wireguard-linux/security/keys, branch stable

KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len

2026-09-11T21:43:45Z

encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key description into the undersized buffer. The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination, and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation. Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang Signed-off-by: Francis Perron Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260909153433.83117-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: Fix tpm2_load_cmd() boundary check

2026-09-11T21:43:45Z

tpm2_load_cmd() does boundary checks against the ASN.1 size i.e., payload->blob_len. Address this by passing the decoded blob size to tpm2_load_cmd(), and use it for the boundary checks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Reported-by: co+6a581c4284f721d4@bugs.sh Closes: https://bugs.sh/b/6a581c4284f721d4/ Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260901205809.2028454-1-jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

keys: translate request_key_auth pid for the reading procfs instance

2026-09-11T21:43:45Z

request_key_auth_describe() prints rka->pid into /proc/keys as a raw pid_t in the initial pid namespace. A reader can open /proc/keys through a mount in another pid namespace. That reader sees a number with no meaning there. The number can even name an unrelated task. The line needs VIEW on the key. So the reader either shares the key owner's uid or possesses the key. The fix keeps a struct pid. Commit 4f82f45730c6 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t") gave /proc/net/ip6_flowlabel the same storage. The print goes through pid_nr_ns(). It renders against the pid namespace of the procfs instance the line is read through. Commit ad08978ab41c ("ipv6/flowlabel: simplify pid namespace lookup") moved that print to the same anchor. Output through an initial namespace /proc does not change. The line shows 0 for a requestor with no number in that namespace. Translating at read time was the alternative. find_pid_ns() can resolve a recycled number. The line would then name a live task with no connection to the key. A stored struct pid gives 0 instead when the requestor has no number there. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260809110202.2180410-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com/ Fixes: 78b7280cce23 ("KEYS: Improve /proc/keys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 codeql Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821095935.1864998-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

keys: fix lost wakeup when reaping a dead key type

2026-09-11T21:43:45Z

clear_bit() is atomic with respect to the word it modifies, but it is an unordered operation: it implies no memory barrier on either side (Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt). key_garbage_collector() clears KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE with clear_bit() and calls wake_up_bit() after reaping a dead key type. wake_up_bit() uses a lockless waitqueue check and requires a full barrier after the clear. The existing smp_mb() is before clear_bit(), so nothing orders the clear against that check. The GC can see an empty waitqueue while unregister_key_type() still sees the bit set. The final wakeup is then lost, leaving module unload stuck in wait_on_bit(). Use clear_and_wake_up_bit(). Its clear_bit_unlock() has RELEASE semantics, so the completed GC work stays ordered before the clear, and its smp_mb__after_atomic() orders the clear before the waitqueue check. Fixes: 0c061b5707ab ("KEYS: Correctly destroy key payloads when their keytype is removed") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821025327.61488-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm-buf: Memory-safe allocations

2026-08-25T15:13:36Z

Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be used: struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); Alternatively, other allocations are also possible (static data, stack, etc) for example: u8 buf_data[512]; struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data; tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data)); This is achieved by embedding buffer's header inside the allocated blob, instead of having an outer wrapper. Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan Message-ID: <20260522013555.1063716-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson

tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW

2026-08-25T15:13:36Z

Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW flags into the TPM_BUF_INVALID flag, as their behavior is identical (the only difference being the associated log messages). Message-ID: <20260125192526.782202-11-jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson

tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers

2026-08-25T15:13:35Z

Consolidate TPM1 constants in tpm_command.h and remove duplicate constants from tpm1-cmd.c. Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith Co-developed-by: Alec Brown Signed-off-by: Alec Brown Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering

2026-08-21T01:33:21Z

trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510 Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed. Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260731140925.2973492-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects()

2026-07-23T15:23:39Z

keyring_get_key_chunk() loads description bytes into the index chunk low address first, while keyring_diff_objects() numbers the first differing bit from the low end and folds the absolute byte index into the level without removing the inline-prefix offset the level already carries. The two disagree on byte order and bit position, so the array can be told two keys first differ at a bit that does not differ in the chunk the walker uses, letting crafted descriptions collide into one node. Load the chunk in the order keyring_diff_objects() assumes and drop the inline-prefix length when folding the byte index into the level. This only changes the in-memory ordering used to place keys within a keyring; add, search and read of non-colliding keys are unaffected. Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()

2026-07-23T15:23:32Z

For description-level chunks keyring_get_key_chunk() advances the read pointer by level * sizeof(long) past the inline prefix but only bounds-checks the prefix, so a long enough key description is read past its kmemdup(desc, desc_len + 1) allocation. Compute the full byte offset and bounds-check the description against it before reading. The walk only reaches a description-level chunk when two keys collide through the hash, x, type and domain_tag chunks, so this is reached from an unprivileged add_key(2) with a crafted pair of same-type keys whose index hashes collide; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read. Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen