diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 51 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 1476a91ce935..c2c5ab05fa7e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, size_t len, u8 mac[16]) { uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; - SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); int err; if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) @@ -181,8 +180,6 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, return -EINVAL; } - desc->tfm = tfm; - /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); @@ -196,8 +193,7 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, return err; } - err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); - shash_desc_zero(desc); + err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); if (err) { BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err); return err; @@ -508,7 +504,7 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], if (!chan || !chan->data) return false; - BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); if (err) @@ -534,7 +530,7 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) if (err < 0) return err; - BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa); return 0; } @@ -551,7 +547,7 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) smp = chan->data; if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { - BT_DBG("Using debug keys"); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); if (err) return err; @@ -730,6 +726,10 @@ static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; + if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS && + max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) + return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; + if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size || max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; @@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; u32 passkey = 0; - int ret = 0; + int ret; /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); @@ -883,9 +883,16 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) smp->method = JUST_WORKS; - /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ + /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for + * confirmation */ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { - set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); + ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, + hcon->type, + hcon->dst_type, + passkey, 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); return 0; } @@ -1860,7 +1867,7 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) { struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; - BT_DBG(""); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; @@ -2194,7 +2201,7 @@ mackey_and_ltk: if (err) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; - if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) { + if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { if (hcon->out) { sc_dhkey_check(smp); SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); @@ -2209,6 +2216,9 @@ mackey_and_ltk: confirm_hint = 0; confirm: + if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) + confirm_hint = 1; + err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint); if (err) @@ -2385,12 +2395,17 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2; } - /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level - * requires it. + /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs + * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C */ - if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || - hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) - authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; + if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) { + /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level + * requires it. + */ + if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || + hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) + authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; + } if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |