From 98c88651365767c72ec6dc672072423bc19a39aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 17:17:25 -0700 Subject: SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure at some later date. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index beec1de5c2da..ad227177550b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3708,12 +3708,6 @@ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); - /* - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. - */ - BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE); - cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL; kfree(tsec); } -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b