From 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:15:24 -0500 Subject: ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'sound/core') diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c index ee601d7f0926..c0690d1ecd55 100644 --- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card, return -ENXIO; if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1) return -EINVAL; + info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2); pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream]; if (pstr->substream_count == 0) return -ENOENT; -- cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b