific interface to our DLM. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.h index b8fbed25df89..e5da5809ed95 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * dlmglue.h * * description here diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/export.c b/fs/ocfs2/export.c index 69ed278dd84d..eaa8c80ace3c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/export.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/export.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * export.c * * Functions to facilitate NFS exporting diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/export.h b/fs/ocfs2/export.h index d485da0c3439..636357400505 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/export.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/export.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * export.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c index 7b93e9c766f6..70a768b623cf 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * extent_map.c * * Block/Cluster mapping functions diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h index e5464f6cee8a..bc4ed59fb925 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * extent_map.h * * In-memory file extent mappings for OCFS2. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/file.c b/fs/ocfs2/file.c index db8a6265b749..f17c3d33fb18 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * file.c * * File open, close, extend, truncate diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/file.h b/fs/ocfs2/file.h index 8536cec5f122..71db8f3aa027 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/file.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * file.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.c b/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.c index 50f11bfdc8c2..90b8d300c1ee 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * filecheck.c * * Code which implements online file check. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.h b/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.h index 4d006777ac54..d3bcb8bcfeb0 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/filecheck.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * filecheck.h * * Online file check. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.c b/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.c index 60c5f995d30c..9099d8fc7599 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * heartbeat.c * * Register ourselves with the heartbaet service, keep our node maps diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.h b/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.h index 5fedb2d35dc0..f1f8b1802fe4 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/heartbeat.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * heartbeat.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c index 7c9dfd50c1c1..bc8f32fab964 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * inode.c * * vfs' aops, fops, dops and iops diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.h b/fs/ocfs2/inode.h index 51a4f7197987..82b28fdacc7e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * inode.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/journal.c b/fs/ocfs2/journal.c index db52e843002a..4e589ce2fce6 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/journal.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/journal.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * journal.c * * Defines functions of journalling api diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/journal.h b/fs/ocfs2/journal.h index bfe611ed1b1d..d158acb8b38a 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/journal.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/journal.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * journal.h * * Defines journalling api and structures. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c index fc8252a28cb1..5f6bacbeef6b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * localalloc.c * * Node local data allocation diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.h b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.h index e8a5cea48639..08f925b7ec6d 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * localalloc.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/locks.c b/fs/ocfs2/locks.c index 7edc4e5c7c2c..fab7c6a4a7d0 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/locks.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/locks.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * locks.c * * Userspace file locking support diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/locks.h b/fs/ocfs2/locks.h index 389fe1fce3a5..b52de3947d5f 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/locks.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/locks.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * locks.h * * Function prototypes for Userspace file locking support diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/mmap.c b/fs/ocfs2/mmap.c index 25cabbfe87fc..1834f26522ed 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/mmap.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/mmap.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * mmap.c * * Code to deal with the mess that is clustered mmap. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.c b/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.c index 758d9661ef1e..192cad0662d8 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * move_extents.c * * Copyright (C) 2011 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.h b/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.h index 28cac43892c5..987f9e559f30 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/move_extents.