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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/setup.ld2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S137
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c82
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c74
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c72
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/camellia_glue.c45
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c68
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c65
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c75
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c37
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c80
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/amd/iommu.c55
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/amd/power.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/core.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/core.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c36
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c31
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c67
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/perf_event.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/rapl.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/camellia.h63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/glue_helper.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-sse2.h28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/twofish.h19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/emulate_prefix.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h73
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvmclock.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c44
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c505
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c102
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c109
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c34
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c174
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/crash.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c38
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c81
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irq.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c107
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c39
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/module.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c53
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/signal.c48
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/step.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c41
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/irq.c85
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c85
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h91
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/pmu_amd.c46
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm.c106
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/trace.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c45
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c96
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c107
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/delay.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/insn.c34
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/msr-smp.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_64.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/fixup.c44
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/xen.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/power/cpu.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/realmode/init.c38
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_32.S6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/tools/relocs.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/ldt.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/um/syscalls_64.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c31
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/p2m.c63
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/pmu.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/pmu.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/time.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_32.S7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S18
206 files changed, 3276 insertions, 1777 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 8ef85139553f..c6c71592f6e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ config X86_UV
depends on X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM
depends on NUMA
depends on EFI
+ depends on KEXEC_CORE
depends on X86_X2APIC
depends on PCI
---help---
@@ -1424,7 +1425,7 @@ config HIGHMEM4G
config HIGHMEM64G
bool "64GB"
- depends on !M486 && !M586 && !M586TSC && !M586MMX && !MGEODE_LX && !MGEODEGX1 && !MCYRIXIII && !MELAN && !MWINCHIPC6 && !WINCHIP3D && !MK6
+ depends on !M486 && !M586 && !M586TSC && !M586MMX && !MGEODE_LX && !MGEODEGX1 && !MCYRIXIII && !MELAN && !MWINCHIPC6 && !MWINCHIP3D && !MK6
select X86_PAE
---help---
Select this if you have a 32-bit processor and more than 4
@@ -1540,7 +1541,6 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
- default y
depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
---help---
Say yes to have system memory encrypted by default if running on
@@ -1990,6 +1990,7 @@ config EFI
depends on ACPI
select UCS2_STRING
select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
+ select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
---help---
This enables the kernel to use EFI runtime services that are
available (such as the EFI variable services).
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 94df0868804b..69f0cb01c666 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -34,12 +34,13 @@ M16_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option, -m16, $(CODE16GCC_CFLAGS))
REALMODE_CFLAGS := $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
-Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -march=i386 -mregparm=3 \
-fno-strict-aliasing -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-pic \
- -mno-mmx -mno-sse
+ -mno-mmx -mno-sse $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -ffreestanding)
REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -fno-stack-protector)
REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -Wno-address-of-packed-member)
REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), $(cc_stack_align4))
+REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(CLANG_FLAGS)
export REALMODE_CFLAGS
# BITS is used as extension for files which are available in a 32 bit
@@ -61,6 +62,9 @@ endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mno-sse2 -mno-3dnow
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mno-avx,)
+# Intel CET isn't enabled in the kernel
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
+
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
BITS := 32
UTS_MACHINE := i386
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
index c8862696a47b..7d0394f4ebf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
@@ -5,15 +5,6 @@
#include "pgtable.h"
#include "../string.h"
-/*
- * __force_order is used by special_insns.h asm code to force instruction
- * serialization.
- *
- * It is not referenced from the code, but GCC < 5 with -fPIE would fail
- * due to an undefined symbol. Define it to make these ancient GCCs work.
- */
-unsigned long __force_order;
-
#define BIOS_START_MIN 0x20000U /* 128K, less than this is insane */
#define BIOS_START_MAX 0x9f000U /* 640K, absolute maximum */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
index 0149e41d42c2..5fac3de57944 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ SECTIONS
.initdata : { *(.initdata) }
__end_init = .;
- .text : { *(.text) }
+ .text : { *(.text .text.*) }
.text32 : { *(.text32) }
. = ALIGN(16);
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
index 9afeb58c910e..dd954d8db629 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ _initial_blocks_\@:
# Main loop - Encrypt/Decrypt remaining blocks
- cmp $0, %r13
+ test %r13, %r13
je _zero_cipher_left_\@
sub $64, %r13
je _four_cipher_left_\@
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes_\@:
mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r12
- cmp $0, %r12
+ test %r12, %r12
je _partial_done\@
GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ _T_8_\@:
add $8, %r10
sub $8, %r11
psrldq $8, %xmm0
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _return_T_done_\@
_T_4_\@:
movd %xmm0, %eax
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ _T_4_\@:
add $4, %r10
sub $4, %r11
psrldq $4, %xmm0
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _return_T_done_\@
_T_123_\@:
movd %xmm0, %eax
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@:
/* read the last <16B of AAD */
_get_AAD_rest\@:
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _get_AAD_done\@
READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, \TMP7
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@:
.macro PARTIAL_BLOCK CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
AAD_HASH operation
mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r13
- cmp $0, %r13
+ test %r13, %r13
je _partial_block_done_\@ # Leave Macro if no partial blocks
# Read in input data without over reading
cmp $16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@:
PSHUFB_XMM %xmm2, %xmm3
pxor %xmm3, \AAD_HASH
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_incomplete_1_\@
# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@:
PSHUFB_XMM %xmm2, %xmm9
pxor %xmm9, \AAD_HASH
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_incomplete_2_\@
# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ _encode_done_\@:
PSHUFB_XMM %xmm2, %xmm9
.endif
# output encrypted Bytes
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_fill_\@
mov %r13, %r12
mov $16, %r13
@@ -1946,7 +1946,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_set_key)
ENDPROC(aesni_set_key)
/*
- * void aesni_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+ * void aesni_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
*/
ENTRY(aesni_enc)
FRAME_BEGIN
@@ -2137,7 +2137,7 @@ _aesni_enc4:
ENDPROC(_aesni_enc4)
/*
- * void aesni_dec (struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+ * void aesni_dec (const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
*/
ENTRY(aesni_dec)
FRAME_BEGIN
@@ -2726,25 +2726,18 @@ ENDPROC(aesni_ctr_enc)
pxor CTR, IV;
/*
- * void aesni_xts_crypt8(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *dst, u8 *src,
- * bool enc, u8 *iv)
+ * void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv)
*/
-ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
+ENTRY(aesni_xts_encrypt)
FRAME_BEGIN
- cmpb $0, %cl
- movl $0, %ecx
- movl $240, %r10d
- leaq _aesni_enc4, %r11
- leaq _aesni_dec4, %rax
- cmovel %r10d, %ecx
- cmoveq %rax, %r11
movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask, GF128MUL_MASK
movups (IVP), IV
mov 480(KEYP), KLEN
- addq %rcx, KEYP
+.Lxts_enc_loop4:
movdqa IV, STATE1
movdqu 0x00(INP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
@@ -2768,71 +2761,103 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
pxor INC, STATE4
movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
- CALL_NOSPEC %r11
+ call _aesni_enc4
movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
movdqu STATE1, 0x00(OUTP)
- _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
- movdqa IV, STATE1
- movdqu 0x40(INP), INC
- pxor INC, STATE1
- movdqu IV, 0x40(OUTP)
-
movdqu 0x10(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE2
movdqu STATE2, 0x10(OUTP)
- _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
- movdqa IV, STATE2
- movdqu 0x50(INP), INC
- pxor INC, STATE2
- movdqu IV, 0x50(OUTP)
-
movdqu 0x20(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE3
movdqu STATE3, 0x20(OUTP)
- _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
- movdqa IV, STATE3
- movdqu 0x60(INP), INC
- pxor INC, STATE3
- movdqu IV, 0x60(OUTP)
-
movdqu 0x30(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE4
movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP)
_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
- movdqa IV, STATE4
- movdqu 0x70(INP), INC
- pxor INC, STATE4
- movdqu IV, 0x70(OUTP)
- _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+ add $64, INP
+ add $64, OUTP
+ sub $64, LEN
+ ja .Lxts_enc_loop4
+
movups IV, (IVP)
- CALL_NOSPEC %r11
+ FRAME_END
+ ret
+ENDPROC(aesni_xts_encrypt)
+
+/*
+ * void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv)
+ */
+ENTRY(aesni_xts_decrypt)
+ FRAME_BEGIN
+
+ movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask, GF128MUL_MASK
+ movups (IVP), IV
+
+ mov 480(KEYP), KLEN
+ add $240, KEYP
- movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
+.Lxts_dec_loop4:
+ movdqa IV, STATE1
+ movdqu 0x00(INP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
- movdqu STATE1, 0x40(OUTP)
+ movdqu IV, 0x00(OUTP)
- movdqu 0x50(OUTP), INC
+ _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+ movdqa IV, STATE2
+ movdqu 0x10(INP), INC
+ pxor INC, STATE2
+ movdqu IV, 0x10(OUTP)
+
+ _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+ movdqa IV, STATE3
+ movdqu 0x20(INP), INC
+ pxor INC, STATE3
+ movdqu IV, 0x20(OUTP)
+
+ _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+ movdqa IV, STATE4
+ movdqu 0x30(INP), INC
+ pxor INC, STATE4
+ movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
+
+ call _aesni_dec4
+
+ movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
+ pxor INC, STATE1
+ movdqu STATE1, 0x00(OUTP)
+
+ movdqu 0x10(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE2
- movdqu STATE2, 0x50(OUTP)
+ movdqu STATE2, 0x10(OUTP)
- movdqu 0x60(OUTP), INC
+ movdqu 0x20(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE3
- movdqu STATE3, 0x60(OUTP)
+ movdqu STATE3, 0x20(OUTP)
- movdqu 0x70(OUTP), INC
+ movdqu 0x30(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE4
- movdqu STATE4, 0x70(OUTP)
+ movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP)
+
+ _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+
+ add $64, INP
+ add $64, OUTP
+ sub $64, LEN
+ ja .Lxts_dec_loop4
+
+ movups IV, (IVP)
FRAME_END
ret
-ENDPROC(aesni_xts_crypt8)
+ENDPROC(aesni_xts_decrypt)
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S
index 91c039ab5699..4e4d34956170 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@:
_initial_blocks_encrypted\@:
- cmp $0, %r13
+ test %r13, %r13
je _zero_cipher_left\@
sub $128, %r13
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes\@:
vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13
mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r12
- cmp $0, %r12
+ test %r12, %r12
je _partial_done\@
#GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ _T_8\@:
add $8, %r10
sub $8, %r11
vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _return_T_done\@
_T_4\@:
vmovd %xmm9, %eax
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ _T_4\@:
add $4, %r10
sub $4, %r11
vpsrldq $4, %xmm9, %xmm9
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _return_T_done\@
_T_123\@:
vmovd %xmm9, %eax
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@:
cmp $16, %r11
jge _get_AAD_blocks\@
vmovdqu \T8, \T7
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
je _get_AAD_done\@
vpxor \T7, \T7, \T7
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ _get_AAD_rest8\@:
vpxor \T1, \T7, \T7
jmp _get_AAD_rest8\@
_get_AAD_rest4\@:
- cmp $0, %r11
+ test %r11, %r11
jle _get_AAD_rest0\@
mov (%r10), %eax
movq %rax, \T1
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ _done_read_partial_block_\@:
.macro PARTIAL_BLOCK GHASH_MUL CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
AAD_HASH ENC_DEC
mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r13
- cmp $0, %r13
+ test %r13, %r13
je _partial_block_done_\@ # Leave Macro if no partial blocks
# Read in input data without over reading
cmp $16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@:
vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3
vpxor %xmm3, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_incomplete_1_\@
# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@:
vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
vpxor %xmm9, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_incomplete_2_\@
# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ _encode_done_\@:
vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
.endif
# output encrypted Bytes
- cmp $0, %r10
+ test %r10, %r10
jl _partial_fill_\@
mov %r13, %r12
mov $16, %r13
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index 3e707e81afdb..18cfb76daa23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -83,10 +83,8 @@ struct gcm_context_data {
asmlinkage int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len);
-asmlinkage void aesni_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
- const u8 *in);
-asmlinkage void aesni_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
- const u8 *in);
+asmlinkage void aesni_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in);
+asmlinkage void aesni_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in);
asmlinkage void aesni_ecb_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
const u8 *in, unsigned int len);
asmlinkage void aesni_ecb_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
@@ -99,6 +97,12 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
#define AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE 640
#define AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE 4096
+asmlinkage void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+
+asmlinkage void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static void (*aesni_ctr_enc_tfm)(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
@@ -106,9 +110,6 @@ static void (*aesni_ctr_enc_tfm)(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
asmlinkage void aesni_ctr_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
-asmlinkage void aesni_xts_crypt8(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
- const u8 *in, bool enc, u8 *iv);
-
/* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc()
* void *ctx, AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
* struct gcm_context_data. May be uninitialized.
@@ -550,29 +551,24 @@ static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
}
-static void aesni_xts_tweak(void *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
-{
- aesni_enc(ctx, out, in);
-}
-
-static void aesni_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, GLUE_FUNC_CAST(aesni_enc));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, aesni_enc);
}
-static void aesni_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, GLUE_FUNC_CAST(aesni_dec));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, aesni_dec);
}
-static void aesni_xts_enc8(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_enc32(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- aesni_xts_crypt8(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (const u8 *)src, true, (u8 *)iv);
+ aesni_xts_encrypt(ctx, dst, src, 32 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (u8 *)iv);
}
-static void aesni_xts_dec8(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_dec32(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- aesni_xts_crypt8(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (const u8 *)src, false, (u8 *)iv);
+ aesni_xts_decrypt(ctx, dst, src, 32 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (u8 *)iv);
}
static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_enc_xts = {
@@ -580,11 +576,11 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_enc_xts = {
.fpu_blocks_limit = 1,
.funcs = { {
- .num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(aesni_xts_enc8) }
+ .num_blocks = 32,
+ .fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_enc32 }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(aesni_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -593,11 +589,11 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_dec_xts = {
.fpu_blocks_limit = 1,
.funcs = { {
- .num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(aesni_xts_dec8) }
+ .num_blocks = 32,
+ .fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_dec32 }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(aesni_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -606,8 +602,7 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&aesni_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(aesni_xts_tweak),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&aesni_enc_xts, req, aesni_enc,
aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx),
aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx),
false);
@@ -618,8 +613,7 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&aesni_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(aesni_xts_tweak),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&aesni_dec_xts, req, aesni_enc,
aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx),
aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx),
true);
@@ -707,7 +701,8 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s *gcm_tfm = aesni_gcm_tfm;
- struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
+ u8 databuf[sizeof(struct gcm_context_data) + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
+ struct gcm_context_data *data = PTR_ALIGN((void *)databuf, AESNI_ALIGN);
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
unsigned long left = req->cryptlen;
unsigned long len, srclen, dstlen;
@@ -760,8 +755,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
}
kernel_fpu_begin();
- gcm_tfm->init(aes_ctx, &data, iv,
- hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
+ gcm_tfm->init(aes_ctx, data, iv, hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
if (req->src != req->dst) {
while (left) {
src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
@@ -771,10 +765,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
len = min(srclen, dstlen);
if (len) {
if (enc)
- gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
+ gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, data,
dst, src, len);
else
- gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
+ gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, data,
dst, src, len);
}
left -= len;
@@ -792,10 +786,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
len = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
if (len) {
if (enc)
- gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
+ gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, data,
src, src, len);
else
- gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
+ gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, data,
src, src, len);
}
left -= len;
@@ -804,7 +798,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 1, left);
}
}
- gcm_tfm->finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len);
+ gcm_tfm->finalize(aes_ctx, data, authTag, auth_tag_len);
kernel_fpu_end();
if (!assocmem)
@@ -853,7 +847,8 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
- u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
unsigned int i;
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
@@ -880,7 +875,8 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
- u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
unsigned int i;
if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20))
@@ -1010,7 +1006,8 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(tfm);
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
- u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
memcpy(iv, req->iv, 12);
@@ -1026,7 +1023,8 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(tfm);
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
- u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ u8 ivbuf[16 + (AESNI_ALIGN - 8)] __aligned(8);
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&ivbuf[0], AESNI_ALIGN);
memcpy(iv, req->iv, 12);
*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c
index a4f00128ea55..a8cc2c83fe1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c
@@ -19,20 +19,17 @@
#define CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 32
/* 32-way AVX2/AES-NI parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_32way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_32way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc = {
.num_funcs = 4,
@@ -40,16 +37,16 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_enc_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_enc_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk }
} }
};
@@ -59,16 +56,16 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ctr_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_ctr_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ctr_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_ctr_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -78,13 +75,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_enc_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_enc_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -94,16 +91,16 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_dec_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_dec_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -113,16 +110,16 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_cbc_dec_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_cbc_dec_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_cbc_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_cbc_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -132,13 +129,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_dec_32way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_dec_32way }
}, {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -161,8 +158,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(camellia_enc_blk, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -180,8 +176,7 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct camellia_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_enc_xts, req, camellia_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
@@ -190,8 +185,7 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct camellia_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_dec_xts, req, camellia_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c
index f28d282779b8..31a82a79f4ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c
@@ -18,41 +18,36 @@
#define CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 16
/* 16-way parallel cipher functions (avx/aes-ni) */
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_ecb_enc_16way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_ecb_dec_16way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_cbc_dec_16way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_ctr_16way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_xts_enc_16way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_xts_dec_16way);
-void camellia_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void camellia_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, camellia_enc_blk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_xts_enc);
-void camellia_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void camellia_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, camellia_dec_blk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_xts_dec);
@@ -62,13 +57,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk }
} }
};
@@ -78,13 +73,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ctr_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_ctr_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -94,10 +89,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -107,13 +102,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_ecb_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_ecb_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -123,13 +118,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_cbc_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_cbc_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -139,10 +134,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(camellia_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = camellia_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -165,8 +160,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(camellia_enc_blk, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -206,8 +200,7 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct camellia_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_enc_xts, req, camellia_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
@@ -216,8 +209,7 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct camellia_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&camellia_dec_xts, req, camellia_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_glue.c
index 7c62db56ffe1..5f3ed5af68d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia_glue.c
@@ -18,19 +18,17 @@
#include <asm/crypto/glue_helper.h>
/* regular block cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, bool xor);
+asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ bool xor);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__camellia_enc_blk);
-asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_dec_blk);
/* 2-way parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, bool xor);
+asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ bool xor);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__camellia_enc_blk_2way);
-asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_dec_blk_2way);
static void camellia_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
@@ -1267,8 +1265,10 @@ static int camellia_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
return camellia_setkey(&tfm->base, key, key_len);
}
-void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
+void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
u128 iv = *src;
camellia_dec_blk_2way(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)src);
@@ -1277,9 +1277,11 @@ void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way);
-void camellia_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void camellia_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblk;
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
if (dst != src)
*dst = *src;
@@ -1291,9 +1293,11 @@ void camellia_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(camellia_crypt_ctr);
-void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblks[2];
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
if (dst != src) {
dst[0] = src[0];
@@ -1315,10 +1319,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_enc_blk }
} }
};
@@ -1328,10 +1332,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(camellia_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = camellia_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -1341,10 +1345,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -1354,10 +1358,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx camellia_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 2,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(camellia_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = camellia_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -1373,8 +1377,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(camellia_enc_blk),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(camellia_enc_blk, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c
index a8a38fffb4a9..da5297475f9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c
@@ -20,20 +20,17 @@
#define CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 8
-asmlinkage void cast6_ecb_enc_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void cast6_ecb_dec_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-
-asmlinkage void cast6_cbc_dec_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void cast6_ctr_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+asmlinkage void cast6_ecb_enc_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void cast6_ecb_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+
+asmlinkage void cast6_cbc_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void cast6_ctr_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void cast6_xts_enc_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void cast6_xts_dec_8way(struct cast6_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void cast6_xts_enc_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void cast6_xts_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
static int cast6_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
@@ -41,21 +38,21 @@ static int cast6_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
return cast6_setkey(&tfm->base, key, keylen);
}
-static void cast6_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void cast6_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_encrypt));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, __cast6_encrypt);
}
-static void cast6_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void cast6_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_decrypt));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, __cast6_decrypt);
}
-static void cast6_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void cast6_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblk;
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
le128_to_be128(&ctrblk, iv);
le128_inc(iv);
@@ -70,10 +67,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(cast6_ecb_enc_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = cast6_ecb_enc_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_encrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __cast6_encrypt }
} }
};
@@ -83,10 +80,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(cast6_ctr_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = cast6_ctr_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(cast6_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = cast6_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -96,10 +93,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(cast6_xts_enc_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = cast6_xts_enc_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(cast6_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = cast6_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -109,10 +106,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(cast6_ecb_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = cast6_ecb_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __cast6_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -122,10 +119,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(cast6_cbc_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = cast6_cbc_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = __cast6_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -135,10 +132,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx cast6_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = CAST6_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(cast6_xts_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = cast6_xts_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(cast6_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = cast6_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -154,8 +151,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__cast6_encrypt),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(__cast6_encrypt, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -199,8 +195,7 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct cast6_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&cast6_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__cast6_encrypt),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&cast6_enc_xts, req, __cast6_encrypt,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
@@ -209,8 +204,7 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct cast6_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&cast6_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__cast6_encrypt),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&cast6_dec_xts, req, __cast6_encrypt,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S
index 848f9c75fd4f..596f91e3a774 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl)
# xor remaining bytes from partial register into output
mov %rcx,%rax
and $0xf,%rcx
- jz .Ldone8
+ jz .Ldone2
mov %rax,%r9
and $~0xf,%r9
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl)
# xor remaining bytes from partial register into output
mov %rcx,%rax
and $0xf,%rcx
- jz .Ldone8
+ jz .Ldone4
mov %rax,%r9
and $~0xf,%r9
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
index d9b734d0c8cc..3c6e01520a97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ continue_block:
## branch into array
lea jump_table(%rip), bufp
- movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len
+ movzwq (bufp, %rax, 2), len
lea crc_array(%rip), bufp
lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp
JMP_NOSPEC bufp
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c b/arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c
index d15b99397480..d3d91a0abf88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c
@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit(const struct common_glue_ctx *gctx,
src -= num_blocks - 1;
dst -= num_blocks - 1;
- gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.cbc(ctx, dst, src);
+ gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.cbc(ctx, (u8 *)dst,
+ (const u8 *)src);
nbytes -= func_bytes;
if (nbytes < bsize)
@@ -188,7 +189,9 @@ int glue_ctr_req_128bit(const struct common_glue_ctx *gctx,
/* Process multi-block batch */
do {
- gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.ctr(ctx, dst, src, &ctrblk);
+ gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.ctr(ctx, (u8 *)dst,
+ (const u8 *)src,
+ &ctrblk);
src += num_blocks;
dst += num_blocks;
nbytes -= func_bytes;
@@ -210,7 +213,8 @@ int glue_ctr_req_128bit(const struct common_glue_ctx *gctx,
be128_to_le128(&ctrblk, (be128 *)walk.iv);
memcpy(&tmp, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes);
- gctx->funcs[gctx->num_funcs - 1].fn_u.ctr(ctx, &tmp, &tmp,
+ gctx->funcs[gctx->num_funcs - 1].fn_u.ctr(ctx, (u8 *)&tmp,
+ (const u8 *)&tmp,
&ctrblk);
memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, &tmp, nbytes);
le128_to_be128((be128 *)walk.iv, &ctrblk);
@@ -240,7 +244,8 @@ static unsigned int __glue_xts_req_128bit(const struct common_glue_ctx *gctx,
if (nbytes >= func_bytes) {
do {
- gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.xts(ctx, dst, src,
+ gctx->funcs[i].fn_u.xts(ctx, (u8 *)dst,
+ (const u8 *)src,
walk->iv);
src += num_blocks;
@@ -354,8 +359,8 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(glue_xts_req_128bit);
-void glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv,
- common_glue_func_t fn)
+void glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv, common_glue_func_t fn)
{
le128 ivblk = *iv;
@@ -363,13 +368,13 @@ void glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv,
gf128mul_x_ble(iv, &ivblk);
/* CC <- T xor C */
- u128_xor(dst, src, (u128 *)&ivblk);
+ u128_xor((u128 *)dst, (const u128 *)src, (u128 *)&ivblk);
/* PP <- D(Key2,CC) */
- fn(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)dst);
+ fn(ctx, dst, dst);
/* P <- T xor PP */
- u128_xor(dst, dst, (u128 *)&ivblk);
+ u128_xor((u128 *)dst, (u128 *)dst, (u128 *)&ivblk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one);
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c
index 13fd8d3d2da0..f973ace44ad3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c
@@ -19,18 +19,16 @@
#define SERPENT_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 16
/* 16-way AVX2 parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_16way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_16way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_16way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src);
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_16way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_16way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_16way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
static int serpent_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
@@ -44,13 +42,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_encrypt }
} }
};
@@ -60,13 +58,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ctr_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = serpent_ctr_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ctr_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = serpent_ctr_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = __serpent_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -76,13 +74,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_enc_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_enc_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -92,13 +90,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -108,13 +106,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(serpent_cbc_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = serpent_cbc_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -124,13 +122,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 16,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_dec_16way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_dec_16way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 8,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -146,8 +144,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(__serpent_encrypt, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -166,8 +163,8 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct serpent_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
return glue_xts_req_128bit(&serpent_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- &ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
+ __serpent_encrypt, &ctx->tweak_ctx,
+ &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -176,8 +173,8 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct serpent_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
return glue_xts_req_128bit(&serpent_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- &ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
+ __serpent_encrypt, &ctx->tweak_ctx,
+ &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
static struct skcipher_alg serpent_algs[] = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c
index 7d3dca38a5a2..7806d1cbe854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c
@@ -20,33 +20,35 @@
#include <asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h>
/* 8-way parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx);
-asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_ctr_8way_avx);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx);
-void __serpent_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void __serpent_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblk;
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
le128_to_be128(&ctrblk, iv);
le128_inc(iv);
@@ -56,17 +58,15 @@ void __serpent_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__serpent_crypt_ctr);
-void serpent_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void serpent_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, __serpent_encrypt);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_xts_enc);
-void serpent_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void serpent_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, __serpent_decrypt);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(serpent_xts_dec);
@@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_encrypt }
} }
};
@@ -115,10 +115,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ctr_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = serpent_ctr_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = __serpent_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(serpent_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = serpent_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -186,8 +186,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(__serpent_encrypt, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -206,8 +205,8 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct serpent_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
return glue_xts_req_128bit(&serpent_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- &ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
+ __serpent_encrypt, &ctx->tweak_ctx,
+ &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -216,8 +215,8 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct serpent_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
return glue_xts_req_128bit(&serpent_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
- &ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
+ __serpent_encrypt, &ctx->tweak_ctx,
+ &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
static struct skcipher_alg serpent_algs[] = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c
index 5fdf1931d069..4fed8d26b91a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c
@@ -31,9 +31,11 @@ static int serpent_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
return __serpent_setkey(crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm), key, keylen);
}
-static void serpent_decrypt_cbc_xway(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
+static void serpent_decrypt_cbc_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
u128 ivs[SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS - 1];
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
unsigned int j;
for (j = 0; j < SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS - 1; j++)
@@ -45,9 +47,11 @@ static void serpent_decrypt_cbc_xway(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
u128_xor(dst + (j + 1), dst + (j + 1), ivs + j);
}
-static void serpent_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void serpent_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblk;
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
le128_to_be128(&ctrblk, iv);
le128_inc(iv);
@@ -56,10 +60,12 @@ static void serpent_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
u128_xor(dst, src, (u128 *)&ctrblk);
}
-static void serpent_crypt_ctr_xway(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+static void serpent_crypt_ctr_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s,
le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblks[SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS; i++) {
@@ -79,10 +85,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_enc_blk_xway) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_enc_blk_xway }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_encrypt }
} }
};
@@ -92,10 +98,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(serpent_crypt_ctr_xway) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = serpent_crypt_ctr_xway }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(serpent_crypt_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = serpent_crypt_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -105,10 +111,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(serpent_dec_blk_xway) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = serpent_dec_blk_xway }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -118,10 +124,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx serpent_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(serpent_decrypt_cbc_xway) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = serpent_decrypt_cbc_xway }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_decrypt) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = __serpent_decrypt }
} }
};
@@ -137,7 +143,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(__serpent_encrypt),
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(__serpent_encrypt,
req);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c
index d561c821788b..3b36e97ec7ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c
@@ -22,20 +22,17 @@
#define TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 8
/* 8-way parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void twofish_ecb_enc_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void twofish_ecb_dec_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void twofish_ecb_enc_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void twofish_ecb_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void twofish_cbc_dec_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void twofish_ctr_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void twofish_cbc_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void twofish_ctr_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void twofish_xts_enc_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void twofish_xts_dec_8way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void twofish_xts_enc_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void twofish_xts_dec_8way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
static int twofish_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
@@ -43,22 +40,19 @@ static int twofish_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
return twofish_setkey(&tfm->base, key, keylen);
}
-static inline void twofish_enc_blk_3way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void twofish_enc_blk_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__twofish_enc_blk_3way(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static void twofish_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void twofish_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, twofish_enc_blk);
}
-static void twofish_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void twofish_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
{
- glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv,
- GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk));
+ glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, twofish_dec_blk);
}
struct twofish_xts_ctx {
@@ -93,13 +87,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_ecb_enc_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_ecb_enc_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_enc_blk_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_enc_blk }
} }
};
@@ -109,13 +103,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(twofish_ctr_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = twofish_ctr_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ctr = GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = twofish_enc_blk_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -125,10 +119,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_enc_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(twofish_xts_enc_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = twofish_xts_enc_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(twofish_xts_enc) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = twofish_xts_enc }
} }
};
@@ -138,13 +132,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_ecb_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_ecb_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_dec_blk_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -154,13 +148,13 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(twofish_cbc_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = twofish_cbc_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = twofish_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -170,10 +164,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_dec_xts = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = TWOFISH_PARALLEL_BLOCKS,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(twofish_xts_dec_8way) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = twofish_xts_dec_8way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .xts = GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(twofish_xts_dec) }
+ .fn_u = { .xts = twofish_xts_dec }
} }
};
@@ -189,8 +183,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(twofish_enc_blk, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -208,8 +201,7 @@ static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct twofish_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&twofish_enc_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&twofish_enc_xts, req, twofish_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, false);
}
@@ -218,8 +210,7 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct twofish_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- return glue_xts_req_128bit(&twofish_dec_xts, req,
- XTS_TWEAK_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
+ return glue_xts_req_128bit(&twofish_dec_xts, req, twofish_enc_blk,
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx, true);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
index 1dc9e29f221e..768af6075479 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish_glue_3way.c
@@ -25,21 +25,22 @@ static int twofish_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
return twofish_setkey(&tfm->base, key, keylen);
}
-static inline void twofish_enc_blk_3way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void twofish_enc_blk_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__twofish_enc_blk_3way(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static inline void twofish_enc_blk_xor_3way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+static inline void twofish_enc_blk_xor_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src)
{
__twofish_enc_blk_3way(ctx, dst, src, true);
}
-void twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
+void twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
u128 ivs[2];
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
ivs[0] = src[0];
ivs[1] = src[1];
@@ -51,9 +52,11 @@ void twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way);
-void twofish_enc_blk_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
+void twofish_enc_blk_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblk;
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
if (dst != src)
*dst = *src;
@@ -66,10 +69,11 @@ void twofish_enc_blk_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(twofish_enc_blk_ctr);
-void twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
- le128 *iv)
+void twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *d, const u8 *s, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblks[3];
+ u128 *dst = (u128 *)d;
+ const u128 *src = (const u128 *)s;
if (dst != src) {
dst[0] = src[0];
@@ -94,10 +98,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_enc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_enc_blk_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_enc_blk }
} }
};
@@ -107,10 +111,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_ctr = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk_ctr) }
+ .fn_u = { .ctr = twofish_enc_blk_ctr }
} }
};
@@ -120,10 +124,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_dec = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_dec_blk_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .ecb = GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .ecb = twofish_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -133,10 +137,10 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx twofish_dec_cbc = {
.funcs = { {
.num_blocks = 3,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way }
}, {
.num_blocks = 1,
- .fn_u = { .cbc = GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(twofish_dec_blk) }
+ .fn_u = { .cbc = twofish_dec_blk }
} }
};
@@ -152,8 +156,7 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(GLUE_FUNC_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
- req);
+ return glue_cbc_encrypt_req_128bit(twofish_enc_blk, req);
}
static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 390edb763826..bde3e0f85425 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -869,9 +869,10 @@ GLOBAL(__begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region)
* Xen doesn't set %esp to be precisely what the normal SYSENTER
* entry point expects, so fix it up before using the normal path.
*/
-ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target)
addl $5*4, %esp /* remove xen-provided frame */
jmp .Lsysenter_past_esp
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target)
#endif
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
index f5937742b290..3613cfb83c6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp)
static __init int vdso_setup(char *s)
{
vdso64_enabled = simple_strtoul(s, NULL, 0);
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
__setup("vdso=", vdso_setup);
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
index 26c36357c4c9..2e930d8c04d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ struct perf_ibs {
u64 max_period;
unsigned long offset_mask[1];
int offset_max;
+ unsigned int fetch_count_reset_broken : 1;
+ unsigned int fetch_ignore_if_zero_rip : 1;
struct cpu_perf_ibs __percpu *pcpu;
struct attribute **format_attrs;
@@ -310,6 +312,16 @@ static int perf_ibs_init(struct perf_event *event)
hwc->config_base = perf_ibs->msr;
hwc->config = config;
+ /*
+ * rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp
+ * recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from
+ * interrupt regs while unwinding call stack. Setting _EARLY flag
+ * makes sure we unwind call-stack before perf sample rip is set to
+ * IbsOpRip.
+ */
+ if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
+ event->attr.sample_type |= __PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN_EARLY;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -334,11 +346,15 @@ static u64 get_ibs_op_count(u64 config)
{
u64 count = 0;
+ /*
+ * If the internal 27-bit counter rolled over, the count is MaxCnt
+ * and the lower 7 bits of CurCnt are randomized.
+ * Otherwise CurCnt has the full 27-bit current counter value.
+ */
if (config & IBS_OP_VAL)
- count += (config & IBS_OP_MAX_CNT) << 4; /* cnt rolled over */
-
- if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_RDWROPCNT)
- count += (config & IBS_OP_CUR_CNT) >> 32;
+ count = (config & IBS_OP_MAX_CNT) << 4;
+ else if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_RDWROPCNT)
+ count = (config & IBS_OP_CUR_CNT) >> 32;
return count;
}
@@ -363,7 +379,12 @@ perf_ibs_event_update(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct perf_event *event,
static inline void perf_ibs_enable_event(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs,
struct hw_perf_event *hwc, u64 config)
{
- wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, hwc->config | config | perf_ibs->enable_mask);
+ u64 tmp = hwc->config | config;
+
+ if (perf_ibs->fetch_count_reset_broken)
+ wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, tmp & ~perf_ibs->enable_mask);
+
+ wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, tmp | perf_ibs->enable_mask);
}
/*
@@ -551,6 +572,7 @@ static struct perf_ibs perf_ibs_op = {
.start = perf_ibs_start,
.stop = perf_ibs_stop,
.read = perf_ibs_read,
+ .capabilities = PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE,
},
.msr = MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL,
.config_mask = IBS_OP_CONFIG_MASK,
@@ -626,18 +648,24 @@ fail:
perf_ibs->offset_max,
offset + 1);
} while (offset < offset_max);
+ /*
+ * Read IbsBrTarget, IbsOpData4, and IbsExtdCtl separately
+ * depending on their availability.
+ * Can't add to offset_max as they are staggered
+ */
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
- /*
- * Read IbsBrTarget and IbsOpData4 separately
- * depending on their availability.
- * Can't add to offset_max as they are staggered
- */
- if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_BRNTRGT) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET, *buf++);
- size++;
+ if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op) {
+ if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_BRNTRGT) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET, *buf++);
+ size++;
+ }
+ if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_OPDATA4) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4, *buf++);
+ size++;
+ }
}
- if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_OPDATA4) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4, *buf++);
+ if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_fetch && (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_FETCHCTLEXTD)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_ICIBSEXTDCTL, *buf++);
size++;
}
}
@@ -647,6 +675,10 @@ fail:
if (check_rip && (ibs_data.regs[2] & IBS_RIP_INVALID)) {
regs.flags &= ~PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
} else {
+ /* Workaround for erratum #1197 */
+ if (perf_ibs->fetch_ignore_if_zero_rip && !(ibs_data.regs[1]))
+ goto out;
+
set_linear_ip(&regs, ibs_data.regs[1]);
regs.flags |= PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
}
@@ -661,6 +693,14 @@ fail:
data.raw = &raw;
}
+ /*
+ * rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp
+ * recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from
+ * interrupt regs while unwinding call stack.
+ */
+ if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
+ data.callchain = perf_callchain(event, iregs);
+
throttle = perf_event_overflow(event, &data, &regs);
out:
if (throttle) {
@@ -733,6 +773,16 @@ static __init void perf_event_ibs_init(void)
{
struct attribute **attr = ibs_op_format_attrs;
+ /*
+ * Some chips fail to reset the fetch count when it is written; instead
+ * they need a 0-1 transition of IbsFetchEn.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 >= 0x16 && boot_cpu_data.x86 <= 0x18)
+ perf_ibs_fetch.fetch_count_reset_broken = 1;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model < 0x10)
+ perf_ibs_fetch.fetch_ignore_if_zero_rip = 1;
+
perf_ibs_pmu_init(&perf_ibs_fetch, "ibs_fetch");
if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_OPCNT) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/iommu.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/iommu.c
index fb616203ce42..2da6139b0977 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/iommu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/iommu.c
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@
#include "../perf_event.h"
#include "iommu.h"
-#define COUNTER_SHIFT 16
-
/* iommu pmu conf masks */
#define GET_CSOURCE(x) ((x)->conf & 0xFFULL)
#define GET_DEVID(x) (((x)->conf >> 8) & 0xFFFFULL)
@@ -81,12 +79,12 @@ static struct attribute_group amd_iommu_events_group = {
};
struct amd_iommu_event_desc {
- struct kobj_attribute attr;
+ struct device_attribute attr;
const char *event;
};
-static ssize_t _iommu_event_show(struct kobject *kobj,
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+static ssize_t _iommu_event_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct amd_iommu_event_desc *event =
container_of(attr, struct amd_iommu_event_desc, attr);
@@ -285,22 +283,31 @@ static void perf_iommu_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE));
hwc->state = 0;
+ /*
+ * To account for power-gating, which prevents write to
+ * the counter, we need to enable the counter
+ * before setting up counter register.
+ */
+ perf_iommu_enable_event(event);
+
if (flags & PERF_EF_RELOAD) {
- u64 prev_raw_count = local64_read(&hwc->prev_count);
+ u64 count = 0;
struct amd_iommu *iommu = perf_event_2_iommu(event);
+ /*
+ * Since the IOMMU PMU only support counting mode,
+ * the counter always start with value zero.
+ */
amd_iommu_pc_set_reg(iommu, hwc->iommu_bank, hwc->iommu_cntr,
- IOMMU_PC_COUNTER_REG, &prev_raw_count);
+ IOMMU_PC_COUNTER_REG, &count);
}
- perf_iommu_enable_event(event);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
-
}
static void perf_iommu_read(struct perf_event *event)
{
- u64 count, prev, delta;
+ u64 count;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
struct amd_iommu *iommu = perf_event_2_iommu(event);
@@ -311,14 +318,11 @@ static void perf_iommu_read(struct perf_event *event)
/* IOMMU pc counter register is only 48 bits */
count &= GENMASK_ULL(47, 0);
- prev = local64_read(&hwc->prev_count);
- if (local64_cmpxchg(&hwc->prev_count, prev, count) != prev)
- return;
-
- /* Handle 48-bit counter overflow */
- delta = (count << COUNTER_SHIFT) - (prev << COUNTER_SHIFT);
- delta >>= COUNTER_SHIFT;
- local64_add(delta, &event->count);
+ /*
+ * Since the counter always start with value zero,
+ * simply just accumulate the count for the event.
+ */
+ local64_add(count, &event->count);
}
static void perf_iommu_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
@@ -328,15 +332,16 @@ static void perf_iommu_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
if (hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE)
return;
+ /*
+ * To account for power-gating, in which reading the counter would
+ * return zero, we need to read the register before disabling.
+ */
+ perf_iommu_read(event);
+ hwc->state |= PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
+
perf_iommu_disable_event(event);
WARN_ON_ONCE(hwc->state & PERF_HES_STOPPED);
hwc->state |= PERF_HES_STOPPED;
-
- if (hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE)
- return;
-
- perf_iommu_read(event);
- hwc->state |= PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
}
static int perf_iommu_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
@@ -379,7 +384,7 @@ static __init int _init_events_attrs(void)
while (amd_iommu_v2_event_descs[i].attr.attr.name)
i++;
- attrs = kcalloc(i + 1, sizeof(struct attribute **), GFP_KERNEL);
+ attrs = kcalloc(i + 1, sizeof(*attrs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attrs)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/power.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/power.c
index abef51320e3a..c4892b7d0c36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/power.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/power.c
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ static struct pmu pmu_class = {
.stop = pmu_event_stop,
.read = pmu_event_read,
.capabilities = PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
};
static int power_cpu_exit(unsigned int cpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index e622158f5659..e4f7ac28dcf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2108,6 +2108,7 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (err) {
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
+ event->destroy = NULL;
}
if (READ_ONCE(x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc) &&
@@ -2365,10 +2366,11 @@ static bool perf_hw_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
void
perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
struct unwind_state state;
unsigned long addr;
- if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
+ if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
/* TODO: We don't support guest os callchain now */
return;
}
@@ -2474,10 +2476,11 @@ perf_callchain_user32(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ent
void
perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
struct stack_frame frame;
const unsigned long __user *fp;
- if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
+ if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
/* TODO: We don't support guest os callchain now */
return;
}
@@ -2561,18 +2564,21 @@ static unsigned long code_segment_base(struct pt_regs *regs)
unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest())
- return perf_guest_cbs->get_guest_ip();
+ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
+
+ if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->is_in_guest())
+ return guest_cbs->get_guest_ip();
return regs->ip + code_segment_base(regs);
}
unsigned long perf_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
int misc = 0;
- if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
- if (perf_guest_cbs->is_user_mode())
+ if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
+ if (guest_cbs->is_user_mode())
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_USER;
else
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_KERNEL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 0461ab257df6..f2976204e8b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -243,21 +243,23 @@ static struct extra_reg intel_skl_extra_regs[] __read_mostly = {
static struct event_constraint intel_icl_event_constraints[] = {
FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x00c0, 0), /* INST_RETIRED.ANY */
- INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x1c0, 0), /* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */
+ FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x01c0, 0), /* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */
FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x003c, 1), /* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.CORE */
FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x0300, 2), /* CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF */
FIXED_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x0400, 3), /* SLOTS */
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x03, 0x0a, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x1f, 0x28, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x32, 0xf), /* SW_PREFETCH_ACCESS.* */
- INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x48, 0x54, 0xf),
+ INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x48, 0x56, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0x60, 0x8b, 0xf),
INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x04a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_TOTAL */
- INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x10a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_MEM_ANY */
+ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x10a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.CYCLES_MEM_ANY */
+ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT(0x14a3, 0xff), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_MEM_ANY */
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xa3, 0xf), /* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.* */
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0xa8, 0xb0, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0xb7, 0xbd, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0xd0, 0xe6, 0xf),
+ INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xef, 0xf),
INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT_RANGE(0xf0, 0xf4, 0xf),
EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
};
@@ -2331,6 +2333,7 @@ static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events);
+ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs;
int bit;
int handled = 0;
@@ -2384,9 +2387,11 @@ static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status)
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(55, (unsigned long *)&status)) {
handled++;
- if (unlikely(perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest() &&
- perf_guest_cbs->handle_intel_pt_intr))
- perf_guest_cbs->handle_intel_pt_intr();
+
+ guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
+ if (unlikely(guest_cbs && guest_cbs->is_in_guest() &&
+ guest_cbs->handle_intel_pt_intr))
+ guest_cbs->handle_intel_pt_intr();
else
intel_pt_interrupt();
}
@@ -3998,9 +4003,12 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_desc isolation_ucodes[] = {
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 3, 0x07000009),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 4, 0x0f000009),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 5, 0x0e000002),
- INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 2, 0x0b000014),
+ INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 1, 0x0b000014),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 3, 0x00000021),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4, 0x00000000),
+ INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 5, 0x00000000),
+ INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 6, 0x00000000),
+ INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 7, 0x00000000),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L, 3, 0x0000007c),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE, 3, 0x0000007c),
INTEL_CPU_DESC(INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 9, 0x0000004e),
@@ -5057,7 +5065,7 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
extra_skl_attr = skl_format_attr;
mem_attr = icl_events_attrs;
tsx_attr = icl_tsx_events_attrs;
- x86_pmu.rtm_abort_event = X86_CONFIG(.event=0xca, .umask=0x02);
+ x86_pmu.rtm_abort_event = X86_CONFIG(.event=0xc9, .umask=0x04);
x86_pmu.lbr_pt_coexist = true;
intel_pmu_pebs_data_source_skl(pmem);
pr_cont("Icelake events, ");
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
index 4814c964692c..0b50119ea12c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
@@ -107,14 +107,14 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
#define DEFINE_CSTATE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \
-static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \
+ struct device_attribute *attr, \
char *page) \
{ \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \
return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \
} \
-static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \
+static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \
__ATTR(_name, 0444, __cstate_##_var##_show, NULL)
static ssize_t cstate_get_attr_cpumask(struct device *dev,
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
index e5ad97a82342..5965d341350c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
@@ -669,9 +669,7 @@ unlock:
static inline void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer(void)
{
- struct pt_regs regs;
-
- x86_pmu.drain_pebs(&regs);
+ x86_pmu.drain_pebs(NULL);
}
/*
@@ -1736,6 +1734,7 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct x86_perf_regs perf_regs;
struct pt_regs *regs = &perf_regs.regs;
void *at = get_next_pebs_record_by_bit(base, top, bit);
+ struct pt_regs dummy_iregs;
if (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD) {
/*
@@ -1748,6 +1747,9 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event,
} else if (!intel_pmu_save_and_restart(event))
return;
+ if (!iregs)
+ iregs = &dummy_iregs;
+
while (count > 1) {
setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs);
perf_event_output(event, &data, regs);
@@ -1757,16 +1759,22 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event,
}
setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs);
-
- /*
- * All but the last records are processed.
- * The last one is left to be able to call the overflow handler.
- */
- if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs)) {
- x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
- return;
+ if (iregs == &dummy_iregs) {
+ /*
+ * The PEBS records may be drained in the non-overflow context,
+ * e.g., large PEBS + context switch. Perf should treat the
+ * last record the same as other PEBS records, and doesn't
+ * invoke the generic overflow handler.
+ */
+ perf_event_output(event, &data, regs);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * All but the last records are processed.
+ * The last one is left to be able to call the overflow handler.
+ */
+ if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs))
+ x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
-
}
static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs)
@@ -1882,7 +1890,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs)
*/
if (!pebs_status && cpuc->pebs_enabled &&
!(cpuc->pebs_enabled & (cpuc->pebs_enabled-1)))
- pebs_status = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
+ pebs_status = p->status = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
bit = find_first_bit((unsigned long *)&pebs_status,
x86_pmu.max_pebs_events);
@@ -1904,7 +1912,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs)
* that caused the PEBS record. It's called collision.
* If collision happened, the record will be dropped.
*/
- if (p->status != (1ULL << bit)) {
+ if (pebs_status != (1ULL << bit)) {
for_each_set_bit(i, (unsigned long *)&pebs_status, size)
error[i]++;
continue;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
index 05e43d0f430b..f4d2322f4c62 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static struct pt_cap_desc {
PT_CAP(single_range_output, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(2)),
PT_CAP(output_subsys, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(3)),
PT_CAP(payloads_lip, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(31)),
- PT_CAP(num_address_ranges, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0x3),
+ PT_CAP(num_address_ranges, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0x7),
PT_CAP(mtc_periods, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0xffff0000),
PT_CAP(cycle_thresholds, 1, CPUID_EBX, 0xffff),
PT_CAP(psb_periods, 1, CPUID_EBX, 0xffff0000),
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static u64 pt_config_filters(struct perf_event *event)
pt->filters.filter[range].msr_b = filter->msr_b;
}
- rtit_ctl |= filter->config << pt_address_ranges[range].reg_off;
+ rtit_ctl |= (u64)filter->config << pt_address_ranges[range].reg_off;
}
return rtit_ctl;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
index 86467f85c383..a335be03aeef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ end:
return map;
}
-ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj,
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct uncore_event_desc *event =
container_of(attr, struct uncore_event_desc, attr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h
index bbfdaa720b45..7b964c63e993 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct intel_uncore_box {
#define UNCORE_BOX_FLAG_CFL8_CBOX_MSR_OFFS 2
struct uncore_event_desc {
- struct kobj_attribute attr;
+ struct device_attribute attr;
const char *config;
};
@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ struct pci2phy_map {
struct pci2phy_map *__find_pci2phy_map(int segment);
int uncore_pcibus_to_physid(struct pci_bus *bus);
-ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj,
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
#define INTEL_UNCORE_EVENT_DESC(_name, _config) \
{ \
@@ -175,14 +175,14 @@ ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj,
}
#define DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \
-static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
+static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \
+ struct device_attribute *attr, \
char *page) \
{ \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \
return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \
} \
-static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \
+static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \
__ATTR(_name, 0444, __uncore_##_var##_show, NULL)
static inline bool uncore_pmc_fixed(int idx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
index c37cb12d0ef6..aec6e63c6a04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@
#define ICL_UNC_CBO_0_PER_CTR0 0x702
#define ICL_UNC_CBO_MSR_OFFSET 0x8
+/* ICL ARB register */
+#define ICL_UNC_ARB_PER_CTR 0x3b1
+#define ICL_UNC_ARB_PERFEVTSEL 0x3b3
+
DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(event, event, "config:0-7");
DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(umask, umask, "config:8-15");
DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(edge, edge, "config:18");
@@ -297,15 +301,21 @@ void skl_uncore_cpu_init(void)
snb_uncore_arb.ops = &skl_uncore_msr_ops;
}
+static struct intel_uncore_ops icl_uncore_msr_ops = {
+ .disable_event = snb_uncore_msr_disable_event,
+ .enable_event = snb_uncore_msr_enable_event,
+ .read_counter = uncore_msr_read_counter,
+};
+
static struct intel_uncore_type icl_uncore_cbox = {
.name = "cbox",
- .num_counters = 4,
+ .num_counters = 2,
.perf_ctr_bits = 44,
.perf_ctr = ICL_UNC_CBO_0_PER_CTR0,
.event_ctl = SNB_UNC_CBO_0_PERFEVTSEL0,
.event_mask = SNB_UNC_RAW_EVENT_MASK,
.msr_offset = ICL_UNC_CBO_MSR_OFFSET,
- .ops = &skl_uncore_msr_ops,
+ .ops = &icl_uncore_msr_ops,
.format_group = &snb_uncore_format_group,
};
@@ -334,13 +344,25 @@ static struct intel_uncore_type icl_uncore_clockbox = {
.single_fixed = 1,
.event_mask = SNB_UNC_CTL_EV_SEL_MASK,
.format_group = &icl_uncore_clock_format_group,
- .ops = &skl_uncore_msr_ops,
+ .ops = &icl_uncore_msr_ops,
.event_descs = icl_uncore_events,
};
+static struct intel_uncore_type icl_uncore_arb = {
+ .name = "arb",
+ .num_counters = 1,
+ .num_boxes = 1,
+ .perf_ctr_bits = 44,
+ .perf_ctr = ICL_UNC_ARB_PER_CTR,
+ .event_ctl = ICL_UNC_ARB_PERFEVTSEL,
+ .event_mask = SNB_UNC_RAW_EVENT_MASK,
+ .ops = &icl_uncore_msr_ops,
+ .format_group = &snb_uncore_format_group,
+};
+
static struct intel_uncore_type *icl_msr_uncores[] = {
&icl_uncore_cbox,
- &snb_uncore_arb,
+ &icl_uncore_arb,
&icl_uncore_clockbox,
NULL,
};
@@ -358,7 +380,6 @@ void icl_uncore_cpu_init(void)
{
uncore_msr_uncores = icl_msr_uncores;
icl_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = icl_get_cbox_num();
- snb_uncore_arb.ops = &skl_uncore_msr_ops;
}
enum {
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
index ad20220af303..0f61f46e6086 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c
@@ -1093,7 +1093,6 @@ enum {
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT0_FILTER,
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER,
BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3,
};
static int snbep_qpi_hw_config(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *event)
@@ -2750,22 +2749,33 @@ static struct intel_uncore_type *hswep_msr_uncores[] = {
NULL,
};
-void hswep_uncore_cpu_init(void)
+#define HSWEP_PCU_DID 0x2fc0
+#define HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET 0x94
+#define hswep_get_chop(_cap) (((_cap) >> 6) & 0x3)
+
+static bool hswep_has_limit_sbox(unsigned int device)
{
- int pkg = boot_cpu_data.logical_proc_id;
+ struct pci_dev *dev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, device, NULL);
+ u32 capid4;
+
+ if (!dev)
+ return false;
+
+ pci_read_config_dword(dev, HSWEP_PCU_CAPID4_OFFET, &capid4);
+ if (!hswep_get_chop(capid4))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+void hswep_uncore_cpu_init(void)
+{
if (hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
hswep_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
/* Detect 6-8 core systems with only two SBOXes */
- if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
- u32 capid4;
-
- pci_read_config_dword(uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3],
- 0x94, &capid4);
- if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
- hswep_uncore_sbox.num_boxes = 2;
- }
+ if (hswep_has_limit_sbox(HSWEP_PCU_DID))
+ hswep_uncore_sbox.num_boxes = 2;
uncore_msr_uncores = hswep_msr_uncores;
}
@@ -3028,11 +3038,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id hswep_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
SNBEP_PCI_QPI_PORT1_FILTER),
},
- { /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
- PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2fc0),
- .driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
- },
{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
};
@@ -3124,27 +3129,18 @@ static struct event_constraint bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints[] = {
EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
};
+#define BDX_PCU_DID 0x6fc0
+
void bdx_uncore_cpu_init(void)
{
- int pkg = topology_phys_to_logical_pkg(boot_cpu_data.phys_proc_id);
-
if (bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes > boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores)
bdx_uncore_cbox.num_boxes = boot_cpu_data.x86_max_cores;
uncore_msr_uncores = bdx_msr_uncores;
- /* BDX-DE doesn't have SBOX */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) {
- uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
/* Detect systems with no SBOXes */
- } else if (uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3]) {
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
- u32 capid4;
-
- pdev = uncore_extra_pci_dev[pkg].dev[HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3];
- pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x94, &capid4);
- if (((capid4 >> 6) & 0x3) == 0)
- bdx_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
- }
+ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 86) || hswep_has_limit_sbox(BDX_PCU_DID))
+ uncore_msr_uncores[BDX_MSR_UNCORE_SBOX] = NULL;
+
hswep_uncore_pcu.constraints = bdx_uncore_pcu_constraints;
}
@@ -3365,11 +3361,6 @@ static const struct pci_device_id bdx_uncore_pci_ids[] = {
.driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
BDX_PCI_QPI_PORT2_FILTER),
},
- { /* PCU.3 (for Capability registers) */
- PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x6fc0),
- .driver_data = UNCORE_PCI_DEV_DATA(UNCORE_EXTRA_PCI_DEV,
- HSWEP_PCI_PCU_3),
- },
{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
};
@@ -3488,6 +3479,9 @@ static int skx_cha_hw_config(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *ev
struct hw_perf_event_extra *reg1 = &event->hw.extra_reg;
struct extra_reg *er;
int idx = 0;
+ /* Any of the CHA events may be filtered by Thread/Core-ID.*/
+ if (event->hw.config & SNBEP_CBO_PMON_CTL_TID_EN)
+ idx = SKX_CHA_MSR_PMON_BOX_FILTER_TID;
for (er = skx_uncore_cha_extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
if (er->event != (event->hw.config & er->config_mask))
@@ -3555,6 +3549,7 @@ static struct event_constraint skx_uncore_iio_constraints[] = {
UNCORE_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xc0, 0xc),
UNCORE_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xc5, 0xc),
UNCORE_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xd4, 0xc),
+ UNCORE_EVENT_CONSTRAINT(0xd5, 0xc),
EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
};
@@ -4391,7 +4386,7 @@ static void snr_uncore_mmio_init_box(struct intel_uncore_box *box)
return;
pci_read_config_dword(pdev, SNR_IMC_MMIO_BASE_OFFSET, &pci_dword);
- addr = (pci_dword & SNR_IMC_MMIO_BASE_MASK) << 23;
+ addr = ((resource_size_t)pci_dword & SNR_IMC_MMIO_BASE_MASK) << 23;
pci_read_config_dword(pdev, SNR_IMC_MMIO_MEM0_OFFSET, &pci_dword);
addr |= (pci_dword & SNR_IMC_MMIO_MEM0_MASK) << 12;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
index 0ed910237c4d..834e53e538d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
@@ -852,9 +852,10 @@ void x86_pmu_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags);
static inline void x86_pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
+ u64 disable_mask = __this_cpu_read(cpu_hw_events.perf_ctr_virt_mask);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
- wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, hwc->config);
+ wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, hwc->config & ~disable_mask);
}
void x86_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event);
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c
index 187c72a58e69..9050d7b8abc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c
@@ -93,18 +93,6 @@ static const char *const rapl_domain_names[NR_RAPL_DOMAINS] __initconst = {
* any other bit is reserved
*/
#define RAPL_EVENT_MASK 0xFFULL
-
-#define DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \
-static ssize_t __rapl_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
- struct kobj_attribute *attr, \
- char *page) \
-{ \
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \
- return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \
-} \
-static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \
- __ATTR(_name, 0444, __rapl_##_var##_show, NULL)
-
#define RAPL_CNTR_WIDTH 32
#define RAPL_EVENT_ATTR_STR(_name, v, str) \
@@ -433,7 +421,7 @@ static struct attribute_group rapl_pmu_events_group = {
.attrs = attrs_empty,
};
-DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(event, event, "config:0-7");
+PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-7");
static struct attribute *rapl_formats_attr[] = {
&format_attr_event.attr,
NULL,
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
index 79583bac9ac4..df4a4a9dc1e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ void set_hv_tscchange_cb(void (*cb)(void))
struct hv_reenlightenment_control re_ctrl = {
.vector = HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR,
.enabled = 1,
- .target_vp = hv_vp_index[smp_processor_id()]
};
struct hv_tsc_emulation_control emu_ctrl = {.enabled = 1};
@@ -164,13 +163,20 @@ void set_hv_tscchange_cb(void (*cb)(void))
return;
}
+ if (!hv_vp_index)
+ return;
+
hv_reenlightenment_cb = cb;
/* Make sure callback is registered before we write to MSRs */
wmb();
+ re_ctrl.target_vp = hv_vp_index[get_cpu()];
+
wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL, *((u64 *)&re_ctrl));
wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL, *((u64 *)&emu_ctrl));
+
+ put_cpu();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_hv_tscchange_cb);
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index 5208ba49c89a..2c87350c1fb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -66,11 +66,17 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus,
if (!hv_hypercall_pg)
goto do_native;
- if (cpumask_empty(cpus))
- return;
-
local_irq_save(flags);
+ /*
+ * Only check the mask _after_ interrupt has been disabled to avoid the
+ * mask changing under our feet.
+ */
+ if (cpumask_empty(cpus)) {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
flush_pcpu = (struct hv_tlb_flush **)
this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
index 9aff97f0de7f..d937c55e717e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
@@ -13,7 +13,19 @@
/* Asm macros */
-#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() wbinvd()
+/*
+ * ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() flushes caches on entering sleep states.
+ * It is required to prevent data loss.
+ *
+ * While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing.
+ * Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system
+ * sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.
+ */
+#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() \
+do { \
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) \
+ wbinvd(); \
+} while (0)
int __acpi_acquire_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);
int __acpi_release_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index 19e94af9cc5d..a49b1aeb2147 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static inline int apic_is_clustered_box(void)
extern int setup_APIC_eilvt(u8 lvt_off, u8 vector, u8 msg_type, u8 mask);
extern void lapic_assign_system_vectors(void);
extern void lapic_assign_legacy_vector(unsigned int isairq, bool replace);
+extern void lapic_update_legacy_vectors(void);
extern void lapic_online(void);
extern void lapic_offline(void);
extern bool apic_needs_pit(void);
@@ -197,16 +198,6 @@ static inline bool apic_needs_pit(void) { return true; }
#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
-/*
- * Make previous memory operations globally visible before
- * sending the IPI through x2apic wrmsr. We need a serializing instruction or
- * mfence for this.
- */
-static inline void x2apic_wrmsr_fence(void)
-{
- asm volatile("mfence" : : : "memory");
-}
-
static inline void native_apic_msr_write(u32 reg, u32 v)
{
if (reg == APIC_DFR || reg == APIC_ID || reg == APIC_LDR ||
@@ -259,6 +250,7 @@ static inline u64 native_x2apic_icr_read(void)
extern int x2apic_mode;
extern int x2apic_phys;
+extern void __init x2apic_set_max_apicid(u32 apicid);
extern void __init check_x2apic(void);
extern void x2apic_setup(void);
static inline int x2apic_enabled(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
index af45e1452f09..feb59461046c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
return ok;
}
-/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */
-#define arch_has_random() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
-#define arch_has_random_seed() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
-
/*
* These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the
* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
@@ -86,22 +82,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
}
extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
index 3ff577c0b102..1b563f9167ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@
# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) x
# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) x,
#else
-# define __ASM_FORM(x) " " #x " "
-# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) #x
-# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x ","
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+
+# define __ASM_FORM(x) " " __stringify(x) " "
+# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) __stringify(x)
+# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " __stringify(x) ","
#endif
#ifndef __x86_64__
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
index 7f828fe49797..4819d5e5a335 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -84,4 +84,22 @@ do { \
#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
+/*
+ * Make previous memory operations globally visible before
+ * a WRMSR.
+ *
+ * MFENCE makes writes visible, but only affects load/store
+ * instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a load/store
+ * instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. The LFENCE ensures
+ * that the WRMSR is not reordered.
+ *
+ * Most WRMSRs are full serializing instructions themselves and
+ * do not require this barrier. This is only required for the
+ * IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs.
+ */
+static inline void weak_wrmsr_fence(void)
+{
+ asm volatile("mfence; lfence" : : : "memory");
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_BARRIER_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h
index 86b63c7feab7..86b2e0dcc4bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H
#define _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H
-void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id);
-void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id);
+void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu);
+void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
index 22c4dfe65992..b4dd6ab0fdfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -31,15 +31,13 @@ typedef s64 __attribute__((aligned(4))) compat_s64;
typedef u64 __attribute__((aligned(4))) compat_u64;
struct compat_stat {
- compat_dev_t st_dev;
- u16 __pad1;
+ u32 st_dev;
compat_ino_t st_ino;
compat_mode_t st_mode;
compat_nlink_t st_nlink;
__compat_uid_t st_uid;
__compat_gid_t st_gid;
- compat_dev_t st_rdev;
- u16 __pad2;
+ u32 st_rdev;
u32 st_size;
u32 st_blksize;
u32 st_blocks;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 59bf91c57aa8..619c1f80a2ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_power_flags[32];
extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
#define test_cpu_cap(c, bit) \
- test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability))
+ arch_test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability))
/*
* There are 32 bits/features in each mask word. The high bits
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index d912457f56a7..8c28a2365a92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT ( 3*32+17) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
#define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
+/* free ( 3*32+29) */
#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
@@ -202,7 +204,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -403,5 +405,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/camellia.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/camellia.h
index a5d86fc0593f..f1592619dd65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/camellia.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/camellia.h
@@ -32,65 +32,60 @@ extern int xts_camellia_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen);
/* regular block cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, bool xor);
-asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ bool xor);
+asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
/* 2-way parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, bool xor);
-asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void __camellia_enc_blk_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ bool xor);
+asmlinkage void camellia_dec_blk_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
/* 16-way parallel cipher functions (avx/aes-ni) */
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-
-asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_16way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-
-static inline void camellia_enc_blk(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ecb_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+
+asmlinkage void camellia_cbc_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void camellia_ctr_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_enc_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void camellia_xts_dec_16way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+
+static inline void camellia_enc_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__camellia_enc_blk(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static inline void camellia_enc_blk_xor(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void camellia_enc_blk_xor(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__camellia_enc_blk(ctx, dst, src, true);
}
-static inline void camellia_enc_blk_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+static inline void camellia_enc_blk_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src)
{
__camellia_enc_blk_2way(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static inline void camellia_enc_blk_xor_2way(struct camellia_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+static inline void camellia_enc_blk_xor_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src)
{
__camellia_enc_blk_2way(ctx, dst, src, true);
}
/* glue helpers */
-extern void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src);
-extern void camellia_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+extern void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+extern void camellia_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-extern void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+extern void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-extern void camellia_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv);
-extern void camellia_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv);
+extern void camellia_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
+extern void camellia_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
#endif /* ASM_X86_CAMELLIA_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/glue_helper.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/glue_helper.h
index 8d4a8e1226ee..777c0f63418c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/glue_helper.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/glue_helper.h
@@ -11,18 +11,13 @@
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
-typedef void (*common_glue_func_t)(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-typedef void (*common_glue_cbc_func_t)(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src);
-typedef void (*common_glue_ctr_func_t)(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+typedef void (*common_glue_func_t)(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+typedef void (*common_glue_cbc_func_t)(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+typedef void (*common_glue_ctr_func_t)(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-typedef void (*common_glue_xts_func_t)(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+typedef void (*common_glue_xts_func_t)(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-#define GLUE_FUNC_CAST(fn) ((common_glue_func_t)(fn))
-#define GLUE_CBC_FUNC_CAST(fn) ((common_glue_cbc_func_t)(fn))
-#define GLUE_CTR_FUNC_CAST(fn) ((common_glue_ctr_func_t)(fn))
-#define GLUE_XTS_FUNC_CAST(fn) ((common_glue_xts_func_t)(fn))
-
struct common_glue_func_entry {
unsigned int num_blocks; /* number of blocks that @fn will process */
union {
@@ -116,7 +111,8 @@ extern int glue_xts_req_128bit(const struct common_glue_ctx *gctx,
common_glue_func_t tweak_fn, void *tweak_ctx,
void *crypt_ctx, bool decrypt);
-extern void glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
- le128 *iv, common_glue_func_t fn);
+extern void glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ const u8 *src, le128 *iv,
+ common_glue_func_t fn);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h
index db7c9cc32234..251c2c89d7cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-avx.h
@@ -15,26 +15,26 @@ struct serpent_xts_ctx {
struct serpent_ctx crypt_ctx;
};
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+asmlinkage void serpent_ctr_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx(const void *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
-extern void __serpent_crypt_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+extern void __serpent_crypt_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-extern void serpent_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv);
-extern void serpent_xts_dec(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv);
+extern void serpent_xts_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
+extern void serpent_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv);
extern int xts_serpent_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-sse2.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-sse2.h
index 1a345e8a7496..860ca248914b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-sse2.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/serpent-sse2.h
@@ -9,25 +9,23 @@
#define SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 4
-asmlinkage void __serpent_enc_blk_4way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void __serpent_enc_blk_4way(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, bool xor);
-asmlinkage void serpent_dec_blk_4way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_dec_blk_4way(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
-static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__serpent_enc_blk_4way(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway_xor(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway_xor(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__serpent_enc_blk_4way(ctx, dst, src, true);
}
-static inline void serpent_dec_blk_xway(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_dec_blk_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
serpent_dec_blk_4way(ctx, dst, src);
}
@@ -36,25 +34,23 @@ static inline void serpent_dec_blk_xway(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
#define SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS 8
-asmlinkage void __serpent_enc_blk_8way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void __serpent_enc_blk_8way(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src, bool xor);
-asmlinkage void serpent_dec_blk_8way(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+asmlinkage void serpent_dec_blk_8way(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
const u8 *src);
-static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__serpent_enc_blk_8way(ctx, dst, src, false);
}
-static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway_xor(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_enc_blk_xway_xor(const struct serpent_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
__serpent_enc_blk_8way(ctx, dst, src, true);
}
-static inline void serpent_dec_blk_xway(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src)
+static inline void serpent_dec_blk_xway(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
serpent_dec_blk_8way(ctx, dst, src);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/twofish.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/twofish.h
index f618bf272b90..2c377a8042e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/twofish.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/crypto/twofish.h
@@ -7,22 +7,19 @@
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
/* regular block cipher functions from twofish_x86_64 module */
-asmlinkage void twofish_enc_blk(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void twofish_dec_blk(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void twofish_enc_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void twofish_dec_blk(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
/* 3-way parallel cipher functions */
-asmlinkage void __twofish_enc_blk_3way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src, bool xor);
-asmlinkage void twofish_dec_blk_3way(struct twofish_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- const u8 *src);
+asmlinkage void __twofish_enc_blk_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ bool xor);
+asmlinkage void twofish_dec_blk_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
/* helpers from twofish_x86_64-3way module */
-extern void twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src);
-extern void twofish_enc_blk_ctr(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+extern void twofish_dec_blk_cbc_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
+extern void twofish_enc_blk_ctr(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
-extern void twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src,
+extern void twofish_enc_blk_ctr_3way(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
le128 *iv);
#endif /* ASM_X86_TWOFISH_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/emulate_prefix.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/emulate_prefix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..70f5b98a5286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/emulate_prefix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_EMULATE_PREFIX_H
+#define _ASM_X86_EMULATE_PREFIX_H
+
+/*
+ * Virt escape sequences to trigger instruction emulation;
+ * ideally these would decode to 'whole' instruction and not destroy
+ * the instruction stream; sadly this is not true for the 'kvm' one :/
+ */
+
+#define __XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX 0x0f,0x0b,0x78,0x65,0x6e /* ud2 ; .ascii "xen" */
+#define __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX 0x0f,0x0b,0x6b,0x76,0x6d /* ud2 ; .ascii "kvm" */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index b774c52e5411..06e767bca0c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -16,14 +16,25 @@
* Use kernel_fpu_begin/end() if you intend to use FPU in kernel context. It
* disables preemption so be careful if you intend to use it for long periods
* of time.
- * If you intend to use the FPU in softirq you need to check first with
+ * If you intend to use the FPU in irq/softirq you need to check first with
* irq_fpu_usable() if it is possible.
*/
-extern void kernel_fpu_begin(void);
+
+/* Kernel FPU states to initialize in kernel_fpu_begin_mask() */
+#define KFPU_387 _BITUL(0) /* 387 state will be initialized */
+#define KFPU_MXCSR _BITUL(1) /* MXCSR will be initialized */
+
+extern void kernel_fpu_begin_mask(unsigned int kfpu_mask);
extern void kernel_fpu_end(void);
extern bool irq_fpu_usable(void);
extern void fpregs_mark_activate(void);
+/* Code that is unaware of kernel_fpu_begin_mask() can use this */
+static inline void kernel_fpu_begin(void)
+{
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387 | KFPU_MXCSR);
+}
+
/*
* Use fpregs_lock() while editing CPU's FPU registers or fpu->state.
* A context switch will (and softirq might) save CPU's FPU registers to
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 00eac7f1529b..5ed702e2c55f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx)
}
extern void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu);
+/* Returns 0 or the negated trap number, which results in -EFAULT for #PF */
#define user_insn(insn, output, input...) \
({ \
int err; \
@@ -109,14 +110,14 @@ extern void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu);
might_fault(); \
\
asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \
- "1:" #insn "\n\t" \
+ "1: " #insn "\n" \
"2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
- "3: movl $-1,%[err]\n" \
+ "3: negl %%eax\n" \
" jmp 2b\n" \
".previous\n" \
- _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \
- : [err] "=r" (err), output \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \
+ : [err] "=a" (err), output \
: "0"(0), input); \
err; \
})
@@ -203,6 +204,14 @@ static inline void copy_fxregs_to_kernel(struct fpu *fpu)
asm volatile("fxsaveq %[fx]" : [fx] "=m" (fpu->state.fxsave));
}
+static inline void fxsave(struct fxregs_state *fx)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ asm volatile( "fxsave %[fx]" : [fx] "=m" (*fx));
+ else
+ asm volatile("fxsaveq %[fx]" : [fx] "=m" (*fx));
+}
+
/* These macros all use (%edi)/(%rdi) as the single memory argument. */
#define XSAVE ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x27"
#define XSAVEOPT ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x37"
@@ -210,16 +219,20 @@ static inline void copy_fxregs_to_kernel(struct fpu *fpu)
#define XRSTOR ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f"
#define XRSTORS ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xc7,0x1f"
+/*
+ * After this @err contains 0 on success or the negated trap number when
+ * the operation raises an exception. For faults this results in -EFAULT.
+ */
#define XSTATE_OP(op, st, lmask, hmask, err) \
asm volatile("1:" op "\n\t" \
"xor %[err], %[err]\n" \
"2:\n\t" \
".pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n\t" \
- "3: movl $-2,%[err]\n\t" \
+ "3: negl %%eax\n\t" \
"jmp 2b\n\t" \
".popsection\n\t" \
- _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \
- : [err] "=r" (err) \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \
+ : [err] "=a" (err) \
: "D" (st), "m" (*st), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask) \
: "memory")
@@ -271,28 +284,6 @@ static inline void copy_fxregs_to_kernel(struct fpu *fpu)
* This function is called only during boot time when x86 caps are not set
* up and alternative can not be used yet.
*/
-static inline void copy_xregs_to_kernel_booting(struct xregs_state *xstate)
-{
- u64 mask = -1;
- u32 lmask = mask;
- u32 hmask = mask >> 32;
- int err;
-
- WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
- XSTATE_OP(XSAVES, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
- else
- XSTATE_OP(XSAVE, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
-
- /* We should never fault when copying to a kernel buffer: */
- WARN_ON_FPU(err);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is called only during boot time when x86 caps are not set
- * up and alternative can not be used yet.
- */
static inline void copy_kernel_to_xregs_booting(struct xregs_state *xstate)
{
u64 mask = -1;
@@ -569,9 +560,11 @@ static inline void __fpregs_load_activate(void)
* The FPU context is only stored/restored for a user task and
* PF_KTHREAD is used to distinguish between kernel and user threads.
*/
-static inline void switch_fpu_prepare(struct fpu *old_fpu, int cpu)
+static inline void switch_fpu_prepare(struct task_struct *prev, int cpu)
{
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) && !(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ struct fpu *old_fpu = &prev->thread.fpu;
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) && !(prev->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
if (!copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(old_fpu))
old_fpu->last_cpu = -1;
else
@@ -590,10 +583,11 @@ static inline void switch_fpu_prepare(struct fpu *old_fpu, int cpu)
* Load PKRU from the FPU context if available. Delay loading of the
* complete FPU state until the return to userland.
*/
-static inline void switch_fpu_finish(struct fpu *new_fpu)
+static inline void switch_fpu_finish(struct task_struct *next)
{
u32 pkru_val = init_pkru_value;
struct pkru_state *pk;
+ struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->thread.fpu;
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
return;
@@ -607,10 +601,17 @@ static inline void switch_fpu_finish(struct fpu *new_fpu)
* PKRU state is switched eagerly because it needs to be valid before we
* return to userland e.g. for a copy_to_user() operation.
*/
- if (current->mm) {
- pk = get_xsave_addr(&new_fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU);
- if (pk)
- pkru_val = pk->pkru;
+ if (!(next->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ /*
+ * If the PKRU bit in xsave.header.xfeatures is not set,
+ * then the PKRU component was in init state, which means
+ * XRSTOR will set PKRU to 0. If the bit is not set then
+ * get_xsave_addr() will return NULL because the PKRU value
+ * in memory is not valid. This means pkru_val has to be
+ * set to 0 and not to init_pkru_value.
+ */
+ pk = get_xsave_addr(&next_fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU);
+ pkru_val = pk ? pk->pkru : 0;
}
__write_pkru(pkru_val);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
index 154f27be8bfc..a8c3d284fa46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct insn {
struct insn_field immediate2; /* for 64bit imm or seg16 */
};
+ int emulate_prefix_size;
insn_attr_t attr;
unsigned char opnd_bytes;
unsigned char addr_bytes;
@@ -128,6 +129,11 @@ static inline int insn_is_evex(struct insn *insn)
return (insn->vex_prefix.nbytes == 4);
}
+static inline int insn_has_emulate_prefix(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ return !!insn->emulate_prefix_size;
+}
+
/* Ensure this instruction is decoded completely */
static inline int insn_complete(struct insn *insn)
{
@@ -195,6 +201,21 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn)
return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes;
}
+/**
+ * for_each_insn_prefix() -- Iterate prefixes in the instruction
+ * @insn: Pointer to struct insn.
+ * @idx: Index storage.
+ * @prefix: Prefix byte.
+ *
+ * Iterate prefix bytes of given @insn. Each prefix byte is stored in @prefix
+ * and the index is stored in @idx (note that this @idx is just for a cursor,
+ * do not change it.)
+ * Since prefixes.nbytes can be bigger than 4 if some prefixes
+ * are repeated, it cannot be used for looping over the prefixes.
+ */
+#define for_each_insn_prefix(insn, idx, prefix) \
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(insn->prefixes.bytes) && (prefix = insn->prefixes.bytes[idx]) != 0; idx++)
+
#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f
#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index c606c0b70738..5b07573c3bc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE 0xA5
#define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L 0xA6
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE 0xA7
+
+/* Hybrid Core/Atom Processors */
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD 0x8A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L 0x9A
+
/* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL 0x1C /* Diamondville, Pineview */
@@ -111,6 +119,7 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D 0x86 /* Jacobsville */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT 0x96 /* Elkhart Lake */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L 0x9C /* Jasper Lake */
/* Xeon Phi */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 5e7d6b46de97..367da081f7d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -201,6 +202,14 @@ extern int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages,
extern void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages);
#define arch_kexec_pre_free_pages arch_kexec_pre_free_pages
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
+struct purgatory_info;
+int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi,
+ Elf_Shdr *section,
+ const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
+ const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
+#define arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add
+#endif
#endif
typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c41686641c3f..4bc476d7fa6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -391,8 +391,6 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
int (*sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
void (*invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa);
- void (*update_pte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
- u64 *spte, const void *pte);
hpa_t root_hpa;
gpa_t root_cr3;
union kvm_mmu_role mmu_role;
@@ -944,7 +942,6 @@ struct kvm_arch {
struct kvm_vm_stat {
ulong mmu_shadow_zapped;
ulong mmu_pte_write;
- ulong mmu_pte_updated;
ulong mmu_pde_zapped;
ulong mmu_flooded;
ulong mmu_recycled;
@@ -1560,6 +1557,7 @@ int kvm_test_age_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva);
int kvm_set_spte_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva, pte_t pte);
int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
index 9b4df6eaa11a..f913f62eb6c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
-extern void kvmclock_init(void);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void);
#else
@@ -85,13 +83,14 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall4(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
+void kvmclock_init(void);
+void kvmclock_disable(void);
bool kvm_para_available(void);
unsigned int kvm_arch_para_features(void);
unsigned int kvm_arch_para_hints(void);
void kvm_async_pf_task_wait(u32 token, int interrupt_kernel);
void kvm_async_pf_task_wake(u32 token);
u32 kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason(void);
-extern void kvm_disable_steal_time(void);
void do_async_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address);
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS
@@ -125,11 +124,6 @@ static inline u32 kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason(void)
{
return 0;
}
-
-static inline void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
-{
- return;
-}
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvmclock.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvmclock.h
index eceea9299097..6c5765192102 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvmclock.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvmclock.h
@@ -2,6 +2,20 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_KVM_CLOCK_H
#define _ASM_X86_KVM_CLOCK_H
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
extern struct clocksource kvm_clock;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *, hv_clock_per_cpu);
+
+static inline struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *this_cpu_pvti(void)
+{
+ return &this_cpu_read(hv_clock_per_cpu)->pvti;
+}
+
+static inline struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *this_cpu_hvclock(void)
+{
+ return this_cpu_read(hv_clock_per_cpu);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_CLOCK_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 14caa9d9fb7f..e07188e8d763 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -13,9 +13,13 @@
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
-#define GLOBAL(name) \
- .globl name; \
- name:
+/*
+ * GLOBAL is DEPRECATED
+ *
+ * use SYM_DATA_START, SYM_FUNC_START, SYM_INNER_LABEL, SYM_CODE_START, or
+ * similar
+ */
+#define GLOBAL(name) SYM_ENTRY(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_ALIGNMENT_16)
#define __ALIGN .p2align 4, 0x90
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
index 2b7cc5397f80..91a06cef50c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h
@@ -133,11 +133,13 @@ extern void load_ucode_ap(void);
void reload_early_microcode(void);
extern bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name);
extern bool initrd_gone;
+void microcode_bsp_resume(void);
#else
static inline int __init microcode_init(void) { return 0; };
static inline void __init load_ucode_bsp(void) { }
static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { }
static inline void reload_early_microcode(void) { }
+static inline void microcode_bsp_resume(void) { }
static inline bool
get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name) { return false; }
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 391812e0384e..c56042916a7c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -105,6 +105,30 @@
* Not susceptible to
* TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO BIT(13) /*
+ * Not susceptible to SBDR and SSDP
+ * variants of Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO BIT(14) /*
+ * Not susceptible to FBSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO BIT(15) /*
+ * Not susceptible to PSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR BIT(17) /*
+ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer
+ * even on MDS_NO CPUs.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /*
+ * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]
+ * bit available to control VERW
+ * behavior.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
@@ -122,6 +146,7 @@
/* SRBDS support */
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
+#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
@@ -432,6 +457,7 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOP_REG_MASK ((1UL<<MSR_AMD64_IBSOP_REG_COUNT)-1)
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSCTL 0xc001103a
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET 0xc001103b
+#define MSR_AMD64_ICIBSEXTDCTL 0xc001103c
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index 86f20d520a07..b40d0295d812 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static inline void do_trace_rdpmc(unsigned int msr, u64 val, int failed) {}
* think of extending them - you will be slapped with a stinking trout or a frozen
* shark will reach you, wherever you are! You've been warned.
*/
-static inline unsigned long long notrace __rdmsr(unsigned int msr)
+static __always_inline unsigned long long __rdmsr(unsigned int msr)
{
DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static inline unsigned long long notrace __rdmsr(unsigned int msr)
return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
}
-static inline void notrace __wrmsr(unsigned int msr, u32 low, u32 high)
+static __always_inline void __wrmsr(unsigned int msr, u32 low, u32 high)
{
asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
"2:\n"
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index b222a3595946..ece2b2c6d020 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \
__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
- __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
#else
jmp *\reg
#endif
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
- __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
#else
call *\reg
#endif
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
"lfence;\n" \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
"lfence;\n" \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
@@ -213,9 +213,11 @@
/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
- SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
};
/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
@@ -311,6 +313,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 288b065955b7..9d0b47945272 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#define THREAD_SIZE_ORDER (2 + KASAN_STACK_ORDER)
#define THREAD_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_SIZE_ORDER)
-#define EXCEPTION_STACK_ORDER (0 + KASAN_STACK_ORDER)
+#define EXCEPTION_STACK_ORDER (1 + KASAN_STACK_ORDER)
#define EXCEPTION_STKSZ (PAGE_SIZE << EXCEPTION_STACK_ORDER)
#define IRQ_STACK_ORDER (2 + KASAN_STACK_ORDER)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index ea85f23d9e22..1ae7c20f5469 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1375,8 +1375,8 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_clear_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
#endif
#endif
-#define PKRU_AD_BIT 0x1
-#define PKRU_WD_BIT 0x2
+#define PKRU_AD_BIT 0x1u
+#define PKRU_WD_BIT 0x2u
#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 8267dd426b15..ff77f561e11f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#endif
#define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
+#define _PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PAT_LARGE)
#define _PAGE_NOCACHE (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC))
#define _PAGE_CACHE_WP (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index a07dfdf7759e..537c0dd4c3d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -507,15 +507,6 @@ static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset,
}
/*
- * Thread-synchronous status.
- *
- * This is different from the flags in that nobody else
- * ever touches our thread-synchronous status, so we don't
- * have to worry about atomic accesses.
- */
-#define TS_COMPAT 0x0002 /* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
-
-/*
* Set IOPL bits in EFLAGS from given mask
*/
static inline void native_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
index 6e81788a30c1..0eaca7a130c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include <asm/ldt.h>
+struct task_struct;
+
/* misc architecture specific prototypes */
void syscall_init(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index 09ecc32f6524..52d7512ea91a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static inline void set_real_mode_mem(phys_addr_t mem)
}
void reserve_real_mode(void);
+void load_trampoline_pgtable(void);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 6d37b8fcfc77..2e0cdc64cb50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -10,45 +10,47 @@
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
/*
- * Volatile isn't enough to prevent the compiler from reordering the
- * read/write functions for the control registers and messing everything up.
- * A memory clobber would solve the problem, but would prevent reordering of
- * all loads stores around it, which can hurt performance. Solution is to
- * use a variable and mimic reads and writes to it to enforce serialization
+ * The compiler should not reorder volatile asm statements with respect to each
+ * other: they should execute in program order. However GCC 4.9.x and 5.x have
+ * a bug (which was fixed in 8.1, 7.3 and 6.5) where they might reorder
+ * volatile asm. The write functions are not affected since they have memory
+ * clobbers preventing reordering. To prevent reads from being reordered with
+ * respect to writes, use a dummy memory operand.
*/
-extern unsigned long __force_order;
+
+#define __FORCE_ORDER "m"(*(unsigned int *)0x1000UL)
void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val);
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr0(void)
{
unsigned long val;
- asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
return val;
}
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr2(void)
{
unsigned long val;
- asm volatile("mov %%cr2,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %%cr2,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
return val;
}
static inline void native_write_cr2(unsigned long val)
{
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr2": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr2": : "r" (val) : "memory");
}
static inline unsigned long __native_read_cr3(void)
{
unsigned long val;
- asm volatile("mov %%cr3,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %%cr3,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
return val;
}
static inline void native_write_cr3(unsigned long val)
{
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr3": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr3": : "r" (val) : "memory");
}
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)
@@ -63,10 +65,10 @@ static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)
asm volatile("1: mov %%cr4, %0\n"
"2:\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
- : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order) : "0" (0));
+ : "=r" (val) : "0" (0), __FORCE_ORDER);
#else
/* CR4 always exists on x86_64. */
- asm volatile("mov %%cr4,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %%cr4,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
#endif
return val;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h
index fdbd9d7b7bca..3b97aa921543 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_32.h
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ struct saved_context {
#endif
unsigned long cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4;
u64 misc_enable;
- bool misc_enable_saved;
struct saved_msrs saved_msrs;
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc;
struct desc_ptr idt;
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ struct saved_context {
unsigned long tr;
unsigned long safety;
unsigned long return_address;
+ bool misc_enable_saved;
} __attribute__((packed));
/* routines for saving/restoring kernel state */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h
index 35bb35d28733..54df06687d83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h
@@ -14,9 +14,13 @@
* Image of the saved processor state, used by the low level ACPI suspend to
* RAM code and by the low level hibernation code.
*
- * If you modify it, fix arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S and make sure that
- * __save/__restore_processor_state(), defined in arch/x86/kernel/suspend_64.c,
- * still work as required.
+ * If you modify it, check how it is used in arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
+ * and make sure that __save/__restore_processor_state(), defined in
+ * arch/x86/power/cpu.c, still work as required.
+ *
+ * Because the structure is packed, make sure to avoid unaligned members. For
+ * optimisation purposes but also because tools like kmemleak only search for
+ * pointers that are aligned.
*/
struct saved_context {
struct pt_regs regs;
@@ -36,7 +40,6 @@ struct saved_context {
unsigned long cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4;
u64 misc_enable;
- bool misc_enable_saved;
struct saved_msrs saved_msrs;
unsigned long efer;
u16 gdt_pad; /* Unused */
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@ struct saved_context {
unsigned long tr;
unsigned long safety;
unsigned long return_address;
+ bool misc_enable_saved;
} __attribute__((packed));
#define loaddebug(thread,register) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 6ece8561ba66..c29d8fb0ffbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -119,6 +119,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT 20
#define V_IGN_TPR_MASK (1 << V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT)
+#define V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK (V_IRQ_MASK | V_INTR_PRIO_MASK | V_IGN_TPR_MASK)
+
#define V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT 24
#define V_INTR_MASKING_MASK (1 << V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h
index c67caafd3381..43b5e02a7b4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h
@@ -16,12 +16,13 @@ static inline void sync_core_before_usermode(void)
/* With PTI, we unconditionally serialize before running user code. */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
return;
+
/*
- * Return from interrupt and NMI is done through iret, which is core
- * serializing.
+ * Even if we're in an interrupt, we might reschedule before returning,
+ * in which case we could switch to a different thread in the same mm
+ * and return using SYSRET or SYSEXIT. Instead of trying to keep
+ * track of our need to sync the core, just sync right away.
*/
- if (in_irq() || in_nmi())
- return;
sync_core();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index f9453536f9bb..a4de7aa7500f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -221,10 +221,31 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
#endif
+/*
+ * Thread-synchronous status.
+ *
+ * This is different from the flags in that nobody else
+ * ever touches our thread-synchronous status, so we don't
+ * have to worry about atomic accesses.
+ */
+#define TS_COMPAT 0x0002 /* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define TS_I386_REGS_POKED 0x0004 /* regs poked by 32-bit ptracer */
+#define TS_COMPAT_RESTART 0x0008
+
+#define arch_set_restart_data arch_set_restart_data
+
+static inline void arch_set_restart_data(struct restart_block *restart)
+{
+ struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+ if (ti->status & TS_COMPAT)
+ ti->status |= TS_COMPAT_RESTART;
+ else
+ ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT_RESTART;
+}
#endif
-#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
#define in_ia32_syscall() true
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index a4a8b1b16c0c..956e4145311b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tsc.h>
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
/* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
index 4b14d2318251..f3459df117aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern const struct cpumask *cpu_coregroup_mask(int cpu);
#define topology_die_id(cpu) (cpu_data(cpu).cpu_die_id)
#define topology_core_id(cpu) (cpu_data(cpu).cpu_core_id)
+extern unsigned int __max_die_per_package;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#define topology_die_cpumask(cpu) (per_cpu(cpu_die_map, cpu))
#define topology_core_cpumask(cpu) (per_cpu(cpu_core_map, cpu))
@@ -118,8 +120,6 @@ extern const struct cpumask *cpu_coregroup_mask(int cpu);
extern unsigned int __max_logical_packages;
#define topology_max_packages() (__max_logical_packages)
-extern unsigned int __max_die_per_package;
-
static inline int topology_max_die_per_package(void)
{
return __max_die_per_package;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index 8a0c25c6bf09..f1ea8f0c8b12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return 0;
-#endif
-
return rdtsc();
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
index 9aad0e0876fb..fda3e7747c22 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/virtext.h
@@ -30,15 +30,22 @@ static inline int cpu_has_vmx(void)
}
-/** Disable VMX on the current CPU
+/**
+ * cpu_vmxoff() - Disable VMX on the current CPU
*
- * vmxoff causes a undefined-opcode exception if vmxon was not run
- * on the CPU previously. Only call this function if you know VMX
- * is enabled.
+ * Disable VMX and clear CR4.VMXE (even if VMXOFF faults)
+ *
+ * Note, VMXOFF causes a #UD if the CPU is !post-VMXON, but it's impossible to
+ * atomically track post-VMXON state, e.g. this may be called in NMI context.
+ * Eat all faults as all other faults on VMXOFF faults are mode related, i.e.
+ * faults are guaranteed to be due to the !post-VMXON check unless the CPU is
+ * magically in RM, VM86, compat mode, or at CPL>0.
*/
static inline void cpu_vmxoff(void)
{
- asm volatile ("vmxoff");
+ asm_volatile_goto("1: vmxoff\n\t"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) :::: fault);
+fault:
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h
index 62ca03ef5c65..9139b3e86316 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface.h
@@ -379,12 +379,9 @@ struct xen_pmu_arch {
* Prefix forces emulation of some non-trapping instructions.
* Currently only CPUID.
*/
-#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
-#define XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX .byte 0x0f,0x0b,0x78,0x65,0x6e ;
-#define XEN_CPUID XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX cpuid
-#else
-#define XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX ".byte 0x0f,0x0b,0x78,0x65,0x6e ; "
-#define XEN_CPUID XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX "cpuid"
-#endif
+#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+
+#define XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX __ASM_FORM(.byte __XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX ;)
+#define XEN_CPUID XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX __ASM_FORM(cpuid)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_XEN_INTERFACE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index f9e84a0e2fa2..7b75658b7e9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -1339,6 +1339,17 @@ static int __init disable_acpi_pci(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
return 0;
}
+static int __init disable_acpi_xsdt(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
+{
+ if (!acpi_force) {
+ pr_notice("%s detected: force use of acpi=rsdt\n", d->ident);
+ acpi_gbl_do_not_use_xsdt = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ pr_notice("Warning: DMI blacklist says broken, but acpi XSDT forced\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init dmi_disable_acpi(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
{
if (!acpi_force) {
@@ -1463,6 +1474,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TravelMate 360"),
},
},
+ /*
+ * Boxes that need ACPI XSDT use disabled due to corrupted tables
+ */
+ {
+ .callback = disable_acpi_xsdt,
+ .ident = "Advantech DAC-BJ01",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "NEC"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Bearlake CRB Board"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "V1.12"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_DATE, "02/01/2011"),
+ },
+ },
{}
};
@@ -1553,10 +1577,18 @@ void __init acpi_boot_table_init(void)
/*
* Initialize the ACPI boot-time table parser.
*/
- if (acpi_table_init()) {
+ if (acpi_locate_initial_tables())
disable_acpi();
- return;
- }
+ else
+ acpi_reserve_initial_tables();
+}
+
+int __init early_acpi_boot_init(void)
+{
+ if (acpi_disabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ acpi_table_init_complete();
acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BOOT, acpi_parse_sbf);
@@ -1569,18 +1601,9 @@ void __init acpi_boot_table_init(void)
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX "Disabling ACPI support\n");
disable_acpi();
- return;
+ return 1;
}
}
-}
-
-int __init early_acpi_boot_init(void)
-{
- /*
- * If acpi_disabled, bail out
- */
- if (acpi_disabled)
- return 1;
/*
* Process the Multiple APIC Description Table (MADT), if present
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S
index e95e95960156..5b076cb79f5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S
@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@
.code32
ALIGN
-ENTRY(wakeup_pmode_return)
-wakeup_pmode_return:
+SYM_CODE_START(wakeup_pmode_return)
movw $__KERNEL_DS, %ax
movw %ax, %ss
movw %ax, %fs
@@ -39,6 +38,7 @@ wakeup_pmode_return:
# jump to place where we left off
movl saved_eip, %eax
jmp *%eax
+SYM_CODE_END(wakeup_pmode_return)
bogus_magic:
jmp bogus_magic
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ restore_registers:
popfl
ret
-ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel)
+SYM_CODE_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
call save_processor_state
call save_registers
pushl $3
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ ret_point:
call restore_registers
call restore_processor_state
ret
+SYM_CODE_END(do_suspend_lowlevel)
.data
ALIGN
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index fce94c799f01..68c734032523 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
#include <asm/i8259.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ static __init int setup_apicpmtimer(char *s)
{
apic_calibrate_pmtmr = 1;
notsc_setup(NULL);
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
__setup("apicpmtimer", setup_apicpmtimer);
#endif
@@ -472,6 +473,9 @@ static int lapic_next_deadline(unsigned long delta,
{
u64 tsc;
+ /* This MSR is special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
+
tsc = rdtsc();
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE, tsc + (((u64) delta) * TSC_DIVISOR));
return 0;
@@ -1886,20 +1890,22 @@ static __init void try_to_enable_x2apic(int remap_mode)
return;
if (remap_mode != IRQ_REMAP_X2APIC_MODE) {
- /* IR is required if there is APIC ID > 255 even when running
- * under KVM
+ /*
+ * Using X2APIC without IR is not architecturally supported
+ * on bare metal but may be supported in guests.
*/
- if (max_physical_apicid > 255 ||
- !x86_init.hyper.x2apic_available()) {
+ if (!x86_init.hyper.x2apic_available()) {
pr_info("x2apic: IRQ remapping doesn't support X2APIC mode\n");
x2apic_disable();
return;
}
/*
- * without IR all CPUs can be addressed by IOAPIC/MSI
- * only in physical mode
+ * Without IR, all CPUs can be addressed by IOAPIC/MSI only
+ * in physical mode, and CPUs with an APIC ID that cannnot
+ * be addressed must not be brought online.
*/
+ x2apic_set_max_apicid(255);
x2apic_phys = 1;
}
x2apic_enable();
@@ -2348,6 +2354,11 @@ static int cpuid_to_apicid[] = {
[0 ... NR_CPUS - 1] = -1,
};
+bool arch_match_cpu_phys_id(int cpu, u64 phys_id)
+{
+ return phys_id == cpuid_to_apicid[cpu];
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/**
* apic_id_is_primary_thread - Check whether APIC ID belongs to a primary thread
@@ -2568,6 +2579,7 @@ static void __init apic_bsp_setup(bool upmode)
end_local_APIC_setup();
irq_remap_enable_fault_handling();
setup_IO_APIC();
+ lapic_update_legacy_vectors();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_UP_LATE_INIT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
index 4b6301946f45..1622cff009c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -1046,6 +1046,16 @@ static int mp_map_pin_to_irq(u32 gsi, int idx, int ioapic, int pin,
if (idx >= 0 && test_bit(mp_irqs[idx].srcbus, mp_bus_not_pci)) {
irq = mp_irqs[idx].srcbusirq;
legacy = mp_is_legacy_irq(irq);
+ /*
+ * IRQ2 is unusable for historical reasons on systems which
+ * have a legacy PIC. See the comment vs. IRQ2 further down.
+ *
+ * If this gets removed at some point then the related code
+ * in lapic_assign_system_vectors() needs to be adjusted as
+ * well.
+ */
+ if (legacy && irq == PIC_CASCADE_IR)
+ return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_lock(&ioapic_mutex);
@@ -1951,7 +1961,8 @@ static struct irq_chip ioapic_chip __read_mostly = {
.irq_set_affinity = ioapic_set_affinity,
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_get_irqchip_state = ioapic_irq_get_chip_state,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
+ IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
static struct irq_chip ioapic_ir_chip __read_mostly = {
@@ -1964,7 +1975,8 @@ static struct irq_chip ioapic_ir_chip __read_mostly = {
.irq_set_affinity = ioapic_set_affinity,
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_get_irqchip_state = ioapic_irq_get_chip_state,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
+ IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
static inline void init_IO_APIC_traps(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
index a20873bbbed6..f86e10b1d99c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c
@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ msi_set_affinity(struct irq_data *irqd, const struct cpumask *mask, bool force)
* The quirk bit is not set in this case.
* - The new vector is the same as the old vector
* - The old vector is MANAGED_IRQ_SHUTDOWN_VECTOR (interrupt starts up)
+ * - The interrupt is not yet started up
* - The new destination CPU is the same as the old destination CPU
*/
if (!irqd_msi_nomask_quirk(irqd) ||
cfg->vector == old_cfg.vector ||
old_cfg.vector == MANAGED_IRQ_SHUTDOWN_VECTOR ||
+ !irqd_is_started(irqd) ||
cfg->dest_apicid == old_cfg.dest_apicid) {
irq_msi_update_msg(irqd, cfg);
return ret;
@@ -178,7 +180,8 @@ static struct irq_chip pci_msi_controller = {
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_compose_msi_msg = irq_msi_compose_msg,
.irq_set_affinity = msi_set_affinity,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
+ IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
int native_setup_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev, int nvec, int type)
@@ -279,7 +282,8 @@ static struct irq_chip pci_msi_ir_controller = {
.irq_ack = irq_chip_ack_parent,
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_set_vcpu_affinity = irq_chip_set_vcpu_affinity_parent,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
+ IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
static struct msi_domain_info pci_msi_ir_domain_info = {
@@ -322,7 +326,8 @@ static struct irq_chip dmar_msi_controller = {
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_compose_msi_msg = irq_msi_compose_msg,
.irq_write_msi_msg = dmar_msi_write_msg,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
+ IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
static irq_hw_number_t dmar_msi_get_hwirq(struct msi_domain_info *info,
@@ -420,7 +425,7 @@ static struct irq_chip hpet_msi_controller __ro_after_init = {
.irq_retrigger = irq_chip_retrigger_hierarchy,
.irq_compose_msi_msg = irq_msi_compose_msg,
.irq_write_msi_msg = hpet_msi_write_msg,
- .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE,
+ .flags = IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE | IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP,
};
static irq_hw_number_t hpet_msi_get_hwirq(struct msi_domain_info *info,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index c8203694d9ce..6b8b6bf6c5d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -272,20 +272,24 @@ static int assign_irq_vector_any_locked(struct irq_data *irqd)
const struct cpumask *affmsk = irq_data_get_affinity_mask(irqd);
int node = irq_data_get_node(irqd);
- if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
- goto all;
- /* Try the intersection of @affmsk and node mask */
- cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, cpumask_of_node(node), affmsk);
- if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask))
- return 0;
- /* Try the node mask */
- if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpumask_of_node(node)))
- return 0;
-all:
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
+ /* Try the intersection of @affmsk and node mask */
+ cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, cpumask_of_node(node), affmsk);
+ if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Try the full affinity mask */
cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, affmsk, cpu_online_mask);
if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask))
return 0;
+
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
+ /* Try the node mask */
+ if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpumask_of_node(node)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Try the full online mask */
return assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpu_online_mask);
}
@@ -676,6 +680,26 @@ void lapic_assign_legacy_vector(unsigned int irq, bool replace)
irq_matrix_assign_system(vector_matrix, ISA_IRQ_VECTOR(irq), replace);
}
+void __init lapic_update_legacy_vectors(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC) && nr_ioapics > 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the IO/APIC is disabled via config, kernel command line or
+ * lack of enumeration then all legacy interrupts are routed
+ * through the PIC. Make sure that they are marked as legacy
+ * vectors. PIC_CASCADE_IRQ has already been marked in
+ * lapic_assign_system_vectors().
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) {
+ if (i != PIC_CASCADE_IR)
+ lapic_assign_legacy_vector(i, true);
+ }
+}
+
void __init lapic_assign_system_vectors(void)
{
unsigned int i, vector = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
index b0889c48a2ac..7eec3c154fa2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ static void x2apic_send_IPI(int cpu, int vector)
{
u32 dest = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_logical_apicid, cpu);
- x2apic_wrmsr_fence();
+ /* x2apic MSRs are special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
__x2apic_send_IPI_dest(dest, vector, APIC_DEST_LOGICAL);
}
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ __x2apic_send_IPI_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector, int apic_dest)
unsigned long flags;
u32 dest;
- x2apic_wrmsr_fence();
+ /* x2apic MSRs are special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
local_irq_save(flags);
tmpmsk = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(ipi_mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c
index bc9693841353..032a00e5d9fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
int x2apic_phys;
static struct apic apic_x2apic_phys;
+static u32 x2apic_max_apicid __ro_after_init;
+
+void __init x2apic_set_max_apicid(u32 apicid)
+{
+ x2apic_max_apicid = apicid;
+}
static int __init set_x2apic_phys_mode(char *arg)
{
@@ -37,7 +43,8 @@ static void x2apic_send_IPI(int cpu, int vector)
{
u32 dest = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu);
- x2apic_wrmsr_fence();
+ /* x2apic MSRs are special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
__x2apic_send_IPI_dest(dest, vector, APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL);
}
@@ -48,7 +55,8 @@ __x2apic_send_IPI_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector, int apic_dest)
unsigned long this_cpu;
unsigned long flags;
- x2apic_wrmsr_fence();
+ /* x2apic MSRs are special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
local_irq_save(flags);
@@ -98,6 +106,9 @@ static int x2apic_phys_probe(void)
/* Common x2apic functions, also used by x2apic_cluster */
int x2apic_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid)
{
+ if (x2apic_max_apicid && apicid > x2apic_max_apicid)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
@@ -116,7 +127,8 @@ void __x2apic_send_IPI_shorthand(int vector, u32 which)
{
unsigned long cfg = __prepare_ICR(which, vector, 0);
- x2apic_wrmsr_fence();
+ /* x2apic MSRs are special and need a special fence: */
+ weak_wrmsr_fence();
native_x2apic_icr_write(cfg, 0);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c553cafd0736..88cef978380b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ static void amd_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u8 node_id;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* get information required for multi-node processors */
@@ -345,7 +344,7 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- node_id = ecx & 0xff;
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
if (c->x86 == 0x15)
c->cu_id = ebx & 0xff;
@@ -365,15 +364,15 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (!err)
c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
- cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id);
+ cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
} else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- node_id = value & 7;
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else
return;
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
/* use socket ID also for last level cache */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
}
u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu)
@@ -546,12 +545,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u32 ecx;
ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001e);
- nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
}
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) &&
@@ -988,6 +987,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF) &&
!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1054))
msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index acbf3dbb8bf2..09d02b1f6f71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -39,8 +40,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
@@ -75,6 +78,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -107,16 +114,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
- mds_select_mitigation();
- taa_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
- /*
- * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
- * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
- */
- mds_print_mitigation();
-
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -256,14 +256,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- return;
-
- pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -311,7 +303,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -325,7 +317,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
- goto out;
+ return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -357,18 +349,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
- /*
- * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
- * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
- */
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_select_mitigation();
- }
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -393,6 +373,151 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
enum srbds_mitigations {
@@ -453,11 +578,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
@@ -607,6 +734,32 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
+#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+ if (new_state)
+ return;
+
+ /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
@@ -621,7 +774,10 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
};
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -694,6 +850,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
{
@@ -733,11 +896,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
@@ -751,15 +916,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
"always-on" : "conditional");
-
- spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
}
/*
- * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
* required.
*/
- if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+ !smt_possible ||
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -771,12 +936,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
- /*
- * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
- */
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-
spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
set_mode:
@@ -785,9 +944,11 @@ set_mode:
static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
};
static const struct {
@@ -798,8 +959,12 @@ static const struct {
{ "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
{ "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
{ "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
- { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
+ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
+ { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+ { "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
+ { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
+ { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
};
@@ -836,17 +1001,30 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
- if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
- pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -855,6 +1033,16 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return cmd;
}
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -875,49 +1063,64 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
- /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
- x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- goto specv2_set_mode;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
}
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_auto;
+
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
- case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_amd;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_generic;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
break;
+
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
- goto retpoline_auto;
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
break;
}
- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
- return;
-retpoline_auto:
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
- retpoline_amd:
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
- goto retpoline_generic;
- }
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
- } else {
- retpoline_generic:
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+ fallthrough;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ break;
}
-specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -943,7 +1146,7 @@ specv2_set_mode:
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
@@ -989,6 +1192,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -1000,19 +1205,26 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
- if (sched_smt_active())
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- else
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
break;
@@ -1048,6 +1260,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
@@ -1252,6 +1474,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
}
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1260,16 +1490,24 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return 0;
/*
- * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
- * by a previous prctl call.
-
+ * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+ * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+ * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+ * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+ * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+ *
+ * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+ * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+ * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+ * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+ * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+ * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+ * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
*/
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
+
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
break;
@@ -1282,10 +1520,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return -EPERM;
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
return 0;
+
task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
@@ -1350,20 +1588,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
- return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
+ else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- } else
+ } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ else
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
}
@@ -1598,9 +1833,23 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
@@ -1630,6 +1879,27 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
+
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
+
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ibpb_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ stibp_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+
static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
@@ -1655,12 +1925,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
- ibpb_state(),
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
- stibp_state(),
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
- spectre_v2_module_string());
+ return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
@@ -1682,6 +1947,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1733,4 +2001,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
index c7503be92f35..cae566567e15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static int find_num_cache_leaves(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return i;
}
-void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
+void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
{
/*
* We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
if (c->x86 < 0x17) {
/* LLC is at the node level. */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else if (c->x86 == 0x17 && c->x86_model <= 0x1F) {
/*
* LLC is at the core complex level.
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
}
}
-void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id)
+void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
{
/*
* We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void ci_leaf_init(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf,
this_leaf->priv = base->nb;
}
-static int __init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
+int init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ static void get_cache_id(int cpu, struct _cpuid4_info_regs *id4_regs)
id4_regs->id = c->apicid >> index_msb;
}
-static int __populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
+int populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
{
unsigned int idx, ret;
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
@@ -1033,6 +1033,3 @@ static int __populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
return 0;
}
-
-DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION(init_cache_level)
-DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION(populate_cache_leaves)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9b3f25e14608..305f30e45f3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
unsigned long bits_missing = 0;
set_register:
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val), "+m" (__force_order));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
set_register:
- asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val), "+m" (cr4_pinned_bits));
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
@@ -1099,18 +1099,42 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -1131,6 +1155,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
return ia32_cap;
}
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1184,12 +1215,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
+ !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@@ -1336,9 +1382,8 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
}
-static void detect_null_seg_behavior(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static bool detect_null_seg_behavior(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Empirically, writing zero to a segment selector on AMD does
* not clear the base, whereas writing zero to a segment
@@ -1359,10 +1404,43 @@ static void detect_null_seg_behavior(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 1);
loadsegment(fs, 0);
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp);
- if (tmp != 0)
- set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
-#endif
+ return tmp == 0;
+}
+
+void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* BUG_NULL_SEG is only relevant with 64bit userspace */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return;
+
+ /* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021 &&
+ cpuid_eax(0x80000021) & BIT(6))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * CPUID bit above wasn't set. If this kernel is still running
+ * as a HV guest, then the HV has decided not to advertize
+ * that CPUID bit for whatever reason. For example, one
+ * member of the migration pool might be vulnerable. Which
+ * means, the bug is present: set the BUG flag and return.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Zen2 CPUs also have this behaviour, but no CPUID bit.
+ * 0x18 is the respective family for Hygon.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 0x17 || c->x86 == 0x18) &&
+ detect_null_seg_behavior())
+ return;
+
+ /* All the remaining ones are affected */
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
}
static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -1398,8 +1476,6 @@ static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
- detect_null_seg_behavior(c);
-
/*
* ESPFIX is a strange bug. All real CPUs have it. Paravirt
* systems that run Linux at CPL > 0 may or may not have the
@@ -1826,7 +1902,7 @@ static void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
struct desc_struct d = { };
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
write_rdtscp_aux(cpudata);
/* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 9d033693519a..4d04c127c4a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
index 4e28c1fc8749..b232bd0be78d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ static void hygon_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u8 node_id;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* get information required for multi-node processors */
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- node_id = ecx & 0xff;
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xff;
@@ -92,14 +91,14 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Socket ID is ApicId[6] for these processors. */
c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT;
- cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id);
+ cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
} else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
u64 value;
rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
- node_id = value & 7;
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
} else
return;
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ static void hygon_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
/* use socket ID also for last level cache */
- per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
}
static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -351,6 +350,8 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
}
static void cpu_detect_tlb_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 11d5c5950e2d..44688917d51f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly;
static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused)
{
ring3mwait_disabled = true;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
__setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index fd76e3733dd3..8a2b8e791314 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -310,11 +310,17 @@ static void wait_for_panic(void)
panic("Panicing machine check CPU died");
}
-static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
+static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
{
- int apei_err = 0;
struct llist_node *pending;
struct mce_evt_llist *l;
+ int apei_err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. Not that it
+ * matters a whole lot since the machine is going to panic anyway.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
if (!fake_panic) {
/*
@@ -329,7 +335,7 @@ static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
} else {
/* Don't log too much for fake panic */
if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_fake_panicked) > 1)
- return;
+ goto out;
}
pending = mce_gen_pool_prepare_records();
/* First print corrected ones that are still unlogged */
@@ -367,6 +373,9 @@ static void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
panic(msg);
} else
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Fake kernel panic: %s\n", msg);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
}
/* Support code for software error injection */
@@ -388,10 +397,28 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
return -1;
}
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+ show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+ panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+ while (true)
+ cpu_relax();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
{
- u64 v;
+ DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
@@ -401,21 +428,43 @@ static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
return *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
}
- if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "mce: Unable to read MSR 0x%x!\n", msr);
- /*
- * Return zero in case the access faulted. This should
- * not happen normally but can happen if the CPU does
- * something weird, or if the code is buggy.
- */
- v = 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * RDMSR on MCA MSRs should not fault. If they do, this is very much an
+ * architectural violation and needs to be reported to hw vendor. Panic
+ * the box to not allow any further progress.
+ */
+ asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_fault)
+ : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
+
- return v;
+ return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
+}
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax,
+ regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+ show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+ panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+ while (true)
+ cpu_relax();
+
+ return true;
}
static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
{
+ u32 low, high;
+
if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
@@ -423,7 +472,15 @@ static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
*(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset) = v;
return;
}
- wrmsrl(msr, v);
+
+ low = (u32)v;
+ high = (u32)(v >> 32);
+
+ /* See comment in mce_rdmsrl() */
+ asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_fault)
+ : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
}
/*
@@ -643,7 +700,7 @@ static struct notifier_block mce_default_nb = {
/*
* Read ADDR and MISC registers.
*/
-static void mce_read_aux(struct mce *m, int i)
+static noinstr void mce_read_aux(struct mce *m, int i)
{
if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
m->misc = mce_rdmsrl(msr_ops.misc(i));
@@ -1023,10 +1080,13 @@ static int mce_start(int *no_way_out)
* Synchronize between CPUs after main scanning loop.
* This invokes the bulk of the Monarch processing.
*/
-static int mce_end(int order)
+static noinstr int mce_end(int order)
{
- int ret = -1;
u64 timeout = (u64)mca_cfg.monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Allow instrumentation around external facilities. */
+ instrumentation_begin();
if (!timeout)
goto reset;
@@ -1070,7 +1130,8 @@ static int mce_end(int order)
/*
* Don't reset anything. That's done by the Monarch.
*/
- return 0;
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
}
/*
@@ -1085,6 +1146,10 @@ reset:
* Let others run again.
*/
atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
return ret;
}
@@ -1313,8 +1378,10 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
* When there's any problem use only local no_way_out state.
*/
if (!lmce) {
- if (mce_end(order) < 0)
- no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ if (mce_end(order) < 0) {
+ if (!no_way_out)
+ no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ }
} else {
/*
* If there was a fatal machine check we should have
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
index eb2d41c1816d..e1fda5b19b6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static ssize_t flags_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
char buf[MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE], *__buf;
int err;
- if (cnt > MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE)
+ if (!cnt || cnt > MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, cnt))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
index 43031db429d2..231954fe5b4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -172,4 +172,14 @@ extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m) { return false; };
#endif
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr);
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+ unsigned long error_code,
+ unsigned long fault_addr);
+
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index 87bcdc6dc2f0..0d09eb13743b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
-#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
#include "internal.h"
/*
@@ -40,9 +42,14 @@ static struct severity {
unsigned char context;
unsigned char excp;
unsigned char covered;
+ unsigned char cpu_model;
+ unsigned char cpu_minstepping;
+ unsigned char bank_lo, bank_hi;
char *msg;
} severities[] = {
#define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
+#define BANK_RANGE(l, h) .bank_lo = l, .bank_hi = h
+#define MODEL_STEPPING(m, s) .cpu_model = m, .cpu_minstepping = s
#define KERNEL .context = IN_KERNEL
#define USER .context = IN_USER
#define KERNEL_RECOV .context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
@@ -97,7 +104,6 @@ static struct severity {
KEEP, "Corrected error",
NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
),
-
/*
* known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
*
@@ -113,6 +119,18 @@ static struct severity {
AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
),
+ /*
+ * Quirk for Skylake/Cascade Lake. Patrol scrubber may be configured
+ * to report uncorrected errors using CMCI with a special signature.
+ * UC=0, MSCOD=0x0010, MCACOD=binary(000X 0000 1100 XXXX) reported
+ * in one of the memory controller banks.
+ * Set severity to "AO" for same action as normal patrol scrub error.
+ */
+ MCESEV(
+ AO, "Uncorrected Patrol Scrub Error",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_ADDR|0xffffeff0, MCI_ADDR|0x001000c0),
+ MODEL_STEPPING(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4), BANK_RANGE(13, 18)
+ ),
/* ignore OVER for UCNA */
MCESEV(
@@ -320,6 +338,12 @@ static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_e
continue;
if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
continue;
+ if (s->cpu_model && boot_cpu_data.x86_model != s->cpu_model)
+ continue;
+ if (s->cpu_minstepping && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < s->cpu_minstepping)
+ continue;
+ if (s->bank_lo && (m->bank < s->bank_lo || m->bank > s->bank_hi))
+ continue;
if (msg)
*msg = s->msg;
s->covered = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
index cb0fdcaf1415..c95a27513a30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -626,16 +626,16 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
if (val != 1)
return size;
- tmp_ret = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(bsp, &microcode_pdev->dev, true);
- if (tmp_ret != UCODE_NEW)
- return size;
-
get_online_cpus();
ret = check_online_cpus();
if (ret)
goto put;
+ tmp_ret = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(bsp, &microcode_pdev->dev, true);
+ if (tmp_ret != UCODE_NEW)
+ goto put;
+
mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
ret = microcode_reload_late();
mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
@@ -772,9 +772,9 @@ static struct subsys_interface mc_cpu_interface = {
};
/**
- * mc_bp_resume - Update boot CPU microcode during resume.
+ * microcode_bsp_resume - Update boot CPU microcode during resume.
*/
-static void mc_bp_resume(void)
+void microcode_bsp_resume(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static void mc_bp_resume(void)
}
static struct syscore_ops mc_syscore_ops = {
- .resume = mc_bp_resume,
+ .resume = microcode_bsp_resume,
};
static int mc_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
index ce799cfe9434..b224d4dae2ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -100,53 +100,6 @@ static int has_newer_microcode(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf, int new_rev
return find_matching_signature(mc, csig, cpf);
}
-/*
- * Given CPU signature and a microcode patch, this function finds if the
- * microcode patch has matching family and model with the CPU.
- *
- * %true - if there's a match
- * %false - otherwise
- */
-static bool microcode_matches(struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header,
- unsigned long sig)
-{
- unsigned long total_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
- unsigned long data_size = get_datasize(mc_header);
- struct extended_sigtable *ext_header;
- unsigned int fam_ucode, model_ucode;
- struct extended_signature *ext_sig;
- unsigned int fam, model;
- int ext_sigcount, i;
-
- fam = x86_family(sig);
- model = x86_model(sig);
-
- fam_ucode = x86_family(mc_header->sig);
- model_ucode = x86_model(mc_header->sig);
-
- if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode)
- return true;
-
- /* Look for ext. headers: */
- if (total_size <= data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE)
- return false;
-
- ext_header = (void *) mc_header + data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE;
- ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE;
- ext_sigcount = ext_header->count;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ext_sigcount; i++) {
- fam_ucode = x86_family(ext_sig->sig);
- model_ucode = x86_model(ext_sig->sig);
-
- if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode)
- return true;
-
- ext_sig++;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
{
struct ucode_patch *p;
@@ -164,7 +117,7 @@ static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
return p;
}
-static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
+static void save_microcode_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, void *data, unsigned int size)
{
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr, *mc_saved_hdr;
struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp, *p = NULL;
@@ -210,6 +163,9 @@ static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
if (!p)
return;
+ if (!find_matching_signature(p->data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, uci->cpu_sig.pf))
+ return;
+
/*
* Save for early loading. On 32-bit, that needs to be a physical
* address as the APs are running from physical addresses, before
@@ -344,13 +300,14 @@ scan_microcode(void *data, size_t size, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool save)
size -= mc_size;
- if (!microcode_matches(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig)) {
+ if (!find_matching_signature(data, uci->cpu_sig.sig,
+ uci->cpu_sig.pf)) {
data += mc_size;
continue;
}
if (save) {
- save_microcode_patch(data, mc_size);
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, data, mc_size);
goto next;
}
@@ -483,14 +440,14 @@ static void show_saved_mc(void)
* Save this microcode patch. It will be loaded early when a CPU is
* hot-added or resumes.
