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<title>wireguard-linux/arch/x86/virt, branch update-toolchain</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard for the Linux kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/arch/x86/virt?h=update-toolchain</id>
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<updated>2024-07-16T18:12:25Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-07-16T18:12:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-16T18:12:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=408323581b722c9bd504dd296920f392049a7f52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:408323581b722c9bd504dd296920f392049a7f52</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add support for running the kernel in a SEV-SNP guest, over a Secure
   VM Service Module (SVSM).

   When running over a SVSM, different services can run at different
   protection levels, apart from the guest OS but still within the
   secure SNP environment. They can provide services to the guest, like
   a vTPM, for example.

   This series adds the required facilities to interface with such a
   SVSM module.

 - The usual fixlets, refactoring and cleanups

[ And as always: "SEV" is AMD's "Secure Encrypted Virtualization".

  I can't be the only one who gets all the newer x86 TLA's confused,
  can I?
              - Linus ]

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/ABI/configfs-tsm: Fix an unexpected indentation silly
  x86/sev: Do RMP memory coverage check after max_pfn has been set
  x86/sev: Move SEV compilation units
  virt: sev-guest: Mark driver struct with __refdata to prevent section mismatch
  x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present
  x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM
  x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM
  fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility
  sev-guest: configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated
  virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL
  x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace
  x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support
  x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0
  x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0
  x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas
  x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP secrets page
  x86/irqflags: Provide native versions of the local_irq_save()/restore()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Do RMP memory coverage check after max_pfn has been set</title>
<updated>2024-07-11T10:03:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T15:42:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=0440feb090790c6243bca85d6a794824e71ff26c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0440feb090790c6243bca85d6a794824e71ff26c</id>
<content type='text'>
The RMP table is probed early in the boot process before max_pfn has been
set, so the logic to check if the RMP covers all of system memory is not
valid.

Move the RMP memory coverage check from snp_probe_rmptable_info() into
snp_rmptable_init(), which is well after max_pfn has been set. Also, fix
the calculation to use PFN_UP instead of PHYS_PFN, in order to compute
the required RMP size properly.

Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bec4364c7e34358cc576f01bb197a7796a109169.1718984524.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt/tdx: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines</title>
<updated>2024-05-28T17:59:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Luck</name>
<email>tony.luck@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-20T22:46:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=189e8d4b98495a9145301a3594f4fb56118211e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:189e8d4b98495a9145301a3594f4fb56118211e8</id>
<content type='text'>
New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240520224620.9480-31-tony.luck%40intel.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-cleanups-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-05-14T01:21:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-14T01:21:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=c4273a66921219803b70491469c8d248909cd185'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4273a66921219803b70491469c8d248909cd185</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:

 - Fix function prototypes to address clang function type cast
   warnings in the math-emu code

 - Reorder definitions in &lt;asm/msr-index.h&gt;

 - Remove unused code

 - Fix typos

 - Simplify #include sections

* tag 'x86-cleanups-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/pci/ce4100: Remove unused 'struct sim_reg_op'
  x86/msr: Move ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE bit definition to its rightful place
  x86/math-emu: Fix function cast warnings
  x86/extable: Remove unused fixup type EX_TYPE_COPY
  x86/rtc: Remove unused intel-mid.h
  x86/32: Remove unused IA32_STACK_TOP and two externs
  x86/head: Simplify relative include path to xen-head.S
  x86/fred: Fix typo in Kconfig description
  x86/syscall/compat: Remove ia32_unistd.h
  x86/syscall/compat: Remove unused macro __SYSCALL_ia32_NR
  x86/virt/tdx: Remove duplicate include
  x86/xen: Remove duplicate #include
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Add callback to apply RMP table fixups for kexec</title>
<updated>2024-04-29T09:21:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-26T00:43:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=400fea4b9651adf5d7ebd5d71e905f34f4e4e493'/>
<id>urn:sha1:400fea4b9651adf5d7ebd5d71e905f34f4e4e493</id>
<content type='text'>
Handle cases where the RMP table placement in the BIOS is not 2M aligned
and the kexec-ed kernel could try to allocate from within that chunk
which then causes a fatal RMP fault.

The kexec failure is illustrated below:

  SEV-SNP: RMP table physical range [0x0000007ffe800000 - 0x000000807f0fffff]
  BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
  BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000008efff] usable
  BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000008f000-0x000000000008ffff] ACPI NVS
  ...
  BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000004080000000-0x0000007ffe7fffff] usable
  BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000007ffe800000-0x000000807f0fffff] reserved
  BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000807f100000-0x000000807f1fefff] usable

As seen here in the e820 memory map, the end range of the RMP table is not
aligned to 2MB and not reserved but it is usable as RAM.

Subsequently, kexec -s (KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall) loads it's purgatory
code and boot_param, command line and other setup data into this RAM
region as seen in the kexec logs below, which leads to fatal RMP fault
during kexec boot.

  Loaded purgatory at 0x807f1fa000
  Loaded boot_param, command line and misc at 0x807f1f8000 bufsz=0x1350 memsz=0x2000
  Loaded 64bit kernel at 0x7ffae00000 bufsz=0xd06200 memsz=0x3894000
  Loaded initrd at 0x7ff6c89000 bufsz=0x4176014 memsz=0x4176014
  E820 memmap:
  0000000000000000-000000000008efff (1)
  000000000008f000-000000000008ffff (4)
  0000000000090000-000000000009ffff (1)
  ...
  0000004080000000-0000007ffe7fffff (1)
  0000007ffe800000-000000807f0fffff (2)
  000000807f100000-000000807f1fefff (1)
  000000807f1ff000-000000807fffffff (2)
  nr_segments = 4
  segment[0]: buf=0x00000000e626d1a2 bufsz=0x4000 mem=0x807f1fa000 memsz=0x5000
  segment[1]: buf=0x0000000029c67bd6 bufsz=0x1350 mem=0x807f1f8000 memsz=0x2000
  segment[2]: buf=0x0000000045c60183 bufsz=0xd06200 mem=0x7ffae00000 memsz=0x3894000
  segment[3]: buf=0x000000006e54f08d bufsz=0x4176014 mem=0x7ff6c89000 memsz=0x4177000
  kexec_file_load: type:0, start:0x807f1fa150 head:0x1184d0002 flags:0x0

Check if RMP table start and end physical range in the e820 tables are
not aligned to 2MB and in that case map this range to reserved in all
the three e820 tables.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df6e995ff88565262c2c7c69964883ff8aa6fc30.1714090302.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*()</title>
<updated>2024-04-04T08:40:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-27T15:43:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=0ecaefb303de69929dc0036d5021d01cec7ea052'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ecaefb303de69929dc0036d5021d01cec7ea052</id>
<content type='text'>
The host SNP worthiness can determined later, after alternatives have
been patched, in snp_rmptable_init() depending on cmdline options like
iommu=pt which is incompatible with SNP, for example.

Which means that one cannot use X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP and will need to
have a special flag for that control.

Use that newly added CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP in the appropriate places.

Move kdump_sev_callback() to its rightful place, while at it.

Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327154317.29909-6-bp@alien8.de
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/build: Use obj-y to descend into arch/x86/virt/</title>
<updated>2024-03-30T09:41:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-30T06:05:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=3f1a9bc5d878004ed4bc3904e5cb9b7fb317fbe2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f1a9bc5d878004ed4bc3904e5cb9b7fb317fbe2</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit c33621b4c5ad ("x86/virt/tdx: Wire up basic SEAMCALL functions")
introduced a new instance of core-y instead of the standardized obj-y
syntax.

X86 Makefiles descend into subdirectories of arch/x86/virt inconsistently;
into arch/x86/virt/ via core-y defined in arch/x86/Makefile, but into
arch/x86/virt/svm/ via obj-y defined in arch/x86/Kbuild.

This is problematic when you build a single object in parallel because
multiple threads attempt to build the same file.

  $ make -j$(nproc) arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o
    [ snip ]
    AS      arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o
    AS      arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o
  fixdep: error opening file: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/.seamcall.o.d: No such file or directory
  make[4]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:362: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.o] Error 2

Use the obj-y syntax, as it works correctly.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240330060554.18524-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt/tdx: Remove duplicate include</title>
<updated>2024-03-22T08:35:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiapeng Chong</name>
<email>jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-22T06:17:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=27d45fc7df2d9026185e86a7e45f3dd17f3e8ba4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:27d45fc7df2d9026185e86a7e45f3dd17f3e8ba4</id>
<content type='text'>
./arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c: linux/acpi.h is included more than once.

Reported-by: Abaci Robot &lt;abaci@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong &lt;jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang &lt;kai.huang@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322061741.9869-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com

Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=8609
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump</title>
<updated>2024-01-29T19:34:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-26T04:11:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=8ef979584ea86c247b768f4420148721a842835f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ef979584ea86c247b768f4420148721a842835f</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a kdump safe version of sev_firmware_shutdown() and register it as a
crash_kexec_post_notifier so it will be invoked during panic/crash to do
SEV/SNP shutdown. This is required for transitioning all IOMMU pages to
reclaim/hypervisor state, otherwise re-init of IOMMU pages during
crashdump kernel boot fails and panics the crashdump kernel.

This panic notifier runs in atomic context, hence it ensures not to
acquire any locks/mutexes and polls for PSP command completion instead
of depending on PSP command completion interrupt.

  [ mdr: Remove use of "we" in comments. ]

Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-21-michael.roth@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list</title>
<updated>2024-01-29T19:34:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-26T04:11:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=8dac642999b1542e0f0abefba100d8bd11226c83'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8dac642999b1542e0f0abefba100d8bd11226c83</id>
<content type='text'>
Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator if they
have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case, add them
to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed or
touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.

  [ mdr: Relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c ]

Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-16-michael.roth@amd.com
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
