From 75c1182e18f4a66bbd2c91511b6b629dac6a27dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:59:30 -0700
Subject: security: don't treat structure as an array of struct hlist_head

The initialization of "security_hook_heads" is done by casting it to
another structure pointer type, and treating it as an array of "struct
hlist_head" objects. This requires an exception be made in "randstruct",
because otherwise it will emit an error, reducing the effectiveness of
the hardening technique.

Instead of using a cast, initialize the individual struct hlist_head
elements in security_hook_heads explicitly. This removes the need for
the cast and randstruct exception.

Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407175930.471870-1-morbo@google.com
---
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index 334741a31d0a..c2ec81b68505 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
 	{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
 	/* big_key payload.data struct splashing */
 	{ "security/keys/big_key.c", "path", "void *" },
-	/* walk struct security_hook_heads as an array of struct hlist_head */
-	{ "security/security.c", "hlist_head", "security_hook_heads" },
 	{ }
 };
 
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From d3646589703731026ae7bcba5731fa7a7d0e5291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:54:59 -0700
Subject: sancov: Split plugin build from plugin CFLAGS

When the sancov_plugin is enabled, it gets added to gcc-plugin-y which
is used to populate both GCC_PLUGIN (for building the plugin) and
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS (for enabling and options). Instead of adding sancov
to both and then removing it from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS, create a separate
list, gcc-plugin-external-y, which is only added to GCC_PLUGIN.

This will also be used by the coming randstruct build changes.

Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-3-keescook@chromium.org
---
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index f67153b260c0..927c3dd57f84 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
 endif
 export DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
 
-gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV)		+= sancov_plugin.so
-
 gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK)	+= structleak_plugin.so
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE)	\
 		+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-verbose
@@ -53,13 +51,17 @@ export DISABLE_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK_PLUGIN
 # All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to
 # filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS.
 GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
-# The sancov_plugin.so is included via CFLAGS_KCOV, so it is removed here.
-GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(filter-out %/sancov_plugin.so, $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS))
 export GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS
 
 # Add the flags to the build!
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
 
-# All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building below.
-GCC_PLUGIN := $(gcc-plugin-y)
+# Some plugins are enabled outside of this Makefile, but they still need to
+# be included in GCC_PLUGIN so they can get built.
+gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV)			\
+	+= sancov_plugin.so
+
+# All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building in
+# scripts/gcc-scripts/Makefile.
+GCC_PLUGIN := $(gcc-plugin-y) $(gcc-plugin-external-y)
 export GCC_PLUGIN
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 595b893e2087de306d0781795fb8ec47873596a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:55:00 -0700
Subject: randstruct: Reorganize Kconfigs and attribute macros

In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs,
move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named
CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full
randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line
sized mode.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
---
 Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst |  7 ++--
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                            |  2 +-
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                 |  8 ----
 include/linux/compiler_types.h               | 14 +++----
 include/linux/vermagic.h                     |  8 ++--
 kernel/panic.c                               |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins                 |  4 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig                  | 38 -----------------
 security/Kconfig.hardening                   | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
index 3b25655e441b..81ff30505d35 100644
--- a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
@@ -99,10 +99,9 @@ unreproducible parts can be treated as sources:
 Structure randomisation
 -----------------------
 
-If you enable ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT``, you will need to
-pre-generate the random seed in
-``scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_seed.h`` so the same value
-is used in rebuilds.
+If you enable ``CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT``, you will need to pre-generate
+the random seed in ``scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_seed.h``
+so the same value is used in rebuilds.
 
 Debug info conflicts
 --------------------
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 00fd9c548f26..3ac2a81a55eb 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS
 
 config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK
 	def_bool y
-	depends on !GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+	depends on !RANDSTRUCT
 	depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS
 
 config PHYS_RAM_BASE_FIXED
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 5d5c7bb50ce9..ffe3b3a087fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void)
 	 * cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a
 	 * secret.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 52299c957c98..a0c55eeaeaf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -66,14 +66,6 @@
 		__builtin_unreachable();	\
 	} while (0)
 
-#if defined(RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
-#define __randomize_layout __attribute__((randomize_layout))
-#define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout))
-/* This anon struct can add padding, so only enable it under randstruct. */
-#define randomized_struct_fields_start	struct {
-#define randomized_struct_fields_end	} __randomize_layout;
-#endif
-
 /*
  * GCC 'asm goto' miscompiles certain code sequences:
  *
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
index 1c2c33ae1b37..d08dfcb0ac68 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
@@ -242,15 +242,15 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
 # define __latent_entropy
 #endif
 