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * move_extents.h * * Copyright (C) 2011 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c index 05ced86580d1..2c46ff6ba4ea 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * namei.c * * Create and rename file, directory, symlinks diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/namei.h b/fs/ocfs2/namei.h index cc091ed02b4a..9cc891eb874e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/namei.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/namei.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * namei.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs1_fs_compat.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs1_fs_compat.h index 01ae48c4834d..6dbcf3d467fb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs1_fs_compat.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs1_fs_compat.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs1_fs_compat.h * * OCFS1 volume header definitions. OCFS2 creates valid but unmountable diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h index 7993d527edae..bb62cc2e0211 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2.h * * Defines macros and structures used in OCFS2 diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h index 19137c6d087b..638d875eccc7 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_fs.h * * On-disk structures for OCFS2. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_ioctl.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_ioctl.h index 273616bd4f19..9680797bc531 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_ioctl.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_ioctl.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_ioctl.h * * Defines OCFS2 ioctls. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockid.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockid.h index b4be84956bc1..8ac357ce6a30 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockid.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockid.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_lockid.h * * Defines OCFS2 lockid bits. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockingver.h b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockingver.h index 5c9c105b33ee..31a5e1619e7f 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockingver.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_lockingver.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * ocfs2_lockingver.h * * Defines OCFS2 Locking version values. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c index c19a463fac55..7f6355cbb587 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * refcounttree.c * * Copyright (C) 2009 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.h b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.h index 0b9014495726..8197a94feec0 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * refcounttree.h * * Copyright (C) 2009 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/reservations.c b/fs/ocfs2/reservations.c index bf3842e34fb9..769e466887b0 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/reservations.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/reservations.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * reservations.c * * Allocation reservations implementation diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/reservations.h b/fs/ocfs2/reservations.h index 6ac88122896d..677c50663595 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/reservations.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/reservations.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * reservations.h * * Allocation reservations function prototypes and structures. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/resize.c b/fs/ocfs2/resize.c index 24eb52f9059c..d65d43c61857 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/resize.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/resize.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * resize.c * * volume resize. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/resize.h b/fs/ocfs2/resize.h index 0af0c023042c..4990637219ef 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/resize.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/resize.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * resize.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c index 4da0e4b1e79b..0b0ae3ebb0cf 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * slot_map.c * * Copyright (C) 2002, 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.h b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.h index 93b53e73f0f7..a43644570b53 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * slotmap.h * * description here diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stack_o2cb.c b/fs/ocfs2/stack_o2cb.c index f70012038383..88f75f7f02d7 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/stack_o2cb.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/stack_o2cb.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * stack_o2cb.c * * Code which interfaces ocfs2 with the o2cb stack. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c b/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c index 7397064c3f35..85a47621e0c0 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * stack_user.c * * Code which interfaces ocfs2 with fs/dlm and a userspace stack. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c index 8d33ebc6b6fc..d50e8b8dfea4 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * stackglue.c * * Code which implements an OCFS2 specific interface to underlying diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.h b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.h index e9d26cbeb3b8..3636847fae19 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * stackglue.h * * Glue to the underlying cluster stack. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index 8c8cf7f4eb34..8521942f5af2 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * suballoc.c * * metadata alloc and free diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h index 50b36250beb6..5805a03d100b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * suballoc.h * * Defines sub allocator api diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.c b/fs/ocfs2/super.c index 079f8826993e..c86bd4e60e20 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * super.c * * load/unload driver, mount/dismount volumes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.h b/fs/ocfs2/super.h index 76facaf63336..8312651135b9 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/super.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * super.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/symlink.c b/fs/ocfs2/symlink.c index 94cfacc9bad7..f755a4985821 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/symlink.c @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * linux/cluster/ssi/cfs/symlink.c * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/symlink.h b/fs/ocfs2/symlink.h index 167094d1e5aa..ffcf0210545c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/symlink.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/symlink.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * symlink.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c b/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c index bb701c4e449f..53a945da873b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * sysfile.c * * Initialize, read, write, etc. system files. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.h b/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.h index a83dd962fccb..2b38c75990fd 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/sysfile.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * sysfile.h * * Function prototypes diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c b/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c index 580852ba05c4..09854925fa5c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * uptodate.c * * Tracking the up-to-date-ness of a local buffer_head with respect to diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.h b/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.h index 77a30cae4879..85d94134001b 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/uptodate.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * uptodate.h * * Cluster uptodate tracking diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index 36ae47a4aef6..dd784eb0cd7c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * xattr.c * * Copyright (C) 2004, 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h index 9c80382da1f5..00308b57f64f 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * xattr.h * * Copyright (C) 2004, 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved. diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/procfs.c b/fs/reiserfs/procfs.c index 155b82870333..4a7cb16e9345 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/procfs.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/procfs.c @@ -488,13 +488,3 @@ int reiserfs_proc_info_global_done(void) * (available at http://www.namesys.com/legalese.html) * */ - -/* - * Make Linus happy. - * Local variables: - * c-indentation-style: "K&R" - * mode-name: "LC" - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/include/linux/configfs.h b/include/linux/configfs.h index 2e8c69b43c64..97cfd13bae51 100644 --- a/include/linux/configfs.h +++ b/include/linux/configfs.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 8; -*- - * vim: noexpandtab sw=8 ts=8 sts=0: - * +/* * configfs.h - definitions for the device driver filesystem * * Based on sysfs: diff --git a/include/linux/genl_magic_func.h b/include/linux/genl_magic_func.h index 6cb82301d8e9..939b1a8f571b 100644 --- a/include/linux/genl_magic_func.h +++ b/include/linux/genl_magic_func.h @@ -404,4 +404,3 @@ s_fields \ /* }}}1 */ #endif /* GENL_MAGIC_FUNC_H */ -/* vim: set foldmethod=marker foldlevel=1 nofoldenable : */ diff --git a/include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h b/include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h index 35d21fddaf2d..f81d48987528 100644 --- a/include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h +++ b/include/linux/genl_magic_struct.h @@ -283,4 +283,3 @@ enum { \ /* }}}1 */ #endif /* GENL_MAGIC_STRUCT_H */ -/* vim: set foldmethod=marker nofoldenable : */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h index e8eb4ad03cf1..d174914a837d 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h @@ -153,14 +153,3 @@ enum { #define BOND_3AD_STAT_MAX (__BOND_3AD_STAT_MAX - 1) #endif /* _LINUX_IF_BONDING_H */ - -/* - * Local variables: - * version-control: t - * kept-new-versions: 5 - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ - diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nfs4.h b/include/uapi/linux/nfs4.h index ed5415e0f1c1..800bb0ffa6e6 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/nfs4.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/nfs4.h @@ -178,9 +178,3 @@ #define NFS4_MAX_BACK_CHANNEL_OPS 2 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_NFS4_H */ - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/include/xen/interface/elfnote.h b/include/xen/interface/elfnote.h index 9e9f9bf7c66d..449bd383cb76 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/elfnote.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/elfnote.h @@ -208,13 +208,3 @@ #define XEN_ELFNOTE_MAX XEN_ELFNOTE_PHYS32_ENTRY #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_ELFNOTE_H__ */ - -/* - * Local variables: - * mode: C - * c-set-style: "BSD" - * c-basic-offset: 4 - * tab-width: 4 - * indent-tabs-mode: nil - * End: - */ diff --git a/include/xen/interface/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h b/include/xen/interface/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h index 32ca83edd44d..bfc2138e0bf5 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h @@ -131,13 +131,3 @@ struct vcpu_hvm_context { typedef struct vcpu_hvm_context vcpu_hvm_context_t; #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_VCPU_H__ */ - -/* - * Local variables: - * mode: C - * c-file-style: "BSD" - * c-basic-offset: 4 - * tab-width: 4 - * indent-tabs-mode: nil - * End: - */ diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/xenbus.h b/include/xen/interface/io/xenbus.h index aaf2951b1cce..fb8716112251 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/io/xenbus.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/io/xenbus.h @@ -39,13 +39,3 @@ enum xenbus_state }; #endif /* _XEN_PUBLIC_IO_XENBUS_H */ - -/* - * Local variables: - * c-file-style: "linux" - * indent-tabs-mode: t - * c-indent-level: 8 - * c-basic-offset: 8 - * tab-width: 8 - * End: - */ diff --git a/samples/configfs/configfs_sample.c b/samples/configfs/configfs_sample.c index f9008be7a8a1..37a657b25d58 100644 --- a/samples/configfs/configfs_sample.c +++ b/samples/configfs/configfs_sample.c @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* - * vim: noexpandtab ts=8 sts=0 sw=8: - * * configfs_example_macros.c - This file is a demonstration module * containing a number of configfs subsystems. It uses the helper * macros defined by configfs.h diff --git a/tools/usb/hcd-tests.sh b/tools/usb/hcd-tests.sh index e8cad6a4f9c9..73f914d13f5c 100644 --- a/tools/usb/hcd-tests.sh +++ b/tools/usb/hcd-tests.sh @@ -272,5 +272,3 @@ do echo '' done done - -# vim: sw=4 -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 63c8af5687f6b1b70e9458cac1ffb25e86db1695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Damien Le Moal Date: Mon, 10 May 2021 08:48:06 +0900 Subject: block: uapi: fix comment about block device ioctl Fix the comment mentioning ioctl command range used for zoned block devices to reflect the range of commands actually implemented. Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210509234806.3000-1-damien.lemoal@wdc.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h index f44eb0a04afd..4c32e97dcdf0 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ struct fsxattr { #define BLKROTATIONAL _IO(0x12,126) #define BLKZEROOUT _IO(0x12,127) /* - * A jump here: 130-131 are reserved for zoned block devices + * A jump here: 130-136 are reserved for zoned block devices * (see uapi/linux/blkzoned.h) */ -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 0683b53197b55343a166f1507086823030809a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Sun, 2 May 2021 17:28:31 -0500 Subject: signal: Deliver all of the siginfo perf data in _perf Don't abuse si_errno and deliver all of the perf data in _perf member of siginfo_t. Note: The data field in the perf data structures in a u64 to allow a pointer to be encoded without needed to implement a 32bit and 64bit version of the same structure. There already exists a 32bit and 64bit versions siginfo_t, and the 32bit version can not include a 64bit member as it only has 32bit alignment. So unsigned long is used in siginfo_t instead of a u64 as unsigned long can encode a pointer on all architectures linux supports. v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/m11rarqqx2.fsf_-_@fess.ebiederm.org v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503203814.25487-10-ebiederm@xmission.com v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-11-ebiederm@xmission.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517195748.8880-4-ebiederm@xmission.com Reviewed-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 6 ++++-- fs/signalfd.c | 3 ++- include/linux/compat.h | 5 ++++- include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 8 ++++++-- include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h | 4 ++-- kernel/signal.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/perf_events/sigtrap_threads.c | 14 +++++++------- 9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c index a4b7ee1df211..8f215e79e70e 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c @@ -623,7 +623,8 @@ static inline void siginfo_build_tests(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_pkey) != 0x12); /* _sigfault._perf */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf) != 0x10); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf_data) != 0x10); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf_type) != 0x14); /* _sigpoll */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_band) != 0x0c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c index a9fcabd8a5e5..06743ec054d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c @@ -141,8 +141,10 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_pkey) != 0x20); BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(compat_siginfo_t, si_pkey) != 0x14); - BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf) != 0x18); - BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(compat_siginfo_t, si_perf) != 0x10); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf_data) != 0x18); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(siginfo_t, si_perf_type) != 0x20); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(compat_siginfo_t, si_perf_data) != 0x10); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(compat_siginfo_t, si_perf_type) != 0x14); CHECK_CSI_OFFSET(_sigpoll); CHECK_CSI_SIZE (_sigpoll, 2*sizeof(int)); diff --git a/fs/signalfd.c b/fs/signalfd.c index e87e59581653..373df2f12415 100644 --- a/fs/signalfd.c +++ b/fs/signalfd.c @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ static int signalfd_copyinfo(struct signalfd_siginfo __user *uinfo, break; case SIL_PERF_EVENT: new.ssi_addr = (long) kinfo->si_addr; - new.ssi_perf = kinfo->si_perf; + new.ssi_perf_type = kinfo->si_perf_type; + new.ssi_perf_data = kinfo->si_perf_data; break; case SIL_CHLD: new.ssi_pid = kinfo->si_pid; diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h index 6af7bef15e94..a27fffaae121 100644 --- a/include/linux/compat.h +++ b/include/linux/compat.h @@ -236,7 +236,10 @@ typedef struct compat_siginfo { u32 _pkey; } _addr_pkey; /* used when si_code=TRAP_PERF */ - compat_ulong_t _perf; + struct { + compat_ulong_t _data; + u32 _type; + } _perf; }; } _sigfault; diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h index e663bf117b46..5a3c221f4c9d 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h @@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields { __u32 _pkey; } _addr_pkey; /* used when si_code=TRAP_PERF */ - unsigned long _perf; + struct { + unsigned long _data; + __u32 _type; + } _perf; }; } _sigfault; @@ -154,7 +157,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo { #define si_lower _sifields._sigfault._addr_bnd._lower #define si_upper _sifields._sigfault._addr_bnd._upper #define si_pkey _sifields._sigfault._addr_pkey._pkey -#define si_perf _sifields._sigfault._perf +#define si_perf_data _sifields._sigfault._perf._data +#define si_perf_type _sifields._sigfault._perf._type #define si_band _sifields._sigpoll._band #define si_fd _sifields._sigpoll._fd #define si_call_addr _sifields._sigsys._call_addr diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h index e54e639248c8..7b14753b3d38 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ struct perf_event_attr { /* * User provided data if sigtrap=1, passed back to user via - * siginfo_t::si_perf, e.g. to permit user to identify the event. + * siginfo_t::si_perf_data, e.g. to permit user to identify the event. */ __u64 sig_data; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h index 7e333042c7e3..e78dddf433fc 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ struct signalfd_siginfo { __s32 ssi_syscall; __u64 ssi_call_addr; __u32 ssi_arch; - __u32 __pad3; - __u64 ssi_perf; + __u32 ssi_perf_type; + __u64 ssi_perf_data; /* * Pad strcture to 128 bytes. Remember to update the diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 3a18d13c39b2..dca53515ae3f 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1768,11 +1768,13 @@ int force_sig_perf(void __user *addr, u32 type, u64 sig_data) struct kernel_siginfo info; clear_siginfo(&info); - info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; - info.si_errno = type; - info.si_code = TRAP_PERF; - info.si_addr = addr; - info.si_perf = sig_data; + info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; + info.si_errno = 0; + info.si_code = TRAP_PERF; + info.si_addr = addr; + info.si_perf_data = sig_data; + info.si_perf_type = type; + return force_sig_info(&info); } @@ -3356,7 +3358,8 @@ void copy_siginfo_to_external32(struct compat_siginfo *to, break; case SIL_PERF_EVENT: to->si_addr = ptr_to_compat(from->si_addr); - to->si_perf = from->si_perf; + to->si_perf_data = from->si_perf_data; + to->si_perf_type = from->si_perf_type; break; case SIL_CHLD: to->si_pid = from->si_pid; @@ -3432,7 +3435,8 @@ static int post_copy_siginfo_from_user32(kernel_siginfo_t *to, break; case SIL_PERF_EVENT: to->si_addr = compat_ptr(from->si_addr); - to->si_perf = from->si_perf; + to->si_perf_data = from->si_perf_data; + to->si_perf_type = from->si_perf_type; break; case SIL_CHLD: to->si_pid = from->si_pid; @@ -4615,7 +4619,8 @@ static inline void siginfo_buildtime_checks(void) CHECK_OFFSET(si_lower); CHECK_OFFSET(si_upper); CHECK_OFFSET(si_pkey); - CHECK_OFFSET(si_perf); + CHECK_OFFSET(si_perf_data); + CHECK_OFFSET(si_perf_type); /* sigpoll */ CHECK_OFFSET(si_band); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/sigtrap_threads.c b/tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/sigtrap_threads.c index 78ddf5e11625..8e83cf91513a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/sigtrap_threads.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/perf_events/sigtrap_threads.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct { siginfo_t first_siginfo; /* First observed siginfo_t. */ } ctx; -/* Unique value to check si_perf is correctly set from perf_event_attr::sig_data. */ +/* Unique value to check si_perf_data is correctly set from perf_event_attr::sig_data. */ #define TEST_SIG_DATA(addr) (~(unsigned long)(addr)) static struct perf_event_attr make_event_attr(bool enabled, volatile void *addr) @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ TEST_F(sigtrap_threads, enable_event) EXPECT_EQ(ctx.signal_count, NUM_THREADS); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.tids_want_signal, 0); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_addr, &ctx.iterate_on); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_errno, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_type, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_data, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); /* Check enabled for parent. */ ctx.iterate_on = 0; @@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ TEST_F(sigtrap_threads, modify_and_enable_event) EXPECT_EQ(ctx.signal_count, NUM_THREADS); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.tids_want_signal, 0); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_addr, &ctx.iterate_on); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_errno, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_type, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_data, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); /* Check enabled for parent. */ ctx.iterate_on = 0; @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ TEST_F(sigtrap_threads, signal_stress) EXPECT_EQ(ctx.signal_count, NUM_THREADS * ctx.iterate_on); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.tids_want_signal, 0); EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_addr, &ctx.iterate_on); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_errno, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); - EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_type, PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT); + EXPECT_EQ(ctx.first_siginfo.si_perf_data, TEST_SIG_DATA(&ctx.iterate_on)); } TEST_HARNESS_MAIN -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 922e3013046b79b444c87eda5baf43afae1326a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 12:52:43 -0500 Subject: signalfd: Remove SIL_PERF_EVENT fields from signalfd_siginfo With the addition of ssi_perf_data and ssi_perf_type struct signalfd_siginfo is dangerously close to running out of space. All that remains is just enough space for two additional 64bit fields. A practice of adding all possible siginfo_t fields into struct singalfd_siginfo can not be supported as adding the missing fields ssi_lower, ssi_upper, and ssi_pkey would require two 64bit fields and one 32bit fields. In practice the fields ssi_perf_data and ssi_perf_type can never be used by signalfd as the signal that generates them always delivers them synchronously to the thread that triggers them. Therefore until someone actually needs the fields ssi_perf_data and ssi_perf_type in signalfd_siginfo remove them. This leaves a bit more room for future expansion. v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503203814.25487-12-ebiederm@xmission.com v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210505141101.11519-12-ebiederm@xmission.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517195748.8880-5-ebiederm@xmission.com Reviewed-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- fs/signalfd.c | 16 ++++++---------- include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/fs/signalfd.c b/fs/signalfd.c index 373df2f12415..167b5889db4b 100644 --- a/fs/signalfd.c +++ b/fs/signalfd.c @@ -114,12 +114,13 @@ static int signalfd_copyinfo(struct signalfd_siginfo __user *uinfo, break; case SIL_FAULT_BNDERR: case SIL_FAULT_PKUERR: + case SIL_PERF_EVENT: /* - * Fall through to the SIL_FAULT case. Both SIL_FAULT_BNDERR - * and SIL_FAULT_PKUERR are only generated by faults that - * deliver them synchronously to userspace. In case someone - * injects one of these signals and signalfd catches it treat - * it as SIL_FAULT. + * Fall through to the SIL_FAULT case. SIL_FAULT_BNDERR, + * SIL_FAULT_PKUERR, and SIL_PERF_EVENT are only + * generated by faults that deliver them synchronously to + * userspace. In case someone injects one of these signals + * and signalfd catches it treat it as SIL_FAULT. */ case SIL_FAULT: new.ssi_addr = (long) kinfo->si_addr; @@ -132,11 +133,6 @@ static int signalfd_copyinfo(struct signalfd_siginfo __user *uinfo, new.ssi_addr = (long) kinfo->si_addr; new.ssi_addr_lsb = (short) kinfo->si_addr_lsb; break; - case SIL_PERF_EVENT: - new.ssi_addr = (long) kinfo->si_addr; - new.ssi_perf_type = kinfo->si_perf_type; - new.ssi_perf_data = kinfo->si_perf_data; - break; case SIL_CHLD: new.ssi_pid = kinfo->si_pid; new.ssi_uid = kinfo->si_uid; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h index e78dddf433fc..83429a05b698 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/signalfd.h @@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ struct signalfd_siginfo { __s32 ssi_syscall; __u64 ssi_call_addr; __u32 ssi_arch; - __u32 ssi_perf_type; - __u64 ssi_perf_data; /* * Pad strcture to 128 bytes. Remember to update the @@ -51,7 +49,7 @@ struct signalfd_siginfo { * comes out of a read(2) and we really don't want to have * a compat on read(2). */ - __u8 __pad[16]; + __u8 __pad[28]; }; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From fb1070d18edb37daf3979662975bc54625a19953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Richey Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 01:58:43 -0700 Subject: KVM: X86: Use _BITUL() macro in UAPI headers Replace BIT() in KVM's UPAI header with _BITUL(). BIT() is not defined in the UAPI headers and its usage may cause userspace build errors. Fixes: fb04a1eddb1a ("KVM: X86: Implement ring-based dirty memory tracking") Signed-off-by: Joe Richey Message-Id: <20210521085849.37676-3-joerichey94@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 5 +++-- tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/uapi/linux') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 3fd9a7e9d90c..79d9c44d1ad7 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ * Note: you must update KVM_API_VERSION if you change this interface. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -1879,8 +1880,8 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd { * conversion after harvesting an entry. Also, it must not skip any * dirty bits, so that dirty bits are always harvested in sequence. */ -#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_DIRTY BIT(0) -#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_RESET BIT(1) +#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_DIRTY _BITUL(0) +#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_RESET _BITUL(1) #define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_MASK 0x3 /* diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f6afee209620..26e6d94d64ed 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ * Note: you must update KVM_API_VERSION if you change this interface. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -1834,8 +1835,8 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd { * conversion after harvesting an entry. Also, it must not skip any * dirty bits, so that dirty bits are always harvested in sequence. */ -#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_DIRTY BIT(0) -#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_RESET BIT(1) +#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_DIRTY _BITUL(0) +#define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_RESET _BITUL(1) #define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_MASK 0x3 /* -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494