From fec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tycho Andersen Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 11:24:14 -0700 Subject: samples: add an example of seccomp user trap The idea here is just to give a demonstration of how one could safely use the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF feature to do mount policies. This particular policy is (as noted in the comment) not very interesting, but it serves to illustrate how one might apply a policy dodging the various TOCTOU issues. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen CC: Kees Cook CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Oleg Nesterov CC: Eric W. Biederman CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" CC: Christian Brauner CC: Tyler Hicks CC: Akihiro Suda Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- samples/seccomp/.gitignore | 1 + samples/seccomp/Makefile | 7 +- samples/seccomp/user-trap.c | 375 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/user-trap.c (limited to 'samples') diff --git a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore index 78fb78184291..d1e2e817d556 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore +++ b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ bpf-direct bpf-fancy dropper +user-trap diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile index cf34ff6b4065..4920903c8009 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile +++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ifndef CROSS_COMPILE -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include bpf-direct-objs := bpf-direct.o +HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include +HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include +user-trap-objs := user-trap.o + # Try to match the kernel target. ifndef CONFIG_64BIT @@ -33,6 +37,7 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += $(MFLAG) HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG) HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG) HOSTLDLIBS_dropper += $(MFLAG) +HOSTLDLIBS_user-trap += $(MFLAG) endif always := $(hostprogs-m) endif diff --git a/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6d0125ca8af7 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c @@ -0,0 +1,375 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x))) + +static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args) +{ + errno = 0; + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args); +} + +static int send_fd(int sock, int fd) +{ + struct msghdr msg = {}; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c'; + struct iovec io = { + .iov_base = &c, + .iov_len = 1, + }; + + msg.msg_iov = &io; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_control = buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf); + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); + *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd; + msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len; + + if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) { + perror("sendmsg"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int recv_fd(int sock) +{ + struct msghdr msg = {}; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c'; + struct iovec io = { + .iov_base = &c, + .iov_len = 1, + }; + + msg.msg_iov = &io; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_control = buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf); + + if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) { + perror("recvmsg"); + return -1; + } + + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + + return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)); +} + +static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct sock_filter filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + + struct sock_fprog prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter), + .filter = filter, + }; + + return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog); +} + +static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req, + struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener) +{ + char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX]; + int ret = -1, mem; + + resp->id = req->id; + resp->error = -EPERM; + resp->val = 0; + + if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) { + fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mount? %d\n", req->data.nr); + return -1; + } + + /* Only allow bind mounts. */ + if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND)) + return 0; + + /* + * Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their + * mount to go. + */ + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid); + mem = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (mem < 0) { + perror("open mem"); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since + * the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that + * the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can + * ask the listener fd this as follows. + * + * Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific + * resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and + * we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make + * decisions. + */ + if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* + * Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note + * that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args + * before we decide to allow the syscall. + */ + if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror("seek"); + goto out; + } + + ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source)); + if (ret < 0) { + perror("read"); + goto out; + } + + if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror("seek"); + goto out; + } + + ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target)); + if (ret < 0) { + perror("read"); + goto out; + } + + /* + * Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very + * interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user + * namespaces already, but you get the idea. + */ + if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp/", 5) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp/", 5)) { + if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) { + ret = -1; + perror("actual mount"); + goto out; + } + resp->error = 0; + } + + /* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the + * response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM. + */ + ret = 0; + +out: + close(mem); + return ret; +} + +int main(void) +{ + int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener; + pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0; + + if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) { + perror("socketpair"); + return 1; + } + + worker = fork(); + if (worker < 0) { + perror("fork"); + goto close_pair; + } + + if (worker == 0) { + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount, + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER); + if (listener < 0) { + perror("seccomp"); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000. + */ + if (setuid(1000) < 0) { + perror("setuid"); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Send the listener to the parent; also serves as + * synchronization. + */ + if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0) + exit(1); + close(listener); + + if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) { + perror("mkdir"); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Try a bad mount just for grins. + */ + if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n"); + exit(1); + } + + if (errno != EPERM) { + perror("bad error from mount"); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Ok, we expect this one to succeed. + */ + if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) { + perror("mount"); + exit(1); + } + + exit(0); + } + + /* + * Get the listener from the child. + */ + listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]); + if (listener < 0) + goto out_kill; + + /* + * Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary, + * but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we + * can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer. + */ + tracer = fork(); + if (tracer < 0) { + perror("fork"); + goto out_kill; + } + + if (tracer == 0) { + struct seccomp_notif *req; + struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp; + struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes; + + if (seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) < 0) { + perror("seccomp(GET_NOTIF_SIZES)"); + goto out_close; + } + + req = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif); + if (!req) + goto out_close; + memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); + + resp = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp); + if (!resp) + goto out_req; + memset(resp, 0, sizeof(*resp)); + + while (1) { + if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req)) { + perror("ioctl recv"); + goto out_resp; + } + + if (handle_req(req, resp, listener) < 0) + goto out_resp; + + /* + * ENOENT here means that the task may have gotten a + * signal and restarted the syscall. It's up to the + * handler to decide what to do in this case, but for + * the sample code, we just ignore it. Probably + * something better should happen, like undoing the + * mount, or keeping track of the args to make sure we + * don't do it again. + */ + if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0 && + errno != ENOENT) { + perror("ioctl send"); + goto out_resp; + } + } +out_resp: + free(resp); +out_req: + free(req); +out_close: + close(listener); + exit(1); + } + + close(listener); + + if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) { + perror("waitpid"); + goto out_kill; + } + + if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) { + perror("umount2"); + goto out_kill; + } + + if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + perror("remove"); + exit(1); + } + + if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) { + fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n"); + goto out_kill; + } + + ret = 0; + +out_kill: + if (tracer > 0) + kill(tracer, SIGKILL); + if (worker > 0) + kill(worker, SIGKILL); + +close_pair: + close(sk_pair[0]); + close(sk_pair[1]); + return ret; +} -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b