wireguard-linux/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c, branch jd/unified-crypt-queue

uml: Create a private mount of proc for mconsole

2020-02-28T18:04:33Z

The mconsole code only ever accesses proc for the initial pid namespace. Instead of depending upon the proc_mnt which is for proc_flush_task have uml create it's own mount of proc instead. This allows proc_flush_task to evolve and remove the need for having a proc_mnt to do it's job. Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

uml: Don't consult current to find the proc_mnt in mconsole_proc

2020-02-28T17:34:47Z

Inspection of the control flow reveals that mconsole_proc is either called from mconsole_stop called from mc_work_proc or from mc_work_proc directly. The function mc_work_proc is dispatched to a kernel thread with schedule_work. All of the threads that run dispatched by schedule_work are in the init pid namespace. So make the code clearer and by using init_pid_ns instead of task_active_pid_ns(current). Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"

2020-02-04T03:05:26Z

The most notable change is DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro split in seq_file.h. Conversion rule is: llseek => proc_lseek unlocked_ioctl => proc_ioctl xxx => proc_xxx delete ".owner = THIS_MODULE" line [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi_proc.c] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix kernel/sched/psi.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200122180545.36222f50@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225172546.GB13378@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

um: Add SPDX headers for files in arch/um/drivers

2019-09-15T19:37:16Z

Convert files to use SPDX header. All files are licensed under the GPLv2. Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger

um: Remove obsolete reenable_XX calls

2018-12-27T21:48:35Z

reenable_fd has been a NOP since the introduction of the EPOLL based interrupt controller. reenable_channel() is no longer needed as the flow control is now handled via the write IRQs on the channel. Signed-off-by: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger

mconsole_proc(): don't mess with file->f_pos

2018-02-10T03:28:01Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mconsole: switch to kernel_read

2017-09-04T23:05:16Z

Instead of playing with address limits. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Al Viro

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to

2017-03-02T07:42:34Z

We are going to split out of , which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder file that just maps to to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mike Galbraith Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Replace with globally

2016-12-24T19:46:01Z

This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include !" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories

2016-03-22T22:36:02Z

This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2. - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.) - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by default using a distro patch.) Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules, causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process, allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with root privileges. To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds