| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517145323.1522010-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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In an effort to annotate all flexible array members with their run-time
size information, the "element_count" attribute is being introduced by
Clang[1] and GCC[2] in future releases. This annotation will provide
the CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE features the ability
to perform run-time bounds checking on otherwise unknown-size flexible
arrays.
Even though the attribute is under development, we can start the
annotation process in the kernel. This requires defining a macro for
it, even if we have to change the name of the actual attribute later.
Since it is likely that this attribute may change its name to "counted_by"
in the future (to better align with a future total bytes "sized_by"
attribute), name the wrapper macro "__counted_by", which also reads more
clearly (and concisely) in structure definitions.
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D148381
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=108896
Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: Qing Zhao <qing.zhao@oracle.com>
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517190841.gonna.796-kees@kernel.org
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Commit df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") introduced a warning
for the autofs_dev_ioctl structure:
In function 'check_name',
inlined from 'validate_dev_ioctl' at fs/autofs/dev-ioctl.c:131:9,
inlined from '_autofs_dev_ioctl' at fs/autofs/dev-ioctl.c:624:8:
fs/autofs/dev-ioctl.c:33:14: error: 'strchr' reading 1 or more bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
33 | if (!strchr(name, '/'))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/linux/auto_dev-ioctl.h:10,
from fs/autofs/autofs_i.h:10,
from fs/autofs/dev-ioctl.c:14:
include/uapi/linux/auto_dev-ioctl.h: In function '_autofs_dev_ioctl':
include/uapi/linux/auto_dev-ioctl.h:112:14: note: source object 'path' of size 0
112 | char path[0];
| ^~~~
This is easily fixed by changing the gnu 0-length array into a c99
flexible array. Since this is a uapi structure, we have to be careful
about possible regressions but this one should be fine as they are
equivalent here. While it would break building with ancient gcc versions
that predate c99, it helps building with --std=c99 and -Wpedantic builds
in user space, as well as non-gnu compilers. This means we probably
also want it fixed in stable kernels.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230523081944.581710-1-arnd@kernel.org
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The testing for ARRAY_BOUNDS just wants an uninstrumented array,
and the proper flexible array definition is fine for that.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated.
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely, replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230509014136.2095900-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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Replace old-style 1-element array of "dev" in struct stripe_head with
modern C99 flexible array. In the future, we can additionally annotate
it with the run-time size, found in the "disks" member.
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230522212114.gonna.589-kees@kernel.org/
---
It looks like this memory calculation:
memory = conf->min_nr_stripes * (sizeof(struct stripe_head) +
max_disks * ((sizeof(struct bio) + PAGE_SIZE))) / 1024;
... was already buggy (i.e. it included the single "dev" bytes in the
result). However, I'm not entirely sure if that is the right analysis,
since "dev" is not related to struct bio nor PAGE_SIZE?
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While struct_size() is normally used in situations where the structure
type already has a pointer instance, there are places where no variable
is available. In the past, this has been worked around by using a typed
NULL first argument, but this is a bit ugly. Add a helper to do this,
and replace the handful of instances of the code pattern with it.
Instances were found with this Coccinelle script:
@struct_size_t@
identifier STRUCT, MEMBER;
expression COUNT;
@@
- struct_size((struct STRUCT *)\(0\|NULL\),
+ struct_size_t(struct STRUCT,
MEMBER, COUNT)
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Cc: HighPoint Linux Team <linux@highpoint-tech.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com>
Cc: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Cc: Shivasharan S <shivasharan.srikanteshwara@broadcom.com>
Cc: Don Brace <don.brace@microchip.com>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Cc: Guo Xuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: megaraidlinux.pdl@broadcom.com
Cc: storagedev@microchip.com
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522211810.never.421-kees@kernel.org
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522155245.2336818-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522155032.2336283-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement with strlcpy is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516143956.1367827-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517142955.1519572-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517143049.1519806-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517143130.1519941-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517143509.1520387-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517143409.1520298-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230510211146.3486600-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
Check for strscpy()'s return value of -E2BIG on truncate for safe
replacement with strlcpy().
This is part of a tree-wide cleanup to remove the strlcpy() function
entirely from the kernel [2].
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512155749.1356958-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230510221237.3509484-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com
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The -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 option is now available with the release
of GCC 13[1] and Clang 16[2]. This feature instructs the compiler to
treat only C99 flexible arrays as dynamically sized for the purposes of
object size calculations. In other words, the ancient practice of using
1-element arrays, or the GNU extension of using 0-sized arrays, as a
dynamically sized array is disabled. This allows CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS,
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, and other object-size aware features to behave
unambiguously in the face of trailing arrays: only C99 flexible arrays
are considered to be dynamically sized. For yet more detail, see:
https://people.kernel.org/kees/bounded-flexible-arrays-in-c
Enabling this will help track down any outstanding cases of fake
flexible arrays that need attention in kernel code.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/C-Dialect-Options.html#index-fstrict-flex-arrays
[2] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.html#cmdoption-clang-fstrict-flex-arrays
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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-fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error has been supported since GCC 5.1 and
Clang 3.2. The minimum supported version of these according to
Documentation/process/changes.rst is 5.1 and 11.0.0 respectively. Drop
this cc-option check.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407215406.768464-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
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Move the definition of fortified strcat() to after strlcat() to use it
for bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The definition of strcat() was defined in terms of unfortified strlcat(),
but that meant there was no bounds checking done on the internal strlen()
calls, and the (bounded) copy would be performed before reporting a
failure. Additionally, pathological cases (i.e. unterminated destination
buffer) did not make calls to fortify_panic(), which will make future unit
testing more difficult. Instead, explicitly define a fortified strlcat()
wrapper for strcat() to use.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The sizes reported by __member_size should never change in a given
function. Mark them as such.
Suggested-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407192717.636137-4-keescook@chromium.org
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Add tests to make sure the strcat() family of functions behave
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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In order for CI systems to notice all the skipped tests related to
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, allow the FORTIFY_SOURCE KUnit tests to build
with or without CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Since commit ba38961a069b ("um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE"), it's possible
to run the FORTIFY tests under UML. Enable CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE when
running with --alltests to gain additional coverage, and by default under
UML.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Fix typo in the strscpy() docstring where q and p were flipped.
Signed-off-by: Arne Welzel <arne.welzel@corelight.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The use of -fsanitize=bounds on GCC will ignore some trailing arrays,
leaving a gap in coverage. Switch to using -fsanitize=bounds-strict to
match Clang's stricter behavior.
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405022356.gonna.338-kees@kernel.org
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Pull compute express link fixes from Dan Williams:
- Fix a compilation issue with DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() in the unit tests
- Fix leaking kernel memory to a root-only sysfs attribute
* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.4-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
cxl: Add missing return to cdat read error path
tools/testing/cxl: Use DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU()
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Pull parisc architecture fixes from Helge Deller:
- Fix encoding of swp_entry due to added SWP_EXCLUSIVE flag
- Include reboot.h to avoid gcc-12 compiler warning
* tag 'parisc-for-6.4-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
parisc: Fix encoding of swp_entry due to added SWP_EXCLUSIVE flag
parisc: kexec: include reboot.h
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Pull ARM fixes from Russell King:
- fix unwinder for uleb128 case
- fix kernel-doc warnings for HP Jornada 7xx
- fix unbalanced stack on vfp success path
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
ARM: 9297/1: vfp: avoid unbalanced stack on 'success' return path
ARM: 9296/1: HP Jornada 7XX: fix kernel-doc warnings
ARM: 9295/1: unwind:fix unwind abort for uleb128 case
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Pull locking fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Make sure __down_read_common() is always inlined so that the callers'
names land in traceevents output and thus the blocked function can be
identified
* tag 'locking_urgent_for_v6.4_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
locking/rwsem: Add __always_inline annotation to __down_read_common() and inlined callers
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Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Make sure the PEBS buffer is flushed before reprogramming the
hardware so that the correct record sizes are used
- Update the sample size for AMD BRS events
- Fix a confusion with using the same on-stack struct with different
events in the event processing path
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.4_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel/ds: Flush PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG
perf/x86: Fix missing sample size update on AMD BRS
perf/core: Fix perf_sample_data not properly initialized for different swevents in perf_tp_event()
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Pull scheduler fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix a couple of kernel-doc warnings
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v6.4_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched: fix cid_lock kernel-doc warnings
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Pull x86 fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the required PCI IDs so that the generic SMN accesses provided by
