From e9f069868d60550c4b46f084ac9276a57c1b4711 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Morton Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:42:42 -0700 Subject: kernel/kthread.c:kthread_create_on_node(): clarify documentation - Make it clear that the `node' arg refers to memory allocations only: kthread_create_on_node() does not pin the new thread to that node's CPUs. - Encourage the use of NUMA_NO_NODE. [nzimmer@sgi.com: use NUMA_NO_NODE in kthread_create() also] Cc: Nathan Zimmer Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/kthread.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/kthread.c b/kernel/kthread.c index 490924cc9e7c..9ff173dca1ae 100644 --- a/kernel/kthread.c +++ b/kernel/kthread.c @@ -248,15 +248,16 @@ static void create_kthread(struct kthread_create_info *create) * kthread_create_on_node - create a kthread. * @threadfn: the function to run until signal_pending(current). * @data: data ptr for @threadfn. - * @node: memory node number. + * @node: task and thread structures for the thread are allocated on this node * @namefmt: printf-style name for the thread. * * Description: This helper function creates and names a kernel * thread. The thread will be stopped: use wake_up_process() to start - * it. See also kthread_run(). + * it. See also kthread_run(). The new thread has SCHED_NORMAL policy and + * is affine to all CPUs. * * If thread is going to be bound on a particular cpu, give its node - * in @node, to get NUMA affinity for kthread stack, or else give -1. + * in @node, to get NUMA affinity for kthread stack, or else give NUMA_NO_NODE. * When woken, the thread will run @threadfn() with @data as its * argument. @threadfn() can either call do_exit() directly if it is a * standalone thread for which no one will call kthread_stop(), or -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:42:45 -0700 Subject: capabilities: ambient capabilities Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Aaron Jones Cc: Ted Ts'o Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn Cc: Markku Savela Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/array.c | 5 ++- include/linux/cred.h | 8 ++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 7 +++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + security/commoncap.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index ce065cf3104f..f60f0121e331 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header, static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) { const struct cred *cred; - kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective, cap_bset; + kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective, + cap_bset, cap_ambient; rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(p); @@ -316,12 +317,14 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_permitted = cred->cap_permitted; cap_effective = cred->cap_effective; cap_bset = cred->cap_bset; + cap_ambient = cred->cap_ambient; rcu_read_unlock(); render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable); render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted); render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective); render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset); + render_cap_t(m, "CapAmb:\t", &cap_ambient); } static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 8b6c083e68a7..8d70e1361ecd 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ struct cred { kernel_cap_t cap_permitted; /* caps we're permitted */ kernel_cap_t cap_effective; /* caps we can actually use */ kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* capability bounding set */ + kernel_cap_t cap_ambient; /* Ambient capability set */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested * keys to */ @@ -212,6 +213,13 @@ static inline void validate_process_creds(void) } #endif +static inline bool cap_ambient_invariant_ok(const struct cred *cred) +{ + return cap_issubset(cred->cap_ambient, + cap_intersect(cred->cap_permitted, + cred->cap_inheritable)); +} + /** * get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials * @cred: The new credentials to reference diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index 31891d9535e2..a8d0759a9e40 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -190,4 +190,11 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_FP_MODE_FR (1 << 0) /* 64b FP registers */ # define PR_FP_MODE_FRE (1 << 1) /* 32b compatibility */ +/* Control the ambient capability set */ +#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index f65a0a06a8c0..88fefa68c516 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; + cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS key_put(cred->request_key_auth); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index d103f5a4043d..1f74dde1063e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -267,6 +267,16 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, new->cap_effective = *effective; new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; new->cap_permitted = *permitted; + + /* + * Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and + * inheritable. + */ + new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient, + cap_intersect(*permitted, + *inheritable)); + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EINVAL; return 0; } @@ -347,6 +357,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, /* * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) + * The addition of pA' is handled later. */ new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | @@ -474,10 +485,13 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective, has_cap = false; + bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) + return -EPERM; + effective = false; ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); if (ret < 0) @@ -522,8 +536,9 @@ skip: * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || - !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || + is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); + + if ((is_setid || !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -539,10 +554,28 @@ skip: new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; + /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ + if (has_cap || is_setid) + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); + + /* + * Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give: + * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' + */ + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient); + + /* + * Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA'). Because pA' is zero if fE is set, + * this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'. + */ if (effective) new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; else - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient; + + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EPERM; + bprm->cap_effective = effective; /* @@ -557,7 +590,7 @@ skip: * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { @@ -568,6 +601,10 @@ skip: } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EPERM; + return 0; } @@ -589,7 +626,7 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { if (bprm->cap_effective) return 1; - if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_ambient)) return 1; } @@ -691,10 +728,18 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && - !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && - !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { - cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) { + if (!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { + cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); + cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + } + + /* + * Pre-ambient programs expect setresuid to nonroot followed + * by exec to drop capabilities. We should make sure that + * this remains the case. + */ + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); } if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) cap_clear(new->cap_effective); @@ -924,6 +969,43 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); return commit_creds(new); + case PR_CAP_AMBIENT: + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL) { + if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5) + return -EINVAL; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); + return commit_creds(new); + } + + if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET) { + return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3); + } else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE && + arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER) { + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE && + (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) || + !cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable, + arg3))) + return -EPERM; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) + cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3); + else + cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3); + return commit_creds(new); + } + default: /* No functionality available - continue with default */ return -ENOSYS; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index bd536cb221e2..43b4cddbf2b3 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted; new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective; + new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset; new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From a068acf2ee77693e0bf39d6e07139ba704f461c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:44:57 -0700 Subject: fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Jan Kara Acked-by: Paul Moore Cc: J. R. Okajima Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/ceph/super.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 6 +++--- fs/ext4/super.c | 4 ++-- fs/gfs2/super.c | 6 +++--- fs/hfs/super.c | 4 ++-- fs/hfsplus/options.c | 4 ++-- fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c | 2 +- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 6 +++--- fs/reiserfs/super.c | 8 +++++--- fs/xfs/xfs_super.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/seq_file.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/cgroup.c | 7 ++++--- net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 7 +++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 15 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index d1c833c321b9..7b6bfcbf801c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static int ceph_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) if (fsopt->max_readdir_bytes != CEPH_MAX_READDIR_BYTES_DEFAULT) seq_printf(m, ",readdir_max_bytes=%d", fsopt->max_readdir_bytes); if (strcmp(fsopt->snapdir_name, CEPH_SNAPDIRNAME_DEFAULT)) - seq_printf(m, ",snapdirname=%s", fsopt->snapdir_name); + seq_show_option(m, "snapdirname", fsopt->snapdir_name); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c index 0a9fb6b53126..6a1119e87fbb 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c @@ -394,17 +394,17 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root) struct sockaddr *srcaddr; srcaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&tcon->ses->server->srcaddr; - seq_printf(s, ",vers=%s", tcon->ses->server->vals->version_string); + seq_show_option(s, "vers", tcon->ses->server->vals->version_string); cifs_show_security(s, tcon->ses); cifs_show_cache_flavor(s, cifs_sb); if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_MULTIUSER) seq_puts(s, ",multiuser"); else if (tcon->ses->user_name) - seq_printf(s, ",username=%s", tcon->ses->user_name); + seq_show_option(s, "username", tcon->ses->user_name); if (tcon->ses->domainName) - seq_printf(s, ",domain=%s", tcon->ses->domainName); + seq_show_option(s, "domain", tcon->ses->domainName); if (srcaddr->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC) { struct sockaddr_in *saddr4; diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index ee3878262a49..a63c7b0a10cf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -1776,10 +1776,10 @@ static inline void ext4_show_quota_options(struct seq_file *seq, } if (sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]) - seq_printf(seq, ",usrjquota=%s", sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]); + seq_show_option(seq, "usrjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]); if (sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]) - seq_printf(seq, ",grpjquota=%s", sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]); + seq_show_option(seq, "grpjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]); #endif } diff --git a/fs/gfs2/super.c b/fs/gfs2/super.c index 2982445947e1..894fb01a91da 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c @@ -1334,11 +1334,11 @@ static int gfs2_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root) if (is_ancestor(root, sdp->sd_master_dir)) seq_puts(s, ",meta"); if (args->ar_lockproto[0]) - seq_printf(s, ",lockproto=%s", args->ar_lockproto); + seq_show_option(s, "lockproto", args->ar_lockproto); if (args->ar_locktable[0]) - seq_printf(s, ",locktable=%s", args->ar_locktable); + seq_show_option(s, "locktable", args->ar_locktable); if (args->ar_hostdata[0]) - seq_printf(s, ",hostdata=%s", args->ar_hostdata); + seq_show_option(s, "hostdata", args->ar_hostdata); if (args->ar_spectator) seq_puts(s, ",spectator"); if (args->ar_localflocks) diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c index 55c03b9e9070..4574fdd3d421 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/super.c +++ b/fs/hfs/super.c @@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ static int hfs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) struct hfs_sb_info *sbi = HFS_SB(root->d_sb); if (sbi->s_creator != cpu_to_be32(0x3f3f3f3f)) - seq_printf(seq, ",creator=%.4s", (char *)&sbi->s_creator); + seq_show_option_n(seq, "creator", (char *)&sbi->s_creator, 4); if (sbi->s_type != cpu_to_be32(0x3f3f3f3f)) - seq_printf(seq, ",type=%.4s", (char *)&sbi->s_type); + seq_show_option_n(seq, "type", (char *)&sbi->s_type, 4); seq_printf(seq, ",uid=%u,gid=%u", from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->s_uid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->s_gid)); diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/options.c b/fs/hfsplus/options.c index c90b72ee676d..bb806e58c977 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/options.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/options.c @@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ int hfsplus_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(root->d_sb); if (sbi->creator != HFSPLUS_DEF_CR_TYPE) - seq_printf(seq, ",creator=%.4s", (char *)&sbi->creator); + seq_show_option_n(seq, "creator", (char *)&sbi->creator, 4); if (sbi->type != HFSPLUS_DEF_CR_TYPE) - seq_printf(seq, ",type=%.4s", (char *)&sbi->type); + seq_show_option_n(seq, "type", (char *)&sbi->type, 4); seq_printf(seq, ",umask=%o,uid=%u,gid=%u", sbi->umask, from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->uid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->gid)); diff --git a/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c b/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c index 059597b23f67..2ac99db3750e 100644 --- a/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c +++ b/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int hostfs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) size_t offset = strlen(root_ino) + 1; if (strlen(root_path) > offset) - seq_printf(seq, ",%s", root_path + offset); + seq_show_option(seq, root_path + offset, NULL); if (append) seq_puts(seq, ",append"); diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.c b/fs/ocfs2/super.c index 3a9a1af39ad7..2de4c8a9340c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.c @@ -1563,8 +1563,8 @@ static int ocfs2_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root) seq_printf(s, ",localflocks,"); if (osb->osb_cluster_stack[0]) - seq_printf(s, ",cluster_stack=%.