*/
-static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size)
+static void save_mc_for_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u8 *mc, unsigned int size)
{
/* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
mutex_lock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
- save_microcode_patch(mc, size);
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, mc, size);
show_saved_mc();
mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
@@ -934,7 +891,7 @@ static enum ucode_state generic_load_microcode(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter)
* permanent memory. So it will be loaded early when a CPU is hot added
* or resumes.
*/
- save_mc_for_early(new_mc, new_mc_size);
+ save_mc_for_early(uci, new_mc, new_mc_size);
pr_debug("CPU%d found a matching microcode update with version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n",
cpu, new_rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
index 1c2f9baf8483..51d95c4b692c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __visible void __irq_entry hv_stimer0_vector_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
if (hv_stimer0_handler)
hv_stimer0_handler();
- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
ack_APIC_irq();
exiting_irq();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
index aa5c064a6a22..4ea906fe1c35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -167,9 +167,6 @@ static u8 mtrr_type_lookup_variable(u64 start, u64 end, u64 *partial_end,
*repeat = 0;
*uniform = 1;
- /* Make end inclusive instead of exclusive */
- end--;
-
prev_match = MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
unsigned short start_state, end_state, inclusive;
@@ -261,6 +258,9 @@ u8 mtrr_type_lookup(u64 start, u64 end, u8 *uniform)
int repeat;
u64 partial_end;
+ /* Make end inclusive instead of exclusive */
+ end--;
+
if (!mtrr_state_set)
return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 87a34b6e06a2..130c3c7f56d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ static void domain_add_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
}
if (r->mon_capable && domain_setup_mon_state(r, d)) {
+ kfree(d->ctrl_val);
+ kfree(d->mbps_val);
kfree(d);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
index 17095435c875..499cb2e727a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
@@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ struct rftype {
* struct mbm_state - status for each MBM counter in each domain
* @chunks: Total data moved (multiply by rdt_group.mon_scale to get bytes)
* @prev_msr Value of IA32_QM_CTR for this RMID last time we read it
- * @chunks_bw Total local data moved. Used for bandwidth calculation
* @prev_bw_msr:Value of previous IA32_QM_CTR for bandwidth counting
* @prev_bw The most recent bandwidth in MBps
* @delta_bw Difference between the current and previous bandwidth
@@ -285,7 +284,6 @@ struct rftype {
struct mbm_state {
u64 chunks;
u64 prev_msr;
- u64 chunks_bw;
u64 prev_bw_msr;
u32 prev_bw;
u32 delta_bw;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index 0cf4f87f6012..008bcb15fe96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -223,15 +223,14 @@ static u64 mbm_overflow_count(u64 prev_msr, u64 cur_msr)
return chunks >>= shift;
}
-static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
+static u64 __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
{
struct mbm_state *m;
u64 chunks, tval;
tval = __rmid_read(rmid, rr->evtid);
if (tval & (RMID_VAL_ERROR | RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL)) {
- rr->val = tval;
- return -EINVAL;
+ return tval;
}
switch (rr->evtid) {
case QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID:
@@ -245,10 +244,10 @@ static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
break;
default:
/*
- * Code would never reach here because
- * an invalid event id would fail the __rmid_read.
+ * Code would never reach here because an invalid
+ * event id would fail the __rmid_read.
*/
- return -EINVAL;
+ return RMID_VAL_ERROR;
}
if (rr->first) {
@@ -280,8 +279,6 @@ static void mbm_bw_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
return;
chunks = mbm_overflow_count(m->prev_bw_msr, tval);
- m->chunks_bw += chunks;
- m->chunks = m->chunks_bw;
cur_bw = (chunks * r->mon_scale) >> 20;
if (m->delta_comp)
@@ -300,23 +297,29 @@ void mon_event_count(void *info)
struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *entry;
struct rmid_read *rr = info;
struct list_head *head;
+ u64 ret_val;
rdtgrp = rr->rgrp;
- if (__mon_event_count(rdtgrp->mon.rmid, rr))
- return;
+ ret_val = __mon_event_count(rdtgrp->mon.rmid, rr);
/*
- * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups.
+ * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups and
+ * add them together. Count events which are read successfully.
+ * Discard the rmid_read's reporting errors.
*/
head = &rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
- if (__mon_event_count(entry->mon.rmid, rr))
- return;
+ if (__mon_event_count(entry->mon.rmid, rr) == 0)
+ ret_val = 0;
}
}
+
+ /* Report error if none of rmid_reads are successful */
+ if (ret_val)
+ rr->val = ret_val;
}
/*
@@ -451,15 +454,14 @@ static void mbm_update(struct rdt_domain *d, int rmid)
}
if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) {
rr.evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID;
+ __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
/*
* Call the MBA software controller only for the
* control groups and when user has enabled
* the software controller explicitly.
*/
- if (!is_mba_sc(NULL))
- __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
- else
+ if (is_mba_sc(NULL))
mbm_bw_count(rmid, &rr);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 54b711bc0607..28f786289fce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -507,85 +507,88 @@ unlock:
return ret ?: nbytes;
}
-struct task_move_callback {
- struct callback_head work;
- struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
-};
-
-static void move_myself(struct callback_head *head)
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_remove - the helper to remove resource group safely
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to remove
+ *
+ * On resource group creation via a mkdir, an extra kernfs_node reference is
+ * taken to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed.
+ *
+ * Drop the extra reference here, then free the rdtgroup structure.
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+static void rdtgroup_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
{
- struct task_move_callback *callback;
- struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
-
- callback = container_of(head, struct task_move_callback, work);
- rdtgrp = callback->rdtgrp;
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
+ kfree(rdtgrp);
+}
+static void _update_task_closid_rmid(void *task)
+{
/*
- * If resource group was deleted before this task work callback
- * was invoked, then assign the task to root group and free the
- * resource group.
+ * If the task is still current on this CPU, update PQR_ASSOC MSR.
+ * Otherwise, the MSR is updated when the task is scheduled in.
*/
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount) &&
- (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED)) {
- current->closid = 0;
- current->rmid = 0;
- kfree(rdtgrp);
- }
-
- preempt_disable();
- /* update PQR_ASSOC MSR to make resource group go into effect */
- resctrl_sched_in();
- preempt_enable();
+ if (task == current)
+ resctrl_sched_in();
+}
- kfree(callback);
+static void update_task_closid_rmid(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && task_curr(t))
+ smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(t), _update_task_closid_rmid, t, 1);
+ else
+ _update_task_closid_rmid(t);
}
static int __rdtgroup_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
{
- struct task_move_callback *callback;
- int ret;
-
- callback = kzalloc(sizeof(*callback), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!callback)
- return -ENOMEM;
- callback->work.func = move_myself;
- callback->rdtgrp = rdtgrp;
+ /* If the task is already in rdtgrp, no need to move the task. */
+ if ((rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP && tsk->closid == rdtgrp->closid &&
+ tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid) ||
+ (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP && tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid &&
+ tsk->closid == rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid))
+ return 0;
/*
- * Take a refcount, so rdtgrp cannot be freed before the
- * callback has been invoked.
+ * Set the task's closid/rmid before the PQR_ASSOC MSR can be
+ * updated by them.
+ *
+ * For ctrl_mon groups, move both closid and rmid.
+ * For monitor groups, can move the tasks only from
+ * their parent CTRL group.
*/
- atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
- ret = task_work_add(tsk, &callback->work, true);
- if (ret) {
- /*
- * Task is exiting. Drop the refcount and free the callback.
- * No need to check the refcount as the group cannot be
- * deleted before the write function unlocks rdtgroup_mutex.
- */
- atomic_dec(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
- kfree(callback);
- rdt_last_cmd_puts("Task exited\n");
- } else {
- /*
- * For ctrl_mon groups move both closid and rmid.
- * For monitor groups, can move the tasks only from
- * their parent CTRL group.
- */
- if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
- tsk->closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
+ tsk->closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+ tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
+ } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid == tsk->closid) {
tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
- } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP) {
- if (rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid == tsk->closid) {
- tsk->rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid;
- } else {
- rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't move task to different control group\n");
- ret = -EINVAL;
- }
+ } else {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't move task to different control group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
- return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the task's closid and rmid are written before determining if
+ * the task is current that will decide if it will be interrupted.
+ */
+ barrier();
+
+ /*
+ * By now, the task's closid and rmid are set. If the task is current
+ * on a CPU, the PQR_ASSOC MSR needs to be updated to make the resource
+ * group go into effect. If the task is not current, the MSR will be
+ * updated when the task is scheduled in.
+ */
+ update_task_closid_rmid(tsk);
+
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -1618,7 +1621,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(struct rdt_resource *r, char *name,
if (IS_ERR(kn_subdir))
return PTR_ERR(kn_subdir);
- kernfs_get(kn_subdir);
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_subdir);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1641,7 +1643,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn)
kn_info = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, "info", parent_kn->mode, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(kn_info))
return PTR_ERR(kn_info);
- kernfs_get(kn_info);
ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn_info, RF_TOP_INFO);
if (ret)
@@ -1662,12 +1663,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn)
goto out_destroy;
}
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn_info);
-
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_info);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -1696,12 +1691,6 @@ mongroup_create_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
if (dest_kn)
*dest_kn = kn;
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
-
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -1928,8 +1917,7 @@ void rdtgroup_kn_unlock(struct kernfs_node *kn)
rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)
rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(rdtgrp);
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
- kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
- kfree(rdtgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
} else {
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
}
@@ -1988,13 +1976,11 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
&kn_mongrp);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_info;
- kernfs_get(kn_mongrp);
ret = mkdir_mondata_all(rdtgroup_default.kn,
&rdtgroup_default, &kn_mondata);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mongrp;
- kernfs_get(kn_mondata);
rdtgroup_default.mon.mon_data_kn = kn_mondata;
}
@@ -2223,7 +2209,7 @@ static void free_all_child_rdtgrp(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
if (atomic_read(&sentry->waitcount) != 0)
sentry->flags = RDT_DELETED;
else
- kfree(sentry);
+ rdtgroup_remove(sentry);
}
}
@@ -2265,7 +2251,7 @@ static void rmdir_all_sub(void)
if (atomic_read(&rdtgrp->waitcount) != 0)
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
else
- kfree(rdtgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
}
/* Notify online CPUs to update per cpu storage and PQR_ASSOC MSR */
update_closid_rmid(cpu_online_mask, &rdtgroup_default);
@@ -2365,11 +2351,6 @@ static int mkdir_mondata_subdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
if (IS_ERR(kn))
return PTR_ERR(kn);
- /*
- * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees
- * that kn is always accessible.
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
if (ret)
goto out_destroy;
@@ -2705,8 +2686,8 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
/*
* kernfs_remove() will drop the reference count on "kn" which
* will free it. But we still need it to stick around for the
- * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn} call below. Take one extra reference
- * here, which will be dropped inside rdtgroup_kn_unlock().
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn) call. Take one extra reference here,
+ * which will be dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_remove().
*/
kernfs_get(kn);
@@ -2747,6 +2728,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
out_idfree:
free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
out_destroy:
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
out_free_rgrp:
kfree(rdtgrp);
@@ -2759,7 +2741,7 @@ static void mkdir_rdt_prepare_clean(struct rdtgroup *rgrp)
{
kernfs_remove(rgrp->kn);
free_rmid(rgrp->mon.rmid);
- kfree(rgrp);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rgrp);
}
/*
@@ -2921,11 +2903,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp,
WARN_ON(list_empty(&prdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list));
list_del(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
- /*
- * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp)
- * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
return 0;
@@ -2937,11 +2914,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn,
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list);
- /*
- * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp)
- * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
- */
- kernfs_get(kn);
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index adf9b71386ef..53004dbd55c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
index ee48c3fc8a65..24da5ee4f022 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@
#define BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax) ((eax) & 0x1f)
#define LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx) ((ebx) & 0xffff)
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
unsigned int __max_die_per_package __read_mostly = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_die_per_package);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Check if given CPUID extended toplogy "leaf" is implemented
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index ff25a2ea271c..0c319d09378d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params)
struct crash_memmap_data cmd;
struct crash_mem *cmem;
- cmem = vzalloc(sizeof(struct crash_mem));
+ cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, 1));
if (!cmem)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c b/arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c
index 2f9ec14be3b1..50225bc0383b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c
@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ static const struct intel_early_ops gen11_early_ops __initconst = {
.stolen_size = gen9_stolen_size,
};
+/* Intel integrated GPUs for which we need to reserve "stolen memory" */
static const struct pci_device_id intel_early_ids[] __initconst = {
INTEL_I830_IDS(&i830_early_ops),
INTEL_I845G_IDS(&i845_early_ops),
@@ -587,6 +588,13 @@ static void __init intel_graphics_quirks(int num, int slot, int func)
u16 device;
int i;
+ /*
+ * Reserve "stolen memory" for an integrated GPU. If we've already
+ * found one, there's nothing to do for other (discrete) GPUs.
+ */
+ if (resource_size(&intel_graphics_stolen_res))
+ return;
+
device = read_pci_config_16(num, slot, func, PCI_DEVICE_ID);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(intel_early_ids); i++) {
@@ -699,7 +707,7 @@ static struct chipset early_qrk[] __initdata = {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3406, PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST,
PCI_BASE_CLASS_BRIDGE, 0, intel_remapping_check },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_CLASS_DISPLAY_VGA, PCI_ANY_ID,
- QFLAG_APPLY_ONCE, intel_graphics_quirks },
+ 0, intel_graphics_quirks },
/*
* HPET on the current version of the Baytrail platform has accuracy
* problems: it will halt in deep idle state - so we disable it.
@@ -710,12 +718,6 @@ static struct chipset early_qrk[] __initdata = {
*/
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x0f00,
PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
- { PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3e20,
- PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
- { PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3ec4,
- PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
- { PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x8a12,
- PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x4331,
PCI_CLASS_NETWORK_OTHER, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, apple_airport_reset},
{}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index cd8839027f66..8c9b202f3e6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ bool irq_fpu_usable(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_fpu_usable);
-void kernel_fpu_begin(void)
+void kernel_fpu_begin_mask(unsigned int kfpu_mask)
{
preempt_disable();
@@ -102,13 +102,14 @@ void kernel_fpu_begin(void)
}
__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state();
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM))
+ /* Put sane initial values into the control registers. */
+ if (likely(kfpu_mask & KFPU_MXCSR) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM))
ldmxcsr(MXCSR_DEFAULT);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
+ if (unlikely(kfpu_mask & KFPU_387) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
asm volatile ("fninit");
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_begin);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_begin_mask);
void kernel_fpu_end(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
index 6ce7e0a23268..b271da0fa219 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
@@ -242,9 +242,9 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(void)
*/
static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void)
{
- char arg[32];
+ char arg[128];
char *argptr = arg;
- int bit;
+ int arglen, res, bit;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387"))
@@ -267,12 +267,26 @@ static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- if (cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg,
- sizeof(arg)) &&
- get_option(&argptr, &bit) &&
- bit >= 0 &&
- bit < NCAPINTS * 32)
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
+ arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (arglen <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Clearing CPUID bits:");
+ do {
+ res = get_option(&argptr, &bit);
+ if (res == 0 || res == 3)
+ break;
+
+ /* If the argument was too long, the last bit may be cut off */
+ if (res == 1 && arglen >= sizeof(arg))
+ break;
+
+ if (bit >= 0 && bit < NCAPINTS * 32) {
+ pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT, x86_cap_flag(bit));
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
+ }
+ } while (res == 2);
+ pr_cont("\n");
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
index d652b939ccfb..68e1fb66e701 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
/*
* A whole standard-format XSAVE buffer is needed:
*/
- if ((pos != 0) || (count < fpu_user_xstate_size))
+ if (pos != 0 || count != fpu_user_xstate_size)
return -EFAULT;
xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index 400a05e1c1c5..ab2f9c2f0683 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -289,13 +289,17 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
return 0;
}
- if (!access_ok(buf, size))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (!access_ok(buf, size)) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
- return fpregs_soft_set(current, NULL,
- 0, sizeof(struct user_i387_ia32_struct),
- NULL, buf) != 0;
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) {
+ ret = fpregs_soft_set(current, NULL, 0,
+ sizeof(struct user_i387_ia32_struct),
+ NULL, buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (use_xsave()) {
struct _fpx_sw_bytes fx_sw_user;
@@ -333,7 +337,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
if (ia32_fxstate) {
ret = __copy_from_user(&env, buf, sizeof(env));
if (ret)
- goto err_out;
+ goto out;
envp = &env;
} else {
/*
@@ -369,7 +373,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
ret = validate_xstate_header(&fpu->state.xsave.header);
}
if (ret)
- goto err_out;
+ goto out;
sanitize_restored_xstate(&fpu->state, envp, xfeatures, fx_only);
@@ -382,7 +386,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
ret = __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.fxsave, buf_fx, state_size);
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
- goto err_out;
+ goto out;
}
sanitize_restored_xstate(&fpu->state, envp, xfeatures, fx_only);
@@ -397,7 +401,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
} else {
ret = __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.fsave, buf_fx, state_size);
if (ret)
- goto err_out;
+ goto out;
fpregs_lock();
ret = copy_kernel_to_fregs_err(&fpu->state.fsave);
@@ -408,7 +412,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
fpregs_unlock();
-err_out:
+out:
if (ret)
fpu__clear(fpu);
return ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 735d1f1bbabc..046782df37a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -399,12 +399,32 @@ static void __init print_xstate_offset_size(void)
}
/*
+ * All supported features have either init state all zeros or are
+ * handled in setup_init_fpu() individually. This is an explicit
+ * feature list and does not use XFEATURE_MASK*SUPPORTED to catch
+ * newly added supported features at build time and make people
+ * actually look at the init state for the new feature.
+ */
+#define XFEATURES_INIT_FPSTATE_HANDLED \
+ (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
+
+/*
* setup the xstate image representing the init state
*/
static void __init setup_init_fpu_buf(void)
{
static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(XCNTXT_MASK != XFEATURES_INIT_FPSTATE_HANDLED);
+
WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu);
on_boot_cpu = 0;
@@ -423,10 +443,22 @@ static void __init setup_init_fpu_buf(void)
copy_kernel_to_xregs_booting(&init_fpstate.xsave);
/*
- * Dump the init state again. This is to identify the init state
- * of any feature which is not represented by all zero's.
+ * All components are now in init state. Read the state back so
+ * that init_fpstate contains all non-zero init state. This only
+ * works with XSAVE, but not with XSAVEOPT and XSAVES because
+ * those use the init optimization which skips writing data for
+ * components in init state.
+ *
+ * XSAVE could be used, but that would require to reshuffle the
+ * data when XSAVES is available because XSAVES uses xstate
+ * compaction. But doing so is a pointless exercise because most
+ * components have an all zeros init state except for the legacy
+ * ones (FP and SSE). Those can be saved with FXSAVE into the
+ * legacy area. Adding new features requires to ensure that init
+ * state is all zeroes or if not to add the necessary handling
+ * here.
*/
- copy_xregs_to_kernel_booting(&init_fpstate.xsave);
+ fxsave(&init_fpstate.fxsave);
}
static int xfeature_uncompacted_offset(int xfeature_nr)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
index 073aab525d80..2cc0303522c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ WEAK(ftrace_stub)
ret
END(ftrace_caller)
-ENTRY(ftrace_regs_caller)
+SYM_CODE_START(ftrace_regs_caller)
/*
* We're here from an mcount/fentry CALL, and the stack frame looks like:
*
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ GLOBAL(ftrace_regs_call)
popl %eax
jmp .Lftrace_ret
+SYM_CODE_END(ftrace_regs_caller)
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
ENTRY(ftrace_graph_caller)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index 2e6a0676c1f4..11a5d5ade52c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ RESERVE_BRK(pagetables, INIT_MAP_SIZE)
* can.
*/
__HEAD
-ENTRY(startup_32)
+SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
movl pa(initial_stack),%ecx
/* test KEEP_SEGMENTS flag to see if the bootloader is asking
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ num_subarch_entries = (. - subarch_entries) / 4
#else
jmp .Ldefault_entry
#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
+SYM_CODE_END(startup_32)
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
index c6f791bc481e..9834d221e390 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/hpet.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
+#include <asm/mwait.h>
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "hpet: " fmt
@@ -806,6 +807,83 @@ static bool __init hpet_counting(void)
return false;
}
+static bool __init mwait_pc10_supported(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, mwait_substates;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT))
+ return false;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF)
+ return false;
+
+ cpuid(CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &mwait_substates);
+
+ return (ecx & CPUID5_ECX_EXTENSIONS_SUPPORTED) &&
+ (ecx & CPUID5_ECX_INTERRUPT_BREAK) &&
+ (mwait_substates & (0xF << 28));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the system supports PC10. If so force disable HPET as that
+ * stops counting in PC10. This check is overbroad as it does not take any
+ * of the following into account:
+ *
+ * - ACPI tables
+ * - Enablement of intel_idle
+ * - Command line arguments which limit intel_idle C-state support
+ *
+ * That's perfectly fine. HPET is a piece of hardware designed by committee
+ * and the only reasons why it is still in use on modern systems is the
+ * fact that it is impossible to reliably query TSC and CPU frequency via
+ * CPUID or firmware.
+ *
+ * If HPET is functional it is useful for calibrating TSC, but this can be
+ * done via PMTIMER as well which seems to be the last remaining timer on
+ * X86/INTEL platforms that has not been completely wreckaged by feature
+ * creep.
+ *
+ * In theory HPET support should be removed altogether, but there are older
+ * systems out there which depend on it because TSC and APIC timer are
+ * dysfunctional in deeper C-states.
+ *
+ * It's only 20 years now that hardware people have been asked to provide
+ * reliable and discoverable facilities which can be used for timekeeping
+ * and per CPU timer interrupts.
+ *
+ * The probability that this problem is going to be solved in the
+ * forseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered
+ * with heuristics to keep up with the ever growing amount of hardware and
+ * firmware trainwrecks. Hopefully some day hardware people will understand
+ * that the approach of "This can be fixed in software" is not sustainable.
+ * Hope dies last...
+ */
+static bool __init hpet_is_pc10_damaged(void)
+{
+ unsigned long long pcfg;
+
+ /* Check whether PC10 substates are supported */
+ if (!mwait_pc10_supported())
+ return false;
+
+ /* Check whether PC10 is enabled in PKG C-state limit */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_PKG_CST_CONFIG_CONTROL, pcfg);
+ if ((pcfg & 0xF) < 8)
+ return false;
+
+ if (hpet_force_user) {
+ pr_warn("HPET force enabled via command line, but dysfunctional in PC10.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("HPET dysfunctional in PC10. Force disabled.\n");
+ boot_hpet_disable = true;
+ return true;
+}
+
/**
* hpet_enable - Try to setup the HPET timer. Returns 1 on success.
*/
@@ -819,6 +897,9 @@ int __init hpet_enable(void)
if (!is_hpet_capable())
return 0;
+ if (hpet_is_pc10_damaged())
+ return 0;
+
hpet_set_mapping();
if (!hpet_virt_address)
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
index 21efee32e2b1..7dfd0185767c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
@@ -295,8 +295,10 @@ void kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(void (*handler)(void))
{
if (handler)
kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_handler = handler;
- else
+ else {
kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_handler = dummy_handler;
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index d2f4e706a428..b8b3b84308ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -210,8 +210,7 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
params->hdr.hardware_subarch = boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch;
/* Copying screen_info will do? */
- memcpy(&params->screen_info, &boot_params.screen_info,
- sizeof(struct screen_info));
+ memcpy(&params->screen_info, &screen_info, sizeof(struct screen_info));
/* Fill in memsize later */
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 62c39baea39e..3700dc94847c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(skip_prefixes);
int can_boost(struct insn *insn, void *addr)
{
kprobe_opcode_t opcode;
+ insn_byte_t prefix;
+ int i;
if (search_exception_tables((unsigned long)addr))
return 0; /* Page fault may occur on this address. */
@@ -169,9 +171,14 @@ int can_boost(struct insn *insn, void *addr)
if (insn->opcode.nbytes != 1)
return 0;
- /* Can't boost Address-size override prefix */
- if (unlikely(inat_is_address_size_prefix(insn->attr)))
- return 0;
+ for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, prefix) {
+ insn_attr_t attr;
+
+ attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(prefix);
+ /* Can't boost Address-size override prefix and CS override prefix */
+ if (prefix == 0x2e || inat_is_address_size_prefix(attr))
+ return 0;
+ }
opcode = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
@@ -196,8 +203,8 @@ int can_boost(struct insn *insn, void *addr)
/* clear and set flags are boostable */
return (opcode == 0xf5 || (0xf7 < opcode && opcode < 0xfe));
default:
- /* CS override prefix and call are not boostable */
- return (opcode != 0x2e && opcode != 0x9a);
+ /* call is not boostable */
+ return opcode != 0x9a;
}
}
@@ -351,6 +358,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real, struct insn *insn)
kernel_insn_init(insn, dest, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
insn_get_length(insn);
+ /* We can not probe force emulate prefixed instruction */
+ if (insn_has_emulate_prefix(insn))
+ return 0;
+
/* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint, failed to recover */
if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
return 0;
@@ -1019,6 +1030,11 @@ int kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
* So clear it by resetting the current kprobe:
*/
regs->flags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+ /*
+ * Since the single step (trap) has been cancelled,
+ * we need to restore BTF here.
+ */
+ restore_btf();
/*
* If the TF flag was set before the kprobe hit,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index e820568ed4d5..f582dda8dd34 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/swait.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
static int kvmapf = 1;
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, apf_reason) __align
DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time) __aligned(64) __visible;
static int has_steal_clock = 0;
+static int has_guest_poll = 0;
/*
* No need for any "IO delay" on KVM
*/
@@ -351,6 +354,14 @@ static void kvm_pv_disable_apf(void)
smp_processor_id());
}
+static void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
+{
+ if (!has_steal_clock)
+ return;
+
+ wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
+}
+
static void kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused)
{
/*
@@ -393,14 +404,6 @@ static u64 kvm_steal_clock(int cpu)
return steal;
}
-void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
-{
- if (!has_steal_clock)
- return;
-
- wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
-}
-
static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) ptr, size);
@@ -428,6 +431,27 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
}
}
+static void kvm_guest_cpu_offline(bool shutdown)
+{
+ kvm_disable_steal_time();
+ if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0);
+ kvm_pv_disable_apf();
+ if (!shutdown)
+ apf_task_wake_all();
+ kvmclock_disable();
+}
+
+static int kvm_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ kvm_guest_cpu_init();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#define KVM_IPI_CLUSTER_SIZE (2 * BITS_PER_LONG)
@@ -464,7 +488,7 @@ static void __send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector)
} else if (apic_id < min && max - apic_id < KVM_IPI_CLUSTER_SIZE) {
ipi_bitmap <<= min - apic_id;
min = apic_id;
- } else if (apic_id < min + KVM_IPI_CLUSTER_SIZE) {
+ } else if (apic_id > min && apic_id < min + KVM_IPI_CLUSTER_SIZE) {
max = apic_id < max ? max : apic_id;
} else {
ret = kvm_hypercall4(KVM_HC_SEND_IPI, (unsigned long)ipi_bitmap,
@@ -547,29 +571,58 @@ static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
kvm_spinlock_init();
}
-static void kvm_guest_cpu_offline(void)
+static int kvm_cpu_down_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
{
- kvm_disable_steal_time();
- if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
- wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0);
- kvm_pv_disable_apf();
- apf_task_wake_all();
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ kvm_guest_cpu_offline(false);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return 0;
}
-static int kvm_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+#endif
+
+static int kvm_suspend(void)
{
- local_irq_disable();
- kvm_guest_cpu_init();
- local_irq_enable();
+ u64 val = 0;
+
+ kvm_guest_cpu_offline(false);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_CPUIDLE_HALTPOLL
+ if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL, val);
+ has_guest_poll = !(val & 1);
+#endif
return 0;
}
-static int kvm_cpu_down_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
+static void kvm_resume(void)
{
- local_irq_disable();
- kvm_guest_cpu_offline();
- local_irq_enable();
- return 0;
+ kvm_cpu_online(raw_smp_processor_id());
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_CPUIDLE_HALTPOLL
+ if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL) && has_guest_poll)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops kvm_syscore_ops = {
+ .suspend = kvm_suspend,
+ .resume = kvm_resume,
+};
+
+/*
+ * After a PV feature is registered, the host will keep writing to the
+ * registered memory location. If the guest happens to shutdown, this memory
+ * won't be valid. In cases like kexec, in which you install a new kernel, this
+ * means a random memory location will be kept being written.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+static void kvm_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ kvm_guest_cpu_offline(true);
+ native_machine_crash_shutdown(regs);
}
#endif
@@ -649,6 +702,12 @@ static void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
kvm_guest_cpu_init();
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+ machine_ops.crash_shutdown = kvm_crash_shutdown;
+#endif
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&kvm_syscore_ops);
+
/*
* Hard lockup detection is enabled by default. Disable it, as guests
* can get false positives too easily, for example if the host is
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index 904494b924c1..d81e34e614e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
-#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/kvmclock.h>
static int kvmclock __initdata = 1;
@@ -51,18 +50,9 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock-vsyscall", parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall);
static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info
hv_clock_boot[HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE] __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock __bss_decrypted;
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *, hv_clock_per_cpu);
static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hvclock_mem;
-
-static inline struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *this_cpu_pvti(void)
-{
- return &this_cpu_read(hv_clock_per_cpu)->pvti;
-}
-
-static inline struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *this_cpu_hvclock(void)
-{
- return this_cpu_read(hv_clock_per_cpu);
-}
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *, hv_clock_per_cpu);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_clock_per_cpu);
/*
* The wallclock is the time of day when we booted. Since then, some time may
@@ -197,28 +187,9 @@ static void kvm_setup_secondary_clock(void)
}
#endif
-/*
- * After the clock is registered, the host will keep writing to the
- * registered memory location. If the guest happens to shutdown, this memory
- * won't be valid. In cases like kexec, in which you install a new kernel, this
- * means a random memory location will be kept being written. So before any
- * kind of shutdown from our side, we unregister the clock by writing anything
- * that does not have the 'enable' bit set in the msr
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
-static void kvm_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- native_write_msr(msr_kvm_system_time, 0, 0);
- kvm_disable_steal_time();
- native_machine_crash_shutdown(regs);
-}
-#endif
-
-static void kvm_shutdown(void)
+void kvmclock_disable(void)
{
native_write_msr(msr_kvm_system_time, 0, 0);
- kvm_disable_steal_time();
- native_machine_shutdown();
}
static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void)
@@ -346,10 +317,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
#endif
x86_platform.save_sched_clock_state = kvm_save_sched_clock_state;
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state = kvm_restore_sched_clock_state;
- machine_ops.shutdown = kvm_shutdown;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- machine_ops.crash_shutdown = kvm_crash_shutdown;
-#endif
kvm_get_preset_lpj();
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
index d5c72cb877b3..77dabedaa9d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs,
*location += sym->st_value;
break;
case R_386_PC32:
+ case R_386_PLT32:
/* Add the value, subtract its position */
*location += sym->st_value - (uint32_t)location;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 54c21d6abd5a..5bb001c0c771 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ fs_initcall(nmi_warning_debugfs);
static void nmi_check_duration(struct nmiaction *action, u64 duration)
{
- u64 whole_msecs = READ_ONCE(action->max_duration);
int remainder_ns, decimal_msecs;
if (duration < nmi_longest_ns || duration < action->max_duration)
@@ -114,12 +113,12 @@ static void nmi_check_duration(struct nmiaction *action, u64 duration)
action->max_duration = duration;
- remainder_ns = do_div(whole_msecs, (1000 * 1000));
+ remainder_ns = do_div(duration, (1000 * 1000));
decimal_msecs = remainder_ns / 1000;
printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
"INFO: NMI handler (%ps) took too long to run: %lld.%03d msecs\n",
- action->handler, whole_msecs, decimal_msecs);
+ action->handler, duration, decimal_msecs);
}
static int nmi_handle(unsigned int type, struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
index b8ceec4974fe..352f876950ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -229,14 +229,12 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
{
struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread,
*next = &next_p->thread;
- struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu;
- struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
- switch_fpu_prepare(prev_fpu, cpu);
+ switch_fpu_prepare(prev_p, cpu);
/*
* Save away %gs. No need to save %fs, as it was saved on the
@@ -292,7 +290,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
this_cpu_write(current_task, next_p);
- switch_fpu_finish(next_fpu);
+ switch_fpu_finish(next_p);
/* Load the Intel cache allocation PQR MSR. */
resctrl_sched_in();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index da3cc3a10d63..633788362906 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -505,15 +505,13 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
{
struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread;
struct thread_struct *next = &next_p->thread;
- struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu;
- struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY) &&
this_cpu_read(irq_count) != -1);
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
- switch_fpu_prepare(prev_fpu, cpu);
+ switch_fpu_prepare(prev_p, cpu);
/* We must save %fs and %gs before load_TLS() because
* %fs and %gs may be cleared by load_TLS().
@@ -565,7 +563,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
this_cpu_write(current_task, next_p);
this_cpu_write(cpu_current_top_of_stack, task_top_of_stack(next_p));
- switch_fpu_finish(next_fpu);
+ switch_fpu_finish(next_p);
/* Reload sp0. */
update_task_stack(next_p);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 762f5c1465a6..fdef27a84d71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -113,17 +113,9 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type)
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
/*
- * Switch back to the initial page table.
+ * Switch to the trampoline page table.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- load_cr3(initial_page_table);
-#else
- write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
-
- /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
- cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
-#endif
+ load_trampoline_pgtable();
/* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -388,10 +380,11 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id reboot_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
},
{ /* Handle problems with rebooting on the OptiPlex 990. */
.callback = set_pci_reboot,
- .ident = "Dell OptiPlex 990",
+ .ident = "Dell OptiPlex 990 BIOS A0x",
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Dell Inc."),
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "OptiPlex 990"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "A0"),
},
},
{ /* Handle problems with rebooting on Dell 300's */
@@ -477,6 +470,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id reboot_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
},
},
+ { /* PCIe Wifi card isn't detected after reboot otherwise */
+ .callback = set_pci_reboot,
+ .ident = "Zotac ZBOX CI327 nano",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "NA"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ZBOX-CI327NANO-GS-01"),
+ },
+ },
+
/* Sony */
{ /* Handle problems with rebooting on Sony VGN-Z540N */
.callback = set_bios_reboot,
@@ -538,29 +540,20 @@ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
local_irq_disable();
/*
- * We need to disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise
- * we risk hanging up the machine, because the CPU ignore INIT
- * signals when VMX is enabled.
- *
- * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent
- * state, so we use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable
- * VMX and halt.
+ * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
+ * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
*
- * For safety, we will avoid running the nmi_shootdown_cpus()
- * stuff unnecessarily, but we don't have a way to check
- * if other CPUs have VMX enabled. So we will call it only if the
- * CPU we are running on has VMX enabled.
+ * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
+ * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
*
- * We will miss cases where VMX is not enabled on all CPUs. This
- * shouldn't do much harm because KVM always enable VMX on all
- * CPUs anyway. But we can miss it on the small window where KVM
- * is still enabling VMX.
+ * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
+ * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
*/
- if (cpu_has_vmx() && cpu_vmx_enabled()) {
- /* Disable VMX on this CPU. */
- cpu_vmxoff();
+ if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
+ /* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
+ __cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
- /* Halt and disable VMX on the other CPUs */
+ /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 77ea96b794bd..366875a828b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
+ /* Look for ACPI tables and reserve memory occupied by them. */
+ acpi_boot_table_init();
vsmp_init();
@@ -1203,11 +1205,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
early_platform_quirks();
- /*
- * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
- */
- acpi_boot_table_init();
-
early_acpi_boot_init();
initmem_init();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 8eb7193e158d..026ce06a24c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -241,10 +241,11 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
void __user **fpstate)
{
/* Default to using normal stack */
+ bool nested_altstack = on_sig_stack(regs->sp);
+ bool entering_altstack = false;
unsigned long math_size = 0;
unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
unsigned long buf_fx = 0;
- int onsigstack = on_sig_stack(sp);
int ret;
/* redzone */
@@ -253,15 +254,23 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
/* This is the X/Open sanctioned signal stack switching. */
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_ONSTACK) {
- if (sas_ss_flags(sp) == 0)
+ /*
+ * This checks nested_altstack via sas_ss_flags(). Sensible
+ * programs use SS_AUTODISARM, which disables that check, and
+ * programs that don't use SS_AUTODISARM get compatible.
+ */
+ if (sas_ss_flags(sp) == 0) {
sp = current->sas_ss_sp + current->sas_ss_size;
+ entering_altstack = true;
+ }
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) &&
- !onsigstack &&
+ !nested_altstack &&
regs->ss != __USER_DS &&
!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) &&
ka->sa.sa_restorer) {
/* This is the legacy signal stack switching. */
sp = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ entering_altstack = true;
}
sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32),
@@ -274,8 +283,15 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
* If we are on the alternate signal stack and would overflow it, don't.
* Return an always-bogus address instead so we will die with SIGSEGV.
*/
- if (onsigstack && !likely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
+ if (unlikely((nested_altstack || entering_altstack) &&
+ !__on_sig_stack(sp))) {
+
+ if (show_unhandled_signals && printk_ratelimit())
+ pr_info("%s[%d] overflowed sigaltstack\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+
return (void __user *)-1L;
+ }
/* save i387 and extended state */
ret = copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);
@@ -770,30 +786,8 @@ handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- /*
- * This function is fundamentally broken as currently
- * implemented.
- *
- * The idea is that we want to trigger a call to the
- * restart_block() syscall and that we want in_ia32_syscall(),
- * in_x32_syscall(), etc. to match whatever they were in the
- * syscall being restarted. We assume that the syscall
- * instruction at (regs->ip - 2) matches whatever syscall
- * instruction we used to enter in the first place.
- *
- * The problem is that we can get here when ptrace pokes
- * syscall-like values into regs even if we're not in a syscall
- * at all.
- *
- * For now, we maintain historical behavior and guess based on
- * stored state. We could do better by saving the actual
- * syscall arch in restart_block or (with caveats on x32) by
- * checking if regs->ip points to 'int $0x80'. The current
- * behavior is incorrect if a tracer has a different bitness
- * than the tracee.
- */
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
- if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
+ if (current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT_RESTART)
return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c
index 60d2c3798ba2..2f97d1a1032f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c
@@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on)
*
* NOTE: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is only safe if
* task is current or it can't be running, otherwise we can race
- * with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced() but
- * PTRACE_KILL is not safe.
+ * with __switch_to_xtra(). We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced().
*/
local_irq_disable();
debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
index f7476ce23b6e..42e31358a9d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
@@ -70,9 +70,6 @@ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
if (*str == 0)
return 1;
- if (*str == '=')
- str++;
-
if (!strcmp(str, "32"))
va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32;
else if (!strcmp(str, "64"))
@@ -82,11 +79,11 @@ static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64;
else
- return 0;
+ pr_warn("invalid option value: 'align_va_addr=%s'\n", str);
return 1;
}
-__setup("align_va_addr", control_va_addr_alignment);
+__setup("align_va_addr=", control_va_addr_alignment);
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
index a49fe1dcb47e..bded81591ad9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -512,9 +512,6 @@ int tboot_force_iommu(void)
if (!tboot_enabled())
return 0;
- if (intel_iommu_tboot_noforce)
- return 1;
-
if (no_iommu || swiotlb || dmar_disabled)
pr_warning("Forcing Intel-IOMMU to enabled\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index 7e322e2daaf5..fe4200b89582 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -1162,6 +1162,12 @@ void mark_tsc_unstable(char *reason)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mark_tsc_unstable);
+static void __init tsc_disable_clocksource_watchdog(void)
+{
+ clocksource_tsc_early.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY;
+ clocksource_tsc.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY;
+}
+
static void __init check_system_tsc_reliable(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_MGEODEGX1) || defined(CONFIG_MGEODE_LX) || defined(CONFIG_X86_GENERIC)
@@ -1178,6 +1184,23 @@ static void __init check_system_tsc_reliable(void)
#endif
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE))
tsc_clocksource_reliable = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable the clocksource watchdog when the system has:
+ * - TSC running at constant frequency
+ * - TSC which does not stop in C-States
+ * - the TSC_ADJUST register which allows to detect even minimal
+ * modifications
+ * - not more than two sockets. As the number of sockets cannot be
+ * evaluated at the early boot stage where this has to be
+ * invoked, check the number of online memory nodes as a
+ * fallback solution which is an reasonable estimate.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST) &&
+ nr_online_nodes <= 2)
+ tsc_disable_clocksource_watchdog();
}
/*
@@ -1369,9 +1392,6 @@ static int __init init_tsc_clocksource(void)
if (tsc_unstable)
goto unreg;
- if (tsc_clocksource_reliable || no_tsc_watchdog)
- clocksource_tsc.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY;
-
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3))
clocksource_tsc.flags |= CLOCK_SOURCE_SUSPEND_NONSTOP;
@@ -1506,7 +1526,7 @@ void __init tsc_init(void)
}
if (tsc_clocksource_reliable || no_tsc_watchdog)
- clocksource_tsc_early.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY;
+ tsc_disable_clocksource_watchdog();
clocksource_register_khz(&clocksource_tsc_early, tsc_khz);
detect_art();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c
index ec534f978867..59b114306300 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct tsc_adjust {
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tsc_adjust, tsc_adjust);
+static struct timer_list tsc_sync_check_timer;
/*
* TSC's on different sockets may be reset asynchronously.
@@ -77,6 +78,46 @@ void tsc_verify_tsc_adjust(bool resume)
}
}
+/*
+ * Normally the tsc_sync will be checked every time system enters idle
+ * state, but there is still caveat that a system won't enter idle,
+ * either because it's too busy or configured purposely to not enter
+ * idle.
+ *
+ * So setup a periodic timer (every 10 minutes) to make sure the check
+ * is always on.
+ */
+
+#define SYNC_CHECK_INTERVAL (HZ * 600)
+
+static void tsc_sync_check_timer_fn(struct timer_list *unused)
+{
+ int next_cpu;
+
+ tsc_verify_tsc_adjust(false);
+
+ /* Run the check for all onlined CPUs in turn */
+ next_cpu = cpumask_next(raw_smp_processor_id(), cpu_online_mask);
+ if (next_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+ next_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
+
+ tsc_sync_check_timer.expires += SYNC_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ add_timer_on(&tsc_sync_check_timer, next_cpu);
+}
+
+static int __init start_sync_check_timer(void)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST) || tsc_clocksource_reliable)
+ return 0;
+
+ timer_setup(&tsc_sync_check_timer, tsc_sync_check_timer_fn, 0);
+ tsc_sync_check_timer.expires = jiffies + SYNC_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ add_timer(&tsc_sync_check_timer);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(start_sync_check_timer);
+
static void tsc_sanitize_first_cpu(struct tsc_adjust *cur, s64 bootval,
unsigned int cpu, bool bootcpu)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index 187a86e0e753..b934f9f68a16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -311,19 +311,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unwind_get_return_address);
unsigned long *unwind_get_return_address_ptr(struct unwind_state *state)
{
- struct task_struct *task = state->task;
-
if (unwind_done(state))
return NULL;
if (state->regs)
return &state->regs->ip;
- if (task != current && state->sp == task->thread.sp) {
- struct inactive_task_frame *frame = (void *)task->thread.sp;
- return &frame->ret_addr;
- }
-
if (state->sp)
return (unsigned long *)state->sp - 1;
@@ -364,8 +357,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr,
if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, sizeof(struct pt_regs)))
return false;
- *ip = regs->ip;
- *sp = regs->sp;
+ *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip);
+ *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp);
return true;
}
@@ -377,8 +370,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_iret_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr
if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, IRET_FRAME_SIZE))
return false;
- *ip = regs->ip;
- *sp = regs->sp;
+ *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip);
+ *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp);
return true;
}
@@ -399,12 +392,12 @@ static bool get_reg(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned int reg_off,
return false;
if (state->full_regs) {
- *val = ((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg];
+ *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg]);
return true;
}
if (state->prev_regs) {
- *val = ((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg];
+ *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg]);
return true;
}
@@ -653,7 +646,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
} else {
struct inactive_task_frame *frame = (void *)task->thread.sp;
- state->sp = task->thread.sp;
+ state->sp = task->thread.sp + sizeof(*frame);
state->bp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(frame->bp);
state->ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(frame->ret_addr);
state->signal = (void *)state->ip == ret_from_fork;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 8cd745ef8c7b..fae5b00cbccf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -255,12 +255,13 @@ static volatile u32 good_2byte_insns[256 / 32] = {
static bool is_prefix_bad(struct insn *insn)
{
+ insn_byte_t p;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
+ for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) {
insn_attr_t attr;
- attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn->prefixes.bytes[i]);
+ attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(p);
switch (attr) {
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_ES):
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_CS):
@@ -715,6 +716,7 @@ static const struct uprobe_xol_ops push_xol_ops = {
static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn)
{
u8 opc1 = OPCODE1(insn);
+ insn_byte_t p;
int i;
switch (opc1) {
@@ -746,8 +748,8 @@ static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn)
* Intel and AMD behavior differ in 64-bit mode: Intel ignores 66 prefix.
* No one uses these insns, reject any branch insns with such prefix.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
- if (insn->prefixes.bytes[i] == 0x66)
+ for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) {
+ if (p == 0x66)
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 6fa946f983c9..62c7f771a7cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -592,6 +592,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
union cpuid10_eax eax;
union cpuid10_edx edx;
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
+ entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(&cap);
/*
@@ -745,8 +750,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
unsigned virt_as = max((entry->eax >> 8) & 0xff, 48U);
unsigned phys_as = entry->eax & 0xff;
- if (!g_phys_as)
+ /*
+ * Use bare metal's MAXPHADDR if the CPU doesn't report guest
+ * MAXPHYADDR separately, or if TDP (NPT) is disabled, as the
+ * guest version "applies only to guests using nested paging".
+ */
+ if (!g_phys_as || !tdp_enabled)
g_phys_as = phys_as;
+
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
entry->edx = 0;
entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index d78a61408243..7dec43b2c420 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -154,6 +154,20 @@ static inline int guest_cpuid_stepping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return x86_stepping(best->eax);
}
+static inline bool guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) ||
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) ||
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD));
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB));
+}
+
static inline bool supports_cpuid_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index cc7823e7ef96..ea48a2fb1677 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -1714,11 +1714,6 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
goto exception;
}
- if (!seg_desc.p) {
- err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
- goto exception;
- }
-
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
switch (seg) {
@@ -1758,6 +1753,10 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
+ if (!seg_desc.p) {
+ err_vec = NP_VECTOR;
+ goto exception;
+ }
old_desc = seg_desc;
seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
@@ -1782,6 +1781,11 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
break;
}
+ if (!seg_desc.p) {
+ err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
+ goto exception;
+ }
+
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
@@ -2890,6 +2894,8 @@ static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = (efer & EFER_LMA) ? msr_data :
(u32)msr_data;
+ if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+ ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -3617,7 +3623,7 @@ static int em_rdpid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
u64 tsc_aux = 0;
if (ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_TSC_AUX, &tsc_aux))
- return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+ return emulate_ud(ctxt);
ctxt->dst.val = tsc_aux;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -4050,6 +4056,12 @@ static int em_clflush(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
+static int em_clflushopt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ /* emulating clflushopt regardless of cpuid */
+ return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
static int em_movsxd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.val = (s32) ctxt->src.val;
@@ -4592,7 +4604,7 @@ static const struct opcode group11[] = {
};
static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_ae_7 = {
- I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), N, N, N,
+ I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflushopt), N, N,
};
static const struct group_dual group15 = { {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 26408434b9bc..ca66459a2e89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = synic_to_vcpu(synic);
int ret;
- if (!synic->active && !host)
+ if (!synic->active && (!host || data))
return 1;
trace_kvm_hv_synic_set_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id, msr, data, host);
@@ -251,6 +251,9 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
case HV_X64_MSR_EOM: {
int i;
+ if (!synic->active)
+ break;
+
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++)
kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu, i);
break;
@@ -514,6 +517,11 @@ static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config,
{
union hv_stimer_config new_config = {.as_uint64 = config},
old_config = {.as_uint64 = stimer->config.as_uint64};
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+ struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu);
+
+ if (!synic->active && (!host || config))
+ return 1;
trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_config(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
stimer->index, config, host);
@@ -533,6 +541,12 @@ static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config,
static int stimer_set_count(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 count,
bool host)
{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+ struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu);
+
+ if (!synic->active && (!host || count))
+ return 1;
+
trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_count(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
stimer->index, count, host);
@@ -1501,11 +1515,13 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *current_vcpu, u64 ingpa, u64 outgpa,
all_cpus = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format == HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL;
+ if (all_cpus)
+ goto check_and_send_ipi;
+
if (!sparse_banks_len)
goto ret_success;
- if (!all_cpus &&
- kvm_read_guest(kvm,
+ if (kvm_read_guest(kvm,
ingpa + offsetof(struct hv_send_ipi_ex,
vp_set.bank_contents),
sparse_banks,
@@ -1513,6 +1529,7 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *current_vcpu, u64 ingpa, u64 outgpa,
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
}
+check_and_send_ipi:
if ((vector < HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR) || (vector > HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR))
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
index e330e7d125f7..896db1aa77e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
@@ -40,29 +40,10 @@ static int pending_userspace_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
* check if there is pending interrupt from
* non-APIC source without intack.
*/
-static int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
-{
- u8 accept = kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(v);
-
- if (accept) {
- if (irqchip_split(v->kvm))
- return pending_userspace_extint(v);
- else
- return v->kvm->arch.vpic->output;
- } else
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there is injectable interrupt:
- * when virtual interrupt delivery enabled,
- * interrupt from apic will handled by hardware,
- * we don't need to check it here.
- */
-int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
/*
- * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt that it's
+ * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt whose
* side-effects have already been applied (e.g. bit from IRR
* already moved to ISR). Therefore, it is incorrect to rely
* on interrupt.injected to know if there is a pending
@@ -75,6 +56,23 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
return v->arch.interrupt.injected;
+ if (!kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(v))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (irqchip_split(v->kvm))
+ return pending_userspace_extint(v);
+ else
+ return v->kvm->arch.vpic->output;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there is injectable interrupt:
+ * when virtual interrupt delivery enabled,
+ * interrupt from apic will handled by hardware,
+ * we don't need to check it here.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
return 1;
@@ -90,20 +88,6 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
*/
int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
- /*
- * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt that it's
- * side-effects have already been applied (e.g. bit from IRR
- * already moved to ISR). Therefore, it is incorrect to rely
- * on interrupt.injected to know if there is a pending
- * interrupt in the user-mode LAPIC.
- * This leads to nVMX/nSVM not be able to distinguish
- * if it should exit from L2 to L1 on EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT on
- * pending interrupt or should re-inject an injected
- * interrupt.
- */
- if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
- return v->arch.interrupt.injected;
-
if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
return 1;
@@ -117,16 +101,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt);
*/
static int kvm_cpu_get_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
- if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) {
- if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) {
- int vector = v->arch.pending_external_vector;
-
- v->arch.pending_external_vector = -1;
- return vector;
- } else
- return kvm_pic_read_irq(v->kvm); /* PIC */
- } else
+ if (!kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) {
+ WARN_ON(!lapic_in_kernel(v));
return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
+ return v->arch.interrupt.nr;
+
+ if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) {
+ int vector = v->arch.pending_external_vector;
+
+ v->arch.pending_external_vector = -1;
+ return vector;
+ } else
+ return kvm_pic_read_irq(v->kvm); /* PIC */
}
/*
@@ -134,13 +123,7 @@ static int kvm_cpu_get_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
*/
int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
- int vector;
-
- if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
- return v->arch.interrupt.nr;
-
- vector = kvm_cpu_get_extint(v);
-
+ int vector = kvm_cpu_get_extint(v);
if (vector != -1)
return vector; /* PIC */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 9f793c9649cd..3696b4de9d99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static inline u32 kvm_x2apic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
bool kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return pi_inject_timer && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu);
+ return pi_inject_timer && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) &&
+ (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt);
@@ -1332,6 +1333,9 @@ int kvm_lapic_reg_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 offset, int len,
if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
valid_reg_mask |= APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ARBPRI);
+ if (alignment + len > 4)
+ return 1;
+
if (offset > 0x3f0 || !(valid_reg_mask & APIC_REG_MASK(offset)))
return 1;
@@ -2096,10 +2100,7 @@ void kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
void kvm_lapic_set_tpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8)
{
- struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
-
- apic_set_tpr(apic, ((cr8 & 0x0f) << 4)
- | (kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI) & 4));
+ apic_set_tpr(vcpu->arch.apic, (cr8 & 0x0f) << 4);
}
u64 kvm_lapic_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -2330,7 +2331,7 @@ int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u32 ppr;
- if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic))
+ if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
return -1;
__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index bb743f956c23..015da62e4ad7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -407,11 +407,11 @@ static inline bool is_access_track_spte(u64 spte)
}
/*
- * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 19 bit subset of
+ * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 18 bit subset of
* the memslots generation and is derived as follows:
*
* Bits 0-8 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 3-11
- * Bits 9-18 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 52-61
+ * Bits 9-17 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 54-62
*
* The KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS flag is intentionally not included in
* the MMIO generation number, as doing so would require stealing a bit from
@@ -420,18 +420,29 @@ static inline bool is_access_track_spte(u64 spte)
* requires a full MMU zap). The flag is instead explicitly queried when
* checking for MMIO spte cache hits.
*/
-#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(17, 0)
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START 3
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END 11
-#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END, \
- MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START)
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START PT64_SECOND_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END 62
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END, \
+ MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START)
#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END, \
MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START + 1)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START + 1)
+
+/* remember to adjust the comment above as well if you change these */
+static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 9 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 9);
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START - 0)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS)
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
+
static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
{
u64 mask;
@@ -439,8 +450,8 @@ static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
BUILD_BUG_ON((MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) & SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK);
- mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
- mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
+ mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
+ mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
return mask;
}
@@ -448,8 +459,8 @@ static u64 get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte)
{
u64 gen;
- gen = (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START;
- gen |= (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START;
+ gen = (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT;
+ gen |= (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT;
return gen;
}
@@ -2132,7 +2143,7 @@ static int is_empty_shadow_page(u64 *spt)
* aggregate version in order to make the slab shrinker
* faster
*/
-static inline void kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long nr)
+static inline void kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, long nr)
{
kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages += nr;
percpu_counter_add(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages, nr);
@@ -2232,13 +2243,6 @@ static void nonpaging_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root)
{
}
-static void nonpaging_update_pte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte,
- const void *pte)
-{
- WARN_ON(1);
-}
-
#define KVM_PAGE_ARRAY_NR 16
struct kvm_mmu_pages {
@@ -4345,7 +4349,6 @@ static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
context->gva_to_gpa = nonpaging_gva_to_gpa;
context->sync_page = nonpaging_sync_page;
context->invlpg = nonpaging_invlpg;
- context->update_pte = nonpaging_update_pte;
context->root_level = 0;
context->shadow_root_level = PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
context->direct_map = true;
@@ -4663,7 +4666,15 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
void
reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
- bool uses_nx = context->nx ||
+ /*
+ * KVM uses NX when TDP is disabled to handle a variety of scenarios,
+ * notably for huge SPTEs if iTLB multi-hit mitigation is enabled and
+ * to generate correct permissions for CR0.WP=0/CR4.SMEP=1/EFER.NX=0.
+ * The iTLB multi-hit workaround can be toggled at any time, so assume
+ * NX can be used by any non-nested shadow MMU to avoid having to reset
+ * MMU contexts. Note, KVM forces EFER.NX=1 when TDP is disabled.
+ */
+ bool uses_nx = context->nx || !tdp_enabled ||
context->mmu_role.base.smep_andnot_wp;
struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
int i;
@@ -4924,7 +4935,6 @@ static void paging64_init_context_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa;
context->sync_page = paging64_sync_page;
context->invlpg = paging64_invlpg;
- context->update_pte = paging64_update_pte;
context->shadow_root_level = level;
context->direct_map = false;
}
@@ -4953,7 +4963,6 @@ static void paging32_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa;
context->sync_page = paging32_sync_page;
context->invlpg = paging32_invlpg;
- context->update_pte = paging32_update_pte;
context->shadow_root_level = PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
context->direct_map = false;
}
@@ -5028,7 +5037,6 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
context->page_fault = tdp_page_fault;
context->sync_page = nonpaging_sync_page;
context->invlpg = nonpaging_invlpg;
- context->update_pte = nonpaging_update_pte;
context->shadow_root_level = kvm_x86_ops->get_tdp_level(vcpu);
context->direct_map = true;
context->set_cr3 = kvm_x86_ops->set_tdp_cr3;
@@ -5161,7 +5169,6 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
context->gva_to_gpa = ept_gva_to_gpa;
context->sync_page = ept_sync_page;
context->invlpg = ept_invlpg;
- context->update_pte = ept_update_pte;
context->root_level = PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
context->direct_map = false;
context->mmu_role.as_u64 = new_role.as_u64;
@@ -5301,19 +5308,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_unload);
-static void mmu_pte_write_new_pte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte,
- const void *new)
-{
- if (sp->role.level != PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL) {
- ++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pde_zapped;
- return;
- }
-
- ++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_updated;
- vcpu->arch.mmu->update_pte(vcpu, sp, spte, new);
-}
-
static bool need_remote_flush(u64 old, u64 new)
{
if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old))
@@ -5479,14 +5473,10 @@ static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
local_flush = true;
while (npte--) {
- u32 base_role = vcpu->arch.mmu->mmu_role.base.word;
-
entry = *spte;
mmu_page_zap_pte(vcpu->kvm, sp, spte);
- if (gentry &&
- !((sp->role.word ^ base_role)
- & mmu_base_role_mask.word) && rmap_can_add(vcpu))
- mmu_pte_write_new_pte(vcpu, sp, spte, &gentry);
+ if (gentry && sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K)
+ ++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pde_zapped;
if (need_remote_flush(entry, *spte))
remote_flush = true;
++spte;
@@ -5831,6 +5821,7 @@ static void kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *node;
int nr_zapped, batch = 0;
+ bool unstable;
restart:
list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(sp, node,
@@ -5863,11 +5854,12 @@ restart:
goto restart;
}
- if (__kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp,
- &kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages, &nr_zapped)) {
- batch += nr_zapped;
+ unstable = __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp,
+ &kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages, &nr_zapped);
+ batch += nr_zapped;
+
+ if (unstable)
goto restart;
- }
}
/*
@@ -6453,6 +6445,7 @@ static void kvm_recover_nx_lpages(struct kvm *kvm)
cond_resched_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
}
}
+ kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, rcu_idx);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 6f2208cf30df..ea9945a05b83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e)
if (e < s)
return 0;
- return ((1ULL << (e - s + 1)) - 1) << s;
+ return ((2ULL << (e - s)) - 1) << s;
}
void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask, u64 mmio_value, u64 access_mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
index a20fc1ba607f..1a1d2b5e7b35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -34,9 +34,8 @@
#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL
- #define CMPXCHG cmpxchg
+ #define CMPXCHG "cmpxchgq"
#else
- #define CMPXCHG cmpxchg64
#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 2
#endif
#elif PTTYPE == 32
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@
#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT PT_DIRTY_SHIFT
#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT
#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true
- #define CMPXCHG cmpxchg
+ #define CMPXCHG "cmpxchgl"
#elif PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
#define pt_element_t u64
#define guest_walker guest_walkerEPT
@@ -65,8 +64,10 @@
#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT 9
#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT 8
#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) ((mmu)->ept_ad)
- #define CMPXCHG cmpxchg64
#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 4
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ #define CMPXCHG "cmpxchgq"
+ #endif
#else
#error Invalid PTTYPE value
#endif
@@ -90,8 +91,8 @@ struct guest_walker {
gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
- unsigned pt_access;
- unsigned pte_access;
+ unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+ unsigned int pte_access;
gfn_t gfn;
struct x86_exception fault;
};
@@ -132,43 +133,39 @@ static int FNAME(cmpxchg_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
pt_element_t __user *ptep_user, unsigned index,
pt_element_t orig_pte, pt_element_t new_pte)
{
- int npages;
- pt_element_t ret;
- pt_element_t *table;
- struct page *page;
-
- npages = get_user_pages_fast((unsigned long)ptep_user, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
- if (likely(npages == 1)) {
- table = kmap_atomic(page);
- ret = CMPXCHG(&table[index], orig_pte, new_pte);
- kunmap_atomic(table);
-
- kvm_release_page_dirty(page);
- } else {
- struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)ptep_user & PAGE_MASK;
- unsigned long pfn;
- unsigned long paddr;
-
- down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = find_vma_intersection(current->mm, vaddr, vaddr + PAGE_SIZE);
- if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP)) {
- up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- pfn = ((vaddr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
- paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
- table = memremap(paddr, PAGE_SIZE, MEMREMAP_WB);
- if (!table) {
- up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- ret = CMPXCHG(&table[index], orig_pte, new_pte);
- memunmap(table);
- up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
- }
+ int r = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!user_access_begin(ptep_user, sizeof(pt_element_t)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+#ifdef CMPXCHG
+ asm volatile("1:" LOCK_PREFIX CMPXCHG " %[new], %[ptr]\n"
+ "mov $0, %[r]\n"
+ "setnz %b[r]\n"
+ "2:"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 2b)
+ : [ptr] "+m" (*ptep_user),
+ [old] "+a" (orig_pte),
+ [r] "+q" (r)
+ : [new] "r" (new_pte)
+ : "memory");
+#else
+ asm volatile("1:" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg8b %[ptr]\n"
+ "movl $0, %[r]\n"
+ "jz 2f\n"
+ "incl %[r]\n"
+ "2:"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 2b)
+ : [ptr] "+m" (*ptep_user),
+ [old] "+A" (orig_pte),
+ [r] "+rm" (r)
+ : [new_lo] "b" ((u32)new_pte),
+ [new_hi] "c" ((u32)(new_pte >> 32))
+ : "memory");
+#endif
- return (ret != orig_pte);
+ user_access_end();
+ return r;
}
static bool FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -406,13 +403,15 @@ retry_walk:
}
walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
+
+ /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */
+ walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
} while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte));
pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte);
accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0;
/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */
- walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access);
if (unlikely(errcode))
@@ -451,7 +450,8 @@ retry_walk:
}
pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n",
- __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access);
+ __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access,
+ walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]);
return 1;
error:
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr,
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
- unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access;
+ unsigned int direct_access, access;
int top_level, ret;
gfn_t gfn, base_gfn;
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr,
sp = NULL;
if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) {
table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2];
+ access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2];
sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1,
false, access);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
index 46875bbd0419..32561431acde 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -143,7 +143,6 @@ static void pmc_reprogram_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u32 type,
void reprogram_gp_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 eventsel)
{
unsigned config, type = PERF_TYPE_RAW;
- u8 event_select, unit_mask;
struct kvm *kvm = pmc->vcpu->kvm;
struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *filter;
int i;
@@ -175,23 +174,18 @@ void reprogram_gp_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 eventsel)
if (!allow_event)
return;
- event_select = eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT;
- unit_mask = (eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
-
if (!(eventsel & (ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EDGE |
ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INV |
ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK |
HSW_IN_TX |
HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED))) {
- config = kvm_x86_ops->pmu_ops->find_arch_event(pmc_to_pmu(pmc),
- event_select,
- unit_mask);
+ config = kvm_x86_ops->pmu_ops->pmc_perf_hw_id(pmc);
if (config != PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX)
type = PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE;
}
if (type == PERF_TYPE_RAW)
- config = eventsel & X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK;
+ config = eventsel & AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK;
pmc_reprogram_counter(pmc, type, config,
!(eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
index 3fc98afd72a8..b63859e340e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping {
};
struct kvm_pmu_ops {
- unsigned (*find_arch_event)(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u8 event_select,
- u8 unit_mask);
+ unsigned int (*pmc_perf_hw_id)(struct kvm_pmc *pmc);
unsigned (*find_fixed_event)(int idx);
bool (*pmc_is_enabled)(struct kvm_pmc *pmc);
struct kvm_pmc *(*pmc_idx_to_pmc)(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_amd.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_amd.c
index c8388389a3b0..799b9a3144e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_amd.c
@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping amd_event_mapping[] = {
[7] = { 0xd1, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND },
};
+/* duplicated from amd_f17h_perfmon_event_map. */
+static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping amd_f17h_event_mapping[] = {
+ [0] = { 0x76, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES },
+ [1] = { 0xc0, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS },
+ [2] = { 0x60, 0xff, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_REFERENCES },
+ [3] = { 0x64, 0x09, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MISSES },
+ [4] = { 0xc2, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS },
+ [5] = { 0xc3, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_MISSES },
+ [6] = { 0x87, 0x02, PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_FRONTEND },
+ [7] = { 0x87, 0x01, PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND },
+};
+
+/* amd_pmc_perf_hw_id depends on these being the same size */
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(amd_event_mapping) ==
+ ARRAY_SIZE(amd_f17h_event_mapping));
+
static unsigned int get_msr_base(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, enum pmu_type type)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = pmu_to_vcpu(pmu);
@@ -126,21 +142,27 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_gp_pmc_amd(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr,
return &pmu->gp_counters[msr_to_index(msr)];
}
-static unsigned amd_find_arch_event(struct kvm_pmu *pmu,
- u8 event_select,
- u8 unit_mask)
+static unsigned int amd_pmc_perf_hw_id(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
{
+ struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping *event_mapping;
+ u8 event_select = pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+ u8 unit_mask = (pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
int i;
+ if (guest_cpuid_family(pmc->vcpu) >= 0x17)
+ event_mapping = amd_f17h_event_mapping;
+ else
+ event_mapping = amd_event_mapping;
+
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(amd_event_mapping); i++)
- if (amd_event_mapping[i].eventsel == event_select
- && amd_event_mapping[i].unit_mask == unit_mask)
+ if (event_mapping[i].eventsel == event_select
+ && event_mapping[i].unit_mask == unit_mask)
break;
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(amd_event_mapping))
return PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX;
- return amd_event_mapping[i].event_type;
+ return event_mapping[i].event_type;
}
/* return PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX as AMD doesn't have fixed events */
@@ -245,12 +267,10 @@ static int amd_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
/* MSR_EVNTSELn */
pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL);
if (pmc) {
- if (data == pmc->eventsel)
- return 0;
- if (!(data & pmu->reserved_bits)) {
+ data &= ~pmu->reserved_bits;
+ if (data != pmc->eventsel)
reprogram_gp_counter(pmc, data);
- return 0;
- }
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -266,7 +286,7 @@ static void amd_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS;
pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP] = ((u64)1 << 48) - 1;
- pmu->reserved_bits = 0xffffffff00200000ull;
+ pmu->reserved_bits = 0xfffffff000280000ull;
pmu->version = 1;
/* not applicable to AMD; but clean them to prevent any fall out */
pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] = 0;
@@ -302,7 +322,7 @@ static void amd_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
struct kvm_pmu_ops amd_pmu_ops = {
- .find_arch_event = amd_find_arch_event,
+ .pmc_perf_hw_id = amd_pmc_perf_hw_id,
.find_fixed_event = amd_find_fixed_event,
.pmc_is_enabled = amd_pmc_is_enabled,
.pmc_idx_to_pmc = amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b58495fde2e8..125970286f28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -516,6 +516,9 @@ static void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
c->intercept_dr = h->intercept_dr | g->intercept_dr;
c->intercept_exceptions = h->intercept_exceptions | g->intercept_exceptions;
c->intercept = h->intercept | g->intercept;
+
+ c->intercept |= (1ULL << INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+ c->intercept |= (1ULL << INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
}
static inline struct vmcb *get_host_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -889,6 +892,11 @@ static int has_svm(void)
return 0;
}
+ if (sev_active()) {
+ pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
@@ -1438,12 +1446,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
}
}
- if (vgif) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VGIF))
- vgif = false;
- else
- pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
- }
+ vgif = false; /* Disabled for CVE-2021-3653 */
return 0;
@@ -1778,7 +1781,7 @@ static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
- sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+ sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = NULL;
}
}
@@ -1789,9 +1792,25 @@ static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
__sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
}
-static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
{
struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
+
+ if (!handle)
+ return;
+
+ decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decommission)
+ return;
+
+ decommission->handle = handle;
+ sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
+
+ kfree(decommission);
+}
+
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+{
struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
if (!handle)
@@ -1809,15 +1828,7 @@ static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
kfree(data);
- decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!decommission)
- return;
-
- /* decommission handle */
- decommission->handle = handle;
- sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
-
- kfree(decommission);
+ sev_decommission(handle);
}
static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
@@ -1830,6 +1841,8 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
struct page **pages;
unsigned long first, last;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
return NULL;
@@ -1891,7 +1904,8 @@ static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
uint8_t *page_virtual;
unsigned long i;
- if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
+ if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
+ pages == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
@@ -1953,6 +1967,7 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
+ cond_resched();
}
}
@@ -3591,7 +3606,13 @@ static void enter_svm_guest_mode(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 vmcb_gpa,
svm->nested.intercept = nested_vmcb->control.intercept;
svm_flush_tlb(&svm->vcpu, true);
- svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl = nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl | V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &=
+ V_INTR_MASKING_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK | V_GIF_MASK;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl &
+ (V_TPR_MASK | V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK);
+
if (nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags |= HF_VINTR_MASK;
else
@@ -4050,7 +4071,7 @@ static int cr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
err = 0;
if (cr >= 16) { /* mov to cr */
cr -= 16;
- val = kvm_register_read(&svm->vcpu, reg);
+ val = kvm_register_readl(&svm->vcpu, reg);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
if (!check_selective_cr0_intercepted(svm, val))
@@ -4095,7 +4116,7 @@ static int cr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
- kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
+ kvm_register_writel(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
}
return kvm_complete_insn_gp(&svm->vcpu, err);
}
@@ -4125,13 +4146,13 @@ static int dr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (dr >= 16) { /* mov to DRn */
if (!kvm_require_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr - 16))
return 1;
- val = kvm_register_read(&svm->vcpu, reg);
+ val = kvm_register_readl(&svm->vcpu, reg);
kvm_set_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr - 16, val);
} else {
if (!kvm_require_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr))
return 1;
kvm_get_dr(&svm->vcpu, dr, &val);
- kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
+ kvm_register_writel(&svm->vcpu, reg, val);
}
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
@@ -4233,8 +4254,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
@@ -4318,16 +4338,13 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
- /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+ if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
return 1;
svm->spec_ctrl = data;
-
if (!data)
break;
@@ -4346,18 +4363,17 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
return 1;
-
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ return 1;
if (!data)
break;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- break;
set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
@@ -4570,8 +4586,6 @@ static int avic_incomplete_ipi_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
break;
}
case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_TARGET:
- WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid IPI target: index=%u, vcpu=%d, icr=%#0x:%#0x\n",
- index, svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, icrh, icrl);
break;
case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_BACKING_PAGE:
WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid backing page\n");
@@ -5383,6 +5397,7 @@ static int svm_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
* - Tell IOMMU to use legacy mode for this interrupt.
* - Retrieve ga_tag of prior interrupt remapping data.
*/
+ pi.prev_ga_tag = 0;
pi.is_guest_mode = false;
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &pi);
@@ -6472,8 +6487,10 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
/* Bind ASID to this guest */
ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
- if (ret)
+ if (ret) {
+ sev_decommission(start->handle);
goto e_free_session;
+ }
/* return handle to userspace */
params.handle = start->handle;
@@ -7090,12 +7107,20 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
if (!region)
return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
if (!region->pages) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
goto e_free;
}
+ region->uaddr = range->addr;
+ region->size = range->size;
+
+ list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
/*
* The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
* or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
@@ -7104,13 +7129,6 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
*/
sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
- region->uaddr = range->addr;
- region->size = range->size;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
- list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
return ret;
e_free:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
index 7c741a0c5f80..5fed9c4d2360 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
@@ -1483,16 +1483,16 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_vmenter_failed,
TP_ARGS(msg, err),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field(const char *, msg)
+ __string(msg, msg)
__field(u32, err)
),
TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->msg = msg;
+ __assign_str(msg, msg);
__entry->err = err;
),
- TP_printk("%s%s", __entry->msg, !__entry->err ? "" :
+ TP_printk("%s%s", __get_str(msg), !__entry->err ? "" :
__print_symbolic(__entry->err, VMX_VMENTER_INSTRUCTION_ERRORS))
);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
index 07ebf6882a45..632bed227152 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(enable_evmcs);
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
-#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL (VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL \
+ (VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | \
+ VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
#define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMFUNC (VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index a460ddf04d60..9f61ae64b727 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -2057,12 +2057,11 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER);
/* Posted interrupts setting is only taken from vmcs12. */
- if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
+ vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
+ if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12))
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = vmcs12->posted_intr_nv;
- vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
- } else {
+ else
exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
- }
pin_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
/*
@@ -2231,6 +2230,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_tr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_idtr_base);
+
+ vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
}
if (!hv_evmcs || !(hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &
@@ -3094,8 +3095,10 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
prepare_vmcs02_early(vmx, vmcs12);
if (from_vmentry) {
- if (unlikely(!nested_get_vmcs12_pages(vcpu)))
+ if (unlikely(!nested_get_vmcs12_pages(vcpu))) {
+ vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
return NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
if (nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(vcpu)) {
vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
@@ -3743,12 +3746,12 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
/* update exit information fields: */
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason;
vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
- vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
-
- vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0;
- vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
- vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+ /*
+ * On VM-Exit due to a failed VM-Entry, the VMCS isn't marked launched
+ * and only EXIT_REASON and EXIT_QUALIFICATION are updated, all other
+ * exit info fields are unmodified.
+ */
if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) {
vmcs12->launch_state = 1;
@@ -3760,8 +3763,13 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
* Transfer the event that L0 or L1 may wanted to inject into
* L2 to IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD.
*/
+ vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0;
vmcs12_save_pending_event(vcpu, vmcs12);
+ vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
+ vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+ vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+
/*
* According to spec, there's no need to store the guest's
* MSRs if the exit is due to a VM-entry failure that occurs
@@ -5095,7 +5103,7 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- if ((vmcs12->vm_function_control & (1 << function)) == 0)
+ if (!(vmcs12->vm_function_control & BIT_ULL(function)))
goto fail;
switch (function) {
@@ -5304,7 +5312,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
/* Decode instruction info and find the field to access */
vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
- field = kvm_register_read(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
+ field = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
/* Out-of-range fields always cause a VM exit from L2 to L1 */
if (field >> 15)
@@ -5575,11 +5583,14 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
- } else if (!vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync) {
- if (vmx->nested.hv_evmcs)
- copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(vmx);
- else if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
- copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+ } else {
+ copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, get_vmcs12(vcpu));
+ if (!vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync) {
+ if (vmx->nested.hv_evmcs)
+ copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+ else if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
+ copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+ }
}
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12) < VMCS12_SIZE);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index f8998a7bc7d5..395566018ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping intel_arch_events[] = {
[4] = { 0x2e, 0x41, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MISSES },
[5] = { 0xc4, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS },
[6] = { 0xc5, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_MISSES },
- [7] = { 0x00, 0x30, PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES },
+ [7] = { 0x00, 0x03, PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES },
};
/* mapping between fixed pmc index and intel_arch_events array */
@@ -64,10 +64,11 @@ static void global_ctrl_changed(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
reprogram_counter(pmu, bit);
}
-static unsigned intel_find_arch_event(struct kvm_pmu *pmu,
- u8 event_select,
- u8 unit_mask)
+static unsigned int intel_pmc_perf_hw_id(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
{
+ struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+ u8 event_select = pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+ u8 unit_mask = (pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(intel_arch_events); i++)
@@ -296,7 +297,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = min_t(int, eax.split.num_counters,
x86_pmu.num_counters_gp);
+ eax.split.bit_width = min_t(int, eax.split.bit_width, x86_pmu.bit_width_gp);
pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP] = ((u64)1 << eax.split.bit_width) - 1;
+ eax.split.mask_length = min_t(int, eax.split.mask_length, x86_pmu.events_mask_len);
pmu->available_event_types = ~entry->ebx &
((1ull << eax.split.mask_length) - 1);
@@ -306,6 +309,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters =
min_t(int, edx.split.num_counters_fixed,
x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed);
+ edx.split.bit_width_fixed = min_t(int,
+ edx.split.bit_width_fixed, x86_pmu.bit_width_fixed);
pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] =
((u64)1 << edx.split.bit_width_fixed) - 1;
}
@@ -370,7 +375,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
struct kvm_pmu_ops intel_pmu_ops = {
- .find_arch_event = intel_find_arch_event,
+ .pmc_perf_hw_id = intel_pmc_perf_hw_id,
.find_fixed_event = intel_find_fixed_event,
.pmc_is_enabled = intel_pmc_is_enabled,
.pmc_idx_to_pmc = intel_pmc_idx_to_pmc,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 2a1ed3aae100..4bd1bf6214ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -204,6 +204,9 @@ static const struct {
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
+static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -335,6 +338,60 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
}
+static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+ if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
+ vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
+ /*
+ * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
+ * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
+ * execute VERW.
+ */
+ if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
+}
+
static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
@@ -785,15 +842,15 @@ void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/*
* Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
*/
-static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+ if (!(exec_controls_get(vmx) & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
return true;
- msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
+ msr_bitmap = vmx->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
@@ -1788,7 +1845,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
@@ -1971,15 +2028,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
- /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+ if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
return 1;
vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
-
if (!data)
break;
@@ -2001,12 +2056,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu))
return 1;
if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
return 1;
-
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ return 1;
if (!data)
break;
@@ -2168,9 +2224,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
}
break;
}
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+ ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
+ /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
+ if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -4363,6 +4423,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
if (init_event)
vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
}
static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -6556,6 +6618,11 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+ kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+ vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2())
write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
@@ -6565,6 +6632,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2();
+ vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
/*
* We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
* SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
@@ -6580,7 +6649,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
* save it.
*/
- if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+ if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
@@ -8039,8 +8108,11 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
return r;
}
+ vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu));
spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index a1919ec7fd10..7a3362ab5986 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -280,8 +280,11 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
u64 ept_pointer;
+ u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl;
+ bool disable_fb_clear;
struct pt_desc pt_desc;
+
};
enum ept_pointers_status {
@@ -512,7 +515,7 @@ static inline void decache_tsc_multiplier(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
static inline bool vmx_has_waitpkg(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
- return vmx->secondary_exec_control &
+ return secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 12e83297ea02..d0b297583df8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
+#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
#include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static void process_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void process_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
static void store_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -207,7 +209,6 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_entries[] = {
{ "l1d_flush", VCPU_STAT(l1d_flush) },
{ "mmu_shadow_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_shadow_zapped) },
{ "mmu_pte_write", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_write) },
- { "mmu_pte_updated", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_updated) },
{ "mmu_pde_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_pde_zapped) },
{ "mmu_flooded", VM_STAT(mmu_flooded) },
{ "mmu_recycled", VM_STAT(mmu_recycled) },
@@ -475,8 +476,6 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending && !vcpu->arch.exception.injected) {
queue:
- if (has_error && !is_protmode(vcpu))
- has_error = false;
if (reinject) {
/*
* On vmentry, vcpu->arch.exception.pending is only
@@ -1220,7 +1219,7 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR1,
- MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 + 2, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 + 3,
+ MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 + 2,
MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS,
MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR1,
@@ -1241,6 +1240,13 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 12, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 13,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 14, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 15,
MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 16, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17,
+
+ MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3,
+ MSR_K7_PERFCTR0, MSR_K7_PERFCTR1, MSR_K7_PERFCTR2, MSR_K7_PERFCTR3,
+ MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL2,
+ MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5,
+ MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2,
+ MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5,
};
static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)];
@@ -1397,6 +1403,10 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
/* KVM does not emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. */
data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR;
+
+ /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */
+ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL;
+
return data;
}
@@ -2766,6 +2776,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
s64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj);
+ /* Before back to guest, tsc_timestamp must be adjusted
+ * as well, otherwise guest's percpu pvclock time could jump.
+ */
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
@@ -3624,22 +3638,33 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static int kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ /*
+ * We can accept userspace's request for interrupt injection
+ * as long as we have a place to store the interrupt number.
+ * The actual injection will happen when the CPU is able to
+ * deliver the interrupt.
+ */
+ if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Acknowledging ExtINT does not happen if LINT0 is masked. */
return (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu));
}
-/*
- * if userspace requested an interrupt window, check that the
- * interrupt window is open.
- *
- * No need to exit to userspace if we already have an interrupt queued.
- */
static int kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
- !kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) &&
+ /*
+ * Do not cause an interrupt window exit if an exception
+ * is pending or an event needs reinjection; userspace
+ * might want to inject the interrupt manually using KVM_SET_REGS
+ * or KVM_SET_SREGS. For that to work, we must be at an
+ * instruction boundary and with no events half-injected.
+ */
+ return (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
+ kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu) &&
!kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) &&
- kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu);
+ !vcpu->arch.exception.pending);
}
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -3770,6 +3795,10 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
{
process_nmi(vcpu);
+
+ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
+ process_smi(vcpu);
+
/*
* The API doesn't provide the instruction length for software
* exceptions, so don't report them. As long as the guest RIP
@@ -5235,6 +5264,10 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
if (!kvm_x86_ops->rdtscp_supported())
continue;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG))
+ continue;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
if (!kvm_x86_ops->pt_supported())
@@ -5555,6 +5588,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_guest_virt_system);
int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ static const char kvm_emulate_prefix[] = { __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX };
int emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD;
char sig[5]; /* ud2; .ascii "kvm" */
struct x86_exception e;
@@ -5562,7 +5596,7 @@ int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (force_emulation_prefix &&
kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu),
sig, sizeof(sig), &e) == 0 &&
- memcmp(sig, "\xf\xbkvm", sizeof(sig)) == 0) {
+ memcmp(sig, kvm_emulate_prefix, sizeof(sig)) == 0) {
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, kvm_rip_read(vcpu) + sizeof(sig));
emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED;
}
@@ -6269,7 +6303,10 @@ static unsigned emulator_get_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
static void emulator_set_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned emul_flags)
{
- emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)->arch.hflags = emul_flags;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+
+ vcpu->arch.hflags = emul_flags;
+ kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
}
static int emulator_pre_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -7346,6 +7383,7 @@ void kvm_arch_exit(void)
cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_X86_KVM_CLK_ONLINE);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pvclock_gtod_unregister_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier);
+ cancel_work_sync(&pvclock_gtod_work);
#endif
kvm_x86_ops = NULL;
kvm_mmu_module_exit();
@@ -7578,6 +7616,13 @@ static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_x86_ops->update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, max_irr);
}
+static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (vcpu->arch.exception.error_code && !is_protmode(vcpu))
+ vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = false;
+ kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception(vcpu);
+}
+
static int inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
@@ -7585,7 +7630,7 @@ static int inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* try to reinject previous events if any */
if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
- kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception(vcpu);
+ kvm_inject_exception(vcpu);
/*
* Do not inject an NMI or interrupt if there is a pending
* exception. Exceptions and interrupts are recognized at
@@ -7651,7 +7696,7 @@ static int inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
- kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception(vcpu);
+ kvm_inject_exception(vcpu);
}
/* Don't consider new event if we re-injected an event */
@@ -8257,6 +8302,8 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_RELOAD;
+ } else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
+ set_debugreg(0, 7);
}
kvm_x86_ops->run(vcpu);
@@ -10364,6 +10411,32 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll);
+int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value)
+{
+ /*
+ * test that setting IA32_SPEC_CTRL to given value
+ * is allowed by the host processor
+ */
+
+ u64 saved_value;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &saved_value))
+ ret = 1;
+ else if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, value))
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, saved_value);
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value);
+
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index de6b55484876..c520d373790a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -368,5 +368,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_pat_valid(u64 data)
void kvm_load_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_put_guest_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
index c126571e5e2e..3d1cfad36ba2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ static void delay_loop(unsigned long loops)
" jnz 2b \n"
"3: dec %0 \n"
- : /* we don't need output */
- :"a" (loops)
+ : "+a" (loops)
+ :
);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
index 306c3a0902ba..cbe7e2503394 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -70,14 +70,15 @@ static int get_seg_reg_override_idx(struct insn *insn)
{
int idx = INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT;
int num_overrides = 0, i;
+ insn_byte_t p;
insn_get_prefixes(insn);
/* Look for any segment override prefixes. */
- for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
+ for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) {
insn_attr_t attr;
- attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn->prefixes.bytes[i]);
+ attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(p);
switch (attr) {
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_CS):
idx = INAT_SEG_REG_CS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c
index 0b5862ba6a75..404279563891 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <asm/inat.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
+#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+
/* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */
#define validate_next(t, insn, n) \
((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n <= (insn)->end_kaddr)
@@ -58,6 +60,36 @@ void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64)
insn->addr_bytes = 4;
}
+static const insn_byte_t xen_prefix[] = { __XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX };
+static const insn_byte_t kvm_prefix[] = { __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX };
+
+static int __insn_get_emulate_prefix(struct insn *insn,
+ const insn_byte_t *prefix, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (peek_nbyte_next(insn_byte_t, insn, i) != prefix[i])
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ insn->emulate_prefix_size = len;
+ insn->next_byte += len;
+
+ return 1;
+
+err_out:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void insn_get_emulate_prefix(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ if (__insn_get_emulate_prefix(insn, xen_prefix, sizeof(xen_prefix)))
+ return;
+
+ __insn_get_emulate_prefix(insn, kvm_prefix, sizeof(kvm_prefix));
+}
+
/**
* insn_get_prefixes - scan x86 instruction prefix bytes
* @insn: &struct insn containing instruction
@@ -76,6 +108,8 @@ void insn_get_prefixes(struct insn *insn)
if (prefixes->got)
return;
+ insn_get_emulate_prefix(insn);
+
nb = 0;
lb = 0;
b = peek_next(insn_byte_t, insn);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
index 92748660ba51..dc2fb886db2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
* to a jmp to memcpy_erms which does the REP; MOVSB mem copy.
*/
-.weak memcpy
-
/*
* memcpy - Copy a memory block.
*
@@ -29,7 +27,7 @@
* rax original destination
*/
ENTRY(__memcpy)
-ENTRY(memcpy)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memcpy)
ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp memcpy_orig", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \
"jmp memcpy_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
index bbec69d8223b..b292445467b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S
@@ -24,9 +24,7 @@
* Output:
* rax: dest
*/
-.weak memmove
-
-ENTRY(memmove)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memmove)
ENTRY(__memmove)
/* Handle more 32 bytes in loop */
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
index 9bc861c71e75..e3376c7d4c97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
-.weak memset
-
/*
* ISO C memset - set a memory block to a byte value. This function uses fast
* string to get better performance than the original function. The code is
@@ -19,7 +17,7 @@
*
* rax original destination
*/
-ENTRY(memset)
+SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memset)
ENTRY(__memset)
/*
* Some CPUs support enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB feature. It is recommended
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c
index 4321fa02e18d..419365c48b2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
+/*
+ * Use KFPU_387. MMX instructions are not affected by MXCSR,
+ * but both AMD and Intel documentation states that even integer MMX
+ * operations will result in #MF if an exception is pending in FCW.
+ *
+ * EMMS is not needed afterwards because, after calling kernel_fpu_end(),
+ * any subsequent user of the 387 stack will reinitialize it using
+ * KFPU_387.
+ */
+
void *_mmx_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len)
{
void *p;
@@ -37,7 +47,7 @@ void *_mmx_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len)
p = to;
i = len >> 6; /* len/64 */
- kernel_fpu_begin();
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387);
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"1: prefetch (%0)\n" /* This set is 28 bytes */
@@ -127,7 +137,7 @@ static void fast_clear_page(void *page)
{
int i;
- kernel_fpu_begin();
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387);
__asm__ __volatile__ (
" pxor %%mm0, %%mm0\n" : :
@@ -160,7 +170,7 @@ static void fast_copy_page(void *to, void *from)
{
int i;
- kernel_fpu_begin();
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387);
/*
* maybe the prefetch stuff can go before the expensive fnsave...