amd_nb.c work for drivers which switch to them. Add a PCI device ID
to k10temp's table so that latter is loaded on such systems too
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.4_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
hwmon: (k10temp) Add PCI ID for family 19, model 78h
x86/amd_nb: Add PCI ID for family 19h model 78h
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Pull timer fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent CPU state corruption when an active clockevent broadcast
device is replaced while the system is already in oneshot mode
* tag 'timers_urgent_for_v6.4_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
tick/broadcast: Make broadcast device replacement work correctly
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Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Some ext4 bug fixes (mostly to address Syzbot reports)"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: bail out of ext4_xattr_ibody_get() fails for any reason
ext4: add bounds checking in get_max_inline_xattr_value_size()
ext4: add indication of ro vs r/w mounts in the mount message
ext4: fix deadlock when converting an inline directory in nojournal mode
ext4: improve error recovery code paths in __ext4_remount()
ext4: improve error handling from ext4_dirhash()
ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting r/w until quota is re-enabled
ext4: check iomap type only if ext4_iomap_begin() does not fail
ext4: avoid a potential slab-out-of-bounds in ext4_group_desc_csum
ext4: fix data races when using cached status extents
ext4: avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback
ext4: fix invalid free tracking in ext4_xattr_move_to_block()
ext4: remove a BUG_ON in ext4_mb_release_group_pa()
ext4: allow ext4_get_group_info() to fail
ext4: fix lockdep warning when enabling MMP
ext4: fix WARNING in mb_find_extent
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Pull fbdev fixes from Helge Deller:
- use after free fix in imsttfb (Zheng Wang)
- fix error handling in arcfb (Zongjie Li)
- lots of whitespace cleanups (Thomas Zimmermann)
- add 1920x1080 modedb entry (me)
* tag 'fbdev-for-6.4-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/linux-fbdev:
fbdev: stifb: Fix info entry in sti_struct on error path
fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode
fbdev: imsttfb: Fix use after free bug in imsttfb_probe
fbdev: vfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: valkyriefb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: stifb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: sa1100fb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: platinumfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: p9100: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: maxinefb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: macfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: hpfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: hgafb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: g364fb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: controlfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: cg14: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: 68328fb: Remove trailing whitespaces
fbdev: arcfb: Fix error handling in arcfb_probe()
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Pull SCSI fix from James Bottomley:
"A single small fix for the UFS driver to fix a power management
failure"
* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix I/O hang that occurs when BKOPS fails in W-LUN suspend
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Fix the __swp_offset() and __swp_entry() macros due to commit 6d239fc78c0b
("parisc/mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE") which introduced the
SWP_EXCLUSIVE flag by reusing the _PAGE_ACCESSED flag.
Reported-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Tested-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Fixes: 6d239fc78c0b ("parisc/mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.3+
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In ext4_update_inline_data(), if ext4_xattr_ibody_get() fails for any
reason, it's best if we just fail as opposed to stumbling on,
especially if the failure is EFSCORRUPTED.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Normally the extended attributes in the inode body would have been
checked when the inode is first opened, but if someone is writing to
the block device while the file system is mounted, it's possible for
the inode table to get corrupted. Add bounds checking to avoid
reading beyond the end of allocated memory if this happens.
Reported-by: syzbot+1966db24521e5f6e23f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1966db24521e5f6e23f7
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Whether the file system is mounted read-only or read/write is more
important than the quota mode, which we are already printing. Add the
ro vs r/w indication since this can be helpful in debugging problems
from the console log.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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In no journal mode, ext4_finish_convert_inline_dir() can self-deadlock
by calling ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock() when it already has taken the
directory lock. There is a similar self-deadlock in
ext4_incvert_inline_data_nolock() for data files which we'll fix at
the same time.
A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem:
mke2fs -Fq -t ext2 -O inline_data -b 4k /dev/vdc 64
mount -t ext4 -o dirsync /dev/vdc /vdc
cd /vdc
mkdir file0
cd file0
touch file0
touch file1
attr -s BurnSpaceInEA -V abcde .
touch supercalifragilisticexpialidocious
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230507021608.1290720-1-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+91dccab7c64e2850a4e5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=ba84cc80a9491d65416bc7877e1650c87530fe8a
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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If there are failures while changing the mount options in
__ext4_remount(), we need to restore the old mount options.
This commit fixes two problem. The first is there is a chance that we
will free the old quota file names before a potential failure leading
to a use-after-free. The second problem addressed in this commit is
if there is a failed read/write to read-only transition, if the quota
has already been suspended, we need to renable quota handling.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230506142419.984260-2-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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The ext4_dirhash() will *almost* never fail, especially when the hash
tree feature was first introduced. However, with the addition of
support of encrypted, casefolded file names, that function can most
certainly fail today.
So make sure the callers of ext4_dirhash() properly check for
failures, and reflect the errors back up to their callers.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230506142419.984260-1-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+394aa8a792cb99dbc837@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+344aaa8697ebd232bfc8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=db56459ea4ac4a676ae4b4678f633e55da005a9b
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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When a file system currently mounted read/only is remounted
read/write, if we clear the SB_RDONLY flag too early, before the quota
is initialized, and there is another process/thread constantly
attempting to create a directory, it's possible to trigger the
WARN_ON_ONCE(dquot_initialize_needed(inode));
in ext4_xattr_block_set(), with the following stack trace:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5338 at fs/ext4/xattr.c:2141 ext4_xattr_block_set+0x2ef2/0x3680
RIP: 0010:ext4_xattr_block_set+0x2ef2/0x3680 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2141
Call Trace:
ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xcd4/0x15c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2458
ext4_initxattrs+0xa3/0x110 fs/ext4/xattr_security.c:44
security_inode_init_security+0x2df/0x3f0 security/security.c:1147
__ext4_new_inode+0x347e/0x43d0 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1324
ext4_mkdir+0x425/0xce0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2992
vfs_mkdir+0x29d/0x450 fs/namei.c:4038
do_mkdirat+0x264/0x520 fs/namei.c:4061
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4076 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4074 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4074
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230506142419.984260-1-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+6385d7d3065524c5ca6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=6513f6cb5cd6b5fc9f37e3bb70d273b94be9c34c
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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When ext4_iomap_overwrite_begin() calls ext4_iomap_begin() map blocks may
fail for some reason (e.g. memory allocation failure, bare disk write), and
later because "iomap->type ! = IOMAP_MAPPED" triggers WARN_ON(). When ext4
iomap_begin() returns an error, it is normal that the type of iomap->type
may not match the expectation. Therefore, we only determine if iomap->type
is as expected when ext4_iomap_begin() is executed successfully.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+08106c4b7d60702dbc14@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000015760b05f9b4eee9@google.com
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505132429.714648-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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When modifying the block device while it is mounted by the filesystem,
syzbot reported the following:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc16+0x206/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888075f5c0a8 by task syz-executor.2/15586
CPU: 1 PID: 15586 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5-syzkaller-00205-gc96618275234 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306
print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417
kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517
crc16+0x206/0x280 lib/crc16.c:58
ext4_group_desc_csum+0x81b/0xb20 fs/ext4/super.c:3187
ext4_group_desc_csum_set+0x195/0x230 fs/ext4/super.c:3210
ext4_mb_clear_bb fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6027 [inline]
ext4_free_blocks+0x191a/0x2810 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:6173
ext4_remove_blocks fs/ext4/extents.c:2527 [inline]
ext4_ext_rm_leaf fs/ext4/extents.c:2710 [inline]
ext4_ext_remove_space+0x24ef/0x46a0 fs/ext4/extents.c:2958
ext4_ext_truncate+0x177/0x220 fs/ext4/extents.c:4416
ext4_truncate+0xa6a/0xea0 fs/ext4/inode.c:4342
ext4_setattr+0x10c8/0x1930 fs/ext4/inode.c:5622
notify_change+0xe50/0x1100 fs/attr.c:482
do_truncate+0x200/0x2f0 fs/open.c:65
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3216 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3561 [inline]
path_openat+0x272b/0x2dd0 fs/namei.c:3714
do_filp_open+0x264/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:3741
do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1310
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1326 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1402 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1396 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0x11f/0x160 fs/open.c:1396
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f72f8a8c0c9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f72f97e3168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f72f8bac050 RCX: 00007f72f8a8c0c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000280
RBP: 00007f72f8ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffd165348bf R14: 00007f72f97e3300 R15: 0000000000022000
Replace
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_desc_size)
with
sbi->s_desc_size
It reduces ext4's compiled text size, and makes the code more efficient
(we remove an extra indirect reference and a potential byte
swap on big endian systems), and there is no downside. It also avoids the
potential KASAN / syzkaller failure, as a bonus.
Reported-by: syzbot+fc51227e7100c9294894@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8785e41224a3afd04321@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=70d28d11ab14bd7938f3e088365252aa923cff42
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b85721b38583ecc6b5e72ff524c67302abbc30f3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000ece18705f3b20934@google.com/
Fixes: 717d50e4971b ("Ext4: Uninitialized Block Groups")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230504121525.3275886-1-tudor.ambarus@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Azeem Shaikh
Kees Cook
Arnd Bergmann
Nick Desaulniers
Arne Welzel
Linus Torvalds
Helge Deller
Theodore Ts'o
Baokun Li
Tudor Ambarus