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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c505
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c102
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c109
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c34
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c174
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c2
21 files changed, 742 insertions, 360 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c553cafd0736..88cef978380b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ static void amd_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u8 node_id;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* get information required for multi-node processors */
@@ -345,7 +344,7 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- node_id = ecx & 0xff;
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
if (c->x86 == 0x15)
c->cu_id = ebx & 0xff;
@@ -365,15 +364,15 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (!err)
c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
- cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id);
+ cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
} else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- node_id = value & 7;
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else
return;
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
/* use socket ID also for last level cache */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
}
u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu)
@@ -546,12 +545,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u32 ecx;
ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001e);
- nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
}
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) &&
@@ -988,6 +987,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF) &&
!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1054))
msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index acbf3dbb8bf2..09d02b1f6f71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -39,8 +40,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
@@ -75,6 +78,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -107,16 +114,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
- mds_select_mitigation();
- taa_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
- /*
- * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
- * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
- */
- mds_print_mitigation();
-
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -256,14 +256,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- return;
-
- pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -311,7 +303,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -325,7 +317,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
- goto out;
+ return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -357,18 +349,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
- /*
- * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
- * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
- */
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_select_mitigation();
- }
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -393,6 +373,151 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
enum srbds_mitigations {
@@ -453,11 +578,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
@@ -607,6 +734,32 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
+#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+ if (new_state)
+ return;
+
+ /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
@@ -621,7 +774,10 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
};
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -694,6 +850,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
{
@@ -733,11 +896,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
@@ -751,15 +916,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
"always-on" : "conditional");
-
- spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
}
/*
- * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
* required.
*/
- if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+ !smt_possible ||
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -771,12 +936,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
- /*
- * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
- */
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-
spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
set_mode:
@@ -785,9 +944,11 @@ set_mode:
static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
};
static const struct {
@@ -798,8 +959,12 @@ static const struct {
{ "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
{ "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
{ "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
- { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
+ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
+ { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+ { "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
+ { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
+ { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
};
@@ -836,17 +1001,30 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
- if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
- pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -855,6 +1033,16 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return cmd;
}
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -875,49 +1063,64 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
- /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
- x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- goto specv2_set_mode;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
}
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_auto;
+
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
- case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_amd;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_generic;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_auto;
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
break;
}
- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
- return;
-retpoline_auto:
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
- retpoline_amd:
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
- goto retpoline_generic;
- }
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
- } else {
- retpoline_generic:
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+ fallthrough;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ break;
}
-specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -943,7 +1146,7 @@ specv2_set_mode:
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
@@ -989,6 +1192,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -1000,19 +1205,26 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
- if (sched_smt_active())
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- else
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
break;
@@ -1048,6 +1260,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
@@ -1252,6 +1474,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
}
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1260,16 +1490,24 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return 0;
/*
- * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
- * by a previous prctl call.
-
+ * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+ * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+ * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+ * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+ * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+ *
+ * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+ * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+ * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+ * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+ * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+ * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+ * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
*/
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
+
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
break;
@@ -1282,10 +1520,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return -EPERM;
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
return 0;
+
task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
@@ -1350,20 +1588,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
- return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
+ else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- } else
+ } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ else
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
}
@@ -1598,9 +1833,23 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
@@ -1630,6 +1879,27 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
+
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
+
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ibpb_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ stibp_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+
static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
@@ -1655,12 +1925,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
- ibpb_state(),
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
- stibp_state(),
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
- spectre_v2_module_string());
+ return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
@@ -1682,6 +1947,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1733,4 +2001,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
index c7503be92f35..cae566567e15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static int find_num_cache_leaves(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return i;
}
-void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
+void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
{
/*
* We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
if (c->x86 < 0x17) {
/* LLC is at the node level. */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else if (c->x86 == 0x17 && c->x86_model <= 0x1F) {
/*
* LLC is at the core complex level.
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
}
}
-void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
+void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
{
/*
* We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void ci_leaf_init(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf,
this_leaf->priv = base->nb;
}
-static int __init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
+int init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ static void get_cache_id(int cpu, struct _cpuid4_info_regs *id4_regs)
id4_regs->id = c->apicid >> index_msb;
}
-static int __populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
+int populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
{
unsigned int idx, ret;
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
@@ -1033,6 +1033,3 @@ static int __populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
return 0;
}
-
-DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION(init_cache_level)
-DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION(populate_cache_leaves)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9b3f25e14608..305f30e45f3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
unsigned long bits_missing = 0;
set_register:
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val), "+m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
set_register:
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val), "+m" (cr4_pinned_bits));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
@@ -1099,18 +1099,42 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -1131,6 +1155,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
return ia32_cap;
}
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1184,12 +1215,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
+ !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@@ -1336,9 +1382,8 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
}
-static void detect_null_seg_behavior(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static bool detect_null_seg_behavior(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Empirically, writing zero to a segment selector on AMD does
* not clear the base, whereas writing zero to a segment
@@ -1359,10 +1404,43 @@ static void detect_null_seg_behavior(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 1);
loadsegment(fs, 0);
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp);
- if (tmp != 0)
- set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
-#endif
+ return tmp == 0;
+}
+
+void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* BUG_NULL_SEG is only relevant with 64bit userspace */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return;
+
+ /* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021 &&
+ cpuid_eax(0x80000021) & BIT(6))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * CPUID bit above wasn't set. If this kernel is still running
+ * as a HV guest, then the HV has decided not to advertize
+ * that CPUID bit for whatever reason. For example, one
+ * member of the migration pool might be vulnerable. Which
+ * means, the bug is present: set the BUG flag and return.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Zen2 CPUs also have this behaviour, but no CPUID bit.
+ * 0x18 is the respective family for Hygon.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 0x17 || c->x86 == 0x18) &&
+ detect_null_seg_behavior())
+ return;
+
+ /* All the remaining ones are affected */
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
}
static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -1398,8 +1476,6 @@ static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
- detect_null_seg_behavior(c);
-
/*
* ESPFIX is a strange bug. All real CPUs have it. Paravirt
* systems that run Linux at CPL > 0 may or may not have the
@@ -1826,7 +1902,7 @@ static void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
struct desc_struct d = { };
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
write_rdtscp_aux(cpudata);
/* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 9d033693519a..4d04c127c4a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
index 4e28c1fc8749..b232bd0be78d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ static void hygon_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u8 node_id;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* get information required for multi-node processors */
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- node_id = ecx & 0xff;
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xff;
@@ -92,14 +91,14 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Socket ID is ApicId[6] for these processors. */
c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT;
- cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id);
+ cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
} else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- node_id = value & 7;
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else
return;
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ static void hygon_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
/* use socket ID also for last level cache */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
}
static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -351,6 +350,8 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
}
static void cpu_detect_tlb_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 11d5c5950e2d..44688917d51f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly;
static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused)
{
ring3mwait_disabled = true;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
__setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index fd76e3733dd3..8a2b8e791314 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -310,11 +310,17 @@ static void wait_for_panic(void)
panic("Panicing machine check CPU died");
}
-static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
+static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
{
- int apei_err = 0;
struct llist_node *pending;
struct mce_evt_llist *l;
+ int apei_err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. Not that it
+ * matters a whole lot since the machine is going to panic anyway.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
if (!fake_panic) {
/*
@@ -329,7 +335,7 @@ static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
} else {
/* Don't log too much for fake panic */
if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_fake_panicked) > 1)
- return;
+ goto out;
}
pending = mce_gen_pool_prepare_records();
/* First print corrected ones that are still unlogged */
@@ -367,6 +373,9 @@ static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
panic(msg);
} else
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Fake kernel panic: %s\n", msg);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
}
/* Support code for software error injection */
@@ -388,10 +397,28 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
return -1;
}
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+ show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+ panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+ while (true)
+ cpu_relax();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
{
- u64 v;
+ DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
@@ -401,21 +428,43 @@ static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
return *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
}
- if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "mce: Unable to read MSR 0x%x!\n", msr);
- /*
- * Return zero in case the access faulted. This should
- * not happen normally but can happen if the CPU does
- * something weird, or if the code is buggy.
- */
- v = 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * RDMSR on MCA MSRs should not fault. If they do, this is very much an
+ * architectural violation and needs to be reported to hw vendor. Panic
+ * the box to not allow any further progress.
+ */
+ asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_fault)
+ : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
+
- return v;
+ return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
+}
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax,
+ regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+ show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+ panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+ while (true)
+ cpu_relax();
+
+ return true;
}
static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
{
+ u32 low, high;
+
if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
@@ -423,7 +472,15 @@ static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
*(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset) = v;
return;
}
- wrmsrl(msr, v);
+
+ low = (u32)v;
+ high = (u32)(v >> 32);
+
+ /* See comment in mce_rdmsrl() */
+ asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_fault)
+ : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
}
/*
@@ -643,7 +700,7 @@ static struct notifier_block mce_default_nb = {
/*
* Read ADDR and MISC registers.
*/
-static void mce_read_aux(struct mce *m, int i)
+static noinstr void mce_read_aux(struct mce *m, int i)
{
if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
m->misc = mce_rdmsrl(msr_ops.misc(i));
@@ -1023,10 +1080,13 @@ static int mce_start(int *no_way_out)
* Synchronize between CPUs after main scanning loop.
* This invokes the bulk of the Monarch processing.
*/
-static int mce_end(int order)
+static noinstr int mce_end(int order)
{
- int ret = -1;
u64 timeout = (u64)mca_cfg.monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Allow instrumentation around external facilities. */
+ instrumentation_begin();
if (!timeout)
goto reset;
@@ -1070,7 +1130,8 @@ static int mce_end(int order)
/*
* Don't reset anything. That's done by the Monarch.
*/
- return 0;
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
}
/*
@@ -1085,6 +1146,10 @@ reset:
* Let others run again.
*/
atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
return ret;
}
@@ -1313,8 +1378,10 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
* When there's any problem use only local no_way_out state.
*/
if (!lmce) {
- if (mce_end(order) < 0)
- no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ if (mce_end(order) < 0) {
+ if (!no_way_out)
+ no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ }
} else {
/*
* If there was a fatal machine check we should have
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
index eb2d41c1816d..e1fda5b19b6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static ssize_t flags_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
char buf[MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE], *__buf;
int err;
- if (cnt > MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE)
+ if (!cnt || cnt > MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, cnt))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
index 43031db429d2..231954fe5b4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -172,4 +172,14 @@ extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m) { return false; };
#endif
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr);
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr);
+
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index 87bcdc6dc2f0..0d09eb13743b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
-#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
#include "internal.h"
/*
@@ -40,9 +42,14 @@ static struct severity {
unsigned char context;
unsigned char excp;
unsigned char covered;
+ unsigned char cpu_model;
+ unsigned char cpu_minstepping;
+ unsigned char bank_lo, bank_hi;
char *msg;
} severities[] = {
#define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
+#define BANK_RANGE(l, h) .bank_lo = l, .bank_hi = h
+#define MODEL_STEPPING(m, s) .cpu_model = m, .cpu_minstepping = s
#define KERNEL .context = IN_KERNEL
#define USER .context = IN_USER
#define KERNEL_RECOV .context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
@@ -97,7 +104,6 @@ static struct severity {
KEEP, "Corrected error",
NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
),
-
/*
* known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
*
@@ -113,6 +119,18 @@ static struct severity {
AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
),
+ /*
+ * Quirk for Skylake/Cascade Lake. Patrol scrubber may be configured
+ * to report uncorrected errors using CMCI with a special signature.
+ * UC=0, MSCOD=0x0010, MCACOD=binary(000X 0000 1100 XXXX) reported
+ * in one of the memory controller banks.
+ * Set severity to "AO" for same action as normal patrol scrub error.
+ */
+ MCESEV(
+ AO, "Uncorrected Patrol Scrub Error",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_ADDR|0xffffeff0, MCI_ADDR|0x001000c0),
+ MODEL_STEPPING(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4), BANK_RANGE(13, 18)
+ ),
/* ignore OVER for UCNA */
MCESEV(
@@ -320,6 +338,12 @@ static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_e
continue;
if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
continue;
+ if (s->cpu_model && boot_cpu_data.x86_model != s->cpu_model)
+ continue;
+ if (s->cpu_minstepping && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < s->cpu_minstepping)
+ continue;
+ if (s->bank_lo && (m->bank < s->bank_lo || m->bank > s->bank_hi))
+ continue;
if (msg)
*msg = s->msg;
s->covered = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
index cb0fdcaf1415..c95a27513a30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -626,16 +626,16 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
if (val != 1)
return size;
- tmp_ret = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(bsp, &microcode_pdev->dev, true);
- if (tmp_ret != UCODE_NEW)
- return size;
-
get_online_cpus();
ret = check_online_cpus();
if (ret)
goto put;
+ tmp_ret = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(bsp, &microcode_pdev->dev, true);
+ if (tmp_ret != UCODE_NEW)
+ goto put;
+
mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
ret = microcode_reload_late();
mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
@@ -772,9 +772,9 @@ static struct subsys_interface mc_cpu_interface = {
};
/**
- * mc_bp_resume - Update boot CPU microcode during resume.
+ * microcode_bsp_resume - Update boot CPU microcode during resume.
*/
-static void mc_bp_resume(void)
+void microcode_bsp_resume(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static void mc_bp_resume(void)
}
static struct syscore_ops mc_syscore_ops = {
- .resume = mc_bp_resume,
+ .resume = microcode_bsp_resume,
};
static int mc_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
index ce799cfe9434..b224d4dae2ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -100,53 +100,6 @@ static int has_newer_microcode(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf, int new_rev
return find_matching_signature(mc, csig, cpf);
}
-/*
- * Given CPU signature and a microcode patch, this function finds if the
- * microcode patch has matching family and model with the CPU.
- *
- * %true - if there's a match
- * %false - otherwise
- */
-static bool microcode_matches(struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header,
- unsigned long sig)
-{
- unsigned long total_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
- unsigned long data_size = get_datasize(mc_header);
- struct extended_sigtable *ext_header;
- unsigned int fam_ucode, model_ucode;
- struct extended_signature *ext_sig;
- unsigned int fam, model;
- int ext_sigcount, i;
-
- fam = x86_family(sig);
- model = x86_model(sig);
-
- fam_ucode = x86_family(mc_header->sig);
- model_ucode = x86_model(mc_header->sig);
-
- if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode)
- return true;
-
- /* Look for ext. headers: */
- if (total_size <= data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE)
- return false;
-
- ext_header = (void *) mc_header + data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE;
- ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE;
- ext_sigcount = ext_header->count;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ext_sigcount; i++) {
- fam_ucode = x86_family(ext_sig->sig);
- model_ucode = x86_model(ext_sig->sig);
-
- if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode)
- return true;
-
- ext_sig++;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
{
struct ucode_patch *p;
@@ -164,7 +117,7 @@ static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
return p;
}
-static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
+static void save_microcode_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, void *data, unsigned int size)
{
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr, *mc_saved_hdr;
struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp, *p = NULL;
@@ -210,6 +163,9 @@ static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
if (!p)
return;
+ if (!find_matching_signature(p->data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, uci->cpu_sig.pf))
+ return;
+
/*
* Save for early loading. On 32-bit, that needs to be a physical
* address as the APs are running from physical addresses, before
@@ -344,13 +300,14 @@ scan_microcode(void *data, size_t size, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool save)
size -= mc_size;
- if (!microcode_matches(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig)) {
+ if (!find_matching_signature(data, uci->cpu_sig.sig,
+ uci->cpu_sig.pf)) {
data += mc_size;
continue;
}
if (save) {
- save_microcode_patch(data, mc_size);
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, data, mc_size);
goto next;
}
@@ -483,14 +440,14 @@ static void show_saved_mc(void)
* Save this microcode patch. It will be loaded early when a CPU is
* hot-added or resumes.
*/
-static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size)
+static void save_mc_for_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u8 *mc, unsigned int size)
{
/* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
mutex_lock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
- save_microcode_patch(mc, size);
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, mc, size);
show_saved_mc();
mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
@@ -934,7 +891,7 @@ static enum ucode_state generic_load_microcode(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter)
* permanent memory. So it will be loaded early when a CPU is hot added
* or resumes.
*/
- save_mc_for_early(new_mc, new_mc_size);
+ save_mc_for_early(uci, new_mc, new_mc_size);
pr_debug("CPU%d found a matching microcode update with version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n",
cpu, new_rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
index 1c2f9baf8483..51d95c4b692c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __visible void __irq_entry hv_stimer0_vector_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
if (hv_stimer0_handler)
hv_stimer0_handler();
- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
ack_APIC_irq();
exiting_irq();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
index aa5c064a6a22..4ea906fe1c35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -167,9 +167,6 @@ static u8 mtrr_type_lookup_variable(u64 start, u64 end, u64 *partial_end,
*repeat = 0;
*uniform = 1;
- /* Make end inclusive instead of exclusive */
- end--;
-
prev_match = MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
unsigned short start_state, end_state, inclusive;
@@ -261,6 +258,9 @@ u8 mtrr_type_lookup(u64 start, u64 end, u8 *uniform)
int repeat;
u64 partial_end;
+ /* Make end inclusive instead of exclusive */
+ end--;
+
if (!mtrr_state_set)
return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 87a34b6e06a2..130c3c7f56d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ static void domain_add_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
}
if (r->mon_capable && domain_setup_mon_state(r, d)) {
+ kfree(d->ctrl_val);
+ kfree(d->mbps_val);
kfree(d);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
index 17095435c875..499cb2e727a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
@@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ struct rftype {
* struct mbm_state - status for each MBM counter in each domain
* @chunks: Total data moved (multiply by rdt_group.mon_scale to get bytes)
* @prev_msr Value of IA32_QM_CTR for this RMID last time we read it
- * @chunks_bw Total local data moved. Used for bandwidth calculation
* @prev_bw_msr:Value of previous IA32_QM_CTR for bandwidth counting
* @prev_bw The most recent bandwidth in MBps
* @delta_bw Difference between the current and previous bandwidth
@@ -285,7 +284,6 @@ struct rftype {
struct mbm_state {
u64 chunks;
u64 prev_msr;
- u64 chunks_bw;
u64 prev_bw_msr;
u32 prev_bw;
u32 delta_bw;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index 0cf4f87f6012..008bcb15fe96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -223,15 +223,14 @@ static u64 mbm_overflow_count(u64 prev_msr, u64 cur_msr)
return chunks >>= shift;
}
-static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
+static u64 __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
{
struct mbm_state *m;
u64 chunks, tval;
tval = __rmid_read(rmid, rr->evtid);
if (tval & (RMID_VAL_ERROR | RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL)) {
- rr->val = tval;
- return -EINVAL;
+ return tval;
}
switch (rr->evtid) {
case QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID:
@@ -245,10 +244,10 @@ static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
break;
default:
/*
- * Code would never reach here because
- * an invalid event id would fail the __rmid_read.
+ * Code would never reach here because an invalid
+ * event id would fail the __rmid_read.
*/
- return -EINVAL;
+ return RMID_VAL_ERROR;
}
if (rr->first) {
@@ -280,8 +279,6 @@ static void mbm_bw_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
return;
chunks = mbm_overflow_count(m->prev_bw_msr, tval);
- m->chunks_bw += chunks;
- m->chunks = m->chunks_bw;
cur_bw = (chunks * r->mon_scale) >> 20;
if (m->delta_comp)
@@ -300,23 +297,29 @@ void mon_event_count(void *info)
struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *entry;
struct rmid_read *rr = info;
struct list_head *head;
+ u64 ret_val;
rdtgrp = rr->rgrp;
- if (__mon_event_count(rdtgrp->mon.rmid, rr))
- return;
+ ret_val = __mon_event_count(rdtgrp->mon.rmid, rr);
/*
- * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups.
+ * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups and
+ * add them together. Count events which are read successfully.
+ * Discard the rmid_read's reporting errors.
*/
head = &rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
- if (__mon_event_count(entry->mon.rmid, rr))
- return;
+ if (__mon_event_count(entry->mon.rmid, rr) == 0)
+ ret_val = 0;
}
}
+
+ /* Report error if none of rmid_reads are successful */
+ if (ret_val)
+ rr->val = ret_val;
}
/*
@@ -451,15 +454,14 @@ static void mbm_update(struct rdt_domain *d, int rmid)
}
if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) {
rr.evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID;
+ __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
/*
* Call the MBA software controller only for the
* control groups and when user has enabled
* the software controller explicitly.
*/
- if (!is_mba_sc(NULL))
- __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
- else
+ if (is_mba_sc(NULL))
mbm_bw_count(rmid, &rr);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 54b711bc0607..28f786289fce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -507,85 +507,88 @@ unlock:
return ret ?: nbytes;
}
-struct task_move_callback {
- struct callback_head work;
- struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
-};
-
-static void move_myself(struct callback_head *head)
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_remove - the helper to remove resource group safely
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to remove
+ *
+ * On resource group creation via a mkdir, an extra kernfs_node reference is
+ * taken to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed.
+ *
+ * Drop the extra reference here, then free the rdtgroup structure.
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+static void rdtgroup_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
{
- struct task_move_callback *callback;
- struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
-
- callback = container_of(head, struct task_move_callback, work);
- rdtgrp = callback->rdtgrp;
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
+ kfree(rdtgrp);
+}
+static void _update_task_closid_rmid(void *task)
+{
/*
- * If resource group was deleted before this task work callback
- * was invoked, then assign the task to root group and free the
- * resource group.
+ * If the task is still current on this CPU, update PQR_ASSOC MSR.
+ * Otherwise, the MSR is updated when the task is scheduled in.
*/
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount) &&
- (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED)) {
- current->closid = 0;
- current->rmid = 0;
- kfree(rdtgrp);
- }
-
- preempt_disable();
- /* update PQR_ASSOC MSR to make resource group go into effect */
- resctrl_sched_in();
- preempt_enable();
+ if (task == current)
+ resctrl_sched_in();
+}
- kfree(callback);
+static void update_task_closid_rmid(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && task_curr(t))
+ smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(t), _update_task_closid_rmid, t, 1);
+ else
+ _update_task_closid_rmid(t);
}
static int __rdtgroup_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
{
- struct task_move_callback *callback;
- int ret;
-
- callback = kzalloc(sizeof(*callback), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!callback)
- return -ENOMEM;
- callback->work.func = move_myself;
- callback->rdtgrp = rdtgrp;
+ /* If the task is already in rdtgrp, no need to move the task. */
+ if ((rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP && tsk->closid == rdtgrp->closid &&
+ tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid) ||
+ (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP && tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid &&
+ tsk->closid == rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid))
+ return 0;
/*
- * Take a refcount, so rdtgrp cannot be freed before the
- * callback has been invoked.
+ * Set the task's closid/rmid before the PQR_ASSOC MSR can be
+ * updated by them.
+ *
+ * For ctrl_mon groups, move both closid and rmid.
+ * For monitor groups, can move the tasks only from
+ * their parent CTRL group.
*/
- atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
- ret = task_work_add(tsk, &callback->work, true);
- if (ret) {
- /*
- * Task is exiting. Drop the refcount and free the callback.
- * No need to check the refcount as the group cannot be
- * deleted before the write function unlocks rdtgroup_mutex.
- */
- atomic_dec(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
- kfree(callback);
- rdt_last_cmd_puts("Task exited\n");
- } else {
- /*
- * For ctrl_mon groups move both closid and rmid.
- * For monitor groups, can move the tasks only from
- * their parent CTRL group.
