// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation * * Author: * Mimi Zohar * Kylene Hall * * File: evm_main.c * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; int evm_hmac_attrs; static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { { .name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_IMA, .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) }, { .name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS, .enabled = true }, }; LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) evm_fixmode = 1; else pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); static void __init evm_init_config(void) { int i, xattrs; xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames); pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n"); for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) { pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name, !evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ? " (disabled)" : ""); list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list, &evm_config_xattrnames); } #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; #endif pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); } static bool evm_key_loaded(void) { return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } /* * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. */ static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void) { if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) return false; if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return false; return true; } static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; int error; int count = 0; if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0); if (error < 0) { if (error == -ENODATA) continue; return error; } count++; } return count; } /* * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr * * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. * * For performance: * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the * HMAC.) * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. * * Returns integrity status */ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ /* first need to know the sig type */ rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */ } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } goto out; } xattr_len = rc; /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: evm_immutable = 1; fallthrough; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data; digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo; rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); if (!rc) { inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { if (iint) iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE; } else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) && !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) && !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) { evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } } break; default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } if (rc) { if (rc == -ENODATA) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; else if (evm_immutable) evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; else evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length, digest.digest); out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name, bool all_xattrs) { int namelen; int found = 0; struct xattr_list *xattr; namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled) continue; if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen) && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) { found = 1; break; } if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { found = 1; break; } } return found; } static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) { return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false); } int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name) { return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true); } /** * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs * @inode: inode of the read xattrs * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to * @buffer_size: size of buffer * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format) * * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL, * just return the total size. * * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error. */ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt) { struct xattr_list *xattr; int rc, size, total_size = 0; list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA) continue; else if (rc < 0) return rc; switch (type) { case 'n': size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1; if (buffer) { if (total_size) *(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|'; memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size); } break; case 'l': size = sizeof(u32); if (buffer) { if (canonical_fmt) rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc); *(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc; } break; case 'v': size = rc; if (buffer) { rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name, buffer + total_size, buffer_size - total_size); if (rc < 0) return rc; } break; default: return -EINVAL; } total_size += size; } return total_size; } /** * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr * @dentry: object of the verify xattr * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length * * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. * * Returns the xattr integrity status. * * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. */ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (!iint) { iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (!iint) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, iint); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); /* * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. */ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) return INTEGRITY_PASS; return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } /* * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length * * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM. * * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise. */ static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL umode_t mode; struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res; struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); int rc; /* * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs. * * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is * guaranteed to have. */ acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode), xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) return 1; acl_res = acl; /* * Passing mnt_userns is necessary to correctly determine the GID in * an idmapped mount, as the GID is used to clear the setgid bit in * the inode mode. */ rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &acl_res); posix_acl_release(acl); if (rc) return 1; if (inode->i_mode != mode) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length * * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value. * * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise. */ static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { char *xattr_data = NULL; int rc = 0; if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) return evm_xattr_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc < 0) return 1; if (rc == xattr_value_len) rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc); else rc = 1; kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid. * * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. */ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { enum integrity_status evm_status; if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; goto out; } evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ if (evm_hmac_disabled()) return 0; iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) return 0; /* exception for pseudo filesystems */ if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name, "update_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); } out: /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) return 0; /* * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable * signatures are immutable and can never be updated. */ if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) return 0; if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len)) return 0; if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS && evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } /** * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } /** * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the * EVM status. * * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. */ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_key_loaded()) return false; /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */ if (!xattr_name) return true; if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) && strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return false; return true; } /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. * * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return; evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. * * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return; evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; if (!i_uid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) && !i_gid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) && (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode)) return 0; return 1; } /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures * are immutable and can never be updated. */ if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) return 0; if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_attr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, attr)) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); return -EPERM; } /** * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID * changes. * * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return; if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; return 0; out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 void __init evm_load_x509(void) { int rc; rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); if (!rc) evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509; } #endif static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; struct list_head *pos, *q; evm_init_config(); error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM); if (error) goto error; error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); goto error; } error: if (error != 0) { if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) { list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) list_del(pos); } } return error; } late_initcall(init_evm);