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author | 2025-03-17 13:45:12 -0700 | |
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committer | 2025-03-17 13:45:13 -0700 | |
commit | b02f072a36560a89155a1ebcb2ca6bd881333a8b (patch) | |
tree | 62436d27fd49365a4db2b9fa92065b6aabbca28c /kernel | |
parent | bpf, x86: Fix objtool warning for timed may_goto (diff) | |
parent | selftests/bpf: Test freplace from user namespace (diff) | |
download | wireguard-linux-b02f072a36560a89155a1ebcb2ca6bd881333a8b.tar.xz wireguard-linux-b02f072a36560a89155a1ebcb2ca6bd881333a8b.zip |
Merge branch 'support-freplace-prog-from-user-namespace'
Mykyta Yatsenko says:
====================
Support freplace prog from user namespace
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Freplace programs can't be loaded from user namespace, as
bpf_program__set_attach_target() requires searching for target prog BTF,
which is locked under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This patch set enables this use case by:
1. Relaxing capable check in bpf's BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID, check for CAP_BPF
instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN, support BPF token in attr argument.
2. Pass BPF token around libbpf from bpf_program__set_attach_target() to
bpf syscall where capable check is.
3. Validate positive/negative scenarios in selftests
This patch set is enabled by the recent libbpf change[1], that
introduced bpf_object__prepare() API. Calling bpf_object__prepare() for
freplace program before bpf_program__set_attach_target() initializes BPF
token, which is then passed to bpf syscall by libbpf.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250303135752.158343-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com/
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250317174039.161275-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 6a8f20ee2851..380b445a304c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -4732,6 +4732,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, info.recursion_misses = stats.misses; info.verified_insns = prog->aux->verified_insns; + if (prog->aux->btf) + info.btf_id = btf_obj_id(prog->aux->btf); if (!bpf_capable()) { info.jited_prog_len = 0; @@ -4878,8 +4880,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, } } - if (prog->aux->btf) - info.btf_id = btf_obj_id(prog->aux->btf); info.attach_btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; if (attach_btf) info.attach_btf_obj_id = btf_obj_id(attach_btf); @@ -5120,15 +5120,34 @@ static int bpf_btf_load(const union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_ return btf_new_fd(attr, uattr, uattr_size); } -#define BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD btf_id +#define BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD fd_by_id_token_fd static int bpf_btf_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr) { + struct bpf_token *token = NULL; + if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID)) return -EINVAL; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (attr->open_flags & ~BPF_F_TOKEN_FD) + return -EINVAL; + + if (attr->open_flags & BPF_F_TOKEN_FD) { + token = bpf_token_get_from_fd(attr->fd_by_id_token_fd); + if (IS_ERR(token)) + return PTR_ERR(token); + if (!bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID)) { + bpf_token_put(token); + token = NULL; + } + } + + if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + bpf_token_put(token); return -EPERM; + } + + bpf_token_put(token); return btf_get_fd_by_id(attr->btf_id); } |