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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-09-17 15:03:01 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-09-17 15:03:01 +0200
commit70f43ea3a360c5a7d3474b0cfbabb80be6424596 (patch)
tree0c4b3ac2078294f9912e7cb0f44ff92f0cc9d596 /tools
parentMerge tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip (diff)
parentx86/ioremap: Improve iounmap() address range checks (diff)
downloadwireguard-linux-70f43ea3a360c5a7d3474b0cfbabb80be6424596.tar.xz
wireguard-linux-70f43ea3a360c5a7d3474b0cfbabb80be6424596.zip
Merge tag 'x86-mm-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 memory management updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Make LAM enablement safe vs. kernel threads using a process mm temporarily as switching back to the process would not update CR3 and therefore not enable LAM causing faults in user space when using tagged pointers. Cure it by synchronizing LAM enablement via IPIs to all CPUs which use the related mm. - Cure a LAM harmless inconsistency between CR3 and the state during context switch. It's both confusing and prone to lead to real bugs - Handle alt stack handling for threads which run with a non-zero protection key. The non-zero key prevents the kernel to access the alternate stack. Cure it by temporarily enabling all protection keys for the alternate stack setup/restore operations. - Provide a EFI config table identity mapping for kexec kernel to prevent kexec fails because the new kernel cannot access the config table array - Use GB pages only when a full GB is mapped in the identity map as otherwise the CPU can speculate into reserved areas after the end of memory which causes malfunction on UV systems. - Remove the noisy and pointless SRAT table dump during boot - Use is_ioremap_addr() for iounmap() address range checks instead of high_memory. is_ioremap_addr() is more precise. * tag 'x86-mm-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/ioremap: Improve iounmap() address range checks x86/mm: Remove duplicate check from build_cr3() x86/mm: Remove unused NX related declarations x86/mm: Remove unused CR3_HW_ASID_BITS x86/mm: Don't print out SRAT table information x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped. x86/kexec: Add EFI config table identity mapping for kexec kernel selftests/mm: Add new testcases for pkeys x86/pkeys: Restore altstack access in sigreturn() x86/pkeys: Update PKRU to enable all pkeys before XSAVE x86/pkeys: Add helper functions to update PKRU on the sigframe x86/pkeys: Add PKRU as a parameter in signal handling functions x86/mm: Cleanup prctl_enable_tagged_addr() nr_bits error checking x86/mm: Fix LAM inconsistency during context switch x86/mm: Use IPIs to synchronize LAM enablement
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h13
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c481
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c10
4 files changed, 494 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
index 5f2ca591c956..e10b87376fde 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ CAN_BUILD_X86_64 := $(shell ./../x86/check_cc.sh "$(CC)" ../x86/trivial_64bit_pr
CAN_BUILD_WITH_NOPIE := $(shell ./../x86/check_cc.sh "$(CC)" ../x86/trivial_program.c -no-pie)
VMTARGETS := protection_keys
+VMTARGETS += pkey_sighandler_tests
BINARIES_32 := $(VMTARGETS:%=%_32)
BINARIES_64 := $(VMTARGETS:%=%_64)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h
index 15608350fc01..9ab6a3ee153b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -79,7 +79,18 @@ extern void abort_hooks(void);
} \
} while (0)
-__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr);
+#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
+#ifndef noinline
+# define noinline __attribute__((noinline))
+#endif
+
+noinline int read_ptr(int *ptr)
+{
+ /* Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow */
+ barrier();
+ return *ptr;
+}
+
void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val);
int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a8088b645ad6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Tests Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst)
+ *
+ * The testcases in this file exercise various flows related to signal handling,
+ * using an alternate signal stack, with the default pkey (pkey 0) disabled.
+ *
+ * Compile with:
+ * gcc -mxsave -o pkey_sighandler_tests -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall pkey_sighandler_tests.c -I../../../../tools/include -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -mxsave -m32 -o pkey_sighandler_tests -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall pkey_sighandler_tests.c -I../../../../tools/include -lrt -ldl -lm
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "pkey-helpers.h"
+
+#define STACK_SIZE PTHREAD_STACK_MIN
+
+void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey) {}
+
+pthread_mutex_t mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+pthread_cond_t cond = PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER;
+siginfo_t siginfo = {0};
+
+/*
+ * We need to use inline assembly instead of glibc's syscall because glibc's
+ * syscall will attempt to access the PLT in order to call a library function
+ * which is protected by MPK 0 which we don't have access to.
