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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
commit | 7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch) | |
tree | 65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /arch/powerpc/include | |
parent | Merge tag 'trace-v5.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace (diff) | |
parent | kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR (diff) | |
download | wireguard-linux-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.tar.xz wireguard-linux-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.zip |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/include')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/include/asm/livepatch.h | 11 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/livepatch.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/livepatch.h index 6f10de6af6e3..fd65931a739f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/livepatch.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/livepatch.h @@ -17,17 +17,6 @@ static inline void klp_arch_set_pc(struct ftrace_regs *fregs, unsigned long ip) ftrace_instruction_pointer_set(fregs, ip); } -#define klp_get_ftrace_location klp_get_ftrace_location -static inline unsigned long klp_get_ftrace_location(unsigned long faddr) -{ - /* - * Live patch works on PPC32 and only with -mprofile-kernel on PPC64. In - * both cases, the ftrace location is always within the first 16 bytes. - */ - return ftrace_location_range(faddr, faddr + 16); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ - #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH_64 static inline void klp_init_thread_info(struct task_struct *p) { |