<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>wireguard-linux/security/selinux/include/avc.h, branch jd/unified-crypt-queue</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard for the Linux kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/security/selinux/include/avc.h?h=jd%2Funified-crypt-queue</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/atom/security/selinux/include/avc.h?h=jd%2Funified-crypt-queue'/>
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<updated>2019-12-09T23:37:47Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required</title>
<updated>2019-12-09T23:37:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T17:22:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=0188d5c025ca8fe756ba3193bd7d150139af5a88'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0188d5c025ca8fe756ba3193bd7d150139af5a88</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.

Fixes: bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"</title>
<updated>2019-12-09T23:28:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T17:22:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=1a37079c236d55fb31ebbf4b59945dab8ec8764c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a37079c236d55fb31ebbf4b59945dab8ec8764c</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type.  This is done in the next commit.

Fixes: e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link</title>
<updated>2019-01-11T01:34:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-12T15:10:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=e46e01eebbbcf2ff6d28ee7cae9f117e9d1572c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e46e01eebbbcf2ff6d28ee7cae9f117e9d1572c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bda0be7ad9948 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk.  However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE).  Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose.  Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk</title>
<updated>2019-01-11T01:32:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-12T15:10:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk.  Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check.  This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.

Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK &lt;bmktuwien@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: wrap AVC state</title>
<updated>2018-03-20T20:58:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-05T16:47:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=6b6bc6205d98796361962ee282a063f18ba8dc57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6b6bc6205d98796361962ee282a063f18ba8dc57</id>
<content type='text'>
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and
pass it explicitly to all AVC functions.  The AVC private state
is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced
from the selinux_state.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or
APIs (userspace or LSM).

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: wrap global selinux state</title>
<updated>2018-03-01T23:48:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-01T23:48:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=aa8e712cee93d520e96a2ca8e3a20f807c937e3f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aa8e712cee93d520e96a2ca8e3a20f807c937e3f</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions.  The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM).  It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: update my email address</title>
<updated>2017-08-17T19:32:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-17T17:32:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=7efbb60b455115f6027e76c45ec548436115f72c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7efbb60b455115f6027e76c45ec548436115f72c</id>
<content type='text'>
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next</title>
<updated>2015-08-15T03:29:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-15T03:29:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=3e5f206c00f73f535c914eedc8b91f424c5a14ab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e5f206c00f73f535c914eedc8b91f424c5a14ab</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: extended permissions for ioctls</title>
<updated>2015-07-13T17:31:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Vander Stoep</name>
<email>jeffv@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-10T21:19:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/commit/?id=fa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a</id>
<content type='text'>
Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:

allowxperm &lt;source&gt; &lt;target&gt;:&lt;class&gt; ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm &lt;source&gt; &lt;target&gt;:&lt;class&gt; ioctl priv_gpu_cmds

Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.

When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.

The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.

The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich &lt;nnk@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
