WireGuard for the Linux kernel https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/arch/x86/entry?h=jd%2Forphan-parallel 2020-10-22T20:13:57Z 2020-10-22T20:13:57Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-22T20:13:57Z urn:sha1:746b25b1aa0f5736d585728ded70a8141da91edb Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada: - Support 'make compile_commands.json' to generate the compilation database more easily, avoiding stale entries - Support 'make clang-analyzer' and 'make clang-tidy' for static checks using clang-tidy - Preprocess scripts/modules.lds.S to allow CONFIG options in the module linker script - Drop cc-option tests from compiler flags supported by our minimal GCC/Clang versions - Use always 12-digits commit hash for CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO=y - Use sha1 build id for both BFD linker and LLD - Improve deb-pkg for reproducible builds and rootless builds - Remove stale, useless scripts/namespace.pl - Turn -Wreturn-type warning into error - Fix build error of deb-pkg when CONFIG_MODULES=n - Replace 'hostname' command with more portable 'uname -n' - Various Makefile cleanups * tag 'kbuild-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (34 commits) kbuild: Use uname for LINUX_COMPILE_HOST detection kbuild: Only add -fno-var-tracking-assignments for old GCC versions kbuild: remove leftover comment for filechk utility treewide: remove DISABLE_LTO kbuild: deb-pkg: clean up package name variables kbuild: deb-pkg: do not build linux-headers package if CONFIG_MODULES=n kbuild: enforce -Werror=return-type scripts: remove namespace.pl builddeb: Add support for all required debian/rules targets builddeb: Enable rootless builds builddeb: Pass -n to gzip for reproducible packages kbuild: split the build log of kallsyms kbuild: explicitly specify the build id style scripts/setlocalversion: make git describe output more reliable kbuild: remove cc-option test of -Werror=date-time kbuild: remove cc-option test of -fno-stack-check kbuild: remove cc-option test of -fno-strict-overflow kbuild: move CFLAGS_{KASAN,UBSAN,KCSAN} exports to relevant Makefiles kbuild: remove redundant CONFIG_KASAN check from scripts/Makefile.kasan kbuild: do not create built-in objects for external module builds ... 2020-10-20T15:28:53Z Sami Tolvanen samitolvanen@google.com 2020-10-13T00:31:45Z urn:sha1:0f6372e522237f39aff63f2e158d629038f26238 This change removes all instances of DISABLE_LTO from Makefiles, as they are currently unused, and the preferred method of disabling LTO is to filter out the flags instead. Note added by Masahiro Yamada: DISABLE_LTO was added as preparation for GCC LTO, but GCC LTO was not pulled into the mainline. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/4/8/272) Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> 2020-10-18T16:27:10Z Minchan Kim minchan@kernel.org 2020-10-17T23:14:59Z urn:sha1:ecb8ac8b1f146915aa6b96449b66dd48984caacc There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService. The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without any app involvement. To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very cache friendly environment). Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2) with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support feature. ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully. The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API. I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus, I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch. If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a buggy syscall but hard to fix it later. So finally, the API is as follows, ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec, unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve system or application performance. The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information) The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in <sys/uio.h> as: struct iovec { void *iov_base; /* starting address */ size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */ }; The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base) and with size length of bytes(iov_len). The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec. The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is external. MADV_COLD MADV_PAGEOUT Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2). The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target process is in same thread group with calling process so user could use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support vector address ranges. RETURN VALUE On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised. This return value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value to determine whether a partial advice occurred. FAQ: Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge? Quote from Sandeep "For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer) are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the preloading during boot. After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the application. In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides which process is "important" to the user for interactivity. So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know* which address range of the application is not used / useful. Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory, please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1]. They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do. So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant memory in these applications will be useful. - ssp Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target process? process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space target process can run between the time the process_madvise process inspects the target process address space and the time that process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write. The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level, there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more fine-grained optimization model. To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument so we could support it in future if someone really needs it. Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work? Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at most one ptracer. [1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory" [2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224 [3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range) validation - Michal Hocko - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/ [minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com [minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops] [minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au [minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com [yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com [minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 2020-10-14T17:21:34Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-14T17:21:34Z urn:sha1:da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58 Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov: "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks. With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between the guest and the hypervisor. Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one. The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two SEV-ES-specific files: arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups. Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others" * tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits) x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events ... 2020-10-12T23:44:57Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T23:44:57Z urn:sha1:22230cd2c55bd27ee2c3a3def97c0d5577a75b82 Pull compat mount cleanups from Al Viro: "The last remnants of mount(2) compat buried by Christoph. Buried into NFS, that is. Generally I'm less enthusiastic about "let's use in_compat_syscall() deep in call chain" kind of approach than Christoph seems to be, but in this case it's warranted - that had been an NFS-specific wart, hopefully not to be repeated in any other filesystems (read: any new filesystem introducing non-text mount options will get NAKed even if it doesn't mess the layout up). IOW, not worth trying to grow an infrastructure that would avoid that use of in_compat_syscall()..." * 'compat.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: remove compat_sys_mount fs,nfs: lift compat nfs4 mount data handling into the nfs code nfs: simplify nfs4_parse_monolithic 2020-10-12T23:37:13Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T23:37:13Z urn:sha1:e18afa5bfa4a2f0e07b0864370485df701dacbc1 Pull compat quotactl cleanups from Al Viro: "More Christoph's compat cleanups: quotactl(2)" * 'work.quota-compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: quota: simplify the quotactl compat handling compat: add a compat_need_64bit_alignment_fixup() helper compat: lift compat_s64 and compat_u64 to <asm-generic/compat.h> 2020-10-12T23:35:51Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T23:35:51Z urn:sha1:85ed13e78dbedf9433115a62c85429922bc5035c Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro: "Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof" * 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev} fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h> 2020-10-12T22:15:24Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T22:15:24Z urn:sha1:ee4a925107d1f4d10ee0a935841c2491f1c06ec0 Pull x86 paravirt cleanup from Ingo Molnar: "Clean up the paravirt code after the removal of 32-bit Xen PV support" * tag 'x86-paravirt-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/paravirt: Avoid needless paravirt step clearing page table entries x86/paravirt: Remove set_pte_at() pv-op x86/entry/32: Simplify CONFIG_XEN_PV build dependency x86/paravirt: Use CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL instead of CONFIG_PARAVIRT x86/paravirt: Clean up paravirt macros x86/paravirt: Remove 32-bit support from CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL 2020-10-12T17:51:02Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T17:51:02Z urn:sha1:f94ab231136c53ee26b1ddda76b29218018834ff Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov: "Misc minor cleanups" * tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/entry: Fix typo in comments for syscall_enter_from_user_mode() x86/resctrl: Fix spelling in user-visible warning messages x86/entry/64: Do not include inst.h in calling.h x86/mpparse: Remove duplicate io_apic.h include 2020-10-12T17:44:24Z Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-10-12T17:44:24Z urn:sha1:87194efe7ecdf8d145c7cef130fda9652bf77fd7 Pull x86 fsgsbase updates from Borislav Petkov: "Misc minor cleanups and corrections to the fsgsbase code and respective selftests" * tag 'x86_fsgsbase_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test PTRACE_PEEKUSER for GSBASE with invalid LDT GS selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Reap a forgotten child x86/fsgsbase: Replace static_cpu_has() with boot_cpu_has() x86/entry/64: Correct the comment over SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE