From 86c2c0a8a4965ae5cbc0ff97ed39a4472e8e9b23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Sat, 6 Nov 2010 20:11:38 +0000 Subject: NET: pktgen - fix compile warning MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This should fix the following warning: net/core/pktgen.c: In function ‘pktgen_if_write’: net/core/pktgen.c:890: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Reviewed-by: Nelson Elhage Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/pktgen.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index fbce4b05a53e..1992cd050e26 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static ssize_t pktgen_if_write(struct file *file, i += len; if (debug) { - size_t copy = min(count, 1023); + size_t copy = min_t(size_t, count, 1023); char tb[copy + 1]; if (copy_from_user(tb, user_buffer, copy)) return -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 4c46ee52589a4edd67447214eb489b10fed5c53a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: stephen hemminger Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2010 11:47:04 +0000 Subject: classifier: report statistics for basic classifier The basic classifier keeps statistics but does not report it to user space. This showed up when using basic classifier (with police) as a default catch all on ingress; no statistics were reported. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/cls_basic.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_basic.c b/net/sched/cls_basic.c index efd4f95fd050..f23d9155b1ef 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_basic.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_basic.c @@ -268,6 +268,10 @@ static int basic_dump(struct tcf_proto *tp, unsigned long fh, goto nla_put_failure; nla_nest_end(skb, nest); + + if (tcf_exts_dump_stats(skb, &f->exts, &basic_ext_map) < 0) + goto nla_put_failure; + return skb->len; nla_put_failure: -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From f46421416fb6b91513fb687d6503142cd99034a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shan Wei Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2010 01:56:34 +0000 Subject: ipv6: fix overlap check for fragments The type of FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset is int, skb->len is *unsigned* int, and offset is int. Without this patch, type conversion occurred to this expression, when (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) is less than offset. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c index c7ba3149633f..0f2766453759 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c +++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c @@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ found: /* Check for overlap with preceding fragment. */ if (prev && - (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset > 0) + (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) > offset) goto discard_fq; /* Look for overlap with succeeding segment. */ -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From eb589063ed482f5592b1378e4136d6998419af6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junchang Wang Date: Sun, 7 Nov 2010 23:19:43 +0000 Subject: pktgen: correct uninitialized queue_map This fix a bug reported by backyes. Right the first time pktgen's using queue_map that's not been initialized by set_cur_queue_map(pkt_dev); Signed-off-by: Junchang Wang Signed-off-by: Backyes Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/pktgen.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 1992cd050e26..33bc3823ac6f 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -2612,8 +2612,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *fill_packet_ipv4(struct net_device *odev, /* Update any of the values, used when we're incrementing various * fields. */ - queue_map = pkt_dev->cur_queue_map; mod_cur_headers(pkt_dev); + queue_map = pkt_dev->cur_queue_map; datalen = (odev->hard_header_len + 16) & ~0xf; @@ -2976,8 +2976,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *fill_packet_ipv6(struct net_device *odev, /* Update any of the values, used when we're incrementing various * fields. */ - queue_map = pkt_dev->cur_queue_map; mod_cur_headers(pkt_dev); + queue_map = pkt_dev->cur_queue_map; skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(odev, pkt_dev->cur_pkt_size + 64 -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From aa58163a76a3aef33c7220931543d45d0fe43753 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Emelyanov Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 06:20:50 +0000 Subject: rds: Fix rds message leak in rds_message_map_pages The sgs allocation error path leaks the allocated message. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov Acked-by: Andy Grover Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rds/message.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rds/message.c b/net/rds/message.c index 848cff45183b..1fd3d29023d7 100644 --- a/net/rds/message.c +++ b/net/rds/message.c @@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ struct rds_message *rds_message_map_pages(unsigned long *page_addrs, unsigned in rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len = cpu_to_be32(total_len); rm->data.op_nents = ceil(total_len, PAGE_SIZE); rm->data.op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, num_sgs); - if (!rm->data.op_sg) + if (!rm->data.op_sg) { + rds_message_put(rm); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } for (i = 0; i < rm->data.op_nents; ++i) { sg_set_page(&rm->data.op_sg[i], -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 3cc25e510dfc36dc62ee0aa87344b36ed7c1742a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Sun, 31 Oct 2010 15:31:54 +0100 Subject: cfg80211: fix a crash in dev lookup on dump commands IS_ERR and PTR_ERR were called with the wrong pointer, leading to a crash when cfg80211_get_dev_from_ifindex fails. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Acked-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index c506241f8637..4e78e3f26798 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ static int nl80211_prepare_netdev_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } *rdev = cfg80211_get_dev_from_ifindex(sock_net(skb->sk), ifidx); - if (IS_ERR(dev)) { - err = PTR_ERR(dev); + if (IS_ERR(*rdev)) { + err = PTR_ERR(*rdev); goto out_rtnl; } -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 352ffad646c0e0c5cf9ae8cea99710ee0d66ee27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Cavagnolo Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2010 16:59:28 -0700 Subject: mac80211: unset SDATA_STATE_OFFCHANNEL when cancelling a scan For client STA interfaces, ieee80211_do_stop unsets the relevant interface's SDATA_STATE_RUNNING state bit prior to cancelling an interrupted scan. When ieee80211_offchannel_return is invoked as part of cancelling the scan, it doesn't bother unsetting the SDATA_STATE_OFFCHANNEL bit because it sees that the interface is down. Normally this doesn't matter because when the client STA interface is brought back up, it will probably issue a scan. But in some cases (e.g., the user changes the interface type while it is down), the SDATA_STATE_OFFCHANNEL bit will remain set. This prevents the interface queues from being started. So we cancel the scan before unsetting the SDATA_STATE_RUNNING bit. Signed-off-by: Brian Cavagnolo Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/iface.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index f9163b12c7f1..7aa85591dbe7 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -391,6 +391,9 @@ static void ieee80211_do_stop(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, u32 hw_reconf_flags = 0; int i; + if (local->scan_sdata == sdata) + ieee80211_scan_cancel(local); + clear_bit(SDATA_STATE_RUNNING, &sdata->state); /* @@ -523,9 +526,6 @@ static void ieee80211_do_stop(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, synchronize_rcu(); skb_queue_purge(&sdata->skb_queue); - if (local->scan_sdata == sdata) - ieee80211_scan_cancel(local); - /* * Disable beaconing here for mesh only, AP and IBSS * are already taken care of. -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 96c99b473a8531188e2f6106c6ef0e33bb4500f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 18:16:52 -0700 Subject: Bluetooth: fix hidp kconfig dependency warning Fix kconfig dependency warning to satisfy dependencies: warning: (BT_HIDP && NET && BT && BT_L2CAP && INPUT || USB_HID && HID_SUPPORT && USB && INPUT) selects HID which has unmet direct dependencies (HID_SUPPORT && INPUT) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- net/bluetooth/hidp/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/hidp/Kconfig index 98fdfa1fbddd..86a91543172a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/Kconfig +++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/Kconfig @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ config BT_HIDP tristate "HIDP protocol support" - depends on BT && BT_L2CAP && INPUT + depends on BT && BT_L2CAP && INPUT && HID_SUPPORT select HID help HIDP (Human Interface Device Protocol) is a transport layer -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From bdb7524a75e4716535a29abb314a82619301e068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2010 10:46:09 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix non-SSP auth request for HIGH security level sockets When initiating dedicated bonding a L2CAP raw socket with HIGH security level is used. The kernel is supposed to trigger the authentication request in this case but this doesn't happen currently for non-SSP (pre-2.1) devices. The reason is that the authentication request happens in the remote extended features callback which never gets called for non-SSP devices. This patch fixes the issue by requesting also authentiation in the (normal) remote features callback in the case of non-SSP devices. This rule is applied only for HIGH security level which might at first seem unintuitive since on the server socket side MEDIUM is already enough for authentication. However, for the clients we really want to prefer the server side to decide the authentication requrement in most cases, and since most client sockets use MEDIUM it's better to be avoided on the kernel side for these sockets. The important socket to request it for is the dedicated bonding one and that socket uses HIGH security level. The patch is based on the initial investigation and patch proposal from Andrei Emeltchenko . Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index bfef5bae0b3a..84093b0000b9 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -1175,6 +1175,12 @@ static inline void hci_remote_features_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_REMOTE_EXT_FEATURES, sizeof(cp), &cp); + } else if (!ev->status && conn->out && + conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { + struct hci_cp_auth_requested cp; + cp.handle = ev->handle; + hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_AUTH_REQUESTED, + sizeof(cp), &cp); } else { conn->state = BT_CONNECTED; hci_proto_connect_cfm(conn, ev->status); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From bfaaeb3ed5533a2dd38e3aa9ea43efd619690aed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: steven miao Date: Sat, 16 Oct 2010 18:29:47 -0400 Subject: Bluetooth: fix unaligned access to l2cap conf data In function l2cap_get_conf_opt() and l2cap_add_conf_opt() the address of opt->val sometimes is not at the edge of 2-bytes/4-bytes, so 2-bytes/4 bytes access will cause data misalignment exeception. Use get_unaligned_le16/32 and put_unaligned_le16/32 function to avoid data misalignment execption. Signed-off-by: steven miao Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- net/bluetooth/l2cap.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c index daa7a988d9a6..b3fb02ab2292 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c @@ -2421,11 +2421,11 @@ static inline int l2cap_get_conf_opt(void **ptr, int *type, int *olen, unsigned break; case 2: - *val = __le16_to_cpu(*((__le16 *) opt->val)); + *val = get_unaligned_le16(opt->val); break; case 4: - *val = __le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *) opt->val)); + *val = get_unaligned_le32(opt->val); break; default: @@ -2452,11 +2452,11 @@ static void l2cap_add_conf_opt(void **ptr, u8 type, u8 len, unsigned long val) break; case 2: - *((__le16 *) opt->val) = cpu_to_le16(val); + put_unaligned_le16(cpu_to_le16(val), opt->val); break; case 4: - *((__le32 *) opt->val) = cpu_to_le32(val); + put_unaligned_le32(cpu_to_le32(val), opt->val); break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 4f8b691c9fb02e72359e71592098c1de3b8ec712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Gustavo F. Padovan" Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2010 14:25:53 -0200 Subject: Bluetooth: fix endianness conversion in L2CAP Last commit added a wrong endianness conversion. Fixing that. Reported-by: Harvey Harrison Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- net/bluetooth/l2cap.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c index b3fb02ab2292..cd8f6ea03841 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c @@ -2452,11 +2452,11 @@ static void l2cap_add_conf_opt(void **ptr, u8 type, u8 len, unsigned long val) break; case 2: - put_unaligned_le16(cpu_to_le16(val), opt->val); + put_unaligned_le16(val, opt->val); break; case 4: - put_unaligned_le32(cpu_to_le32(val), opt->val); + put_unaligned_le32(val, opt->val); break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 63ce0900d79645c714de6c8b66d8040670068c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2010 14:06:10 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: fix not setting security level when creating a rfcomm session This cause 'No Bonding' to be used if userspace has not yet been paired with remote device since the l2cap socket used to create the rfcomm session does not have any security level set. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Acked-by: Ville Tervo Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c index 39a5d87e33b4..fa642aa652bd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c @@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ static void rfcomm_make_uih(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 addr); static void rfcomm_process_connect(struct rfcomm_session *s); -static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, int *err); +static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, + bdaddr_t *dst, + u8 sec_level, + int *err); static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_get(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst); static void rfcomm_session_del(struct rfcomm_session *s); @@ -401,7 +404,7 @@ static int __rfcomm_dlc_open(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, s = rfcomm_session_get(src, dst); if (!s) { - s = rfcomm_session_create(src, dst, &err); + s = rfcomm_session_create(src, dst, d->sec_level, &err); if (!s) return err; } @@ -679,7 +682,10 @@ static void rfcomm_session_close(struct rfcomm_session *s, int err) rfcomm_session_put(s); } -static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, int *err) +static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, + bdaddr_t *dst, + u8 sec_level, + int *err) { struct rfcomm_session *s = NULL; struct sockaddr_l2 addr; @@ -704,6 +710,7 @@ static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst sk = sock->sk; lock_sock(sk); l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu = l2cap_mtu; + l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec_level; if (l2cap_ertm) l2cap_pi(sk)->mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM; release_sock(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 18943d292facbc70e6a36fc62399ae833f64671b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 11:15:54 +0000 Subject: inet: fix ip_mc_drop_socket() commit 8723e1b4ad9be4444 (inet: RCU changes in inetdev_by_index()) forgot one call site in ip_mc_drop_socket() We should not decrease idev refcount after inetdev_by_index() call, since refcount is not increased anymore. Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf Reported-by: Miles Lane Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index c8877c6c7216..3c53c2d89e3b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -2306,10 +2306,8 @@ void ip_mc_drop_socket(struct sock *sk) in_dev = inetdev_by_index(net, iml->multi.imr_ifindex); (void) ip_mc_leave_src(sk, iml, in_dev); - if (in_dev != NULL) { + if (in_dev != NULL) ip_mc_dec_group(in_dev, iml->multi.imr_multiaddr.s_addr); - in_dev_put(in_dev); - } /* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */ atomic_sub(sizeof(*iml), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); call_rcu(&iml->rcu, ip_mc_socklist_reclaim); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 88f8a5e3e7defccd3925cabb1ee4d3994e5cdb52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kulikov Vasiliy Date: Sun, 31 Oct 2010 07:10:32 +0000 Subject: net: tipc: fix information leak to userland Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after "id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/socket.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c index 33217fc3d697..e9f0d5004483 100644 --- a/net/tipc/socket.c +++ b/net/tipc/socket.c @@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ static int get_name(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, struct sockaddr_tipc *addr = (struct sockaddr_tipc *)uaddr; struct tipc_sock *tsock = tipc_sk(sock->sk); + memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr)); if (peer) { if ((sock->state != SS_CONNECTED) && ((peer != 2) || (sock->state != SS_DISCONNECTING))) -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 332dd96f7ac15e937088fe11f15cfe0210e8edd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2010 11:46:33 -0800 Subject: net/dst: dst_dev_event() called after other notifiers Followup of commit ef885afbf8a37689 (net: use rcu_barrier() in rollback_registered_many) dst_dev_event() scans a garbage dst list that might be feeded by various network notifiers at device dismantle time. Its important to call dst_dev_event() after other notifiers, or we might enter the infamous msleep(250) in netdev_wait_allrefs(), and wait one second before calling again call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, dev) to properly remove last device references. Use priority -10 to let dst_dev_notifier be called after other network notifiers (they have the default 0 priority) Reported-by: Ben Greear Reported-by: Nicolas Dichtel Reported-by: Octavian Purdila Reported-by: Benjamin LaHaise Tested-by: Ben Greear Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dst.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dst.c b/net/core/dst.c index 8abe628b79f1..b99c7c7ffce2 100644 --- a/net/core/dst.c +++ b/net/core/dst.c @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ static int dst_dev_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, static struct notifier_block dst_dev_notifier = { .notifier_call = dst_dev_event, + .priority = -10, /* must be called after other network notifiers */ }; void __init dst_init(void) -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 10:14:33 -0800 Subject: net: ax25: fix information leak to userland Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 26eaebf4aaa9..bb86d2932394 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -1392,6 +1392,7 @@ static int ax25_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, ax25_cb *ax25; int err = 0; + memset(fsa, 0, sizeof(fsa)); lock_sock(sk); ax25 = ax25_sk(sk); @@ -1403,7 +1404,6 @@ static int ax25_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, fsa->fsa_ax25.sax25_family = AF_AX25; fsa->fsa_ax25.sax25_call = ax25->dest_addr; - fsa->fsa_ax25.sax25_ndigis = 0; if (ax25->digipeat != NULL) { ndigi = ax25->digipeat->ndigi; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 10:38:24 -0800 Subject: filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by hostile user. Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is expensive since most filters dont even use this array. Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of the jumps. This might be done later. In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks. For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction. [ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ] Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/filter.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 7beaec36b541..23e9b2a6b4c8 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -112,39 +112,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_filter); */ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int flen) { - struct sock_filter *fentry; /* We walk down these */ void *ptr; u32 A = 0; /* Accumulator */ u32 X = 0; /* Index Register */ u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS]; /* Scratch Memory Store */ + unsigned long memvalid = 0; u32 tmp; int k; int pc; + BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_MEMWORDS > BITS_PER_LONG); /* * Process array of filter instructions. */ for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { - fentry = &filter[pc]; + const struct sock_filter *fentry = &filter[pc]; + u32 f_k = fentry->k; switch (fentry->code) { case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X: A += X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K: - A += fentry->k; + A += f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X: A -= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K: - A -= fentry->k; + A -= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X: A *= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K: - A *= fentry->k; + A *= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X: if (X == 0) @@ -152,49 +154,49 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int A /= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K: - A /= fentry->k; + A /= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X: A &= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K: - A &= fentry->k; + A &= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X: A |= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K: - A |= fentry->k; + A |= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X: A <<= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K: - A <<= fentry->k; + A <<= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X: A >>= X; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K: - A >>= fentry->k; + A >>= f_k; continue; case BPF_S_ALU_NEG: A = -A; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JA: - pc += fentry->k; + pc += f_k; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K: - pc += (A > fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A > f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K: - pc += (A >= fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A >= f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K: - pc += (A == fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A == f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K: - pc += (A & fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A & f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; continue; case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X: pc += (A > X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; @@ -209,7 +211,7 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int pc += (A & X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; continue; case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS: - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_w: ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 4, &tmp); if (ptr != NULL) { @@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ load_w: } break; case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS: - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_h: ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 2, &tmp); if (ptr != NULL) { @@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ load_h: } break; case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS: - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_b: ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 1, &tmp); if (ptr != NULL) { @@ -242,32 +244,34 @@ load_b: X = skb->len; continue; case BPF_S_LD_W_IND: - k = X + fentry->k; + k = X + f_k; goto load_w; case BPF_S_LD_H_IND: - k = X + fentry->k; + k = X + f_k; goto load_h; case BPF_S_LD_B_IND: - k = X + fentry->k; + k = X + f_k; goto load_b; case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH: - ptr = load_pointer(skb, fentry->k, 1, &tmp); + ptr = load_pointer(skb, f_k, 1, &tmp); if (ptr != NULL) { X = (*(u8 *)ptr & 0xf) << 2; continue; } return 0; case BPF_S_LD_IMM: - A = fentry->k; + A = f_k; continue; case BPF_S_LDX_IMM: - X = fentry->k; + X = f_k; continue; case BPF_S_LD_MEM: - A = mem[fentry->k]; + A = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ? + mem[f_k] : 0; continue; case BPF_S_LDX_MEM: - X = mem[fentry->k]; + X = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ? + mem[f_k] : 0; continue; case BPF_S_MISC_TAX: X = A; @@ -276,14 +280,16 @@ load_b: A = X; continue; case BPF_S_RET_K: - return fentry->k; + return f_k; case BPF_S_RET_A: return A; case BPF_S_ST: - mem[fentry->k] = A; + memvalid |= 1UL << f_k; + mem[f_k] = A; continue; case BPF_S_STX: - mem[fentry->k] = X; + memvalid |= 1UL << f_k; + mem[f_k] = X; continue; default: WARN_ON(1); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:09:10 -0800 Subject: net: packet: fix information leak to userland packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy(). The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 3616f27b9d46..0856a13cb53d 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, rcu_read_lock(); dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex); if (dev) - strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, 15); + strncpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, 14); else memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, 14); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1742,6 +1742,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET; sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex; sll->sll_protocol = po->num; + sll->sll_pkttype = 0; rcu_read_lock(); dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex); if (dev) { -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 8d987e5c75107ca7515fa19e857cfa24aab6ec8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2010 23:24:26 +0000 Subject: net: avoid limits overflow Robin Holt tried to boot a 16TB machine and found some limits were reached : sysctl_tcp_mem[2], sysctl_udp_mem[2] We can switch infrastructure to use long "instead" of "int", now atomic_long_t primitives are available for free. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Robin Holt Reviewed-by: Robin Holt Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/dn.h | 2 +- include/net/sock.h | 4 ++-- include/net/tcp.h | 6 +++--- include/net/udp.h | 4 ++-- net/core/sock.c | 14 +++++++------- net/decnet/af_decnet.c | 2 +- net/decnet/sysctl_net_decnet.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/proc.c | 8 ++++---- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 5 ++--- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 11 +++++++---- net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 ++-- net/sctp/protocol.c | 2 +- net/sctp/socket.c | 4 ++-- net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++-- 15 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/dn.h b/include/net/dn.h index e5469f7b67a3..a514a3cf4573 100644 --- a/include/net/dn.h +++ b/include/net/dn.h @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ extern int decnet_di_count; extern int decnet_dr_count; extern int decnet_no_fc_max_cwnd; -extern int sysctl_decnet_mem[3]; +extern long sysctl_decnet_mem[3]; extern int sysctl_decnet_wmem[3]; extern int sysctl_decnet_rmem[3]; diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index c7a736228ca2..a6338d039857 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ struct proto { /* Memory pressure */ void (*enter_memory_pressure)(struct sock *sk); - atomic_t *memory_allocated; /* Current allocated memory. */ + atomic_long_t *memory_allocated; /* Current allocated memory. */ struct percpu_counter *sockets_allocated; /* Current number of sockets. */ /* * Pressure flag: try to collapse. @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ struct proto { * is strict, actions are advisory and have some latency. */ int *memory_pressure; - int *sysctl_mem; + long *sysctl_mem; int *sysctl_wmem; int *sysctl_rmem; int max_header; diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 4fee0424af7e..e36c874c7fb1 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ extern int sysctl_tcp_fack; extern int sysctl_tcp_reordering; extern int sysctl_tcp_ecn; extern int sysctl_tcp_dsack; -extern int sysctl_tcp_mem[3]; +extern long sysctl_tcp_mem[3]; extern int sysctl_tcp_wmem[3]; extern int sysctl_tcp_rmem[3]; extern int sysctl_tcp_app_win; @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ extern int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size; extern int sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts; extern int sysctl_tcp_thin_dupack; -extern atomic_t tcp_memory_allocated; +extern atomic_long_t tcp_memory_allocated; extern struct percpu_counter tcp_sockets_allocated; extern int tcp_memory_pressure; @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static inline bool tcp_too_many_orphans(struct sock *sk, int shift) } if (sk->sk_wmem_queued > SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF && - atomic_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) > sysctl_tcp_mem[2]) + atomic_long_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) > sysctl_tcp_mem[2]) return true; return false; } diff --git a/include/net/udp.h b/include/net/udp.h index 200b82848c9a..bb967dd59bf7 100644 --- a/include/net/udp.h +++ b/include/net/udp.h @@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ static inline struct udp_hslot *udp_hashslot2(struct udp_table *table, extern struct proto udp_prot; -extern atomic_t udp_memory_allocated; +extern atomic_long_t udp_memory_allocated; /* sysctl variables for udp */ -extern int sysctl_udp_mem[3]; +extern long sysctl_udp_mem[3]; extern int sysctl_udp_rmem_min; extern int sysctl_udp_wmem_min; diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 3eed5424e659..fb6080111461 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1653,10 +1653,10 @@ int __sk_mem_schedule(struct sock *sk, int size, int kind) { struct proto *prot = sk->sk_prot; int amt = sk_mem_pages(size); - int allocated; + long allocated; sk->sk_forward_alloc += amt * SK_MEM_QUANTUM; - allocated = atomic_add_return(amt, prot->memory_allocated); + allocated = atomic_long_add_return(amt, prot->memory_allocated); /* Under limit. */ if (allocated <= prot->sysctl_mem[0]) { @@ -1714,7 +1714,7 @@ suppress_allocation: /* Alas. Undo changes. */ sk->sk_forward_alloc -= amt * SK_MEM_QUANTUM; - atomic_sub(amt, prot->memory_allocated); + atomic_long_sub(amt, prot->memory_allocated); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sk_mem_schedule); @@ -1727,12 +1727,12 @@ void __sk_mem_reclaim(struct sock *sk) { struct proto *prot = sk->sk_prot; - atomic_sub(sk->sk_forward_alloc >> SK_MEM_QUANTUM_SHIFT, + atomic_long_sub(sk->sk_forward_alloc >> SK_MEM_QUANTUM_SHIFT, prot->memory_allocated); sk->sk_forward_alloc &= SK_MEM_QUANTUM - 1; if (prot->memory_pressure && *prot->memory_pressure && - (atomic_read(prot->memory_allocated) < prot->sysctl_mem[0])) + (atomic_long_read(prot->memory_allocated) < prot->sysctl_mem[0])) *prot->memory_pressure = 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sk_mem_reclaim); @@ -2452,12 +2452,12 @@ static char proto_method_implemented(const void *method) static void proto_seq_printf(struct seq_file *seq, struct proto *proto) { - seq_printf(seq, "%-9s %4u %6d %6d %-3s %6u %-3s %-10s " + seq_printf(seq, "%-9s %4u %6d %6ld %-3s %6u %-3s %-10s " "%2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c\n", proto->name, proto->obj_size, sock_prot_inuse_get(seq_file_net(seq), proto), - proto->memory_allocated != NULL ? atomic_read(proto->memory_allocated) : -1, + proto->memory_allocated != NULL ? atomic_long_read(proto->memory_allocated) : -1L, proto->memory_pressure != NULL ? *proto->memory_pressure ? "yes" : "no" : "NI", proto->max_header, proto->slab == NULL ? "no" : "yes", diff --git a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c index d6b93d19790f..a76b78de679f 100644 --- a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c +++ b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops dn_proto_ops; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(dn_hash_lock); static struct hlist_head dn_sk_hash[DN_SK_HASH_SIZE]; static struct hlist_head dn_wild_sk; -static atomic_t decnet_memory_allocated; +static atomic_long_t decnet_memory_allocated; static int __dn_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen, int flags); static int __dn_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, int flags); diff --git a/net/decnet/sysctl_net_decnet.c b/net/decnet/sysctl_net_decnet.c index be3eb8e23288..28f8b5e5f73b 100644 --- a/net/decnet/sysctl_net_decnet.c +++ b/net/decnet/sysctl_net_decnet.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int decnet_log_martians = 1; int decnet_no_fc_max_cwnd = NSP_MIN_WINDOW; /* Reasonable defaults, I hope, based on tcp's defaults */ -int sysctl_decnet_mem[3] = { 768 << 3, 1024 << 3, 1536 << 3 }; +long sysctl_decnet_mem[3] = { 768 << 3, 1024 << 3, 1536 << 3 }; int sysctl_decnet_wmem[3] = { 4 * 1024, 16 * 1024, 128 * 1024 }; int sysctl_decnet_rmem[3] = { 4 * 1024, 87380, 87380 * 2 }; @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static ctl_table dn_table[] = { .data = &sysctl_decnet_mem, .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_decnet_mem), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax }, { .procname = "decnet_rmem", diff --git a/net/ipv4/proc.c b/net/ipv4/proc.c index 4ae1f203f7cb..1b48eb1ed453 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/proc.c +++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c @@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ static int sockstat_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) local_bh_enable(); socket_seq_show(seq); - seq_printf(seq, "TCP: inuse %d orphan %d tw %d alloc %d mem %d\n", + seq_printf(seq, "TCP: inuse %d orphan %d tw %d alloc %d mem %ld\n", sock_prot_inuse_get(net, &tcp_prot), orphans, tcp_death_row.tw_count, sockets, - atomic_read(&tcp_memory_allocated)); - seq_printf(seq, "UDP: inuse %d mem %d\n", + atomic_long_read(&tcp_memory_allocated)); + seq_printf(seq, "UDP: inuse %d mem %ld\n", sock_prot_inuse_get(net, &udp_prot), - atomic_read(&udp_memory_allocated)); + atomic_long_read(&udp_memory_allocated)); seq_printf(seq, "UDPLITE: inuse %d\n", sock_prot_inuse_get(net, &udplite_prot)); seq_printf(seq, "RAW: inuse %d\n", diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index d96c1da4b17c..e91911d7aae2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .data = &sysctl_tcp_mem, .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_tcp_mem), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax }, { .procname = "tcp_wmem", @@ -602,8 +602,7 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .data = &sysctl_udp_mem, .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &zero + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, }, { .procname = "udp_rmem_min", diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 1664a0590bb8..245603c4ad48 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout __read_mostly = TCP_FIN_TIMEOUT; struct percpu_counter tcp_orphan_count; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_orphan_count); -int sysctl_tcp_mem[3] __read_mostly; +long sysctl_tcp_mem[3] __read_mostly; int sysctl_tcp_wmem[3] __read_mostly; int sysctl_tcp_rmem[3] __read_mostly; @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_mem); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_rmem); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_wmem); -atomic_t tcp_memory_allocated; /* Current allocated memory. */ +atomic_long_t tcp_memory_allocated; /* Current allocated memory. */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_memory_allocated); /* diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 3357f69e353d..6d8ab1c4efc3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -259,8 +259,11 @@ static void tcp_fixup_sndbuf(struct sock *sk) int sndmem = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.mss_clamp + MAX_TCP_HEADER + 16 + sizeof(struct sk_buff); - if (sk->sk_sndbuf < 3 * sndmem) - sk->sk_sndbuf = min(3 * sndmem, sysctl_tcp_wmem[2]); + if (sk->sk_sndbuf < 3 * sndmem) { + sk->sk_sndbuf = 3 * sndmem; + if (sk->sk_sndbuf > sysctl_tcp_wmem[2]) + sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[2]; + } } /* 2. Tuning advertised window (window_clamp, rcv_ssthresh) @@ -396,7 +399,7 @@ static void tcp_clamp_window(struct sock *sk) if (sk->sk_rcvbuf < sysctl_tcp_rmem[2] && !(sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK) && !tcp_memory_pressure && - atomic_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) < sysctl_tcp_mem[0]) { + atomic_long_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) < sysctl_tcp_mem[0]) { sk->sk_rcvbuf = min(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc), sysctl_tcp_rmem[2]); } @@ -4861,7 +4864,7 @@ static int tcp_should_expand_sndbuf(struct sock *sk) return 0; /* If we are under soft global TCP memory pressure, do not expand. */ - if (atomic_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) >= sysctl_tcp_mem[0]) + if (atomic_long_read(&tcp_memory_allocated) >= sysctl_tcp_mem[0]) return 0; /* If we filled the congestion window, do not expand. */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 28cb2d733a3c..5e0a3a582a59 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ struct udp_table udp_table __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_table); -int sysctl_udp_mem[3] __read_mostly; +long sysctl_udp_mem[3] __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_udp_mem); int sysctl_udp_rmem_min __read_mostly; @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_udp_rmem_min); int sysctl_udp_wmem_min __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_udp_wmem_min); -atomic_t udp_memory_allocated; +atomic_long_t udp_memory_allocated; EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_memory_allocated); #define MAX_UDP_PORTS 65536 diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c index 1ef29c74d85e..e58f9476f29c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_af_v6_specific; struct kmem_cache *sctp_chunk_cachep __read_mostly; struct kmem_cache *sctp_bucket_cachep __read_mostly; -int sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; +long sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; int sysctl_sctp_rmem[3]; int sysctl_sctp_wmem[3]; diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index e34ca9cc1167..6bd554323a34 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -111,12 +111,12 @@ static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *, struct sock *, static char *sctp_hmac_alg = SCTP_COOKIE_HMAC_ALG; extern struct kmem_cache *sctp_bucket_cachep; -extern int sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; +extern long sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; extern int sysctl_sctp_rmem[3]; extern int sysctl_sctp_wmem[3]; static int sctp_memory_pressure; -static atomic_t sctp_memory_allocated; +static atomic_long_t sctp_memory_allocated; struct percpu_counter sctp_sockets_allocated; static void sctp_enter_memory_pressure(struct sock *sk) diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c index 832590bbe0c0..50cb57f0919e 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int sack_timer_max = 500; static int addr_scope_max = 3; /* check sctp_scope_policy_t in include/net/sctp/constants.h for max entries */ static int rwnd_scale_max = 16; -extern int sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; +extern long sysctl_sctp_mem[3]; extern int sysctl_sctp_rmem[3]; extern int sysctl_sctp_wmem[3]; @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static ctl_table sctp_table[] = { .data = &sysctl_sctp_mem, .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_sctp_mem), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax }, { .procname = "sctp_rmem", -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 7a1abd08d52fdeddb3e9a5a33f2f15cc6a5674d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 21:35:37 -0800 Subject: tcp: Increase TCP_MAXSEG socket option minimum. As noted by Steve Chen, since commit f5fff5dc8a7a3f395b0525c02ba92c95d42b7390 ("tcp: advertise MSS requested by user") we can end up with a situation where tcp_select_initial_window() does a divide by a zero (or even negative) mss value. The problem is that sometimes we effectively subtract TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED and/or TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED from the mss. Fix this by increasing the minimum from 8 to 64. Reported-by: Steve Chen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 245603c4ad48..081419969485 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2246,7 +2246,7 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, /* Values greater than interface MTU won't take effect. However * at the point when this call is done we typically don't yet * know which interface is going to be used */ - if (val < 8 || val > MAX_TCP_WINDOW) { + if (val < 64 || val > MAX_TCP_WINDOW) { err = -EINVAL; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 22e091e5253da1e9ad7c0a82c2c84446fc403efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shan Wei Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 08:51:55 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ipv6: fix overlap check for fragments The type of FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset is int, skb->len is *unsigned* int, and offset is int. Without this patch, type conversion occurred to this expression, when (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) is less than offset. Signed-off-by: Shan Wei Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index 3a3f129a44cb..79d43aa8fa8d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ found: /* Check for overlap with preceding fragment. */ if (prev && - (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset > 0) + (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) > offset) goto discard_fq; /* Look for overlap with succeeding segment. */ -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 369cf77a6a3e41b1110506ddf43d45804103bfde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Graf Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 15:47:59 +0000 Subject: rtnetlink: Fix message size calculation for link messages nlmsg_total_size() calculates the length of a netlink message including header and alignment. nla_total_size() calculates the space an individual attribute consumes which was meant to be used in this context. Also, ensure to account for the attribute header for the IFLA_INFO_XSTATS attribute as implementations of get_xstats_size() seem to assume that we do so. The addition of two message headers minus the missing attribute header resulted in a calculated message size that was larger than required. Therefore we never risked running out of skb tailroom. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf Acked-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 8121268ddbdd..841c287ef40a 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -347,16 +347,17 @@ static size_t rtnl_link_get_size(const struct net_device *dev) if (!ops) return 0; - size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + /* IFLA_LINKINFO */ - nlmsg_total_size(strlen(ops->kind) + 1); /* IFLA_INFO_KIND */ + size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + /* IFLA_LINKINFO */ + nla_total_size(strlen(ops->kind) + 1); /* IFLA_INFO_KIND */ if (ops->get_size) /* IFLA_INFO_DATA + nested data */ - size += nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + + size += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + ops->get_size(dev); if (ops->get_xstats_size) - size += ops->get_xstats_size(dev); /* IFLA_INFO_XSTATS */ + /* IFLA_INFO_XSTATS */ + size += nla_total_size(ops->get_xstats_size(dev)); return size; } -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 1f18b7176e2e41fada24584ce3c80e9abfaca52b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mariusz Kozlowski Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 11:58:45 +0000 Subject: net: Fix header size check for GSO case in recvmsg (af_packet) Parameter 'len' is size_t type so it will never get negative. Signed-off-by: Mariusz Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 0856a13cb53d..8298e676f5a0 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1610,9 +1610,11 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, err = -EINVAL; vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr); - if ((len -= vnet_hdr_len) < 0) + if (len < vnet_hdr_len) goto out_free; + len -= vnet_hdr_len; + if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 5ef41308f94dcbb3b7afc56cdef1c2ba53fa5d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 12:44:42 -0800 Subject: x25: Prevent crashing when parsing bad X.25 facilities Now with improved comma support. On parsing malformed X.25 facilities, decrementing the remaining length may cause it to underflow. Since the length is an unsigned integer, this will result in the loop continuing until the kernel crashes. This patch adds checks to ensure decrementing the remaining length does not cause it to wrap around. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/x25/x25_facilities.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/x25/x25_facilities.c b/net/x25/x25_facilities.c index 3a8c4c419cd4..55187c8f6420 100644 --- a/net/x25/x25_facilities.c +++ b/net/x25/x25_facilities.c @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, while (len > 0) { switch (*p & X25_FAC_CLASS_MASK) { case X25_FAC_CLASS_A: + if (len < 2) + return 0; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_REVERSE: if((p[1] & 0x81) == 0x81) { @@ -104,6 +106,8 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, len -= 2; break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_B: + if (len < 3) + return 0; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_PACKET_SIZE: facilities->pacsize_in = p[1]; @@ -125,6 +129,8 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, len -= 3; break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_C: + if (len < 4) + return 0; printk(KERN_DEBUG "X.25: unknown facility %02X, " "values %02X, %02X, %02X\n", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]); @@ -132,6 +138,8 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, len -= 4; break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_D: + if (len < p[1] + 2) + return 0; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_CALLING_AE: if (p[1] > X25_MAX_DTE_FACIL_LEN || p[1] <= 1) @@ -149,9 +157,7 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, break; default: printk(KERN_DEBUG "X.25: unknown facility %02X," - "length %d, values %02X, %02X, " - "%02X, %02X\n", - p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5]); + "length %d\n", p[0], p[1]); break; } len -= p[1] + 2; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 8f49c2703b33519aaaccc63f571b465b9d2b3a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 13:35:00 -0800 Subject: tcp: Don't change unlocked socket state in tcp_v4_err(). Alexey Kuznetsov noticed a regression introduced by commit f1ecd5d9e7366609d640ff4040304ea197fbc618 ("Revert Backoff [v3]: Revert RTO on ICMP destination unreachable") The RTO and timer modification code added to tcp_v4_err() doesn't check sock_owned_by_user(), which if true means we don't have exclusive access to the socket and therefore cannot modify it's critical state. Just skip this new code block if sock_owned_by_user() is true and eliminate the now superfluous sock_owned_by_user() code block contained within. Reported-by: Alexey Kuznetsov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller CC: Damian Lukowski Acked-by: Eric Dumazet --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 8f8527d41682..69ccbc1dde9c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ void tcp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *icmp_skb, u32 info) !icsk->icsk_backoff) break; + if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) + break; + icsk->icsk_backoff--; inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto = __tcp_set_rto(tp) << icsk->icsk_backoff; @@ -429,11 +432,6 @@ void tcp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *icmp_skb, u32 info) if (remaining) { inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, remaining, TCP_RTO_MAX); - } else if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { - /* RTO revert clocked out retransmission, - * but socket is locked. Will defer. */ - inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, - HZ/20, TCP_RTO_MAX); } else { /* RTO revert clocked out retransmission. * Will retransmit now */ -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 2de795707294972f6c34bae9de713e502c431296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Colitti Date: Wed, 27 Oct 2010 18:16:49 +0000 Subject: ipv6: addrconf: don't remove address state on ifdown if the address is being kept Currently, addrconf_ifdown does not delete statically configured IPv6 addresses when the interface is brought down. The intent is that when the interface comes back up the address will be usable again. However, this doesn't actually work, because the system stops listening on the corresponding solicited-node multicast address, so the address cannot respond to neighbor solicitations and thus receive traffic. Also, the code notifies the rest of the system that the address is being deleted (e.g, RTM_DELADDR), even though it is not. Fix it so that none of this state is updated if the address is being kept on the interface. Tested: Added a statically configured IPv6 address to an interface, started ping, brought link down, brought link up again. When link came up ping kept on going and "ip -6 maddr" showed that the host was still subscribed to there Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 24 ++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index e048ec62d109..b41ce0f0d514 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -2740,10 +2740,6 @@ static int addrconf_ifdown(struct net_device *dev, int how) /* Flag it for later restoration when link comes up */ ifa->flags |= IFA_F_TENTATIVE; ifa->state = INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DAD; - - write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - - in6_ifa_hold(ifa); } else { list_del(&ifa->if_list); @@ -2758,19 +2754,15 @@ static int addrconf_ifdown(struct net_device *dev, int how) ifa->state = INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD; spin_unlock_bh(&ifa->state_lock); - if (state == INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD) - goto put_ifa; + if (state == INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD) { + in6_ifa_put(ifa); + } else { + __ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_DELADDR, ifa); + atomic_notifier_call_chain(&inet6addr_chain, + NETDEV_DOWN, ifa); + } + write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); } - - __ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_DELADDR, ifa); - if (ifa->state == INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD) - atomic_notifier_call_chain(&inet6addr_chain, - NETDEV_DOWN, ifa); - -put_ifa: - in6_ifa_put(ifa); - - write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); } list_splice(&keep_list, &idev->addr_list); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 403856532734317d25ec86ab1e75b8133db7acc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Greear Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 12:33:48 +0000 Subject: ipv6: Warn users if maximum number of routes is reached. This gives users at least some clue as to what the problem might be and how to go about fixing it. Signed-off-by: Ben Greear Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/route.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index fc328339be99..96455ffb76fb 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -1945,8 +1945,12 @@ struct rt6_info *addrconf_dst_alloc(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct rt6_info *rt = ip6_dst_alloc(&net->ipv6.ip6_dst_ops); struct neighbour *neigh; - if (rt == NULL) + if (rt == NULL) { + if (net_ratelimit()) + pr_warning("IPv6: Maximum number of routes reached," + " consider increasing route/max_size.\n"); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } dev_hold(net->loopback_dev); in6_dev_hold(idev); -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b From 0597d1b99fcfc2c0eada09a698f85ed413d4ba84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:10:30 +0000 Subject: can-bcm: fix minor heap overflow On 64-bit platforms the ASCII representation of a pointer may be up to 17 bytes long. This patch increases the length of the buffer accordingly. http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128872251418192&w=2 Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp CC: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/can/bcm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 08ffe9e4be20..6faa8256e10c 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct bcm_sock { struct list_head tx_ops; unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs; struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read; - char procname [9]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ + char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ }; static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk) -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b