| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jörg Thalheim <joerg@higgsboson.tk>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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If it's time to rekey, and the responder sends a message, the initator
will begin the rekeying when sending his response message. In the worst
case, this response message will actually just be the keepalive. This
generally works well, with the one edge case of the message arriving
less than 10 seconds before key expiration, in which the keepalive is
not sufficient. In this case, we simply rehandshake immediately.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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With the prior behavior, when sending a packet, we checked to see if it
was about time to start a new handshake, and if we were past a certain
time, we started it. For the responder, we made that time a bit further
in the future than for the initiator, to prevent the thundering herd
problem of them both starting at the same time. However, this was
flawed.
If both parties stopped communicating after 2.2 minutes, and then one
party decided to initiate a TCP connection before the 3 minute mark, the
currently open session would be used. However, because it was after the
2.2 minute mark, both peers would try to initiate a handshake upon
sending their first packet. The errant flow was as follows:
1. Peer A sends SYN.
2. Peer A sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
3. Peer B receives SYN and sends ACK.
4. Peer B sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
Since these events happened after the 2.2 minute mark, there's no delay
between handshake initiations, and problems begin. The new behavior is
changed to:
1. Peer A sends SYN.
2. Peer A sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
3. Peer B receives SYN and sends ACK.
4. Peer B sees that his key is getting old and schedules a delayed
handshake for 12.5 seconds in the future.
5. Peer B receives handshake initiation and cancels scheduled handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Since it's extremely unlikely for jiffies to be exactly identical
everywhere, applying quarter second power of two slack not only improves
power efficiency but also ensures that retries have a bit of jitter.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Before:
t+120: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
t+125: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
t+130: A sends rekey
t+130: B sends rekey
! race !
After: t+120: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
t+125: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
t+130: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
T+132.5: B sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
T+135: A sends rekey
[packet dropped by network congestion]
T+137.5: B sends rekey
! success, eventually !
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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http: //marc.info/?l=linux-mm-commits&m=147553169709478&w=2
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Otherwise we get packet reordering.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We're not leaking the DSCP, but we do deal with ECN.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The C standard states:
A declaration of a parameter as ``array of type'' shall be adjusted to ``qualified pointer to
type'', where the type qualifiers (if any) are those specified within the [ and ] of the
array type derivation. If the keyword static also appears within the [ and ] of the
array type derivation, then for each call to the function, the value of the corresponding
actual argument shall provide access to the first element of an array with at least as many
elements as specified by the size expression.
By changing void func(int array[4]) to void func(int array[static 4]),
we automatically get the compiler checking argument sizes for us, which
is quite nice.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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No longer do we specify slack ourselves. Instead we need to add it
directly in the main scheduling.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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If /dev/urandom is a NOBUS RNG backdoor, like the infamous Dual_EC_DRBG,
then sending 4 bytes of raw RNG output over the wire directly might not
be such a great idea. This mitigates that vulnerability by, at some
point before the indices are generated, creating a random secret. Then,
for each session index, we simply run SipHash24 on an incrementing
counter.
This is probably overkill because /dev/urandom is probably not a
backdoored RNG, and itself already uses several rounds of SHA-1 for
mixing. If the kernel RNG is backdoored, there may very well be
bigger problems at play. Four bytes is also not so many bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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It may not be wise to directly publish the output of the CSPRNG, so we
run the output through a round of Blake2s first.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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