From 160da84dbb39443fdade7151bc63a88f8e953077 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 10:04:54 -0700
Subject: userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.

As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/commoncap.c')

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe6648e..9fccf71b2b62 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  */
 static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
 {
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (!cap_valid(cap))
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
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