*s", OCFS2_STACK_LABEL_LEN, - osb->osb_cluster_stack); + seq_show_option_n(s, "cluster_stack", osb->osb_cluster_stack, + OCFS2_STACK_LABEL_LEN); if (opts & OCFS2_MOUNT_USRQUOTA) seq_printf(s, ",usrquota"); if (opts & OCFS2_MOUNT_GRPQUOTA) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 7466ff339c66..79073d68b475 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -588,10 +588,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry) struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; struct ovl_fs *ufs = sb->s_fs_info; - seq_printf(m, ",lowerdir=%s", ufs->config.lowerdir); + seq_show_option(m, "lowerdir", ufs->config.lowerdir); if (ufs->config.upperdir) { - seq_printf(m, ",upperdir=%s", ufs->config.upperdir); - seq_printf(m, ",workdir=%s", ufs->config.workdir); + seq_show_option(m, "upperdir", ufs->config.upperdir); + seq_show_option(m, "workdir", ufs->config.workdir); } return 0; } diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/super.c b/fs/reiserfs/super.c index 0e4cf728126f..4a62fe8cc3bf 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/super.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/super.c @@ -714,18 +714,20 @@ static int reiserfs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) seq_puts(seq, ",acl"); if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_jdev) - seq_printf(seq, ",jdev=%s", REISERFS_SB(s)->s_jdev); + seq_show_option(seq, "jdev", REISERFS_SB(s)->s_jdev); if (journal->j_max_commit_age != journal->j_default_max_commit_age) seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%d", journal->j_max_commit_age); #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]) - seq_printf(seq, ",usrjquota=%s", REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]); + seq_show_option(seq, "usrjquota", + REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]); else if (opts & (1 << REISERFS_USRQUOTA)) seq_puts(seq, ",usrquota"); if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]) - seq_printf(seq, ",grpjquota=%s", REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]); + seq_show_option(seq, "grpjquota", + REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]); else if (opts & (1 << REISERFS_GRPQUOTA)) seq_puts(seq, ",grpquota"); if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_jquota_fmt) { diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c index 1fb16562c159..bbd9b1f10ffb 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c @@ -511,9 +511,9 @@ xfs_showargs( seq_printf(m, "," MNTOPT_LOGBSIZE "=%dk", mp->m_logbsize >> 10); if (mp->m_logname) - seq_printf(m, "," MNTOPT_LOGDEV "=%s", mp->m_logname); + seq_show_option(m, MNTOPT_LOGDEV, mp->m_logname); if (mp->m_rtname) - seq_printf(m, "," MNTOPT_RTDEV "=%s", mp->m_rtname); + seq_show_option(m, MNTOPT_RTDEV, mp->m_rtname); if (mp->m_dalign > 0) seq_printf(m, "," MNTOPT_SUNIT "=%d", diff --git a/include/linux/seq_file.h b/include/linux/seq_file.h index 912a7c482649..d4c7271382cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/seq_file.h +++ b/include/linux/seq_file.h @@ -149,6 +149,41 @@ static inline struct user_namespace *seq_user_ns(struct seq_file *seq) #endif } +/** + * seq_show_options - display mount options with appropriate escapes. + * @m: the seq_file handle + * @name: the mount option name + * @value: the mount option name's value, can be NULL + */ +static inline void seq_show_option(struct seq_file *m, const char *name, + const char *value) +{ + seq_putc(m, ','); + seq_escape(m, name, ",= \t\n\\"); + if (value) { + seq_putc(m, '='); + seq_escape(m, value, ", \t\n\\"); + } +} + +/** + * seq_show_option_n - display mount options with appropriate escapes + * where @value must be a specific length. + * @m: the seq_file handle + * @name: the mount option name + * @value: the mount option name's value, cannot be NULL + * @length: the length of @value to display + * + * This is a macro since this uses "length" to define the size of the + * stack buffer. + */ +#define seq_show_option_n(m, name, value, length) { \ + char val_buf[length + 1]; \ + strncpy(val_buf, value, length); \ + val_buf[length] = '\0'; \ + seq_show_option(m, name, val_buf); \ +} + #define SEQ_START_TOKEN ((void *)1) /* * Helpers for iteration over list_head-s in seq_files diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index f3f5cd5e2c0d..a8538e443784 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int cgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root) for_each_subsys(ss, ssid) if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid)) - seq_printf(seq, ",%s", ss->legacy_name); + seq_show_option(seq, ss->name, NULL); if (root->flags & CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX) seq_puts(seq, ",noprefix"); if (root->flags & CGRP_ROOT_XATTR) @@ -1350,13 +1350,14 @@ static int cgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, spin_lock(&release_agent_path_lock); if (strlen(root->release_agent_path)) - seq_printf(seq, ",release_agent=%s", root->release_agent_path); + seq_show_option(seq, "release_agent", + root->release_agent_path); spin_unlock(&release_agent_path_lock); if (test_bit(CGRP_CPUSET_CLONE_CHILDREN, &root->cgrp.flags)) seq_puts(seq, ",clone_children"); if (strlen(root->name)) - seq_printf(seq, ",name=%s", root->name); + seq_show_option(seq, "name", root->name); return 0; } diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index f30329f72641..69a4d30a9ccf 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -517,8 +517,11 @@ int ceph_print_client_options(struct seq_file *m, struct ceph_client *client) struct ceph_options *opt = client->options; size_t pos = m->count; - if (opt->name) - seq_printf(m, "name=%s,", opt->name); + if (opt->name) { + seq_puts(m, "name="); + seq_escape(m, opt->name, ", \t\n\\"); + seq_putc(m, ','); + } if (opt->key) seq_puts(m, "secret=,"); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 564079c5c49d..cdf4c589a391 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, seq_puts(m, prefix); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); - seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); + seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 5869b5064b0950afc447610c0f5d4134b71d9e94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:00 -0700 Subject: smpboot: fix memory leak on error handling The cpumask is allocated before threads get created. If the latter step fails, we need to free the cpumask. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Chris Metcalf Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/smpboot.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/smpboot.c b/kernel/smpboot.c index 7c434c39f02a..71aa90b69f8f 100644 --- a/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ int smpboot_register_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread) ret = __smpboot_create_thread(plug_thread, cpu); if (ret) { smpboot_destroy_threads(plug_thread); + free_cpumask_var(plug_thread->cpumask); goto out; } smpboot_unpark_thread(plug_thread, cpu); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 3dd08c0c918f9bf058572ddbf26e7d6fb5674a5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:03 -0700 Subject: smpboot: make cleanup to mirror setup The per-cpu kthread cleanup() callback is the mirror of the setup() callback. When the per-cpu kthread is started, it first calls setup() to initialize the resources which are then released by cleanup() when the kthread exits. Now since the introduction of a per-cpu kthread cpumask, the kthreads excluded by the cpumask on boot may happen to be parked immediately after their creation without taking the setup() stage, waiting to be asked to unpark to do so. Then when smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread() is later called, the kthread is stopped without having ever called setup(). But this triggers a bug as the kthread