@@ -247,7 +257,7 @@ static void fast_clear_page(void *page)
{
int i;
- kernel_fpu_begin();
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387);
__asm__ __volatile__ (
" pxor %%mm0, %%mm0\n" : :
@@ -282,7 +292,7 @@ static void fast_copy_page(void *to, void *from)
{
int i;
- kernel_fpu_begin();
+ kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387);
__asm__ __volatile__ (
"1: prefetch (%0)\n"
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/msr-smp.c b/arch/x86/lib/msr-smp.c
index fee8b9c0520c..9009393f44c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/msr-smp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/msr-smp.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static void __wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(void *info)
rv->err = wrmsr_safe_regs(rv->regs);
}
-int rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 *regs)
+int rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 regs[8])
{
int err;
struct msr_regs_info rv;
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 *regs)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu);
-int wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 *regs)
+int wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 regs[8])
{
int err;
struct msr_regs_info rv;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
index 1847e993ac63..f3f7f4cb15a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ void __memcpy_flushcache(void *_dst, const void *_src, size_t size)
/* cache copy and flush to align dest */
if (!IS_ALIGNED(dest, 8)) {
- unsigned len = min_t(unsigned, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest);
+ size_t len = min_t(size_t, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest);
memcpy((void *) dest, (void *) source, len);
clean_cache_range((void *) dest, len);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index fe7a12599d8e..968d7005f4a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
{
unsigned long next;
+ int result;
for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
p4d_t *p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(addr);
@@ -73,13 +74,20 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page,
if (p4d_present(*p4d)) {
pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
- ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
+ result = ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
continue;
}
pud = (pud_t *)info->alloc_pgt_page(info->context);
if (!pud)
return -ENOMEM;
- ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
+
+ result = ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index b8541d77452c..a37ccafe065b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -1355,18 +1355,18 @@ int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
return 0;
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
- if (p4d_none(*p4d))
+ if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
return 0;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
- if (pud_none(*pud))
+ if (!pud_present(*pud))
return 0;
if (pud_large(*pud))
return pfn_valid(pud_pfn(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
- if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+ if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return 0;
if (pmd_large(*pmd))
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 9268c12458c8..7b558939b89c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
if (pgprot_val(old_prot) == pgprot_val(new_prot))
return;
- pa = pfn << page_level_shift(level);
+ pa = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
size = page_level_size(level);
/*
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
return false;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index e2b0e2ac07bb..ebc8e3af1c67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS
+/*
+ * This code runs before CPU feature bits are set. By default, the
+ * pgtable_l5_enabled() function uses bit X86_FEATURE_LA57 to determine if
+ * 5-level paging is active, so that won't work here. USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
+ * is provided to handle this situation and, instead, use a variable that
+ * has been set by the early boot code.
+ */
+#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
+
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
@@ -45,8 +54,8 @@
#define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC PMD_FLAGS_LARGE
-#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
- (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
+#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
+ (_PAGE_PAT_LARGE | _PAGE_PWT))
#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 281e584cfe39..d61313f5c5b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
/*
* Before changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush caches.
*/
- cpa_flush(&cpa, 1);
+ cpa_flush(&cpa, !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT));
ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
index d9fbd4f69920..c7c4e2f8c6a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int pat_debug_enable;
static int __init pat_debug_setup(char *str)
{
pat_debug_enable = 1;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
__setup("debugpat", pat_debug_setup);
@@ -1132,12 +1132,14 @@ static void *memtype_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
static void *memtype_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
+ kfree(v);
++*pos;
return memtype_get_idx(*pos);
}
static void memtype_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
+ kfree(v);
}
static int memtype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
@@ -1146,7 +1148,6 @@ static int memtype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
seq_printf(seq, "%s @ 0x%Lx-0x%Lx\n", cattr_name(print_entry->type),
print_entry->start, print_entry->end);
- kfree(print_entry);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 7bd2c3a52297..7982f13807aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -826,6 +826,8 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
}
free_page((unsigned long)pmd_sv);
+
+ pgtable_pmd_page_dtor(virt_to_page(pmd));
free_page((unsigned long)pmd);
return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index e6a9edc5baaf..851359b7edc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -327,8 +327,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
/*
* The membarrier system call requires a full memory barrier and
* core serialization before returning to user-space, after
- * storing to rq->curr. Writing to CR3 provides that full
- * memory barrier and core serializing instruction.
+ * storing to rq->curr, when changing mm. This is because
+ * membarrier() sends IPIs to all CPUs that are in the target mm
+ * to make them issue memory barriers. However, if another CPU
+ * switches to/from the target mm concurrently with
+ * membarrier(), it can cause that CPU not to receive an IPI
+ * when it really should issue a memory barrier. Writing to CR3
+ * provides that full memory barrier and core serializing
+ * instruction.
*/
if (real_prev == next) {
VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 18936533666e..55f62dca28aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -728,6 +728,13 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
}
break;
+ /* speculation barrier */
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
+ /* Emit 'lfence' */
+ EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8);
+ break;
+
/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
if (is_ereg(dst_reg))
@@ -1050,7 +1057,16 @@ emit_jmp:
}
if (image) {
- if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen)) {
+ /*
+ * When populating the image, assert that:
+ *
+ * i) We do not write beyond the allocated space, and
+ * ii) addrs[i] did not change from the prior run, in order
+ * to validate assumptions made for computing branch
+ * displacements.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen ||
+ proglen + ilen != addrs[i])) {
pr_err("bpf_jit: fatal error\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -1118,7 +1134,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
extra_pass = true;
goto skip_init_addrs;
}
- addrs = kmalloc_array(prog->len + 1, sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ addrs = kvmalloc_array(prog->len + 1, sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!addrs) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_addrs;
@@ -1195,7 +1211,7 @@ out_image:
if (image)
bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(prog, addrs + 1);
out_addrs:
- kfree(addrs);
+ kvfree(addrs);
kfree(jit_data);
prog->aux->jit_data = NULL;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 66cd150b7e54..2914f900034e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1705,6 +1705,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
i++;
break;
}
+ /* speculation barrier */
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
+ /* Emit 'lfence' */
+ EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8);
+ break;
/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
@@ -2278,7 +2284,16 @@ notyet:
}
if (image) {
- if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen)) {
+ /*
+ * When populating the image, assert that:
+ *
+ * i) We do not write beyond the allocated space, and
+ * ii) addrs[i] did not change from the prior run, in order
+ * to validate assumptions made for computing branch
+ * displacements.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen ||
+ proglen + ilen != addrs[i])) {
pr_err("bpf_jit: fatal error\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
index 0c67a5a94de3..76959a7d88c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
@@ -779,4 +779,48 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x1571, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x15b1, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x1601, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
+#define RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 0x30
+#define RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2_VALID 0x1
+#define RS690_UPPER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 0x31
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX 0xA8
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE 0x100
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA 0xAC
+
+/*
+ * Some BIOS implementations support RAM above 4GB, but do not configure the
+ * PCI host to respond to bus master accesses for these addresses. These
+ * implementations set the TOP_OF_DRAM_SLOT1 register correctly, so PCI DMA
+ * works as expected for addresses below 4GB.
+ *
+ * Reference: "AMD RS690 ASIC Family Register Reference Guide" (pg. 2-57)
+ * https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/43372_rs690_rrg_3.00o.pdf
+ */
+static void rs690_fix_64bit_dma(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+{
+ u32 val = 0;
+ phys_addr_t top_of_dram = __pa(high_memory - 1) + 1;
+
+ if (top_of_dram <= (1ULL << 32))
+ return;
+
+ pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+ RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2);
+ pci_read_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA, &val);
+
+ if (val)
+ return;
+
+ pci_info(pdev, "Adjusting top of DRAM to %pa for 64-bit DMA support\n", &top_of_dram);
+
+ pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+ RS690_UPPER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 | RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE);
+ pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA, top_of_dram >> 32);
+
+ pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+ RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 | RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE);
+ pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA,
+ top_of_dram | RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2_VALID);
+}
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x7910, rs690_fix_64bit_dma);
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c b/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c
index 43867bc85368..eea5a0f3b959 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/intel_mid_pci.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
#include <asm/intel-mid.h>
+#include <asm/acpi.h>
#define PCIE_CAP_OFFSET 0x100
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
index 5c11ae66b5d8..9cf8f5417e7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
@@ -442,6 +442,11 @@ void __init xen_msi_init(void)
x86_msi.setup_msi_irqs = xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs;
x86_msi.teardown_msi_irq = xen_teardown_msi_irq;
+ /*
+ * With XEN PIRQ/Eventchannels in use PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely
+ * controlled by the hypervisor.
+ */
+ pci_msi_ignore_mask = 1;
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index e39c930cfbd1..528397818110 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -217,28 +217,30 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO;
efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
if (!efi_pgd)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
pgd = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END);
p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, EFI_VA_END);
- if (!p4d) {
- free_page((unsigned long)efi_pgd);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (!p4d)
+ goto free_pgd;
pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, EFI_VA_END);
- if (!pud) {
- if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
- free_page((unsigned long) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd));
- free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (!pud)
+ goto free_p4d;
efi_mm.pgd = efi_pgd;
mm_init_cpumask(&efi_mm);
init_new_context(NULL, &efi_mm);
return 0;
+
+free_p4d:
+ if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
+ free_page((unsigned long)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd));
+free_pgd:
+ free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
+fail:
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
index aefe845dff59..6ca88fbc009c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size)
return;
}
- new = early_memremap(new_phys, new_size);
+ new = early_memremap_prot(new_phys, new_size,
+ pgprot_val(pgprot_encrypted(FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL)));
if (!new) {
pr_err("Failed to map new boot services memmap\n");
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc.c b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc.c
index ee2beda590d0..1d4a00e767ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc.c
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct olpc_ec_driver ec_xo1_driver = {
static struct olpc_ec_driver ec_xo1_5_driver = {
.ec_cmd = olpc_xo1_ec_cmd,
-#ifdef CONFIG_OLPC_XO1_5_SCI
+#ifdef CONFIG_OLPC_XO15_SCI
/*
* XO-1.5 EC wakeups are available when olpc-xo15-sci driver is
* compiled in
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
index 915bb1639763..20dd7023132f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
__visible unsigned long saved_context_ebx;
@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ static void msr_save_context(struct saved_context *ctxt)
struct saved_msr *end = msr + ctxt->saved_msrs.num;
while (msr < end) {
- msr->valid = !rdmsrl_safe(msr->info.msr_no, &msr->info.reg.q);
+ if (msr->valid)
+ rdmsrl(msr->info.msr_no, msr->info.reg.q);
msr++;
}
}
@@ -262,6 +264,13 @@ static void notrace __restore_processor_state(struct saved_context *ctxt)
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state();
mtrr_bp_restore();
perf_restore_debug_store();
+
+ microcode_bsp_resume();
+
+ /*
+ * This needs to happen after the microcode has been updated upon resume
+ * because some of the MSRs are "emulated" in microcode.
+ */
msr_restore_context(ctxt);
}
@@ -421,8 +430,10 @@ static int msr_build_context(const u32 *msr_id, const int num)
}
for (i = saved_msrs->num, j = 0; i < total_num; i++, j++) {
+ u64 dummy;
+
msr_array[i].info.msr_no = msr_id[j];
- msr_array[i].valid = false;
+ msr_array[i].valid = !rdmsrl_safe(msr_id[j], &dummy);
msr_array[i].info.reg.q = 0;
}
saved_msrs->num = total_num;
@@ -509,10 +520,24 @@ static int pm_cpu_check(const struct x86_cpu_id *c)
return ret;
}
+static void pm_save_spec_msr(void)
+{
+ u32 spec_msr_id[] = {
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
+ MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,
+ MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL,
+ MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,
+ };
+
+ msr_build_context(spec_msr_id, ARRAY_SIZE(spec_msr_id));
+}
+
static int pm_check_save_msr(void)
{
dmi_check_system(msr_save_dmi_table);
pm_cpu_check(msr_save_cpu_table);
+ pm_save_spec_msr();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S
index 6fe383002125..a19ed3d23185 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ ENTRY(swsusp_arch_suspend)
ret
ENDPROC(swsusp_arch_suspend)
-ENTRY(restore_image)
+SYM_CODE_START(restore_image)
/* prepare to jump to the image kernel */
movl restore_jump_address, %ebx
movl restore_cr3, %ebp
@@ -45,9 +45,10 @@ ENTRY(restore_image)
/* jump to relocated restore code */
movl relocated_restore_code, %eax
jmpl *%eax
+SYM_CODE_END(restore_image)
/* code below has been relocated to a safe page */
-ENTRY(core_restore_code)
+SYM_CODE_START(core_restore_code)
movl temp_pgt, %eax
movl %eax, %cr3
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ copy_loop:
done:
jmpl *%ebx
+SYM_CODE_END(core_restore_code)
/* code below belongs to the image kernel */
.align PAGE_SIZE
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 262f83cad355..fac50ebb122b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -16,6 +16,32 @@ u32 *trampoline_cr4_features;
/* Hold the pgd entry used on booting additional CPUs */
pgd_t trampoline_pgd_entry;
+void load_trampoline_pgtable(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ load_cr3(initial_page_table);
+#else
+ /*
+ * This function is called before exiting to real-mode and that will
+ * fail with CR4.PCIDE still set.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+ write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * The CR3 write above will not flush global TLB entries.
+ * Stale, global entries from previous page tables may still be
+ * present. Flush those stale entries.
+ *
+ * This ensures that memory accessed while running with
+ * trampoline_pgd is *actually* mapped into trampoline_pgd.
+ */
+ __flush_tlb_all();
+}
+
void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
{
phys_addr_t mem;
@@ -50,6 +76,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
u64 *trampoline_pgd;
u64 efer;
+ int i;
#endif
base = (unsigned char *)real_mode_header;
@@ -108,8 +135,17 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
+
+ /* Map the real mode stub as virtual == physical */
trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
- trampoline_pgd[511] = init_top_pgt[511].pgd;
+
+ /*
+ * Include the entirety of the kernel mapping into the trampoline
+ * PGD. This way, all mappings present in the normal kernel page
+ * tables are usable while running on trampoline_pgd.
+ */
+ for (i = pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET); i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++)
+ trampoline_pgd[i] = init_top_pgt[i].pgd;
#endif
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_32.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_32.S
index 1868b158480d..3a0ef0d57734 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_32.S
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.code16
.balign PAGE_SIZE
-ENTRY(trampoline_start)
+SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_start)
wbinvd # Needed for NUMA-Q should be harmless for others
LJMPW_RM(1f)
@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ ENTRY(trampoline_start)
lmsw %dx # into protected mode
ljmpl $__BOOT_CS, $pa_startup_32
+SYM_CODE_END(trampoline_start)
.section ".text32","ax"
.code32
-ENTRY(startup_32) # note: also used from wakeup_asm.S
+SYM_CODE_START(startup_32) # note: also used from wakeup_asm.S
jmp *%eax
+SYM_CODE_END(startup_32)
.bss
.balign 8
diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk b/arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk
index fd1ab80be0de..a4cf678cf5c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk
+++ b/arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ BEGIN {
/^GNU objdump/ {
verstr = ""
+ gsub(/\(.*\)/, "");
for (i = 3; i <= NF; i++)
if (match($(i), "^[0-9]")) {
verstr = $(i);
diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c
index ce7188cbdae5..1c3a1962cade 100644
--- a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c
@@ -867,9 +867,11 @@ static int do_reloc32(struct section *sec, Elf_Rel *rel, Elf_Sym *sym,
case R_386_PC32:
case R_386_PC16:
case R_386_PC8:
+ case R_386_PLT32:
/*
- * NONE can be ignored and PC relative relocations don't
- * need to be adjusted.
+ * NONE can be ignored and PC relative relocations don't need
+ * to be adjusted. Because sym must be defined, R_386_PLT32 can
+ * be treated the same way as R_386_PC32.
*/
break;
@@ -910,9 +912,11 @@ static int do_reloc_real(struct section *sec, Elf_Rel *rel, Elf_Sym *sym,
case R_386_PC32:
case R_386_PC16:
case R_386_PC8:
+ case R_386_PLT32:
/*
- * NONE can be ignored and PC relative relocations don't
- * need to be adjusted.
+ * NONE can be ignored and PC relative relocations don't need
+ * to be adjusted. Because sym must be defined, R_386_PLT32 can
+ * be treated the same way as R_386_PC32.
*/
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/ldt.c b/arch/x86/um/ldt.c
index 3ee234b6234d..255a44dd415a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/ldt.c
@@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ static long write_ldt_entry(struct mm_id *mm_idp, int func,
{
long res;
void *stub_addr;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*desc) % sizeof(long));
+
res = syscall_stub_data(mm_idp, (unsigned long *)desc,
- (sizeof(*desc) + sizeof(long) - 1) &
- ~(sizeof(long) - 1),
+ sizeof(*desc) / sizeof(long),
addr, &stub_addr);
if (!res) {
unsigned long args[] = { func,
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h
index 8a7d5e1da98e..1e6875b4ffd8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_64.h
@@ -10,13 +10,12 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
-typedef long syscall_handler_t(void);
+typedef long syscall_handler_t(long, long, long, long, long, long);
extern syscall_handler_t *sys_call_table[];
#define EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs) \
- (((long (*)(long, long, long, long, long, long)) \
- (*sys_call_table[syscall]))(UPT_SYSCALL_ARG1(&regs->regs), \
+ (((*sys_call_table[syscall]))(UPT_SYSCALL_ARG1(&regs->regs), \
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG2(&regs->regs), \
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG3(&regs->regs), \
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG4(&regs->regs), \
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/syscalls_64.c b/arch/x86/um/syscalls_64.c
index 58f51667e2e4..8249685b4096 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/syscalls_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/syscalls_64.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/prctl.h> /* XXX This should get the constants from libc */
#include <os.h>
+#include <registers.h>
long arch_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long __user *arg2)
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ long arch_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
switch (option) {
case ARCH_SET_FS:
case ARCH_SET_GS:
- ret = restore_registers(pid, &current->thread.regs.regs);
+ ret = restore_pid_registers(pid, &current->thread.regs.regs);
if (ret)
return ret;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
index e138f7de52d2..6024fafed164 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ static int xen_cpu_dead_hvm(unsigned int cpu)
return 0;
}
+static bool no_vector_callback __initdata;
+
static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
{
if (xen_pv_domain())
@@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
xen_panic_handler_init();
- if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
+ if (!no_vector_callback && xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
xen_hvm_smp_init();
@@ -220,6 +222,13 @@ static __init int xen_parse_nopv(char *arg)
}
early_param("xen_nopv", xen_parse_nopv);
+static __init int xen_parse_no_vector_callback(char *arg)
+{
+ no_vector_callback = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("xen_no_vector_callback", xen_parse_no_vector_callback);
+
bool __init xen_hvm_need_lapic(void)
{
if (xen_pv_domain())
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 6d4d8a5700b7..65cf405cd975 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -727,8 +727,8 @@ static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g)
preempt_enable();
}
-static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc,
- struct trap_info *traps)
+static unsigned xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc,
+ struct trap_info *traps, bool full)
{
unsigned in, out, count;
@@ -738,17 +738,18 @@ static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc,
for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) {
gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc *)(desc->address) + in;
- if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out]))
+ if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out]) || full)
out++;
}
- traps[out].address = 0;
+
+ return out;
}
void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps)
{
const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc);
- xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
+ xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, true);
}
/* Load a new IDT into Xen. In principle this can be per-CPU, so we
@@ -758,6 +759,7 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
static struct trap_info traps[257];
+ unsigned out;
trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc);
@@ -765,7 +767,8 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc));
- xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
+ out = xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, false);
+ memset(&traps[out], 0, sizeof(traps[0]));
xen_mc_flush();
if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps))
@@ -1183,6 +1186,11 @@ static void __init xen_dom0_set_legacy_features(void)
x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 1;
}
+static void __init xen_domu_set_legacy_features(void)
+{
+ x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 0;
+}
+
/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */
asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
{
@@ -1353,6 +1361,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
add_preferred_console("xenboot", 0, NULL);
if (pci_xen)
x86_init.pci.arch_init = pci_xen_init;
+ x86_platform.set_legacy_features =
+ xen_domu_set_legacy_features;
} else {
const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info =
(void *)((char *)xen_start_info +
@@ -1382,6 +1392,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop;
xen_boot_params_init_edd();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+ /*
+ * Disable selecting "Firmware First mode" for correctable
+ * memory errors, as this is the duty of the hypervisor to
+ * decide.
+ */
+ acpi_disable_cmcff = 1;
+#endif
}
if (!boot_params.screen_info.orig_video_isVGA)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
index 0acba2c712ab..8b1e40ec58f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
@@ -622,8 +622,8 @@ int xen_alloc_p2m_entry(unsigned long pfn)
}
/* Expanded the p2m? */
- if (pfn > xen_p2m_last_pfn) {
- xen_p2m_last_pfn = pfn;
+ if (pfn >= xen_p2m_last_pfn) {
+ xen_p2m_last_pfn = ALIGN(pfn + 1, P2M_PER_PAGE);
HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.max_pfn = xen_p2m_last_pfn;
}
@@ -714,9 +714,12 @@ int set_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *map_ops,
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
unsigned long mfn, pfn;
+ struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref unmap[2];
+ int rc;
/* Do not add to override if the map failed. */
- if (map_ops[i].status)
+ if (map_ops[i].status != GNTST_okay ||
+ (kmap_ops && kmap_ops[i].status != GNTST_okay))
continue;
if (map_ops[i].flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte) {
@@ -730,10 +733,46 @@ int set_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *map_ops,
WARN(pfn_to_mfn(pfn) != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY, "page must be ballooned");
- if (unlikely(!set_phys_to_machine(pfn, FOREIGN_FRAME(mfn)))) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+ if (likely(set_phys_to_machine(pfn, FOREIGN_FRAME(mfn))))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Signal an error for this slot. This in turn requires
+ * immediate unmapping.
+ */
+ map_ops[i].status = GNTST_general_error;
+ unmap[0].host_addr = map_ops[i].host_addr,
+ unmap[0].handle = map_ops[i].handle;
+ map_ops[i].handle = ~0;
+ if (map_ops[i].flags & GNTMAP_device_map)
+ unmap[0].dev_bus_addr = map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr;
+ else
+ unmap[0].dev_bus_addr = 0;
+
+ if (kmap_ops) {
+ kmap_ops[i].status = GNTST_general_error;
+ unmap[1].host_addr = kmap_ops[i].host_addr,
+ unmap[1].handle = kmap_ops[i].handle;
+ kmap_ops[i].handle = ~0;
+ if (kmap_ops[i].flags & GNTMAP_device_map)
+ unmap[1].dev_bus_addr = kmap_ops[i].dev_bus_addr;
+ else
+ unmap[1].dev_bus_addr = 0;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-populate both status fields, to be recognizable in
+ * the log message below.
+ */
+ unmap[0].status = 1;
+ unmap[1].status = 1;
+
+ rc = HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op(GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref,
+ unmap, 1 + !!kmap_ops);
+ if (rc || unmap[0].status != GNTST_okay ||
+ unmap[1].status != GNTST_okay)
+ pr_err_once("gnttab unmap failed: rc=%d st0=%d st1=%d\n",
+ rc, unmap[0].status, unmap[1].status);
}
out:
@@ -754,17 +793,15 @@ int clear_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *unmap_ops,
unsigned long mfn = __pfn_to_mfn(page_to_pfn(pages[i]));
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(pages[i]);
- if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY || !(mfn & FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT)) {
+ if (mfn != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY && (mfn & FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT))
+ set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
+ else
ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
}
if (kunmap_ops)
ret = HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op(GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref,
- kunmap_ops, count);
-out:
+ kunmap_ops, count) ?: ret;
+
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_foreign_p2m_mapping);
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c
index e13b0b49fcdf..d7249f4c90f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c
@@ -512,10 +512,7 @@ irqreturn_t xen_pmu_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
return ret;
}
-bool is_xen_pmu(int cpu)
-{
- return (get_xenpmu_data() != NULL);
-}
+bool is_xen_pmu;
void xen_pmu_init(int cpu)
{
@@ -526,7 +523,7 @@ void xen_pmu_init(int cpu)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct xen_pmu_data) > PAGE_SIZE);
- if (xen_hvm_domain())
+ if (xen_hvm_domain() || (cpu != 0 && !is_xen_pmu))
return;
xenpmu_data = (struct xen_pmu_data *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -547,7 +544,8 @@ void xen_pmu_init(int cpu)
per_cpu(xenpmu_shared, cpu).xenpmu_data = xenpmu_data;
per_cpu(xenpmu_shared, cpu).flags = 0;
- if (cpu == 0) {
+ if (!is_xen_pmu) {
+ is_xen_pmu = true;
perf_register_guest_info_callbacks(&xen_guest_cbs);
xen_pmu_arch_init();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.h b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.h
index 0e83a160589b..65c58894fc79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include <xen/interface/xenpmu.h>
+extern bool is_xen_pmu;
+
irqreturn_t xen_pmu_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev_id);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_HAVE_VPMU
void xen_pmu_init(int cpu);
@@ -12,7 +14,6 @@ void xen_pmu_finish(int cpu);
static inline void xen_pmu_init(int cpu) {}
static inline void xen_pmu_finish(int cpu) {}
#endif
-bool is_xen_pmu(int cpu);
bool pmu_msr_read(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *val, int *err);
bool pmu_msr_write(unsigned int msr, uint32_t low, uint32_t high, int *err);
int pmu_apic_update(uint32_t reg);
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c
index f8d39440b292..e5bd9eb42191 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
xen_vcpu_setup(0);
/*
+ * Called again in case the kernel boots on vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS.
+ * Refer to comments in xen_hvm_init_time_ops().
+ */
+ xen_hvm_init_time_ops();
+
+ /*
* The alternative logic (which patches the unlock/lock) runs before
* the smp bootup up code is activated. Hence we need to set this up
* the core kernel is being patched. Otherwise we will have only
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
index 0cebe5db691d..9d9777ded5f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct xen_common_irq, xen_irq_work) = { .irq = -1 };
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct xen_common_irq, xen_pmu_irq) = { .irq = -1 };
static irqreturn_t xen_irq_work_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id);
+void asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle(void);
static void cpu_bringup(void)
{
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init_pv(unsigned int cpu)
per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).irq = rc;
per_cpu(xen_irq_work, cpu).name = callfunc_name;
- if (is_xen_pmu(cpu)) {
+ if (is_xen_pmu) {
pmu_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "pmu%d", cpu);
rc = bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_XENPMU, cpu,
xen_pmu_irq_handler,
@@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
* pointing just below where pt_regs would be if it were a normal
* kernel entry.
*/
- ctxt->user_regs.eip = (unsigned long)cpu_bringup_and_idle;
+ ctxt->user_regs.eip = (unsigned long)asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle;
ctxt->flags = VGCF_IN_KERNEL;
ctxt->user_regs.eflags = 0x1000; /* IOPL_RING1 */
ctxt->user_regs.ds = __USER_DS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
index 6deb49094c60..d817b7c862a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
@@ -93,10 +93,20 @@ void xen_init_lock_cpu(int cpu)
void xen_uninit_lock_cpu(int cpu)
{
+ int irq;
+
if (!xen_pvspin)
return;
- unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu), NULL);
+ /*
+ * When booting the kernel with 'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the secondary
+ * CPUs are not activated, and lock_kicker_irq is not initialized.
+ */
+ irq = per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu);
+ if (irq == -1)
+ return;
+
+ unbind_from_irqhandler(irq, NULL);
per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu) = -1;
kfree(per_cpu(irq_name, cpu));
per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/time.c b/arch/x86/xen/time.c
index befbdd8b17f0..4ec6c80f7687 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/time.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/time.c
@@ -547,6 +547,11 @@ static void xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents(void)
void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void)
{
+ static bool hvm_time_initialized;
+
+ if (hvm_time_initialized)
+ return;
+
/*
* vector callback is needed otherwise we cannot receive interrupts
* on cpu > 0 and at this point we don't know how many cpus are
@@ -556,7 +561,22 @@ void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void)
return;
if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)) {
- pr_info("Xen doesn't support pvclock on HVM, disable pv timer");
+ pr_info_once("Xen doesn't support pvclock on HVM, disable pv timer");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only MAX_VIRT_CPUS 'vcpu_info' are embedded inside 'shared_info'.
+ * The __this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu) is still NULL when Xen HVM guest
+ * boots on vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS (e.g., kexec), To access
+ * __this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu) via xen_clocksource_read() will panic.
+ *
+ * The xen_hvm_init_time_ops() should be called again later after
+ * __this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu) is available.
+ */
+ if (!__this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu)) {
+ pr_info("Delay xen_init_time_common() as kernel is running on vcpu=%d\n",
+ xen_vcpu_nr(0));
return;
}
@@ -568,6 +588,8 @@ void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void)
x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = xen_tsc_khz;
x86_platform.get_wallclock = xen_get_wallclock;
x86_platform.set_wallclock = xen_set_wallclock;
+
+ hvm_time_initialized = true;
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_32.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_32.S
index cd177772fe4d..2712e9155306 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_32.S
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,2b)
.endm
-ENTRY(xen_iret)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret)
/* test eflags for special cases */
testl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | XEN_EFLAGS_NMI), 8(%esp)
jnz hyper_iret
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ xen_iret_end_crit:
hyper_iret:
/* put this out of line since its very rarely used */
jmp hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_iret * 32
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret)
.globl xen_iret_start_crit, xen_iret_end_crit
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ hyper_iret:
* The only caveat is that if the outer eax hasn't been restored yet (i.e.
* it's still on stack), we need to restore its value here.
*/
-ENTRY(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
+SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
/*
* Paranoia: Make sure we're really coming from kernel space.
* One could imagine a case where userspace jumps into the
@@ -179,4 +180,4 @@ ENTRY(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
2:
ret
-END(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
+SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
index c1d8b90aa4e2..142da8547480 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
@@ -35,7 +35,11 @@ ENTRY(startup_xen)
rep __ASM_SIZE(stos)
mov %_ASM_SI, xen_start_info
- mov $init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ mov initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
+#else
+ mov initial_stack, %esp
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Set up %gs.
@@ -51,9 +55,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_xen)
wrmsr
#endif
- jmp xen_start_kernel
+ call xen_start_kernel
END(startup_xen)
__FINIT
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV_SMP
+.pushsection .text
+SYM_CODE_START(asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle)
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+
+ call cpu_bringup_and_idle
+SYM_CODE_END(asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle)
+.popsection
+#endif
#endif
.pushsection .text