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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2021-07-23 10:53:03 +0200
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-07-23 09:27:02 -0400
commitce5bb5a86e5ebcd3c2e40e6dd1382027b5d43caf (patch)
tree93fde4a707aaeec18ba7e63f2b863b444349dfef /security
parentima: Introduce ima_get_current_hash_algo() (diff)
downloadwireguard-linux-ce5bb5a86e5ebcd3c2e40e6dd1382027b5d43caf.tar.xz
wireguard-linux-ce5bb5a86e5ebcd3c2e40e6dd1382027b5d43caf.zip
ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently don't return a result as, unlike appraisal-related functions, the result is not used by callers to deny an operation. Measurement-related functions instead rely on the audit subsystem to notify the system administrator when an error occurs. However, ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() are a special case, as these are the only functions that can return a buffer measurement (for files, there is ima_file_hash()). In a subsequent patch, they will be modified to return the calculated digest. In preparation to return the result of the digest calculation, this patch modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise. Given that the result of the measurement is still not necessary, this patch does not modify the behavior of existing callers by processing the returned value. For those, the return value is ignored. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (for the SELinux bits) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c40
2 files changed, 28 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f0e448ed1f9f..03db221324c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
- const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *func_data,
- bool buf_hash);
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int pcr, const char *func_data,
+ bool buf_hash);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 634e4709d8af..c814738caaca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
-/*
+/**
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
@@ -840,12 +840,15 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
* @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
*
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value
+ * otherwise.
*/
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
- const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
- int pcr, const char *func_data,
- bool buf_hash)
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int pcr, const char *func_data,
+ bool buf_hash)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -867,7 +870,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
u32 secid;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
- return;
+ return -ENOENT;
template = ima_template_desc_buf();
if (!template) {
@@ -889,7 +892,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
- return;
+ return -ENOENT;
}
if (!pcr)
@@ -937,7 +940,7 @@ out:
func_measure_str(func),
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
- return;
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -977,18 +980,21 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
* and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
* structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
* impact the integrity of the system.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, a negative value
+ * otherwise.
*/
-void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
- const char *event_name,
- const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
- bool hash)
+int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
+ const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
+ bool hash)
{
if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
- return;
+ return -ENOPARAM;
- process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
- CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_label,
- hash);
+ return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
+ event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
+ event_label, hash);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)