-#ifndef __randomize_layout
+#if defined(RANDSTRUCT) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+# define __randomize_layout __designated_init __attribute__((randomize_layout))
+# define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout))
+/* This anon struct can add padding, so only enable it under randstruct. */
+# define randomized_struct_fields_start	struct {
+# define randomized_struct_fields_end	} __randomize_layout;
+#else
 # define __randomize_layout __designated_init
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __no_randomize_layout
 # define __no_randomize_layout
-#endif
-
-#ifndef randomized_struct_fields_start
 # define randomized_struct_fields_start
 # define randomized_struct_fields_end
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/vermagic.h b/include/linux/vermagic.h
index 329d63babaeb..efb51a2da599 100644
--- a/include/linux/vermagic.h
+++ b/include/linux/vermagic.h
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@
 #else
 #define MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODVERSIONS ""
 #endif
-#ifdef RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+#ifdef RANDSTRUCT
 #include <generated/randomize_layout_hash.h>
-#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN "RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN_" RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED
+#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT "RANDSTRUCT_" RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED
 #else
-#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT
 #endif
 
 #define VERMAGIC_STRING 						\
@@ -44,6 +44,6 @@
 	MODULE_VERMAGIC_SMP MODULE_VERMAGIC_PREEMPT 			\
 	MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODULE_UNLOAD MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODVERSIONS	\
 	MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC						\
-	MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+	MODULE_RANDSTRUCT
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERMAGIC_H */
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index eb4dfb932c85..8355b19676f8 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
 
 int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
 static unsigned long tainted_mask =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
 static int pause_on_oops;
 static int pause_on_oops_flag;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 927c3dd57f84..827c47ce5c73 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK)		\
 
 gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)		\
-		+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)	\
+		+= -DRANDSTRUCT
+gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)		\
 		+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
 
 gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
index 51d81c3f03d6..e383cda05367 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
@@ -46,44 +46,6 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
 
-config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
-	bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
-	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
-	help
-	  If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely
-	  function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
-	  __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
-	  marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
-	  This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
-	  exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
-	  types.
-
-	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
-	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
-	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
-	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
-
-	  The seed used for compilation is located at
-	  scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_seed.h.  It remains after
-	  a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
-	  the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
-	  make distclean.
-
-	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
-	   * https://grsecurity.net/
-	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
-	bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
-	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# do not reduce test coverage
-	help
-	  If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
-	  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
-	  groups of elements.  It will further not randomize bitfields
-	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
-	  at the cost of weakened randomization.
-
 config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
 	bool
 	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index ded4d7c0d132..364e3f8c6eea 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -266,4 +266,66 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 
 endmenu
 
+choice
+	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
+	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
+	default RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+	help
+	  If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely
+	  function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
+	  __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
+	  marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
+	  This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
+	  exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
+	  types.
+
+	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
+	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
+	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
+	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
+
+	  The seed used for compilation is located at
+	  scripts/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after a "make clean"
+	  to allow for external modules to be compiled with the existing
+	  seed and will be removed by a "make mrproper" or "make distclean".
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+		bool "Disable structure layout randomization"
+		help
+		  Build normally: no structure layout randomization.
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_FULL
+		bool "Fully randomize structure layout"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
+		help
+		  Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive
+		  structures as much as possible, which may have both a
+		  memory size and performance impact.
+
+	config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
+		bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines"
+		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
+		help
+		  Randomization of sensitive kernel structures will make a
+		  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
+		  groups of members. It will further not randomize bitfields
+		  in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
+		  at the cost of weakened randomization.
+endchoice
+
+config RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool !RANDSTRUCT_NONE
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool GCC_PLUGINS && RANDSTRUCT
+	help
+	  Use GCC plugin to randomize structure layout.
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
+	  information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
 endmenu
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 613f4b3ed7902d1dbbc6ade6401e452a63dfbc21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:55:01 -0700
Subject: randstruct: Split randstruct Makefile and CFLAGS

To enable the new Clang randstruct implementation[1], move
randstruct into its own Makefile and split the CFLAGS from
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS into RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS.

