<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>wireguard-linux/include/xen, branch jd/orphan-parallel</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard for the Linux kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/include/xen?h=jd%2Forphan-parallel</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/include/xen?h=jd%2Forphan-parallel'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/'/>
<updated>2020-10-20T16:24:01Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2020-10-20T16:24:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-20T16:24:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=4a5bb973fa0353d25dbe854694c71bb58eb4cf78'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a5bb973fa0353d25dbe854694c71bb58eb4cf78</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - A single patch to fix the Xen security issue XSA-331 (malicious
   guests can DoS dom0 by triggering NULL-pointer dereferences or access
   to stale data).

 - A larger series to fix the Xen security issue XSA-332 (malicious
   guests can DoS dom0 by sending events at high frequency leading to
   dom0's vcpus being busy in IRQ handling for elongated times).

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/events: block rogue events for some time
  xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events
  xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels
  xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model
  xen/pciback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/pvcallsback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/scsiback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding
  xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework
  xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask()
  xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking
  xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework</title>
<updated>2020-10-20T08:21:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:47:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().

This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.

In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm/arm64: xen: Fix to convert percpu address to gfn correctly</title>
<updated>2020-10-07T05:08:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-06T06:49:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=5a0677110b73dd3e1766f89159701bfe8ac06808'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a0677110b73dd3e1766f89159701bfe8ac06808</id>
<content type='text'>
Use per_cpu_ptr_to_phys() instead of virt_to_phys() for per-cpu
address conversion.

In xen_starting_cpu(), per-cpu xen_vcpu_info address is converted
to gfn by virt_to_gfn() macro. However, since the virt_to_gfn(v)
assumes the given virtual address is in linear mapped kernel memory
area, it can not convert the per-cpu memory if it is allocated on
vmalloc area.

This depends on CONFIG_NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK.
If it is enabled, the first chunk of percpu memory is linear mapped.
In the other case, that is allocated from vmalloc area. Moreover,
if the first chunk of percpu has run out until allocating
xen_vcpu_info, it will be allocated on the 2nd chunk, which is
based on kernel memory or vmalloc memory (depends on
CONFIG_NEED_PER_CPU_KM).

Without this fix and kernel configured to use vmalloc area for
the percpu memory, the Dom0 kernel will fail to boot with following
errors.

[    0.466172] Xen: initializing cpu0
[    0.469601] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.474295] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/arm64/xen/../../arm/xen/enlighten.c:153 xen_starting_cpu+0x160/0x180
[    0.484435] Modules linked in:
[    0.487565] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4+ #4
[    0.493895] Hardware name: Socionext Developer Box (DT)
[    0.499194] pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[    0.504836] pc : xen_starting_cpu+0x160/0x180
[    0.509263] lr : xen_starting_cpu+0xb0/0x180
[    0.513599] sp : ffff8000116cbb60
[    0.516984] x29: ffff8000116cbb60 x28: ffff80000abec000
[    0.522366] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    0.527754] x25: ffff80001156c000 x24: fffffdffbfcdb600
[    0.533129] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[    0.538511] x21: ffff8000113a99c8 x20: ffff800010fe4f68
[    0.543892] x19: ffff8000113a9988 x18: 0000000000000010
[    0.549274] x17: 0000000094fe0f81 x16: 00000000deadbeef
[    0.554655] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0720072007200720
[    0.560037] x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
[    0.565418] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
[    0.570801] x9 : ffff8000100fbdc0 x8 : ffff800010715208
[    0.576182] x7 : 0000000000000054 x6 : ffff00001b790f00
[    0.581564] x5 : ffff800010bbf880 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.586945] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000abec000
[    0.592327] x1 : 000000000000002f x0 : 0000800000000000
[    0.597716] Call trace:
[    0.600232]  xen_starting_cpu+0x160/0x180
[    0.604309]  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xac/0x640
[    0.608736]  cpuhp_issue_call+0xf4/0x150
[    0.612728]  __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x128/0x2c8
[    0.618030]  __cpuhp_setup_state+0x84/0xf8
[    0.622192]  xen_guest_init+0x324/0x364
[    0.626097]  do_one_initcall+0x54/0x250
[    0.630003]  kernel_init_freeable+0x12c/0x2c8
[    0.634428]  kernel_init+0x1c/0x128
[    0.637988]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[    0.641635] ---[ end trace d95b5309a33f8b27 ]---
[    0.646337] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.651005] kernel BUG at arch/arm64/xen/../../arm/xen/enlighten.c:158!
[    0.657697] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
[    0.662548] Modules linked in:
[    0.665676] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc4+ #4
[    0.673398] Hardware name: Socionext Developer Box (DT)
[    0.678695] pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[    0.684338] pc : xen_starting_cpu+0x178/0x180
[    0.688765] lr : xen_starting_cpu+0x144/0x180
[    0.693188] sp : ffff8000116cbb60
[    0.696573] x29: ffff8000116cbb60 x28: ffff80000abec000
[    0.701955] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    0.707344] x25: ffff80001156c000 x24: fffffdffbfcdb600
[    0.712718] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[    0.718107] x21: ffff8000113a99c8 x20: ffff800010fe4f68
[    0.723481] x19: ffff8000113a9988 x18: 0000000000000010
[    0.728863] x17: 0000000094fe0f81 x16: 00000000deadbeef
[    0.734245] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0720072007200720
[    0.739626] x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
[    0.745008] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
[    0.750390] x9 : ffff8000100fbdc0 x8 : ffff800010715208
[    0.755771] x7 : 0000000000000054 x6 : ffff00001b790f00
[    0.761153] x5 : ffff800010bbf880 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.766534] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 00000000deadbeef
[    0.771916] x1 : 00000000deadbeef x0 : ffffffffffffffea
[    0.777304] Call trace:
[    0.779819]  xen_starting_cpu+0x178/0x180
[    0.783898]  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xac/0x640
[    0.788325]  cpuhp_issue_call+0xf4/0x150
[    0.792317]  __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x128/0x2c8
[    0.797619]  __cpuhp_setup_state+0x84/0xf8
[    0.801779]  xen_guest_init+0x324/0x364
[    0.805683]  do_one_initcall+0x54/0x250
[    0.809590]  kernel_init_freeable+0x12c/0x2c8
[    0.814016]  kernel_init+0x1c/0x128
[    0.817583]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[    0.821226] Code: d0006980 f9427c00 cb000300 17ffffea (d4210000)
[    0.827415] ---[ end trace d95b5309a33f8b28 ]---
[    0.832076] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
[    0.839815] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]---

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160196697165.60224.17470743378683334995.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2020-09-06T16:59:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-06T16:59:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=68beef571071014ef34a3beac65fe2af7e8e3cf6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:68beef571071014ef34a3beac65fe2af7e8e3cf6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
 "A small series for fixing a problem with Xen PVH guests when running
  as backends (e.g. as dom0).

  Mapping other guests' memory is now working via ZONE_DEVICE, thus not
  requiring to abuse the memory hotplug functionality for that purpose"

* tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen: add helpers to allocate unpopulated memory
  memremap: rename MEMORY_DEVICE_DEVDAX to MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC
  xen/balloon: add header guard
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: add helpers to allocate unpopulated memory</title>
<updated>2020-09-04T08:00:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T08:33:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=9e2369c06c8a181478039258a4598c1ddd2cadfa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e2369c06c8a181478039258a4598c1ddd2cadfa</id>
<content type='text'>
To be used in order to create foreign mappings. This is based on the
ZONE_DEVICE facility which is used by persistent memory devices in
order to create struct pages and kernel virtual mappings for the IOMEM
areas of such devices. Note that on kernels without support for
ZONE_DEVICE Xen will fallback to use ballooned pages in order to
create foreign mappings.

The newly added helpers use the same parameters as the existing
{alloc/free}_xenballooned_pages functions, which allows for in-place
replacement of the callers. Once a memory region has been added to be
used as scratch mapping space it will no longer be released, and pages
returned are kept in a linked list. This allows to have a buffer of
pages and prevents resorting to frequent additions and removals of
regions.

If enabled (because ZONE_DEVICE is supported) the usage of the new
functionality untangles Xen balloon and RAM hotplug from the usage of
unpopulated physical memory ranges to map foreign pages, which is the
correct thing to do in order to avoid mappings of foreign pages depend
on memory hotplug.

