// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2020 Francis Laniel * * Add tests related to fortified functions in this file. */ #include "lkdtm.h" #include #include static volatile int fortify_scratch_space; void lkdtm_FORTIFIED_OBJECT(void) { struct target { char a[10]; } target[2] = {}; /* * Using volatile prevents the compiler from determining the value of * 'size' at compile time. Without that, we would get a compile error * rather than a runtime error. */ volatile int size = 11; pr_info("trying to read past the end of a struct\n"); /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ fortify_scratch_space = memcmp(&target[0], &target[1], size); pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block an object overread!\n"); pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); } void lkdtm_FORTIFIED_SUBOBJECT(void) { struct target { char a[10]; char b[10]; } target; volatile int size = 20; char *src; src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); strscpy(src, "over ten bytes", size); size = strlen(src) + 1; pr_info("trying to strcpy past the end of a member of a struct\n"); /* * memcpy(target.a, src, 20); will hit a compile error because the * compiler knows at build time that target.a < 20 bytes. Use a * volatile to force a runtime error. */ memcpy(target.a, src, size); /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3]; pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block an sub-object overrun!\n"); pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); kfree(src); } /* * Calls fortified strscpy to test that it returns the same result as vanilla * strscpy and generate a panic because there is a write overflow (i.e. src * length is greater than dst length). */ void lkdtm_FORTIFIED_STRSCPY(void) { char *src; char dst[5]; struct { union { char big[10]; char src[5]; }; } weird = { .big = "hello!" }; char weird_dst[sizeof(weird.src) + 1]; src = kstrdup("foobar", GFP_KERNEL); if (src == NULL) return; /* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if size is 0. */ if (strscpy(dst, src, 0) != -E2BIG) pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() of 0 length did not return -E2BIG\n"); /* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if src is truncated. */ if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != -E2BIG) pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return -E2BIG while src is truncated\n"); /* After above call, dst must contain "foob" because src was truncated. */ if (strncmp(dst, "foob", sizeof(dst)) != 0) pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foob\" but \"%s\"\n", dst); /* Shrink src so the strscpy() below succeeds. */ src[3] = '\0'; /* * Vanilla strscpy returns number of character copied if everything goes * well. */ if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != 3) pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return 3 while src was copied entirely truncated\n"); /* After above call, dst must contain "foo" because src was copied. */ if (strncmp(dst, "foo", sizeof(dst)) != 0) pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foo\" but \"%s\"\n", dst); /* Test when src is embedded inside a union. */ strscpy(weird_dst, weird.src, sizeof(weird_dst)); if (strcmp(weird_dst, "hello") != 0) pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() weird_dst does not contain \"hello\" but \"%s\"\n", weird_dst); /* Restore src to its initial value. */ src[3] = 'b'; /* * Use strlen here so size cannot be known at compile time and there is * a runtime write overflow. */ strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src)); pr_err("FAIL: strscpy() overflow not detected!\n"); pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); kfree(src); }