[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D121556

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-5-keescook@chromium.org
---
 Makefile                        |  1 +
 arch/arm/vdso/Makefile          |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile |  3 ++-
 arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile        |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile    |  3 ++-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins    |  8 ++------
 scripts/Makefile.randstruct     | 14 ++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.randstruct

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 29e273d3f8cc..91c91fcf3c24 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@ include-$(CONFIG_KASAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.kasan
 include-$(CONFIG_KCSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.kcsan
 include-$(CONFIG_UBSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.ubsan
 include-$(CONFIG_KCOV)		+= scripts/Makefile.kcov
+include-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT)	+= scripts/Makefile.randstruct
 include-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS)	+= scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
 
 include $(addprefix $(srctree)/, $(include-y))
diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
index ec52b776f926..8ca1c9f262a2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso.o = -pg
 
 # Force -O2 to avoid libgcc dependencies
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
 ifeq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),)
 CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o = -O2
 else
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
index 172452f79e46..d9147fba1a0b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ ccflags-y += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
 # -Wmissing-prototypes and -Wmissing-declarations are removed from
 # the CFLAGS of vgettimeofday.c to make possible to build the
 # kernel with CONFIG_WERROR enabled.
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) \
+				$(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \
 				$(CC_FLAGS_LTO) -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
diff --git a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
index c5e1545bc5cf..77d7b9032158 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=medlow -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64
 
 SPARC_REG_CFLAGS = -ffixed-g4 -ffixed-g5 -fcall-used-g5 -fcall-used-g7
 
-$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
+$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
 
 #
 # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ $(obj)/vdso32.so.dbg: asflags-$(CONFIG_SPARC64) += -m32
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=medlow,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
+KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -m32 -msoft-float -fpic
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 693f8b9031fb..c2a8b76ae0bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
 endif
 endif
 
-$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
+$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
 
 #
 # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=kernel,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mfentry,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
+KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 827c47ce5c73..692d64a70542 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -22,12 +22,6 @@ export DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK)		\
 		+= -DSTRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
 
-gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)		\
-		+= -DRANDSTRUCT
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)		\
-		+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
-
 gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
 		+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN
@@ -60,6 +54,8 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
 # be included in GCC_PLUGIN so they can get built.
 gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV)			\
 	+= sancov_plugin.so
+gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)		\
+	+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
 
 # All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building in
 # scripts/gcc-scripts/Makefile.
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.randstruct b/scripts/Makefile.randstruct
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4d741e6db554
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.randstruct
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+randstruct-cflags-y += -DRANDSTRUCT
+
+ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+randstruct-cflags-y	\
+	+= -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.so
+randstruct-cflags-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)		\
+	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
+endif
+
+export RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS := $(randstruct-cflags-y)
+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS)
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From be2b34fa9be31c60a95989f984c9a5d40cd781b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:55:02 -0700
Subject: randstruct: Move seed generation into scripts/basic/

To enable Clang randstruct support, move the structure layout
randomization seed generation out of scripts/gcc-plugins/ into
scripts/basic/ so it happens early enough that it can be used by either
compiler implementation. The gcc-plugin still builds its own header file,
but now does so from the common "randstruct.seed" file.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-6-keescook@chromium.org
---
 Documentation/dontdiff                       |  1 +
 Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst |  5 +++--
 include/linux/vermagic.h                     |  2 +-
 scripts/basic/.gitignore                     |  1 +
 scripts/basic/Makefile                       | 11 +++++++++++
 scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile                 | 15 ++++++++++-----
 scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh       |  9 ---------
 scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh               |  7 +++++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening                   |  9 +++++----
 9 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100755 scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
 create mode 100755 scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff
index 910b30a2a7d9..352ff53a2306 100644
--- a/Documentation/dontdiff
+++ b/Documentation/dontdiff
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ r200_reg_safe.h
 r300_reg_safe.h
 r420_reg_safe.h
 r600_reg_safe.h
+randstruct.seed
 randomize_layout_hash.h
 randomize_layout_seed.h
 recordmcount
diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
index 81ff30505d35..071f0151a7a4 100644
--- a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst
@@ -100,8 +100,9 @@ Structure randomisation
 -----------------------
 
 If you enable ``CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT``, you will need to pre-generate
-the random seed in ``scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_seed.h``
-so the same value is used in rebuilds.
+the random seed in ``scripts/basic/randstruct.seed`` so the same
+value is used by each build. See ``scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh``
+for details.
 
 Debug info conflicts
 --------------------
diff --git a/include/linux/vermagic.h b/include/linux/vermagic.h
index efb51a2da599..a54046bf37e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/vermagic.h
+++ b/include/linux/vermagic.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 #define MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODVERSIONS ""
 #endif
 #ifdef RANDSTRUCT
-#include <generated/randomize_layout_hash.h>
+#include <generated/randstruct_hash.h>
 #define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT "RANDSTRUCT_" RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED
 #else
 #define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT
diff --git a/scripts/basic/.gitignore b/scripts/basic/.gitignore
index 961c91c8a884..07c195f605a1 100644
--- a/scripts/basic/.gitignore
+++ b/scripts/basic/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 /fixdep
+/randstruct.seed
diff --git a/scripts/basic/Makefile b/scripts/basic/Makefile
index eeb6a38c5551..dd289a6725ac 100644
--- a/scripts/basic/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/basic/Makefile
@@ -3,3 +3,14 @@
 # fixdep: used to generate dependency information during build process
 
 hostprogs-always-y	+= fixdep
+
+# randstruct: the seed is needed before building the gcc-plugin or
+# before running a Clang kernel build.
+gen-randstruct-seed	:= $(srctree)/scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh
+quiet_cmd_create_randstruct_seed = GENSEED $@
+cmd_create_randstruct_seed = \
+	$(CONFIG_SHELL) $(gen-randstruct-seed) \
+		$@ $(objtree)/include/generated/randstruct_hash.h
+$(obj)/randstruct.seed: $(gen-randstruct-seed) FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,create_randstruct_seed)
+always-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT) += randstruct.seed
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
index 1952d3bb80c6..148f4639cf09 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-$(obj)/randomize_layout_plugin.so: $(objtree)/$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h
-quiet_cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = GENSEED $@
+$(obj)/randomize_layout_plugin.so: $(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h
+quiet_cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = SEEDHDR $@
 cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = \
-  $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/$(src)/gen-random-seed.sh $@ $(objtree)/include/generated/randomize_layout_hash.h
-$(objtree)/$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h: FORCE
+	SEED=$$(cat $(filter-out FORCE,$^) </dev/null); \
+	echo '/*' > $@; \
+	echo ' * This file is automatically generated. Keep it private.' >> $@; \
+	echo ' * Exposing this value will expose the layout of randomized structures.' >> $@; \
+	echo ' */' >> $@; \
+	echo "const char *randstruct_seed = \"$$SEED\";" >> $@
+$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h: $(objtree)/scripts/basic/randstruct.seed FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,create_randomize_layout_seed)
-targets += randomize_layout_seed.h randomize_layout_hash.h
+targets += randomize_layout_seed.h
 
 # Build rules for plugins
 #
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh b/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 68af5cc20a64..000000000000
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
-	SEED=`od -A n -t x8 -N 32 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n'`
-	echo "const char *randstruct_seed = \"$SEED\";" > "$1"
-	HASH=`echo -n "$SEED" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1 | tr -d ' \n'`
-	echo "#define RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED \"$HASH\"" > "$2"
-fi
diff --git a/scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh b/scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..61017b36c464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SEED=$(od -A n -t x8 -N 32 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')
+echo "$SEED" > "$1"
+HASH=$(echo -n "$SEED" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1)
+echo "#define RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED \"$HASH\"" > "$2"
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 364e3f8c6eea..0277ba578779 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ choice
 	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
 	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
 
-	  The seed used for compilation is located at
-	  scripts/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after a "make clean"
-	  to allow for external modules to be compiled with the existing
-	  seed and will be removed by a "make mrproper" or "make distclean".
+	  The seed used for compilation is in scripts/basic/randomize.seed.
+	  It remains after a "make clean" to allow for external modules to
+	  be compiled with the existing seed and will be removed by a
+	  "make mrproper" or "make distclean". This file should not be made
+	  public, or the structure layout can be determined.
 
 	config RANDSTRUCT_NONE
 		bool "Disable structure layout randomization"
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 035f7f87b7295a342577aebd7b5b451f1e2a353c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:55:03 -0700
Subject: randstruct: Enable Clang support

Clang 15 will support randstruct via the -frandomize-layout-seed-file=...
option. Update the Kconfig and Makefile to recognize this feature.

Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-7-keescook@chromium.org
---
 scripts/Makefile.randstruct |  3 +++
 security/Kconfig.hardening  | 14 ++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.randstruct b/scripts/Makefile.randstruct
index 4d741e6db554..24e283e89893 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.randstruct
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.randstruct
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ randstruct-cflags-y	\
 	+= -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.so
 randstruct-cflags-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)		\
 	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
+else
+randstruct-cflags-y	\
+	+= -frandomize-layout-seed-file=$(objtree)/scripts/basic/randstruct.seed
 endif
 
 export RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS := $(randstruct-cflags-y)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 0277ba578779..bd2aabb2c60f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -266,9 +266,12 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 
 endmenu
 
+config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
+
 choice
 	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
-	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
+	default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && (GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT)
 	default RANDSTRUCT_NONE
 	help
 	  If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely
@@ -297,13 +300,20 @@ choice
 
 	config RANDSTRUCT_FULL
 		bool "Fully randomize structure layout"
-		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+		depends on CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT || GCC_PLUGINS
 		select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
 		help
 		  Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive
 		  structures as much as possible, which may have both a
 		  memory size and performance impact.
 
+		  One difference between the Clang and GCC plugin
+		  implementations is the handling of bitfields. The GCC
+		  plugin treats them as fully separate variables,
+		  introducing sometimes significant padding. Clang tries
+		  to keep adjacent bitfields together, but with their bit
+		  ordering randomized.
+
 	config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
 		bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines"
 		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 61f60bac8c05f8ecd2ae2a6360520b91a45be9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 16:25:54 -0700
Subject: gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernel

It's not meaningful for the GCC plugins to track their versions separately
from the rest of the kernel. Switch all versions to the kernel version.

Fix mismatched indenting while we're at it.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile                  | 9 +++++----
 scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c   | 2 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 2 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c           | 2 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c        | 2 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c       | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
index 148f4639cf09..6f0aecad5d67 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
@@ -28,10 +28,11 @@ GCC_PLUGINS_DIR = $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=plugin)
 
 plugin_cxxflags	= -Wp,-MMD,$(depfile) $(KBUILD_HOSTCXXFLAGS) -fPIC \
 		  -include $(srctree)/include/linux/compiler-version.h \
-		   -I $(GCC_PLUGINS_DIR)/include -I $(obj) -std=gnu++11 \
-		   -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions -fasynchronous-unwind-tables \
-		   -ggdb -Wno-narrowing -Wno-unused-variable \
-		   -Wno-format-diag
+		  -include $(objtree)/include/generated/utsrelease.h \
+		  -I $(GCC_PLUGINS_DIR)/include -I $(obj) -std=gnu++11 \
+		  -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions -fasynchronous-unwind-tables \
+		  -ggdb -Wno-narrowing -Wno-unused-variable \
+		  -Wno-format-diag
 
 plugin_ldflags	= -shared
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
index 8425da41de0d..5d415b2572a8 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
 static GTY(()) tree latent_entropy_decl;
 
 static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
-	.version	= "201606141920vanilla",
+	.version	= UTS_RELEASE,
 	.help		= "disable\tturn off latent entropy instrumentation\n",
 };
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index c2ec81b68505..19214e573137 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
 static int performance_mode;
 
 static struct plugin_info randomize_layout_plugin_info = {
-	.version	= "201402201816vanilla",
+	.version	= UTS_RELEASE,
 	.help		= "disable\t\t\tdo not activate plugin\n"
 			  "performance-mode\tenable cacheline-aware layout randomization\n"
 };
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c
index 23bd023a283b..f3d629555b84 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
 tree sancov_fndecl;
 
 static struct plugin_info sancov_plugin_info = {
-	.version	= "20160402",
+	.version	= UTS_RELEASE,
 	.help		= "sancov plugin\n",
 };
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
index 42f0252ee2a4..de817d54b8af 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static bool verbose = false;
 static GTY(()) tree track_function_decl;
 
 static struct plugin_info stackleak_plugin_info = {
-	.version = "201707101337",
+	.version = UTS_RELEASE,
 	.help = "track-min-size=nn\ttrack stack for functions with a stack frame size >= nn bytes\n"
 		"arch=target_arch\tspecify target build arch\n"
 		"disable\t\tdo not activate the plugin\n"
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c
index 74e319288389..86b608a24ec0 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
 
 static struct plugin_info structleak_plugin_info = {
-	.version	= "20190125vanilla",
+	.version	= UTS_RELEASE,
 	.help		= "disable\tdo not activate plugin\n"
 			  "byref\tinit structs passed by reference\n"
 			  "byref-all\tinit anything passed by reference\n"
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From c1298a3a1139c9a73a188fbb153b6eb83dbd4d7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 09:15:53 -0700
Subject: big_keys: Use struct for internal payload

The randstruct GCC plugin gets upset when it sees struct path (which is
randomized) being assigned from a "void *" (which it cannot type-check).

There's no need for these casts, as the entire internal payload use is
following a normal struct layout. Convert the enum-based void * offset
dereferencing to the new big_key_payload struct. No meaningful machine
code changes result after this change, and source readability is improved.

Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type
assignment.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c |  2 -
 security/keys/big_key.c                       | 73 +++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index 19214e573137..5836a7fc7532 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -50,8 +50,6 @@ static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
 	{ "drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c", "page", "address_space" },
 	/* unix_skb_parms via UNIXCB() buffer */
 	{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
-	/* big_key payload.data struct splashing */
-	{ "security/keys/big_key.c", "path", "void *" },
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index d17e5f09eeb8..c3367622c683 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -20,12 +20,13 @@
 /*
  * Layout of key payload words.
  */
-enum {
-	big_key_data,
-	big_key_path,
-	big_key_path_2nd_part,
-	big_key_len,
+struct big_key_payload {
+	u8 *data;
+	struct path path;
+	size_t length;
 };
+#define to_big_key_payload(payload)			\
+	(struct big_key_payload *)((payload).data)
 
 /*
  * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
  */
 int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
 	struct file *file;
 	u8 *buf, *enckey;
 	ssize_t written;
@@ -63,13 +64,15 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
 	int ret;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data));
+
 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Set an arbitrary quota */
 	prep->quotalen = 16;
 
-	prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
+	payload->length = datalen;
 
 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
 		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
@@ -117,9 +120,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
 		 * later
 		 */
-		prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
-		*path = file->f_path;
-		path_get(path);
+		payload->data = enckey;
+		payload->path = file->f_path;
+		path_get(&payload->path);
 		fput(file);
 		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
@@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		if (!data)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
+		payload->data = data;
 		memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -148,12 +151,11 @@ error:
  */
 void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-		struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
 
-		path_put(path);
-	}
-	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+	if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+		path_put(&payload->path);
+	kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -162,13 +164,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
  */
 void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
-	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
 
 	/* clear the quota */
 	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
-	if (key_is_positive(key) &&
-	    (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
-		vfs_truncate(path, 0);
+	if (key_is_positive(key) && payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+		vfs_truncate(&payload->path, 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -176,17 +177,15 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
  */
 void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
-
-	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
 
-		path_put(path);
-		path->mnt = NULL;
-		path->dentry = NULL;
+	if (payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		path_put(&payload->path);
+		payload->path.mnt = NULL;
+		payload->path.dentry = NULL;
 	}
-	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
-	key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
+	kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+	payload->data = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -211,14 +210,14 @@ int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
  */
 void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 {
-	size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
 
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
 
 	if (key_is_positive(key))
 		seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
-			   datalen,
-			   datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
+			   payload->length,
+			   payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -227,16 +226,16 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
  */
 long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 {
-	size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
+	struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+	size_t datalen = payload->length;
 	long ret;
 
 	if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
 		return datalen;
 
 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
 		struct file *file;
-		u8 *buf, *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
+		u8 *buf, *enckey = payload->data;
 		size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
 		loff_t pos = 0;
 
@@ -244,7 +243,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+		file = dentry_open(&payload->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
 		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
 			goto error;
@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ error:
 		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
-		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
+		memcpy(buffer, payload->data, datalen);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 2dcfe9e2d370f6643486e327c6ae17af8887756c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 15:11:54 -0700
Subject: niu: Silence randstruct warnings

Clang randstruct gets upset when it sees struct addresspace (which is
randomized) being assigned to a struct page (which is not randomized):

drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c:3385:12: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct address_space *' to 'struct page *'
                        *link = (struct page *) page->mapping;
                                ^

It looks like niu.c is looking for an in-line place to chain its allocated
pages together and is overloading the "mapping" member, as it is unused.
This is very non-standard, and is expected to be cleaned up in the
future[1], but there is no "correct" way to handle it today.

No meaningful machine code changes result after this change, and source
readability is improved.

Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type
assignment.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YnqgjVoMDu5v9PNG@casper.infradead.org/

Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511151647.7290adbe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c                | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c |  2 --
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
index 42460c0885fc..df70df29deea 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
@@ -35,6 +35,25 @@
 
 #include "niu.h"
 
+/* This driver wants to store a link to a "next page" within the
+ * page struct itself by overloading the content of the "mapping"
+ * member. This is not expected by the page API, but does currently
+ * work. However, the randstruct plugin gets very bothered by this
+ * case because "mapping" (struct address_space) is randomized, so
+ * casts to/from it trigger warnings. Hide this by way of a union,
+ * to create a typed alias of "mapping", since that's how it is
+ * actually being used here.
+ */
+union niu_page {
+	struct page page;
+	struct {
+		unsigned long __flags;	/* unused alias of "flags" */
+		struct list_head __lru;	/* unused alias of "lru" */
+		struct page *next;	/* alias of "mapping" */
+	};
+};
+#define niu_next_page(p)	container_of(p, union niu_page, page)->next
+
 #define DRV_MODULE_NAME		"niu"
 #define DRV_MODULE_VERSION	"1.1"
 #define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE	"Apr 22, 2010"
@@ -3283,7 +3302,7 @@ static struct page *niu_find_rxpage(struct rx_ring_info *rp, u64 addr,
 
 	addr &= PAGE_MASK;
 	pp = &rp->rxhash[h];
-	for (; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = (struct page **) &p->mapping) {
+	for (; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &niu_next_page(p)) {
 		if (p->index == addr) {
 			*link = pp;
 			goto found;
@@ -3300,7 +3319,7 @@ static void niu_hash_page(struct rx_ring_info *rp, struct page *page, u64 base)
 	unsigned int h = niu_hash_rxaddr(rp, base);
 
 	page->index = base;
-	page->mapping = (struct address_space *) rp->rxhash[h];
+	niu_next_page(page) = rp->rxhash[h];
 	rp->rxhash[h] = page;
 }
 
@@ -3382,11 +3401,11 @@ static int niu_rx_pkt_ignore(struct niu *np, struct rx_ring_info *rp)
 		rcr_size = rp->rbr_sizes[(val & RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ) >>
 					 RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ_SHIFT];
 		if ((page->index + PAGE_SIZE) - rcr_size == addr) {
-			*link = (struct page *) page->mapping;
+			*link = niu_next_page(page);
 			np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, page->index,
 					    PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 			page->index = 0;
-			page->mapping = NULL;
+			niu_next_page(page) = NULL;
 			__free_page(page);
 			rp->rbr_refill_pending++;
 		}
@@ -3451,11 +3470,11 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct napi_struct *napi, struct niu *np,
 
 		niu_rx_skb_append(skb, page, off, append_size, rcr_size);
 		if ((page->index + rp->rbr_block_size) - rcr_size == addr) {
-			*link = (struct page *) page->mapping;
+			*link = niu_next_page(page);
 			np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, page->index,
 					    PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 			page->index = 0;
-			page->mapping = NULL;
+			niu_next_page(page) = NULL;
 			rp->rbr_refill_pending++;
 		} else
 			get_page(page);
@@ -3518,13 +3537,13 @@ static void niu_rbr_free(struct niu *np, struct rx_ring_info *rp)
 
 		page = rp->rxhash[i];
 		while (page) {
-			struct page *next = (struct page *) page->mapping;
+			struct page *next = niu_next_page(page);
 			u64 base = page->index;
 
 			np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, base, PAGE_SIZE,
 					    DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 			page->index = 0;
-			page->mapping = NULL;
+			niu_next_page(page) = NULL;
 
 			__free_page(page);
 
@@ -6440,8 +6459,7 @@ static void niu_reset_buffers(struct niu *np)
 
 				page = rp->rxhash[j];
 				while (page) {
-					struct page *next =
-						(struct page *) page->mapping;
+					struct page *next = niu_next_page(page);
 					u64 base = page->index;
 					base = base >> RBR_DESCR_ADDR_SHIFT;
 					rp->rbr[k++] = cpu_to_le32(base);
@@ -10176,6 +10194,9 @@ static int __init niu_init(void)
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE < 4 * 1024);
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct page, mapping) !=
+		     offsetof(union niu_page, next));
+
 	niu_debug = netif_msg_init(debug, NIU_MSG_DEFAULT);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPARC64
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index 5836a7fc7532..c9d345a91c41 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ struct whitelist_entry {
 };
 
 static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
-	/* NIU overloads mapping with page struct */
-	{ "drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c", "page", "address_space" },
 	/* unix_skb_parms via UNIXCB() buffer */
 	{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
 	{ }
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From b146cbf2e32f01f56244d670aef2f43d44fcf120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 15:46:26 -0700
Subject: af_unix: Silence randstruct GCC plugin warning

While preparing for Clang randstruct support (which duplicated many of
the warnings the randstruct GCC plugin warned about), one strange one
remained only for the randstruct GCC plugin. Eliminating this rids
the plugin of the last exception.

It seems the plugin is happy to dereference individual members of
a cross-struct cast, but it is upset about casting to a whole object
pointer. This only manifests in one place in the kernel, so just replace
the variable with individual member accesses. There is no change in
executable instruction output.

Drop the last exception from the randstruct GCC plugin.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511022217.58586-1-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511151542.4cb3ff17@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c                            | 8 +++-----
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 2 --
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index e71a312faa1e..36367e7e3e0a 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1808,11 +1808,9 @@ static int maybe_init_creds(struct scm_cookie *scm,
 static bool unix_skb_scm_eq(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			    struct scm_cookie *scm)
 {
-	const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb);
-
-	return u->pid == scm->pid &&
-	       uid_eq(u->uid, scm->creds.uid) &&
-	       gid_eq(u->gid, scm->creds.gid) &&
+	return UNIXCB(skb).pid == scm->pid &&
+	       uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, scm->creds.uid) &&
+	       gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, scm->creds.gid) &&
 	       unix_secdata_eq(scm, skb);
 }
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index c9d345a91c41..2ca768d88a68 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ struct whitelist_entry {
 };
 
 static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
-	/* unix_skb_parms via UNIXCB() buffer */
-	{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
 	{ }
 };
 
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494


From 710e4ebfbacac53b05c86a01e6d636c69f6eca9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 16:22:45 -0700
Subject: gcc-plugins: randstruct: Remove cast exception handling

With all randstruct exceptions removed, remove all the exception
handling code. Any future warnings are likely to be shared between
this plugin and Clang randstruct, and will need to be addressed in a
more wholistic fashion.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 79 +--------------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

(limited to 'scripts')

diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index 2ca768d88a68..ea2aea570404 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -39,16 +39,6 @@ static struct plugin_info randomize_layout_plugin_info = {
 			  "performance-mode\tenable cacheline-aware layout randomization\n"
 };
 
-struct whitelist_entry {
-	const char *pathname;
-	const char *lhs;
-	const char *rhs;
-};
-
-static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
-	{ }
-};
-
 /* from old Linux dcache.h */
 static inline unsigned long
 partial_name_hash(unsigned long c, unsigned long prevhash)
@@ -734,60 +724,6 @@ static void handle_local_var_initializers(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool type_name_eq(gimple stmt, const_tree type_tree, const char *wanted_name)
-{
-	const char *type_name;
-
-	if (type_tree == NULL_TREE)
-		return false;
-
-	switch (TREE_CODE(type_tree)) {
-	case RECORD_TYPE:
-		type_name = TYPE_NAME_POINTER(type_tree);
-		break;
-	case INTEGER_TYPE:
-		if (TYPE_PRECISION(type_tree) == CHAR_TYPE_SIZE)
-			type_name = "char";
-		else {
-			INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-char INTEGER_TYPE cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
-			debug_tree(type_tree);
-			return false;
-		}
-		break;
-	case POINTER_TYPE:
-		if (TREE_CODE(TREE_TYPE(type_tree)) == VOID_TYPE) {
-			type_name = "void *";
-			break;
-		} else {
-			INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-void POINTER_TYPE cast comparison %qT\n", type_tree);
-			debug_tree(type_tree);
-			return false;
-		}
-	default:
-		INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "unhandled cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
-		debug_tree(type_tree);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	return strcmp(type_name, wanted_name) == 0;
-}
-
-static bool whitelisted_cast(gimple stmt, const_tree lhs_tree, const_tree rhs_tree)
-{
-	const struct whitelist_entry *entry;
-	expanded_location xloc = expand_location(gimple_location(stmt));
-
-	for (entry = whitelist; entry->pathname; entry++) {
-		if (!strstr(xloc.file, entry->pathname))
-			continue;
-
-		if (type_name_eq(stmt, lhs_tree, entry->lhs) && type_name_eq(stmt, rhs_tree, entry->rhs))
-			return true;
-	}
-
-	return false;
-}
-
 /*
  * iterate over all statements to find "bad" casts:
  * those where the address of the start of a structure is cast
@@ -864,10 +800,7 @@ static unsigned int find_bad_casts_execute(void)
 #ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
 				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_lhs_type)))
 #endif
-				{
-					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
-						MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "rhs", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
-				}
+				MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "rhs", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
 				continue;
 			}
 
@@ -890,10 +823,7 @@ static unsigned int find_bad_casts_execute(void)
 #ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
 				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(op0_type)))
 #endif
-				{
-					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, op0_type))
-						MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "op0", ptr_lhs_type, op0_type);
-				}
+				MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "op0", ptr_lhs_type, op0_type);
 			} else {
 				const_tree ssa_name_var = SSA_NAME_VAR(rhs1);
 				/* skip bogus type casts introduced by container_of */
@@ -903,10 +833,7 @@ static unsigned int find_bad_casts_execute(void)
 #ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
 				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_rhs_type)))
 #endif
-				{
-					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
-						MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "ssa", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
-				}
+				MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "ssa", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
 			}
 
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.3-18-gd494