/* * AppArmor security module * * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/capability.h" #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/procattr.h" /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ int apparmor_initialized __initdata; /* * LSM hook functions */ /* * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles */ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { aa_free_task_context(cred->security); cred->security = NULL; } /* * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials */ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); if (!cxt) return -ENOMEM; cred->security = cxt; return 0; } /* * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block */ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); if (!cxt) return -ENOMEM; aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security); new->security = cxt; return 0; } /* * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds */ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security; struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security; aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); } static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); if (error) return error; return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); } static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); if (error) return error; return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); } /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { struct aa_profile *profile; const struct cred *cred; rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(target); profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); *effective = cred->cap_effective; *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); } rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; } static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); if (!error) { profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(profile)) error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit); } return error; } /** * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths * @op: operation being checked * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) * @mask: requested permissions mask * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) * * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied */ static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, struct path_cond *cond) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; profile = __aa_current_profile(); if (!unconfined(profile)) error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); return error; } /** * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry * @op: operation being checked * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) * @mask: requested permissions mask * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) * * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied */ static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, struct path_cond *cond) { struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); } /** * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry * @op: operation being checked * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) * @mask: requested permissions mask * * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied */ static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) { struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid, dentry->d_inode->i_mode }; return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); } /** * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm * @op: operation being checked * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) * @mask: requested permission mask * * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied */ static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct path_cond cond = { }; if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode)) return 0; cond.uid = inode->i_uid; cond.mode = inode->i_mode; return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); } /** * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create * @op: operation being checked * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) * @mask: request permission mask * @mode: created file mode * * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied */ static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) { struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode)) return 0; return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); } static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); } static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, S_IFDIR); } static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); } static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) { return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); } static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) { struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode }; if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) return 0; return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, &cond); } static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name) { return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, S_IFLNK); } static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) return 0; profile = aa_current_profile(); if (!unconfined(profile)) error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); return error; } static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) return 0; profile = aa_current_profile(); if (!unconfined(profile)) { struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode }; error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, &cond); if (!error) error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); } return error; } static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) { if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) return 0; return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); } static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode }; if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) return 0; return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); } static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) { if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) return 0; return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_META_READ); } static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) return 0; /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to * actually execute the image. */ if (current->in_execve) { fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; return 0; } profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(profile)) { struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); } return error; } static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); if (!file->f_security) return -ENOMEM; return 0; } static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; aa_free_file_context(cxt); } static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) { struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); int error = 0; BUG_ON(!fprofile); if (!file->f_path.mnt || !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) return 0; profile = __aa_current_profile(); /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than * was granted. * * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file * delegation from unconfined tasks */ if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); return error; } static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); } static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; if (cmd == F_WRLCK) mask |= MAY_WRITE; return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); } static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct dentry *dentry; int mask = 0; if (!file || !file->f_security) return 0; if (prot & PROT_READ) mask |= MAY_READ; /* * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't * write back to the files */ if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) mask |= MAY_WRITE; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; dentry = file->f_path.dentry; return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); } static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); } static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); } static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, char **value) { int error = -ENOENT; struct aa_profile *profile; /* released below */ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile), value); else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous), value); else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec), value); else error = -EINVAL; put_cred(cred); return error; } static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { char *command, *args = value; size_t arg_size; int error; if (size == 0) return -EINVAL; /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them */ if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { if (size == PAGE_SIZE) return -EINVAL; args[size] = '\0'; } /* task can only write its own attributes */ if (current != task) return -EACCES; args = value; args = strim(args); command = strsep(&args, " "); if (!args) return -EINVAL; args = skip_spaces(args); if (!*args) return -EINVAL; arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, !AA_DO_TEST); } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, AA_DO_TEST); } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST); } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, AA_DO_TEST); } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); } else { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; aad.info = name; aad.error = -EINVAL; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL, &sa, NULL); } } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST); } else { /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ return -EINVAL; } if (!error) error = size; return error; } static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); int error = 0; if (!unconfined(profile)) error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim); return error; } static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { .name = "apparmor", .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, .capget = apparmor_capget, .capable = apparmor_capable, .path_link = apparmor_path_link, .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, .file_open = apparmor_file_open, .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file, .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, }; /* * AppArmor sysfs module parameters */ static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { .set = param_set_aabool, .get = param_get_aabool }; static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { .set = param_set_aauint, .get = param_get_aauint }; static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, .get = param_get_aalockpolicy }; static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. */ /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Debug mode */ bool aa_g_debug; module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Audit mode */ enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running */ bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* lock out loading/removal of policy * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to * load policy, if lock_policy is set */ bool aa_g_lock_policy; module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Syscall logging mode */ bool aa_g_logsyscall; module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification * on the loaded policy is done. */ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Boot time disable flag */ static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); if (!error) apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (aa_g_lock_policy) return -EACCES; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return param_set_uint(val, kp); } static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); } static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; if (!val) return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { aa_g_audit = i; return 0; } } return -EINVAL; } static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); } static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; if (!val) return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { aa_g_profile_mode = i; return 0; } } return -EINVAL; } /* * AppArmor init functions */ /** * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. * * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined */ static int __init set_init_cxt(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); if (!cxt) return -ENOMEM; cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); cred->security = cxt; return 0; } static int __init apparmor_init(void) { int error; if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); apparmor_enabled = 0; return 0; } error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); goto alloc_out; } error = set_init_cxt(); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); goto register_security_out; } error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); goto set_init_cxt_out; } /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized = 1; if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); else aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); return error; set_init_cxt_out: aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security); register_security_out: aa_free_root_ns(); alloc_out: aa_destroy_aafs(); apparmor_enabled = 0; return error; } security_initcall(apparmor_init);