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Fix "WARNING: Title underline too short" by extending title line to the
proper length.
Signed-off-by: Chang Yu <marcus.yu.56@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ZqB3lofbzMQh5Q-5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SAP's vSMP MemoryONE continuously requests a local APIC timer period
less than 500 us, resulting in the following kernel log spam:
kvm: vcpu 15: requested 70240 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 19: requested 52848 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 15: requested 70256 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 70256 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 70208 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 387520 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 70160 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 66: requested 205744 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 70224 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
kvm: vcpu 9: requested 70256 ns lapic timer period limited to 500000 ns
limit_periodic_timer_frequency: 7569 callbacks suppressed
...
To eliminate this spam, change the pr_info_ratelimited() in
limit_periodic_timer_frequency() to pr_info_once().
Reported-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240724190640.2449291-1-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
enrolled cloud service providers (CSPs).
For VLEK keys, an SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP firmware command is used to load
them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS. Add a
corresponding userspace interface so to allow the loading of VLEK keys
into the system.
See SEV-SNP Firmware ABI 1.54, SNP_VLEK_LOAD for more details.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-21-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Similar to kvm_x86_call(), kvm_pmu_call() is added to streamline the usage
of static calls of kvm_pmu_ops, which improves code readability.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507133103.15052-4-wei.w.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduces kvm_x86_call(), to streamline the usage of static calls of
kvm_x86_ops. The current implementation of these calls is verbose and
could lead to alignment challenges. This makes the code susceptible to
exceeding the "80 columns per single line of code" limit as defined in
the coding-style document. Another issue with the existing implementation
is that the addition of kvm_x86_ prefix to hooks at the static_call sites
hinders code readability and navigation. kvm_x86_call() is added to
improve code readability and maintainability, while adhering to the coding
style guidelines.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507133103.15052-3-wei.w.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The use of static_call_cond() is essentially the same as static_call() on
x86 (e.g. static_call() now handles a NULL pointer as a NOP), so replace
it with static_call() to simplify the code.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3916caa1dcd114301a49beafa5030eca396745c1.1679456900.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org/
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507133103.15052-2-wei.w.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of GHCB specification added support for the SNP Extended Guest
Request Message NAE event. This event serves a nearly identical purpose
to the previously-added SNP_GUEST_REQUEST event, but for certain message
types it allows the guest to supply a buffer to be used for additional
information in some cases.
Currently the GHCB spec only defines extended handling of this sort in
the case of attestation requests, where the additional buffer is used to
supply a table of certificate data corresponding to the attestion
report's signing key. Support for this extended handling will require
additional KVM APIs to handle coordinating with userspace.
Whether or not the hypervisor opts to provide this certificate data is
optional. However, support for processing SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST
GHCB requests is required by the GHCB 2.0 specification for SNP guests,
so for now implement a stub implementation that provides an empty
certificate table to the guest if it supplies an additional buffer, but
otherwise behaves identically to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST.
Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao.osdev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240701223148.3798365-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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sev_guest.h currently contains various definitions relating to the
format of SNP_GUEST_REQUEST commands to SNP firmware. Currently only the
sev-guest driver makes use of them, but when the KVM side of this is
implemented there's a need to parse the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST header to
determine whether additional information needs to be provided to the
guest. Prepare for this by moving those definitions to a common header
that's shared by host/guest code so that KVM can also make use of them.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240701223148.3798365-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of GHCB specification added support for the SNP Guest Request
Message NAE event. The event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to make
requests to the SEV-SNP firmware through the hypervisor using the
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API defined in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
This is used by guests primarily to request attestation reports from
firmware. There are other request types are available as well, but the
specifics of what guest requests are being made generally does not
affect how they are handled by the hypervisor, which only serves as a
proxy for the guest requests and firmware responses.
Implement handling for these events.
When an SNP Guest Request is issued, the guest will provide its own
request/response pages, which could in theory be passed along directly
to firmware. However, these pages would need special care:
- Both pages are from shared guest memory, so they need to be
protected from migration/etc. occurring while firmware reads/writes
to them. At a minimum, this requires elevating the ref counts and
potentially needing an explicit pinning of the memory. This places
additional restrictions on what type of memory backends userspace
can use for shared guest memory since there would be some reliance
on using refcounted pages.
- The response page needs to be switched to Firmware-owned state
before the firmware can write to it, which can lead to potential
host RMP #PFs if the guest is misbehaved and hands the host a
guest page that KVM is writing to for other reasons (e.g. virtio
buffers).
Both of these issues can be avoided completely by using
separately-allocated bounce pages for both the request/response pages
and passing those to firmware instead. So that's the approach taken
here.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
[mdr: ensure FW command failures are indicated to guest, drop extended
request handling to be re-written as separate patch, massage commit]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240701223148.3798365-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are triggered when
emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support userspace MMIO during
complex (multi-step) emulation. Silently ignoring the exit request can
result in the WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to
userspace for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed.
See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write exits if
emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's limitations with
respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator flows.
Reported-by: syzbot+2fb9f8ed752c01bc9a3f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240712144841.1230591-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Tweak the definition of make_huge_page_split_spte() to eliminate an
unnecessarily long line, and opportunistically initialize child_spte to
make it more obvious that the child is directly derived from the huge
parent.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240712151335.1242633-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE that is
non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a broken state as
the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, e.g. the shadow MMU will add an
rmap entry, and all MMUs will account the expected small page. Returning
'0' is also technically wrong now that SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE exists,
i.e. would cause KVM to create a potential #VE SPTE.
While it would be possible to have the callers gracefully handle failure,
doing so would provide no practical value as the scenario really should be
impossible, while the error handling would add a non-trivial amount of
noise.
Fixes: a3fe5dbda0a4 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Split huge pages mapped by the TDP MMU when dirty logging is enabled")
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240712151335.1242633-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a test case to exercise KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY and run the guest to access the
pre-populated area. It tests KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM
and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <32427791ef42e5efaafb05d2ac37fa4372715f47.1712785629.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wire KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl to kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() to populate guest
memory. It can be called right after KVM_CREATE_VCPU creates a vCPU,
since at that point kvm_mmu_create() and kvm_init_mmu() are called and
the vCPU is ready to invoke the KVM page fault handler.
The helper function kvm_tdp_map_page() takes care of the logic to
process RET_PF_* return values and convert them to success or errno.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <9b866a0ae7147f96571c439e75429a03dcb659b6.1712785629.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The guest memory population logic will need to know what page size or level
(4K, 2M, ...) is mapped.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <eabc3f3e5eb03b370cadf6e1901ea34d7a020adc.1712785629.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the accounting of the result of kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() to its
callers, as only pf_fixed is common to guest page faults and async #PFs,
and upcoming support KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY won't bump _any_ stats.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Account stat.pf_taken in kvm_mmu_page_fault(), i.e. the actual page fault
handler, instead of conditionally bumping it in kvm_mmu_do_page_fault().
The "real" page fault handler is the only path that should ever increment
the number of taken page faults, as all other paths that "do page fault"
are by definition not handling faults that occurred in the guest.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a new ioctl KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY in the KVM common code. It iterates on the
memory range and calls the arch-specific function. The implementation is
optional and enabled by a Kconfig symbol.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Message-ID: <819322b8f25971f2b9933bfa4506e618508ad782.1712785629.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Adds documentation of KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl. [1]
It populates guest memory. It doesn't do extra operations on the
underlying technology-specific initialization [2]. For example,
CoCo-related operations won't be performed. Concretely for TDX, this API
won't invoke TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD() or TDH.MR.EXTEND(). Vendor-specific APIs
are required for such operations.
The key point is to adapt of vcpu ioctl instead of VM ioctl. First,
populating guest memory requires vcpu. If it is VM ioctl, we need to pick
one vcpu somehow. Secondly, vcpu ioctl allows each vcpu to invoke this
ioctl in parallel. It helps to scale regarding guest memory size, e.g.,
hundreds of GB.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/Zbrj5WKVgMsUFDtb@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/Ze-TJh0BBOWm9spT@google.com/
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <9a060293c9ad9a78f1d8994cfe1311e818e99257.1712785629.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The flags AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE were both added just for guest_memfd;
AS_UNMOVABLE is already in existing versions of Linux, while AS_INACCESSIBLE was
acked for inclusion in 6.11.
But really, they are the same thing: only guest_memfd uses them, at least for
now, and guest_memfd pages are unmovable because they should not be
accessed by the CPU.
So merge them into one; use the AS_INACCESSIBLE name which is more comprehensive.
At the same time, this fixes an embarrassing bug where AS_INACCESSIBLE was used
as a bit mask, despite it being just a bit index.
The bug was mostly benign, because AS_INACCESSIBLE's bit representation (1010)
corresponded to setting AS_UNEVICTABLE (which is already set) and AS_ENOSPC
(except no async writes can happen on the guest_memfd). So the AS_INACCESSIBLE
flag simply had no effect.
Fixes: 1d23040caa8b ("KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode")
Fixes: c72ceafbd12c ("mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory")
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for 'perf kvm stat' on loongarch64 platform, now only kvm
exit event is supported.
Here is example output about "perf kvm --host stat report" command
Event name Samples Sample% Time (ns) Time% Mean Time (ns)
Mem Store 83969 51.00% 625697070 8.00% 7451
Mem Read 37641 22.00% 112485730 1.00% 2988
Interrupt 15542 9.00% 20620190 0.00% 1326
IOCSR 15207 9.00% 94296190 1.00% 6200
Hypercall 4873 2.00% 12265280 0.00% 2516
Idle 3713 2.00% 6322055860 87.00% 1702681
FPU 1819 1.00% 2750300 0.00% 1511
Inst Fetch 502 0.00% 1341740 0.00% 2672
Mem Modify 324 0.00% 602240 0.00% 1858
CPUCFG 55 0.00% 77610 0.00% 1411
CSR 12 0.00% 19690 0.00% 1640
LASX 3 0.00% 4870 0.00% 1623
LSX 2 0.00% 2100 0.00% 1050
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Per-cpu struct kvm_steal_time is added here, its size is 64 bytes and
also defined as 64 bytes, so that the whole structure is in one physical
page.
When a VCPU is online, function pv_enable_steal_time() is called. This
function will pass guest physical address of struct kvm_steal_time and
tells hypervisor to enable steal time. When a vcpu is offline, physical
address is set as 0 and tells hypervisor to disable steal time.
Here is an output of vmstat on guest when there is workload on both host
and guest. It shows steal time stat information.
procs -----------memory---------- -----io---- -system-- ------cpu-----
r b swpd free inact active bi bo in cs us sy id wa st
15 1 0 7583616 184112 72208 20 0 162 52 31 6 43 0 20
17 0 0 7583616 184704 72192 0 0 6318 6885 5 60 8 5 22
16 0 0 7583616 185392 72144 0 0 1766 1081 0 49 0 1 50
16 0 0 7583616 184816 72304 0 0 6300 6166 4 62 12 2 20
18 0 0 7583632 184480 72240 0 0 2814 1754 2 58 4 1 35
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Add ParaVirt steal time feature in host side, VM can search supported
features provided by KVM hypervisor, a feature KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME
is added here. Like x86, steal time structure is saved in guest memory,
one hypercall function KVM_HCALL_FUNC_NOTIFY is added to notify KVM to
enable this feature.
One CPU attr ioctl command KVM_LOONGARCH_VCPU_PVTIME_CTRL is added to
save and restore the base address of steal time structure when a VM is
migrated.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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It seems redundant to check if pte is young before the call to
kvm_pte_mkyoung() in kvm_map_page_fast(). Just remove the check.
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jia Qingtong <jiaqingtong97@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Function kvm_map_page_fast() is fast path of secondary mmu page fault
flow, pfn is parsed from secondary mmu page table walker. However the
corresponding page reference is not added, it is dangerious to access
page out of mmu_lock.
Here page ref is added inside mmu_lock, function kvm_set_pfn_accessed()
and kvm_set_pfn_dirty() is called with page ref added, so that the page
will not be freed by others.
Also kvm_set_pfn_accessed() is removed here since it is called in the
following function kvm_release_pfn_clean().
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Add KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET support on LoongArch system, this
feature comes from other architectures like x86 and arm64.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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When updating pmd entry such as allocating new pmd page or splitting
huge page into normal page, it is necessary to firstly update all pte
entries, and then update pmd entry.
It is weak order with LoongArch system, there will be problem if other
VCPUs see pmd update firstly while ptes are not updated. Here smp_wmb()
is added to assure this.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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For readonly memslot such as UEFI BIOS or UEFI var space, guest cannot
write this memory space directly. So it is not necessary to track dirty
pages for readonly memslot. Here we make such optimization in function
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region().
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Currently page level selection about secondary mmu depends on memory
slot and page level about host mmu. There will be problems if page level
of secondary mmu is zero already. Huge page cannot be selected if there is
normal page mapped in secondary mmu already, since it is not supported to
merge normal pages into huge pages now.
So page level selection should depend on the following three conditions.
1. Memslot is aligned for huge page and vm is not migrating.
2. Page level of host mmu is also huge page.
3. Page level of secondary mmu is suituable for huge page.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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With hardware assisted virtualization, there are two level HW mmu, one
is GVA to GPA mapping, the other is GPA to HPA mapping which is called
secondary mmu in generic. If there is page fault for secondary mmu,
there needs tlb flush operation indexed with fault GPA address and VMID.
VMID is stored at register CSR.GSTAT and will be reload or recalculated
before guest entry.
Currently CSR.GSTAT is not saved and restored during VCPU context
switch, instead it is recalculated during guest entry. So CSR.GSTAT is
effective only when a VCPU runs in guest mode, however it may not be
effective if the VCPU exits to host mode. Since register CSR.GSTAT may
be stale, it may records the VMID of the last schedule-out VCPU, rather
than the current VCPU.
Function kvm_flush_tlb_gpa() should be called with its real VMID, so
here move it to the guest entrance. Also an arch-specific request id
KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GPA is added to flush tlb for secondary mmu, and it
can be optimized if VMID is updated, since all guest tlb entries will
be invalid if VMID is updated.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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Currently interrupts are posted and cleared with the asynchronous mode,
meanwhile they are saved in SW state vcpu::arch::irq_pending and vcpu::
arch::irq_clear. When vcpu is ready to run, pending interrupt is written
back to CSR.ESTAT register from SW state vcpu::arch::irq_pending at the
guest entrance.
During VM migration stage, vcpu is put into stopped state, however
pending interrupts are not synced to CSR.ESTAT register. So there will
be interrupt lost when VCPU is migrated to another host machines.
Here in this patch when ESTAT CSR register is read from VMM user mode,
pending interrupts are synchronized to ESTAT also. So that VMM can get
correct pending interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
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This reverts commit eb9d53d4a949c6d6d7c9f130e537f6b5687fedf9.
As Marc pointed out on the list [*], this patch is wrong, and those who
find themselves in the SOB chain should have their heads checked.
Annoyingly, the architecture has some FGT trap bits that are negative
(i.e. 0 implies trap), and there was some confusion how KVM handles
this for nested guests. However, it is clear now that KVM honors the
RES0-ness of FGT traps already, meaning traps for features never exposed
to the guest hypervisor get handled at L0. As they should.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/86bk3c3uss.wl-maz@kernel.org/T/#mb9abb3dd79f6a4544a91cb35676bd637c3a5e836
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Currently building the powerpc selftests with USERCFLAGS set to anything
causes the build to break:
$ make -C tools/testing/selftests/powerpc V=1 USERCFLAGS=-Wno-error
...
gcc -Wno-error cache_shape.c ...
cache_shape.c:18:10: fatal error: utils.h: No such file or directory
18 | #include "utils.h"
| ^~~~~~~~~
compilation terminated.
This happens because the USERCFLAGS are added to CFLAGS in lib.mk, which
causes the check of CFLAGS in powerpc/flags.mk to skip setting CFLAGS at
all, resulting in none of the usual CFLAGS being passed. That can
be seen in the output above, the only flag passed to the compiler is
-Wno-error.
Fix it by dropping the conditional setting of CFLAGS in flags.mk.
Instead always set CFLAGS, but also append USERCFLAGS if they are set.