Note the driver is currently not enabled on Arm platforms because it
would interfere with the identity mapping required on some platforms.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901083326.21264-4-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/balloon: add header guard</title>
<updated>2020-09-04T07:59:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T08:33:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=aecb2016c90a1b620e21c9e143afbdc9666cce52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aecb2016c90a1b620e21c9e143afbdc9666cce52</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to protect against the header being included multiple times
on the same compilation unit.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901083326.21264-2-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2020-08-29T19:44:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-29T19:44:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=c8b5563abe02c5e9abdd6a74043c651a9ec31e9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c8b5563abe02c5e9abdd6a74043c651a9ec31e9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
 "Two fixes for Xen: one needed for ongoing work to support virtio with
  Xen, and one for a corner case in IRQ handling with Xen"

* tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  arm/xen: Add misuse warning to virt_to_gfn
  xen/xenbus: Fix granting of vmalloc'd memory
  XEN uses irqdesc::irq_data_common::handler_data to store a per interrupt XEN data pointer which contains XEN specific information.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm/xen: Add misuse warning to virt_to_gfn</title>
<updated>2020-08-27T06:58:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Simon Leiner</name>
<email>simon@leiner.me</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-25T09:31:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=9d3004bf7ba32c89873bb8422671d52b4bb52ce1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d3004bf7ba32c89873bb8422671d52b4bb52ce1</id>
<content type='text'>
As virt_to_gfn uses virt_to_phys, it will return invalid addresses when
used with vmalloc'd addresses. This patch introduces a warning, when
virt_to_gfn is used in this way.

Signed-off-by: Simon Leiner &lt;simon@leiner.me&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200825093153.35500-2-simon@leiner.me
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2020-08-14T20:34:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-14T20:34:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=0520058d0578c2924b1571c16281f873cb4a3d2b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0520058d0578c2924b1571c16281f873cb4a3d2b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - Remove support for running as 32-bit Xen PV-guest.

   32-bit PV guests are rarely used, are lacking security fixes for
   Meltdown, and can be easily replaced by PVH mode. Another series for
   doing more cleanup will follow soon (removal of 32-bit-only pvops
   functionality).

 - Fixes and additional features for the Xen display frontend driver.

* tag 'for-linus-5.9-rc1b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  drm/xen-front: Pass dumb buffer data offset to the backend
  xen: Sync up with the canonical protocol definition in Xen
  drm/xen-front: Add YUYV to supported formats
  drm/xen-front: Fix misused IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks
  xen/gntdev: Fix dmabuf import with non-zero sgt offset
  x86/xen: drop tests for highmem in pv code
  x86/xen: eliminate xen-asm_64.S
  x86/xen: remove 32-bit Xen PV guest support
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Sync up with the canonical protocol definition in Xen</title>
<updated>2020-08-13T10:50:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Andrushchenko</name>
<email>oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-13T06:21:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=6f92337b6bffb3d9e509024d6ef5c3f2b112757d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f92337b6bffb3d9e509024d6ef5c3f2b112757d</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the sync up with the canonical definition of the
display protocol in Xen.

1. Add protocol version as an integer

Version string, which is in fact an integer, is hard to handle in the
code that supports different protocol versions. To simplify that
also add the version as an integer.

2. Pass buffer offset with XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_CREATE

There are cases when display data buffer is created with non-zero
offset to the data start. Handle such cases and provide that offset
while creating a display buffer.

3. Add XENDISPL_OP_GET_EDID command

Add an optional request for reading Extended Display Identification
Data (EDID) structure which allows better configuration of the
display connectors over the configuration set in XenStore.
With this change connectors may have multiple resolutions defined
with respect to detailed timing definitions and additional properties
normally provided by displays.

If this request is not supported by the backend then visible area
is defined by the relevant XenStore's "resolution" property.

If backend provides extended display identification data (EDID) with
XENDISPL_OP_GET_EDID request then EDID values must take precedence
over the resolutions defined in XenStore.

4. Bump protocol version to 2.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko &lt;oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200813062113.11030-5-andr2000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