+ */
+static inline __always_inline
+long syscall_raw(long n, long a1, long a2, long a3, long a4, long a5, long a6)
+{
+ unsigned long ret;
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ register long r10 asm("r10") = a4;
+ register long r8 asm("r8") = a5;
+ register long r9 asm("r9") = a6;
+ asm volatile ("syscall"
+ : "=a"(ret)
+ : "a"(n), "D"(a1), "S"(a2), "d"(a3), "r"(r10), "r"(r8), "r"(r9)
+ : "rcx", "r11", "memory");
+#elif defined __i386__
+ asm volatile ("int $0x80"
+ : "=a"(ret)
+ : "a"(n), "b"(a1), "c"(a2), "d"(a3), "S"(a4), "D"(a5)
+ : "memory");
+#else
+# error syscall_raw() not implemented
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sigsegv_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *info, void *ucontext)
+{
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+
+ memcpy(&siginfo, info, sizeof(siginfo_t));
+
+ pthread_cond_signal(&cond);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+
+ syscall_raw(SYS_exit, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void sigusr1_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *info, void *ucontext)
+{
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+
+ memcpy(&siginfo, info, sizeof(siginfo_t));
+
+ pthread_cond_signal(&cond);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+}
+
+static void sigusr2_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *info, void *ucontext)
+{
+ /*
+ * pkru should be the init_pkru value which enabled MPK 0 so
+ * we can use library functions.
+ */
+ printf("%s invoked.\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static void raise_sigusr2(void)
+{
+ pid_t tid = 0;
+
+ tid = syscall_raw(SYS_gettid, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ syscall_raw(SYS_tkill, tid, SIGUSR2, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * We should return from the signal handler here and be able to
+ * return to the interrupted thread.
+ */
+}
+
+static void *thread_segv_with_pkey0_disabled(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* Disable MPK 0 (and all others too) */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555555);
+
+ /* Segfault (with SEGV_MAPERR) */
+ *(int *) (0x1) = 1;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *thread_segv_pkuerr_stack(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* Disable MPK 0 (and all others too) */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555555);
+
+ /* After we disable MPK 0, we can't access the stack to return */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *thread_segv_maperr_ptr(void *ptr)
+{
+ stack_t *stack = ptr;
+ int *bad = (int *)1;
+
+ /*
+ * Setup alternate signal stack, which should be pkey_mprotect()ed by
+ * MPK 0. The thread's stack cannot be used for signals because it is
+ * not accessible by the default init_pkru value of 0x55555554.
+ */
+ syscall_raw(SYS_sigaltstack, (long)stack, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ /* Disable MPK 0. Only MPK 1 is enabled. */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555551);
+
+ /* Segfault */
+ *bad = 1;
+ syscall_raw(SYS_exit, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the sigsegv handler is invoked when pkey 0 is disabled.
+ * Note that the new thread stack and the alternate signal stack is
+ * protected by MPK 0.
+ */
+static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_pkey0_disabled(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ pthread_attr_t attr;
+ pthread_t thr;
+
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+
+ sa.sa_sigaction = sigsegv_handler;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
+
+ pthread_attr_init(&attr);
+ pthread_attr_setdetachstate(&attr, PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED);
+
+ pthread_create(&thr, &attr, thread_segv_with_pkey0_disabled, NULL);
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+ while (siginfo.si_signo == 0)
+ pthread_cond_wait(&cond, &mutex);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+
+ ksft_test_result(siginfo.si_signo == SIGSEGV &&
+ siginfo.si_code == SEGV_MAPERR &&
+ siginfo.si_addr == (void *)1,
+ "%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the sigsegv handler is invoked when pkey 0 is disabled.
+ * Note that the new thread stack and the alternate signal stack is
+ * protected by MPK 0, which renders them inaccessible when MPK 0
+ * is disabled. So just the return from the thread should cause a
+ * segfault with SEGV_PKUERR.
+ */
+static void test_sigsegv_handler_cannot_access_stack(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ pthread_attr_t attr;
+ pthread_t thr;
+
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+
+ sa.sa_sigaction = sigsegv_handler;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
+
+ pthread_attr_init(&attr);
+ pthread_attr_setdetachstate(&attr, PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED);
+
+ pthread_create(&thr, &attr, thread_segv_pkuerr_stack, NULL);
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+ while (siginfo.si_signo == 0)
+ pthread_cond_wait(&cond, &mutex);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+
+ ksft_test_result(siginfo.si_signo == SIGSEGV &&
+ siginfo.si_code == SEGV_PKUERR,
+ "%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the sigsegv handler that uses an alternate signal stack
+ * is correctly invoked for a thread which uses a non-zero MPK to protect
+ * its own stack, and disables all other MPKs (including 0).
+ */
+static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ static stack_t sigstack;
+ void *stack;
+ int pkey;
+ int parent_pid = 0;
+ int child_pid = 0;
+
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_ONSTACK;
+
+ sa.sa_sigaction = sigsegv_handler;
+
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ stack = mmap(0, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+
+ assert(stack != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ /* Allow access to MPK 0 and MPK 1 */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555550);
+
+ /* Protect the new stack with MPK 1 */
+ pkey = pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+ pkey_mprotect(stack, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, pkey);
+
+ /* Set up alternate signal stack that will use the default MPK */
+ sigstack.ss_sp = mmap(0, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ sigstack.ss_flags = 0;
+ sigstack.ss_size = STACK_SIZE;
+
+ memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
+
+ /* Use clone to avoid newer glibcs using rseq on new threads */
+ long ret = syscall_raw(SYS_clone,
+ CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
+ CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
+ CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+ CLONE_DETACHED,
+ (long) ((char *)(stack) + STACK_SIZE),
+ (long) &parent_pid,
+ (long) &child_pid, 0, 0);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ errno = -ret;
+ perror("clone");
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ thread_segv_maperr_ptr(&sigstack);
+ syscall_raw(SYS_exit, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+ while (siginfo.si_signo == 0)
+ pthread_cond_wait(&cond, &mutex);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+
+ ksft_test_result(siginfo.si_signo == SIGSEGV &&
+ siginfo.si_code == SEGV_MAPERR &&
+ siginfo.si_addr == (void *)1,
+ "%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the PKRU value set by the application is correctly
+ * restored upon return from signal handling.
+ */
+static void test_pkru_preserved_after_sigusr1(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ unsigned long pkru = 0x45454544;
+
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+
+ sa.sa_sigaction = sigusr1_handler;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
+
+ __write_pkey_reg(pkru);
+
+ raise(SIGUSR1);
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
+ while (siginfo.si_signo == 0)
+ pthread_cond_wait(&cond, &mutex);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure the pkru value is the same after returning from signal. */
+ ksft_test_result(pkru == __read_pkey_reg() &&
+ siginfo.si_signo == SIGUSR1,
+ "%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static noinline void *thread_sigusr2_self(void *ptr)
+{
+ /*
+ * A const char array like "Resuming after SIGUSR2" won't be stored on
+ * the stack and the code could access it via an offset from the program
+ * counter. This makes sure it's on the function's stack frame.
+ */
+ char str[] = {'R', 'e', 's', 'u', 'm', 'i', 'n', 'g', ' ',
+ 'a', 'f', 't', 'e', 'r', ' ',
+ 'S', 'I', 'G', 'U', 'S', 'R', '2',
+ '.', '.', '.', '\n', '\0'};
+ stack_t *stack = ptr;
+
+ /*
+ * Setup alternate signal stack, which should be pkey_mprotect()ed by
+ * MPK 0. The thread's stack cannot be used for signals because it is
+ * not accessible by the default init_pkru value of 0x55555554.
+ */
+ syscall(SYS_sigaltstack, (long)stack, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ /* Disable MPK 0. Only MPK 2 is enabled. */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555545);
+
+ raise_sigusr2();
+
+ /* Do something, to show the thread resumed execution after the signal */
+ syscall_raw(SYS_write, 1, (long) str, sizeof(str) - 1, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * We can't return to test_pkru_sigreturn because it
+ * will attempt to use a %rbp value which is on the stack
+ * of the main thread.
+ */
+ syscall_raw(SYS_exit, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that sigreturn is able to restore altstack even if the thread had
+ * disabled pkey 0.
+ */
+static void test_pkru_sigreturn(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa = {0};
+ static stack_t sigstack;
+ void *stack;
+ int pkey;
+ int parent_pid = 0;
+ int child_pid = 0;
+
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ sa.sa_flags = 0;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+
+ /*
+ * For this testcase, we do not want to handle SIGSEGV. Reset handler
+ * to default so that the application can crash if it receives SIGSEGV.
+ */
+ if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_ONSTACK;
+ sa.sa_sigaction = sigusr2_handler;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+
+ if (sigaction(SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ stack = mmap(0, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+
+ assert(stack != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow access to MPK 0 and MPK 2. The child thread (to be created
+ * later in this flow) will have its stack protected by MPK 2, whereas
+ * the current thread's stack is protected by the default MPK 0. Hence
+ * both need to be enabled.
+ */
+ __write_pkey_reg(0x55555544);
+
+ /* Protect the stack with MPK 2 */
+ pkey = pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+ pkey_mprotect(stack, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, pkey);
+
+ /* Set up alternate signal stack that will use the default MPK */
+ sigstack.ss_sp = mmap(0, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ sigstack.ss_flags = 0;
+ sigstack.ss_size = STACK_SIZE;
+
+ /* Use clone to avoid newer glibcs using rseq on new threads */
+ long ret = syscall_raw(SYS_clone,
+ CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
+ CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
+ CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+ CLONE_DETACHED,
+ (long) ((char *)(stack) + STACK_SIZE),
+ (long) &parent_pid,
+ (long) &child_pid, 0, 0);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ errno = -ret;
+ perror("clone");
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ thread_sigusr2_self(&sigstack);
+ syscall_raw(SYS_exit, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ child_pid = ret;
+ /* Check that thread exited */
+ do {
+ sched_yield();
+ ret = syscall_raw(SYS_tkill, child_pid, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ } while (ret != -ESRCH && ret != -EINVAL);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static void (*pkey_tests[])(void) = {
+ test_sigsegv_handler_with_pkey0_disabled,
+ test_sigsegv_handler_cannot_access_stack,
+ test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack,
+ test_pkru_preserved_after_sigusr1,
+ test_pkru_sigreturn
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); i++)
+ (*pkey_tests[i])();
+
+ ksft_finished();
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c
index 0789981b72b9..4990f7ab4cb7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c
@@ -954,16 +954,6 @@ void close_test_fds(void)
nr_test_fds = 0;
}
-#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
-__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr)
-{
- /*
- * Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow
- */
- barrier();
- return *ptr;
-}
-
void test_pkey_alloc_free_attach_pkey0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int i, err;