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| author |   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> | 2020-02-10 13:00:13 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2020-02-27 23:21:52 -0500 |
| commit | 253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee (patch) | |
| tree | e9e6c341e7642b3e5cade3e18b57e2e049b75060 /drivers/char | |
| parent | random: split primary/secondary crng init paths (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-linux-253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee.tar.xz wireguard-linux-253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee.zip | |
random: add arch_get_random_*long_early()
Some architectures (e.g. arm64) can have heterogeneous CPUs, and the
boot CPU may be able to provide entropy while secondary CPUs cannot. On
such systems, arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long()
will fail unless support for RNG instructions has been detected on all
CPUs. This prevents the boot CPU from being able to provide
(potentially) trusted entropy when seeding the primary CRNG.
To make it possible to seed the primary CRNG from the boot CPU without
adversely affecting the runtime versions of arch_get_random_long() and
arch_get_random_seed_long(), this patch adds new early versions of the
functions used when initializing the primary CRNG.
Default implementations are provided atop of the existing
arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() so that only
architectures with such constraints need to provide the new helpers.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 62d32e62f2da..02a85b87b993 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -799,6 +799,24 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } +static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; + + for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { + rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = false; + } + crng->state[i] ^= rv; + } + + return arch_init; +} + static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); @@ -811,7 +829,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - if (crng_init_try_arch(crng) && trust_cpu) { + if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; |