Note that appending to CFLAGS (with +=) wouldn't work, because flags.mk
is included by multiple Makefiles (to support partial builds), causing
CFLAGS to be appended to multiple times. Additionally that would place
the USERCFLAGS prior to the standard CFLAGS, meaning the USERCFLAGS
couldn't override the standard flags. Being able to override the
standard flags is desirable, for example for adding -Wno-error.
With the fix in place, the CFLAGS are set correctly, including the
USERCFLAGS:
$ make -C tools/testing/selftests/powerpc V=1 USERCFLAGS=-Wno-error
...
gcc -std=gnu99 -O2 -Wall -Werror -DGIT_VERSION='"v6.10-rc2-7-gdea17e7e56c3"'
-I/home/michael/linux/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include -Wno-error
cache_shape.c ...
Fixes: 5553a79387e9 ("selftests/powerpc: Add flags.mk to support pmu buildable")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240706120833.909853-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
DTS for Nokia N900 incorrectly specifies "active high" polarity for
the reset line, while the chip documentation actually specifies it as
"active low". In the past the driver fudged gpiod API and inverted
the logic internally, but it was changed in d0d89493bff8.
Fixes: d0d89493bff8 ("Input: tsc2004/5 - switch to using generic device properties")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZoWXwYtwgJIxi-hD@google.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
|
|
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause
a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in
tpm2_*_auth_session().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
While creating a new RSS context, bnxt_rfs_capable() currently
makes a strict check to see if the required VNICs are already
available. If the current VNICs are not what is required,
either too many or not enough, it will call the firmware to
reserve the exact number required.
There is a bug in the firmware when the driver tries to
relinquish some reserved VNICs and RSS contexts. It will
cause the default VNIC to lose its RSS configuration and
cause receive packets to be placed incorrectly.
Workaround this problem by skipping the resource reduction.
The driver will not reduce the VNIC and RSS context reservations
when a context is deleted. The resources will be available for
use when new contexts are created later.
Potentially, this workaround can cause us to run out of VNIC
and RSS contexts if there are a lot of VF functions creating
and deleting RSS contexts. In the future, we will conditionally
disable this workaround when the firmware fix is available.
Fixes: 438ba39b25fe ("bnxt_en: Improve RSS context reservation infrastructure")
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240625010210.2002310-1-kuba@kernel.org/
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <andrew.gospodarek@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703180112.78590-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
In case of invalid INI file mlxsw_linecard_types_init() deallocates memory
but doesn't reset pointer to NULL and returns 0. In case of any error
occurred after mlxsw_linecard_types_init() call, mlxsw_linecards_init()
calls mlxsw_linecard_types_fini() which performs memory deallocation again.
Add pointer reset to NULL.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: b217127e5e4e ("mlxsw: core_linecards: Add line card objects and implement provisioning")
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin <amishin@t-argos.ru>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703203251.8871-1-amishin@t-argos.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw
sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the
underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol
field in struct inet_diag_req_raw.
inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to
inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue
occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field.
Fix this by initializing the pad field in
inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in
inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline]
raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was stored to memory at:
raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71
raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99
inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675
x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable req.i created at:
inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282
CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
Fixes: 432490f9d455 ("net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703091649.111773-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
When we process segments with TCP AO, we don't check it in
tcp_parse_options(). Thus, opt_rx->saw_unknown is set to 1,
which unconditionally triggers the BPF TCP option parser.
Let's avoid the unnecessary BPF invocation.
Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703033508.6321-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
A couple copy/paste mistakes in the code that selects steering targets
for OADDRM and INSTANCE0 unintentionally clobbered the steering target
for DSS ranges in some cases.
The OADDRM/INSTANCE0 values were also not assigned as intended, although
that mistake wound up being harmless since the desired values for those
specific ranges were '0' which the kzalloc of the GT structure should
have already taken care of implicitly.
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Signed-off-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240626210536.1620176-2-matthew.d.roper@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 4f82ac6102788112e599a6074d2c1f2afce923df)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
|
|
Don't call drm_suballoc_free with sa_bo pointing to PTR_ERR.
References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2120
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240620102025.127699-2-matthew.auld@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit ce6b63336f79ec5f3996de65f452330e395f99ae)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
|
|
Bos can be put with multiple unrelated dma-resv locks held. But
imported bos attempt to grab the bo dma-resv during dma-buf detach
that typically happens during cleanup. That leads to lockde splats
similar to the below and a potential ABBA deadlock.