unconditionally calls cleanup() on exit but this doesn't mirror any setup(). Thus the kernel crashes because we try to free resources that haven't been initialized, as in the watchdog case: WATCHDOG disable 0 WATCHDOG disable 1 WATCHDOG disable 2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: hrtimer_active+0x26/0x60 [...] Call Trace: hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x1c/0x280 hrtimer_cancel+0x1d/0x30 watchdog_disable+0x56/0x70 watchdog_cleanup+0xe/0x10 smpboot_thread_fn+0x23c/0x2c0 kthread+0xf8/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 This bug is currently masked with explicit kthread unparking before kthread_stop() on smpboot_destroy_threads(). This forces a call to setup() and then unpark(). We could fix this by unconditionally calling setup() on kthread entry. But setup() isn't always cheap. In the case of watchdog it launches hrtimer, perf events, etc... So we may as well like to skip it if there are chances the kthread will never be used, as in a reduced cpumask value. So let's simply do a state machine check before calling cleanup() that makes sure setup() has been called before mirroring it. And remove the nasty hack workaround. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Chris Metcalf Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/smpboot.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/smpboot.c b/kernel/smpboot.c index 71aa90b69f8f..60aa858a6a07 100644 --- a/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int smpboot_thread_fn(void *data) if (kthread_should_stop()) { __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); preempt_enable(); - if (ht->cleanup) + /* cleanup must mirror setup */ + if (ht->cleanup && td->status != HP_THREAD_NONE) ht->cleanup(td->cpu, cpu_online(td->cpu)); kfree(td); return 0; @@ -259,15 +260,6 @@ static void smpboot_destroy_threads(struct smp_hotplug_thread *ht) { unsigned int cpu; - /* Unpark any threads that were voluntarily parked. */ - for_each_cpu_not(cpu, ht->cpumask) { - if (cpu_online(cpu)) { - struct task_struct *tsk = *per_cpu_ptr(ht->store, cpu); - if (tsk) - kthread_unpark(tsk); - } - } - /* We need to destroy also the parked threads of offline cpus */ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { struct task_struct *tsk = *per_cpu_ptr(ht->store, cpu); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 230ec93909f00678401cb2d63b8b95f1dea68e40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:06 -0700 Subject: smpboot: allow passing the cpumask on per-cpu thread registration It makes the registration cheaper and simpler for the smpboot per-cpu kthread users that don't need to always update the cpumask after threads creation. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix for allow passing the cpumask on per-cpu thread registration] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Chris Metcalf Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/smpboot.h | 11 ++++++++++- kernel/smpboot.c | 14 +++++++++----- kernel/watchdog.c | 9 +++------ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/include/linux/smpboot.h b/include/linux/smpboot.h index da3c593f9845..e6109a6cd8f6 100644 --- a/include/linux/smpboot.h +++ b/include/linux/smpboot.h @@ -48,7 +48,16 @@ struct smp_hotplug_thread { const char *thread_comm; }; -int smpboot_register_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread); +int smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread, + const struct cpumask *cpumask); + +static inline int +smpboot_register_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread) +{ + return smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask(plug_thread, + cpu_possible_mask); +} + void smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread); int smpboot_update_cpumask_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread, const struct cpumask *); diff --git a/kernel/smpboot.c b/kernel/smpboot.c index 60aa858a6a07..a818cbc73e14 100644 --- a/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -273,19 +273,22 @@ static void smpboot_destroy_threads(struct smp_hotplug_thread *ht) } /** - * smpboot_register_percpu_thread - Register a per_cpu thread related to hotplug + * smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask - Register a per_cpu thread related + * to hotplug * @plug_thread: Hotplug thread descriptor + * @cpumask: The cpumask where threads run * * Creates and starts the threads on all online cpus. */ -int smpboot_register_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread) +int smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread, + const struct cpumask *cpumask) { unsigned int cpu; int ret = 0; if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&plug_thread->cpumask, GFP_KERNEL)) return -ENOMEM; - cpumask_copy(plug_thread->cpumask, cpu_possible_mask); + cpumask_copy(plug_thread->cpumask, cpumask); get_online_cpus(); mutex_lock(&smpboot_threads_lock); @@ -296,7 +299,8 @@ int smpboot_register_percpu_thread(struct smp_hotplug_thread *plug_thread) free_cpumask_var(plug_thread->cpumask); goto out; } - smpboot_unpark_thread(plug_thread, cpu); + if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpumask)) + smpboot_unpark_thread(plug_thread, cpu); } list_add(&plug_thread->list, &hotplug_threads); out: @@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ out: put_online_cpus(); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(smpboot_register_percpu_thread); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask); /** * smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread - Unregister a per_cpu thread related to hotplug diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index a6ffa43f2993..e5bb86fb0ea5 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -713,15 +713,12 @@ static int watchdog_enable_all_cpus(void) int err = 0; if (!watchdog_running) { - err = smpboot_register_percpu_thread(&watchdog_threads); + err = smpboot_register_percpu_thread_cpumask(&watchdog_threads, + &watchdog_cpumask); if (err) pr_err("Failed to create watchdog threads, disabled\n"); - else { - if (smpboot_update_cpumask_percpu_thread( - &watchdog_threads, &watchdog_cpumask)) - pr_err("Failed to set cpumask for watchdog threads\n"); + else watchdog_running = 1; - } } else { /* * Enable/disable the lockup detectors or -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 314b08ff5205420d956d14657e16d92c460a6f21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:09 -0700 Subject: watchdog: simplify housekeeping affinity with the appropriate mask housekeeping_mask gathers all the CPUs that aren't part of the nohz_full set. This is exactly what we want the watchdog to be affine to without the need to use complicated cpumask operations. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Chris Metcalf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/watchdog.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index e5bb86fb0ea5..d18330fa4776 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -929,10 +929,8 @@ void __init lockup_detector_init(void) #ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL if (tick_nohz_full_enabled()) { - if (!cpumask_empty(tick_nohz_full_mask)) - pr_info("Disabling watchdog on nohz_full cores by default\n"); - cpumask_andnot(&watchdog_cpumask, cpu_possible_mask, - tick_nohz_full_mask); + pr_info("Disabling watchdog on nohz_full cores by default\n"); + cpumask_copy(&watchdog_cpumask, housekeeping_mask); } else cpumask_copy(&watchdog_cpumask, cpu_possible_mask); #else -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From aacfbe6a9724bb6d66a656a5abcc681d5649ed92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:12 -0700 Subject: kernel/watchdog: move NMI function header declarations from watchdog.h to nmi.h The kernel's NMI watchdog has nothing to do with the watchdog subsystem. Its header declarations should be in linux/nmi.h, not linux/watchdog.h. The code provided two sets of dummy functions if HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR is not configured, one in the include file and one in kernel/watchdog.c. Remove the dummy functions from kernel/watchdog.c and use those from the include file. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Don Zickus Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 2 +- include/linux/nmi.h | 8 +++++--- include/linux/watchdog.h | 8 -------- kernel/watchdog.c | 2 -- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c index 3f124d553c5a..36bd8250934b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include diff --git a/include/linux/nmi.h b/include/linux/nmi.h index f94da0e65dea..088714537d10 100644 --- a/include/linux/nmi.h +++ b/include/linux/nmi.h @@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ static inline void touch_nmi_watchdog(void) #if defined(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR) extern void hardlockup_detector_disable(void); +void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void); +void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void); #else -static inline void hardlockup_detector_disable(void) -{ -} +static inline void hardlockup_detector_disable(void) {} +static inline void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void) {} +static inline void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void) {} #endif /* diff --git a/include/linux/watchdog.h b/include/linux/watchdog.h index f47feada5b42..d74a0e907b9e 100644 --- a/include/linux/watchdog.h +++ b/include/linux/watchdog.h @@ -140,12 +140,4 @@ extern int watchdog_init_timeout(struct watchdog_device *wdd, extern int watchdog_register_device(struct watchdog_device *); extern void watchdog_unregister_device(struct watchdog_device *); -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR -void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void); -void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void); -#else -static inline void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void) {} -static inline void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void) {} -#endif - #endif /* ifndef _LINUX_WATCHDOG_H */ diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index d18330fa4776..e74d48bc3e61 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -651,8 +651,6 @@ unlock: #else static int watchdog_nmi_enable(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; } static void watchdog_nmi_disable(unsigned int cpu) { return; } -void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void) {} -void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR */ static struct smp_hotplug_thread watchdog_threads = { -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 81a4beef91ba4a9e8ad6054ca9933dff7e25ff28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Obergfell Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:15 -0700 Subject: watchdog: introduce watchdog_park_threads() and watchdog_unpark_threads() Originally watchdog_nmi_enable(cpu) and watchdog_nmi_disable(cpu) were only called in watchdog thread context. However, the following commits utilize these functions outside of watchdog thread context too. commit 9809b18fcf6b8d8ec4d3643677345907e6b50eca Author: Michal Hocko Date: Tue Sep 24 15:27:30 2013 -0700 watchdog: update watchdog_thresh properly commit b3738d29323344da3017a91010530cf3a58590fc Author: Stephane Eranian Date: Mon Nov 17 20:07:03 2014 +0100 watchdog: Add watchdog enable/disable all functions Hence, it is now possible that these functions execute concurrently with the same 'cpu' argument. This concurrency is problematic because per-cpu 'watchdog_ev' can be accessed/modified without adequate synchronization. The patch series aims to address the above problem. However, instead of introducing locks to protect per-cpu 'watchdog_ev' a different approach is taken: Invoke these functions by parking and unparking the watchdog threads (to ensure they are always called in watchdog thread context). static struct smp_hotplug_thread watchdog_threads = { ... .park = watchdog_disable, // calls watchdog_nmi_disable() .unpark = watchdog_enable, // calls watchdog_nmi_enable() }; Both previously mentioned commits call these functions in a similar way and thus in principle contain some duplicate code. The patch series also avoids this duplication by providing a commonly usable mechanism. - Patch 1/4 introduces the watchdog_{park|unpark}_threads functions that park/unpark all watchdog threads specified in 'watchdog_cpumask'. They are intended to be called inside of kernel/watchdog.c only. - Patch 2/4 introduces the watchdog_{suspend|resume} functions which can be utilized by external callers to deactivate the hard and soft lockup detector temporarily. - Patch 3/4 utilizes watchdog_{park|unpark}_threads to replace some code that was introduced by commit 9809b18fcf6b8d8ec4d3643677345907e6b50eca. - Patch 4/4 utilizes watchdog_{suspend|resume} to replace some code that was introduced by commit b3738d29323344da3017a91010530cf3a58590fc. A few corner cases should be mentioned here for completeness. - kthread_park() of watchdog/N could hang if cpu N is already locked up. However, if watchdog is enabled the lockup will be detected anyway. - kthread_unpark() of watchdog/N could hang if cpu N got locked up after kthread_park(). The occurrence of this scenario should be _very_ rare in practice, in particular because it is not expected that temporary deactivation will happen frequently, and if it happens at all it is expected that the duration of deactivation will be short. This patch (of 4): introduce watchdog_park_threads() and watchdog_unpark_threads() These functions are intended to be used only from inside kernel/watchdog.c to park/unpark all watchdog threads that are specified in watchdog_cpumask. Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/watchdog.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index e74d48bc3e61..6c489e49c610 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * The run state of the lockup detectors is controlled by the content of the @@ -664,6 +665,41 @@ static struct smp_hotplug_thread watchdog_threads = { .unpark = watchdog_enable, }; +/* + * park all watchdog threads that are specified in 'watchdog_cpumask' + */ +static int watchdog_park_threads(void) +{ + int cpu, ret = 0; + + get_online_cpus(); + for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) { + ret = kthread_park(per_cpu(softlockup_watchdog, cpu)); + if (ret) + break; + } + if (ret) { + for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) + kthread_unpark(per_cpu(softlockup_watchdog, cpu)); + } + put_online_cpus(); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * unpark all watchdog threads that are specified in 'watchdog_cpumask' + */ +static void watchdog_unpark_threads(void) +{ + int cpu; + + get_online_cpus(); + for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) + kthread_unpark(per_cpu(softlockup_watchdog, cpu)); + put_online_cpus(); +} + static void restart_watchdog_hrtimer(void *info) { struct hrtimer *hrtimer = raw_cpu_ptr(&watchdog_hrtimer); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 8c073d27d7ad293bf734cc8475689413afadab81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Obergfell Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:18 -0700 Subject: watchdog: introduce watchdog_suspend() and watchdog_resume() This interface can be utilized to deactivate the hard and soft lockup detector temporarily. Callers are expected to minimize the duration of deactivation. Multiple deactivations are allowed to occur in parallel but should be rare in practice. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded static initialization] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/nmi.h | 2 ++ kernel/watchdog.