# # Security configuration # menu "Security options" config KEYS bool "Enable access key retention support" help This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and access keys in the kernel. It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption support and the like can find them. Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring: a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session, process and thread. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" depends on KEYS help This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the reading process. The only keys included in the list are those that grant View permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in the resulting table. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS help This allows you to choose different security modules to be configured into your kernel. If this option is not selected, the default Linux security model will be used. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITYFS bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" help This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY help This enables the socket and networking security hooks. If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK help This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to implement per-packet access controls based on labels derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized to communicate unlabelled data can send without using IPSec. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_PATH bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" depends on SECURITY help This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to implement pathname based access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities" default n help This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0. If in doubt, answer N. config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG bool "Root Plug Support" depends on USB=y && SECURITY help This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such. It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific USB device is not present in the system. See for more information about this module. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config INTEL_TXT bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT help This option enables support for booting the kernel with the Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this will have no effect. Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside of the kernel itself. Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. See for more information about Intel(R) TXT. See for more information about tboot. See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX default 65536 help This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map this low address space will need the permission specific to the systems running LSM. source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig endmenu