- */
- if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
- tsk->closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
+ tsk->closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+ tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
+ } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid == tsk->closid) {
tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
- } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP) {
- if (rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid == tsk->closid) {
- tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
- } else {
- rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't move task to different control group\n");
- ret = -EINVAL;
- }
+ } else {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't move task to different control group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
- return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the task's closid and rmid are written before determining if
+ * the task is current that will decide if it will be interrupted.
+ */
+ barrier();
+
+ /*
+ * By now, the task's closid and rmid are set. If the task is current
+ * on a CPU, the PQR_ASSOC MSR needs to be updated to make the resource
+ * group go into effect. If the task is not current, the MSR will be
+ * updated when the task is scheduled in.
+ */
+ update_task_closid_rmid(tsk);
+
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -1618,7 +1621,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(struct rdt_resource *r, char *name,
if (IS_ERR(kn_subdir))
return PTR_ERR(kn_subdir);
- kernfs_get(kn_subdir);
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_subdir);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1641,7 +1643,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn)
kn_info = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, "info", parent_kn->mode, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(kn_info))
return PTR_ERR(kn_info);
- kernfs_get(kn_info);
ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn_info, RF_TOP_INFO);
if (ret)
@@ -1662,12 +1663,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn)
goto out_destroy;
}
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn_info);
-
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_info);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -1696,12 +1691,6 @@ mongroup_create_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
if (dest_kn)
*dest_kn = kn;
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
-
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -1928,8 +1917,7 @@ void rdtgroup_kn_unlock(struct kernfs_node *kn)
rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)
rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(rdtgrp);
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
- kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
- kfree(rdtgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
} else {
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
}
@@ -1988,13 +1976,11 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
&kn_mongrp);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_info;
- kernfs_get(kn_mongrp);
ret = mkdir_mondata_all(rdtgroup_default.kn,
&rdtgroup_default, &kn_mondata);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mongrp;
- kernfs_get(kn_mondata);
rdtgroup_default.mon.mon_data_kn = kn_mondata;
}
@@ -2223,7 +2209,7 @@ static void free_all_child_rdtgrp(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
if (atomic_read(&sentry->waitcount) != 0)
sentry->flags = RDT_DELETED;
else
- kfree(sentry);
+ rdtgroup_remove(sentry);
}
}
@@ -2265,7 +2251,7 @@ static void rmdir_all_sub(void)
if (atomic_read(&rdtgrp->waitcount) != 0)
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
else
- kfree(rdtgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
}
/* Notify online CPUs to update per cpu storage and PQR_ASSOC MSR */
update_closid_rmid(cpu_online_mask, &rdtgroup_default);
@@ -2365,11 +2351,6 @@ static int mkdir_mondata_subdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
if (IS_ERR(kn))
return PTR_ERR(kn);
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -2705,8 +2686,8 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
/*
* kernfs_remove() will drop the reference count on "kn" which
* will free it. But we still need it to stick around for the
- * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn} call below. Take one extra reference
- * here, which will be dropped inside rdtgroup_kn_unlock().
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn) call. Take one extra reference here,
+ * which will be dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_remove().
*/
kernfs_get(kn);
@@ -2747,6 +2728,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
out_idfree:
free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
out_destroy:
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
out_free_rgrp:
kfree(rdtgrp);
@@ -2759,7 +2741,7 @@ static void mkdir_rdt_prepare_clean(struct rdtgroup *rgrp)
{
kernfs_remove(rgrp->kn);
free_rmid(rgrp->mon.rmid);
- kfree(rgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rgrp);
}
/*
@@ -2921,11 +2903,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp,
WARN_ON(list_empty(&prdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list));
list_del(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
- /*
- * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp)
- * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
return 0;
@@ -2937,11 +2914,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn,
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list);
- /*
- * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp)
- * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index adf9b71386ef..53004dbd55c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
index ee48c3fc8a65..24da5ee4f022 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@
#define BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax) ((eax) & 0x1f)
#define LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx) ((ebx) & 0xffff)
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
unsigned int __max_die_per_package __read_mostly = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_die_per_package);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Check if given CPUID extended toplogy "leaf" is implemented
*/
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.