Fix this by always taking the delayed workqueue cleanup path for
imported bos.
Requesting stable fixes from when the Xe driver was introduced,
since its usage of drm_exec and wide vm dma_resvs appear to be
the first reliable trigger of this.
[22982.116427] ============================================
[22982.116428] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[22982.116429] 6.10.0-rc2+ #10 Tainted: G U W
[22982.116430] --------------------------------------------
[22982.116430] glxgears:sh0/5785 is trying to acquire lock:
[22982.116431] ffff8c2bafa539a8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116438]
but task is already holding lock:
[22982.116438] ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116442]
other info that might help us debug this:
[22982.116442] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[22982.116443] CPU0
[22982.116444] ----
[22982.116444] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[22982.116445] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[22982.116447]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[22982.116447] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[22982.116448] 5 locks held by glxgears:sh0/5785:
[22982.116449] #0: ffff8c2d9aba58c8 (&xef->vm.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xe_file_close+0xde/0x1c0 [xe]
[22982.116507] #1: ffff8c2e28cc8480 (&vm->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: xe_vm_close_and_put+0x161/0x9b0 [xe]
[22982.116578] #2: ffff8c2e31982970 (&val->lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: xe_validation_ctx_init+0x6d/0x70 [xe]
[22982.116647] #3: ffffacdc469478a8 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0x7f/0xe0 [xe]
[22982.116716] #4: ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116719]
stack backtrace:
[22982.116720] CPU: 8 PID: 5785 Comm: glxgears:sh0 Tainted: G U W 6.10.0-rc2+ #10
[22982.116721] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023
[22982.116723] Call Trace:
[22982.116724] <TASK>
[22982.116725] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[22982.116727] __lock_acquire+0x1232/0x2160
[22982.116730] lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.116732] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116734] ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160
[22982.116736] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xd0/0x13b0
[22982.116738] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116741] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116743] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[22982.116745] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[22982.116747] dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116749] drm_prime_gem_destroy+0x2f/0x40 [drm]
[22982.116775] xe_ttm_bo_destroy+0x32/0x220 [xe]
[22982.116818] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3a/0x290
[22982.116821] drm_exec_unlock_all+0xa1/0xd0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116823] drm_exec_fini+0x12/0xb0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116824] xe_validation_ctx_fini+0x15/0x40 [xe]
[22982.116892] xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0xb1/0xe0 [xe]
[22982.116959] xe_vm_close_and_put+0x41a/0x9b0 [xe]
[22982.117025] ? xa_find+0xe3/0x1e0
[22982.117028] xe_file_close+0x10a/0x1c0 [xe]
[22982.117074] drm_file_free+0x22a/0x280 [drm]
[22982.117099] drm_release_noglobal+0x22/0x70 [drm]
[22982.117119] __fput+0xf1/0x2d0
[22982.117122] task_work_run+0x59/0x90
[22982.117125] do_exit+0x330/0xb40
[22982.117127] do_group_exit+0x36/0xa0
[22982.117129] get_signal+0xbd2/0xbe0
[22982.117131] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3e/0x240
[22982.117134] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e7/0x290
[22982.117137] do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180
[22982.117139] ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.117140] ? __set_task_comm+0x28/0x1e0
[22982.117141] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[22982.117144] ? __set_task_comm+0xe1/0x1e0
[22982.117145] ? lock_release+0xca/0x290
[22982.117147] ? __do_sys_prctl+0x245/0xab0
[22982.117149] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190
[22982.117150] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xb0/0x290
[22982.117152] ? do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180
[22982.117154] ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160
[22982.117155] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0
[22982.117156] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x30c/0x790
[22982.117158] ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.117160] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[22982.117162] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x357/0x790
[22982.117163] ? lock_release+0xca/0x290
[22982.117164] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x361/0x790
[22982.117166] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0
[22982.117168] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117170] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117172] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117174] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[22982.117176] RIP: 0033:0x7f943d267169
[22982.117192] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f943d26713f.
[22982.117193] RSP: 002b:00007f9430bffc80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
[22982.117195] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f943d267169
[22982.117196] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000189 RDI: 00005622f89579d0
[22982.117197] RBP: 00007f9430bffcb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[22982.117198] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[22982.117199] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005622f89579d0
[22982.117202] </TASK>
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240628153848.4989-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com
|
|
This change rejects the KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION and
KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 ioctls when called on a ucontrol VM.
This is necessary since ucontrol VMs have kvm->arch.gmap set to 0 and
would thus result in a null pointer dereference further in.
Memory management needs to be performed in userspace and using the
ioctls KVM_S390_UCAS_MAP and KVM_S390_UCAS_UNMAP.
Also improve s390 specific documentation for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION
and KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 27e0393f15fc ("KVM: s390: ucontrol: per vcpu address spaces")
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240624095902.29375-1-schlameuss@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
[frankja@linux.ibm.com: commit message spelling fix, subject prefix fix]
Message-ID: <20240624095902.29375-1-schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
It's possible that SIE exits for work that the host needs to perform
rather than something that is intended for the guest.
A Linux guest will ignore this intercept code since there is nothing
for it to do, but a more robust solution would rewind the PSW back to
the SIE instruction. This will transparently resume the guest once
the host completes its work, without the guest needing to process
what is effectively a NOP and re-issue SIE itself.
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301204342.3217540-1-farman@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20240301204342.3217540-1-farman@linux.ibm.com>
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We find that when lock debugging is on, notifications may not come in
order. Thus, we have order checking outputs managed by cfg_verbose, to
avoid too many outputs in this case.
Fixes: 07b65c5b31ce ("test: add msg_zerocopy test")
Signed-off-by: Zijian Zhang <zijianzhang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaochun Lu <xiaochun.lu@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240701225349.3395580-3-zijianzhang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c, it has a while loop keeps calling sendmsg
on a socket with MSG_ZEROCOPY flag, and it will recv the notifications
until the socket is not writable. Typically, it will start the receiving
process after around 30+ sendmsgs. However, as the introduction of commit
dfa2f0483360 ("tcp: get rid of sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale"), the sender is
always writable and does not get any chance to run recv notifications.
The selftest always exits with OUT_OF_MEMORY because the memory used by
opt_skb exceeds the net.core.optmem_max. Meanwhile, it could be set to a
different value to trigger OOM on older kernels too.
Thus, we introduce "cfg_notification_limit" to force sender to receive
notifications after some number of sendmsgs.
Fixes: 07b65c5b31ce ("test: add msg_zerocopy test")
Signed-off-by: Zijian Zhang <zijianzhang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaochun Lu <xiaochun.lu@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240701225349.3395580-2-zijianzhang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Do not use _test_bit() macro for testing bit. The proper macro for this
is one without underline.
_test_bit() is what test_bit() was prior to const-optimization. It
directly calls arch_test_bit(), i.e. the arch-specific implementation
(or the generic one). It's strictly _internal_ and shouldn't be used
anywhere outside the actual test_bit() macro.
test_bit() is a wrapper which checks whether the bitmap and the bit
number are compile-time constants and if so, it calls the optimized
function which evaluates this call to a compile-time constant as well.
If either of them is not a compile-time constant, it just calls _test_bit().
test_bit() is the actual function to use anywhere in the kernel.
IOW, calling _test_bit() avoids potential compile-time optimizations.
The sensors is not a compile-time constant, thus most probably there
are no object code changes before and after the patch.
But anyway, we shouldn't call internal wrappers instead of
the actual API.
Fixes: 4da71a77fc3b ("ice: read internal temperature sensor")
Acked-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <poros@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702171459.2606611-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Chang Yu
Jim Mattson
Michael Roth
Wei Wang
Brijesh Singh
Sean Christopherson
Isaku Yamahata
Paolo Bonzini
Bibo Mao
Jia Qingtong
Oliver Upton
Linus Torvalds
Michael Ellerman
Dmitry Torokhov
Jarkko Sakkinen
Pavan Chebbi
Aleksandr Mishin
Shigeru Yoshida
Kuniyuki Iwashima
Matt Roper
Matthew Auld
Thomas Hellström
Christoph Schlameuss
Eric Farman
Zijian Zhang
Petr Oros