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/include/linux/nmi.h b/include/linux/nmi.h index 088714537d10..e9f213c337bb 100644 --- a/include/linux/nmi.h +++ b/include/linux/nmi.h @@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ extern int proc_watchdog_thresh(struct ctl_table *, int , void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *); extern int proc_watchdog_cpumask(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *); +extern int watchdog_suspend(void); +extern void watchdog_resume(void); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ACPI_APEI_NMI diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index 6c489e49c610..e6eb5b697212 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ unsigned long *watchdog_cpumask_bits = cpumask_bits(&watchdog_cpumask); #define for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) \ for_each_cpu_and((cpu), cpu_online_mask, &watchdog_cpumask) +static int __read_mostly watchdog_suspended; static int __read_mostly watchdog_running; static u64 __read_mostly sample_period; @@ -700,6 +701,50 @@ static void watchdog_unpark_threads(void) put_online_cpus(); } +/* + * Suspend the hard and soft lockup detector by parking the watchdog threads. + */ +int watchdog_suspend(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + /* + * Multiple suspend requests can be active in parallel (counted by + * the 'watchdog_suspended' variable). If the watchdog threads are + * running, the first caller takes care that they will be parked. + * The state of 'watchdog_running' cannot change while a suspend + * request is active (see related changes in 'proc' handlers). + */ + if (watchdog_running && !watchdog_suspended) + ret = watchdog_park_threads(); + + if (ret == 0) + watchdog_suspended++; + + mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Resume the hard and soft lockup detector by unparking the watchdog threads. + */ +void watchdog_resume(void) +{ + mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + + watchdog_suspended--; + /* + * The watchdog threads are unparked if they were previously running + * and if there is no more active suspend request. + */ + if (watchdog_running && !watchdog_suspended) + watchdog_unpark_threads(); + + mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); +} + static void restart_watchdog_hrtimer(void *info) { struct hrtimer *hrtimer = raw_cpu_ptr(&watchdog_hrtimer); @@ -818,6 +863,12 @@ static int proc_watchdog_common(int which, struct ctl_table *table, int write, mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + if (watchdog_suspended) { + /* no parameter changes allowed while watchdog is suspended */ + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + /* * If the parameter is being read return the state of the corresponding * bit(s) in 'watchdog_enabled', else update 'watchdog_enabled' and the @@ -903,6 +954,12 @@ int proc_watchdog_thresh(struct ctl_table *table, int write, mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + if (watchdog_suspended) { + /* no parameter changes allowed while watchdog is suspended */ + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + old = ACCESS_ONCE(watchdog_thresh); err = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); @@ -934,6 +991,13 @@ int proc_watchdog_cpumask(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int err; mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); + + if (watchdog_suspended) { + /* no parameter changes allowed while watchdog is suspended */ + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + err = proc_do_large_bitmap(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (!err && write) { /* Remove impossible cpus to keep sysctl output cleaner. */ @@ -951,6 +1015,7 @@ int proc_watchdog_cpumask(struct ctl_table *table, int write, pr_err("cpumask update failed\n"); } } +out: mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); return err; } -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From d4bdd0b21c7652a8271f873cc755486b255c1bbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Obergfell Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:21 -0700 Subject: watchdog: use park/unpark functions in update_watchdog_all_cpus() Remove update_watchdog() and restart_watchdog_hrtimer() since these functions are no longer needed. Changes of parameters such as the sample period are honored at the time when the watchdog threads are being unparked. Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/watchdog.c | 40 ++-------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index e6eb5b697212..eb8f94b50101 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -745,46 +745,10 @@ void watchdog_resume(void) mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); } -static void restart_watchdog_hrtimer(void *info) -{ - struct hrtimer *hrtimer = raw_cpu_ptr(&watchdog_hrtimer); - int ret; - - /* - * No need to cancel and restart hrtimer if it is currently executing - * because it will reprogram itself with the new period now. - * We should never see it unqueued here because we are running per-cpu - * with interrupts disabled. - */ - ret = hrtimer_try_to_cancel(hrtimer); - if (ret == 1) - hrtimer_start(hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(sample_period), - HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); -} - -static void update_watchdog(int cpu) -{ - /* - * Make sure that perf event counter will adopt to a new - * sampling period. Updating the sampling period directly would - * be much nicer but we do not have an API for that now so - * let's use a big hammer. - * Hrtimer will adopt the new period on the next tick but this - * might be late already so we have to restart the timer as well. - */ - watchdog_nmi_disable(cpu); - smp_call_function_single(cpu, restart_watchdog_hrtimer, NULL, 1); - watchdog_nmi_enable(cpu); -} - static void update_watchdog_all_cpus(void) { - int cpu; - - get_online_cpus(); - for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) - update_watchdog(cpu); - put_online_cpus(); + watchdog_park_threads(); + watchdog_unpark_threads(); } static int watchdog_enable_all_cpus(void) -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 999bbe49ea0118b70ddf3f5d679f51dc7a97ae55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Obergfell Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:25 -0700 Subject: watchdog: use suspend/resume interface in fixup_ht_bug() Remove watchdog_nmi_disable_all() and watchdog_nmi_enable_all() since these functions are no longer needed. If a subsystem has a need to deactivate the watchdog temporarily, it should utilize the watchdog_suspend() and watchdog_resume() functions. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build with CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=m] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 7 +++++-- include/linux/nmi.h | 13 +++++++++---- kernel/watchdog.c | 35 ---------------------------------- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c index 36bd8250934b..144ab91951a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -3627,7 +3627,10 @@ static __init int fixup_ht_bug(void) return 0; } - watchdog_nmi_disable_all(); + if (watchdog_suspend() != 0) { + pr_debug("failed to disable PMU erratum BJ122, BV98, HSD29 workaround\n"); + return 0; + } x86_pmu.flags &= ~(PMU_FL_EXCL_CNTRS | PMU_FL_EXCL_ENABLED); @@ -3635,7 +3638,7 @@ static __init int fixup_ht_bug(void) x86_pmu.commit_scheduling = NULL; x86_pmu.stop_scheduling = NULL; - watchdog_nmi_enable_all(); + watchdog_resume(); get_online_cpus(); diff --git a/include/linux/nmi.h b/include/linux/nmi.h index e9f213c337bb..e5afe8bae202 100644 --- a/include/linux/nmi.h +++ b/include/linux/nmi.h @@ -26,12 +26,8 @@ static inline void touch_nmi_watchdog(void) #if defined(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR) extern void hardlockup_detector_disable(void); -void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void); -void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void); #else static inline void hardlockup_detector_disable(void) {} -static inline void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void) {} -static inline void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void) {} #endif /* @@ -84,6 +80,15 @@ extern int proc_watchdog_cpumask(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *); extern int watchdog_suspend(void); extern void watchdog_resume(void); +#else +static inline int watchdog_suspend(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void watchdog_resume(void) +{ +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ACPI_APEI_NMI diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index eb8f94b50101..69666f4b8e8f 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -615,41 +615,6 @@ static void watchdog_nmi_disable(unsigned int cpu) } } -void watchdog_nmi_enable_all(void) -{ - int cpu; - - mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); - - if (!(watchdog_enabled & NMI_WATCHDOG_ENABLED)) - goto unlock; - - get_online_cpus(); - for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) - watchdog_nmi_enable(cpu); - put_online_cpus(); - -unlock: - mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); -} - -void watchdog_nmi_disable_all(void) -{ - int cpu; - - mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); - - if (!watchdog_running) - goto unlock; - - get_online_cpus(); - for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) - watchdog_nmi_disable(cpu); - put_online_cpus(); - -unlock: - mutex_unlock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); -} #else static int watchdog_nmi_enable(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; } static void watchdog_nmi_disable(unsigned int cpu) { return; } -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From ec6a90661a0d6ce1461d05c7a58a0a151154e14a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Obergfell Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:45:28 -0700 Subject: watchdog: rename watchdog_suspend() and watchdog_resume() Rename watchdog_suspend() to lockup_detector_suspend() and watchdog_resume() to lockup_detector_resume() to avoid confusion with the watchdog subsystem and to be consistent with the existing name lockup_detector_init(). Also provide comment blocks to explain the watchdog_running and watchdog_suspended variables and their relationship. Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/nmi.h | 8 ++++---- kernel/watchdog.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c index 144ab91951a7..cd9b6d0b10bf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -3627,7 +3627,7 @@ static __init int fixup_ht_bug(void) return 0; } - if (watchdog_suspend() != 0) { + if (lockup_detector_suspend() != 0) { pr_debug("failed to disable PMU erratum BJ122, BV98, HSD29 workaround\n"); return 0; } @@ -3638,7 +3638,7 @@ static __init int fixup_ht_bug(void) x86_pmu.commit_scheduling = NULL; x86_pmu.stop_scheduling = NULL; - watchdog_resume(); + lockup_detector_resume(); get_online_cpus(); diff --git a/include/linux/nmi.h b/include/linux/nmi.h index e5afe8bae202..a91adf6e02f2 100644 --- a/include/linux/nmi.h +++ b/include/linux/nmi.h @@ -78,15 +78,15 @@ extern int proc_watchdog_thresh(struct ctl_table *, int , void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *); extern int proc_watchdog_cpumask(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *); -extern int watchdog_suspend(void); -extern void watchdog_resume(void); +extern int lockup_detector_suspend(void); +extern void lockup_detector_resume(void); #else -static inline int watchdog_suspend(void) +static inline int lockup_detector_suspend(void) { return 0; } -static inline void watchdog_resume(void) +static inline void lockup_detector_resume(void) { } #endif diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index 69666f4b8e8f..64ed1c37bd1f 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -67,8 +67,26 @@ unsigned long *watchdog_cpumask_bits = cpumask_bits(&watchdog_cpumask); #define for_each_watchdog_cpu(cpu) \ for_each_cpu_and((cpu), cpu_online_mask, &watchdog_cpumask) -static int __read_mostly watchdog_suspended; +/* + * The 'watchdog_running' variable is set to 1 when the watchdog threads + * are registered/started and is set to 0 when the watchdog threads are + * unregistered/stopped, so it is an indicator whether the threads exist. + */ static int __read_mostly watchdog_running; +/* + * If a subsystem has a need to deactivate the watchdog temporarily, it + * can use the suspend/resume interface to achieve this. The content of + * the 'watchdog_suspended' variable reflects this state. Existing threads + * are parked/unparked by the lockup_detector_{suspend|resume} functions + * (see comment blocks pertaining to those functions for further details). + * + * 'watchdog_suspended' also prevents threads from being registered/started + * or unregistered/stopped via parameters in /proc/sys/kernel, so the state + * of 'watchdog_running' cannot change while the watchdog is deactivated + * temporarily (see related code in 'proc' handlers). + */ +static int __read_mostly watchdog_suspended; + static u64 __read_mostly sample_period; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, watchdog_touch_ts); @@ -669,7 +687,7 @@ static void watchdog_unpark_threads(void) /* * Suspend the hard and soft lockup detector by parking the watchdog threads. */ -int watchdog_suspend(void) +int lockup_detector_suspend(void) { int ret = 0; @@ -679,7 +697,7 @@ int watchdog_suspend(void) * the 'watchdog_suspended' variable). If the watchdog threads are * running, the first caller takes care that they will be parked. * The state of 'watchdog_running' cannot change while a suspend - * request is active (see related changes in 'proc' handlers). + * request is active (see related code in 'proc' handlers). */ if (watchdog_running && !watchdog_suspended) ret = watchdog_park_threads(); @@ -695,7 +713,7 @@ int watchdog_suspend(void) /* * Resume the hard and soft lockup detector by unparking the watchdog threads. */ -void watchdog_resume(void) +void lockup_detector_resume(void) { mutex_lock(&watchdog_proc_mutex); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 51360155eccb907ff8635bd10fc7de876408c2e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:46:04 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: waitqueue: add nr wake parameter to __wake_up_locked_key userfaultfd needs to wake all waitqueues (pass 0 as nr parameter), instead of the current hardcoded 1 (that would wake just the first waitqueue in the head list). Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Peter Feiner Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/wait.h | 5 +++-- kernel/sched/wait.c | 7 ++++--- net/sunrpc/sched.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/include/linux/wait.h b/include/linux/wait.h index 1e1bf9f963a9..d3d077228d4c 100644 --- a/include/linux/wait.h +++ b/include/linux/wait.h @@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ __remove_wait_queue(wait_queue_head_t *head, wait_queue_t *old) typedef int wait_bit_action_f(struct wait_bit_key *); void __wake_up(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr, void *key); -void __wake_up_locked_key(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, void *key); +void __wake_up_locked_key(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr, + void *key); void __wake_up_sync_key(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr, void *key); void __wake_up_locked(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr); void __wake_up_sync(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr); @@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ wait_queue_head_t *bit_waitqueue(void *, int); #define wake_up_poll(x, m) \ __wake_up(x, TASK_NORMAL, 1, (void *) (m)) #define wake_up_locked_poll(x, m) \ - __wake_up_locked_key((x), TASK_NORMAL, (void *) (m)) + __wake_up_locked_key((x), TASK_NORMAL, 1, (void *) (m)) #define wake_up_interruptible_poll(x, m) \ __wake_up(x, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, 1, (void *) (m)) #define wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(x, m) \ diff --git a/kernel/sched/wait.c b/kernel/sched/wait.c index 052e02672d12..272d9322bc5d 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/wait.c +++ b/kernel/sched/wait.c @@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ void __wake_up_locked(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__wake_up_locked); -void __wake_up_locked_key(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, void *key) +void __wake_up_locked_key(wait_queue_head_t *q, unsigned int mode, int nr, + void *key) { - __wake_up_common(q, mode, 1, 0, key); + __wake_up_common(q, mode, nr, 0, key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__wake_up_locked_key); @@ -283,7 +284,7 @@ void abort_exclusive_wait(wait_queue_head_t *q, wait_queue_t *wait, if (!list_empty(&wait->task_list)) list_del_init(&wait->task_list); else if (waitqueue_active(q)) - __wake_up_locked_key(q, mode, key); + __wake_up_locked_key(q, mode, 1, key); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_exclusive_wait); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sched.c b/net/sunrpc/sched.c index 337ca851a350..b140c092d226 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sched.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sched.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int rpc_complete_task(struct rpc_task *task) clear_bit(RPC_TASK_ACTIVE, &task->tk_runstate); ret = atomic_dec_and_test(&task->tk_count); if (waitqueue_active(wq)) - __wake_up_locked_key(wq, TASK_NORMAL, &k); + __wake_up_locked_key(wq, TASK_NORMAL, 1, &k); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&wq->lock, flags); return ret; } -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 745f234be12b6191b15eae8dd415cc81a9137f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:46:14 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: add vm_userfaultfd_ctx to the vm_area_struct This adds the vm_userfaultfd_ctx to the vm_area_struct. Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Peter Feiner Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/mm_types.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h index 15549578d559..26a30c3566f0 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h @@ -256,6 +256,16 @@ struct vm_region { * this region */ }; +#ifdef CONFIG_USERFAULTFD +#define NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX ((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx) { NULL, }) +struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx { + struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx; +}; +#else /* CONFIG_USERFAULTFD */ +#define NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX ((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx) {}) +struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx {}; +#endif /* CONFIG_USERFAULTFD */ + /* * This struct defines a memory VMM memory area. There is one of these * per VM-area/task. A VM area is any part of the process virtual memory @@ -322,6 +332,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct { #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA struct mempolicy *vm_policy; /* NUMA policy for the VMA */ #endif + struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx; }; struct core_thread { diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 03aa2e6de7a4..ceb4eb4abb9d 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork; tmp->vm_flags &= ~VM_LOCKED; tmp->vm_next = tmp->vm_prev = NULL; + tmp->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX; file = tmp->vm_file; if (file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 16ba6f811dfe44bc14f7946a4b257b85476fc16e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:46:17 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: add VM_UFFD_MISSING and VM_UFFD_WP These two flags gets set in vma->vm_flags to tell the VM common code if the userfaultfd is armed and in which mode (only tracking missing faults, only tracking wrprotect faults or both). If neither flags is set it means the userfaultfd is not armed on the vma. Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Peter Feiner Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 ++ include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index ca1e091881d4..3b4d8255e806 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) [ilog2(VM_HUGEPAGE)] = "hg", [ilog2(VM_NOHUGEPAGE)] = "nh", [ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)] = "mg", + [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um", + [ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)] = "uw", }; size_t i; diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index bf6f117fcf4d..0f7cd30039ea 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #define VM_MAYSHARE 0x00000080 #define VM_GROWSDOWN 0x00000100 /* general info on the segment */ +#define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0x00000200 /* missing pages tracking */ #define VM_PFNMAP 0x00000400 /* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */ #define VM_DENYWRITE 0x00000800 /* ETXTBSY on write attempts.. */ +#define VM_UFFD_WP 0x00001000 /* wrprotect pages tracking */ #define VM_LOCKED 0x00002000 #define VM_IO 0x00004000 /* Memory mapped I/O or similar */ diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index ceb4eb4abb9d..7d5f0f118a63 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) tmp->vm_mm = mm; if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt)) goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork; - tmp->vm_flags &= ~VM_LOCKED; + tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED|VM_UFFD_MISSING|VM_UFFD_WP); tmp->vm_next = tmp->vm_prev = NULL; tmp->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX; file = tmp->vm_file; -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494 From 1380fca084743fef8d17e59b273473393944ce58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 15:46:58 -0700 Subject: userfaultfd: activate syscall This activates the userfaultfd syscall. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: activate syscall fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't enable userfaultfd on powerpc] Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Peter Feiner Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index 25e3cf1cd8fd..477bfa6db370 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -380,3 +380,4 @@ 371 i386 recvfrom sys_recvfrom compat_sys_recvfrom 372 i386 recvmsg sys_recvmsg compat_sys_recvmsg 373 i386 shutdown sys_shutdown +374 i386 userfaultfd sys_userfaultfd diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index 9ef32d5f1b19..81c490634db9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ 320 common kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load 321 common bpf sys_bpf 322 64 execveat stub_execveat +323 common userfaultfd sys_userfaultfd # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index b45c45b8c829..08001317aee7 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec __user *otmr); asmlinkage long sys_eventfd(unsigned int count); asmlinkage long sys_eventfd2(unsigned int count, int flags); asmlinkage long sys_memfd_create(const char __user *uname_ptr, unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_userfaultfd(int flags); asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len); asmlinkage long sys_old_readdir(unsigned int, struct old_linux_dirent __user *, unsigned int); asmlinkage long sys_pselect6(int, fd_set __user *, fd_set __user *, diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index ca7d84f438f1..03c3875d9958 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_timerfd_gettime); cond_syscall(sys_eventfd); cond_syscall(sys_eventfd2); cond_syscall(sys_memfd_create); +cond_syscall(sys_userfaultfd); /* performance counters: */ cond_syscall(sys_perf_event_open); -- cgit v1.3-18-gd494