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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig99
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index eb6c9f5b3be7..39886bab943a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE
select ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER
- select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
+ select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX
select ARCH_HAS_ZONE_DMA_SET if EXPERT
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ config X86
select EDAC_ATOMIC_SCRUB
select EDAC_SUPPORT
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if X86_64 || (X86_32 && X86_LOCAL_APIC)
+ select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST_IDLE if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
@@ -244,7 +245,6 @@ config X86
select HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
select HAVE_KRETPROBES
select HAVE_RETHOOK
- select HAVE_KVM
select HAVE_LIVEPATCH if X86_64
select HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS
select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION if HAVE_OBJTOOL
select HAVE_OBJTOOL if X86_64
select HAVE_OPTPROBES
+ select HAVE_PAGE_SIZE_4KB
select HAVE_PCSPKR_PLATFORM
select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
@@ -492,6 +493,15 @@ config X86_CPU_RESCTRL
Say N if unsure.
+config X86_FRED
+ bool "Flexible Return and Event Delivery"
+ depends on X86_64
+ help
+ When enabled, try to use Flexible Return and Event Delivery
+ instead of the legacy SYSCALL/SYSENTER/IDT architecture for
+ ring transitions and exception/interrupt handling if the
+ system supports.
+
if X86_32
config X86_BIGSMP
bool "Support for big SMP systems with more than 8 CPUs"
@@ -1050,8 +1060,9 @@ config SCHED_MC
config SCHED_MC_PRIO
bool "CPU core priorities scheduler support"
- depends on SCHED_MC && CPU_SUP_INTEL
- select X86_INTEL_PSTATE
+ depends on SCHED_MC
+ select X86_INTEL_PSTATE if CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ select X86_AMD_PSTATE if CPU_SUP_AMD && ACPI
select CPU_FREQ
default y
help
@@ -1535,19 +1546,6 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
Encryption (SME).
-config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
- bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
- depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- help
- Say yes to have system memory encrypted by default if running on
- an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
-
- If set to Y, then the encryption of system memory can be
- deactivated with the mem_encrypt=off command line option.
-
- If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
- activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
-
# Common NUMA Features
config NUMA
bool "NUMA Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
@@ -2102,7 +2100,7 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_HOTPLUG
def_bool y
config ARCH_HAS_GENERIC_CRASHKERNEL_RESERVATION
- def_bool CRASH_CORE
+ def_bool CRASH_RESERVE
config PHYSICAL_START
hex "Physical address where the kernel is loaded" if (EXPERT || CRASH_DUMP)
@@ -2110,11 +2108,11 @@ config PHYSICAL_START
help
This gives the physical address where the kernel is loaded.
- If kernel is a not relocatable (CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=n) then
- bzImage will decompress itself to above physical address and
- run from there. Otherwise, bzImage will run from the address where
- it has been loaded by the boot loader and will ignore above physical
- address.
+ If the kernel is not relocatable (CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=n) then bzImage
+ will decompress itself to above physical address and run from there.
+ Otherwise, bzImage will run from the address where it has been loaded
+ by the boot loader. The only exception is if it is loaded below the
+ above physical address, in which case it will relocate itself there.
In normal kdump cases one does not have to set/change this option
as now bzImage can be compiled as a completely relocatable image
@@ -2430,6 +2428,18 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
endmenu
+config CC_HAS_NAMED_AS
+ def_bool CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION >= 120100
+
+config USE_X86_SEG_SUPPORT
+ def_bool y
+ depends on CC_HAS_NAMED_AS
+ #
+ # -fsanitize=kernel-address (KASAN) is at the moment incompatible
+ # with named address spaces - see GCC PR sanitizer/111736.
+ #
+ depends on !KASAN
+
config CC_HAS_SLS
def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
@@ -2461,12 +2471,12 @@ config CALL_PADDING
config FINEIBT
def_bool y
- depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
+ depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
select CALL_PADDING
config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
def_bool y
- depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
+ depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
config CALL_THUNKS
def_bool n
@@ -2488,7 +2498,7 @@ menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
-config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
default y
depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
@@ -2499,7 +2509,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
-config RETPOLINE
+config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y
@@ -2509,9 +2519,9 @@ config RETPOLINE
branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-config RETHUNK
+config MITIGATION_RETHUNK
bool "Enable return-thunks"
- depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y if X86_64
help
@@ -2520,14 +2530,14 @@ config RETHUNK
Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
-config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+config MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
bool "Mitigate RSB underflow with call depth tracking"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE
@@ -2547,7 +2557,7 @@ config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
bool "Enable call thunks and call depth tracking debugging"
- depends on CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+ depends on MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
default n
help
@@ -2558,14 +2568,14 @@ config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
Only enable this when you are debugging call thunks as this
creates a noticeable runtime overhead. If unsure say N.
-config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
-config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
default y
@@ -2574,14 +2584,14 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
performance.
-config CPU_SRSO
+config MITIGATION_SRSO
bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && MITIGATION_RETHUNK
default y
help
Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
-config SLS
+config MITIGATION_SLS
bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
@@ -2591,7 +2601,7 @@ config SLS
against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
larger.
-config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
default n
@@ -2610,6 +2620,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
If in doubt, say N.
+config MITIGATION_RFDS
+ bool "RFDS Mitigation"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default.
+ RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It
+ allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously
+ stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
+ See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
+
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES