<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>wireguard-linux/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c, branch jd/unified-crypt-queue</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard for the Linux kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c?h=jd%2Funified-crypt-queue</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c?h=jd%2Funified-crypt-queue'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/'/>
<updated>2020-03-06T01:28:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member</title>
<updated>2020-03-06T01:28:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-24T16:21:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=5a8a076506af03f83f83d80412a7c0b06b687ee1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a8a076506af03f83f83d80412a7c0b06b687ee1</id>
<content type='text'>
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 76497732932f ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithms</title>
<updated>2020-02-22T01:25:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-12T17:55:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=1c24022667130eefe15d49b906373807f181305c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c24022667130eefe15d49b906373807f181305c</id>
<content type='text'>
Add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithms, to make use of
the engine queue.
The requests, with backlog flag, will be listed into crypto-engine
queue and processed by CAAM when free.
If sending just the backlog request to crypto-engine, and non-blocking
directly to CAAM, the latter requests have a better chance to be
executed since JR has up to 1024 entries, more than the 10 entries
from crypto-engine.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - support crypto_engine framework for SKCIPHER algorithms</title>
<updated>2020-02-22T01:25:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-12T17:55:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=ee38767f152a3310aabee7074848911f43bf5d69'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ee38767f152a3310aabee7074848911f43bf5d69</id>
<content type='text'>
Integrate crypto_engine into CAAM, to make use of the engine queue.
Add support for SKCIPHER algorithms.

This is intended to be used for CAAM backlogging support.
The requests, with backlog flag (e.g. from dm-crypt) will be listed
into crypto-engine queue and processed by CAAM when free.
This changes the return codes for enqueuing a request:
-EINPROGRESS if OK, -EBUSY if request is backlogged (via
crypto-engine), -ENOSPC if the queue is full, -EIO if it
cannot map the caller's descriptor.

The requests, with backlog flag, will be listed into crypto-engine
queue and processed by CAAM when free. Only the backlog request are
sent to crypto-engine since the others can be handled by CAAM, if free,
especially since JR has up to 1024 entries (more than the 10 entries
from crypto-engine).

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Franck LENORMAND &lt;franck.lenormand@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - change return code in caam_jr_enqueue function</title>
<updated>2020-02-22T01:25:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-12T17:55:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=4d370a1036958d7df9f1492c345b4984a4eba7f6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d370a1036958d7df9f1492c345b4984a4eba7f6</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on commit 6b80ea389a0b ("crypto: change transient busy return code to -ENOSPC"),
change the return code of caam_jr_enqueue function to -EINPROGRESS, in
case of success, -ENOSPC in case the CAAM is busy (has no space left
in job ring queue), -EIO if it cannot map the caller's descriptor.

Update, also, the cases for resource-freeing for each algorithm type.

This is done for later use, on backlogging support in CAAM.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - refactor skcipher/aead/gcm/chachapoly {en,de}crypt functions</title>
<updated>2020-02-22T01:25:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-12T17:55:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=b7f17fe281442de420cbd9b4a6ad34b1d498aec6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b7f17fe281442de420cbd9b4a6ad34b1d498aec6</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a common crypt function for each skcipher/aead/gcm/chachapoly
algorithms and call it for encrypt/decrypt with the specific boolean -
true for encrypt and false for decrypt.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-31T03:19:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c</id>
<content type='text'>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the -&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - make CAAM_PTR_SZ dynamic</title>
<updated>2019-08-30T08:05:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Smirnov</name>
<email>andrew.smirnov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-20T20:23:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1a3daadce955530df92b1bb22093618dd26a1717</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to be able to configure CAAM pointer size at run-time, which
needed to support i.MX8MQ, which is 64-bit SoC with 32-bit pointer
size, convert CAAM_PTR_SZ to refer to a global variable of the same
name ("caam_ptr_sz") and adjust the rest of the code accordingly. No
functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov &lt;andrew.smirnov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Spencer &lt;christopher.spencer@sea.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Cory Tusar &lt;cory.tusar@zii.aero&gt;
Cc: Chris Healy &lt;cphealy@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Lucas Stach &lt;l.stach@pengutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Cc: Aymen Sghaier &lt;aymen.sghaier@nxp.com&gt;
Cc: Leonard Crestez &lt;leonard.crestez@nxp.com&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam/des - switch to new verification routines</title>
<updated>2019-08-22T04:39:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-15T09:00:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=a628c5a11d8b87a16dbc0d5bbc9b6ff233865622'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a628c5a11d8b87a16dbc0d5bbc9b6ff233865622</id>
<content type='text'>
Cc: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - fix MDHA key derivation for certain user key lengths</title>
<updated>2019-08-09T05:11:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Horia Geantă</name>
<email>horia.geanta@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-31T13:08:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=e9b4913a5f944b23d6109c44b6f3fc6e092e30ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e9b4913a5f944b23d6109c44b6f3fc6e092e30ce</id>
<content type='text'>
Fuzz testing uncovered an issue when |user key| &gt; |derived key|.
Derived key generation has to be fixed in two cases:

1. Era &gt;= 6 (DKP is available)
DKP cannot be used with immediate input key if |user key| &gt; |derived key|,
since the resulting descriptor (after DKP execution) would be invalid -
having a few bytes from user key left in descriptor buffer
as incorrect opcodes.

Fix DKP usage both in standalone hmac and in authenc algorithms.
For authenc the logic is simplified, by always storing both virtual
and dma key addresses.

2. Era &lt; 6
The same case (|user key| &gt; |derived key|) fails when DKP
is not available.
Make sure gen_split_key() dma maps max(|user key|, |derived key|),
since this is an in-place (bidirectional) operation.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: caam - check zero-length input</title>
<updated>2019-08-09T05:11:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-31T13:08:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=31bb2f0da1b5099732337d9ecef792ab67970ddf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:31bb2f0da1b5099732337d9ecef792ab67970ddf</id>
<content type='text'>
Check zero-length input, for skcipher algorithm, to solve the extra
tests. This is a valid operation, therefore the API will return no error.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
